Thursday, July 2, 2026

A Briefing on Ethiopian Constitutional Reform and National Dialogue

A Briefing on Ethiopian Constitutional Reform and National Dialogue

Executive Summary

This briefing document synthesizes a series of proposals and critical reflections concerning the potential revision of the Ethiopian Constitution. The central thesis posits that Ethiopia’s previous constitutions have lacked "mass approval" or legitimacy, having been established primarily through state power rather than inclusive consensus.

The current political landscape, characterized by the National Dialogue Commission's efforts and the Prosperity Party’s legislative dominance, presents an opportunity for reform. However, the existing process is critiqued for a lack of transparency and technical competence. To address these deficiencies, the document outlines nine foundational pillars for an "Inclusive Constitution." These pillars advocate for a shift from ethnic-based federalism to a civil-centred "Autonomous Administration" model, the adoption of a semi-presidential hybrid government, land tenure reform, and the decentralization of federal power through the establishment of three distinct capital cities.

Context and Current Climate of Reform

The impetus for constitutional revision stems from the ongoing National Dialogue Commission, which is tasked with submitting consensus-based recommendations to the government. Given the current parliamentary majority held by the Prosperity Party, the two houses (the House of Peoples' Representatives and the House of Federation) possess the required two-thirds majority to enact constitutional amendments.

The Legitimacy Deficit

Historically, Ethiopian constitutions have been driven by the interests of the ruling government rather than the will of the majority.

  • Power over Consent: Constitutional legitimacy in Ethiopia has traditionally relied on "absolute superiority of force" rather than popular mandate.
  • Inclusivity Gaps: While the current FDRE Constitution involved public discussion during its drafting, it failed to include all political factions or achieve immediate mass acceptance.
  • The "Red Flags" of the Dialogue: Some observers view the current National Dialogue process as lacking transparency. Concerns have been raised regarding the "incompetence" of the agenda-gathering phase and the absence of elite-modelled reconciliation before the broader dialogue.

The Nine Pillars for an Inclusive Constitution

The proposed framework for an "Inclusive Constitution" seeks to balance individual and group rights while moving away from ethnically exclusive governance.

1. Philosophical Reorientation: From Ethnic to Civil Society

The document argues that the current preamble views citizens solely as members of ethnic groups with mutually exclusive histories.

  • Citizenship First: The constitution must recognize individual citizenship and balance it with group rights.
  • Civil Identity: The state should be modelled as a "civil society" guided by scientific discovery and inclusive principles rather than "blood and inheritance."
  • Renaming the Federal Units: The term "Region" (derived from Soviet-era concepts) should be replaced with "Autonomous Administration." These units should be named after geographic features (e.g., rivers or directions) rather than ethnic groups to prevent the sense of "ethnic enclosures."

2. Governance: Adoption of a Semi-Presidential System

To prevent party dictatorship and mitigate ethnic polarization, a hybrid or semi-presidential system is proposed:

  • The President: Directly elected by the people. If no candidate secures 50%+1 of the vote, the runner-up becomes Vice President. The President oversees Defence and Foreign Affairs and is limited to two terms.
  • The Prime Minister: Appointed from the majority party in Parliament. The PM manages the federal police, the bureaucracy, and the security sector.
  • Local Empowerment: Directly elected presidents for autonomous administrations and mayors for cities, ensuring they are accountable to the electorate rather than federal appointees.

3. Electoral Reform: Mixed Representation

The current "First Past the Post" system is criticized for wasting votes.

  • Executive Elections: Majoritarian (highest vote wins) for the President and Mayors to ensure decisive leadership.
  • Legislative Elections: Proportional Representation for councils and parliament to ensure all voter voices are represented and to prevent single-party monopolies.

4. Federal Restructuring and the Three-Year Transition

The current federal structure is described as a collection of "ethnically exclusive homelands." The proposal suggests a radical restructuring:

  • Administrative Balance: Large regions like Oromia and Amhara should be divided into three or four smaller autonomous administrations. Smaller entities, such as Harari, should be merged with neighbours to ensure balanced population sizes (ideally between 10 million and 20 million). To avoid conflict, restructuring must follow a peaceful, three-year roadmap involving a national census, boundary studies, and resource-sharing agreements.

 

5. Urban Governance: Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa

As centers of "mixed diversity," these cities should:

  • Function as autonomous administrations reflecting their multicultural settlement.
  • Use the primary languages spoken by their residents for work and education as models for inclusive society-building.

6. Decentralization: Three Federal Capitals

To reduce political tension and distribute economic development, the federal government’s seats should be split across three different autonomous administrations:

1. Legislative Capital: Seat of the Parliament.

2. Executive Capital: Seat of government offices and the diplomatic community.

3. Judicial Capital: Seat of the High Courts and the Constitutional Court. Note: To maximize development elsewhere, the new autonomous administration encompassing Addis Ababa should not host any of these three seats.

 

 

7. Land Tenure Reform: Triple Ownership

The current state monopoly on land allows the government to use land as a tool of political patronage. The proposed "Triple Ownership" model includes:

  • Private Ownership: For farmers and urban residents (owning the land, not just the structures).
  • State Ownership: For unheld lands and limited infrastructure development.
  • Communal Ownership: For pastoralists and urban community use.
  • Neutrality: No ethnic group should have exclusive ownership rights over any specific territory.

8. Judicial Independence: A Dedicated Constitutional Court

Currently, the House of Federation—a political body—interprets the constitution.

  • Independent Court: Establish a neutral Constitutional Court to ensure the rule of law.
  • Tenure: Judges should be nominated by the President and approved by Parliament for 10-year terms to ensure stability and independence from the executive branch.

9. Linguistic Policy: The Three-Language Model

Modelled after successful implementations in India, this policy aims to balance national unity with local autonomy:

  • Federal Level: Amharic and Afaan Oromo as official working and educational languages.
  • Autonomous Level: Each administration uses one federal language, its own local working language, and English.

Summary of Proposed Structural Shifts

Current Feature

Proposed Reform

Preamble Focus

Ethnic group identity

Federal Units

Ethnic "Regions"

Government Type

Parliamentary

Electoral System

First Past the Post

Land Ownership

State-only

Capital City

Centralized (Addis Ababa)

Interpretation

House of Federation

Language Policy

Variable

 

 

 

 

 II Research Report on Building an Inclusive Constitution in Ethiopia with Popular Consent and Legitimacy

Historical Background of Constitutional Transition and Current Realpolitik

The effort to establish sustainable peace and political stability in Ethiopia is closely linked to the drafting of a constitutional framework capable of resolving historical structural contradictions. Analyzing based on historical realities (realpolitik), Ethiopia’s past constitutions were founded not on popular consensus and legitimacy, but rather on the desires of the ruling regimes and their absolute monopoly of force. When the current Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE) was ratified in 1995 (1987 E.C.), although it was drafted by a constitutional assembly and subjected to public discussion, it did not include all political forces and failed to achieve broad consensus. Consequently, it immediately lacked widespread national legitimacy. Since the primary source of legitimacy for Ethiopian governments has historically been the monopoly of force rather than popular consent, whenever they lose that dominance, the entire system faces collapse.

