በኢፌዴሪ ሕገ መንግሥት መሠረታዊ መርሆዎች ማሻሻያ ሳቢያ የሚመጡ መዋቅራዊ የአስተዳደር ሥርዓት ሽግግሮች የምርምር ሪፖርት

በኢፌዴሪ ሕገ መንግሥት መሠረታዊ መርሆዎች ማሻሻያ ሳቢያ የሚመጡ መዋቅራዊ የአስተዳደር ሥርዓት ሽግግሮች የምርምር ሪፖርት

የሕገ መንግሥታዊ ማሻሻያ ሥርዓት መዋቅራዊ ጥብቅነት እና የአሠራር ሥነ ሥርዓት

የኢትዮጵያ ፌዴራላዊ ዲሞክራሲያዊ ሪፐብሊክ (ኢፌዴሪ) ሕገ መንግሥት የራሱን ድንጋጌዎች ለማሻሻል ያስቀመጠው ሥነ ሥርዓት እጅግ ጥብቅና ባለብዙ-ደረጃ አሠራርን የተከተለ ነው። በአንቀጽ 104 እና 105 ሥር የተዘረዘሩት ድንጋጌዎች ለሕገ መንግሥታዊ ማሻሻያ ሁለት የተለዩ የአፈጻጸም መንገዶችን ያስቀምጣሉ። የመጀመሪያው መንገድ በሕገ መንግሥቱ ምዕራፍ ሦስት ሥር የተደነገጉትን መሠረታዊ መብቶችና ነፃነቶች እንዲሁም ራሱን የማሻሻያ ድንጋጌውን አንቀጽ 105 ለማሻሻል የሚተገበር ነው። ይህ ዓይነቱ ማሻሻያ እንዲጸድቅ የሕዝብ ተወካዮች ምክር ቤት እና የፌዴሬሽን ምክር ቤት በተናጠል በሁለት ሦስተኛ አብላጫ ድምፅ መደገፍ ያለባቸው ሲሆን፣ ከዚህ በተጨማሪም ሁሉም የፌዴሬሽኑ አባል የሆኑ የክልል ምክር ቤቶች ማሻሻያውን በድምፅ ብልጫ ማጽደቅ ይኖርባቸዋል። ይህ ፍጹም ስምምነትን (unanimity) የሚጠይቀው ድንጋጌ ለማንኛውም ነጠላ ክልል የማሻሻያ ሒደቱን ሙሉ በሙሉ የመግታት የቪቶ (veto) መዋቅራዊ ሥልጣን ይሰጠዋል። ሁለተኛው መንገድ ደግሞ ከእነዚህ ውጭ ያሉትን የሕገ መንግሥቱን ድንጋጌዎች ለማሻሻል የሚያገለግል ሲሆን፣ የሁለቱ የፌዴራል ምክር ቤቶች የጋራ ስብሰባ በሁለት ሦስተኛ ድምፅ ሲያጸድቀው እና ከፌዴሬሽኑ አባል ክልሎች ምክር ቤቶች መካከል የሁለት ሦስተኛው ክልሎች ምክር ቤቶች በድምፅ ብልጫ ሲደግፉት ብቻ ተግባራዊ ይደረጋል።

ይህ በይዘት ላይ የተመሠረተ የደረጃ መዋቅር የሕገ መንግሥቱን ጥብቅነት የሚያረጋግጥ ቢሆንም፣ በተግባር ግን ከፍተኛ የአስተዳደር መዘጋትን (constitutional impasse) ሊያስከትል እንደሚችል በታሪክ ታይቷል። የሕግ ባለሙያዎች እንደሚከራከሩት፣ የመጀመሪያው የማሻሻያ ሥርዓት እጅግ የጠበቀ በመሆኑ መሠረታዊ ድንጋጌዎችን በጽሑፍ ደረጃ ማሻሻል በተግባር የማይቻል ያደርገዋል። በመሆኑም በአንቀጽ 39 ወይም በምዕራፍ ሦስት መብቶች ላይ የሚደረጉ መዋቅራዊ ለውጦች ከመደበኛ ሕገ መንግሥታዊ ማሻሻያ ይልቅ፣ አጠቃላይ መንግሥታዊ ውሉን ወደ መበተንና አዲስ የሀገር ግንባታ ውል ወደ መዋጋት የሚያመራ "ሕገ መንግሥታዊ አብዮት" የመሆን ዕድላቸው ከፍተኛ ነው። ይህንን ተግዳሮት ለመቅረፍ እንደ አማራጭ የሚወሰደው መንገድ መደበኛ የጽሑፍ ማሻሻያ ከማድረግ ይልቅ፣ በፌዴሬሽን ምክር ቤት በኩል በሚሰጡ የሕገ መንግሥት ትርጓሜዎች አማካኝነት መዋቅራዊ ማስተካከያዎችን (interpretive adjustments) ማከናወን ነው።

የማኅበራዊ መሠረቶች ሽግግር፦ የብሔር ሉዓላዊነት፣ የማንነት ፖለቲካ እና የትርጉም ማስተካከያ አማራጮች

የኢፌዴሪ ሕገ መንግሥት መግቢያ "እኛ የኢትዮጵያ ብሔሮች፣ ብሔረሰቦችና ሕዝቦች..." በማለት የሚጀምረው ሐረግ፣ በአንድ ወጥ ሕዝብ (singular demos) ፈንታ በርካታ የሉዓላዊነት ባለቤቶች (multiple demos) መኖራቸውን የሚያረጋግጥ ነው። በአንቀጽ 8 መሠረት፣ የሀገሪቱ የሉዓላዊ ሥልጣን ባለቤቶች እነዚህ ብሔሮች፣ ብሔረሰቦችና ሕዝቦች ሲሆኑ፣ ሕገ መንግሥቱም የዚሁ ሉዓላዊነት መግለጫ ተደርጎ ይወሰዳል። ይህንን መርሕ የሚደግፈውና እጅግ አከራካሪ የሆነው የአንቀጽ 39 ድንጋጌ ማንኛውም የኢትዮጵያ ብሔር፣ ብሔረሰብና ሕዝብ ያለገደብ የራስን ዕድል በራስ የመወሰን እስከመገንጠል ያለው መብት በሕግ እንዲጠበቅ ያደርጋል።

ይህንን ማኅበራዊ መሠረት ለማሻሻል የሚደረጉ ጥረቶች በአስተዳደር ሥርዓቱ ላይ ጥልቅ የሆነ ሁለተኛ እና ሦስተኛ ደረጃ ተፅዕኖዎችን ያስከትላሉ። ሉዓላዊነትን ከብሔረሰቦች ወደ ግለሰብ ዜጋ (civic citizenship) የሚያዛውር ማሻሻያ ከተደረገ፣ የኢትዮጵያ ፌዴራላዊ አወቃቀር ከማንነት ፌዴራሊዝም ወደ መልክዓ ምድራዊና ኢኮኖሚያዊ ሁኔታዎችን ብቻ መሠረት ያደረገ ሲቪክ ፌዴራሊዝም ይቀየራል። ይህ ሽግግር በክልል ደረጃ ያሉ አብላጫና አናሳ ግንኙነቶችን መዋቅር ሙሉ በሙሉ የሚገለብጥ ሲሆን፣ በተለይም የክልል መንግሥታት ማንነትን መሠረት አድርገው የሚዘረጉትን የፖለቲካና የኢኮኖሚ ጥበቃ ሥርዓት ያፈርሰዋል።

በተጨማሪም በአንቀጽ 39 ሥር በተቀመጠው "እስከመገንጠል" በሚለው ሐረግ ላይ የሚደረግ የጽሑፍ ማሻሻያ እጅግ አስቸጋሪ በመሆኑ፣ ሕገ መንግሥታዊ ትርጓሜ እንደ አማራጭ መፍትሔ ይወሰዳል። ሕገ መንግሥት አርቃቂዎቹ በመጀመሪያ ያሰቡትን ሐሳብ መነሻ በማድረግ፣ "መገንጠል" የሚለውን ጽንሰ ሐሳብ ከሀገር መገንጠል (external secession) ይልቅ፣ በሀገሪቱ ሉዓላዊነት ሥር አዲስ የአስተዳደር መዋቅር ወይም ክልል ወደ መመሥረት (internal secession/restructuring) የሚያመራ መብት አድርጎ መተርጎም ይቻላል። ይህ ዓይነቱ የትርጉም ማስተካከያ አጠቃላይ የሕገ መንግሥቱን መንፈስ ሳይንድ፣ የአስተዳደር ሥርዓቱን መረጋጋት ለማረጋገጥ የሚያስችል ስልታዊ መሣሪያ ነው።

ከቡድን መብቶች ጎን ለጎን፣ ማኅበራዊ መሠረቶችን ከጾታ እኩልነት፣ ከአካል ጉዳተኞች መብት ጥበቃ እና ከማኅበራዊ ደኅንነት አንጻር ማሻሻል የአስተዳደር ሥርዓቱን አካታችነት ይወስናል። የጾታ እኩልነትንና የአዎንታዊ እርምጃ (affirmative action) መርሆዎችን በሕገ መንግሥታዊ ደረጃ ይበልጥ ማጠናከር፣ የመንግሥት የልማትና ማኅበራዊ ፖሊሲዎች በሴቶችና በተገለሉ የኅብረተሰብ ክፍሎች ላይ ትኩረት እንዲያደርጉ ያስገድዳል። ይህ ሽግግር የመንግሥት የአስተዳደር መዋቅር ከባህላዊውና ከቡድን መብት ተኮር የፖለቲካ ሥርዓት ወደ ሰብዓዊ ልማትና የግለሰብ ደኅንነት ተኮር የአገልግሎት አሰጣጥ ሥርዓት እንዲለወጥ ያደርገዋል።

የፖለቲካ ኢኮኖሚ መዋቅር ሽግግር፦ የመሬት ባለቤትነት፣ የሀብት ክፍፍል እና ልማት መብት

የኢፌዴሪ ሕገ መንግሥት የፖለቲካ ኢኮኖሚ መሠረቱን የጣለው በመንግሥት ቁጥጥር ሥር ባለው የመሬትና ተፈጥሮ ሀብት ባለቤትነት መዋቅር ላይ ነው። በአንቀጽ 40 ንዑስ አንቀጽ 3 መሠረት፣ የገጠርም ሆነ የከተማ መሬትና የተፈጥሮ ሀብት ባለቤትነት መብት የመንግሥትና የሕዝብ ብቻ ነው። መሬት የማይሸጥና የማይለወጥ የኢትዮጵያ ብሔሮች፣ ብሔረሰቦችና ሕዝቦች የጋራ ንብረት ሆኖ ተደንግጓል። አርሶ አደሮችና አርብቶ አደሮች መሬትን በነፃ የማግኘት፣ የመጠቀምና ከመሬታቸው ያለመነቀል መብት ሲኖራቸው፣ የግል ባለሀብቶች ደግሞ በኪራይ/በሊዝ ሥርዓት እንዲጠቀሙ ይደረጋል።

