A Briefing on Ethiopian
Constitutional Reform and National Dialogue
Executive Summary
This briefing document synthesizes a
series of proposals and critical reflections concerning the potential revision
of the Ethiopian Constitution. The central thesis posits that Ethiopia’s
previous constitutions have lacked "mass approval" or legitimacy,
having been established primarily through state power rather than inclusive
consensus.
The current political landscape,
characterized by the National Dialogue Commission's efforts and the Prosperity
Party’s legislative dominance, presents an opportunity for reform. However, the
existing process is critiqued for a lack of transparency and technical
competence. To address these deficiencies, the document outlines nine
foundational pillars for an "Inclusive Constitution." These pillars
advocate for a shift from ethnic-based federalism to a civil-centred
"Autonomous Administration" model, the adoption of a
semi-presidential hybrid government, land tenure reform, and the
decentralization of federal power through the establishment of three distinct
capital cities.
Context and Current Climate of
Reform
The impetus for constitutional revision
stems from the ongoing National Dialogue Commission, which is tasked with
submitting consensus-based recommendations to the government. Given the current
parliamentary majority held by the Prosperity Party, the two houses (the House
of Peoples' Representatives and the House of Federation) possess the required
two-thirds majority to enact constitutional amendments.
The Legitimacy Deficit
Historically, Ethiopian constitutions
have been driven by the interests of the ruling government rather than the will
of the majority.
- Power
over Consent: Constitutional
legitimacy in Ethiopia has traditionally relied on "absolute
superiority of force" rather than popular mandate.
- Inclusivity
Gaps: While the current FDRE
Constitution involved public discussion during its drafting, it failed to
include all political factions or achieve immediate mass acceptance.
- The
"Red Flags" of the Dialogue: Some observers view the current National Dialogue process as
lacking transparency. Concerns have been raised regarding the
"incompetence" of the agenda-gathering phase and the absence of
elite-modelled reconciliation before the broader dialogue.
The Nine Pillars for an Inclusive
Constitution
The proposed framework for an
"Inclusive Constitution" seeks to balance individual and group rights
while moving away from ethnically exclusive governance.
1. Philosophical Reorientation:
From Ethnic to Civil Society
The document argues that the current
preamble views citizens solely as members of ethnic groups with mutually
exclusive histories.
- Citizenship
First: The constitution must
recognize individual citizenship and balance it with group rights.
- Civil
Identity: The state should be modelled
as a "civil society" guided by scientific discovery and
inclusive principles rather than "blood and inheritance."
- Renaming
the Federal Units: The term
"Region" (derived from Soviet-era concepts) should be replaced
with "Autonomous Administration." These units should be named
after geographic features (e.g., rivers or directions) rather than ethnic
groups to prevent the sense of "ethnic enclosures."
2. Governance: Adoption of a
Semi-Presidential System
To prevent party dictatorship and
mitigate ethnic polarization, a hybrid or semi-presidential system is proposed:
- The
President: Directly elected by the
people. If no candidate secures 50%+1 of the vote, the runner-up becomes
Vice President. The President oversees Defence and Foreign Affairs and is
limited to two terms.
- The
Prime Minister: Appointed from
the majority party in Parliament. The PM manages the federal police, the
bureaucracy, and the security sector.
- Local
Empowerment: Directly elected
presidents for autonomous administrations and mayors for cities, ensuring
they are accountable to the electorate rather than federal appointees.
3. Electoral Reform: Mixed
Representation
The current "First Past the
Post" system is criticized for wasting votes.
- Executive
Elections: Majoritarian (highest vote
wins) for the President and Mayors to ensure decisive leadership.
- Legislative
Elections: Proportional Representation
for councils and parliament to ensure all voter voices are represented and
to prevent single-party monopolies.
4. Federal Restructuring and the
Three-Year Transition
The current federal structure is
described as a collection of "ethnically exclusive homelands." The
proposal suggests a radical restructuring:
- Administrative
Balance: Large regions like Oromia and
Amhara should be divided into three or four smaller autonomous
administrations. Smaller entities, such as Harari, should be merged with
neighbours to ensure balanced population sizes (ideally between 10 million
and 20 million). To avoid
conflict, restructuring must follow a peaceful, three-year roadmap
involving a national census, boundary studies, and resource-sharing
agreements.
5. Urban Governance: Addis Ababa
and Dire Dawa
As centers of "mixed
diversity," these cities should:
- Function
as autonomous administrations reflecting their multicultural settlement.
