Fault Lines in the Horn of Africa: Geopolitical Competition and Regional Stability

Executive Summary

The Horn of Africa has emerged as a primary theatre for a new era of middle-power competition that risks escalating into a regional proxy war. Since approximately 2020, the strategic interests of the Gulf states, Turkey, and Israel have mapped onto pre-existing African conflicts, hardening a divide between two distinct blocs:

The Revisionist Axis: Led by the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and supported by Israel, this bloc favours transactional partnerships with disruptive actors—including the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in Sudan and autonomous regional governments in Somalia—to secure economic interests and strategic depth.

The Status Quo Coalition: Comprising Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey, this bloc supports internationally recognized governments and territorial integrity to ensure regional stability and protect long-term economic visions, such as Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030.

This external competition has regionalized domestic disputes in Sudan, Ethiopia, and Somalia, making them more lethal and difficult to resolve. The United States faces a critical inflection point at which it must move beyond a "hands-off" approach to achieve inclusive solutions. Failure to de-escalate these tensions threatens mutual US interests, including maritime security in the Red Sea and the containment of Iranian and Russian influence.

I. Primary Conflict Theatres in the Horn of Africa

The current regional instability is driven by five intersecting domestic and regional conflicts.

1. The Sudanese Civil War

Beginning in April 2023, the war between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) has created the world’s worst humanitarian crisis, with 150,000 deaths and 14 million people displaced.

The Standoff: As of February 2026, the SAF controls the Nile River Valley and eastern Sudan, while the RSF dominates Darfur and western regions.

Strategic Battleground: The town of el Obeid serves as the current pivot point; its capture by the RSF would threaten Khartoum, while an SAF victory would open a path to Darfur.

2. Somali Federal Tensions

A constitutional crisis is unfolding as regional states resist the Federal Government of Somalia’s (FGS) efforts to centralize power through a direct "one-person, one-vote" election system.

Somaliland: Operating as a de facto independent state since 1991, it recently gained momentum through recognition from Israel in December 2025 and a port-for-recognition memorandum with Ethiopia.

Puntland and Jubbaland: Both states have suspended formal ties with the FGS. In late 2025, they helped form the "Somali Future Council" to oppose FGS reforms, raising the risk of parallel elections and political violence.

3. Ethiopian Federal Tensions

Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s centralization efforts have triggered insurgencies among former allies.

Tigray: The 2022 Pretoria agreement has effectively collapsed. In March 2025, hardline Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) factions ousted the federally backed interim administration, leading to renewed large-scale clashes in early 2026.

Amhara: The Fano militias, once allied with Abiy against Tigray, launched an insurgency in 2023. By early 2026, these factions unified into the Amhara Fano National Movement, sustaining a high rate of operations against federal forces.

4. Ethiopian Sea Access

Ethiopia views sovereign naval and commercial sea access as an "existential right."

Littoral Friction: Abiy has implicitly threatened to annex the Eritrean port of Assab and signed a controversial MOU with Somaliland for a naval base.

Economic Impact: Ethiopia currently pays Djibouti $1.5 billion annually in port fees (one-third of Djibouti's GDP), making any shift in access a major economic threat to the status quo.

5. The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD)

The operationalization of the GERD is a cornerstone of Ethiopia's ambition to become a regional energy exporter.

Existential Threat to Egypt: Egypt, which derives 97% of its water from the Nile, views the dam as a threat to its water and food security. Tensions peaked in late 2025 when Egypt withdrew from negotiations, citing Ethiopian "bad faith."

II. Middle-Power Strategic Orientations

The following table outlines the competing alignments and objectives of the external powers involved in the region:

 

The UAE: Transactional Interventionism

The UAE views the Horn of Africa as a vital node in its global trade network. It has invested $70 billion in renewable energy and relies heavily on African gold (importing $34.5 billion in 2022). The UAE is willing to back non-state actors and "authoritarian strongmen" to secure these interests, viewing a stable, status-quo-oriented Red Sea as less important than a pliable one.

Saudi Arabia: Defensive Stabilization

Saudi Arabia’s "Vision 2030" depends on attracting tourism and investment to its Red Sea coastline. Consequently, Riyadh views the UAE's support for non-state actors as a threat that could fragment neighbouring states and spill instability across the sea. Saudi Arabia has recently sought to "catch up" to the UAE through massive investments in African mining and agriculture.

Turkey: The Alternative Partner

Turkey utilizes a "whole-of-government" approach, combining humanitarian aid, religious education, and advanced military tech (Bayraktar drones). It has successfully positioned itself as a mediator, recently brokering talks between Ethiopia and Somalia to resolve the Somaliland port dispute.

III. Risks of Horizontal Escalation

The regionalization of these conflicts has created several "fault lines" where a spark in one country could ignite a broader war:

The Sudan-Ethiopia-Eritrea Triangle: Eritrea and the TPLF, once bitter enemies, appear to be forming a tactical alliance against Abiy Ahmed’s government. There are reports of Eritrea and the TPLF coordinating support for the Amhara Fano insurgency.

The Red Sea Maritime Crisis: Houthis' attacks and the potential for an Ethiopian navy have militarized the Red Sea. Egypt and Saudi Arabia have responded by strengthening ties with Eritrea and Djibouti to contain the UAE-Ethiopia-Israel axis.

Adversarial Exploitation: Iran and Russia are actively seeking to exploit the vacuum. Radical Islamist groups, including al-Shabaab, the Islamic State Somalia Province, and the Yemeni Houthis, remain positioned to capitalize on state fragmentation.

IV. Framework for De-escalation

To prevent a full-scale proxy war, the briefing identifies several urgent policy requirements for the international community and the United States:

Tangible Pressure: The US should consider sanctions against actors detrimental to stability, such as designating the RSF as a Foreign Terrorist Organization to warn third-party sponsors.

