Eritrea Is the North Korea of Africa: America Must Act

Eritrea Is the North Korea of Africa: America Must Act

By Michael Rubin

19fortyfive.com

January 06, 2025

 

The United States Should Openly Support Regime Change in Eritrea: Africa may be the world’s second most-populous continent and a growing economic powerhouse but, for too long, the White House and State Department have treated it as an afterthought.

Often, this manifests itself in missed opportunities: Africa is the world’s second most populous continent and potentially a wealthy one. The Democratic Republic of Congo alone has $214 trillion in untapped mineral wealth. At other times, U.S. officials do not hold Africans to the same standards as they would Europeans or Asians.

Consider the case of Eritrea: Upon winning its independence in 1993, Eritrea should have thrived. Its capital Asmara is one of the world’s loveliest, a world heritage site with a moderate climate and some of the best preserved art deco architecture. Eritrea’s independence leader, Isaias Afwerki, was genuinely popular. Eritrea also had a cohesive enough history and population that its religious and ethnic diversity could be more assets than a source of instability. Its strategic position along the Red Sea imbued Eritrea with commercial potential about which landlocked African countries could only dream. Culturally, Eritreans were primed to thrive. 

Unfortunately, Isaias had other ideas. While he could have won any election initially, he chose to forego them entirely, not even undertaking a pantomime process as dictators do in Egypt or Azerbaijan. Nor do war heroes or liberation necessarily make good stewards of government. Such was the case with Isaias. He did not understand economics, nor did he care. Eritrea’s standard of living plummeted.

In effect, he followed Zimbabwean leader Robert Mugabe’s model. When Mugabe established Zimbabwe upon the ashes of Rhodesia, he inherited a state with good physical infrastructure, a stable currency, a productive agricultural sector, and a good manufacturing base. By the end of his tenure 37 years later, Zimbabwe was in total economic collapse, with its currency devalued by the second worst case of hyperinflation in history (after Hungary 1946) and its agriculture grinding to zero after race-motivated land redistribution.

Eritrea: The North Korea of Africa? 

Isaias also took a page from late Iraqi President Saddam Hussein’s playbook. To distract from his own mismanagement, Isaias launched a war against Ethiopia, sending forces into territory he disputed. That 1998-2000 border war, likened by contemporary analysts as “two bald men fighting over a comb” because of the insignificance of the land involved, killed up to 100,000. That war devastated Eritrea and sent Isaias into a spiral of tightening authoritarianism. Isaias also implemented a system of indefinite national service, essentially reducing Eritrea’s youth to slavery. In 2024, Freedom House ranked Eritrea alongside North Korea in its “freedom in the world” rankings; North Korea even scored marginally higher in civil liberty measurements.

Rather than subject themselves to manual labor to benefit Isaias only rather than build a state, many chose instead to flee, risking their lives to flee across the desert and Mediterranean Sea to Europe and perhaps onward to the United States. For Isaias, this is a win-win situation, for those who make it to the West send remittances home to keep his economy afloat. Eritrean embassies tax the Eritrean diaspora, even those who have renounced their citizenship.

For most countries, embassies are mechanisms with which to conduct diplomacy. Ambassadors and more junior diplomats engage with counterparts and host government officials, and sponsor cultural events to advance their country’s interests. Both North Korea and Eritrea, however, treat embassies as criminal enterprises. North Korean diplomats seldom mix, but instead use their status to engage in everything from narcotics to trade in endangered species. Eritrea uses its posts to extort the diaspora under threat of harm coming to their relatives back in Eritrea, illicit surveillance, and fundraising under false pretenses, 

On November 26, 2024, Yohannes Teklemicael, Eritrea’s ambassador to South Sudan gave an interview that highlighted many of his activities. While the Eritrean embassy removed the video within 12 hours, the Eritrean opposition was able to preserve it.

He described how Eritrea operates on four fronts: three within Eritrea and the fourth among the diaspora. The ambassador admitted that the primary job of Eritrean embassies is to “administer this fourth front.” When Eritreans need any item from the embassy, they must sign a “regret form” to acknowledge they fled Eritrea illegally, pay the two percent tax retroactively, and join an embassy-mandated association: All Eritreans under 40 must join Isaias’ People’s Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ) Youth Association, the corollary Women’s Association, or the Mahberekom Association that organizes the remaining men. In addition to the two percent tax, each of these associations requires membership dues that it transfers to the PFDJ-controlled Himbol Bank in Eritrea. The embassy also operates a school to continue the indoctrination of local students.