- Use
the primary languages spoken by their residents for work and education as models for inclusive society-building.
6. Decentralization: Three Federal
Capitals
To reduce political tension and
distribute economic development, the federal government’s seats should be split
across three different autonomous administrations:
1. Legislative
Capital: Seat of the Parliament.
2. Executive
Capital: Seat of government offices and the
diplomatic community.
3. Judicial
Capital: Seat of the High Courts and the
Constitutional Court. Note: To maximize development elsewhere, the new
autonomous administration encompassing Addis Ababa should not host any of these
three seats.
7. Land Tenure Reform: Triple
Ownership
The current state monopoly on land
allows the government to use land as a tool of political patronage. The
proposed "Triple Ownership" model includes:
- Private
Ownership: For farmers and urban
residents (owning the land, not just the structures).
- State
Ownership: For unheld lands and limited
infrastructure development.
- Communal
Ownership: For pastoralists and urban
community use.
- Neutrality:
No ethnic group should have exclusive ownership rights over any specific
territory.
8. Judicial Independence: A
Dedicated Constitutional Court
Currently, the House of Federation—a
political body—interprets the constitution.
- Independent
Court: Establish a neutral
Constitutional Court to ensure the rule of law.
- Tenure:
Judges should be nominated by the President and approved by Parliament for
10-year terms to ensure stability and independence from the executive
branch.
9. Linguistic Policy: The
Three-Language Model
Modelled after successful implementations
in India, this policy aims to balance national unity with local autonomy:
- Federal
Level: Amharic and Afaan Oromo as
official working and educational languages.
- Autonomous
Level: Each administration uses one
federal language, its own local working language, and English.
Summary of Proposed Structural
Shifts
|
Current Feature
|
Proposed Reform
|
|
Preamble Focus
|
Ethnic group identity
|
|
Federal Units
|
Ethnic "Regions"
|
|
Government Type
|
Parliamentary
|
|
Electoral System
|
First Past the Post
|
|
Land Ownership
|
State-only
|
|
Capital City
|
Centralized (Addis Ababa)
|
|
Interpretation
|
House of Federation
|
|
Language Policy
|
Variable
|
II Research Report on Building an Inclusive
Constitution in Ethiopia with Popular Consent and Legitimacy
Historical Background of
Constitutional Transition and Current Realpolitik
The effort to establish sustainable
peace and political stability in Ethiopia is closely linked to the drafting of a
constitutional framework capable of resolving historical structural
contradictions. Analyzing based on historical realities (realpolitik), Ethiopia’s
past constitutions were founded not on popular consensus and legitimacy, but
rather on the desires of the ruling regimes and their absolute monopoly of
force. When the current Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of
Ethiopia (FDRE) was ratified in 1995 (1987 E.C.), although it was drafted by a
constitutional assembly and subjected to public discussion, it did not
include all political forces and failed to achieve broad consensus.
Consequently, it immediately lacked widespread national legitimacy. Since the
primary source of legitimacy for Ethiopian governments has historically been
the monopoly of force rather than popular consent, whenever they lose that
dominance, the entire system faces collapse.
Past constitutional systems cannot be
dismissed as entirely devoid of useful content; the current constitution also
contains several constitutional provisions that ought to be preserved. However,
the FDRE constitution—much like the United States Constitution, which has
evolved through various amendments—must become a "living document"
capable of adapting to modern political and social shifts.
Although the Ethiopian National Dialogue
Commission (ENDC) was established by parliamentary proclamation to address
fundamental disagreements over state-building narratives and the federal
system, the process faces widespread criticism regarding its transparency and
inclusivity. Political science analyses suggest that "elite political
reconciliation" should have preceded the national dialogue. Without this,
the dialogue risks becoming a mere tool to execute the government's will. The
weaknesses in the agenda-gathering process and the failure to synthesize
collected agendas into professional policy language are seen as indicators of
limited operational capacity within the commission.
Furthermore, despite individuals with
disabilities accounting for nearly 20% of the country's population, their
representation in the dialogue process remains extremely low, and procedural
gaps such as the lack of sign language services persist. Nonetheless, because
the ruling Prosperity Party holds the necessary parliamentary seats to pass any
constitutional amendment by a two-thirds majority, a government-led
constitutional revision is highly likely.