Past constitutional systems cannot be dismissed as entirely devoid of useful content; the current constitution also contains several constitutional provisions that ought to be preserved. However, the FDRE constitution—much like the United States Constitution, which has evolved through various amendments—must become a "living document" capable of adapting to modern political and social shifts.

Although the Ethiopian National Dialogue Commission (ENDC) was established by parliamentary proclamation to address fundamental disagreements over state-building narratives and the federal system, the process faces widespread criticism regarding its transparency and inclusivity. Political science analyses suggest that "elite political reconciliation" should have preceded the national dialogue. Without this, the dialogue risks becoming a mere tool to execute the government's will. The weaknesses in the agenda-gathering process and the failure to synthesize collected agendas into professional policy language are seen as indicators of limited operational capacity within the commission.

Furthermore, despite individuals with disabilities accounting for nearly 20% of the country's population, their representation in the dialogue process remains extremely low, and procedural gaps such as the lack of sign language services persist. Nonetheless, because the ruling Prosperity Party holds the necessary parliamentary seats to pass any constitutional amendment by a two-thirds majority, a government-led constitutional revision is highly likely.

Table 1: Historical and Current Realpolitik of Ethiopian Constitutional Transitions

Historical Phase

Source of Legitimacy/Consent

Major Structural Weaknesses & Threats

Historical Constitutions (Pre-1995)

Monopoly of force and imperial/military regime desires

Entirely devoid of popular consent

1995 FDRE Constitution

Dominated by the victors with limited public discussion

Failed to include all political forces and immediately lacked popular consensus

2026 Historical Revision

Approved by the ruling party's parliamentary dominance under the guise of National Dialogue recommendations

Lack of sufficient elite political reconciliation, exclusion of key peripheral actors, and security instability

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Nine Structural Recommendations for an Inclusive Constitution

To guarantee the long-term survival of Ethiopia and build an "Inclusive Constitution" that commands popular consent, this report details and analyzes the following nine structural revisions

 

1. Modernizing Constitutional Philosophy with Inclusivity

The preamble of the current FDRE constitution, rather than recognizing Ethiopian citizenship, categorizes citizens solely as members of ethnic or national groups. This philosophy fosters conflicting narratives of history and demands, thereby weakening a shared national identity. The proposed constitutional philosophy must balance individual and collective rights.

Citizens have diverse collective identities (social, professional, and civic) beyond ethnic ones; the choice of which identity to prioritize must remain a matter of individual freedom rather than a constitutional mandate. The constitution should envision building an inclusive state and society based on civic ideals and civil society, rather than lineage (blood and heritage).

To implement this philosophy, the administrative units forming the federation should not be named "regions" (Kilils). The term "region" is derived from the Soviet Union's administrative division; it restricts an ethnic group to a specific territory and risks the federation's disintegration, similar to the Soviet Union's fate. To address this, the term "Autonomous Administration" will be implemented. The names of these autonomous administrations, zones, or woredas must not bear ethnic names. Instead, names should be based on geographic directions or prominent rivers. While autonomous administrations may have working languages, they will have no official ethnic identity, ensuring that any citizen with a legal residency ID enjoys equal rights and opportunities.

2. Limiting Power and Adopting a Semi-Presidential Form of Government

The current parliamentary system encourages single-party dominance and authoritarianism. In contrast, presidential systems, which clearly limit term limits, are more vulnerable to sudden electoral defeat. Since Ethiopia has no single ethnic group exceeding 50% of the population and is plagued by ethnic politics, a presidential system could soften ethnic polarization by requiring candidates to appeal to multiple ethnic groups to get elected.

However, to merge the benefits of both systems, this report argues for a semi-presidential or hybrid form of government. In this system, there will be two executive branches:

  • The President: Directly elected by a majority vote nationwide, accountable to the electorate. The President will lead the national defence forces and foreign affairs. The President's power will be limited to two terms. If no candidate secures a 50% + 1 majority in the first round, the leading candidate is legally mandated to select the runner-up as their vice president. This mechanism ensures a joint executive backed by popular consensus.
  • The Prime Minister: Nominated by the President from the party holding a majority in parliament and approved by parliament, accountable to parliament. The Prime Minister will oversee the federal police, the national security sector, and the civil bureaucracy.

This separation of power limits the absolute dominance of the federal executive over the legislative and judicial branches. Furthermore, ensuring that regional presidents and city mayors are directly elected by the public builds political accountability from the bottom up.

Table 2: Power and Accountability Division in the Semi-Presidential System

Executive Branch

Key Powers and Responsibilities

Constitutional Accountability

Term Limits

President

National Defence, Foreign Affairs, Nominating the Prime Minister

Directly to the electorate

Maximum of two terms

Prime Minister

Federal Police, National Security, Civil Bureaucracy

To the Federal Parliament (Legislative)

Subject to parliamentary confidence

3. Changing the Electoral System to a Hybrid of First-Past-The-Post and Proportional Representation

The current First-Past-The-Post (FPTP) electoral system leads to significant vote wasting. For example, in the 2021 election in Addis Ababa, opposition parties won approximately 32% of the vote but failed to secure a single seat in parliament due to the "winner-takes-all" system. This creates a sense of alienation among many citizens.

Conversely, Proportional Representation (PR) allocates seats based on the percentage of total votes won by political forces, ensuring the representation of all citizens' voices. However, because the President and mayors must be directly elected, PR is not suitable for executive elections.

Therefore, the following hybrid electoral system will be implemented:

  • Executive Elections (President, Autonomous Administration Presidents, Mayors): Elected via the First-Past-The-Post (FPTP) system.
  • Legislative Council Elections (Federal Parliament and Local Councils): Elected via Proportional Representation (PR). This reduces exclusion and enhances the quality of democratic representation.

 4. Reorganizing the Federal Structure and Approving a 3-Year Transition Plan

The current FDRE federal structure is fenced by ethnic boundaries, whose ultimate goal is secession. This has created oppressive and exclusive homelands based on primordial lineage. To avoid this, autonomous administrations must be reconstructed based on administrative convenience and civic ideals rather than language and ancestry.

To address the vast disparities in population and geographic size among administrations, the following population limit formula shall be applied. The population P of each autonomous administration must fall within the following range:

10,000,000\le P\le 20,000,000

Taking into account Ethiopia’s rapid total population growth P_{\text{total}}, the population ratio of an individual administration relative to the national population must follow this formula:

0.07\le\frac{P}{P_{\text{total}}}\le0.15

Accordingly, massive regions like Oromia and Amhara will be divided into three to four smaller, administratively convenient autonomous administrations, while extremely small regions like Harari will merge with neighboring areas to establish a structure with a viable population size.

