Friday, June 26, 2026

የትራምፕ የኢራን ቁማር፡ የአሜሪካን የበላይነት ውድቀት ሊያፋጥን የሚችል ጦርነት



የትራምፕ የኢራን ቁማር፡ የአሜሪካን የበላይነት ውድቀት ሊያፋጥን የሚችል ጦርነት
ትልቁ ስትራቴጂካዊ ውድቀቶች በጦር ሜዳ ድሎች ወይም ሽንፈቶች ብቻ የሚለኩት አልፎ አልፎ ነው። የሚለኩት ጠመንጃዎች ጸጥ ካሉ ከረጅም ጊዜ በኋላ በሚከሰቱት የፖለቲካ ውጤቶች ነው። የዩናይትድ ስቴትስ ወታደራዊ ጣልቃ ገብነት በኢራን ላይ የሚያሳድረው የቅርብ ጊዜ ክስተቶች ምንም አይነት አመላካች ከሆኑ፣ የፕሬዚዳንት ዶናልድ ትራምፕ የመካከለኛው ምስራቅ ፖሊሲ ዘላቂ ቅርስ የቴህራን መዳከም ላይሆን ይችላል፣ ነገር ግን የአሜሪካን ዓለም አቀፍ አመራር ማዳከም ሊሆን ይችላል።

ወታደራዊ ዘመቻው የኢራንን ስትራቴጂካዊ ስጋት ለማስወገድ፣ የአሜሪካን መከላከያ ወደነበረበት ለመመለስ እና የእስራኤልን ክልላዊ ደህንነት ለማጠናከር እንደ ወሳኝ ጥረት ቀርቧል። በምትኩ፣ ውጤቱ እየጨመረ በመጣው ባለብዙ ዋልታ ዓለም ውስጥ የወታደራዊ ኃይል ገደብን ያጋለጠ ይመስላል። የታክቲካል የበላይነት ስትራቴጂካዊ ስኬት ማስገኘት አልቻለም። የአገዛዝ ለውጥ ወይም ያለ ቅድመ ሁኔታ እጅ መስጠትን ከማድረስ ይልቅ፣ ግጭቱ ብዙዎቹን የመጀመሪያ ዓላማዎች ያልተፈቱ ቀላል የዲፕሎማሲ ስምምነት በማድረግ ተጠናቀቀ።

በጣም ፈጣን የሆነው የፖለቲካ ጉዳት በባህላዊ አጋሮቿ መካከል የአሜሪካ አመራር ተዓማኒነት ነው። የአውሮፓ መንግስታት በዋሽንግተን እየጨመረ በመጣው የውጭ ፖሊሲ ያልተደሰቱበት፣ ግጭቱን ትርጉም ያለው ምክክር ሳይደረግ የተከናወነ ዋና ወታደራዊ እርምጃ ሌላ ምሳሌ አድርገው ተመልክተውታል። እምነት - ከአሜሪካ ታላላቅ ስትራቴጂካዊ ሀብቶች አንዱ - አንዴ ከጠፋ በኋላ በቀላሉ እንደገና መገንባት አይቻልም።
ግጭቱ የእስራኤልን ስትራቴጂካዊ አካባቢም አወሳስቦታል። ለብዙ አሥርተ ዓመታት እስራኤል በአሜሪካ ወታደራዊ ድጋፍ ላይ ብቻ ሳይሆን በዩናይትድ ስቴትስ ውስጥ ሰፊ የሁለት ወገን የፖለቲካ ድጋፍ ላይም ጥገኛ ሆና ቆይታለች። በእስራኤል ዙሪያ እየጨመረ የመጣው የፖለቲካ ፖላራይዜሽን ይህ ስምምነት ከአሁን በኋላ እንደ ቀላል ሊወሰድ እንደማይችል ይጠቁማል። ለእስራኤል የሚሰጠው ድጋፍ ከብሔራዊ ጉዳይ ይልቅ የፓርቲ ጉዳይ እየሆነ ከመጣ፣ ኢየሩሳሌም በጣም አስፈላጊው ጥምረት እምብዛም የማይገመት ሆኖ ልታገኘው ትችላለች።
ይህ በእንዲህ እንዳለ፣ የባህረ ሰላጤው ንጉሣዊ አገዛዝ የተለየ አጣብቂኝ ውስጥ ይወድቃል። የደህንነት አርክቴክቸራቸው በዩናይትድ ስቴትስ ላይ በእጅጉ ጥገኛ ሆኖ ይቆያል፣ ነገር ግን ግጭቱ ሙሉ በሙሉ በአንድ ውጫዊ ዋስትና ላይ የመተማመን አደጋዎችን አሳይቷል። ይህ ግንዛቤ ከቻይና፣ አውሮፓ፣ ህንድ እና ሌሎች የእስያ ኃያላንን ጨምሮ - ከአማራጭ አጋሮች ጋር ጥልቅ ግንኙነትን ሊያበረታታ ይችላል - እንደ ዋሽንግተን ምትክ ሳይሆን ለወደፊቱ እርግጠኛ አለመሆንን ለመከላከል እንደ ስትራቴጂካዊ መከላከያ።

በሚያስገርም ሁኔታ፣ ቤጂንግ ከዋና ዋና የጂኦፖሊቲካል ተጠቃሚዎች አንዷ ሆና ልትወጣ ትችላለች። በመካከለኛው ምስራቅ ውስጥ ያለ እያንዳንዱ ተጨማሪ የአሜሪካ ወታደራዊ ቁርጠኝነት የዲፕሎማሲ ትኩረትን፣ ወታደራዊ ሀብቶችን እና የፖለቲካ ካፒታልን ከኢንዶ-ፓስፊክ ያርቃል፣ ከቻይና ጋር ያለው ስትራቴጂካዊ ውድድር የሃያ አንደኛው ክፍለ ዘመን ዓለም አቀፍ ፖለቲካን እየጨመረ የሚገልጸው ነው። አሜሪካ በፋርስ ባሕረ ሰላጤ ላይ ለረጅም ጊዜ ትኩረት መስጠቷ ቤጂንግ ያለ ግጭት የክልል ተጽዕኖዋን ለማጠናከር ጠቃሚ ስትራቴጂካዊ ቦታ ይሰጣታል።

ሩሲያም በተዘዋዋሪ ትጠቀማለች። እየጨመረ የመጣው የኃይል ዋጋ ጊዜያዊ የኢኮኖሚ እፎይታ ያስገኛል፣ የምዕራባውያን ወታደራዊ ሀብቶች ደግሞ በብዙ ቲያትሮች ላይ እየተስፋፉ ይሄዳሉ። ሞስኮ ከፍተኛ የኢኮኖሚ እና ወታደራዊ ጫናዎችን መጋፈጥ ብትቀጥልም፣ የምዕራባውያን ስትራቴጂካዊ ትስስር መቀነስ የሩሲያን ጥቅም ያገለግላል።
ምናልባት በጣም ዘላቂው ውጤት ዓለም አቀፍ የኢኮኖሚ ስርዓትን ይመለከታል። ግጭቱ የዓለም ንግድ በሆርሙዝ ወሽመጥ ውስጥ ለሚከሰቱ መስተጓጎሎች ተጋላጭነትን በድጋሚ አሳይቷል። የኢነርጂ ደህንነት፣ የባህር ንግድ፣ የኢንሹራንስ ገበያዎች እና የአቅርቦት ሰንሰለቶች ለጂኦፖሊቲካዊ ድንጋጤዎች ተጋልጠዋል። ስለዚህ መንግስታት እና ዓለም አቀፍ ኮርፖሬሽኖች የአቅርቦት ልዩነትን፣ የስትራቴጂክ ክምችትን እና አማራጭ የትራንስፖርት ኮሪደሮችን ለማፋጠን የሚያደርጉትን ጥረት ሊያፋጥኑ ይችላሉ።