ኢትዮጵያ የፖለቲካ ሥልጣን ውክልናን በከፍተኛ ደረጃ ወደ ክልሎች ያማከለች (decentralized) ብትሆንም፣ በኢኮኖሚ ረገድ ግን መሬትን በመንግሥት ሥር በማድረግ ከፍተኛ ማዕከላዊ ቁጥጥር ዘርግታለች። በአንቀጽ 40 ሥር መሬት የማይሸጥና የማይለወጥ ተደርጎ መደንገጉ፣ የክልል ልሂቃን መሬትን ለፖለቲካዊ ታማኝነት ማሳያነትና ለደንበኝነት (clientelism) ሥርዓት ግንባታ እንዲጠቀሙበት ዕድል ሰጥቷል። ይህ ድንጋጌ ተሻሽሎ መሬት የግል ይዞታ ቢሆን፣ የመንግሥት ኢኮኖሚያዊ ቁጥጥር የሚዳከም ሲሆን፣ አርሶ አደሮችና ከተሜዎች መሬታቸውን ለብድር ዋስትናነት በመጠቀም ካፒታል እንዲያመነጩ ይረዳቸዋል። ነገር ግን፣ ይህ ማሻሻያ ተገቢ የሕግ ዋስትና ሳይኖረው ቢተገበር፣ አነስተኛ አርሶ አደሮች ከመሬታቸው ተፈናቅለው ለከፋ ማኅበራዊ ቀውስ ሊዳረጉ ይችላሉ።

በተጨማሪም በአንቀጽ 43 ሥር የተደነገገው የልማት መብት እና በአንቀጽ 89 ሥር የተቀመጡት የኢኮኖሚ ዓላማዎች መንግሥት ሀብትንና የልማት ዕድሎችን ፍትሐዊ በሆነ መልኩ የማከፋፈል ግዴታ እንዳለበት ይደነግጋሉ። የሀብት ክፍፍልንና የፊሲካል ፌዴራሊዝምን የሚመለከቱ ድንጋጌዎች ሲሻሻሉ፣ በማዕከላዊው መንግሥትና በክልሎች መካከል ያለውን የፋይናንስ ኃይል ሚዛን ይቀይሩታል። የክልሎች የፊሲካል ራስን የመቻል አቅም ከተጠናከረ፣ ክልሎች ከማዕከላዊ በጀት ጥገኝነት በመውጣት ገለልተኛ የልማት ፖሊሲዎችን የመቅረጽና የመተግበር ዕድል ያገኛሉ። በአንጻሩ ማዕከላዊው መንግሥት የሀብት ክፍፍሉን ይበልጥ ከተቆጣጠረው፣ የአስተዳደር ሥርዓቱ በስም ፌዴራላዊ በግብር ግን ማዕከላዊ (unitary) ሆኖ እንዲቀጥል ያደርገዋል።

የዲሞክራሲ፣ የውክልና እና የምርጫ ሂደት መርሆዎች ማሻሻያ

የኢፌዴሪ ሕገ መንግሥት በአንቀጽ 45 መሠረት የፓርላማ የአስተዳደር ሥርዓትን ዘርግቷል። በአንቀጽ 56 መሠረት ደግሞ በምክር ቤቱ ከፍተኛ መቀመጫ ያገኘው የፖለቲካ ፓርቲ ወይም ጥምረት አስፈጻሚውን አካል ይመራል። የሕዝብ ተወካዮች ምክር ቤት አባላት በአብላጫ ድምፅ (First-Past-the-Post) የምርጫ ሥርዓት በቀጥታ የሚመረጡ ሲሆን፣ የፌዴሬሽን ምክር ቤት አባላት ደግሞ በክልል ምክር ቤቶች በኩል በተዘዋዋሪ ይመረጣሉ። በአሁኑ ወቅት የኢትዮጵያ ፓርላማ በአስፈጻሚውና በሕግ አውጪው አካል መካከል ባለው የሥልጣን ውሕደት (fusion of power) ሳቢያ የአስፈጻሚው የበላይነት የሚንጸባረቅበትና "የካቢኔ አምባገነንነትን" የሚያበረታታ ሆኖ ይገኛል።

ይህንን ሥርዓት ወደ ፕሬዝዳንታዊ ወይም ከፊል-ፕሬዝዳንታዊ ሥርዓት የሚቀይር ማሻሻያ ከተደረገ፣ በአስፈጻሚውና በሕግ አውጪው መካከል ግልጽ የሆነ የሥልጣን ክፍፍልና ቁጥጥር (checks and balances) ይፈጠራል። ይህ መዋቅራዊ ለውጥ አስፈጻሚው አካል ከፓርላማው ቁጥጥር ወጥቶ በቀጥታ ከሕዝብ የሥልጣን ውክልና እንዲያገኝ የሚያደርግ ሲሆን፣ የአስተዳደር ሥርዓቱን መረጋጋት ያሳድጋል። ይሁን እንጂ፣ ፕሬዝዳንቱና የፓርላማው አብላጫ ወገን ከተለያዩ የፖለቲካ ኃይሎች በሚሆኑበት ጊዜ የአስተዳደር ሽባነትን ሊያስከትል ይችላል።

በምርጫ ሥርዓቱ ረገድ ከአብላጫ ድምፅ ሥርዓት ወደ ተመጣጣኝ ውክልና (Proportional Representation) ወይም ወደ ቅይጥ ሥርዓት መሸጋገር የአስተዳደር ሥርዓቱን አካታች ያደርገዋል። የአብላጫ ድምፅ ሥርዓት ጥቂት የፖለቲካ ድጋፍ ያላቸውን ትናንሽ ፓርቲዎችና የብሔር ቡድኖችን ከፓርላማ ውጭ በማድረግ የአንድ ወገን የበላይነትን ያበረታታል። የምርጫ ሥርዓቱ ወደ ተመጣጣኝ ውክልና ከተቀየረ፣ የቅንጅት መንግሥት (coalition government) ምስረታ የግድ የሚል ሲሆን፣ ይህም የፖለቲካ ስምምነትንና የሊበራል ኮንሶሺየሽናሊዝም መርሆዎችን በአስተዳደሩ ውስጥ ያሰርጻል።

በተጨማሪም በአንቀጽ 12 ሥር የተቀመጡት የመንግሥት አሠራር ግልጽነትና ተጠያቂነት መርሆዎች እንዲሁም የሕዝብ ተወካዮችን የመሻር (right of recall) መብት ማሻሻል፣ በዜጎችና በባለሥልጣናት መካከል ያለውን ቀጥተኛ ተጠያቂነት ይወስናል። እነዚህ መርሆዎች ሲሻሻሉና ተጠያቂነትን የሚያረጋግጡ ጠንካራ ገለልተኛ ተቋማት (ለምሳሌ የምርጫ ቦርድ፣ የሕዝብ ዕንባ ጠባቂ እና የኦዲት መሥሪያ ቤቶች) ሲቋቋሙ፣ የአስተዳደር ሥርዓቱ ከአምባገነናዊ ባህል ወደ ተቋማዊ ዲሞክራሲ ይሸጋገራል።

በመጨረሻም፣ የፌዴራል ከተሞች (የአዲስ አበባ እና የድሬዳዋ) ሕጋዊ አቋምና አስተዳደራዊ ወሰኖች መወሰን ከአስተዳደር ሥርዓቱ ጋር ቀጥተኛ ትስስር አለው። በአንቀጽ 49 ሥር የአዲስ አበባ አስተዳደር ራስን የማስተዳደር መብትና ለፌዴራል መንግሥት ያለው ተጠያቂነት፣ እንዲሁም ከኦሮሚያ ክልል ጋር ያለው ልዩ ጥቅም ግንኙነት በግልጽ ተቀምጧል። ይህ ድንጋጌ እንዲሁም የድሬዳዋ አስተዳደር ቻርተርና ግንኙነቶች ሲሻሻሉ፣ በፌዴራሉና በአጎራባች ክልሎች መካከል ያለውን መልክዓ ምድራዊና ኢኮኖሚያዊ ትስስር የሚወስኑ ሲሆን፣ የድንበር ግጭቶችንና የበጀት ክፍፍል ውጥረቶችን ለመፍታት ወሳኝ ሚና ይጫወታሉ።

በ2020 የተከሰተው የምርጫ መራዘም ቀውስ እና የተነሱት አማራጮች—የሕዝብ ተወካዮች ምክር ቤትን መበተን (አንቀጽ 60)፣ የአስቸኳይ ጊዜ አዋጅ ማወጅ (አንቀጽ 93)፣ ሕገ መንግሥታዊ ትርጓሜ መጠየቅ ወይም የሽግግር መንግሥት ማቋቋም—ሕገ መንግሥቱ ለድንገተኛ የፖለቲካ ሽግግሮች ያለውን ዝግጁነት በግልጽ ያሳያል። መሠረታዊ የምርጫ መርሆዎች ላይ የሚደረግ ማሻሻያ ለእንደዚህ ዓይነት የሽግግር ወቅት ቀውሶች ግልጽ የሕግ ማዕቀፍን ሊፈጥር ይችላል።

የመሠረታዊ መርሆዎች ማሻሻያ የአስተዳደር ሥርዓት ሽግግር ንጽጽራዊ ትንተና

ከዚህ በታች ያለው ሰንጠረዥ በሕገ መንግሥቱ መሠረታዊ መርሆዎች ላይ የሚደረጉ ለውጦች በአስተዳደር ሥርዓቱ ላይ የሚያስከትሉትን ሁለተኛ እና ሦስተኛ ደረጃ መዋቅራዊ ሽግግሮች በንጽጽር ያሳያል፦

መሠረታዊ ሕገ መንግሥታዊ መርሕ

ወቅታዊ ሕገ መንግሥታዊ ድንጋጌ እና ይዘት

ሊደረግ የሚችል የማሻሻያ አቅጣጫ

በአስተዳደር ሥርዓቱ ላይ የሚኖረው ሁለተኛ እና ሦስተኛ ደረጃ ተፅዕኖ

ሉዓላዊነት እና የራስን ዕድል በራስ መወሰን (አንቀጽ 8 እና 39)

ሉዓላዊነት የብሔሮች፣ ብሔረሰቦችና ሕዝቦች ነው፤ እስከመገንጠል ያለውን መብት ያካትታል።

ሉዓላዊነትን ለአጠቃላይ ዜጎች መስጠት፤ የመገንጠል መብትን መሻር ወይም በሕገ መንግሥት ትርጓሜ ወደ ክልል ምስረታ መብት ማጥበብ።

ከብሔር ፌዴራሊዝም ወደ ዜግነት ፌዴራሊዝም መሸጋገር፤ የክልሎችን የማንነት ፖለቲካ ማዳከም፤ የወሰንና የማንነት ግጭቶች መፈጠር።

የመሬትና የተፈጥሮ ሀብት ባለቤትነት (አንቀጽ 40)

የመሬት ባለቤትነት የመንግሥትና የሕዝብ ብቻ ነው፤ መሸጥና መለወጥ አይቻልም።

መሬትን በግል ባለቤትነት መፍቀድ እና የይዞታ መብትን ወደ ሙሉ ንብረትነት ማሳደግ።

ከመንግሥት ቁጥጥር ስር ካለ የፖለቲካ ኢኮኖሚ ወደ ነጻ ገበያ ሥርዓት መሸጋገር፤ የክልል ልሂቃንን የፖለቲካና የደንበኝነት ቁጥጥር ማዳከም።

የመንግሥት ቅርጽና የሥልጣን ክፍፍል (አንቀጽ 45 እና 56)

የፓርላማ የአስተዳደር ሥርዓት፤ በአስፈጻሚውና ሕግ አውጪው መካከል የሥልጣን ውሕደት አለ።

ወደ ፕሬዝዳንታዊ ወይም ከፊል-ፕሬዝዳንታዊ ሥርዓት መቀየር።

የሥልጣን ክፍፍልን ማጠናከር፤ አስፈጻሚውን ከፓርላማ ተፅዕኖ ማላቀቅ፤ የአስተዳደር ሽባነት (gridlock) ሥጋት መፈጠር。

የምርጫ ሥርዓት (አንቀጽ 54)