Implementing this boundary reorganization abruptly could trigger severe political tension and security crises on the ground. Thus, the restructuring process must be guided by a 3-year transition plan approved alongside the constitution. Over these three years, census-taking, border studies, asset sharing, and administrative transitions will be executed gradually and peacefully. Both federal and autonomous institutions can incorporate symbolic representations blending local traditions with modern governance.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Table 3: Demographic Boundary Formula for Autonomous Administrations

Metric

Minimum Threshold

Maximum Threshold

Administrative Purpose

Population Size (P)

10 Million

20 Million

Ensure equitable resource distribution and administrative convenience

Population Ratio (\frac{P}{P_{\text{total}}})

7%

15%

Establish balanced political representation across the nation

5. Reclassifying Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa as Autonomous Administrations Integrated with Surrounding Areas

Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa are highly diverse urban centers with mixed demographics. To reflect this reality legally, these cities will be integrated with their surrounding suburban and rural areas to form distinct autonomous administrations. The primary languages spoken by the residents will serve as the working and educational languages. This allows these cities to preserve their diversity and serve as models for building an inclusive society.

6. Establishing Three Capital Cities

Concentrating the federal capital in a single location (Addis Ababa) has made the city a focal point of political disputes and power struggles. It has also skewed the flow of resources and infrastructure toward a single direction. To decentralize power and spread the developmental benefits of hosting government institutions, and drawing on the experience of South Africa, the federal government will establish three distinct capital cities.

Accordingly, three cities will be selected within newly created autonomous administrations:

  • The Legislative Capital (Parliament) will be seated in the first city.
  • The Executive Capital (Government Ministries and Diplomatic Missions) will be seated in the second city.
  • The Judicial Capital (Supreme and Constitutional Courts) will be seated in the third city.

This arrangement will distribute infrastructure and economic activity more equitably across different regions while significantly easing the political tension and pressure focused on Addis Ababa. To foster development elsewhere, the new autonomous administration containing Addis Ababa will be excluded from hosting any of these three capitals.

Table 4: Structural Division of the Three Federal Capitals

Branch of Government

Functional Center

Objectives and Benefits

Legislative

1st City (Outside Addis Ababa)

Enhance regional accessibility for public representatives

Executive

2nd City (Outside Addis Ababa)

Centralize bureaucracy and the diplomatic core

Judicial

3rd City (Outside Addis Ababa)

Guarantee judicial independence and insulation from politics

7. Making Land Ownership Private, Public, and Communal

Exclusive state ownership of land has allowed the government to act as a landlord, utilizing land as a political tool to cultivate loyalty and punish dissent. To resolve this and secure citizens' economic freedom, a tripartite land ownership system—originally championed in the policy platform of Ethiopian Citizens for Social Justice (Ezema)—must be implemented.

This system includes three types of ownership:

1. Private Ownership: Farmers, pastoralists, and urban landholders will own not only the structures built on the land but the land itself.

2. State Ownership: Forests, minerals, major rivers, and land required for infrastructure that are not privately held will be managed by the state. The state's power to manage land will be strictly limited by law.

3. Communal Ownership: Pasture and resource lands utilized collectively by urban communities and pastoralists will be placed under communal management.

The current constitution's implication that land belongs to specific ethnic groups poses a severe challenge to inclusivity. A core principle of the inclusive constitution is that no ethnic group shall have exclusive or preferential ownership over any piece of land.

 

 

8. Establishing an Independent Constitutional Court

The judiciary must be separated from the executive. Currently, constitutional interpretation is handled by the House of Federation, which represents a major obstacle to the rule of law. Because the House of Federation is a body of political representatives, its decisions are often driven by political expediency rather than legal principles.

To prevent this, an independent Constitutional Court based on the German model should be established. Judges of the Constitutional Court will be nominated by the President and confirmed by Parliament for non-renewable terms of up to 10 years, granting them the stability and independence needed to uphold the rule of law free from political interference.

9. A Three-Language Policy

To foster deeper inclusivity, a Three-Language Policy modeled on India's successful experience should be enshrined in the inclusive constitution. Under this policy:

  • At the federal level, Amharic and Oromo—the languages with the largest number of speakers—will serve as the working and educational languages of the federal government.
  • Autonomous administrations will retain the full right to determine their own local working languages.
  • The education system will mandate that every student learn three languages:

1. The Local/Regional Working Language (including mother tongue).

2. One Federal Language (which must be different from the student's local language).

3. English as the global language of communication.

This system will strengthen national unity, protect regional autonomy, and enhance global competitiveness.

Table 5: The Three-Language Policy in the Education System

Language Tier

Educational Role

Purpose and Implementation

1st Language (R1)

Local/Mother Tongue

Foster cognitive development and preserve cultural knowledge

2nd Language (R2)

Federal Working Language (Amharic or Oromo)

Facilitate inter-regional commerce, mobility, and national integration

3rd Language (R3)

English

Equipping the workforce to compete globally

Structural Challenges and Future Policy Directions

The proposed recommendations can potentially bring about fundamental structural shifts, yet their implementation clashes with several political and social realities.

1. Security Instability and Regional Resistance

Ongoing security crises and armed conflicts in Amhara, Oromia, and Tigray are massive hurdles to implementing a new constitutional design. In Tigray, political instability and the absence of a fully reconstituted regional government forced the agenda-gathering forums to be relocated to Addis Ababa. Groups like Salsay Weyane Tigray (SaWeT) and the Tigray Independence Party (TIP) argue that a constitutional order must be fully restored before meaningful dialogue can occur.

Additionally, there are concerns that the federal government intends to use the upcoming 2026 elections to replace the 1995 EPRDF constitution with PM Abiy Ahmed's centralized "Medemer" presidential vision. This centralization push is bound to trigger intense resistance from regional ethnonational forces.

2. Transitional Justice Integration Gap

Although a transitional justice policy was adopted by the Council of Ministers in 2024, its integration with the National Dialogue remains vague, slowing down both processes. If constitutional revision is decoupled from transitional justice, addressing historical grievances and grievances in a sustainable manner will be impossible. The non-derogable principle in Article 28 of the current constitution, which bars statutes of limitations and amnesties for gross human rights violations, must be strictly preserved in the new constitution.

Conclusion and Policy Recommendations

Ethiopia’s political crisis can only find a lasting resolution through fundamental, structurally sound constitutional amendments. Because the current constitution's amendment procedures (Articles 104 and 105) are extremely rigid and difficult to execute, a specialized Constitutional Amendment Commission must be established to translate the national dialogue's recommendations into law.

The following policy steps are recommended for the constitutional revision process:

  • Establish an Elite Reconciliation Forum: Parallel to the broad national dialogue, create a high-level negotiation platform specifically for armed groups and key opposition leaders to reach political consensus.
  • Form a Constitutional Amendment Commission: Establish an independent, time-bound, expert-led body authorized by parliament to draft the specific constitutional changes.
  • Link Transitional Justice with Constitutional Reform: Systematically anchor transitional justice policies within the constitutional framework to legally address historical grievances.
  • Enact a Phased Transition Plan: Avoid abrupt restructuring of federal boundaries; instead, mandate a 3-year phased transition plan based on detailed technical studies and public consensus.