Inclusive Peace Dividends: Mediation must address core concerns, such as ensuring Emirati economic investments in Sudan are protected in peace talks and negotiating a long-term deal on the GERD that satisfies Egyptian water security and Ethiopian energy needs.

Diplomatic Architecture: Expand the Abraham Accords to include Horn of Africa nations and push for an inclusive Red Sea Council that includes Ethiopia, Israel, and the UAE.

Dedicated Leadership: The appointment of a Senate-approved special envoy to the Horn of Africa is essential to coordinate long-term mediation across a dozen highly centralized regional actors.

Depoliticized Investment: Strengthening debt relief and multilateral financing tools can provide African nations with alternatives to transactional, politicized middle-power partnerships.

Drones, Deterrence, and the Caribbean: Is Washington Reading a Real Cuban Threat or Writing the Next Chapter

Drones, Deterrence, and the Caribbean: Is Washington Reading a Real Cuban Threat or Writing the Next Chapter?

In international politics, threats are rarely just about weapons. They are equally about narratives, timing, and strategic positioning. The latest reports alleging that Cuba has acquired more than 300 military drones from Russia and Iran and discussing potential attacks on U.S. targets have reignited memories of Cold War confrontation across the Florida Straits. Yet beneath the headlines lies a more complicated question: Is Havana genuinely transforming its military strategy, or is Washington constructing a framework for its next geopolitical move? 

The Axios report presents a troubling picture. According to classified intelligence cited by U.S. officials, Cuban authorities have allegedly examined contingency scenarios involving attacks on the U.S. naval base at Guantanamo Bay, American vessels, and even Key West. The Trump administration reportedly sees the development as a growing national security concern, especially given Iran’s role in modern drone warfare and Cuba's expanding military ties with Moscow and Tehran. 

But history teaches caution. Intelligence assessments do not automatically equal operational intent. Even the same U.S. officials cited in these reports acknowledge that an attack is not considered imminent and that Cuba lacks conventional military capabilities comparable to major powers. 

This distinction matters.

Since the war in Ukraine, military thinking worldwide has changed dramatically. Small, inexpensive drones have transformed warfare by allowing weaker actors to challenge stronger militaries. Ukraine, Iran, and non-state groups have demonstrated that modern conflict increasingly favours asymmetric tools over traditional military power. Cuba, a state under intense economic pressure and sanctions, may simply be adapting to global trends.

From Havana's perspective, acquiring drones may represent less a plan for aggression than a strategy of deterrence.

Small states facing larger powers often seek capabilities that increase the cost of intervention. Cuba cannot compete with American naval fleets, air power, or intelligence systems. Yet possessing drones—even symbolically—could create uncertainty. The objective may not be to win a war, but to raise the political and military price of one.

However, Washington's timing raises equally important questions.

These allegations arrive amid rapidly escalating U.S.-Cuba tensions. The Department of Justice is reportedly preparing legal action against Raúl Castro over the 1996 Brothers to the Rescue incident, while additional sanctions appear imminent. Meanwhile, rhetoric surrounding Cuba has intensified, with some observers warning of increasingly confrontational policy discussions. 

Cuba has pushed back sharply. Foreign Minister Bruno Rodríguez Parrilla accused Washington of fabricating a "fraudulent case" to justify further sanctions or military action, while insisting Cuba seeks self-defence rather than conflict. 

That accusation cannot be dismissed outright.

Historically, security threats have often served dual purposes in U.S. foreign policy: addressing genuine concerns while simultaneously creating political legitimacy for broader strategic objectives. The Monroe Doctrine, anti-communist containment, and post-9/11 security doctrines all involved narratives that shaped public consent and strategic action.

This does not mean the intelligence is false. It means intelligence can be interpreted through political lenses.

The most striking phrase in the Axios reporting may be the admission that the intelligence "could become a pretext for military action." That wording deserves careful attention.

The real story may therefore not be whether Cuba intends to launch drones at Florida. Rather, the more consequential question is whether both sides are entering a new phase of strategic signalling: Havana displaying deterrent capacity. At the same time, Washington frames emerging threats through a broader doctrine of hemispheric control.

The Cold War's missile crisis was about nuclear weapons stationed ninety miles from American shores. The new Caribbean confrontation may be about something smaller but potentially just as symbolic: drones, intelligence narratives, and competing interpretations of security.

History rarely repeats itself exactly.

But sometimes it rhymes.

Shadow in Africa: Power Projection, Proxy Networks, and the Crisis of Regional Order

The UAE's Expanding Shadow in Africa: Power Projection, Proxy Networks, and the Crisis of Regional Order

An analytical article based on SWP Comment 19 | May 2026

The modern geopolitical map of Africa increasingly reveals a powerful yet controversial actor operating far beyond its territorial boundaries: the United Arab Emirates. Once known primarily as a Gulf commercial and financial hub, the UAE has evolved into an assertive middle power with a growing footprint across African conflict zones. From Sudan and Libya to Somalia and Ethiopia, Abu Dhabi's influence has become increasingly visible through military assistance, financial leverage, logistics networks, and relationships with local armed actors.

A recent analysis by the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) portrays the UAE not as a stabilizing actor but as a disruptive force whose interventions have aggravated conflicts, prolonged wars, and weakened international conflict-resolution mechanisms.

A Strategy of Influence without Occupation

Unlike traditional military powers, the UAE rarely deploys large numbers of its own troops. Instead, it relies on an indirect model of influence built around local allies and proxy actors. This strategy minimizes political risks while maximizing strategic reach.

In Libya, the UAE backed General Khalifa Haftar and the Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF), including support during military offensives against the internationally recognized government in Tripoli. In Sudan, Abu Dhabi is widely accused of becoming the principal external sponsor of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) led by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti). In Somalia, its support extended to the Puntland Maritime Police Force and security structures in Somaliland.