በአንድ ምርጫ ክልል አንድ አሸናፊ የሚወጣበት የአብላጫ ድምፅ (First-Past-the-Post) ሥርዓት።

ወደ ተመጣጣኝ ውክልና (Proportional Representation) የምርጫ ሥርዓት መቀየር።

የብዙኃን ፓርቲዎችን ውክልና ማሳደግ፤ የቅንጅት መንግሥት ምስረታን ማበረታታት፤ የአንድ ፓርቲ የበላይነትን መቀነስ።

የመንግሥትና የሃይማኖት መለያየት (አንቀጽ 11)

መንግሥትና ሃይማኖት ፍጹም የተለያዩ ናቸው፤ በመካከላቸው ጣልቃ ገብነት የለም።

በሃይማኖታዊ ተቋማትና በመንግሥት መዋቅር መካከል ሕጋዊ ትስስር መፍጠር።

ዓለማዊ (secular) የአስተዳደር መዋቅርን ማዳከም፤ ሃይማኖታዊ እሴቶች በሕዝባዊ ፖሊሲ ላይ ሕጋዊ ተፅዕኖ እንዲኖራቸው ማድረግ።

የመንግሥት አሠራርና ተጠያቂነት (አንቀጽ 12)

የአሠራር ግልጽነት፣ የኃላፊዎች ተጠያቂነት እና ተመራጮችን በሕዝብ የመሻር መብት።

ተጠያቂነትንና የመሻር ሥነ ሥርዓቱን ይበልጥ ተፈጻሚ የሚያደርጉ ገለልተኛ ተቋማትን መዘርጋት።

የዜጎችን ቀጥተኛ የቁጥጥር አቅም ማሳደግ፤ የመንግሥት ቢሮክራሲን ለሕዝብ ፍላጎት ተገዥ ማድረግ፤ ሙስናንና አስተዳደራዊ በደሎችን መቀነስ።

ማጠቃለያ እና ስልታዊ ምክረ ሐሳቦች

የኢፌዴሪ ሕገ መንግሥት መሠረታዊ መርሆዎች ማሻሻያ ጉዳይ የሕግ ቃላትን ከመቀየር ባለፈ፣ የሀገሪቱን ማኅበራዊ ውል፣ የፖለቲካ ኢኮኖሚ አቅጣጫ እና የሥልጣን ክፍፍል ሥርዓትን መሠረታዊ በሆነ መልኩ የመቅረጽ አቅም አለው። በአሁኑ ወቅት በሀገራዊ ምክክር ኮሚሽን በኩል የቀረቡት አጀንዳዎች—የመንግሥት አደረጃጀት ቅርጽ፣ የአንቀጽ 39 ትርጓሜ፣ የመሬት ይዞታ መብት እና የፍትሕ ሥርዓቱ ገለልተኝነት—እነዚህኑ መሠረታዊ መርሆዎች ለመፈተሽና ብሔራዊ መግባባትን ለመፍጠር ያለሙ ናቸው።

የአስተዳደር ሥርዓቱ ወደ ተሻለ ዴሞክራሲያዊና የተረጋጋ መዋቅር እንዲሸጋገር ከተፈለገ፣ የሚደረጉ ማሻሻያዎች በሕግ አውጪውና በአስፈጻሚው መካከል ያለውን የሥልጣን ሚዛን የሚጠብቁ፣ የግለሰብና የቡድን መብቶችን በስምምነት የሚያስታርቁ፣ እና ኢኮኖሚያዊ ነፃነትን የሚያረጋግጡ መሆን ይኖርባቸዋል። ይህ ሳይሆን ቀርቶ የሚደረጉ ድንገተኛና የአንድ ወገን ፍላጎትን ብቻ ያማከሉ መዋቅራዊ ለውጦች ግን፣ ሀገሪቱን ወደ ከፋ ሕገ መንግሥታዊ ቀውስና የፖለቲካ አለመረጋጋት ሊመሯት ይችላሉ።

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18. የሥርዓተ-ፆታ እኩልነት እና ማህበራዊ አካታችነት አካቶ ትግበራ መመሪያ - Climate and Development Knowledge Network (CDKN), https://cdkn.org/sites/default/files/2025-01/Gender%20Mainstreaming%20Guideline_Amharic_Final_Jan%202025.pdf

 19. አንቀጽ 39ን ጨምሮ ኢትዮጵያን ወደ መከራ ያመሩ ጉዳዮች ለምክክሩ ይቀርባሉ፤ ኢትዮጵያ [ከልጆቿ] ቀናነትን እየተማጸነች ነው፤ “ታሪካዊ መስቀለኛ መንገድ” | Addis Reporter, https://addisreporter.com/2026/06/25/historic-crossroads-addressing-article-39-and-ethiopias-past-miseries-through-national-dialogue/ 20. 1 Ethiopia Introductory Notes By Adem Kassie Abebe, University of Pretoria, South Africa I. Origins and Historical Development, https://www.icla.up.ac.za/images/country_reports/ethiopia_country_report.pdf

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23. Legal and Institutional Frameworks Regulating Rural Land Governance in Ethiopia: Towards a Comparative Analysis on the Best Practices of Other African Countries - Scirp.org., https://www.scirp.org/journal/paperinformation?paperid=97794 24. አዋጅ ቁጥር 1/1987 - የኢትዮጵያ ፌዴራላዊ ዲሞክራሲያዊ ሪፐብሊክ ሕገ መንግሥት - Abyssinia Law, https://www.abyssinialaw.com/?view=article&id=7853&catid=430 25. Land Rights in Ethiopia | - Law Explorer, https://lawexplores.com/land-rights-in-ethiopia/ 

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35. የምርጫ ሥርዓት ማለት ምን ማለት ነው? ( ክፍል ሦስት) | Amharic news borkena, https://amharic.borkena.com/2025/08/06/%E1%8B%A8%E1%88%9D%E1%88%AD%E1%8C%AB-%E1%88%A5%E1%88%AD%E1%8B%93%E1%89%B5-%E1%88%9B%E1%88%88%E1%89%B5-%E1%88%9D%E1%8A%95-%E1%88%9B%E1%88%88%E1%89%B5-%E1%8A%90%E1%8B%8D-%E1%8A%AD/ 

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37. የአዲስ አበበ ከተማ አስተዳደር በኢትዮጵያ ፌዴራላዊ ዴሞክራሲያዊ ሪፐብሊክ - Law Ethiopia, https://www.lawethiopia.com/images/addis%20ababa/Addis%20Ababa%20consolidated%20laws%20volume%201.pdf

የኢትዮጵያ ድብልቅ ፌዴራላዊ መዋቅር፡ ሕገ-መንግሥታዊ ንድፍ፣ የንዑስ-ብሔራዊ አደረጃጀት ተሞክሮዎች እና ንፅፅራዊ ዓለም አቀፍ ትንታኔ

የኢትዮጵያ የፌዴራል ስርዓት ሙሉ በሙሉ በብሔር ወይም በቋንቋ ላይ ብቻ የተመሠረተ ሳይሆን፣ በርካታ አስተዳደራዊና ታሪካዊ መርሆዎችን ያጣመረ የፌዴራሊዝም ድብልቅ ሞዴል እንደሆነ በተሻለ ሁኔታ መረዳት ይቻላል። የ1995ቱ የኢፌዲሪ ሕገ-መንግሥት የክልል መንግሥታትን ድንበር ሲያዋቅር በቋንቋ ላይ ብቻ ከመደገፍ ይልቅ የሰፈራ ቅጦችን፣ ታሪካዊ ማንነትን፣ የስነ-ሕዝብ ሁኔታዎችን፣ ጂኦግራፊያዊ አቀማመጥን እና በማህበረሰቦች መካከል የመሆን ስነ-ልቦናዊ ስሜትን ያጣመረ ባለብዙ ገፅታ መመዘኛዎችን ተጠቅሟል። ይህ የተቀላቀለ አቀራረብ በአንድ በኩል ለብዝሃነት ሕገ-መንግሥታዊ ዕውቅና ለመስጠት፣ በሌላ በኩል ደግሞ የአስተዳደር ቅልጥፍናን እና ተግባራዊ የክልል መንግሥታት መስፈርቶችን ለማመጣጠን ያለመ ነው። ይህ መዋቅር የተነደፈው ቀደም ሲል የነበሩትን ወጥ እና ማዕከላዊ የንጉሣዊ እና የወታደራዊ ደርግ አገዛዞችን ለመቀየር በተደረገ የፖለቲካ ሽግግር ሲሆን፣ ያለፉት አገዛዞች የአገሪቱን ብዝሃነት የካዱ እና የባህል ውህደትን የጫኑ በመሆናቸው፣ አዲሱ የሕገ-መንግሥት ስርዓት ብሔር-ተኮር ማንነትን ዋነኛ የፖለቲካ መለኪያ አድርጎ ወስዶታል።

የኢትዮጵያ ፌዴራሊዝም አራት ገፅታዎች

በንፅፅራዊ የፌዴራሊዝም ጥናቶች ውስጥ የኢትዮጵያ ስርዓት በብሔር ላይ ብቻ የተመሠረተ ተደርጎ ቢገመትም፣ ከብሔር ፌዴራሊዝም በዘለለ በአራት የተለያዩ ገፅታዎች የሚገለፅ ድብልቅ መዋቅር እንደሆነ በጥናት ይተነተናል። እነዚህ አራት ገፅታዎች የአንድነት፣ የፌዴራል፣ የኮንፌዴራል እና የኢትኖክራሲያዊ ባህሪያት ድብልቅ ናቸው።

የመጀመሪያው ገፅታ የፌዴራል ስርዓቱ ማዕከላዊነት ያለው የአንድነት (Unitary) ባህሪ ሲሆን፣ ይህም በተለይ በስልጣን ክፍፍል ረገድ ክልሎች በማዕከላዊ መንግሥት ላይ ያላቸውን ጥገኝነት እና በገዥው ፓርቲ የቁልቁል ቁጥጥር ሰንሰለት ምክንያት የሚገለፅ ነው። ይህ የአንድነት ፊት በሕገ-መንግሥቱ የተቀመጡትን የራስ-አገዛዝ ተስፋዎች ወደኋላ እንዲጎተቱ አድርጓቸዋል። ሁለተኛው የፌዴራል (Federal) ገፅታ ሲሆን፣ ብሔረሰቦች እንደ ህጋዊና የጋራ አካላት በሚወሰዱበት ጊዜ ስርዓቱ የፌዴራል ባህሪን ይይዛል። ሆኖም፣ ሉዓላዊ ስልጣኑን በቀጥታ ለብሔሮች፣ ብሔረሰቦች እና ሕዝቦች የሚሰጥ በመሆኑ ስርዓቱ በማንኛውም ጊዜ ሊፈርስ የሚችል የጋራ ፍላጎት ጥምረት እንዲሆን አድርጎታል። ሶስተኛው ከዜጎች መብትና ግለሰባዊ ነፃነት አንፃር የሚታየው የኮንፌዴራል (Confederal) ገፅታ ሲሆን፣ ዜጎች ከመኖሪያ ክልላቸው ውጭ በሚንቀሳቀሱበት ጊዜ ሙሉ የፖለቲካና የሲቪክ መብቶችን መጠቀም አለመቻላቸው ይህንን ያሳያል። አራተኛው በቡድኖች መካከል ያለውን ግንኙነት የሚገልፀው የኢትኖክራሲያዊ (Ethnocratic) ገፅታ ሲሆን፣ ይህም ክልሎችን የነባር ባለቤቶች እና የሰፋሪዎች በሚል በመከፋፈል ዜጎችንና ተገዢዎችን የፈጠረ መዋቅር ነው።