Eritrea is increasingly a problem not only for its neighbors and the United States, but also for the broader region. Isaias has long been arrogant. While Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed won a peace prize for burying the hatchet with Eritrea, Isaias sees their partnership not as one between equals but rather between mentor and student. Indeed, in his interview, Teklemicael described Abiy as “childish” and predicted his imminent loss of power. 

Isaias continues to hold Djiboutians that Eritrean forces kidnapped from within Djibouti itself, but also arms two separate Sudanese tribes to involves himself in what is the world’s bloodiest ongoing conflict. Previously, Isaias trafficked in Somali army recruits to use as cannon fodder for his own adventurism in Ethiopia, much as Russian President Vladimir Putin uses involuntary North Korean units. By any definition, Eritrea is a state-sponsor of terrorism.

Don’t Ignore Eritrea 

The incoming Trump administration may choose to ignore Eritrea, but this would be a mistake given the instability it can catalyze and terrorism is sponsors, as well as the financial impropriety in which Eritrean officials engage in the United States.

While Congress is polarized, Democrats and Republicans both from the “Squad” to the MAGA fringe should have common interest in countering a regime that runs roughshod over U.S. law and is alongside North Korea, the world’s greatest violator of human rights. In 1998, Congress united to pass the Iraq Liberation Act which, among other facets, authorized the United States to work with, fund, and otherwise empower opposition groups. While U.S. forces have no business in Eritrea nor would their deployment be wise, Congress might authorize funding to build the capacity of the Blue Revolution movement among other groups.

Eritrean diplomats including those at the United Nations are already subject to the Foreign Missions Travel Control Program that limits them to a 25-mile radius of their embassy or mission. The Justice Department should crackdown on Eritreans who act as unregistered foreign agents, however. The Asmara regime may not care if the U.S. expels such agents; as they can always compel others from within the Eritrean community. Instead, it will be essential to prosecute, fine, and jail those who violate U.S. law.

The U.S. Department of the Treasury should also tighten sanctions on Eritrean banks, financial institutions, and money transfer agencies such as Himbol. That an Eritrean ambassador identified Himbol’s operation is significant; that the Eritrean government scrambled to erase that video highlights its sensitivity to the regime.

The State Department should make clear to the United Arab Emirates that it should cease its partnership with Africa’s most destabilizing state, one which is increasingly a partner for China. It might also convene, perhaps in conjunction with the National Endowment for Democracy, a “Future of Eritrea” project to identify and assess the areas of greatest need upon Isaias’ exit.

It is also essential to sanction Isaias, his family members, and key confidants among his military and intelligence service. As Isaias nears the end of his life—he is 78-year-old, has suffered a stroke, and is generally in ill-health—it is time the United States plan for transition. Eritrea is less a state than a criminal enterprise. Eritreans deserve better. The money Isaias and his cronies have stolen and sent abroad should be identified, seized, and placed in a fund that a provisional Eritrean government can utilize and apply to the country’s reconstruction.

It is easy for U.S. officials to say Eritreans deserve better. Rhetoric is cheap and business as usual only preserves the status quo, however. President Donald Trump need not engage actively in Africa. Still, he should empower his incoming National Security Council and assistant secretary of State for African Affairs to do so to help Eritreans rid the world of one of its worst regimes. 

Michael Rubin 

Senior Fellow

Latest Work

Trump Can't Bully the Entire World

ARGUMENT

An expert's point of view on a current event.

Trump Can't Bully the Entire World

Loudly making threats doesn't amount to a foreign policy.

By Stephen M. Walt, a columnist at Foreign Policy and the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University.

In books and movies, predicting what will happen to a bully is easy. They will torment the hero for a while, but eventually, someone will stand up to them, expose their weaknesses, and deliver their comeuppance. You've seen it repeatedly: Harry Potter humiliates Draco Malfoy and defeats Voldemort; Marty McFly bests Biff not once but thrice; Cinderella gets the handsome Prince Charming and her mean stepsisters get nothing; Tom Brown triumphs over Flashman, Elizabeth Bennet defies Lady Catherine de Bourgh and wins Mr. Darcy's love.    

Bourgh and wins Mr. Darcy's love. This

the familiar plotline is comforting

a reminder that good eventually

triumphs over evil.