Ethiopia presents a somewhat different case. During the Tigray conflict, the government of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed reportedly relied heavily on Emirati drone technology, which many analysts argue helped shift the battlefield dynamics in Addis Ababa's favour.

Despite these differing contexts, a common pattern emerges: support directed toward actors capable of reshaping political and military balances.

Sudan: The Epicentre of Controversy

Sudan increasingly stands at the center of criticism concerning Emirati interventionism.

The RSF's capture of El-Fasher in late 2025 reportedly triggered mass atrocities and catastrophic humanitarian consequences. Numerous international observers identify the UAE as the RSF's critical external lifeline through military assistance, logistics networks, and financial support.

The consequences have been devastating. Sudan now faces one of the world's largest humanitarian crises, with millions displaced and widespread hunger threatening entire populations.

The controversy intensified after reports suggested suspicious cargo flights continued between the UAE and logistical routes through Ethiopia and Libya, allegedly facilitating support operations even amid broader regional instability.

Abu Dhabi strongly rejects such accusations and insists that it supports peace initiatives and humanitarian efforts. Yet accusations continue to surface from international observers and leaked investigative reports.

Economics and Geopolitics: More than Trade

Emirati engagement in Africa is often explained in terms of economic interests.

State-linked corporations such as DP World and AD Ports have invested heavily in ports and strategic infrastructure across Africa, including in Somalia, Tanzania, Mozambique, Senegal, and Egypt.

These projects form part of a wider effort to establish commercial corridors connecting Africa, Asia, Europe, and the Gulf.

However, economics alone cannot explain Emirati behaviour.

The UAE's broader geopolitical ambitions increasingly appear tied to competition with regional powers, particularly Saudi Arabia and Iran.

The relationship between Abu Dhabi and Riyadh has evolved from a strategic partnership toward quiet rivalry. While both countries seek influence in Africa and the Red Sea, they increasingly pursue competing visions.

Saudi Arabia generally favours a state-centred regional order and institutional stability.

The UAE often appears more comfortable operating through flexible networks, commercial leverage, and local power brokers.

This divergence became visible in Sudan and Yemen and increasingly affects Horn of Africa politics.

Ideology and Security Calculations

Another major driver behind Emirati policy appears to be ideological.

The ruling leadership in Abu Dhabi strongly opposes movements associated with the Muslim Brotherhood and political Islam. Since the Arab uprisings, the UAE has pursued aggressive policies aimed at limiting the influence of actors perceived as Islamist or politically mobilizing.

This ideological framework has shaped intervention choices throughout the Middle East and Africa.

However, critics note inconsistencies. Some Emirati alliances appear driven less by ideology than by pragmatic calculations and strategic convenience.

The Erosion of International Norms

Perhaps the most significant concern raised by the SWP analysis is not merely the UAE's military role but its broader impact on international governance.

Repeated allegations of violations of UN arms embargoes in Libya and Sudan raise questions about the credibility of enforcement.

When external powers openly circumvent international restrictions without consequences, multilateral institutions lose authority.

The concern extends beyond the UAE alone. Turkey, Russia, Egypt, Iran, and other regional actors have also become increasingly involved in African conflicts.

The result is a regional security environment increasingly characterized by overlapping proxy wars and fragmented sovereignty.

Europe Faces a Strategic Dilemma

The SWP authors argue that Germany and Europe have historically treated the UAE as a valuable economic and diplomatic partner while avoiding direct confrontation over its activities in Africa.

This approach may now face growing scrutiny.

European interests—stable trade routes, migration management, regional integration, and conflict prevention—are increasingly affected by African instability.

The central question is no longer whether the UAE possesses influence in Africa.

Rather, it is whether that influence contributes to regional stability or whether it increasingly reinforces cycles of fragmentation and proxy competition.

As geopolitical rivalries intensify across the Red Sea and Horn of Africa, the answer may shape the future security architecture of an entire region.

Washington’s New Horn Strategy: Sudan, GERD and Libya at the Center of U.S. Diplomacy

Washington’s New Horn Strategy: Sudan, GERD and Libya at the Center of U.S. Diplomacy

By Habtamu Nini Abino

Recent remarks by Massad Boulos during an interview with [Al Jazeera Mubasher](https://mubasher.aljazeera.net/?utm_source=chatgpt.com) offer one of the clearest windows yet into Washington’s evolving diplomatic strategy toward Africa and the Middle East. The conversation, aired on May 11, 2026, focused on three major regional files: Sudan’s devastating war, the future of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), and renewed efforts toward political stabilization in Libya.

Taken together, the remarks suggest that Washington is moving from reactive crisis management toward a broader diplomatic architecture in the Horn of Africa and North Africa. Whether such efforts can succeed remains uncertain, but they indicate an important recalibration of U.S. engagement.

Sudan: Humanitarian Catastrophe and Search for Political Transition

Boulos characterized Sudan as the world's largest humanitarian disaster. The conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) has generated immense human suffering, leaving millions displaced and dependent on humanitarian aid.

He pointed to the April 2026 Berlin Conference as a significant diplomatic achievement. According to Boulos, participants reached a broad international agreement on a 12-point “Declaration of Principles” intended to guide a future political settlement.

Yet he acknowledged a central contradiction undermining peace efforts: both warring sides continue receiving extraordinary levels of external military and political support. Such backing sustains the illusion that victory can still be achieved militarily despite nearly three years of conflict.

According to the U.S. assessment, a military solution no longer appears realistic. Washington, instead, favours what Boulos described as a “Sudanese-Sudanese” process that would eventually lead to an independent civilian authority. Notably, he signalled flexibility regarding transitional arrangements, indicating that existing actors could participate if accepted by the Sudanese people.

The immediate U.S. priority remains humanitarian. Washington is pushing for a three-month ceasefire designed to enable aid delivery to over thirty million civilians. The broader objective would then be a permanent ceasefire, followed by an inclusive national dialogue.