በመሠረቱ፣ ግጭቱ በዓለም ፖለቲካ ውስጥ ሰፊ ለውጥን ያሳያል። ወታደራዊ የበላይነት ብቻውን የፖለቲካ ውጤቶችን ዋስትና አይሰጥም። ታላላቅ ኃያላን በጦር ኃይል ብቻ ሳይሆን በኢኮኖሚያዊ መቋቋም፣ በቴክኖሎጂ ፈጠራ፣ በዲፕሎማሲያዊ ህጋዊነት እና በአጋርነት አስተዳደርም ጭምር እየተወዳደሩ ነው። ስኬት በዓለም አቀፍ መተማመን ላይ ከመሆን ይልቅ በጦርነት ማሸነፍ ላይ ያነሰ ነው።

ዩናይትድ ስቴትስ በዓለም ላይ በጣም ኃይለኛ ወታደራዊ ተዋናይ ሆና ትቀጥላለች። ሆኖም ስትራቴጂካዊ ቁጥጥር የሌለው ኃይል እየቀነሰ የሚሄድ ትርፍ ሊያመጣ ይችላል። ታሪክ በተደጋጋሚ እንደሚያሳየው ኢምፓየሮች አንድ ጦርነት ስለተሸነፉ እምብዛም እንደማይወድቁ፤ ተደጋጋሚ ስትራቴጂካዊ ከመጠን በላይ መጨመር ጥምረትን፣ ተአማኒነትን እና የሀገር ውስጥ መግባባትን ቀስ በቀስ ሲያበላሽ ይወድቃሉ።የኢራን ግጭት በመጨረሻ እንደ ጊዜያዊ መሰናክል ወይም ወሳኝ የሆነ የለውጥ ነጥብ መታወሱ የሚወሰነው ዋሽንግተን በሚቀጥሉት ዓመታት ውስጥ ታላቁን ስትራቴጂዋን እንዴት እንደምታስተካክል ነው። የአሜሪካ ፖሊሲ አውጪዎች ጥምረቶችን እንደገና ካቋቋሙ፣ የዲፕሎማሲያዊ ተዓማኒነትን መልሰው ካቋቋሙ እና በረጅም ጊዜ ስትራቴጂካዊ ውድድር ላይ እንደገና ካተኮሩ፣ ጉዳቱ ሊቀለበስ ይችላል።

ካልሆነ፣ የታሪክ ምሁራን የኢራንን ጦርነት አሜሪካ ጥንካሬዋን እንዳሳየችበት ቅጽበት ሳይሆን፣ በአሜሪካ ከሚመራው ዓለም አቀፍ ሥርዓት ወደ ይበልጥ የተበታተነ እና ባለብዙ ዋልታ ዓለም ቀስ በቀስ በሚሸጋገርበት ወቅት እንደ ሌላ ምዕራፍ አድርገው ሊመለከቱት ይችላሉ።
https://x.com/i/status/2070564643987165476

Thursday, June 25, 2026

Evaluation of Ethiopian insurgencies (OLA, TDF, FANO) through the lens of *The Strategy of Terrorism* by Peter R. Neumann and M.L.R. Smith*

**Evaluation of Ethiopian insurgencies (OLA, TDF, FANO) through the lens of *The Strategy of Terrorism* by Peter R. Neumann and M.L.R. Smith**

The book frames **terrorism as a strategy** — the deliberate creation of fear through symbolic violence to influence political behaviour — rather than an irrational or purely grievance-driven phenomenon. It is a value-neutral analysis rooted in Clausewitzian principles: violence as a continuation of politics by other means, a battle of wills aimed at breaking the opponent’s resolve.

The authors distinguish **strategic terrorism** (reliance on symbolic acts of violence alone to disorient and provoke, bypassing mass political organization and conventional battles) from **guerrilla warfare** (which builds popular support, accumulates strength over time, and often aims toward eventual conventional confrontation, per Maoist models).

They outline a **three-stage model** for strategic terrorism and argue it is systemically **flawed**, with rare successes (e.g., FLN in Algeria or Irgun in Palestine). Most campaigns fail due to limited disorientation, ineffective provocation, inability to convert momentum into lasting legitimacy, and the **escalation trap** (need to intensify violence to sustain fear often alienates supporters and invites decisive countermeasures).

### 1. TDF (Tigray Defence Forces) – Tigray War (2020–2022)
The TDF represents a **hybrid guerrilla/conventional-asymmetric campaign** more than pure strategic terrorism. After initial territorial losses, it reorganized into a guerrilla force using hit-and-run tactics, ambushes, infiltration (“qoretta”), and popular mobilization in Tigray’s terrain, while retaining the capacity for larger operations. It drew on a strong pre-existing Tigrayan ethnic/national identity.

- **Stage 1 (Disorientation)**: Partial success locally. Federal and allied actions (including alleged atrocities) created fear and displacement in Tigray, framing the conflict as resistance to external imposition. However, it did not broadly shatter Ethiopian societal “structural supports” (sense of security/stability) nationwide. Outside Tigray, effects were limited.
- **Stage 2 (Target response/Provocation)**: Mixed. Heavy federal response (including Eritrean involvement) initially alienated some but rallied support elsewhere (e.g., the Amhara alliance) and drew international pressure. It did not collapse the government or force capitulation.
- **Stage 3 (Gaining legitimacy)**: Strong local legitimacy in Tigray via ethnic cohesion and defensive narrative. The political wing (TPLF) enabled the transition to negotiations, culminating in the Pretoria Agreement (cessation of hostilities and a disarmament framework). This partial success aligns with the book’s emphasis that even effective violence requires eventual political conversion.

**Assessment per book**: Closer to guerrilla resistance against perceived overreach than pure terrorism. Ethnic identity aided legitimacy, but the resilience of the federal government and population, plus the internal (not foreign-occupier) nature of the conflict, limited broader impact. Negotiated outcome reflects the book’s point that pure terror rarely wins outright; politics is essential. It avoided a total escalation trap through compromise, but at enormous human and economic cost.

### 2. OLA (Oromo Liberation Army)
The OLA blends **guerrilla tactics** (rural hit-and-run in Oromia’s terrain, some territorial control in fluid rural pockets) with elements of symbolic violence (attacks on officials, infrastructure, alleged civilian targeting, kidnappings). It seeks Oromo self-determination/autonomy amid historical grievances. It is fractured, with limited governance structures in controlled areas.

- **Stage 1 (Disorientation)**: Creates significant local insecurity, displacement, and ethnic clashes in Oromia. However, widespread civilian suffering often attributes chaos to the conflict itself rather than solely to the government. It has not produced the widespread “it could happen to me” panic or total breakdown of societal cohesion across broader populations.
- **Stage 2 (Target response)**: Government countermeasures (counterinsurgency, arrests of relatives, alleged indiscriminate actions, air strikes) can alienate Oromos and reinforce narratives of oppression. Yet they also demonstrate resolve and may rally non-Oromo support or public demand for security.
- **Stage 3 (Gaining legitimacy)**: Ethnic identity provides a ready base among many Oromos. Some political roots (OLF) and intermittent peace talks exist, but factionalism, a limited unified vision, and difficulty communicating an attractive alternative beyond ethnic lines hinder broader appeal. Violent risks alienating moderates.