Table 1: Historical and Current
Realpolitik of Ethiopian Constitutional Transitions
|
Historical Phase
|
Source of Legitimacy/Consent
|
Major Structural Weaknesses
& Threats
|
|
Historical Constitutions
(Pre-1995)
|
Monopoly of force and
imperial/military regime desires
|
Entirely devoid of popular consent
|
|
1995 FDRE Constitution
|
Dominated by the victors with limited
public discussion
|
Failed to include all political forces
and immediately lacked popular consensus
|
|
2026 Historical Revision
|
Approved by the ruling party's
parliamentary dominance under the guise of National Dialogue recommendations
|
Lack of sufficient elite political
reconciliation, exclusion of key peripheral actors, and security instability
|
Nine Structural Recommendations for
an Inclusive Constitution
To guarantee the long-term survival of
Ethiopia and build an "Inclusive Constitution" that commands popular
consent, this report details and analyzes the following nine structural
revisions
1. Modernizing Constitutional
Philosophy with Inclusivity
The preamble of the current FDRE
constitution, rather than recognizing Ethiopian citizenship, categorizes
citizens solely as members of ethnic or national groups. This philosophy
fosters conflicting narratives of history and demands, thereby weakening a shared
national identity. The proposed constitutional philosophy must balance
individual and collective rights.
Citizens have diverse collective
identities (social, professional, and civic) beyond ethnic ones; the choice of
which identity to prioritize must remain a matter of individual freedom rather
than a constitutional mandate. The constitution should envision building an
inclusive state and society based on civic ideals and civil society, rather
than lineage (blood and heritage).
To implement this philosophy, the
administrative units forming the federation should not be named
"regions" (Kilils). The term "region" is derived from the
Soviet Union's administrative division; it restricts an ethnic group to a specific territory and risks the federation's disintegration, similar to the Soviet Union's fate. To address this, the term "Autonomous
Administration" will be implemented. The names of these autonomous
administrations, zones, or woredas must not bear ethnic names. Instead, names
should be based on geographic directions or prominent rivers. While autonomous
administrations may have working languages, they will have no official ethnic
identity, ensuring that any citizen with a legal residency ID enjoys equal
rights and opportunities.
2. Limiting Power and Adopting a
Semi-Presidential Form of Government
The current parliamentary system
encourages single-party dominance and authoritarianism. In contrast,
presidential systems, which clearly limit term limits, are more vulnerable to
sudden electoral defeat. Since Ethiopia has no single ethnic group exceeding
50% of the population and is plagued by ethnic politics, a presidential system
could soften ethnic polarization by requiring candidates to appeal to multiple
ethnic groups to get elected.
However, to merge the benefits of both
systems, this report argues for a semi-presidential or hybrid form of
government. In this system, there will be two executive branches:
- The
President: Directly elected by a
majority vote nationwide, accountable to the electorate. The President
will lead the national defence forces and foreign affairs. The President's
power will be limited to two terms. If no candidate secures a 50% + 1
majority in the first round, the leading candidate is legally mandated to
select the runner-up as their vice president. This mechanism ensures a
joint executive backed by popular consensus.
- The
Prime Minister: Nominated by the
President from the party holding a majority in parliament and approved by
parliament, accountable to parliament. The Prime Minister will oversee the
federal police, the national security sector, and the civil bureaucracy.
This separation of power limits the
absolute dominance of the federal executive over the legislative and judicial
branches. Furthermore, ensuring that regional presidents and city mayors are
directly elected by the public builds political accountability from the
bottom up.
Table 2: Power and Accountability
Division in the Semi-Presidential System
|
Executive Branch
|
Key Powers and Responsibilities
|
Constitutional Accountability
|
Term Limits
|
|
President
|
National Defence, Foreign Affairs,
Nominating the Prime Minister
|
Directly to the electorate
|
Maximum of two terms
|
|
Prime Minister
|
Federal Police, National Security,
Civil Bureaucracy
|
To the Federal Parliament
(Legislative)
|
Subject to parliamentary confidence
|
3. Changing the Electoral System to
a Hybrid of First-Past-The-Post and Proportional Representation
The current First-Past-The-Post (FPTP)
electoral system leads to significant vote wasting. For example, in the 2021
election in Addis Ababa, opposition parties won approximately 32% of the vote
but failed to secure a single seat in parliament due to the
"winner-takes-all" system. This creates a sense of alienation among
many citizens.
Conversely, Proportional Representation
(PR) allocates seats based on the percentage of total votes won by political
forces, ensuring the representation of all citizens' voices. However, because
the President and mayors must be directly elected, PR is not suitable for
executive elections.
Therefore, the following hybrid
electoral system will be implemented:
- Executive
Elections (President, Autonomous Administration Presidents, Mayors):
Elected via the First-Past-The-Post (FPTP) system.