GERD: From Technical Engineering to Political Negotiation

On the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, Boulos suggested a major shift in American thinking.

The dispute surrounding the dam has transformed substantially since earlier U.S.-mediated talks in 2020. At that time, negotiations centred heavily on technical concerns related to filling schedules and water management mechanisms.

Today, the dam exists as a completed strategic reality.

As a result, Boulos argued that the issue has evolved from a primarily engineering and technical question into a political challenge requiring new diplomatic approaches.

He noted that Washington had hosted Ethiopian officials for discussions covering bilateral relations and the GERD issue. Yet he also indicated caution, stating that the United States intended to await outcomes of Ethiopia's anticipated electoral process before pursuing further practical measures toward a final legal arrangement.

This statement may indicate recognition that durable agreements require political legitimacy and stable domestic conditions within the region.

Libya: Signs of Cautious Optimism

Unlike his comments on Sudan, Boulos expressed unusually strong optimism concerning Libya.

He highlighted what he called unprecedented progress in rebuilding national institutions. For the first time in approximately fifteen years, Libya reportedly adopted a unified national budget, assisted by technical support from the U.S. Treasury.

He also emphasized security cooperation through the April 2026 Flintlock military exercises conducted in Sirte. The exercises reportedly brought together eastern and western Libyan forces within a joint operational framework.

Such cooperation is significant because divisions between eastern and western institutions have long prevented political consolidation.

Based on current trends and support for the UN roadmap, Boulos suggested that national elections might become possible by late 2026 or early 2027.

A Broader Strategic Picture

Viewed collectively, these remarks reveal more than separate policy discussions. They suggest that Washington increasingly sees conflicts in Sudan, Libya, and the Horn of Africa as interconnected components of a broader regional security architecture.

The challenge, however, remains substantial. External actors continue competing for influence across Sudan, the Red Sea, and the Horn. Regional rivalries involving Gulf states, Egypt, Turkey, and other powers complicate diplomatic calculations.

The critical question is whether diplomacy can move faster than geopolitical competition.

Washington appears to be signalling renewed engagement. But history in the region suggests that declarations of principles alone rarely end wars. Durable peace ultimately depends on whether local actors—and their external supporters—choose compromise over confrontation.

Power Struggle in Ethiopia’s Tigray: Averting a Return to War

Power Struggle in Ethiopia’s Tigray: Averting a Return to War

 What is happening?

The dramatic struggle for control of Ethiopia’s Tigray region has taken a sharp and dangerous turn. Over the course of several days, culminating on 5 May, the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) elbowed out regional leader Tadesse Werede, who enjoyed the federal government’s backing, and replaced his administration with a new regional council. This body is led by TPLF chair Debretsion Gebremichael, who was the region’s leader during a bloody 2020-2022 war between Tigray and the federal government. A few days after the TPLF pronounced him the new regional president, Debretsion took over Tadesse’s office and convened a cabinet meeting in the presidential building in Mekelle, the regional capital. Soon thereafter, Debretsion ordered that local administrators appointed by Tadesse now answer to the TPLF’s new regional council.

The TPLF power grab has already heightened tensions with Addis Ababa. Tadesse had warned that such a move would annul the 2022 Pretoria agreement, which ended the two-year civil war. As the TPLF installed Debretsion, Tadesse issued a statement from Mekelle saying he refused to resign, adding that those who had seized power by force would be responsible for the consequences. With the 2022 deal hanging by a thread, the risk of renewed conflict in northern Ethiopia is significant.

> TPLF leaders increasingly saw Tadesse as unwilling to push their agenda.

> The TPLF’s attempt to reassert its authority over Tigray is a direct challenge to the federal government under Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, who viewed himself as the victor in the 2020-2022 civil war, which took hundreds of thousands of lives and devastated much of Tigray. The roots of the current dispute date back to 8 April, when the federal government unilaterally extended the mandate of Tigray’s interim administration, created under the peace deal, and reappointed Tadesse to another year in office. The TPLF had agreed to Tadesse’s original appointment one year prior, but tensions between him and the wider group grew over the course of his term. TPLF leaders increasingly saw Tadesse as unwilling to push their agenda, which would have seen greater confrontation with Ethiopian central authorities and closer ties to Eritrea, Ethiopia’s longstanding geopolitical rival.

Tadesse’s reappointment brought these tensions to a head. The TPLF said it was not consulted and denounced the reappointment as a violation of the 2022 accord, which states that the interim administration should be formed “through political dialogue between the Parties”. Though Addis Ababa has not explained its reasoning for the unilateral appointment, some close to federal authorities argue that the extension was a technical rollover that did not require new consultations.

The federal government has not yet issued a statement in response to the developments, though it has sent fighter jets buzzing over Mekelle. A substantial troop deployment on Tigray’s borders from earlier in the year also remains in place. Ethiopia is facing a severe fuel shortage as a result of the U.S.-Israeli war with Iran and is preparing for elections in June – two factors that may have prodded the TPLF, seeing Addis Ababa as vulnerable, to choose this moment to seize power. For its part, the TPLF asserts that its objective is to restore the region’s “sovereign ownership of power” – an allusion to the ideology that formed the basis of Ethiopia’s ethnic nationalist constitution that gives every ethnic region explicit self-determination.

This stance, however, will only reinforce the impression in Addis Ababa that the TPLF is acting treacherously to reverse the outcome of the 2020-2022 war and form a de facto breakaway rogue province. It is unclear how the TPLF plans to govern the vast mountainous area without assistance from Addis Ababa, given that the interim administration was dependent on the federal government for budget subsidies and salaries. But, if that was a concern, it was insufficient to deter the group from a highly escalatory step.

 Why are relations between the federal government and TPLF so fraught?