The problem is, alas, that real life isn't a

book or a Hollywood movie. Indeed,

2024 has been a damn good year for

bullies. Russian President Vladimir

Putin is winning in Ukraine, albeit at a

frightful cost. Hungarian Prime

Minister Viktor Orban's illiberal brand

of populism is on a roll in Europe

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin

Netanyahu is still in power in Israel,

despite exposing his country to

Hamas's attack in October 2023,

 

The problem is that real life isn't a book or a Hollywood movie. Indeed, 2024 has been a damn good year for bullies. Russian President Vladimir Putin is winning in Ukraine, albeit at a frightful cost. Hungarian Prime

Minister Viktor Orban's illiberal brand of populism is on a roll in Europe. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is still in power in Israel, despite exposing his country to Hamas's attack in October 2023, presiding over a genocidal campaign

that has taken tens of thousands of

innocent Palestinian lives, and an arrest warrant from the International

riming

warrant from the International

Criminal Court. And U.S. President-elect Donald Trump is returning to the White House with the world's richest bully-Elon Musk-at his side (for now).

 

Trump, Musk, and their minions appear to be convinced that they can bully the entire world. He hasn't even been sworn in, and he's already threatening foreign countries with tariffs and other sanctions if they don't give him whatever he demands. He's threatening to sue newspapers criticising him and punish corporate leaders who don't fall in line. Trump's nominee to head the FBI and some Republican lawmakers seem eager to go after his political opponents. This approach goes well beyond quid-pro-quo

transactional; it's a blatant attempt to blackmail, bully, and cow others into 

They made preemptive concessions based on their fear of what Trump might do to hurt them.

It's not surprising that Trump thinks this approach will work. The Republican Party to which I once belonged has been exposed as a sorry collection of unprincipled opportunists with the collective backbone of a bowl of Jello. Wealthy corporate leaders are tripping over themselves to curry favour with Trump, once-distinguished news organisations like ABC and the Los Angeles Times are running up white flags, and spineless pundits with their fingers in the wind are pivoting to

 

They made preemptive concessions based on their fear of what Trump might do to hurt them.

It's not surprising that Trump thinks this approach will work. The Republican Party to which I once belonged has been exposed as a sorry collection of unprincipled opportunists with the collective backbone of a bowl of Jello. Wealthy corporate leaders are tripping over themselves to curry favour with Trump, once-distinguished news organisations like ABC and the Los Angeles Times are running up white flags, and spineless pundits with their fingers in the wind are pivoting to

The stars in the global firmament seem to be lining up behind them, too. Europe is economically stagnant and politically divided. The Trudeau government in Canada is on life

support. Russia is overstretched.

China's economy is flirting with

deflation and more vulnerable to pressure. The Axis of Resistance in the Middle East is in disarray, with the ouster of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad as merely the latest blow to its efforts to challenge U.S.-Israeli dominance. Not surprisingly, the incoming U.S. administration thinks

that now's the time for the United

States to impose maximum pressure on

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 TRUMP administration thinks that now's the time for the United States to impose maximum pressure on anyone and everyone who isn't willing to give Trump what he wants. And, at first glance, this approach seems to be working: Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau has already made the trek to Mar-a-Lago; NATO members are now talking about a 3 per cent of GDP target for defence spending; and Iran's president keeps saying he wants lower tensions with the outside world. The United States, by implication,

Trump seems to be on a roll.

Is the United States now poised to remake world politics in accordance with Trump or Musk's whims? Are we witnessing a return to the unipolar moment, minus the naive liberal idealism that got the United States into trouble the first time around? Can Trump bully the whole world?

I doubt it.

One reason I'm sceptical is that I've seen this movie before. Back in the 1990s, politicians and pundits in the United States assumed that history was running the United States' way and that country after country would bow before

the awesome might of U.S. power and the irresistible appeal of liberal democratic capitalism. The only holdouts would be a handful of "rogue states," whose leaders hadn't got the memo, and they would be contained and eventually compelled to go along. If that didn't work, there was always the option of regime change. Things didn't quite go as the optimists predicted, however, which is one of the reasons we ended up with someone like Trump in the first place.

Second, unchecked power makes others nervous, and overt bullying makes

people angry and resentful.  

Second, unchecked power makes otners nervous, and overt bullying makes people angry and resentful. The typical reaction is to balance against U.S. pressure, either overtly (as Russia, China, and Iran have done) or by "soft balancing,” as U.S. allies did during the last unipolar moment. Leaders who bend their knees repeatedly will face domestic pressures to resist, especially if acceding to Trump's demands imposes heavy costs on their public.

This problem is exacerbated by Trump's purely transactional approach to

politics. The United States has frequently used its superior power to pressure allies to do what it wanted. Still, it did so while emphasising a set of shared values and insisting that the country was acting not only in its self-interest but also in the interest of a broader community of primarily like-minded countries. The mailed fist was there, but so was the velvet glove. U.S. willingness to operate within a set of multilateral institutions that placed certain limits on its power made its position of primacy less threatening and its leadership more acceptable to others. Trump doesn't care about these things and even longtime U.S.