 

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Wednesday, July 1, 2026

Macroeconomic Success, Social Fragility: Ethiopia's Economic Reforms Need a Human Face

Ethiopia's ongoing economic reforms under the International Monetary Fund's (IMF) Extended Credit Facility (ECF) represent one of the most ambitious macroeconomic restructuring programs in Africa. The Homegrown Economic Reform (HGER) agenda has delivered measurable improvements in macroeconomic stability: economic growth has accelerated, inflation has declined from previous highs, foreign exchange reserves have increased substantially, and export earnings—particularly from gold and coffee—have strengthened.

These achievements deserve recognition. However, macroeconomic success should not be confused with broad-based human development. The ultimate measure of economic reform is not merely whether fiscal balances improve or reserves accumulate, but whether ordinary citizens experience greater economic security and improved living standards.

The Ethiopian experience illustrates a classic dilemma confronting many developing economies implementing IMF-supported adjustment programs. Fiscal consolidation, exchange-rate liberalization, tax reform, and subsidy removal are designed to restore long-term macroeconomic sustainability. Yet these same policies often impose significant short-term costs on vulnerable populations. Ethiopia now finds itself precisely at this crossroads.

The transition to a market-determined exchange rate has corrected longstanding distortions in Ethiopia's foreign exchange market and reduced opportunities for arbitrage. Nevertheless, the rapid depreciation of the Ethiopian Birr has sharply increased the domestic prices of imported goods, agricultural inputs, fuel, medicines, and industrial materials. Although headline inflation has moderated, many households continue to experience declining purchasing power because prices remain substantially above pre-reform levels.

Similarly, the removal of fuel subsidies has strengthened fiscal discipline by reducing budgetary pressures and discouraging market distortions. However, it has also increased transportation costs, disrupted supply chains, and contributed to localized fuel shortages that affected economic activity, education, and food distribution. These developments demonstrate that economically rational policies can produce socially painful outcomes when implementation outpaces institutional capacity.

Perhaps the greatest concern is the widening gap between macroeconomic indicators and household welfare. The report documents rising poverty, persistent multidimensional deprivation, and disproportionate burdens on rural communities and low-income households. Since poorer families devote a much larger share of their income to food, they experience inflation more intensely than aggregate national statistics suggest. Children remain particularly vulnerable, with food insecurity and human capital deficits threatening Ethiopia's long-term development prospects.

The government's mitigation efforts—including expansion of the Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP), civil service salary adjustments, and reforms to targeted social protection—are important policy responses. Yet these interventions remain constrained by limited domestic financing and continued dependence on external donor support. Sustainable social protection requires stronger domestic revenue generation, improved governance, and more efficient public expenditure.

Equally important is institutional credibility. Successful structural adjustment depends not only on sound economic design but also on transparent implementation. The report highlights concerns surrounding fuel distribution, corruption, and weaknesses in digital payment enforcement, reminding policymakers that governance reforms must accompany economic liberalization.

Ethiopia's reform program should therefore be judged through a dual lens. Macroeconomic stabilization is indispensable for restoring investor confidence, strengthening debt sustainability, and promoting long-term growth. Yet economic reforms that neglect social equity risk undermining the very political legitimacy necessary for their success.

The challenge facing Ethiopia is no longer whether reform should continue, but how it should continue. Policymakers must ensure that economic efficiency and fiscal responsibility are balanced with social protection, inclusive growth, and institutional accountability. Durable economic transformation will ultimately depend not only on stronger balance sheets but also on stronger households. Ethiopia's future prosperity will be determined by whether macroeconomic stability translates into tangible improvements in the daily lives of its citizens.

Friday, June 26, 2026

የትራምፕ የኢራን ቁማር፡ የአሜሪካን የበላይነት ውድቀት ሊያፋጥን የሚችል ጦርነት



የትራምፕ የኢራን ቁማር፡ የአሜሪካን የበላይነት ውድቀት ሊያፋጥን የሚችል ጦርነት
ትልቁ ስትራቴጂካዊ ውድቀቶች በጦር ሜዳ ድሎች ወይም ሽንፈቶች ብቻ የሚለኩት አልፎ አልፎ ነው። የሚለኩት ጠመንጃዎች ጸጥ ካሉ ከረጅም ጊዜ በኋላ በሚከሰቱት የፖለቲካ ውጤቶች ነው። የዩናይትድ ስቴትስ ወታደራዊ ጣልቃ ገብነት በኢራን ላይ የሚያሳድረው የቅርብ ጊዜ ክስተቶች ምንም አይነት አመላካች ከሆኑ፣ የፕሬዚዳንት ዶናልድ ትራምፕ የመካከለኛው ምስራቅ ፖሊሲ ዘላቂ ቅርስ የቴህራን መዳከም ላይሆን ይችላል፣ ነገር ግን የአሜሪካን ዓለም አቀፍ አመራር ማዳከም ሊሆን ይችላል።

ወታደራዊ ዘመቻው የኢራንን ስትራቴጂካዊ ስጋት ለማስወገድ፣ የአሜሪካን መከላከያ ወደነበረበት ለመመለስ እና የእስራኤልን ክልላዊ ደህንነት ለማጠናከር እንደ ወሳኝ ጥረት ቀርቧል። በምትኩ፣ ውጤቱ እየጨመረ በመጣው ባለብዙ ዋልታ ዓለም ውስጥ የወታደራዊ ኃይል ገደብን ያጋለጠ ይመስላል። የታክቲካል የበላይነት ስትራቴጂካዊ ስኬት ማስገኘት አልቻለም። የአገዛዝ ለውጥ ወይም ያለ ቅድመ ሁኔታ እጅ መስጠትን ከማድረስ ይልቅ፣ ግጭቱ ብዙዎቹን የመጀመሪያ ዓላማዎች ያልተፈቱ ቀላል የዲፕሎማሲ ስምምነት በማድረግ ተጠናቀቀ።