Abiy’s rise to power in 2018 put his government on a collision course with the TPLF, which had dominated power in Ethiopia since toppling Mengistu Hailemariam’s military dictatorship in 1991. Abiy ascended to the premiership on the back of mass protest movements against the TPLF’s rule, which had overseen a period of economic growth and stability but also fomented antipathy among many Ethiopians who resented the outsized power concentrated in the hands of the minority Tigrayans.

After Abiy’s rise, most of Tigray’s elite decamped from Addis Ababa to their homeland in the country’s north. Tensions between Addis Ababa and Mekelle steadily grew. In September 2020, Tigray – under Debretsion’s leadership – held its own polls in defiance of the federal government. Tigrayan forces then overran a major federal military base, sparking civil war. The federal government, which was allied with militias from the neighbouring Amhara and Afar regions, as well as Eritrea, fought the Tigrayans for two years and eventually achieved a decisive military advantage in late 2022.

The result was an unsteady peace. With Tigrayan forces in massive retreat on the battlefield, the parties signed a lopsided peace agreement in Pretoria in November 2022. Among other provisions, it required the TPLF to demobilise its forces and gave Abiy a veto over the region’s post-war interim leadership. But though some Tigrayan forces did stand down and disarm, most did not. Other parts of the accord remained contested as well – including the status of territories disputed between Tigray and Amhara, which were taken by Amhara militias during the war and continue to be outside Tigrayan control. Over more than three years, the two parties failed to move forward on implementing the agreement or to agree on how to reintegrate Tigray into Ethiopia’s political federation.

Amid these disagreements, some of the TPLF’s leaders, known as the “old guard”, began to flex their muscles, leading the charge to push back against parts of the Pretoria agreement. Though the TPLF had suffered a major military defeat at the hands of the federal government and its allies, this party that once ruled all Ethiopia remained the dominant political force in the region. The old guard also retained de facto power over the Tigray Defence Forces, which had formed during the 2020-2022 war to fight the federal government, from a combination of Tigrayan elements of the national army and local conscripts.

After Abiy vetoed the TPLF’s nomination of Debretsion to serve as head of the post-war regional administration, the group settled on Getachew Reda, who had led the TPLF’s negotiating team in Pretoria. He assumed the post in March 2023. Party leaders soon soured on Getachew, however, concluding that he had grown too close to Addis Ababa and was failing to advocate for Tigray and the TPLF’s core interests. They also blamed him for the 2022 peace agreement that he had helped negotiate, which they viewed as stacked in favour of the federal government. As a result, they began a political campaign to oust him from power, starting in the countryside and moving slowly toward Mekelle. By March 2025, they had forced Getachew to flee to Addis Ababa.

Though many feared a return to conflict, Abiy and Debretsion compromised on who would assume the mantle of regional leader. They settled on Tadesse, a veteran Ethiopian general and chief of the regional security forces. But relations between the TPLF and Tadesse, whose job required him to maintain a working relationship with Abiy, also disintegrated. Caught between two increasingly antagonistic masters vying for political control of Tigray, Tadesse’s position became untenable.

> Core to the rising tensions between Mekelle and Addis Ababa has been the TPLF’s surprising rapprochement with its neighbour and long-time foe Eritrea.

> Core to the rising tensions between Mekelle and Addis Ababa has been the TPLF’s surprising rapprochement with its neighbour and long-time foe Eritrea, which joined Abiy’s military campaign against Tigray in the 2020-2022 war. (Ties between Ethiopia and Eritrea began to fray right after the Pretoria agreement, as Asmara believed the accord made too many political concessions to the defeated TPLF, which at that time it wanted to see destroyed.) The new alliance angered Abiy, contributing to a rapid deterioration in relations between Addis Ababa and Asmara. At the same time, Abiy started to make public his desire for landlocked Ethiopia to regain control of a sea port – an ambition that many suspected he sought to achieve through annexation of Eritrean territory. Not surprisingly, this declaration pushed Eritrea closer to Tigray. The TPLF’s alliance with Eritrea creates a new power dynamic in Ethiopia’s north by removing the prospect that, in the event of reignited conflict, Addis Ababa could work with Asmara to encircle Tigray. The result is an emboldened TPLF.

Other moves from both sides deepened the crisis. In May 2025, after a dispute between the national electoral commission and the TPLF, the government banned the TPLF as a political party, a move that legally prevented it from holding political power in Tigray. Afterward, Addis Ababa started to restrict government budget subsidies and fuel supplies to Tigray, imposing a kind of economic blockade on the region. The government also appeared to be backing an armed splinter group from the Tigray Defence Forces, known as the Tigray Peace Force, which had started a low-level insurgency against the TPLF in 2025. After clashes between the Tigray Defence Forces and Tigray Peace Force broke out in late 2025, the federal army carried out drone strikes on Tigrayan units it claimed had strayed into the Afar region. The strikes marked the first direct engagement between government and Tigrayan forces since the 2020-2022 war.

The government and TPLF have also clashed over disputed areas that lie along the border of the Tigray and Amhara regions, which have been under the joint control of Amhara militias and federal forces since the Tigray war. The TPLF claims that the government has stalled on finding a solution to the thorny issue of which region can claim these territories. It also says Addis Ababa has obstructed the return of Tigrayans displaced from these areas, most of whom are still living in camps far from their homes. In late January, Tigrayan forces entered the disputed Tselemti area and exchanged fire with army units stationed there. Tadesse claimed the intent was to protect Tigrayan civilians who had returned to the area and were being persecuted by Amhara militias. The government – which believes that Mekelle wishes to reassert control of the disputed areas – responded by conducting drone strikes in Tigray and temporarily halting flights to the region. Tadesse then ordered the Tigrayan forces to withdraw, complaining that Abiy had escalated to “something resembling an all-out war”.