Partners will be wary of complying, too

 

Partners will be wary of complying too readily and thereby inviting new demands.

Moreover, although issuing bombastic threats doesn't cost Trump anything in the short term, carrying them out would. Because the United States is bigger and stronger than everyone else, imposing tariffs or other sanctions may hurt others more than it hurts the United States. However, imposing tariffs or other coercive measures is not cost-free, especially when dealing with larger countries such as China or states on which U.S. industry depends for key inputs or goods. And even far weaker.

Inputs or goods. And even far weaker states are sometimes willing to pay a large price when their vital interests are at stake, as Serbia did over Kosovo and as Iran has done for decades. There are limits, in short, to how much Trump can demand of anyone.

Fourth, a bully like Trump wants to deal

with his targets one-on-one because

Fourth, a bully like Trump wants to deal with his targets one-on-one because that maximises his leverage. He won't want to deal directly with the European Union (which he once described as one of the United States "foes"); he'd prefer to deal directly with separate European countries and strike deals with each of them independently. But that approach is inefficient and time-consuming, and I guess many of these new deals won't get done.

Fifth, states facing a bully have many ways to pretend to go along without complying. As we are already seeing, some astute foreign leaders will

Fifth, states facing a bully have lots of

ways to pretend to go along without

complying. As we are already

seeing some astute foreign leaders will

flatter Trump's ego and say they are

willing to discuss whatever's on his

mind, while offering only minor or

purely symbolic concessions. Canada

has said it's perfectly willing to tighten

the border and control shipments of

fentanyl precursors to the United

States, but this is a meaningless pledge

because Canada is not a significant source of

illegal immigrants or precursor

chemicals. Other countries will adopt a

a similar approach: telling Trump they

States, out thumpi

because Canada is not a significant source of illegal Comeuppance precursor chemicals. Other countries will adopt a similar approach: telling Trump they will do what he wants and then dragging their feet, as China did successfully during his first term. This is another way that a purely transactional and mostly bilateral approach breaks down: When dealing with the whole world one-on-one, monitoring who delivers on their promises and who is shirking becomes an onerous task.

   

Sixth, remember that Trump cares more about appearances than he does. About actual accomplishments. He thinks those reality-show summit meetings with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un were a great success: The entire world was watching, and the ratings were boffo. However, nothing came of all the hoopla, and it was Kim, not Trump, who was the big winner. He got the prestige and legitimacy that accrues from a direct meeting with a U.S. president, and Trump left empty-handed.

Nor is the United States all-powerful. The bond market has a mind of its own

Nor is the United States all-powerful. For example, the bond market has a mind of its own, and Trump may discover just how powerful it can be if the U.S. deficit explodes or inflation comes back significantly. Trump's grip on domestic politics is anything but firm: The GOP's margins in the House and Senate are razor-thin, and his election was nowhere near the landslide he claims it was. A few stumbles and every member of Congress who is up for

reelection in 2026 will start looking for ways to distance themselves. The willingness of several dozen

Republicans to defy Trump over the

Republicans to defy Trump over the recent government funding bill is another sign of the constraints he will face. And all the bluster and social media hype in the world can't change the laws of physics, chemistry, and biology: The environment pays no attention to whatever Trump spouts on Truth Social, and viruses will keep evolving no matter what his nominee

for secretary of the Department for Health and Human Services, Robert F. Kennedy Jr., believes, or what the

talking heads on Fox News say.

Finally, every U.S. president faces some nasty surprises-problems or crises that

 

Finally, every U.S. president faces nasty surprises-problems or crises they didn't expect or plan for. For George W. Bush, it was Sept. 11; for Barack Obama, it was the Arab Spring and the Russian seizure of Crimea; for Joe Biden, it was Russia's invasion of Ukraine and the carnage in Gaza, Lebanon, and the West Bank. In

Trump's first term was the COVID-19 pandemic, and his mishandling of that unexpected crisis is one of the main

 

Trump's first term was the COVID-19 pandemic, and his mishandling of that unexpected crisis is one of the main reasons he lost the 2020 election. Having assembled a clown show of an administration with incompetent oddballs in some key areas, Trump 2.0 may be ill-prepared for whatever unexpected problem lands on the Resolute Desk.