የክልሎች ድብልቅ ተሞክሮ እና የአናሳዎች አያያዝ

የኢፌዲሪ ሕገ-መንግሥት አንቀጽ 52(2) ክልሎች የራሳቸውን ሕገ-መንግሥት እንዲያወጡና የአካባቢ አስተዳደር መዋቅር እንዲዘረጉ ስልጣን ይሰጣል። በዚህ መሠረት የተለያዩ ክልሎች የአናሳ ማህበረሰቦችን መብት ለመጠበቅ እና ልዩነቶችን ለማስተናገድ የተለያዩ ንዑስ-ሕገ-መንግሥታዊ ሞዴሎችን በተግባር አሳይተዋል።

የኦሮሚያ ክልል የአናሳዎች ውክልና እና የልዩ ዞኖች አደረጃጀት

የኦሮሚያ ብሔራዊ ክልላዊ መንግሥት ሕገ-መንግሥት ሉዓላዊ ስልጣኑን በቀጥታ ለኦሮሞ ሕዝብ ብቻ የሰጠ ሲሆን፣ በውስጡ ለሚኖሩ የሌላ ብሔረሰብ አናሳዎች ግልጽ ሕገ-መንግሥታዊ ዕውቅና አልሰጠም። በዚህ የተነሳ በክልሉ ውስጥ የሚኖሩ እንደ ጊራር ጃርሶ ወረዳ ያሉ የአማራ አናሳ ማህበረሰቦች የአፍ መፍቻ ቋንቋቸውን በአስተዳደርና በትምህርት ረገድ የመጠቀም መብታቸው የተገደበ ሲሆን፣ ይህም ወደ ሥራ ስደት እንዲያመሩ ምክንያት ሆኗል። በተጨማሪም በኦሮሚያ ክልል የሚኖረው የዛይ ማህበረሰብ በክልሉ ሕገ-መንግሥት ውስጥ ዕውቅና አላገኘም። በኦሮሚያ ክልል ምክር ቤት (ጨፌ) ውስጥ ለሌሎች ብሔረሰቦች የተመደበ የውክልና ወንበር የሌለ ሲሆን፣ ይህም በገዥው ፓርቲ ፖሊሲ ምክንያት እጩዎች ከኦሮሞ ብሔር ብቻ እንዲሆኑ በመደረጉ ነው። ሆኖም ክልሉ ከተሞችን በአንደኛና ሁለተኛ ደረጃ በመከፋፈል የአናሳዎችን ውክልና ለመፍቀድ ሞክሯል። የከተማ መስፋፋትን ለመቆጣጠር እና የጋራ ልማትን ለማምጣትም በ2008 ዓ.ም የአዲስ አበባ ዙሪያ የኦሮሚያ ልዩ ዞን ተመስርቷል።

በአንፃሩ የአማራ ክልል በውስጡ ለሚኖሩ የኦሮሞ አናሳዎች ማዕከሉን ከሚሴ ያደረገ የኦሮሚያ ልዩ ዞን በማቋቋም በክልሉ ውስጥ የራስ-አገዛዝ መብት ሰጥቷል። ለአዊ እና ለሂምራ ብሔረሰቦችም የብሔረሰብ ዞኖችን ፈጥሯል። በመጀመሪያ ላይ በሕገ-መንግሥቱ ያልተካተቱትን የአርጎባ (በ2006) እና የቅማንት (በ2015) ብሔረሰቦችንም በአስተዳደራዊ አዋጅ በማቋቋም የራስ-አገዛዝ መብታቸውን አረጋግጧል።

የደቡብ ክልል መልሶ መዋቅር እና የክላስተር አቀራረብ

የቀድሞው የደቡብ ብሔሮች፣ ብሔረሰቦችና ሕዝቦች ክልል (ደብብሕክ) በ2023 ዓ.ም ሙሉ በሙሉ በመፍረሱ፣ በምትኩ የደቡብ ኢትዮጵያ ክልል እና የመካከለኛው ኢትዮጵያ ክልል ተመስርተዋል። የደቡብ ኢትዮጵያ ክልል 12 ዞኖችን ያካተተ ሲሆን፣ እነሱም ወላይታ፣ ጋሞ፣ ጎፋ፣ ጌዴኦ፣ ደቡብ ኦሞ፣ አሪ፣ ኮንሶ፣ ጋርዱላ፣ ቡርጂ፣ ኮሬ፣ ባስኬቶ እና አሌ ናቸው። የክልሉ ዋና ከተማ ወላይታ ሶዶ ሲሆን፣ የክልሉ ቢሮዎች በስድስት ከተሞች እንዲደራጁ ተደርጓል። ይህ መዋቅር በብሔረሰቦች መካከል ያለውን የበጀትና የስልጣን ሽሚያ ለመቀነስ ያለመ ቢሆንም፣ በኮንሶ/ሰገን እና በመስከን/ማሬኮ መካከል የተከሰቱት ግጭቶች እንደሚያሳዩት በአካባቢው የድንበርና የይዞታ ግጭቶችን ሙሉ በሙሉ መፍታት አልቻለም። በብሔራዊ ሕገ-መንግሥቱ መሠረት የውስጥ መገንጠልን (Internal Secession) ለመጠየቅ መጀመሪያ በብሔረሰቡ ምክር ቤት የሁለት-ሶስተኛ ድምፅ መፅደቅ፣ በመቀጠል በክልሉ ምክር ቤት ህዝበ-ውሳኔ መደራጀት እና በህዝቡ በአብላጫ ድምፅ መደገፍ አለበት።

ንፅፅራዊ ዓለም አቀፍ ድብልቅ ሞዴሎች

ኢትዮጵያ ማንነትን፣ ግዛትንና አስተዳደራዊ ፍላጎቶችን ለማመጣጠን የምትከተለው ድብልቅ አካሄድ በተለያዩ የዓለም አቀፍ ፌዴሬሽኖች ውስጥም ይንፀባረቃል። የሚከተለው ሰንጠረዥ በኢትዮጵያ፣ በህንድ፣ በቤልጂየም እና በካናዳ መካከል ያለውን የፌዴራላዊ አደረጃጀት መርሆዎች ያነፃፅራል፡-

ሀገር	የፌዴራል አደረጃጀት መሠረት	የአናሳዎች ውክልና እና የራስ-አስተዳደር ስልት	የአሲሜትሪክ (ተመጣጣኝ ያልሆነ) ፌዴራሊዝም መገለጫዎች
ኢትዮጵያ	የብሔር-ቋንቋ፣ የሰፈራ ቅጦች፣ ስነ-ሕዝብ እና የሕዝብ ፈቃድ	የብሔረሰብ ዞኖች እና ልዩ ወረዳዎች፤ በፌዴሬሽን ምክር ቤት የብሔረሰቦች ውክልና፤ በሕዝብ ተወካዮች ምክር ቤት የአናሳዎች ኮታ	ሕገ-መንግሥታዊ የመገንጠል መብት (አንቀጽ 39)፤ የሐረሪ ክልል ልዩ የሁለት ምክር ቤት መዋቅር ለአናሳዎች የበላይነት
ህንድ	የቋንቋ መስመሮች፣ የኢኮኖሚ አዋጭነት፣ ጂኦግራፊ እና አስተዳደራዊ ቅልጥፍና	የአናሳ ቋንቋዎች ጥበቃ፤ "አንድ ቋንቋ፣ አንድ ግዛት" መርህን አለመቀበል	ለአንዳንድ ግዛቶች (ለምሳሌ የሰሜን-ምስራቅ ግዛቶች) የሚሰጥ ልዩ ሕገ-መንግሥታዊ ጥበቃ፤ የህብረት ግዛቶች (Union Territories)
ቤልጂየም	የቋንቋ ማህበረሰቦች እና የግዛት ክልሎች ድርብ ድብልቅ መዋቅር	የቋንቋ ማህበረሰቦች በባህልና በትምህርት ላይ ስልጣን ሲኖራቸው፣ ክልሎች በኢኮኖሚና መሠረተ ልማት ላይ ይወስናሉ	የብራስልስ ክልል የቋንቋ አናሳዎች ጥበቃ (የደች ተናጋሪዎች 50% ሚኒስትሮች ማግኘት)፤ የፍላንደርስ ማህበረሰብና ክልል ውህደት
ካናዳ	የክልሎች ጂኦግራፊያዊና ፖለቲካዊ ራስ-ገዝነት፣ የታሪክ ስምምነቶች	በአንቀጽ 35 የተደነገጉ የሀገር በቀል (አቦሪጂናል) መብቶች ጥበቃ እና የስምምነት (Treaty) ፌዴራሊዝም	የኩቤክ ልዩ የቋንቋ መብቶች ጥበቃ፣ የራሷን የጡረታ ዋስትና እና የኢሚግሬሽን ፖሊሲ የመወሰን ስልጣን

የህንድ የቋንቋ እና የአስተዳደር ቅልጥፍና ሚዛን

ህንድ በ1947 ነፃነቷን ስታገኝ የነበሩት ግዛቶች የተዋቀሩት በቅኝ አገዛዝ አስተዳደራዊ ፍላጎት እንጂ በባህል ወይም በቋንቋ ትስስር አልነበረም። ከፋፍሎ የመግዛትን አደጋ የፈሩት የህንድ መሪዎች መጀመሪያ ላይ የቋንቋ ፌዴራሊዝምን አልተቀበሉም ነበር። በ1948 የተቋቋመው የዳር (Dhar) ኮሚሽን እና የጄቪፒ (JVP) ኮሚቴ በቋንቋ ላይ የተመሠረተ አደረጃጀት የአገሪቱን አንድነት አደጋ ላይ ይጥላል በሚል ውድቅ አድርገውት ነበር። ሆኖም፣ የፖቲ ስሪራሙሉ የ58 ቀናት የረሃብ አድማ እና ህልፈት ተከትሎ በ1953 የቴሉጉ ተናጋሪዎች አንድራ ግዛት እንድትመሠረት ተገደደ። በመቀጠል በ1955 የተቋቋመው የክልሎች መልሶ ማደራጃ ኮሚሽን (SRC) የቋንቋ አንድነትን፣ የአገር ደህንነትን፣ የፋይናንስ አቅምን እና የአስተዳደር ቅልጥፍናን ያጣመረ ባለብዙ ገፅታ መመዘኛዎችን ተግባራዊ አደረገ። ይህ ሂደት በፓንጃብ የቋንቋና የሃይማኖት ትስስርን ተከትሎ ወደ ፓንጃብ እና ሃሪያና መከፈል አመልክቷል።

የቤልጂየም የድርብ ፌዴራሊዝም ስምምነት

ቤልጂየም በ1830 ነፃ ስትሆን ፈረንሳይኛን ብቻ የምትጠቀም ማዕከላዊ ሀገር ነበረች። የደች ተናጋሪዎች የባህልና የቋንቋ ጥያቄን ተከትሎ በ1970ዎቹ እና 1980ዎቹ በተደረጉ ማሻሻያዎች ወደ ፌዴራሊዝም ተሸጋገረች። ቤልጂየም የቋንቋ ማህበረሰቦች (ፈረንሳይኛ፣ ደች እና ጀርመንኛ ተናጋሪ) እና የግዛት ክልሎች (ፍላንደርስ፣ ዋሎኒያ እና ብራስልስ-ካፒታል) የተባለ ድርብ መዋቅር አላት። ማህበረሰቦች በባህልና በትምህርት (በሰው ላይ ባተኮሩ ጉዳዮች) ላይ ስልጣን ሲኖራቸው፣ ክልሎች ደግሞ በኢኮኖሚ፣ በትራንስፖርትና በአካባቢ ጥበቃ (በግዛት ላይ ባተኮሩ ጉዳዮች) ላይ ይወስናሉ። ይህ ድርብ መዋቅር በሁለቱ ዋና የቋንቋ ቡድኖች መካከል የነበረውን ቅራኔ ለመፍታት የተደረገ ስምምነት ነው።