A few weeks later, the government moved a sizeable contingent of troops to Tigray’s borders, raising alarm that it had indeed decided to use military force to regain control of the region. For several weeks the government forces sat in camps strategically located around Tigray’s borders. Some of them were then quietly withdrawn, though it remains unclear why. Whatever the case, the redeployments failed to achieve an enduring de-escalation. The expiry of the interim administration’s mandate in early April was widely viewed as a flashpoint, with speculation rife over whether Abiy would reappoint Tadesse as the body’s leader. At first, the TPLF expressed its opposition to the unilateral decision in a written statement, but after several weeks of internal discussions they decided to go further by reinstating Tigray’s pre-war leadership and ceasing to cooperate with the existing regional administration backed by Addis Ababa.

 How are regional tensions contributing to the Tigray problem?

The war in Sudan and other regional rivalries, including the bitter antagonism between Ethiopia and Eritrea, heighten the risk of a new conflict in Tigray, in part because Addis Ababa worries that the TPLF has become a pawn in an effort by its main regional adversaries (namely Eritrea, but possibly also Egypt and the Sudanese army) to exert pressure on it.

As concerns Sudan, the civil war there has drawn the Sudanese army into a closer relationship with Egypt and Eritrea – an alignment that puts it at odds with Addis Ababa given its long-running disputes with both. Compounding tensions, several thousand Tigrayan troops in a unit known as Army 70, which fled to Sudan during the 2020-2022 war, have fought alongside the Sudanese army in its battle with the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Army 70 troops have remained in eastern Sudan, posing (from Addis Ababa’s perspective) a threat to Western Tigray (known as Welkait by the Amhara) – one of the disputed border regions referred to above. Addis Ababa has also accused the Sudanese army of allowing the TPLF and other armed opposition groups, including the Amhara Fano and Oromo Liberation Army, to hold coordination meetings in Sudanese territory.

There are other sources of friction, too. In late 2025, Addis Ababa claimed that it had intercepted Eritrean weapon supplies to the Fano via the Tigray Defence Forces, which it also said had helped Fano groups coordinate attacks on the army in the Amhara region. Ethiopian officials also say they detect the hand of Egypt in these murky proxy engagements. The Ethiopian government believes that Cairo seeks to strengthen its hand in the dispute over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam on the Blue Nile, which Egypt sees as threatening the downstream flow of the Nile waters on which it heavily depends.

> Ethiopia has sought to push back against Sudan’s involvement with the TPLF by increasing its own engagement with the RSF.

> Ethiopia has sought to push back against Sudan’s involvement with the TPLF by increasing its own engagement with the RSF. While retaining its official neutral stance in the conflict, in late 2025 Addis Ababa appeared to pivot toward the paramilitary, reportedly allowing supplies to the group to transit through Ethiopia and apparently permitting the RSF to assemble in Ethiopian territory for an offensive in Sudan’s Blue Nile state in early 2026. Sudan’s army-led government also accuses Ethiopia of allowing the United Arab Emirates to launch drones into Sudan on behalf of the RSF from its territory, allegations that Ethiopia and the UAE deny.

These dynamics increase the stakes for Addis Ababa in the new showdown over Tigray. Ethiopia believes that allowing the TPLF to regain uncontested control of Tigray would in effect grant its regional foes a dangerous foothold inside Ethiopian territory.

 How serious is the risk of a return to war?

The TPLF’s attempt to wrest back political control of Tigray has heightened tensions between Mekelle and Addis Ababa and increases the risk of a new military confrontation between the TPLF and federal government. After the TPLF’s ouster of Tadesse, the ball now appears to be in the federal government’s court. There are several ways it could respond.

One possibility is that Abiy could decide to refrain from taking the military option, at least for now. The federal government does not presently see Tigray as a major military threat and Abiy may calculate that the status quo is less risky than a new war, which could see him become bogged down against an opponent fighting for its survival. An attack on the TPLF would also risk Ethiopia’s regional opponents, particularly Eritrea and the Sudanese army, siding with Mekelle and further destabilising an already fragile region.

On top of these considerations, Ethiopia’s national elections are scheduled for early June with Abiy and his Prosperity Party all but guaranteed to record a comprehensive victory with very little opposition. Abiy is unlikely to want to disrupt what he will seek to portray as a validation of his government and political project.

Finally, Ethiopia is suffering from an acute fuel shortage due to the disruption of global oil supply caused by the U.S.-Israeli war with Iran and the resultant closure of the Strait of Hormuz. From a purely operational perspective, the shortage makes a major military offensive against Tigray less likely in the short term.

> [Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed] may view the TPLF’s actions as a grave provocation that undercuts Ethiopia’s sovereignty and demands a response.

> But there are no guarantees that Addis Ababa will forebear, even temporarily. Abiy may view the TPLF’s actions as a grave provocation that undercuts Ethiopia’s sovereignty and demands a response. Even if Abiy does not immediately respond militarily, the federal government may conclude that the only long-term solution is through a military operation to remove the TPLF administration from power and replace it with one that is more aligned with Addis Ababa. Another option Abiy may take is to embark on a campaign focused on enforcing a tighter economic blockade, and possibly aerial strikes, rather than a new ground invasion. The possibility that such operations could escalate cannot be discounted.

However the situation develops, unless and until there is a meaningful reduction in tensions, Tigray’s beleaguered population will find themselves facing economic decline and mounting insecurity, forcing a growing number of Tigrayans to leave the region.

 What can be done to reduce tensions?

The TPLF’s move to restore its pre-war government in defiance of Addis Ababa more or less guts the Pretoria agreement, with the important exception of the tenuous cessation of hostilities it established, which is well worth preserving and building upon. If the parties are left to their own devices, it is not clear whether the accord – or the peace it ushered in – will survive. But outside pressure could help.