**Assessment per book**: Fits patterns of flawed insurgent strategies in peripheral regions with legitimacy deficits. Low government legitimacy in parts of Oromia aids in the early stages. Still, resilience, diminishing returns from sustained violence, and challenges in stage 3 (unified politics, avoiding alienation) explain its protracted yet contained nature. It has not escalated to threaten core state power, but it risks the escalation trap (more attacks → more harm → potential backlash). Aligns with the book’s view that such campaigns rarely achieve fundamental change without mass organization and political transition.

### 3. FANO (Amhara militias/insurgency)
FANO is a **decentralized ethnic militia/guerrilla movement** (with many ex-soldiers) that evolved from community defence into an insurgency against federal policies (disarmament, perceived marginalization, constitutional issues). Tactics include rural control, ambushes, road attacks, and some urban operations. Goals range from protecting Amhara interests/territorial claims to broader constitutional change or, in radical factions, opposing the government. Recent unification efforts (e.g., Amhara Fano National Movement) aim to address fragmentation.

- **Stage 1 (Disorientation)**: Disrupts the Amhara region (rural control, economic harm, insecurity). Ethnic framing polarises rather than broadly disorients Ethiopian society. Alleged civilian impacts can undermine the narrative.
- **Stage 2 (Target response)**: Federal operations (state of emergency, drones, counteroffensives) are portrayed by supporters as repression, sustaining resistance. However, the government retains control of urban/highway areas and has not collapsed.
- **Stage 3 (Gaining legitimacy)**: Strong local/ethnic support in Amhara via identity and community roots aids appeal. But decentralization, factional goals, and difficulty presenting a cohesive alternative vision limit national traction. Unification helps but remains incomplete.

**Assessment per book**: Classic example of ethnic insurgency benefiting from regional legitimacy deficits and identity cohesion (aiding stage 3). Guerrilla elements (territorial aspects) distinguish it from pure symbolic terrorism. It exploits provocation dynamics but faces the same limits: population/government resilience, the risk of escalation that alienates supporters, and hurdles in converting armed momentum into unified political power. Controls rural areas but struggles for decisive leverage, consistent with the book’s prediction of limited utility for such strategies without favourable conditions or political shift.

### Overall Assessment
These insurgencies are primarily **ethnic/regional guerrilla-style conflicts with terrorist elements**, not textbook strategic terrorism campaigns that rely solely on fear-inducing symbolic violence to bypass mass politics (per the book’s distinction). 

**Strengths aligning with the framework**:
- Ethnic identities provide pre-existing legitimacy bases (helpful for stage 3).
- Government heavy-handedness in all cases can alienate locals and aid provocation narratives (stage 2), especially where central legitimacy is questioned.
- Local control and resilience in peripheral regions create sustained pressure.

**Why they largely conform to the book’s “flawed strategy” thesis**:
- **Limited disorientation**: Populations and the state show resilience; violence causes real suffering and displacement, but rarely shatters societal “structural supports” enough for mass transfer of allegiance. Repetition often leads to coping mechanisms rather than chronic panic.
- **Provocation is double-edged**: Responses alienate some but demonstrate resolve, rally counter-support, or invite international scrutiny without collapsing authority.
- **Stage 3 bottlenecks**: Fragmentation (especially OLA, FANO), difficulty building a broad (non-ethnic) appeal or unified vision, and challenges transitioning from armed struggle to effective politics hinder consolidation. Media and government narratives counter insurgent messaging.
- **Escalation trap**: Sustaining momentum requires intensified operations, risking civilian harm, alienation, stronger crackdowns, or loss of support.
- **Internal (not foreign occupation) context**: The book notes that anti-colonial/occupier campaigns are relatively easier due to inherent legitimacy deficits and dual targeting (home + metropolis). These are domestic ethnic conflicts, making broad success harder to achieve.
- **Empirical pattern**: TDF achieved a negotiated settlement (partial success via politics). OLA and FANO remain protracted, controlling rural pockets but not posing existential threats to the centre or achieving stated transformative goals. This matches the book’s finding that most such campaigns end in failure, marginalization, or compromise rather than victory.

**Implications per the authors**: Governments facing these challenges should avoid over- or under-reaction that plays into insurgent hands, maintain the rule of law where possible, address underlying legitimacy issues, separate moderates from hardliners, and prevent insurgents from gaining unchallenged legitimacy through media or political fronts. Pure reliance on military eradication is insufficient; political dimensions matter.

In short, the Ethiopian cases illustrate the book’s core argument: terrorism and related insurgent violence can create chaos and impose costs, but are rarely sufficient on their own to achieve fundamental political ends. Success, when it occurs, typically requires favourable conditions, resilience on the insurgent side, *and* a viable path to political legitimacy and transition.

Monday, June 15, 2026

What's In BluePosted Mon 15 Jun 2026 Yemen: Briefing and Consultations


Security Council Report

What's In Blue

Posted Mon 15 Jun 2026

Yemen: Briefing and Consultations

Tomorrow morning (16 June), the Security Council will hold a briefing on Yemen. UN Special Envoy for Yemen Hans Grundberg and Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Tom Fletcher are expected to brief. Closed consultations are scheduled to follow the open briefing.

The Houthis’ continued involvement in the Middle East crisis, which began with US-Israeli strikes against Iran on 28 February, is expected to feature prominently in the discussion at tomorrow’s meeting. The Houthis, a Yemeni rebel group that de facto controls northern Yemen and is part of the Iran-allied “Axis of Resistance”, have launched multiple attacks against Israel since the beginning of the regional war. Following the 7 April announcement of a ceasefire between Iran and the US, the group paused its strikes against Israel. On 8 June, however, it resumed attacks. It fired several missiles at Israel, which the Houthis said were a response to the country’s continued assaults against Palestinians and violations of its ceasefire agreement with Lebanon. The Israel Defence Forces (IDF) reportedly said that it had intercepted one of the missiles, while the second failed to reach Israeli territory. Furthermore, on 9 June, the IDF reported that it had intercepted a Houthi-launched drone over the southern Israeli city of Eilat.

The Houthis have also threatened to resume targeting Israeli-linked shipping in the Red Sea, which the group had paused following the Gaza ceasefire agreement in October 2025. (Since the war in Gaza began in October 2023, the group has attacked several commercial ships in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, including some that were not directly affiliated with Israel.) Additionally, on 9 June, the commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force, Brigadier General Esmail Qaani, said that the Axis of Resistance will establish a new “security belt” extending from the Strait of Hormuz to the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. This vital shipping waterway connects the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden. At the time of writing, it was unclear whether the Houthis would refrain from further attacks against Israel or threats to maritime security following yesterday’s (14 June) announcement of a new ceasefire deal between the US and Iran.

Tomorrow, speakers are likely to raise concerns regarding the Houthis’ re-involvement in the Middle East crisis and their threats to resume attacks against shipping in the region. Several Council members are expected to condemn the most recent assaults targeting Israel and call on the Houthis to cease any further actions which could risk dragging Yemen into the regional conflict. Some members, such as the US, may further underline the Houthis’ alliance with Iran and criticize the latter’s support for the group. Members may also warn the Houthis against taking any actions which undermine the freedom of navigation and maritime security in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, underlining that such actions could have grave ramifications for the Yemeni people.

Fletcher and Grundberg are expected to recall that June marks two years since the Houthis arbitrarily detained several UN personnel, diplomatic staff, and aid workers, and condemn the ongoing detentions. A 10 June statement attributable to the Spokesperson for the Secretary-General noted that UN personnel were detained in 2025, 2024, 2023, and 2021, adding that 73 UN personnel remain detained and that one died during detention. It called for their immediate and unconditional release. It stressed that the actions of the Houthis have “severely constrained” the UN’s ability to assist millions of Yemenis in need of aid. The briefers may also voice concerns that three of the detained UN staff have been referred to the Houthis’ special criminal court and are undergoing trials which do not satisfy basic standards of due process.