የካናዳ የስምምነት እና የአሲሜትሪክ ፌዴራሊዝም

የካናዳ ፌዴራሊዝም ታሪክ በኩቤክ የፈረንሳይኛ ተናጋሪዎች እና በሀገር በቀል (አቦሪጂናል) ማህበረሰቦች መብት ዙሪያ የተቃኘ ነው። በ1960ዎቹ የተነሳውን የኩቤክን ፀጥተኛ አብዮት (Quiet Revolution) ተከትሎ፣ ካናዳ የኩቤክን ልዩ ባህሪ የሚያከብር ተመጣጣኝ ያልሆነ (Asymmetrical) ፌዴራሊዝም ተግባራዊ አደረገች። በዚህ መሠረት ኩቤክ የራሷን የጡረታ ዋስትና፣ የኢሚግሬሽን መዋቅር እና የጤና አገልግሎት የመወሰን መብት አላት። በአንፃሩ፣ የ1982ቱ ሕገ-መንግሥት አንቀጽ 35 የሀገር በቀል ማህበረሰቦችን የታሪክ ስምምነቶች (Treaties) ያረጋገጠ ሲሆን፣ ይህም የስምምነት ፌዴራሊዝም (Treaty Federalism) የተባለ አዲስ መዋቅር ፈጥሯል።

መዋቅራዊ ቅራኔዎች እና የወደፊት አንድምታዎች

የቀረቡት መረጃዎችና ዓለም አቀፍ ተሞክሮዎች በኢትዮጵያ የፌዴራል ንድፍ ውስጥ በርካታ ጥልቅ መዋቅራዊ ቅራኔዎችንና ተግዳሮቶችን ያመላክታሉ። እነዚህም በዜግነት እና በክልል ባለቤትነት መካከል ያለው ቅራኔ፣ የድንበር አስተዳደራዊ እና ፖለቲካዊ ትርጉሞች መለዋወጥ፣ እና የራስ-አገዛዝ እና የጋራ-አገዛዝ አለመመጣጠን ናቸው።

የመሬት ይዞታን ከብሔር ማንነት ጋር ማያያዙ የውስጥ ወሰኖችን የአስተዳደር መዋቅር ከመሆን ይልቅ የብሔር ሉዓላዊነት ወሰኖች እንዲሆኑ አድርጓቸዋል። ክልሎች ለአንድ የተወሰነ ብሔረሰብ እንደ ብሔራዊ አገር ተደርገው ሲዋቀሩ፣ በክልሉ ውስጥ የሚኖሩ ሌሎች ብሔረሰቦች እንደ ቋሚ እንግዶች ወይም ሰፋሪዎች ተደርገው ይወሰዳሉ። ይህ ሁኔታ በደቡብ ክልል መፍረስና አዳዲስ ክልሎች መመሥረት ሂደት ውስጥ እንደታየው፣ የአካባቢው ቁንጮዎች መሬትና ስልጣን ለመቆጣጠር የብሔር ሚሊሻዎችን በማደራጀት ወደ ግጭት እንዲገቡ በር ከፍቷል። በኢፌዲሪ ሕገ-መንግሥት ውስጥ የራስ-አገዛዝ መርህ እጅግ ጎልቶ ሲቀመጥ፣ ሁሉንም ብሔረሰቦች የሚያገናኝ እና ብሔራዊ አንድነትን የሚያጠናክር የጋራ-አገዛዝ መዋቅር ግን ደካማ ነው።

እነዚህን ችግሮች ለመቅረፍ እና የብዝሃነትን ጥበቃ ከዜጎች ግለሰባዊ መብቶች ጋር ለማመጣጠን ስርዓቱን ወደ ዜጋ-ተኮር እና ድብልቅ ሞዴል (citizen-based and hybrid-model) ማሸጋገር አስፈላጊ ነው። ይህም በነዋሪነት ላይ የተመሠረተ ዜግነትን ማረጋገጥ፣ ከተሞችን በሲቪክ መርሆዎች የሚመሩ የልዩ ቻርተር ከተሞች ማድረግ እና የብሔረሰቦችን የቋንቋና ባህል መብት በተለያዩ የአካባቢ አስተዳደር ደረጃዎች ማስጠበቅን ይጠይቃል።

Reference:

1. Challenges in Ethiopia's Post-1991 Ethnic Federalism Entwined with Ethnic-based Political Parties - ResearchGate, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/357934747_Challenges_in_Ethiopia's_Post-1991_Ethnic_Federalism_Entwined_with_Ethnic-based_Political_Parties 2. ICL > Ethiopia > Constitution, https://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/et00000_.html

 3. Full article: Subnational Constitutional Space and Ethnic Accommodation: A Comparative Analysis of Ethiopian Regions - Taylor & Francis, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17449057.2025.2583585

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5. Federalism in Ethiopia By Hashim Tewfik (Ph.D) Institute of Federalism, Addis Ababa University, Ethiopia Paper submitted to the, https://lawethiopia.com/images/ethnic%20politics%20in%20ethiopia/Federalism%20in%20Ethiopia%20(2).pdf 

6. NEW CLUSTER REGIONS AND DISTRIBUTIVE STRUGGLES IN SOUTHERN ETHIOPIA - Rift Valley Institute, https://riftvalley.net/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/New-Cluster-Regions-and-Distributive-Struggles_v4.pdf 

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10. Ethnic Federalism in a Dominant Party State: The Ethiopian Experience 1991-2000, https://www.cmi.no/publications/file/769-ethnic-federalism-in-adominant-party-state.pdf 

11. The Four Faces of Ethiopian Federalism, https://hrp.law.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/pp.-157-190.pdf 12. 1 POLICY BRIEF Title: Ethiopia's Federal Fault Lines: Beyond the Ethnic Paradigm Date - DBU Journals, https://dbujournals.edu.et/dbujsAdmin/policy_briefs/Policy%20Brief%20by%20Tamirat%20Cheru%20(PhD)__824278698383.pdf 

13. The Need to Accommodate the Basic Rights of Ethno-National Minorities in the Oromia Regional State of Federal Ethiopia - Brill, https://brill.com/display/book/edcoll/9789004415966/BP000007.pdf 

14. The Matrix of Ethnic Federalism in Ethiopia in Protecting Internal Minority Rights: Examining Perceptions in Oromia Regional State, https://www.ejecs.org/index.php/JECS/article/download/1050/pdf/4683 

15. The Accommodation of Minority Rights in Oromia National Regional State: A Case Study of Girar Jarso Woreda - AAU-ETD - Addis Ababa University, https://etd.aau.edu.et/items/e08f8683-ff4b-47d9-b14d-c69dcd86a0ee 

16. The Legal and Practical Protection of the Rights of Minorities in Self Administering Nations of Ethiopia: The Case of Oromia - AAU-ETD - Addis Ababa University, https://etd.aau.edu.et/items/421bce2b-87ab-4496-a0ec-c3b4bfe2a18e

 17. Oromia Special Zone surrounding Finfinne - Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oromia_Special_Zone_surrounding_Finfinne 

18. Oromia Zone - Grokipedia, https://grokipedia.com/page/Oromia_Zone 19. A year after SNNPR's dissolution, violence returns to historically troubled areas - September 2024 | ACLED, https://acleddata.com/update/year-after-snnprs-dissolution-violence-returns-historically-troubled-areas-september-2024 20. South Ethiopia Regional State - Grokipedia, https://grokipedia.com/page/South_Ethiopia_Regional_State

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29. States Reorganization and Accommodation of Ethno-Territorial Cleavages in India Occasional Paper Number 29 | ConstitutionNet, https://constitutionnet.org/vl/item/states-reorganization-and-accommodation-ethno-territorial-cleavages-india-occasional-paper 30. Belgium - Federal Countries - Forum of Federations, https://www.forumfed.org/countries/belgium/ 

31. Communities, regions, and language areas of Belgium - Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Communities,_regions,_and_language_areas_of_Belgium 

32. The Belgian constitution: Federalism and Multilingualism, https://belgian-macedonian-business-club.org/2026/01/10/the-belgian-constitution-federalism-and-multilingualism/ 

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41. UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and Treaty Federalism in Canada - Centre for Constitutional Studies, https://www.constitutionalstudies.ca/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/02_Henderson-4.pdf

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A Briefing on Ethiopian Constitutional Reform and National Dialogue

A Briefing on Ethiopian Constitutional Reform and National Dialogue

Executive Summary

This briefing document synthesizes a series of proposals and critical reflections concerning the potential revision of the Ethiopian Constitution. The central thesis posits that Ethiopia’s previous constitutions have lacked "mass approval" or legitimacy, having been established primarily through state power rather than inclusive consensus.

The current political landscape, characterized by the National Dialogue Commission's efforts and the Prosperity Party’s legislative dominance, presents an opportunity for reform. However, the existing process is critiqued for a lack of transparency and technical competence. To address these deficiencies, the document outlines nine foundational pillars for an "Inclusive Constitution." These pillars advocate for a shift from ethnic-based federalism to a civil-centred "Autonomous Administration" model, the adoption of a semi-presidential hybrid government, land tenure reform, and the decentralization of federal power through the establishment of three distinct capital cities.

Context and Current Climate of Reform

The impetus for constitutional revision stems from the ongoing National Dialogue Commission, which is tasked with submitting consensus-based recommendations to the government. Given the current parliamentary majority held by the Prosperity Party, the two houses (the House of Peoples' Representatives and the House of Federation) possess the required two-thirds majority to enact constitutional amendments.

The Legitimacy Deficit

Historically, Ethiopian constitutions have been driven by the interests of the ruling government rather than the will of the majority.

• Power over Consent: Constitutional legitimacy in Ethiopia has traditionally relied on "absolute superiority of force" rather than popular mandate.
• Inclusivity Gaps: While the current FDRE Constitution involved public discussion during its drafting, it failed to include all political factions or achieve immediate mass acceptance.
• The "Red Flags" of the Dialogue: Some observers view the current National Dialogue process as lacking transparency. Concerns have been raised regarding the "incompetence" of the agenda-gathering phase and the absence of elite-modelled reconciliation before the broader dialogue.

The Nine Pillars for an Inclusive Constitution

The proposed framework for an "Inclusive Constitution" seeks to balance individual and group rights while moving away from ethnically exclusive governance.

1. Philosophical Reorientation: From Ethnic to Civil Society

The document argues that the current preamble views citizens solely as members of ethnic groups with mutually exclusive histories.

• Citizenship First: The constitution must recognize individual citizenship and balance it with group rights.
• Civil Identity: The state should be modelled as a "civil society" guided by scientific discovery and inclusive principles rather than "blood and inheritance."
• Renaming the Federal Units: The term "Region" (derived from Soviet-era concepts) should be replaced with "Autonomous Administration." These units should be named after geographic features (e.g., rivers or directions) rather than ethnic groups to prevent the sense of "ethnic enclosures."

2. Governance: Adoption of a Semi-Presidential System

To prevent party dictatorship and mitigate ethnic polarization, a hybrid or semi-presidential system is proposed:

• The President: Directly elected by the people. If no candidate secures 50%+1 of the vote, the runner-up becomes Vice President. The President oversees Defence and Foreign Affairs and is limited to two terms.
• The Prime Minister: Appointed from the majority party in Parliament. The PM manages the federal police, the bureaucracy, and the security sector.
• Local Empowerment: Directly elected presidents for autonomous administrations and mayors for cities, ensuring they are accountable to the electorate rather than federal appointees.

3. Electoral Reform: Mixed Representation

The current "First Past the Post" system is criticized for wasting votes.