በጣም ፈጣን የሆነው የፖለቲካ ጉዳት በባህላዊ አጋሮቿ መካከል የአሜሪካ አመራር ተዓማኒነት ነው። የአውሮፓ መንግስታት በዋሽንግተን እየጨመረ በመጣው የውጭ ፖሊሲ ያልተደሰቱበት፣ ግጭቱን ትርጉም ያለው ምክክር ሳይደረግ የተከናወነ ዋና ወታደራዊ እርምጃ ሌላ ምሳሌ አድርገው ተመልክተውታል። እምነት - ከአሜሪካ ታላላቅ ስትራቴጂካዊ ሀብቶች አንዱ - አንዴ ከጠፋ በኋላ በቀላሉ እንደገና መገንባት አይቻልም።
ግጭቱ የእስራኤልን ስትራቴጂካዊ አካባቢም አወሳስቦታል። ለብዙ አሥርተ ዓመታት እስራኤል በአሜሪካ ወታደራዊ ድጋፍ ላይ ብቻ ሳይሆን በዩናይትድ ስቴትስ ውስጥ ሰፊ የሁለት ወገን የፖለቲካ ድጋፍ ላይም ጥገኛ ሆና ቆይታለች። በእስራኤል ዙሪያ እየጨመረ የመጣው የፖለቲካ ፖላራይዜሽን ይህ ስምምነት ከአሁን በኋላ እንደ ቀላል ሊወሰድ እንደማይችል ይጠቁማል። ለእስራኤል የሚሰጠው ድጋፍ ከብሔራዊ ጉዳይ ይልቅ የፓርቲ ጉዳይ እየሆነ ከመጣ፣ ኢየሩሳሌም በጣም አስፈላጊው ጥምረት እምብዛም የማይገመት ሆኖ ልታገኘው ትችላለች።
ይህ በእንዲህ እንዳለ፣ የባህረ ሰላጤው ንጉሣዊ አገዛዝ የተለየ አጣብቂኝ ውስጥ ይወድቃል። የደህንነት አርክቴክቸራቸው በዩናይትድ ስቴትስ ላይ በእጅጉ ጥገኛ ሆኖ ይቆያል፣ ነገር ግን ግጭቱ ሙሉ በሙሉ በአንድ ውጫዊ ዋስትና ላይ የመተማመን አደጋዎችን አሳይቷል። ይህ ግንዛቤ ከቻይና፣ አውሮፓ፣ ህንድ እና ሌሎች የእስያ ኃያላንን ጨምሮ - ከአማራጭ አጋሮች ጋር ጥልቅ ግንኙነትን ሊያበረታታ ይችላል - እንደ ዋሽንግተን ምትክ ሳይሆን ለወደፊቱ እርግጠኛ አለመሆንን ለመከላከል እንደ ስትራቴጂካዊ መከላከያ።

በሚያስገርም ሁኔታ፣ ቤጂንግ ከዋና ዋና የጂኦፖሊቲካል ተጠቃሚዎች አንዷ ሆና ልትወጣ ትችላለች። በመካከለኛው ምስራቅ ውስጥ ያለ እያንዳንዱ ተጨማሪ የአሜሪካ ወታደራዊ ቁርጠኝነት የዲፕሎማሲ ትኩረትን፣ ወታደራዊ ሀብቶችን እና የፖለቲካ ካፒታልን ከኢንዶ-ፓስፊክ ያርቃል፣ ከቻይና ጋር ያለው ስትራቴጂካዊ ውድድር የሃያ አንደኛው ክፍለ ዘመን ዓለም አቀፍ ፖለቲካን እየጨመረ የሚገልጸው ነው። አሜሪካ በፋርስ ባሕረ ሰላጤ ላይ ለረጅም ጊዜ ትኩረት መስጠቷ ቤጂንግ ያለ ግጭት የክልል ተጽዕኖዋን ለማጠናከር ጠቃሚ ስትራቴጂካዊ ቦታ ይሰጣታል።

ሩሲያም በተዘዋዋሪ ትጠቀማለች። እየጨመረ የመጣው የኃይል ዋጋ ጊዜያዊ የኢኮኖሚ እፎይታ ያስገኛል፣ የምዕራባውያን ወታደራዊ ሀብቶች ደግሞ በብዙ ቲያትሮች ላይ እየተስፋፉ ይሄዳሉ። ሞስኮ ከፍተኛ የኢኮኖሚ እና ወታደራዊ ጫናዎችን መጋፈጥ ብትቀጥልም፣ የምዕራባውያን ስትራቴጂካዊ ትስስር መቀነስ የሩሲያን ጥቅም ያገለግላል።
ምናልባት በጣም ዘላቂው ውጤት ዓለም አቀፍ የኢኮኖሚ ስርዓትን ይመለከታል። ግጭቱ የዓለም ንግድ በሆርሙዝ ወሽመጥ ውስጥ ለሚከሰቱ መስተጓጎሎች ተጋላጭነትን በድጋሚ አሳይቷል። የኢነርጂ ደህንነት፣ የባህር ንግድ፣ የኢንሹራንስ ገበያዎች እና የአቅርቦት ሰንሰለቶች ለጂኦፖሊቲካዊ ድንጋጤዎች ተጋልጠዋል። ስለዚህ መንግስታት እና ዓለም አቀፍ ኮርፖሬሽኖች የአቅርቦት ልዩነትን፣ የስትራቴጂክ ክምችትን እና አማራጭ የትራንስፖርት ኮሪደሮችን ለማፋጠን የሚያደርጉትን ጥረት ሊያፋጥኑ ይችላሉ።

በመሠረቱ፣ ግጭቱ በዓለም ፖለቲካ ውስጥ ሰፊ ለውጥን ያሳያል። ወታደራዊ የበላይነት ብቻውን የፖለቲካ ውጤቶችን ዋስትና አይሰጥም። ታላላቅ ኃያላን በጦር ኃይል ብቻ ሳይሆን በኢኮኖሚያዊ መቋቋም፣ በቴክኖሎጂ ፈጠራ፣ በዲፕሎማሲያዊ ህጋዊነት እና በአጋርነት አስተዳደርም ጭምር እየተወዳደሩ ነው። ስኬት በዓለም አቀፍ መተማመን ላይ ከመሆን ይልቅ በጦርነት ማሸነፍ ላይ ያነሰ ነው።

ዩናይትድ ስቴትስ በዓለም ላይ በጣም ኃይለኛ ወታደራዊ ተዋናይ ሆና ትቀጥላለች። ሆኖም ስትራቴጂካዊ ቁጥጥር የሌለው ኃይል እየቀነሰ የሚሄድ ትርፍ ሊያመጣ ይችላል። ታሪክ በተደጋጋሚ እንደሚያሳየው ኢምፓየሮች አንድ ጦርነት ስለተሸነፉ እምብዛም እንደማይወድቁ፤ ተደጋጋሚ ስትራቴጂካዊ ከመጠን በላይ መጨመር ጥምረትን፣ ተአማኒነትን እና የሀገር ውስጥ መግባባትን ቀስ በቀስ ሲያበላሽ ይወድቃሉ።የኢራን ግጭት በመጨረሻ እንደ ጊዜያዊ መሰናክል ወይም ወሳኝ የሆነ የለውጥ ነጥብ መታወሱ የሚወሰነው ዋሽንግተን በሚቀጥሉት ዓመታት ውስጥ ታላቁን ስትራቴጂዋን እንዴት እንደምታስተካክል ነው። የአሜሪካ ፖሊሲ አውጪዎች ጥምረቶችን እንደገና ካቋቋሙ፣ የዲፕሎማሲያዊ ተዓማኒነትን መልሰው ካቋቋሙ እና በረጅም ጊዜ ስትራቴጂካዊ ውድድር ላይ እንደገና ካተኮሩ፣ ጉዳቱ ሊቀለበስ ይችላል።