Council members are likely to echo the messages conveyed in their 5 June press statement, which reiterated their condemnation of the detentions and demanded the personnel’s release. The statement also emphasized that all parties to a conflict are obliged by international humanitarian law to facilitate unhindered humanitarian access to civilians in need and “to promote the safety, security and freedom of movement” of humanitarian, UN, and associated personnel.

Grundberg is also expected to reference an agreement announced on 14 May—reached following months of negotiations held in Jordan, Switzerland, and Oman under UN auspices—through which the Yemeni government and the Houthis pledged to release over 1,600 conflict-related detainees. The negotiations were facilitated by the Supervisory Committee on the implementation of the detainee release agreement, co-chaired by the UN and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and established under the framework of the 2018 Stockholm Agreement. Grundberg is likely to elaborate on the agreement, which represents the largest detainee release since the outbreak of the Yemeni conflict, as a demonstration of what can be achieved through dialogue and negotiations under UN auspices and may express hope that it can serve as a foundation for further confidence-building between the parties.

Several Council members are expected to commend the 14 May agreement, which some may characterize as the most significant concrete achievement on the Yemen file in some time, and call on the parties to implement it swiftly and to build on it towards a broader political process. Grundberg may reiterate that such a process needs to be comprehensively focused on the political, economic, and security tracks; reflective of current realities; and must deliver on both short-term needs, such as reducing economic pressures, as well as longer-term issues, such as the future shape of the state, security arrangements, and governance. Some speakers are expected to argue that Houthi involvement in the regional escalation and the continued arbitrary detention of UN, aid, and diplomatic workers hampers progress towards a negotiated political resolution to the conflict. On the other hand, Russia may warn against isolating the Houthis and stress that the group must be part of a comprehensive settlement of the Yemeni conflict.

The Special Envoy may also brief on his recent visit to Riyadh, which concluded on 10 June. During the visit, he met with the President of the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), Rashad al-Alimi and other senior officials. The discussions focused on urgent economic issues and how to advance the political process, among other things. He may also cover the most recent meeting of the Military Coordination Committee (MCC), held on the same day in Amman, which included the government of Yemen and the Joint Forces Command of the Coalition to Restore Legitimacy in Yemen—a Saudi-led coalition established at the height of the Yemeni civil war to militarily support the Yemeni government—and which focused on “ceasefire planning, maritime security, and de-escalation steps”. The Houthis are the third party to the MCC, and the UN statement following the meeting noted that Grundberg plans to “convene all three delegations of the MCC in the coming period”.

Another issue that may be discussed at tomorrow’s meeting is the “Southern Dialogue Conference” initiative. In January, Saudi Arabia and Yemen announced plans to convene such a dialogue in Riyadh following a failed attempt by the Southern Transitional Council (STC)—a southern Yemeni faction that is a former member of the PLC—to take control of Yemen’s government-controlled southeastern governorates in December 2025. Given that there have been no further announcements regarding plans to host the conference, some Council members may ask Grundberg for updates on this initiative during the closed consultations.

The dire humanitarian situation in Yemen is another expected key area of discussion. Fletcher is likely to focus on the biggest challenges facing Yemeni civilians, including the deteriorating food security situation. He may refer to the 21 May Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) snapshot report, which said that, between March and May, around five million people—nearly half of the population in government-controlled areas—experienced Crisis (Phase 3) or worse levels of food insecurity, including 1.4 million in Emergency (Phase 4) conditions. According to the report, the outlook is expected to worsen significantly during the June-September lean season, with 5.4 million people projected to face acute food insecurity. This figure is unlikely to improve even during the harvest season, when Phase 4 conditions are projected to affect 1.8 million people.

Fletcher may underscore that sharply reduced humanitarian assistance—driven by critical funding shortfalls—is not only driving the deterioration in food security but is also affecting the health, water, sanitation, and hygiene sectors. A 2 June joint press release on Yemen issued by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the World Food Programme (WFP), and UNICEF warned that “[w]ithout immediate, sustained and scaled-up action, millions of vulnerable people risk falling deeper into hunger, malnutrition and irreversible livelihood loss”. Fletcher is likely to echo this message and to call on the international community to urgently scale up support.

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Friday, June 5, 2026

America Enabled the Gulf's African Adventurism: The New Geopolitics of Influence in Africa

The Foreign Policy analysis by Zuri Linetsky and Michael Woldemariam.

America Enabled the Gulf's African Adventurism: The New Geopolitics of Influence in Africa

Introduction

For much of the past two decades, policymakers in Washington and European capitals have focused on China's expanding economic footprint across Africa. Chinese infrastructure projects, loans, and investments have dominated discussions about external influence on the continent. Yet, according to a recent analysis by Zuri Linetsky and Michael Woldemariam in Foreign Policy, an equally significant—and potentially more destabilizing—transformation has been unfolding with far less scrutiny: the rise of Gulf state influence in Africa.

The authors argue that the United States has effectively enabled the geopolitical adventurism of its Middle Eastern partners, particularly the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia, and Qatar, by prioritizing strategic relationships in the Middle East over stability in Africa.

The Gulf's Expanding African Presence

The scale of Gulf engagement in Africa is unprecedented. The UAE alone has invested tens of billions of dollars across the continent in sectors ranging from ports and logistics to energy, agriculture, mining, and security. These investments have transformed the UAE into one of Africa's largest foreign investors.

Beyond economics, Gulf influence increasingly extends into military and security affairs. Through military bases, defence agreements, and security partnerships, Gulf states have established a presence stretching from the Horn of Africa to West Africa. Strategic ports along the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, and Atlantic coast have become critical nodes in a growing network of Gulf influence.

This expansion reflects a broader strategy: securing maritime trade routes, protecting supply chains, gaining access to natural resources, and enhancing geopolitical leverage in an increasingly competitive international environment.

The Security Dimension

The most controversial aspect of Gulf engagement is its security footprint. The UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar have frequently become involved in local conflicts, political rivalries, and regional power struggles. In some cases, Gulf funding, military assistance, or political backing has strengthened local factions and intensified existing disputes.

Rather than acting solely as economic partners, Gulf states have emerged as influential security actors capable of shaping political outcomes across multiple African regions. Their involvement has often blurred the line between investment and intervention.

Critics argue that such activities contribute to the militarization of political competition and create new forms of dependency among fragile states.

Washington's Role

A central argument advanced by Linetsky and Woldemariam is that the United States bears significant responsibility for this situation. Successive American administrations have prioritized counterterrorism cooperation, energy security, regional stability in the Persian Gulf, and strategic partnerships with Gulf monarchies.

As a result, Washington has often overlooked or tolerated the actions of its allies in Africa. When Gulf states have pursued aggressive regional agendas, supported competing factions, or intervened in domestic political disputes, the United States has rarely imposed meaningful diplomatic costs.

This approach has effectively created what the authors describe as a permissive environment in which Gulf powers can expand their influence with limited accountability.

Implications for Africa

The consequences for Africa are profound. While Gulf investments can bring much-needed capital, infrastructure, and economic opportunities, they also risk deepening political fragmentation and external dependency. African governments may benefit from new sources of financing, but they can also become entangled in rivalries among external powers.

The growing competition among Gulf states adds another layer to an already complex geopolitical landscape involving China, the United States, Russia, Turkey, and European actors.

For African leaders, the challenge is to maximize the benefits of external engagement while safeguarding sovereignty, strengthening institutions, and avoiding becoming arenas for proxy competition.