• Executive Elections: Majoritarian (highest vote wins) for the President and Mayors to ensure decisive leadership.
• Legislative Elections: Proportional Representation for councils and parliament to ensure all voter voices are represented and to prevent single-party monopolies.

4. Federal Restructuring and the Three-Year Transition

The current federal structure is described as a collection of "ethnically exclusive homelands." The proposal suggests a radical restructuring:

• Administrative Balance: Large regions like Oromia and Amhara should be divided into three or four smaller autonomous administrations. Smaller entities, such as Harari, should be merged with neighbours to ensure balanced population sizes (ideally between 10 million and 20 million). To avoid conflict, restructuring must follow a peaceful, three-year roadmap involving a national census, boundary studies, and resource-sharing agreements.

 

5. Urban Governance: Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa

As centers of "mixed diversity," these cities should:

• Function as autonomous administrations reflecting their multicultural settlement.
• Use the primary languages spoken by their residents for work and education as models for inclusive society-building.

6. Decentralization: Three Federal Capitals

To reduce political tension and distribute economic development, the federal government’s seats should be split across three different autonomous administrations:

1. Legislative Capital: Seat of the Parliament.

2. Executive Capital: Seat of government offices and the diplomatic community.

3. Judicial Capital: Seat of the High Courts and the Constitutional Court. Note: To maximize development elsewhere, the new autonomous administration encompassing Addis Ababa should not host any of these three seats.

 

 

7. Land Tenure Reform: Triple Ownership

The current state monopoly on land allows the government to use land as a tool of political patronage. The proposed "Triple Ownership" model includes:

• Private Ownership: For farmers and urban residents (owning the land, not just the structures).
• State Ownership: For unheld lands and limited infrastructure development.
• Communal Ownership: For pastoralists and urban community use.
• Neutrality: No ethnic group should have exclusive ownership rights over any specific territory.

8. Judicial Independence: A Dedicated Constitutional Court

Currently, the House of Federation—a political body—interprets the constitution.

• Independent Court: Establish a neutral Constitutional Court to ensure the rule of law.
• Tenure: Judges should be nominated by the President and approved by Parliament for 10-year terms to ensure stability and independence from the executive branch.

9. Linguistic Policy: The Three-Language Model

Modelled after successful implementations in India, this policy aims to balance national unity with local autonomy:

• Federal Level: Amharic and Afaan Oromo as official working and educational languages.
• Autonomous Level: Each administration uses one federal language, its own local working language, and English.

Summary of Proposed Structural Shifts

Current Feature	Proposed Reform
Preamble Focus	Ethnic group identity
Federal Units	Ethnic "Regions"
Government Type	Parliamentary
Electoral System	First Past the Post
Land Ownership	State-only
Capital City	Centralized (Addis Ababa)
Interpretation	House of Federation
Language Policy	Variable

 

 

 

 

 II Research Report on Building an Inclusive Constitution in Ethiopia with Popular Consent and Legitimacy

Historical Background of Constitutional Transition and Current Realpolitik

The effort to establish sustainable peace and political stability in Ethiopia is closely linked to the drafting of a constitutional framework capable of resolving historical structural contradictions. Analyzing based on historical realities (realpolitik), Ethiopia’s past constitutions were founded not on popular consensus and legitimacy, but rather on the desires of the ruling regimes and their absolute monopoly of force. When the current Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE) was ratified in 1995 (1987 E.C.), although it was drafted by a constitutional assembly and subjected to public discussion, it did not include all political forces and failed to achieve broad consensus. Consequently, it immediately lacked widespread national legitimacy. Since the primary source of legitimacy for Ethiopian governments has historically been the monopoly of force rather than popular consent, whenever they lose that dominance, the entire system faces collapse.

Past constitutional systems cannot be dismissed as entirely devoid of useful content; the current constitution also contains several constitutional provisions that ought to be preserved. However, the FDRE constitution—much like the United States Constitution, which has evolved through various amendments—must become a "living document" capable of adapting to modern political and social shifts.

Although the Ethiopian National Dialogue Commission (ENDC) was established by parliamentary proclamation to address fundamental disagreements over state-building narratives and the federal system, the process faces widespread criticism regarding its transparency and inclusivity. Political science analyses suggest that "elite political reconciliation" should have preceded the national dialogue. Without this, the dialogue risks becoming a mere tool to execute the government's will. The weaknesses in the agenda-gathering process and the failure to synthesize collected agendas into professional policy language are seen as indicators of limited operational capacity within the commission.

Furthermore, despite individuals with disabilities accounting for nearly 20% of the country's population, their representation in the dialogue process remains extremely low, and procedural gaps such as the lack of sign language services persist. Nonetheless, because the ruling Prosperity Party holds the necessary parliamentary seats to pass any constitutional amendment by a two-thirds majority, a government-led constitutional revision is highly likely.

Table 1: Historical and Current Realpolitik of Ethiopian Constitutional Transitions

Historical Phase	Source of Legitimacy/Consent	Major Structural Weaknesses & Threats
Historical Constitutions (Pre-1995)	Monopoly of force and imperial/military regime desires	Entirely devoid of popular consent
1995 FDRE Constitution	Dominated by the victors with limited public discussion	Failed to include all political forces and immediately lacked popular consensus
2026 Historical Revision	Approved by the ruling party's parliamentary dominance under the guise of National Dialogue recommendations	Lack of sufficient elite political reconciliation, exclusion of key peripheral actors, and security instability

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Nine Structural Recommendations for an Inclusive Constitution

To guarantee the long-term survival of Ethiopia and build an "Inclusive Constitution" that commands popular consent, this report details and analyzes the following nine structural revisions

 

1. Modernizing Constitutional Philosophy with Inclusivity

The preamble of the current FDRE constitution, rather than recognizing Ethiopian citizenship, categorizes citizens solely as members of ethnic or national groups. This philosophy fosters conflicting narratives of history and demands, thereby weakening a shared national identity. The proposed constitutional philosophy must balance individual and collective rights.

Citizens have diverse collective identities (social, professional, and civic) beyond ethnic ones; the choice of which identity to prioritize must remain a matter of individual freedom rather than a constitutional mandate. The constitution should envision building an inclusive state and society based on civic ideals and civil society, rather than lineage (blood and heritage).

To implement this philosophy, the administrative units forming the federation should not be named "regions" (Kilils). The term "region" is derived from the Soviet Union's administrative division; it restricts an ethnic group to a specific territory and risks the federation's disintegration, similar to the Soviet Union's fate. To address this, the term "Autonomous Administration" will be implemented. The names of these autonomous administrations, zones, or woredas must not bear ethnic names. Instead, names should be based on geographic directions or prominent rivers. While autonomous administrations may have working languages, they will have no official ethnic identity, ensuring that any citizen with a legal residency ID enjoys equal rights and opportunities.

2. Limiting Power and Adopting a Semi-Presidential Form of Government

The current parliamentary system encourages single-party dominance and authoritarianism. In contrast, presidential systems, which clearly limit term limits, are more vulnerable to sudden electoral defeat. Since Ethiopia has no single ethnic group exceeding 50% of the population and is plagued by ethnic politics, a presidential system could soften ethnic polarization by requiring candidates to appeal to multiple ethnic groups to get elected.

However, to merge the benefits of both systems, this report argues for a semi-presidential or hybrid form of government. In this system, there will be two executive branches:

• The President: Directly elected by a majority vote nationwide, accountable to the electorate. The President will lead the national defence forces and foreign affairs. The President's power will be limited to two terms. If no candidate secures a 50% + 1 majority in the first round, the leading candidate is legally mandated to select the runner-up as their vice president. This mechanism ensures a joint executive backed by popular consensus.
• The Prime Minister: Nominated by the President from the party holding a majority in parliament and approved by parliament, accountable to parliament. The Prime Minister will oversee the federal police, the national security sector, and the civil bureaucracy.

This separation of power limits the absolute dominance of the federal executive over the legislative and judicial branches. Furthermore, ensuring that regional presidents and city mayors are directly elected by the public builds political accountability from the bottom up.

Table 2: Power and Accountability Division in the Semi-Presidential System

Executive Branch	Key Powers and Responsibilities	Constitutional Accountability	Term Limits
President	National Defence, Foreign Affairs, Nominating the Prime Minister	Directly to the electorate	Maximum of two terms
Prime Minister	Federal Police, National Security, Civil Bureaucracy	To the Federal Parliament (Legislative)	Subject to parliamentary confidence

3. Changing the Electoral System to a Hybrid of First-Past-The-Post and Proportional Representation

The current First-Past-The-Post (FPTP) electoral system leads to significant vote wasting. For example, in the 2021 election in Addis Ababa, opposition parties won approximately 32% of the vote but failed to secure a single seat in parliament due to the "winner-takes-all" system. This creates a sense of alienation among many citizens.

Conversely, Proportional Representation (PR) allocates seats based on the percentage of total votes won by political forces, ensuring the representation of all citizens' voices. However, because the President and mayors must be directly elected, PR is not suitable for executive elections.

Therefore, the following hybrid electoral system will be implemented:

• Executive Elections (President, Autonomous Administration Presidents, Mayors): Elected via the First-Past-The-Post (FPTP) system.
• Legislative Council Elections (Federal Parliament and Local Councils): Elected via Proportional Representation (PR). This reduces exclusion and enhances the quality of democratic representation.

 4. Reorganizing the Federal Structure and Approving a 3-Year Transition Plan

The current FDRE federal structure is fenced by ethnic boundaries, whose ultimate goal is secession. This has created oppressive and exclusive homelands based on primordial lineage. To avoid this, autonomous administrations must be reconstructed based on administrative convenience and civic ideals rather than language and ancestry.

To address the vast disparities in population and geographic size among administrations, the following population limit formula shall be applied. The population P of each autonomous administration must fall within the following range:

10,000,000\le P\le 20,000,000

Taking into account Ethiopia’s rapid total population growth P_{\text{total}}, the population ratio of an individual administration relative to the national population must follow this formula:

0.07\le\frac{P}{P_{\text{total}}}\le0.15

Accordingly, massive regions like Oromia and Amhara will be divided into three to four smaller, administratively convenient autonomous administrations, while extremely small regions like Harari will merge with neighboring areas to establish a structure with a viable population size.

Implementing this boundary reorganization abruptly could trigger severe political tension and security crises on the ground. Thus, the restructuring process must be guided by a 3-year transition plan approved alongside the constitution. Over these three years, census-taking, border studies, asset sharing, and administrative transitions will be executed gradually and peacefully. Both federal and autonomous institutions can incorporate symbolic representations blending local traditions with modern governance.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Table 3: Demographic Boundary Formula for Autonomous Administrations

Metric	Minimum Threshold	Maximum Threshold	Administrative Purpose
Population Size (P)	10 Million	20 Million	Ensure equitable resource distribution and administrative convenience
Population Ratio (\frac{P}{P_{\text{total}}})	7%	15%	Establish balanced political representation across the nation

5. Reclassifying Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa as Autonomous Administrations Integrated with Surrounding Areas

Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa are highly diverse urban centers with mixed demographics. To reflect this reality legally, these cities will be integrated with their surrounding suburban and rural areas to form distinct autonomous administrations. The primary languages spoken by the residents will serve as the working and educational languages. This allows these cities to preserve their diversity and serve as models for building an inclusive society.

6. Establishing Three Capital Cities

Concentrating the federal capital in a single location (Addis Ababa) has made the city a focal point of political disputes and power struggles. It has also skewed the flow of resources and infrastructure toward a single direction. To decentralize power and spread the developmental benefits of hosting government institutions, and drawing on the experience of South Africa, the federal government will establish three distinct capital cities.

Accordingly, three cities will be selected within newly created autonomous administrations:

• The Legislative Capital (Parliament) will be seated in the first city.
• The Executive Capital (Government Ministries and Diplomatic Missions) will be seated in the second city.
• The Judicial Capital (Supreme and Constitutional Courts) will be seated in the third city.