ካልሆነ፣ የታሪክ ምሁራን የኢራንን ጦርነት አሜሪካ ጥንካሬዋን እንዳሳየችበት ቅጽበት ሳይሆን፣ በአሜሪካ ከሚመራው ዓለም አቀፍ ሥርዓት ወደ ይበልጥ የተበታተነ እና ባለብዙ ዋልታ ዓለም ቀስ በቀስ በሚሸጋገርበት ወቅት እንደ ሌላ ምዕራፍ አድርገው ሊመለከቱት ይችላሉ።
https://x.com/i/status/2070564643987165476

Thursday, June 25, 2026

Evaluation of Ethiopian insurgencies (OLA, TDF, FANO) through the lens of *The Strategy of Terrorism* by Peter R. Neumann and M.L.R. Smith*

**Evaluation of Ethiopian insurgencies (OLA, TDF, FANO) through the lens of *The Strategy of Terrorism* by Peter R. Neumann and M.L.R. Smith**

The book frames **terrorism as a strategy** — the deliberate creation of fear through symbolic violence to influence political behaviour — rather than an irrational or purely grievance-driven phenomenon. It is a value-neutral analysis rooted in Clausewitzian principles: violence as a continuation of politics by other means, a battle of wills aimed at breaking the opponent’s resolve.

The authors distinguish **strategic terrorism** (reliance on symbolic acts of violence alone to disorient and provoke, bypassing mass political organization and conventional battles) from **guerrilla warfare** (which builds popular support, accumulates strength over time, and often aims toward eventual conventional confrontation, per Maoist models).

They outline a **three-stage model** for strategic terrorism and argue it is systemically **flawed**, with rare successes (e.g., FLN in Algeria or Irgun in Palestine). Most campaigns fail due to limited disorientation, ineffective provocation, inability to convert momentum into lasting legitimacy, and the **escalation trap** (need to intensify violence to sustain fear often alienates supporters and invites decisive countermeasures).

### 1. TDF (Tigray Defence Forces) – Tigray War (2020–2022)
The TDF represents a **hybrid guerrilla/conventional-asymmetric campaign** more than pure strategic terrorism. After initial territorial losses, it reorganized into a guerrilla force using hit-and-run tactics, ambushes, infiltration (“qoretta”), and popular mobilization in Tigray’s terrain, while retaining the capacity for larger operations. It drew on a strong pre-existing Tigrayan ethnic/national identity.

- **Stage 1 (Disorientation)**: Partial success locally. Federal and allied actions (including alleged atrocities) created fear and displacement in Tigray, framing the conflict as resistance to external imposition. However, it did not broadly shatter Ethiopian societal “structural supports” (sense of security/stability) nationwide. Outside Tigray, effects were limited.
- **Stage 2 (Target response/Provocation)**: Mixed. Heavy federal response (including Eritrean involvement) initially alienated some but rallied support elsewhere (e.g., the Amhara alliance) and drew international pressure. It did not collapse the government or force capitulation.
- **Stage 3 (Gaining legitimacy)**: Strong local legitimacy in Tigray via ethnic cohesion and defensive narrative. The political wing (TPLF) enabled the transition to negotiations, culminating in the Pretoria Agreement (cessation of hostilities and a disarmament framework). This partial success aligns with the book’s emphasis that even effective violence requires eventual political conversion.

**Assessment per book**: Closer to guerrilla resistance against perceived overreach than pure terrorism. Ethnic identity aided legitimacy, but the resilience of the federal government and population, plus the internal (not foreign-occupier) nature of the conflict, limited broader impact. Negotiated outcome reflects the book’s point that pure terror rarely wins outright; politics is essential. It avoided a total escalation trap through compromise, but at enormous human and economic cost.

### 2. OLA (Oromo Liberation Army)
The OLA blends **guerrilla tactics** (rural hit-and-run in Oromia’s terrain, some territorial control in fluid rural pockets) with elements of symbolic violence (attacks on officials, infrastructure, alleged civilian targeting, kidnappings). It seeks Oromo self-determination/autonomy amid historical grievances. It is fractured, with limited governance structures in controlled areas.

- **Stage 1 (Disorientation)**: Creates significant local insecurity, displacement, and ethnic clashes in Oromia. However, widespread civilian suffering often attributes chaos to the conflict itself rather than solely to the government. It has not produced the widespread “it could happen to me” panic or total breakdown of societal cohesion across broader populations.
- **Stage 2 (Target response)**: Government countermeasures (counterinsurgency, arrests of relatives, alleged indiscriminate actions, air strikes) can alienate Oromos and reinforce narratives of oppression. Yet they also demonstrate resolve and may rally non-Oromo support or public demand for security.
- **Stage 3 (Gaining legitimacy)**: Ethnic identity provides a ready base among many Oromos. Some political roots (OLF) and intermittent peace talks exist, but factionalism, a limited unified vision, and difficulty communicating an attractive alternative beyond ethnic lines hinder broader appeal. Violent risks alienating moderates.

**Assessment per book**: Fits patterns of flawed insurgent strategies in peripheral regions with legitimacy deficits. Low government legitimacy in parts of Oromia aids in the early stages. Still, resilience, diminishing returns from sustained violence, and challenges in stage 3 (unified politics, avoiding alienation) explain its protracted yet contained nature. It has not escalated to threaten core state power, but it risks the escalation trap (more attacks → more harm → potential backlash). Aligns with the book’s view that such campaigns rarely achieve fundamental change without mass organization and political transition.

### 3. FANO (Amhara militias/insurgency)
FANO is a **decentralized ethnic militia/guerrilla movement** (with many ex-soldiers) that evolved from community defence into an insurgency against federal policies (disarmament, perceived marginalization, constitutional issues). Tactics include rural control, ambushes, road attacks, and some urban operations. Goals range from protecting Amhara interests/territorial claims to broader constitutional change or, in radical factions, opposing the government. Recent unification efforts (e.g., Amhara Fano National Movement) aim to address fragmentation.

- **Stage 1 (Disorientation)**: Disrupts the Amhara region (rural control, economic harm, insecurity). Ethnic framing polarises rather than broadly disorients Ethiopian society. Alleged civilian impacts can undermine the narrative.
- **Stage 2 (Target response)**: Federal operations (state of emergency, drones, counteroffensives) are portrayed by supporters as repression, sustaining resistance. However, the government retains control of urban/highway areas and has not collapsed.
- **Stage 3 (Gaining legitimacy)**: Strong local/ethnic support in Amhara via identity and community roots aids appeal. But decentralization, factional goals, and difficulty presenting a cohesive alternative vision limit national traction. Unification helps but remains incomplete.

**Assessment per book**: Classic example of ethnic insurgency benefiting from regional legitimacy deficits and identity cohesion (aiding stage 3). Guerrilla elements (territorial aspects) distinguish it from pure symbolic terrorism. It exploits provocation dynamics but faces the same limits: population/government resilience, the risk of escalation that alienates supporters, and hurdles in converting armed momentum into unified political power. Controls rural areas but struggles for decisive leverage, consistent with the book’s prediction of limited utility for such strategies without favourable conditions or political shift.