Conclusion

The rise of Gulf influence represents one of the most important yet underappreciated developments in contemporary African geopolitics. As the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar continue expanding their economic and security presence, the continent is becoming an increasingly significant arena for Middle Eastern power projection.

The critique offered by Linetsky and Woldemariam raises an important question: can the United States continue prioritizing its strategic partnerships in the Gulf while ignoring the consequences of those relationships in Africa? The answer will shape not only U.S.-Africa relations but also the future balance of power across the African continent.

Africa's future should ultimately be determined by Africans themselves, not by the competing ambitions of external powers. Achieving that goal will require stronger institutions, greater regional cooperation, and a renewed commitment to protecting African sovereignty in an era of intensifying geopolitical competition.

Monday, June 1, 2026

The Emirati Prince Preparing for PowerBy: Financial Times


 The Emirati Prince Preparing for Power
By: Financial Times

**Abu Dhabi’s Sheikh Khaled is a growing force in global dealmaking and diplomacy as he readies to take over.**
In recent weeks, **Sheikh Khaled bin Mohamed bin Zayed al-Nahyan** has travelled to Beijing to meet President Xi Jinping, hosted international bank chiefs, and signed off on billions of dollars of global investment. In between, Abu Dhabi’s 44-year-old crown prince has also reviewed the capital’s emergency medical readiness and state oil company Adnoc’s contingency plans in a time of war.
All these points contribute to his rise in Abu Dhabi’s absolute monarchy as he transitions into a "chief executive" role under his "chair" father, UAE President **Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed al-Nahyan (MBZ)**. Three years after being anointed heir apparent, Sheikh Khaled is becoming a growing force in global finance and diplomacy, signalling a generational shift in the UAE’s wealthiest emirate.
### The Rise of L’Imad and Financial Influence
Sheikh Khaled has become a central figure for global dealmakers looking to tap into Abu Dhabi’s $1.8tn sovereign wealth. He chairs **L’Imad**, a nascent $300bn fund that recently emerged as a major player.
 * **Major Moves:** L’Imad recently partnered with BlackRock’s Global Infrastructure Partners, Temasek, and Adnoc to invest $30bn in Central Asia and the Middle East.
 * **Strategic Consolidation:** In January 2026, the $263bn assets of the sovereign fund **ADQ** were merged into L’Imad under Sheikh Khaled's leadership.
 * **Adnoc:** He also chairs the executive committee of the state oil giant.
### Diplomatic Stature and Regional Challenges
Sheikh Khaled’s prominent role was underscored by his April 2026 visit to China. The trip occurred during a period of tension where Abu Dhabi felt Beijing had not done enough to pressure Iran to keep the Strait of Hormuz open.
However, a significant challenge remains: convincing investors of "business as usual" following the regional instability caused by the US-Israeli war against Iran. Analysts note that while Abu Dhabi has the financial firepower to navigate the turmoil, an immediate return to the previous status quo is unlikely.
### Succession and Leadership Structure
President MBZ (65) appears to be following a playbook similar to his own rise, ensuring a smooth transition to avoid the internal friction often seen in Gulf successions. In 2023, MBZ redistributed responsibilities among his brothers while positioning his son as the clear heir:
| Royal Member | Current Key Roles |
|---|---|
| **Sheikh Khaled** | Crown Prince; Chair of L’Imad; Chair of Abu Dhabi Executive Council |
| **Sheikh Tahnoon** | National Security Adviser; Chair of ADIA ($1.1tn fund); Deputy Ruler |

| **Sheikh Mansour** | UAE Vice-President; Chair of Mubadala; Owner of Manchester City FC |

### Background and Core Team
Sheikh Khaled, a Georgetown University graduate, first gained international exposure in 2010 when he managed a high-stakes regulatory dispute with BlackBerry (Research In Motion).
Today, he is building a new generation of alliances, working closely with influential non-royals like **Khaldoon al-Mubarak** (Mubadala CEO) and **Sultan al-Jaber** (Adnoc head), while promoting his own confidantes, such as **Jassem al-Zaabi**, the CEO of L’Imad.
> **Key Quote:** "Sheikh Khaled is handling many heavy duties and responsibilities these days... He has proven himself, and more and more, his father would like to depend on him." Abdulkhaleq Abdulla, Emirati academic.