To be clear, I'm not saying Trump can't brandish the big stick and get some countries to give him some of what he wants. If you threaten enough people, a few of your targets will undoubtedly

comply. He'll take full credit whenever

few of your targets will undoubtedly comply. He'll take full credit whenever this happens (even if the benefits are modest) and hope everyone overlooks the threats that backfired or fizzled. Given his proven ability to convince people of many things that aren't true and our news media's equally well-proven inability to hold him accountable, this approach may even convince Americans he's doing a great job. But what it won't do is produce a steady series of genuine foreign-policy accomplishments. It might even lead to the 

comeuppance that novelists and

scriptwriters adore. That's a movie I'd

Comeuppance that novelists and scriptwriters adore. That's a movie I'd like to watch.

 

Stephen M. Walt is a columnist at Foreign Policy and the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University.

Bluesky: @stephenwalt.bsky.social X: @stephenwalt

   

The Great Crack-Up: Analyzing the Evolution of Western Political Dynamics

The Great Crack-Up: Analyzing the Evolution of Western Political Dynamics.

Recent developments within Canadian politics, epitomised by Justin Trudeau's resignation, indicate a more significant trend rather than isolated incidents. These events reflect a substantial disintegration of the long-standing consensus that has characterised Western political discourse for several decades. This consensus, which has traditionally upheld immigration as an unequivocal benefit and viewed multiculturalism as the paramount objective, is increasingly being repudiated across various Western nations.

Central to this transformation is mounting dissatisfaction with progressive social ideologies and the marginalisation of dissenting perspectives. The categorisation of opposing viewpoints as "disinformation," coupled with heightened online censorship, has fostered an atmosphere of enforced conformity. However, this strategy has proven counterproductive, as individuals and communities are beginning to resist the imposition of progressive principles assertively.

The emergence of leaders such as Donald Trump, Giorgia Meloni, and Nigel Farage exemplifies this intensifying backlash. These figures have effectively harnessed the frustrations of working-class demographics who feel overlooked by the progressive elite. In Italy, Meloni now heads one of the most stable administrations in Western Europe. At the same time, in the United Kingdom, Labour leader Keir Starmer has garnered voter support by addressing immigration concerns.

The ramifications of the previously dominant consensus are also evident in Germany, where Chancellor Angela Merkel's decision to welcome over a million asylum-seekers in 2015 has catalysed a notable shift toward right-wing politics. The far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) party is now positioned to become the second-largest faction in the Bundestag.

The fragmentation of the old consensus transcends mere political realignment; it underscores a broader inability to adequately address critical issues such as Islamic fundamentalism, the societal repercussions of mass immigration, escalating crime rates, and stagnant economic conditions.

Trudeau's efforts to amend his immigration policies have proven to be belated, positioning him as a notable casualty of this evolving landscape.

As Western nations continue to confront these challenges, it is evident that the previously established consensus is no longer sustainable. The pressing inquiry now pertains to the nature of the forthcoming paradigm. Will it usher in a new phase of pragmatic governance that reconciles diverse values and interests, or will it lead to an ongoing descent into polarisation and division? Only time will provide clarity on this matter.

The New Maximum Pressure: Outlines of the New US Policy Toward Iran in Trump’s Second Term. Iran Studies Unit|20 Dec 2024

Key Takeaways

• American President-elect Donald Trump has chosen hardline Republicans to hold key positions in his administration. This has dashed any optimism in Iran, sparking renewed concerns about the desire of the new American administration to reinstate the maximum pressure campaign against Tehran, potentially pushing it toward bankruptcy.
• The Trump administration is likely to focus on alienating Iran from its Russian and Chinese allies. This strategy could involve reaching a settlement in Ukraine to diminish Moscow’s support for Iran, disrupting the flow of Iranian oil to China and denying Beijing access to cheap Iranian oil.
• The scenario of pushing the Iranian regime toward bankruptcy is likely to force Tehran to look for ways to thwart it. Likely responses include applying pressure on Washington’s regional allies and pursuing strategies to enhance deterrence – most notably, accelerating efforts to acquire a nuclear bomb.

---

 

US President-elect Donald Trump has preoccupied Iranian circles for over a year prior to his election victory. This preoccupation extends beyond Iranian think tanks analyses, influencing official positions and producing tangible effects. Iran now anticipates the return of the maximum pressure campaign – this time with more coordination within the new American administration and between Washington and its European allies.

 

The Significance of the Return of ‘Hardline Conservatives’

 

Iran was one of the most interested parties globally in the outcome of the US presidential election. Iranian markets reacted sensitively to fluctuations in Trump’s odds at returning to the White House. Some analysis centers have suggested that the Iranian Supreme Leader’s endorsement of a reformist candidate in Iran’s mid-2024 presidential election was a calculated move to prepare for Trump’s anticipated presidency.