### Overall Assessment
These insurgencies are primarily **ethnic/regional guerrilla-style conflicts with terrorist elements**, not textbook strategic terrorism campaigns that rely solely on fear-inducing symbolic violence to bypass mass politics (per the book’s distinction). 

**Strengths aligning with the framework**:
- Ethnic identities provide pre-existing legitimacy bases (helpful for stage 3).
- Government heavy-handedness in all cases can alienate locals and aid provocation narratives (stage 2), especially where central legitimacy is questioned.
- Local control and resilience in peripheral regions create sustained pressure.

**Why they largely conform to the book’s “flawed strategy” thesis**:
- **Limited disorientation**: Populations and the state show resilience; violence causes real suffering and displacement, but rarely shatters societal “structural supports” enough for mass transfer of allegiance. Repetition often leads to coping mechanisms rather than chronic panic.
- **Provocation is double-edged**: Responses alienate some but demonstrate resolve, rally counter-support, or invite international scrutiny without collapsing authority.
- **Stage 3 bottlenecks**: Fragmentation (especially OLA, FANO), difficulty building a broad (non-ethnic) appeal or unified vision, and challenges transitioning from armed struggle to effective politics hinder consolidation. Media and government narratives counter insurgent messaging.
- **Escalation trap**: Sustaining momentum requires intensified operations, risking civilian harm, alienation, stronger crackdowns, or loss of support.
- **Internal (not foreign occupation) context**: The book notes that anti-colonial/occupier campaigns are relatively easier due to inherent legitimacy deficits and dual targeting (home + metropolis). These are domestic ethnic conflicts, making broad success harder to achieve.
- **Empirical pattern**: TDF achieved a negotiated settlement (partial success via politics). OLA and FANO remain protracted, controlling rural pockets but not posing existential threats to the centre or achieving stated transformative goals. This matches the book’s finding that most such campaigns end in failure, marginalization, or compromise rather than victory.

**Implications per the authors**: Governments facing these challenges should avoid over- or under-reaction that plays into insurgent hands, maintain the rule of law where possible, address underlying legitimacy issues, separate moderates from hardliners, and prevent insurgents from gaining unchallenged legitimacy through media or political fronts. Pure reliance on military eradication is insufficient; political dimensions matter.

In short, the Ethiopian cases illustrate the book’s core argument: terrorism and related insurgent violence can create chaos and impose costs, but are rarely sufficient on their own to achieve fundamental political ends. Success, when it occurs, typically requires favourable conditions, resilience on the insurgent side, *and* a viable path to political legitimacy and transition.

Monday, June 15, 2026

What's In BluePosted Mon 15 Jun 2026 Yemen: Briefing and Consultations


Security Council Report

What's In Blue

Posted Mon 15 Jun 2026

Yemen: Briefing and Consultations

Tomorrow morning (16 June), the Security Council will hold a briefing on Yemen. UN Special Envoy for Yemen Hans Grundberg and Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Tom Fletcher are expected to brief. Closed consultations are scheduled to follow the open briefing.

The Houthis’ continued involvement in the Middle East crisis, which began with US-Israeli strikes against Iran on 28 February, is expected to feature prominently in the discussion at tomorrow’s meeting. The Houthis, a Yemeni rebel group that de facto controls northern Yemen and is part of the Iran-allied “Axis of Resistance”, have launched multiple attacks against Israel since the beginning of the regional war. Following the 7 April announcement of a ceasefire between Iran and the US, the group paused its strikes against Israel. On 8 June, however, it resumed attacks. It fired several missiles at Israel, which the Houthis said were a response to the country’s continued assaults against Palestinians and violations of its ceasefire agreement with Lebanon. The Israel Defence Forces (IDF) reportedly said that it had intercepted one of the missiles, while the second failed to reach Israeli territory. Furthermore, on 9 June, the IDF reported that it had intercepted a Houthi-launched drone over the southern Israeli city of Eilat.

The Houthis have also threatened to resume targeting Israeli-linked shipping in the Red Sea, which the group had paused following the Gaza ceasefire agreement in October 2025. (Since the war in Gaza began in October 2023, the group has attacked several commercial ships in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, including some that were not directly affiliated with Israel.) Additionally, on 9 June, the commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force, Brigadier General Esmail Qaani, said that the Axis of Resistance will establish a new “security belt” extending from the Strait of Hormuz to the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. This vital shipping waterway connects the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden. At the time of writing, it was unclear whether the Houthis would refrain from further attacks against Israel or threats to maritime security following yesterday’s (14 June) announcement of a new ceasefire deal between the US and Iran.

Tomorrow, speakers are likely to raise concerns regarding the Houthis’ re-involvement in the Middle East crisis and their threats to resume attacks against shipping in the region. Several Council members are expected to condemn the most recent assaults targeting Israel and call on the Houthis to cease any further actions which could risk dragging Yemen into the regional conflict. Some members, such as the US, may further underline the Houthis’ alliance with Iran and criticize the latter’s support for the group. Members may also warn the Houthis against taking any actions which undermine the freedom of navigation and maritime security in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, underlining that such actions could have grave ramifications for the Yemeni people.

Fletcher and Grundberg are expected to recall that June marks two years since the Houthis arbitrarily detained several UN personnel, diplomatic staff, and aid workers, and condemn the ongoing detentions. A 10 June statement attributable to the Spokesperson for the Secretary-General noted that UN personnel were detained in 2025, 2024, 2023, and 2021, adding that 73 UN personnel remain detained and that one died during detention. It called for their immediate and unconditional release. It stressed that the actions of the Houthis have “severely constrained” the UN’s ability to assist millions of Yemenis in need of aid. The briefers may also voice concerns that three of the detained UN staff have been referred to the Houthis’ special criminal court and are undergoing trials which do not satisfy basic standards of due process.

Council members are likely to echo the messages conveyed in their 5 June press statement, which reiterated their condemnation of the detentions and demanded the personnel’s release. The statement also emphasized that all parties to a conflict are obliged by international humanitarian law to facilitate unhindered humanitarian access to civilians in need and “to promote the safety, security and freedom of movement” of humanitarian, UN, and associated personnel.

Grundberg is also expected to reference an agreement announced on 14 May—reached following months of negotiations held in Jordan, Switzerland, and Oman under UN auspices—through which the Yemeni government and the Houthis pledged to release over 1,600 conflict-related detainees. The negotiations were facilitated by the Supervisory Committee on the implementation of the detainee release agreement, co-chaired by the UN and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and established under the framework of the 2018 Stockholm Agreement. Grundberg is likely to elaborate on the agreement, which represents the largest detainee release since the outbreak of the Yemeni conflict, as a demonstration of what can be achieved through dialogue and negotiations under UN auspices and may express hope that it can serve as a foundation for further confidence-building between the parties.