- Legislative
Council Elections (Federal Parliament and Local Councils):
Elected via Proportional Representation (PR). This reduces exclusion and
enhances the quality of democratic representation.
4. Reorganizing the Federal Structure and
Approving a 3-Year Transition Plan
The current FDRE federal structure is
fenced by ethnic boundaries, whose ultimate goal is secession. This has created
oppressive and exclusive homelands based on primordial lineage. To avoid this,
autonomous administrations must be reconstructed based on administrative
convenience and civic ideals rather than language and ancestry.
To address the vast disparities in
population and geographic size among administrations, the following population
limit formula shall be applied. The population P of each autonomous
administration must fall within the following range:
10,000,000\le P\le 20,000,000
Taking into account Ethiopia’s rapid
total population growth P_{\text{total}}, the population ratio of an individual
administration relative to the national population must follow this formula:
0.07\le\frac{P}{P_{\text{total}}}\le0.15
Accordingly, massive regions like Oromia
and Amhara will be divided into three to four smaller, administratively
convenient autonomous administrations, while extremely small regions like
Harari will merge with neighboring areas to establish a structure with a viable
population size.
Implementing this boundary
reorganization abruptly could trigger severe political tension and security
crises on the ground. Thus, the restructuring process must be guided by a
3-year transition plan approved alongside the constitution. Over these three years,
census-taking, border studies, asset sharing, and administrative transitions
will be executed gradually and peacefully. Both federal and autonomous
institutions can incorporate symbolic representations blending local traditions
with modern governance.
Table 3: Demographic Boundary
Formula for Autonomous Administrations
|
Metric
|
Minimum Threshold
|
Maximum Threshold
|
Administrative Purpose
|
|
Population Size (P)
|
10 Million
|
20 Million
|
Ensure equitable resource distribution
and administrative convenience
|
|
Population
Ratio (\frac{P}{P_{\text{total}}})
|
7%
|
15%
|
Establish balanced political
representation across the nation
|
5. Reclassifying Addis Ababa and
Dire Dawa as Autonomous Administrations Integrated with Surrounding Areas
Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa are highly
diverse urban centers with mixed demographics. To reflect this reality legally,
these cities will be integrated with their surrounding suburban and rural areas
to form distinct autonomous administrations. The primary languages spoken by
the residents will serve as the working and educational languages. This allows
these cities to preserve their diversity and serve as models for building an
inclusive society.
6. Establishing Three Capital
Cities
Concentrating the federal capital in a
single location (Addis Ababa) has made the city a focal point of political
disputes and power struggles. It has also skewed the flow of resources and
infrastructure toward a single direction. To decentralize power and spread the
developmental benefits of hosting government institutions, and drawing on the
experience of South Africa, the federal government will establish three
distinct capital cities.
Accordingly, three cities will be
selected within newly created autonomous administrations:
- The
Legislative Capital (Parliament) will be seated in the first city.
- The
Executive Capital (Government Ministries and Diplomatic Missions)
will be seated in the second city.
- The
Judicial Capital (Supreme and Constitutional Courts) will be seated
in the third city.
This arrangement will distribute
infrastructure and economic activity more equitably across different regions
while significantly easing the political tension and pressure focused on Addis
Ababa. To foster development elsewhere, the new autonomous administration
containing Addis Ababa will be excluded from hosting any of these three
capitals.
Table 4: Structural Division of the
Three Federal Capitals
|
Branch of Government
|
Functional Center
|
Objectives and Benefits
|
|
Legislative
|
1st City (Outside Addis Ababa)
|
Enhance regional accessibility for
public representatives
|
|
Executive
|
2nd City (Outside Addis Ababa)
|
Centralize bureaucracy and the
diplomatic core
|
|
Judicial
|
3rd City (Outside Addis Ababa)
|
Guarantee judicial independence and
insulation from politics
|
7. Making Land Ownership Private,
Public, and Communal
Exclusive state ownership of land has
allowed the government to act as a landlord, utilizing land as a political tool
to cultivate loyalty and punish dissent. To resolve this and secure citizens'
economic freedom, a tripartite land ownership system—originally championed in
the policy platform of Ethiopian Citizens for Social Justice (Ezema)—must be
implemented.
This system includes three types of
ownership:
1. Private
Ownership: Farmers, pastoralists, and urban
landholders will own not only the structures built on the land but the land
itself.
2. State
Ownership: Forests, minerals, major rivers, and
land required for infrastructure that are not privately held will be managed by
the state. The state's power to manage land will be strictly limited by law.