This arrangement will distribute infrastructure and economic activity more equitably across different regions while significantly easing the political tension and pressure focused on Addis Ababa. To foster development elsewhere, the new autonomous administration containing Addis Ababa will be excluded from hosting any of these three capitals.

Table 4: Structural Division of the Three Federal Capitals

Branch of Government	Functional Center	Objectives and Benefits
Legislative	1st City (Outside Addis Ababa)	Enhance regional accessibility for public representatives
Executive	2nd City (Outside Addis Ababa)	Centralize bureaucracy and the diplomatic core
Judicial	3rd City (Outside Addis Ababa)	Guarantee judicial independence and insulation from politics

7. Making Land Ownership Private, Public, and Communal

Exclusive state ownership of land has allowed the government to act as a landlord, utilizing land as a political tool to cultivate loyalty and punish dissent. To resolve this and secure citizens' economic freedom, a tripartite land ownership system—originally championed in the policy platform of Ethiopian Citizens for Social Justice (Ezema)—must be implemented.

This system includes three types of ownership:

1. Private Ownership: Farmers, pastoralists, and urban landholders will own not only the structures built on the land but the land itself.

2. State Ownership: Forests, minerals, major rivers, and land required for infrastructure that are not privately held will be managed by the state. The state's power to manage land will be strictly limited by law.

3. Communal Ownership: Pasture and resource lands utilized collectively by urban communities and pastoralists will be placed under communal management.

The current constitution's implication that land belongs to specific ethnic groups poses a severe challenge to inclusivity. A core principle of the inclusive constitution is that no ethnic group shall have exclusive or preferential ownership over any piece of land.

 

 

8. Establishing an Independent Constitutional Court

The judiciary must be separated from the executive. Currently, constitutional interpretation is handled by the House of Federation, which represents a major obstacle to the rule of law. Because the House of Federation is a body of political representatives, its decisions are often driven by political expediency rather than legal principles.

To prevent this, an independent Constitutional Court based on the German model should be established. Judges of the Constitutional Court will be nominated by the President and confirmed by Parliament for non-renewable terms of up to 10 years, granting them the stability and independence needed to uphold the rule of law free from political interference.

9. A Three-Language Policy

To foster deeper inclusivity, a Three-Language Policy modeled on India's successful experience should be enshrined in the inclusive constitution. Under this policy:

• At the federal level, Amharic and Oromo—the languages with the largest number of speakers—will serve as the working and educational languages of the federal government.
• Autonomous administrations will retain the full right to determine their own local working languages.
• The education system will mandate that every student learn three languages:

1. The Local/Regional Working Language (including mother tongue).

2. One Federal Language (which must be different from the student's local language).

3. English as the global language of communication.

This system will strengthen national unity, protect regional autonomy, and enhance global competitiveness.

Table 5: The Three-Language Policy in the Education System

Language Tier	Educational Role	Purpose and Implementation
1st Language (R1)	Local/Mother Tongue	Foster cognitive development and preserve cultural knowledge
2nd Language (R2)	Federal Working Language (Amharic or Oromo)	Facilitate inter-regional commerce, mobility, and national integration
3rd Language (R3)	English	Equipping the workforce to compete globally

Structural Challenges and Future Policy Directions

The proposed recommendations can potentially bring about fundamental structural shifts, yet their implementation clashes with several political and social realities.

1. Security Instability and Regional Resistance

Ongoing security crises and armed conflicts in Amhara, Oromia, and Tigray are massive hurdles to implementing a new constitutional design. In Tigray, political instability and the absence of a fully reconstituted regional government forced the agenda-gathering forums to be relocated to Addis Ababa. Groups like Salsay Weyane Tigray (SaWeT) and the Tigray Independence Party (TIP) argue that a constitutional order must be fully restored before meaningful dialogue can occur.

Additionally, there are concerns that the federal government intends to use the upcoming 2026 elections to replace the 1995 EPRDF constitution with PM Abiy Ahmed's centralized "Medemer" presidential vision. This centralization push is bound to trigger intense resistance from regional ethnonational forces.

2. Transitional Justice Integration Gap

Although a transitional justice policy was adopted by the Council of Ministers in 2024, its integration with the National Dialogue remains vague, slowing down both processes. If constitutional revision is decoupled from transitional justice, addressing historical grievances and grievances in a sustainable manner will be impossible. The non-derogable principle in Article 28 of the current constitution, which bars statutes of limitations and amnesties for gross human rights violations, must be strictly preserved in the new constitution.

Conclusion and Policy Recommendations

Ethiopia’s political crisis can only find a lasting resolution through fundamental, structurally sound constitutional amendments. Because the current constitution's amendment procedures (Articles 104 and 105) are extremely rigid and difficult to execute, a specialized Constitutional Amendment Commission must be established to translate the national dialogue's recommendations into law.

The following policy steps are recommended for the constitutional revision process:

• Establish an Elite Reconciliation Forum: Parallel to the broad national dialogue, create a high-level negotiation platform specifically for armed groups and key opposition leaders to reach political consensus.
• Form a Constitutional Amendment Commission: Establish an independent, time-bound, expert-led body authorized by parliament to draft the specific constitutional changes.
• Link Transitional Justice with Constitutional Reform: Systematically anchor transitional justice policies within the constitutional framework to legally address historical grievances.
• Enact a Phased Transition Plan: Avoid abrupt restructuring of federal boundaries; instead, mandate a 3-year phased transition plan based on detailed technical studies and public consensus.

 

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1. Ethiopia Country Report 2026 - BTI Transformation Index, https://bti-project.org/en/reports/country-report/ETH

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6. የኢትዮጵያ እንደራሴዎች ክራሞት, https://bridge-et.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/Bridge_Amharic_013.pdf

7. የኢፌድሪ ሕገ-መንግሥትን በሕገ-መንግሥታዊ መንገድ ለማሻሻል ብቸኛው መንገድ፡- የአስቸኳይ ጊዜ አዋጅን ተግባራዊ ማድረግ - Blog - Abyssinia Law, https://abyssinialaw.com/blog/the-only-way-to-amend-the-fdre-constitution-constitutionally-is-by-implementing-state-of-emergency

 8. የሕገመንግስት ስልጠና ሞጁል በፌዴራል የፍትህ Aካላት ማሰልጠኛ ማEከል የተዘጋጀ - Ethiopian Legal Brief, https://chilot.wordpress.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/revised-module-on-the-justice-system-and-the-role-of-justice-organs1.pdf

 9. የአገራዊ ምክክር ኮሚሽን ማቋቋሚያ ዐዋጅ ምን ይላል? | Addis Maleda, https://addismaleda.com/archives/10135

10. አገራዊ ምክክር ኮሚሽን የአካል ጉዳተኞችን ተሳትፎ እንዲያረጋገጥ ተጠየቀ - ኢዜአ አማርኛ - ENA English, https://www.ena.et/web/amh/w/am_172232 11. በሕገ መንግሥት ማሻሻያ አንቀጽ 39ኝን መቀየር ይቻል ይሆን? - Blog - Abyssinia Law, https://www.abyssinialaw.com/blog/constitutional-amendment-and-article-39

12. Usuari Discussió:Pere Serafi/constitució - Viquipèdia, l'enciclopèdia lliure, https://ca.wikipedia.org/wiki/Usuari_Discussi%C3%B3:Pere_Serafi/constituci%C3%B3

 13. የኢዜማ ሀገራዊ ምክክር ሰነድ - Oromia Today,  

14. Ethiopia's National Dialogue needs time and an interim report | ISS Africa, https://issafrica.org/iss-today/ethiopia-s-national-dialogue-needs-time-and-an-interim-report

15. If your country had 3 capital cities like South Africa which cities would or should they be? - Reddit, https://www.reddit.com/r/Africa/comments/1i0encm/if_your_country_had_3_capital_cities_like_south/

 16. Top 10 Geography Quiz Questions Answers to Boost Your Knowledge | EarthChasers Blog, https://www.earthchasers.com/blog/geography-quiz-questions-answers

17. The three language formula as a bridge to India's linguistic unity - Organiser, https://organiser.org/2026/04/27/350745/bharat/the-three-language-formula-as-a-bridge-to-indias-linguistic-unity/

18. India Today.In features the Ethiopian Government Delegation and IPE Global Meet, https://www.ipeglobal.com/india-today-in-features-the-ethiopian-government-delegation-and-ipe-global-meet/

19. Three-Language Formula: Resistance, State Decisions, and NEP 2020 - ClearIAS, https://www.clearias.com/three-language-formula/

 20. Literacy and Linguistic Diversity in Multilingual India (Chapter 8), https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/global-variation-in-literacy-development/literacy-and-linguistic-diversity-in-multilingual-india/9CCB51D9AA06751FD4B258134986E6C3

21. Language Policy and Federalism in Independent India, https://forumfed.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/OPS-58-Language-Policy.pdf

22. Third Language Bill, 2020: Boon or Bane - iPleaders, https://blog.ipleaders.in/third-language-bill-2020-boon-bane/

23. Ethiopia: Expanding Representation While Managing Centrifugal Forces, https://africacenter.org/spotlight/en-elections-2026/ethiopia/

 

Macroeconomic Success, Social Fragility: Ethiopia's Economic Reforms Need a Human Face

Ethiopia's ongoing economic reforms under the International Monetary Fund's (IMF) Extended Credit Facility (ECF) represent one of the most ambitious macroeconomic restructuring programs in Africa. The Homegrown Economic Reform (HGER) agenda has delivered measurable improvements in macroeconomic stability: economic growth has accelerated, inflation has declined from previous highs, foreign exchange reserves have increased substantially, and export earnings—particularly from gold and coffee—have strengthened.

These achievements deserve recognition. However, macroeconomic success should not be confused with broad-based human development. The ultimate measure of economic reform is not merely whether fiscal balances improve or reserves accumulate, but whether ordinary citizens experience greater economic security and improved living standards.

The Ethiopian experience illustrates a classic dilemma confronting many developing economies implementing IMF-supported adjustment programs. Fiscal consolidation, exchange-rate liberalization, tax reform, and subsidy removal are designed to restore long-term macroeconomic sustainability. Yet these same policies often impose significant short-term costs on vulnerable populations. Ethiopia now finds itself precisely at this crossroads.

The transition to a market-determined exchange rate has corrected longstanding distortions in Ethiopia's foreign exchange market and reduced opportunities for arbitrage. Nevertheless, the rapid depreciation of the Ethiopian Birr has sharply increased the domestic prices of imported goods, agricultural inputs, fuel, medicines, and industrial materials. Although headline inflation has moderated, many households continue to experience declining purchasing power because prices remain substantially above pre-reform levels.

Similarly, the removal of fuel subsidies has strengthened fiscal discipline by reducing budgetary pressures and discouraging market distortions. However, it has also increased transportation costs, disrupted supply chains, and contributed to localized fuel shortages that affected economic activity, education, and food distribution. These developments demonstrate that economically rational policies can produce socially painful outcomes when implementation outpaces institutional capacity.

Perhaps the greatest concern is the widening gap between macroeconomic indicators and household welfare. The report documents rising poverty, persistent multidimensional deprivation, and disproportionate burdens on rural communities and low-income households. Since poorer families devote a much larger share of their income to food, they experience inflation more intensely than aggregate national statistics suggest. Children remain particularly vulnerable, with food insecurity and human capital deficits threatening Ethiopia's long-term development prospects.

The government's mitigation efforts—including expansion of the Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP), civil service salary adjustments, and reforms to targeted social protection—are important policy responses. Yet these interventions remain constrained by limited domestic financing and continued dependence on external donor support. Sustainable social protection requires stronger domestic revenue generation, improved governance, and more efficient public expenditure.