The states and figures that helped strike a deal in 2022 should engage. A first step could be to urgently reinsert one of the continental leaders involved in the negotiation of the Pretoria agreement, perhaps under the aegis of the African Union (AU), to shuttle between Addis Ababa and Mekelle, open a channel of communication and seek possible areas of common ground. The AU’s appointment of former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo, who was involved in the Pretoria negotiations, “to support [its] efforts toward peace and stability in the Horn of Africa” – apparently with a focus on Tigray – is a good start. Kenya’s former president, Uhuru Kenyatta, another Pretoria veteran, is respected by both sides and could also play a useful role in mediation. Other well-placed mediators could also step in. Any regional involvement should receive the backing of major international players, especially the U.S., the EU, China, Saudi Arabia and Türkiye, all of which have an interest in the region’s stability, and thus in preventing a new war in Ethiopia’s north.

The U.S., in particular, has been working to strengthen its ties with Ethiopia, including by encouraging U.S. companies to invest in various projects, such as construction of a major new international airport near Addis Ababa. On 11 May, the U.S. announced that it would be relaxing its policy of denying arms exports to Ethiopia. U.S. officials believe there is an understanding in Addis Ababa that its deepening relationship with Washington would be imperilled by the launch of a major new conflict with Eritrea. Whether the same applies to Tigray is not fully clear, but one way or the other, Washington should use the leverage it is working to create to nudge Addis Ababa toward seeking a peaceful route out of the deadlock.

As for the goals of such a process, substantive progress may be difficult to achieve over the short term given the complexity of local and regional dynamics, suggesting that external players should focus on stopping the situation from deteriorating further toward war. Gaining agreement from both sides to engage in talks (either in person or indirectly via mediators) would be an important starting point. Broader regional de-escalation is also desperately needed, particularly between Addis Ababa and the Sudanese army, which are increasingly at loggerheads due to mutual suspicions about support for proxies.

Once the immediate risk of a flare-up has receded, the two sides will need to hash out a follow-on to the Pretoria agreement – one that wrestles with the issues that are now causing the most friction between the parties. The foundation of any such deal would be the painful recognition that neither side can soon rid itself of the other – and the costs of trying to do so through war would be far too immense and dangerous. Also important would be a plan for how Tigray can be reintegrated into the Ethiopian political federation. Absent a hard focus on these issues, Mekelle and Addis Ababa will find themselves repeatedly drawn back to their present collision course.

Between Transparency and Strategic Ambiguity: Why the UAE–Israel Dispute Matters

Between Transparency and Strategic Ambiguity: Why the UAE–Israel Dispute Matters

The public disagreement between the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Israel over reports of a secret visit by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu reveals more than a diplomatic misunderstanding. It reveals a deeper structural reality: states with fundamentally different political systems often manage alliances in distinct ways. The controversy is therefore not merely about whether a meeting occurred; it is about competing political cultures, competing methods of governance, and competing understandings of transparency itself.

Reports from Israeli sources claimed that Netanyahu secretly travelled to the UAE during the Iran conflict and met with UAE President Mohammed bin Zayed (MBZ), describing the encounter as a historic diplomatic breakthrough. Soon afterward, Abu Dhabi strongly denied the reports and publicly insisted that relations with Israel under the Abraham Accords be conducted openly, not through clandestine arrangements. 

At first glance, this contradiction appears puzzling. Why would two countries that cooperate closely on security and strategic matters publicly disagree? The answer may lie in their distinct political operating systems.

Israel operates within a parliamentary democratic framework characterized by electoral competition, a relatively independent media, public scrutiny, and vigorous domestic political debate. Such systems often generate leaks, competing narratives, and political incentives for leaders to publicize diplomatic achievements. Transparency in democracies is not always orderly; it is often noisy and politically contested.

The UAE functions differently. It is a federation of monarchies with centralized decision-making and highly controlled political communication. Legitimacy is derived less from electoral competition and more from stability, economic performance, and state effectiveness. Such systems frequently prioritize strategic discretion and message discipline.

However, portraying the issue as a simple contrast between “democratic transparency” and “authoritarian secrecy” would oversimplify reality. Democracies themselves frequently conduct covert diplomacy and intelligence operations. Likewise, the UAE openly promotes many aspects of its international partnerships and economic strategy. The distinction is not between absolute transparency and total secrecy; it is between selective disclosure and public contestation.

Regional conditions also matter. The Middle East remains a highly volatile security environment. The UAE simultaneously balances relations with the United States, Israel, Iran, Gulf partners, and the wider Arab public. Analysts note that Iran has increasingly targeted the UAE rhetorically and strategically due to its growing alignment with Israel and Washington. Under these circumstances, strategic ambiguity becomes a tool of survival.

The Netanyahu episode, therefore, reflects a collision between two political logics. Israel’s system often rewards publicity and domestic political signalling; the UAE’s system rewards controlled narratives and diplomatic flexibility. The disagreement may reveal less about dishonesty and more about the friction produced when transparency and strategic ambiguity coexist within the same alliance.

As Middle Eastern alliances deepen, such tensions may become increasingly common. Partnerships can unite strategic interests, but political systems still shape how states communicate, conceal, and legitimize power. 

Economically Locked Eritrea Is a Maritime Dead End By:Selam Tesfaye |May 11, 2026

Published by *Abren* on May 11, 2026.

 Economically Locked Eritrea Is a Maritime Dead End

By:Selam Tesfaye | May 11, 2026

 A foreign policy paper on the structural limits of Eritrean maritime power

On a map, Eritrea appears positioned for maritime relevance. Its Red Sea ports, Massawa and Assab, sit near one of the world's most important shipping corridors linking Africa, the Middle East, Europe, and Asia. Yet geography alone does not produce maritime power. Ports derive value from the system that supports them: demand, capital, electricity, technology, institutions, security, law, labour, and trust.

Eritrea's condition is best understood as one of economic lock. It is not simply poor or underdeveloped. It is structurally constrained from the flows of trade, finance, expertise, and confidence that make modern port economies viable.