3. Communal
Ownership: Pasture and resource lands utilized
collectively by urban communities and pastoralists will be placed under
communal management.
The current constitution's implication
that land belongs to specific ethnic groups poses a severe challenge to
inclusivity. A core principle of the inclusive constitution is that no ethnic
group shall have exclusive or preferential ownership over any piece of land.
8. Establishing an Independent
Constitutional Court
The judiciary must be separated from the
executive. Currently, constitutional interpretation is handled by the House of
Federation, which represents a major obstacle to the rule of law. Because the
House of Federation is a body of political representatives, its decisions are
often driven by political expediency rather than legal principles.
To prevent this, an independent
Constitutional Court based on the German model should be established. Judges of
the Constitutional Court will be nominated by the President and confirmed by
Parliament for non-renewable terms of up to 10 years, granting them the
stability and independence needed to uphold the rule of law free from political
interference.
9. A Three-Language Policy
To foster deeper inclusivity, a
Three-Language Policy modeled on India's successful experience should be
enshrined in the inclusive constitution. Under this policy:
- At
the federal level, Amharic and Oromo—the languages with the
largest number of speakers—will serve as the working and educational
languages of the federal government.
- Autonomous
administrations will retain the full right to determine their own local
working languages.
- The
education system will mandate that every student learn three languages:
1. The
Local/Regional Working Language (including
mother tongue).
2. One
Federal Language (which must be different from the
student's local language).
3. English
as the global language of communication.
This system will strengthen national
unity, protect regional autonomy, and enhance global competitiveness.
Table 5: The Three-Language Policy
in the Education System
|
Language Tier
|
Educational Role
|
Purpose and Implementation
|
|
1st Language (R1)
|
Local/Mother Tongue
|
Foster cognitive development and
preserve cultural knowledge
|
|
2nd Language (R2)
|
Federal Working Language (Amharic or
Oromo)
|
Facilitate inter-regional commerce,
mobility, and national integration
|
|
3rd Language (R3)
|
English
|
Equipping the workforce to compete
globally
|
Structural Challenges and Future
Policy Directions
The proposed recommendations can
potentially bring about fundamental structural shifts, yet their implementation
clashes with several political and social realities.
1. Security Instability and
Regional Resistance
Ongoing security crises and armed
conflicts in Amhara, Oromia, and Tigray are massive hurdles to implementing a
new constitutional design. In Tigray, political instability and the absence of
a fully reconstituted regional government forced the agenda-gathering forums to
be relocated to Addis Ababa. Groups like Salsay Weyane Tigray (SaWeT) and the
Tigray Independence Party (TIP) argue that a constitutional order must be fully
restored before meaningful dialogue can occur.
Additionally, there are concerns that
the federal government intends to use the upcoming 2026 elections to replace
the 1995 EPRDF constitution with PM Abiy Ahmed's centralized
"Medemer" presidential vision. This centralization push is bound to trigger
intense resistance from regional ethnonational forces.
2. Transitional Justice Integration
Gap
Although a transitional justice policy
was adopted by the Council of Ministers in 2024, its integration with the
National Dialogue remains vague, slowing down both processes. If constitutional
revision is decoupled from transitional justice, addressing historical
grievances and grievances in a sustainable manner will be impossible. The
non-derogable principle in Article 28 of the current constitution, which bars
statutes of limitations and amnesties for gross human rights violations, must
be strictly preserved in the new constitution.
Conclusion and Policy
Recommendations
Ethiopia’s political crisis can only
find a lasting resolution through fundamental, structurally sound
constitutional amendments. Because the current constitution's amendment
procedures (Articles 104 and 105) are extremely rigid and difficult to execute,
a specialized Constitutional Amendment Commission must be established to
translate the national dialogue's recommendations into law.
The following policy steps are
recommended for the constitutional revision process:
- Establish
an Elite Reconciliation Forum: Parallel
to the broad national dialogue, create a high-level negotiation platform
specifically for armed groups and key opposition leaders to reach
political consensus.
- Form
a Constitutional Amendment Commission:
Establish an independent, time-bound, expert-led body authorized by
parliament to draft the specific constitutional changes.
- Link
Transitional Justice with Constitutional Reform:
Systematically anchor transitional justice policies within the
constitutional framework to legally address historical grievances.
- Enact
a Phased Transition Plan: Avoid abrupt
restructuring of federal boundaries; instead, mandate a 3-year phased
transition plan based on detailed technical studies and public consensus.
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