 

While some observers have downplayed the challenge posed by Trump’s return, citing his alleged desire to reach an understanding with Tehran and revive the nuclear deal, his appointments of hardline Republicans to key positions have erased any optimism. These selections have reignited concerns in Tehran about a renewed maximum pressure campaign designed to push Iran toward bankruptcy. 

 

Iranians closely followed the US election, anticipating its outcome and the implications of a potential Trump return to power (AFP).

 

Iranian circles have described Marco Rubio, Trump’s nominee for secretary of state, as Iran’s nightmare. Rubio has been sharply critical of the Biden administration’s efforts to revive the nuclear deal, arguing that the Democrat’s leniency in enforcing sanctions bolstered Iran’s regional influence. Tehran’s fears deepened further when Trump selected Pete Hegseth as his defense secretary. Hegseth has previously advocated for Washington to permit Tel Aviv to take decisive action to destroy Iran’s nuclear program, a position echoed by the president-elect in the broader context of the Iranian-Israeli confrontation.

 

Iranian concerns have continued to mount with Trump’s nomination of Mike Waltz as national security advisor and John Ratcliffe as director of the Central Intelligence Agency. Both individuals are well-known for their hawkish stances on Iran.

 

The alignment within the new American administration on adopting a hardline approach toward Iran is only part of Tehran’s anxiety. The other significant concern stems from a noticeable shift in Europe’s position compared to Trump’s first term. While Europe previously supported Tehran and actively worked to disrupt Trump’s plans as much as possible, European nations now appear more inclined to collaborate with Washington in exerting pressure on Iran.

 

Iran Preparing for the Coming Storm

 

Iran has responded swiftly to the shifting political landscape in Washington, signaling its willingness to return to negotiations. Iranian markets have also reacted to Trump’s return to power, reflecting growing economic uncertainties. In addition, Iranian analysis centers have highlighted the potential for a significant public budget deficit due to a projected decline in oil exports for next year. Abdolnaser Hemmati, the minister of economic and financial affairs in President Masoud Pezeshkian government, has acknowledged that achieving high growth rates and reducing unemployment to less than 30% are not likely next year. This statement has extinguished the optimism that accompanied the start of Pezeshkian’s presidency.

 

Complicating matters further, recent developments in the EU suggest an increasingly hardline stance toward Iran. Data related to the nuclear issue and the growing political rifts following the October 7 war indicate a hardline European stance in the next phase, particularly as European parties appear poised to intensify the nuclear confrontation. It is also likely that they may consider additional measures against Tehran, such as designating the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a terrorist organization.

 

Key Determinants of Iranian-American Confrontation in Trump’s Era

 

The nuclear question is one of the most critical items on the agenda for American President-elect Donald Trump. This was underscored by current President Joe Biden during his White House meeting with Trump. The Iranian issue holds such prominence because it intersects with several trajectories that occupy the attention of American decision-makers. It also influences Washington’s status in the broader international competition, particularly with China emerging as a key strategic challenge. These trajectories can be summarized as follows:

 

1. The Nuclear Track: The nuclear issue remains the central pillar of the  American-Iranian confrontation, as it has defined their dynamic for over a decade and culminated in the 2015 nuclear deal. Tehran continues to view this track as the primary avenue for engaging with Washington, shaping the Pezeshkian government’s foreign policy priorities. Pezeshkian’s appointment of a diplomatic team led by Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi reflects this approach, with its roots in the earlier negotiations involving the P5+1 and the European Troika under Mohammad Javad Zarif. The inclusion of Zarif in this government, despite opposition by extremists, highlights Tehran’s intent to keep diplomacy central to its strategy.

 

Pezeshkian also signaled Iran’s willingness to engage  when he attended the UN General Assembly meetings in New York in September. While Trumps has hinted at a desire to resolve the nuclear issue and bridge the gap with Tehran, the path forward is fraught with complexity because the situation at the present is completely different. Unlike in 2015, Iran now possesses hundreds of kilograms of uranium enriched up to 60%. Iran also has the capability to produce uranium metal and hundreds of advanced centrifuges, bringing Tehran closer to achieving nuclear weapon capability. Additionally, Iran has also enacted laws that prohibit relinquishing its nuclear accomplishments, further complicating negotiations. Data shows that sovereign decision-making centers in Iran do not agree on giving up these nuclear achievements nor on engaging in negotiations that include issues other than the nuclear one. This evolving landscape has led to a clear change in the global discourse, asserting the need to activate the snapback mechanism included in the nuclear deal and reimpose international sanctions canceled after reaching the 2015 deal.