Friday, May 29, 2026

History of Neoliberalism

History of Neoliberalism: Origins, Evolution, and the Restoration of Class Power

Executive Summary
The transition to neoliberalism between 1978 and 1980 represents a revolutionary turning point in global nd economic history. Emerging as a response to the crisis of "embedded liberalism" in the 1970s, neoliberalism is a theory of political-economic practices asserting that human well-being is abandoned within a framework of strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade.
While neoliberalism is rhetorically framed as a utopian project to advance human dignity and freedom, its practical application has primarily served as a political project to re-establish conditions for capital accumulation and restore the power of economic elites. This briefing document outlines the historical rise of neoliberal theory, its implementation through the construction of popular consent, the contradictions inherent in the neoliberal state, and the resulting uneven geographical developments that have reshaped the global economy.
1. Abandon neoliberalism
Neoliberalism proposes that market transactions should be maximized to encompass all human action. It values market exchange as an ethic in itself, capable of guiding all human behaviour and substituting for previously held ethical beliefs.
The Role of the State
In neoliberal theory, the state’s primary functions are limited and specific:
• Institutional Framework: The state must guarantee the quality and integrity of money and secure private property rights.
• Market Creation: If markets do not exist (in land, water, education, or social security), the state must create them.
• Security: The state must maintain military, police, and legal structures to guarantee the proper functioning of markets, by force if necessary.
• Minimal Intervention: Beyond these functions, the state should not venture. It is assumed that the state lacks sufficient information to second-guess market signals and that democratic processes will inevitably be distorted by powerful interest groups.
2. The Historical Turn: From Embedded Liberalism to Neoliberalism
The post-WWII era (1945–1970) was characterized by "embedded liberalism," a system in which market processes were embedded within social and political constraints.
The Crisis of the 1970s
By the late 1960s, embedded liberalism began to break down. Signs of a serious crisis of capital accumulation appeared globally:
• Stagflation: A combination of surging unemployment and accelerating inflation.
• Fiscal Crises: Tax revenues plunged while social expenditures soared, leading to state-level financial instability (e.g., the 1975–76 IMF bailout of Britain).
• Class Threat: The economic power of the upper classes was under threat. In the US, the share of national income held by the top 1% had dropped to 8%, and asset values (stocks, property) collapsed in the 1970s.
Key Figures of the Revolution
The shift was spearheaded by majoritarian measures that were made through protracted struggle:
• Deng Xiaoping (1978): Initiate people's internal efforts. Paul Volcker (1979): Shift Reserve policy to prioritize fighting inflation via high interest rates (the "Volcker Shock"), regardless of unemployment consequences.
• Margaret Thatcher (1979): Mandated to curb trade union power and dismantle the British welfare state.
• Ronald Reagan (1980): Advanced policies to curb labour power, deregulate indust:ry, and liberate finance.
3. Neoliberalism as the Restoration of Class Power
Evidence suggests that neoliberalization has been highly successful in restoring or creating the power of an economic elite, even while failing to significantly revitalize global capital accumulation.
Data on Income and Wealth Concentration
The implementation of neoliberal policies corresponds with a dramatic surge in inequality:
Metric Pre-Neoliberal Era (approx. 1970) Post-Neoliberal Consolidation (approx. 2000)
Top 0.1% Share of National Income (US) 2% (1978) Over 6% (1999)
Top 1% Share of National Income (UK) 6.5% (1982) 13%
CEO Remuneration vs. Average Salary (US) 30 to 1 500 to 1
The "Financialization" of the Economy
Class power shifted away from production toward finance. This involved:
• Fusing Ownership and Management: Paying CEOs in stock options to align their interests with shareholders.
• The Rise of Finance Capital: Large corporations became increasingly financial in orientation, often reporting production losses offset by financial operation gains.
• New Elite Clusters: Power concentrated among CEOs, corporate board operators, and the leaders of financial, legal, and technical apparatuses.
4. The Construction of Consent
In democratic nations, the shift to neoliberalism required the construction of "common sense" to gain popular legitimacy.
The United States Strategy
• Business as a Class: Following the 1971 "Powell Memo," US business interests organized collectively, funding think tanks (Heritage Foundation, AEI) and capturing the Republican Party.
• The "Moral Majority": The Republican Party built a popular base by forming an alliance with the Christian Right. This allowed voters to be mobilized around cultural nationalism and religious values rather than their materialistic interests.
• Legalized Influenreme Co of the worldurt decisions (starting in 1976) defined corporate financial contributions as a protected form of "freedom of speech."
The United Kingdom Strategy
• The Winter of Discontent (1978): Crippling strikes provided Thatcher a mandate to tame unions.
• Privatization: Thatcher sold off favoured enterprises (telecom, aerospace, etc.) and public housing. The latter created a new class of homeowners with a stake in the neoliberal system.
• Nationalism: The Falklands/Malvinas war was used to generate the nationalistic fervour necessary to bypass social democratic opposition.
The New York City Prototype
The 1975 New York City fiscal crisis served as a pioneer for neoliberal practices. Financial institutions refused to roll over the city's debt, forcing a coup that prioritized bondholder payments over essential services and municipal union contracts. This established the principle that the role of government is to create a "good business climate" rather than provide for the well-being of citizens.
5. The Neoliberal State: Theory vs. Practice
There is a stark divergence between the theoretical ideals of the neoliberal state and its actual conduct.
Theoretical Contradictions
Feature Neoliberal Theory Neoliberal Practice
State Intervention Minimal; the state should only facilitate markets. High; state intervenes to bail out financial institutions (e.g., 1987 S&L crisis).
Monopoly Competition is the primary virtue. Increasing the consolidation of power in transnational oligopolies.
Democracy is suspicious of majority rule; it favours expert elites. Relies on undemocratic institutions (IMF, WTO, Federal Reserve) to set policy.
Risk Individuals/firms take responsibility for failure. "Borrower beware": states and citizens pay for lenders' mistakes.
The Neoconservative Response
As the "anarchy" of individual market interests threatens social coherence, a neoconservative variant has emerged (notably in the US). It maintains the neoliberal economic agenda but adds:
1. Militarization: Using external and internal threats to maintain social order.
2. Moral Purpose: Invoking traditional values, religion, and cultural nationalism to provide the "social glue" that market individualism lacks.
6. Uneven Geographical Developments
Neoliberalization has proliferated through mechanisms of territorial competition.
• Forced Implementation: In Chile (1973), neoliberalism was imposed through a brutal military coup. In other developing nations, it was imposed via IMF-led "structural adjustment" following debt crises.
• The Washington Consensus: By the 1990s, a specific set of neoliberal rules—centred on financialization and the opening of capital markets—became the global standard.
• Flow of Tribute: The system allowed core financial centers (the US and UK) to extract high rates of return from the rest of the world. By 1997, the income gap between the world's richest and poorest fifths had grown to 74 to 1, compared to 30 to 1. The deregulation of markets made financial crises both more likely and more contagious, as seen in the Mexican "tequila crisis" (1995) and the Asian financial crisis (1997–98).
 PART II
Ethiopia’s Macroeconomic Reform and Political Stability: A Briefing on the Prosperity Party’s Economic Trajectory
Executive Summary
The Ethiopian government, led by the Prosperity Party, is currently navigating a period of radical economic transition facilitated by a USD 3.4 billion IMF rescue package. While senior government officials frame recent developments as "macroeconomic stabilization," there is a widening gap between official narratives and the lived experience of the Ethiopian population. The forced flotation of the Birr has led to a devaluationfavourrrrrrver 100%, and the removal of subsidies alongside expanded taxation is precipitating a severe cost-of-living crisis.
This economic shift occurs against a backdrop of active armed conflict in the Amhara region and an unresolved political transition in Tigray. The core challenge facing the administration is the attempt to implement stringent austerity and dismantle the long-standing state-led developmental model while simultaneously managing civil unrest and preparing for national elections. The reliance on international financial institutions marks a significant departure from previous national economic strategies and risks undermining long-term national stability.
Economic Reforms and IMF Intervention
The Ethiopian government’s current economic strategy is heavily influenced by the requirements of international lenders, specifically the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
• Financial Relief: The IMF has recently released an additional USD 216 million as part of a larger USD 3.4 billion rescue package.
• Official Sentiment: Senior economic advisors—including Ahmed Shide, Girma Birru, Teklewold Atnafu, and Dr. Eyob Tekalign—have publicly celebrated these developments as successful stabilization measures.
• Compromised Autonomy: Critics argue that the Prosperity Party has traded Ethiopia’s economic independence for short-term financial injections, effectively delegating national policy to international institutions.

Key Economic Indicators and Policy Changes
Policy/Indicator Status/Impact
Exchange Rate Forced flotation of the Birr; official devaluation exceeds 100%.
Inflation Officially reported at 11%, though this figure is contested by economic realities.
Subsidies Complete elimination of fuel subsidies per IMF requirements.
Taxation Expansion of Value-Added Tax (VAT) coverage.
Parallel Market Remains active and continues to disregard official exchange rates.
Socio-Political Implications of Austerity
The implementation of "radical" reforms is creating significant friction within the Ethiopian domestic context, particularly as the population faces mounting financial pressure.
• Cost-of-Living Crisis: The combination of currency devaluation and the removal of subsidies has made basic necessities, such as teff and fertilizer, increasingly unaffordable for the average citizen.
• Public Hardship: The population is currently burdened by high unemployment and rising food prices, leading to a disconnect between the "Prosperity" narrative and daily survival.
• Electoral Risks: Imposing austerity measures shortly before national elections may undermine the legitimacy of the outcomes and exacerbate disparities in political participation.
Security Context and Regional Instability
The central government is attempting to transition its economic model while its authority is being actively challenged in several key regions.
• Amhara Region: The Amhara Fano National Movement (AFNM) continues to provide military resistance against the central government.
• Tigray Region: The political transition following recent conflict remains unresolved.
• The Conflict-Austerity Nexus: Implementing stringent economic reforms in regions affected by armed opposition increases the risk of further destabilization. The shift away from state-led investment is occurring exactly when the government's central authority is most contested.
Shift in Economic Philosophy
The current administration is dismantling the "public investment-led developmental state model" that defined Ethiopia’s growth for the past two decades.
• Private-Sector Reliance: The IMF-backed strategy prioritizes private-sector-led growth. However, this transition is being pushed before a robust domestic market has been established.
• Loss of Protections: The removal of protections for local industries exposes them to volatile global markets without sufficient institutional safeguards.
• Historical Departure: This approach is a direct reversal of the policies maintained by former Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, who famously opposed the delegation of economic policy to international financial institutions.
Conclusion
The Prosperity Party faces a critical juncture. While high GDP growth rates may provide a positive veneer for international forums, they do not reflect the internal reality of civil unrest and severe economic hardship. The reliance on foreign lenders and the imposition of austerity in a time of conflict suggests a "collision course with disaster" if the administration fails to address the basic needs and stability of its citizens. Sustainable progress likely requires a reconciliation of macroeconomic targets with the immediate socio-economic realities of the Ethiopian people.