Equally important is institutional credibility. Successful structural adjustment depends not only on sound economic design but also on transparent implementation. The report highlights concerns surrounding fuel distribution, corruption, and weaknesses in digital payment enforcement, reminding policymakers that governance reforms must accompany economic liberalization.

Ethiopia's reform program should therefore be judged through a dual lens. Macroeconomic stabilization is indispensable for restoring investor confidence, strengthening debt sustainability, and promoting long-term growth. Yet economic reforms that neglect social equity risk undermining the very political legitimacy necessary for their success.

The challenge facing Ethiopia is no longer whether reform should continue, but how it should continue. Policymakers must ensure that economic efficiency and fiscal responsibility are balanced with social protection, inclusive growth, and institutional accountability. Durable economic transformation will ultimately depend not only on stronger balance sheets but also on stronger households. Ethiopia's future prosperity will be determined by whether macroeconomic stability translates into tangible improvements in the daily lives of its citizens.

የትራምፕ የኢራን ቁማር፡ የአሜሪካን የበላይነት ውድቀት ሊያፋጥን የሚችል ጦርነት

የትራምፕ የኢራን ቁማር፡ የአሜሪካን የበላይነት ውድቀት ሊያፋጥን የሚችል ጦርነት

ትልቁ ስትራቴጂካዊ ውድቀቶች በጦር ሜዳ ድሎች ወይም ሽንፈቶች ብቻ የሚለኩት አልፎ አልፎ ነው። የሚለኩት ጠመንጃዎች ጸጥ ካሉ ከረጅም ጊዜ በኋላ በሚከሰቱት የፖለቲካ ውጤቶች ነው። የዩናይትድ ስቴትስ ወታደራዊ ጣልቃ ገብነት በኢራን ላይ የሚያሳድረው የቅርብ ጊዜ ክስተቶች ምንም አይነት አመላካች ከሆኑ፣ የፕሬዚዳንት ዶናልድ ትራምፕ የመካከለኛው ምስራቅ ፖሊሲ ዘላቂ ቅርስ የቴህራን መዳከም ላይሆን ይችላል፣ ነገር ግን የአሜሪካን ዓለም አቀፍ አመራር ማዳከም ሊሆን ይችላል።

ወታደራዊ ዘመቻው የኢራንን ስትራቴጂካዊ ስጋት ለማስወገድ፣ የአሜሪካን መከላከያ ወደነበረበት ለመመለስ እና የእስራኤልን ክልላዊ ደህንነት ለማጠናከር እንደ ወሳኝ ጥረት ቀርቧል። በምትኩ፣ ውጤቱ እየጨመረ በመጣው ባለብዙ ዋልታ ዓለም ውስጥ የወታደራዊ ኃይል ገደብን ያጋለጠ ይመስላል። የታክቲካል የበላይነት ስትራቴጂካዊ ስኬት ማስገኘት አልቻለም። የአገዛዝ ለውጥ ወይም ያለ ቅድመ ሁኔታ እጅ መስጠትን ከማድረስ ይልቅ፣ ግጭቱ ብዙዎቹን የመጀመሪያ ዓላማዎች ያልተፈቱ ቀላል የዲፕሎማሲ ስምምነት በማድረግ ተጠናቀቀ።

በጣም ፈጣን የሆነው የፖለቲካ ጉዳት በባህላዊ አጋሮቿ መካከል የአሜሪካ አመራር ተዓማኒነት ነው። የአውሮፓ መንግስታት በዋሽንግተን እየጨመረ በመጣው የውጭ ፖሊሲ ያልተደሰቱበት፣ ግጭቱን ትርጉም ያለው ምክክር ሳይደረግ የተከናወነ ዋና ወታደራዊ እርምጃ ሌላ ምሳሌ አድርገው ተመልክተውታል። እምነት - ከአሜሪካ ታላላቅ ስትራቴጂካዊ ሀብቶች አንዱ - አንዴ ከጠፋ በኋላ በቀላሉ እንደገና መገንባት አይቻልም።

ግጭቱ የእስራኤልን ስትራቴጂካዊ አካባቢም አወሳስቦታል። ለብዙ አሥርተ ዓመታት እስራኤል በአሜሪካ ወታደራዊ ድጋፍ ላይ ብቻ ሳይሆን በዩናይትድ ስቴትስ ውስጥ ሰፊ የሁለት ወገን የፖለቲካ ድጋፍ ላይም ጥገኛ ሆና ቆይታለች። በእስራኤል ዙሪያ እየጨመረ የመጣው የፖለቲካ ፖላራይዜሽን ይህ ስምምነት ከአሁን በኋላ እንደ ቀላል ሊወሰድ እንደማይችል ይጠቁማል። ለእስራኤል የሚሰጠው ድጋፍ ከብሔራዊ ጉዳይ ይልቅ የፓርቲ ጉዳይ እየሆነ ከመጣ፣ ኢየሩሳሌም በጣም አስፈላጊው ጥምረት እምብዛም የማይገመት ሆኖ ልታገኘው ትችላለች።

ይህ በእንዲህ እንዳለ፣ የባህረ ሰላጤው ንጉሣዊ አገዛዝ የተለየ አጣብቂኝ ውስጥ ይወድቃል። የደህንነት አርክቴክቸራቸው በዩናይትድ ስቴትስ ላይ በእጅጉ ጥገኛ ሆኖ ይቆያል፣ ነገር ግን ግጭቱ ሙሉ በሙሉ በአንድ ውጫዊ ዋስትና ላይ የመተማመን አደጋዎችን አሳይቷል። ይህ ግንዛቤ ከቻይና፣ አውሮፓ፣ ህንድ እና ሌሎች የእስያ ኃያላንን ጨምሮ - ከአማራጭ አጋሮች ጋር ጥልቅ ግንኙነትን ሊያበረታታ ይችላል - እንደ ዋሽንግተን ምትክ ሳይሆን ለወደፊቱ እርግጠኛ አለመሆንን ለመከላከል እንደ ስትራቴጂካዊ መከላከያ።

በሚያስገርም ሁኔታ፣ ቤጂንግ ከዋና ዋና የጂኦፖሊቲካል ተጠቃሚዎች አንዷ ሆና ልትወጣ ትችላለች። በመካከለኛው ምስራቅ ውስጥ ያለ እያንዳንዱ ተጨማሪ የአሜሪካ ወታደራዊ ቁርጠኝነት የዲፕሎማሲ ትኩረትን፣ ወታደራዊ ሀብቶችን እና የፖለቲካ ካፒታልን ከኢንዶ-ፓስፊክ ያርቃል፣ ከቻይና ጋር ያለው ስትራቴጂካዊ ውድድር የሃያ አንደኛው ክፍለ ዘመን ዓለም አቀፍ ፖለቲካን እየጨመረ የሚገልጸው ነው። አሜሪካ በፋርስ ባሕረ ሰላጤ ላይ ለረጅም ጊዜ ትኩረት መስጠቷ ቤጂንግ ያለ ግጭት የክልል ተጽዕኖዋን ለማጠናከር ጠቃሚ ስትራቴጂካዊ ቦታ ይሰጣታል።

ሩሲያም በተዘዋዋሪ ትጠቀማለች። እየጨመረ የመጣው የኃይል ዋጋ ጊዜያዊ የኢኮኖሚ እፎይታ ያስገኛል፣ የምዕራባውያን ወታደራዊ ሀብቶች ደግሞ በብዙ ቲያትሮች ላይ እየተስፋፉ ይሄዳሉ። ሞስኮ ከፍተኛ የኢኮኖሚ እና ወታደራዊ ጫናዎችን መጋፈጥ ብትቀጥልም፣ የምዕራባውያን ስትራቴጂካዊ ትስስር መቀነስ የሩሲያን ጥቅም ያገለግላል።

ምናልባት በጣም ዘላቂው ውጤት ዓለም አቀፍ የኢኮኖሚ ስርዓትን ይመለከታል። ግጭቱ የዓለም ንግድ በሆርሙዝ ወሽመጥ ውስጥ ለሚከሰቱ መስተጓጎሎች ተጋላጭነትን በድጋሚ አሳይቷል። የኢነርጂ ደህንነት፣ የባህር ንግድ፣ የኢንሹራንስ ገበያዎች እና የአቅርቦት ሰንሰለቶች ለጂኦፖሊቲካዊ ድንጋጤዎች ተጋልጠዋል። ስለዚህ መንግስታት እና ዓለም አቀፍ ኮርፖሬሽኖች የአቅርቦት ልዩነትን፣ የስትራቴጂክ ክምችትን እና አማራጭ የትራንስፖርት ኮሪደሮችን ለማፋጠን የሚያደርጉትን ጥረት ሊያፋጥኑ ይችላሉ።

በመሠረቱ፣ ግጭቱ በዓለም ፖለቲካ ውስጥ ሰፊ ለውጥን ያሳያል። ወታደራዊ የበላይነት ብቻውን የፖለቲካ ውጤቶችን ዋስትና አይሰጥም። ታላላቅ ኃያላን በጦር ኃይል ብቻ ሳይሆን በኢኮኖሚያዊ መቋቋም፣ በቴክኖሎጂ ፈጠራ፣ በዲፕሎማሲያዊ ህጋዊነት እና በአጋርነት አስተዳደርም ጭምር እየተወዳደሩ ነው። ስኬት በዓለም አቀፍ መተማመን ላይ ከመሆን ይልቅ በጦርነት ማሸነፍ ላይ ያነሰ ነው።

ዩናይትድ ስቴትስ በዓለም ላይ በጣም ኃይለኛ ወታደራዊ ተዋናይ ሆና ትቀጥላለች። ሆኖም ስትራቴጂካዊ ቁጥጥር የሌለው ኃይል እየቀነሰ የሚሄድ ትርፍ ሊያመጣ ይችላል። ታሪክ በተደጋጋሚ እንደሚያሳየው ኢምፓየሮች አንድ ጦርነት ስለተሸነፉ እምብዛም እንደማይወድቁ፤ ተደጋጋሚ ስትራቴጂካዊ ከመጠን በላይ መጨመር ጥምረትን፣ ተአማኒነትን እና የሀገር ውስጥ መግባባትን ቀስ በቀስ ሲያበላሽ ይወድቃሉ።የኢራን ግጭት በመጨረሻ እንደ ጊዜያዊ መሰናክል ወይም ወሳኝ የሆነ የለውጥ ነጥብ መታወሱ የሚወሰነው ዋሽንግተን በሚቀጥሉት ዓመታት ውስጥ ታላቁን ስትራቴጂዋን እንዴት እንደምታስተካክል ነው። የአሜሪካ ፖሊሲ አውጪዎች ጥምረቶችን እንደገና ካቋቋሙ፣ የዲፕሎማሲያዊ ተዓማኒነትን መልሰው ካቋቋሙ እና በረጅም ጊዜ ስትራቴጂካዊ ውድድር ላይ እንደገና ካተኮሩ፣ ጉዳቱ ሊቀለበስ ይችላል።

ካልሆነ፣ የታሪክ ምሁራን የኢራንን ጦርነት አሜሪካ ጥንካሬዋን እንዳሳየችበት ቅጽበት ሳይሆን፣ በአሜሪካ ከሚመራው ዓለም አቀፍ ሥርዓት ወደ ይበልጥ የተበታተነ እና ባለብዙ ዋልታ ዓለም ቀስ በቀስ በሚሸጋገርበት ወቅት እንደ ሌላ ምዕራፍ አድርገው ሊመለከቱት ይችላሉ።

https://x.com/i/status/2070564643987165476