 

US and European pressure on the IRGC is expected to increase under a second Trump administration (AFP).

 

2. The Comprehensive Agreement Track: The incoming Republican administration does not intend to simply revive the nuclear deal but aims to push Iran into talks that lead to a broader, more encompassing agreement. Washington and its allies are determined to avoid repeating the Obama administration’s perceived shortcomings, where limitations were imposed on Iran’s nuclear program while other contentious issues were left unaddressed.

 

From Tehran’s perspective, the nuclear deal is a potential gateway to mending relations with the international community, escaping isolation and improving ties with Washington. However, for the US and its partners this gateway is a strategic means to compel Tehran into a comprehensive deal that restrains its regional ambitions and curtails its influence.

All of this means that the new American administration needs an effective strategy to force Tehran and push it toward comprehensive negotiations. In this context comes the widespread talk these days about going back to the maximum pressure campaign, designed to force Iran to choose between economic collapse and returning to the negotiating table. Such a campaign aims to exhaust Iran’s resources and leverage its economic vulnerabilities to secure a broader deal.

 

3. The Regional Track

 

Iran's regional activities have long been a source of contention between Tehran, on the one hand, and Washington and its regional allies, on the other. Many of these allies opposed the 2015 nuclear deal for failing to address these activities. The importance of this track has gained additional importance over the past year, particularly following the escalating confrontation between Iran and Israel following October 7, 2023.

 

Iran has consistently refused to negotiate its regional policies or include them in any comprehensive dialogue involving multiple stakeholders. At one end of the table is Iran, which views regional expansion as both an ideological imperative – to support the Shiite presence in the region – and a strategic necessity for ensuring depth in its confrontation with the United States and regional rivals. This expansion is also central to Iran’s existential struggle against Israel.

 

At the other end is Israel, which sees Iran – along with its militia proxies that openly call for Israel's destruction, its advanced missile arsenals and drone capabilities – as an urgeeeeent and existential threat requiring immediate action. Other regional actors also have a seat at the table, aiming to counter Iran’s hegemonic ambitions and respond to the periodic threats Tehran poses to their security.

 

The United States finds itself squarely at the table, compelled to address the Iranian dilemma that deeply concerns its regional partners and its strategic ally, Israel. The experience of the 2015 nuclear deal demonstrated that neglecting the regional dimension – which encompasses Iran's missile program and militia network – results in incomplete solutions. These truncated approaches have fueled frustration among US allies, prompting them to seek support from other global powers, as evidenced by the recent Gulf-Chinese rapprochement. In this context, a Trump-led United States is likely to pursue a strategy aimed at pressuring Iran into making concessions. This strategy could involve several steps, including:

 

• Reinstating a maximum pressure campaign to force the Iranian regime to the negotiating table as a matter of survival. The goal would be to leave Tehran with a stark choice: face economic collapse or relinquish critical assets, including its missile arsenal and militia network.
• Conducting a coordinated field campaign alongside the maximum pressure initiative to dismantle the network of militias through which Iran exerts regional dominance. This could include measures to neutralize Iran's missile capabilities by deploying advanced missile defence systems across the region and fostering military alliances aimed at bolstering a unified regional stance against Iran’s missile and drone programs. As part of this broader strategy, it is likely that the United States would grant Israel more freedom of action to address the Iranian threat directly, including launching intensified operations to degrade Iran’s regional influence and even its nuclear capabilities.

 

4. The International Track:

The United States’ confrontation with Iran is not solely to placate its regional allies but is deeply rooted in broader strategic challenges. Chief among these is the concern over diminishing US influence in the Middle East amid efforts by the Eastern bloc – led by China – to establish a foothold in the region.

 

From a US strategic perspective, Iran's growing alignment with the Eastern bloc is alarming due to its potential role as a stepping stone for future Chinese dominance – considered the primary long-term threat. For over a decade, Iran has actively pursued integration into the Eastern bloc under its "Look East" strategy, heavily promoted by its deep state. As a result, Iran is now on the verge of finalizing two strategic partnership agreements with Beijing and Moscow. Additionally, Tehran has secured membership in significant organizations, including the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, BRICS and the Eurasian Economic Union.

 

Despite US sanctions, Iran has emerged as China's largest oil supplier, with Iranian oil exports to China reportedly reaching approximately two million barrels per day. Moreover, Iran's involvement in the Russian-Ukrainian war through the provision of drones, ballistic missiles and logistical support has further strengthened its ties with Moscow. In return, Tehran has received advanced military technology, including hypersonic missile assistance and satellite launch capabilities. It is now on the cusp of acquiring Russian Su-35 fighter jets, bolstering its military capabilities within this Eastern alliance framework.