PART III
Strategic Autonomy and the Dual Nature of Foreign Aid
Executive Summary
The following briefing document analyzes the strategic implications of foreign aid as outlined in the provided source context. The central thesis is that foreign aid is a double-edged sword: it is beneficial only when it supplements a predefined national survival strategy and harmful when it requires the abandonment of that strategy for short-term gains. The analysis emphasizes that a nation's path out of poverty must be driven by internal diligence and strategic integrity, rather than a passive acceptance of external assistance that fosters perpetual dependency.
The Primacy of National Strategy
The source establishes that a nation must first define its own survival and development strategy. The value of external assistance is measured solely by its alignment with this internal framework.
• Strategic Integrity: A clear strategy is the benchmark for evaluating aid. If a donor offers "candy" (short-term incentives) on the condition that a nation abandons its long-term strategy, that aid is categorized as destructive and should be rejected.
• The "Candy" Metaphor: The document uses the metaphor of "candies" to represent units of aid. While receiving more aid (e.g., three candies) is preferable to less (e.g., half a candy), the quantity is secondary to the impact on the national strategy.
• Acceptance Criteria: Aid is acceptable in varying amounts—whether full or partial—provided it does not compromise the core survival strategy. The "pivot point" of the decision to accept aid is whether it protects or harms the long-term vision.
The Risk of Perpetual Dependency
A critical distinction is made between aid that facilitates an exit from poverty and aid that reinforces the status of a "beggar nation."
• Harmful Aid: Assistance that touches or undermines the "survival strategy" is viewed as a mechanism to ensure the nation continues to live in a state of perpetual begging. This type of aid does not provide a path to self-sufficiency.
• Strategic Rejection: The source advocates for the absolute rejection of aid that compromises national survival, regardless of the country's level of poverty. The core argument is that it is better to remain poor but strategically sound than to accept help that ensures eternal dependency.
Dignity and the "Garbage" of Poverty
The source addresses the intersection of poverty and national dignity, rejecting the notion that being poor justifies becoming a passive recipient of the world's unwanted influences.
• Rejecting the "Garbage Dump" Status: The document asserts that being poor does not mean a country should accept being the "world's garbage dump." This suggests a rejection of low-quality aid or policies that treat the nation as a passive object of external charity.
• The Mandate for Diligence: Instead of passivity, poverty is framed as a reason to work "day and night" to clear away the "garbage" (the conditions of poverty). The responsibility for national improvement lies with the internal effort of the people.
Redefining Partnership and Alliance
The criteria for international friendship and partnership are narrowed down to a single metric: contribution to the national effort.
Type of Actor Definition/Action Strategic Status
Friend/Ally Any entity that adds even "one gram of energy" to the nation's effort to clear poverty. Beneficial Partner
Harmful Actor Any entity offering aid that requires the abandonment of the national survival strategy. Strategic Threat
Conclusion
The analysis concludes that the utility of foreign aid is not inherent in the aid itself, but in how it interacts with a nation's sovereign strategy. To move from a state of begging to a state of self-sufficiency, a nation must prioritize its survival strategy above all else, accepting only that which adds "energy" to its internal efforts and rejecting any assistance that threatens its long-term autonomy.

PART IV
Prosperity Theology and Democracy: An Analysis of Social and Political Intersections
Executive Summary
The interaction between prosperity theology and democratic governance represents a significant shift in the political and religious landscapes of modern developing societies. While democracy is predicated on collective welfare, equality, and institutional accountability, prosperity theology prioritizes individual material success as a marker of spiritual righteousness.
This briefing outlines a complex relationship: prosperity theology can act as a catalyst for economic ambition and civic optimism, yet it simultaneously poses risks to democratic stability. These risks include the erosion of social solidarity, the legitimization of economic inequality, and the personalization of political power through alliances between charismatic religious leaders and political elites. The ultimate impact of this religious movement on democracy depends on whether it is harnessed to promote justice and civic responsibility or used to consolidate wealth and political influence.
Defining Prosperity Theology and its Social Context
Prosperity theology emerged from 20th-century Pentecostal and evangelical movements. It is defined by several core tenets and has found significant traction in specific global regions.
• Core Beliefs: The doctrine teaches that faith, "positive confession," and financial contributions to religious institutions lead to health, wealth, and personal advancement.
• Significance of Material Success: In this framework, material prosperity is viewed as evidence of divine favor and spiritual righteousness.
• Geographic Influence: The movement has gained immense popularity across Africa, Latin America, and parts of Asia.
• Socio-Economic Drivers: It thrives in environments characterized by:
o High poverty and unemployment.
o Political instability.
o A central role for religion in public life.

Positive Contributions to Civic Life
Under certain conditions, prosperity theology can provide psychological and social frameworks that support democratic and economic participation.
Individual Empowerment
The message of prosperity offers hope to those in marginalized conditions. By encouraging ambition, self-confidence, and resilience, it fosters an entrepreneurial spirit. This psychological empowerment can lead to increased activity in economic and political affairs as individuals feel more capable of improving their circumstances.
Social Mobilization
Religious institutions practicing prosperity theology often serve as powerful community hubs. These organizations:
• Create robust social networks.
• Mobilize large groups for public debate.
• Encourage civic optimism and self-reliance.
• In specific political crises, have been known to advocate for peace, social justice, and national reconciliation.
 ----
Democratic Tensions and Ethical Risks
Despite its empowering aspects, the foundational principles of prosperity theology often clash with the essential requirements of a functioning democracy.
Weakening of Collective Responsibility
Democracy requires citizens to prioritize the common good and institutional accountability. Prosperity theology’s intense focus on individual enrichment can undermine social solidarity. When wealth is seen as a divine blessing, poverty is frequently reinterpreted as a sign of spiritual failure or personal weakness.

Legitimization of Inequality
By framing economic status in spiritual terms, prosperity theology risks:
• Legitimizing existing social and economic inequalities.
• Discouraging structural critiques of corruption or economic exclusion.
• Reducing the motivation for citizens to demand systemic justice.

The Personalization of Political Power
One of the most critical threats identified is the potential for prosperity theology to distort political culture and weaken independent institutions.
Alliances Between Leaders and Elites
A recurring trend involves prosperity preachers forming close ties with political elites. This often manifests as an exchange of public religious endorsements for financial or political privileges. This dynamic shifts citizen loyalty away from constitutional principles and toward charismatic personalities.
Impact on Governance
The "miracle-centered" nature of these movements can contribute to a political culture that favors "strong individuals" over institutional governance. In fragile democracies, this can have the following effects:
• Promotion of Populism: Emotional mobilization can be leveraged for populist agendas.
• Institutional Erosion: The emphasis on charismatic authority can weaken the independence of legislatures, courts, and civil society organizations.


Summary of Values: Democracy vs. Prosperity Theology
The following table contrasts the core orientations of these two influential systems:
Feature Democracy Prosperity Theology
Primary Focus Collective welfare and public good Individual wealth and success
Social Goal Equality and accountability Personal advancement and divine favor
View of Success Often linked to policy and merit Evidence of spiritual righteousness
View of Poverty A systemic or social challenge Potentially a sign of spiritual failure
Leadership Institutional and constitutional Charismatic and personal
Conclusion: Balancing Spiritual Influence and Democratic Principles
The social impact of prosperity theology is not inherently negative; rather, it is contingent upon its interaction with broader economic and political conditions. The movement can contribute positively to national development when it is aligned with ethical responsibility and a commitment to justice.
However, when the theology becomes a tool for political manipulation or focuses exclusively on materialism, it threatens to deepen social divisions and undermine democratic culture. A healthy democracy requires a balance where religious movements promote compassion and civic responsibility rather than mere personal enrichment and loyalty to charismatic leaders.