Several Council members are expected to commend the 14 May agreement, which some may characterize as the most significant concrete achievement on the Yemen file in some time, and call on the parties to implement it swiftly and to build on it towards a broader political process. Grundberg may reiterate that such a process needs to be comprehensively focused on the political, economic, and security tracks; reflective of current realities; and must deliver on both short-term needs, such as reducing economic pressures, as well as longer-term issues, such as the future shape of the state, security arrangements, and governance. Some speakers are expected to argue that Houthi involvement in the regional escalation and the continued arbitrary detention of UN, aid, and diplomatic workers hampers progress towards a negotiated political resolution to the conflict. On the other hand, Russia may warn against isolating the Houthis and stress that the group must be part of a comprehensive settlement of the Yemeni conflict.

The Special Envoy may also brief on his recent visit to Riyadh, which concluded on 10 June. During the visit, he met with the President of the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), Rashad al-Alimi and other senior officials. The discussions focused on urgent economic issues and how to advance the political process, among other things. He may also cover the most recent meeting of the Military Coordination Committee (MCC), held on the same day in Amman, which included the government of Yemen and the Joint Forces Command of the Coalition to Restore Legitimacy in Yemen—a Saudi-led coalition established at the height of the Yemeni civil war to militarily support the Yemeni government—and which focused on “ceasefire planning, maritime security, and de-escalation steps”. The Houthis are the third party to the MCC, and the UN statement following the meeting noted that Grundberg plans to “convene all three delegations of the MCC in the coming period”.

Another issue that may be discussed at tomorrow’s meeting is the “Southern Dialogue Conference” initiative. In January, Saudi Arabia and Yemen announced plans to convene such a dialogue in Riyadh following a failed attempt by the Southern Transitional Council (STC)—a southern Yemeni faction that is a former member of the PLC—to take control of Yemen’s government-controlled southeastern governorates in December 2025. Given that there have been no further announcements regarding plans to host the conference, some Council members may ask Grundberg for updates on this initiative during the closed consultations.

The dire humanitarian situation in Yemen is another expected key area of discussion. Fletcher is likely to focus on the biggest challenges facing Yemeni civilians, including the deteriorating food security situation. He may refer to the 21 May Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) snapshot report, which said that, between March and May, around five million people—nearly half of the population in government-controlled areas—experienced Crisis (Phase 3) or worse levels of food insecurity, including 1.4 million in Emergency (Phase 4) conditions. According to the report, the outlook is expected to worsen significantly during the June-September lean season, with 5.4 million people projected to face acute food insecurity. This figure is unlikely to improve even during the harvest season, when Phase 4 conditions are projected to affect 1.8 million people.

Fletcher may underscore that sharply reduced humanitarian assistance—driven by critical funding shortfalls—is not only driving the deterioration in food security but is also affecting the health, water, sanitation, and hygiene sectors. A 2 June joint press release on Yemen issued by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the World Food Programme (WFP), and UNICEF warned that “[w]ithout immediate, sustained and scaled-up action, millions of vulnerable people risk falling deeper into hunger, malnutrition and irreversible livelihood loss”. Fletcher is likely to echo this message and to call on the international community to urgently scale up support.

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Friday, June 5, 2026

America Enabled the Gulf's African Adventurism: The New Geopolitics of Influence in Africa

The Foreign Policy analysis by Zuri Linetsky and Michael Woldemariam.

America Enabled the Gulf's African Adventurism: The New Geopolitics of Influence in Africa

Introduction

For much of the past two decades, policymakers in Washington and European capitals have focused on China's expanding economic footprint across Africa. Chinese infrastructure projects, loans, and investments have dominated discussions about external influence on the continent. Yet, according to a recent analysis by Zuri Linetsky and Michael Woldemariam in Foreign Policy, an equally significant—and potentially more destabilizing—transformation has been unfolding with far less scrutiny: the rise of Gulf state influence in Africa.

The authors argue that the United States has effectively enabled the geopolitical adventurism of its Middle Eastern partners, particularly the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia, and Qatar, by prioritizing strategic relationships in the Middle East over stability in Africa.

The Gulf's Expanding African Presence

The scale of Gulf engagement in Africa is unprecedented. The UAE alone has invested tens of billions of dollars across the continent in sectors ranging from ports and logistics to energy, agriculture, mining, and security. These investments have transformed the UAE into one of Africa's largest foreign investors.

Beyond economics, Gulf influence increasingly extends into military and security affairs. Through military bases, defence agreements, and security partnerships, Gulf states have established a presence stretching from the Horn of Africa to West Africa. Strategic ports along the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, and Atlantic coast have become critical nodes in a growing network of Gulf influence.

This expansion reflects a broader strategy: securing maritime trade routes, protecting supply chains, gaining access to natural resources, and enhancing geopolitical leverage in an increasingly competitive international environment.

The Security Dimension

The most controversial aspect of Gulf engagement is its security footprint. The UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar have frequently become involved in local conflicts, political rivalries, and regional power struggles. In some cases, Gulf funding, military assistance, or political backing has strengthened local factions and intensified existing disputes.

Rather than acting solely as economic partners, Gulf states have emerged as influential security actors capable of shaping political outcomes across multiple African regions. Their involvement has often blurred the line between investment and intervention.

Critics argue that such activities contribute to the militarization of political competition and create new forms of dependency among fragile states.

Washington's Role

A central argument advanced by Linetsky and Woldemariam is that the United States bears significant responsibility for this situation. Successive American administrations have prioritized counterterrorism cooperation, energy security, regional stability in the Persian Gulf, and strategic partnerships with Gulf monarchies.

As a result, Washington has often overlooked or tolerated the actions of its allies in Africa. When Gulf states have pursued aggressive regional agendas, supported competing factions, or intervened in domestic political disputes, the United States has rarely imposed meaningful diplomatic costs.

This approach has effectively created what the authors describe as a permissive environment in which Gulf powers can expand their influence with limited accountability.

Implications for Africa

The consequences for Africa are profound. While Gulf investments can bring much-needed capital, infrastructure, and economic opportunities, they also risk deepening political fragmentation and external dependency. African governments may benefit from new sources of financing, but they can also become entangled in rivalries among external powers.

The growing competition among Gulf states adds another layer to an already complex geopolitical landscape involving China, the United States, Russia, Turkey, and European actors.

For African leaders, the challenge is to maximize the benefits of external engagement while safeguarding sovereignty, strengthening institutions, and avoiding becoming arenas for proxy competition.

Conclusion

The rise of Gulf influence represents one of the most important yet underappreciated developments in contemporary African geopolitics. As the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar continue expanding their economic and security presence, the continent is becoming an increasingly significant arena for Middle Eastern power projection.

The critique offered by Linetsky and Woldemariam raises an important question: can the United States continue prioritizing its strategic partnerships in the Gulf while ignoring the consequences of those relationships in Africa? The answer will shape not only U.S.-Africa relations but also the future balance of power across the African continent.

Africa's future should ultimately be determined by Africans themselves, not by the competing ambitions of external powers. Achieving that goal will require stronger institutions, greater regional cooperation, and a renewed commitment to protecting African sovereignty in an era of intensifying geopolitical competition.