 

This dynamic does not alarm the United States in terms of immediate ground-level developments but raises significant concerns at the strategic level. Tehran is increasingly viewed as a pivotal player in the broader context of the Eastern bloc's efforts to strengthen its regional foothold and challenge the Middle East's traditional alignment with exclusive American influence. US, Western and regional pressures have prompted Tehran to deepen its alignment with the Eastern bloc, seeking refuge in its support to withstand sanctions and international isolation. The Trump administration is likely to attempt to sever Tehran's ties with its Russian and Chinese allies. This could involve pursuing a settlement on Ukraine that curtails Moscow's influence over Iran, restricting the flow of Iranian oil to China and denying Beijing access to cheap Iranian energy supplies.

 

Iran is likely to seek further integration with the Eastern bloc, seeking to mitigate sanctions and counter isolation attempts (Shutterstock).

 

Possible Scenarios

 

1. Return to ‘Maximum Pressure’

A Trump-led US administration would likely intensify its pressure campaign, targeting multiple fronts to ensure the strict enforcement of sanctions. Key priorities would include halting Iranian oil exports to China. This time, European nations are expected to align with Washington's approach. The European E3 group – France, Germany and the United Kingdom – might activate the snapback mechanism under the 2015 nuclear deal to reinstate international sanctions, while the EU may consider designating the Revolutionary Guard as a terrorist organization.

In addition, Washington might grant Israel significant leeway to counter Iran's regional influence through targeted actions. Simultaneously, the US could spearhead efforts to establish regional defence systems aimed at neutralizing Iran's missile capabilities, fostering a collective approach among its regional allies to confront Tehran's threats effectively. 

The scenario of driving the Iranian regime toward bankruptcy appears to be the most likely course in the coming phase. However, it is expected to encounter significant resistance from Tehran, which is most likely seek ways to undermine the strategy. Among its potential countermeasures are applying pressure on regional allies and pursuing deterrent paths, most notably by accelerating efforts to obtain a nuclear weapon.

This scenario is also unlikely to proceed smoothly on the international stage, as it directly threatens the interests of key powers such as China and Russia, which have strategic partnerships with Iran.

 

2. Launching the Diplomatic Track and the Return Theorizing for ‘Heroic Flexibility’ 

Another possibility is that President Pezeshkian’s government could successfully reopen negotiations with the United States, convincing the Trump administration to delay escalation and explore compromise solutions in exchange for certain concessions. This scenario aligns with the preferences of the Iranian government at this stage and could gain traction among factions within the Iranian deep state as a means to avoid the collapse of the political system.

Regional actors might also favor this path to prevent further escalation in the region.

 

However, several significant hurdles stand in its way:

 

Internal Challenges: Any hypothetical negotiations would require significant concessions on critical issues for which the Pezeshkian government lacks sufficient authority or political backing.

External Resistance: The prospect of rapprochement between Iran and the United States is likely to face obstruction from external powers such as China, Russia and Israel, each with its own strategic interests in maintaining the status quo.

 

Even if Iran resorts to nuclear brinkmanship to force the international community into negotiations, substantial obstacles persist. Chief among these is the nuclear agreement itself, which has been rendered effectively obsolete due to Iran’s violations. Moreover, European nations are likely to preempt any negotiations by activating the snapback mechanism, closing the window for diplomatic solutions.

 

3. ‘Strategic Patience’ and China's Intervention to Save Iran

This is the least likely scenario but merits consideration. In this case, Iran would attempt to withstand US, Western and Israeli pressure by seeking shelter under the umbrella of its Eastern allies, particularly China. In this scenario, China would take the initiative to shield Iran and push back against the United States, viewing confrontation with Iran as part of the broader US-China rivalry and seeing Iran as a strategic ally that cannot be abandoned.

 

This scenario draws parallels to the US-Soviet standoff over Cuba in the 1960s.

However, this scenario faces several significant challenges. China does not appear ready to engage in a standoff akin to the Cold War confrontation between the US and the Soviet Union. Furthermore, China’s economic and strategic partnerships in the Gulf region limit its ability to take escalatory actions in the Middle East.

While China may intervene within reasonable limits to prevent Iran from being fully isolated or removed from its sphere of influence, it is unlikely to fully confront the US over Iran in the same way the Soviet Union did over Cuba.

 

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