Wednesday, May 27, 2026

The Horn of Africa at the Crossroads: Maritime Power, Proxy Conflict, and the Geopolitical Re-engineering of the Red Sea Order



The Horn of Africa at the Crossroads: Maritime Power, Proxy Conflict, and the Geopolitical Re-engineering of the Red Sea Order

The Horn of Africa has entered one of the most consequential geopolitical transitions since the end of the Cold War. What once appeared to be localized disputes over borders, identity, and political legitimacy has now evolved into a broader contest involving maritime access, Red Sea security architecture, energy corridors, and global strategic competition. Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia, Sudan, Djibouti, and external powers are increasingly drawn into a multidimensional struggle whose implications extend far beyond the region itself.

At the center of this transformation lies Ethiopia’s strategic dilemma as the world’s largest landlocked country. Since Eritrea’s independence in 1993, Ethiopia has depended heavily on Djibouti for maritime access, a dependency that Addis Ababa increasingly frames as economically unsustainable and strategically dangerous. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has elevated Red Sea access from a commercial necessity into a national security doctrine, arguing that maritime access represents an existential issue for Ethiopia’s long-term survival and development.

This evolving doctrine has triggered profound anxiety across the region. Eritrea, under President Isaias Afwerki, interprets Ethiopia’s rhetoric as a direct challenge to Eritrean sovereignty. Egypt views any strengthening of Ethiopia through maritime expansion as indirectly weakening Cairo’s leverage in the long-standing dispute over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. Turkey, the UAE, Israel, Saudi Arabia, the United States, China, and Russia each increasingly perceive the Horn of Africa through the lens of Red Sea geopolitics and global supply chain security.

Within this environment, three strategic trajectories appear increasingly plausible.

Scenario One: The Grand Bargain and Western-Backed Consolidation

The first scenario envisions a major geopolitical realignment orchestrated through Western and Gulf diplomacy. Under this framework, Eritrea—facing prolonged isolation, sanctions pressure, and economic stagnation—accepts a negotiated arrangement granting Ethiopia long-term sovereign access to the Port of Massawa or Assab. Such a settlement would likely emerge through mediation involving the United States, the UAE, France, and Israel.

Under this model, Ethiopia would rapidly transform into a maritime state with naval capabilities supported by foreign investment and military partnerships. France could assist naval training, while Gulf financing might modernize port infrastructure and logistics corridors linking Ethiopia to the Red Sea. The strategic implications would be enormous. Ethiopia would reduce its dependence on Djibouti, strengthen its geopolitical leverage, and reshape the balance of power in the Horn.

For Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, such a breakthrough would constitute a historic political achievement capable of reinforcing state legitimacy ahead of a politically sensitive electoral period. Domestically, maritime access could be framed as the restoration of Ethiopian strategic dignity after decades of landlocked vulnerability.

Yet the consequences would reverberate across the region. Djibouti could face a severe economic decline due to reduced trade flows with Ethiopia. Egypt would likely perceive the emergence of a Western-aligned Ethiopian naval presence as a strategic setback in the GERD dispute. Turkey’s growing influence in Somalia and the Red Sea corridor could also encounter significant resistance from a new Ethiopian-UAE-Israeli maritime alignment.

However, this scenario assumes a level of political trust and regional compromise that currently appears fragile. Eritrea’s political culture has historically prioritized sovereignty and strategic autonomy above economic incentives. For Asmara, the fear of gradual Ethiopian dominance may outweigh the benefits of normalization.

Scenario Two: Proxy War Escalation and Direct Interstate Conflict

The second scenario is considerably more dangerous. In this trajectory, escalating rhetoric, proxy warfare, and internal fragmentation push Ethiopia and Eritrea toward direct military confrontation.

Ethiopia currently faces simultaneous pressures from multiple internal conflicts, including insurgencies linked to Fano factions in Amhara, instability in Oromia, and unresolved tensions surrounding Tigray after the Pretoria Agreement. In this context, maritime nationalism may become an instrument of political mobilization.

Eritrea, meanwhile, has long relied on asymmetric regional strategy and alliance manipulation to offset Ethiopia’s demographic and economic superiority. Addis Ababa frequently accuses Asmara of maintaining relationships with anti-government armed actors, including factions associated with Tigrayan, Amhara, and Oromo resistance movements.

The collapse of political arrangements in Tigray could become the critical trigger. If disputes surrounding political legitimacy and electoral participation intensify, the Pretoria framework may unravel entirely. Ethiopia could interpret Eritrean involvement in internal destabilization as justification for a military response aimed at neutralizing perceived threats along the Red Sea corridor.

Such a conflict would likely begin as a limited punitive operation but could rapidly expand into a full-scale regional war. Eritrea’s militarized state structure and defensive fortifications would make any coastal offensive extremely costly. Sudan’s internal instability could further internationalize the conflict, while external actors might align behind competing sides.

The economic consequences would be devastating. Ethiopia’s fragile macroeconomic conditions, fuel shortages, debt vulnerabilities, and dependence on international financial support would make prolonged warfare unsustainable. International lenders, including the IMF and World Bank, could suspend assistance. Trade routes across the Red Sea would become increasingly vulnerable, generating wider repercussions for global shipping and energy markets.

Scenario Three: The Cold War of the Horn

The third and perhaps most realistic scenario is neither diplomatic breakthrough nor outright war, but rather a prolonged strategic stalemate.

Under this framework, competing regional and global powers prevent either Ethiopia or Eritrea from achieving decisive dominance. Eritrea deepens strategic coordination with Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Russia, China, and Turkey, while Ethiopia continues expanding relations with the UAE, Western powers, and alternative regional partners.

This produces a militarized equilibrium characterized by proxy struggles, intelligence competition, arms accumulation, and diplomatic maneuvering rather than open interstate warfare. Saudi Arabia attempts to prevent direct conflict near critical Red Sea shipping lanes while quietly balancing competing regional interests. Egypt strengthens its strategic encirclement strategy against Ethiopia through partnerships with Eritrea and Sudan. Turkey preserves influence through Somalia, while China and Russia maintain broader strategic footholds tied to maritime trade and security.

In this environment, Ethiopia remains landlocked and strategically constrained, while Eritrea survives through external balancing and securitized nationalism. The Berbera and Somaliland question remains frozen under Turkish-mediated arrangements emphasizing Somalia’s territorial integrity. Regional politics become increasingly defined by containment rather than resolution.

The result is a “Cold War of the Horn”: a region trapped in permanent brinkmanship where peace exists without trust and war remains possible without becoming inevitable.

Conclusion

The Horn of Africa is no longer merely a regional theatre of instability. It has become a central arena in the emerging geopolitical competition over maritime corridors, Red Sea security, global trade infrastructure, and Middle Eastern strategic influence. Ethiopia’s search for maritime access, Eritrea’s defence of sovereignty, Egypt’s Nile security concerns, Gulf rivalries, and global power competition are now deeply interconnected.

The approaching political transitions and electoral pressures in 2026 may further accelerate these dynamics. Whether the region moves toward negotiated restructuring, catastrophic confrontation, or prolonged militarized stalemate will depend not only on regional leaders but also on the calculations of external powers competing to shape the future of the Red Sea order.

The central question is no longer whether the Horn of Africa will change, but rather what kind of geopolitical order will emerge from the transformation already underway.