An Economy Without Scale or Verifiability

A viable port economy requires a large and measurable economic base. Eritrea lacks both. The World Bank's Eritrea data shows the country's last widely available GDP figure at about 2.07 billion dollars in 2011, with no recent comparable GDP series available. The IMF has also stated that Eritrea's economic information base has deteriorated and that data and capacity constraints limit understanding of the country's macroeconomic situation.

This matters because port finance depends on measurable risk. Investors need credible GDP figures, trade volumes, sector data, import patterns, export capacity, and revenue projections. Without reliable data, capital becomes cautious. In infrastructure finance, uncertainty is priced before money moves.

Eritrea also lacks a diversified export base. It has no major manufacturing platform, no large reexport economy, no major industrial cluster, and no anchor industries capable of producing consistent cargo flows. A port cannot sustain itself if the economy behind it does not produce or consume at scale.

 Demand, Path Dependency, and Regional Exclusion

The decisive constraint is demand. Eritrea's ports historically mattered because they served Ethiopia, the only nearby economy large enough to generate major cargo volume. That market is gone, due to long-standing mistrust and conflict between the two states.

Ethiopia has built its trade system around Djibouti. World Bank project documents describe the Ethiopia-Djibouti corridor as the dominant gateway for Ethiopia, accounting for 95% of the country's imports and exports. A more recent World Bank document also states that the Modjo Dry Port handles more than 80% of Ethiopia's imports via the Djibouti corridor.

This is not a temporary arrangement. It is a case of path dependency. Railways, roads, dry ports, customs systems, contracts, and commercial habits all reinforce the Djibouti route. Once trade infrastructure is along a single undulating corridor, changing direction becomes costly.

Eritrea is therefore not merely competing from behind. It is outside the system that already carries the region's most important cargo flows. Without Ethiopian cargo, Eritrea has no anchor demand. Without anchor demand, there is no throughput. Without throughput, there is no revenue model.

Network Effects and Economies of Scale

Modern ports operate through integrated NES pre-r ports, where other shipping lines already operate. Freight forwarders cluster around established hubs. Warehouses, insurers, customs brokers, repair firms, banks, and trucking companies follow cargo volume.

Volume attracts more volume. Scale lowers the cost per container. Lower cost attracts more shipping routes. More routes attract more cargo.

Eritrea lacks this cycle. It has low domestic cargo, no major hinterland market, no established liner route inclusion, no large shipping line partnerships, no global port operator partnerships, and no economies of scale. Economic lock-in is reinforced by the fact that maritime networks reward those within them.

The Cost Barrier and Capital Exclusion

Modern ports require deep water berths, container yards, cranes, scanners, digital customs platforms, storage facilities, power systems, roads, rail links, security systems, and maintenance capacity. These investments often cost hundreds of millions or billions of dollars.

For a country whose last widely reported GDP figure is only a few billion dollars, domestic financing capacity is extremely limited. External capital is also difficult to attract because investors look for predictable cargo, credible data, legal protection, policy stability, and trusted institutions.

Eritrea struggles on each of these fronts. The result is capital exclusion. The country lacks domestic financing, faces limited international finance, carries a high perceived borrowing risk, and would likely face elevated insurance costs due to political, legal, and operational uncertainty.

Technology and Operational Capability

A modern port is not merely a dock. It is a digital operating system. Containers are tracked electronically. Customs clearance is automated. Security depends on scanners, databases, surveillance systems, and a chain of record-keeping.

Eritrea lacks the technological ecosystem required for this kind of port economy. It has weak ICT capacity, limited integration with global logistics platforms, no advanced transportation base, and no major technology partnerships. Without automation and digital logistics systems, operational efficiency remains weak.

Technology is not a luxury in port competition. It is the entry fee.

Human Capital and Institutional Knowledge

Ports require specialized expertise. They need experienced port operators, logistics professionals, customs officials, maritime lawyers, security managers, crane technicians, warehouse operators, freight forwarders, insurers, compliance officers, and maintenance teams.

Eritrea lacks a deep professional base in these fields. Human Rights Watch reports that Eritrea continues to rely on indefinite military and national service, which contributes to emigration and the labour force.

This creates a shortage of a skilled workforce with institutional memory. The issue is labour quantity. It is the absence of accumulated experience in complex commercial port management.

 Infrastructure Constraints

Ports depend on reliable electricity and inland transport. Eritrea faces major constraints in both.

World Bank electricity data shows that access to electricity in Eritrea remains limited. Modern port operations require continuous power for cranes, lighting, cold storage, scanners, customs platforms, security systems, and communications.

Eritrea also lacks an integrated rail system connecting its ports to major inland markets. Road infrastructure is limited, logistics connectivity is weak, and industrial infrastructure is underdeveloped. A port without reliable electricity, roads, rail, and inland logistics is not a gateway. It is a dead end.

 

Security, Chain of Custody, and Risk Pricing

Security is central to maritime commerce. A port is a custody system. Cargo owners, insurers, shipping lines, and importers must trust that containers will be protected from theft, tampering, smuggling, corruption, arbitrary seizure, and unexplained delay.

This requires custody procedures, predictable customs security, accountable enforcement, and credible compensation mechanisms when cargo is lost or damaged.

Eritrea's weak transparency raises difficult questions. Who guarantees container protection? Who investigates cargo loss? Who compensates owners? Who ensures that customs procedures are not arbitrary? Who gives insurers and shipping lines confidence that cargo will be handled predictably?

In global shipping, risk is priced before cargo moves. If risk appears unclear, insurers charge more, shipping lines hesitate, and cargo owners choose safer corridors.

 Political Structure and Predictability

Eritrea has not held national elections since its independence. Human Rights Watch states that President Isaias Afewerki has ruled for decades, that the 1997 constitution has not been implemented, and that no legislature has met since 2010. Freedom House describes Eritrea as a militarized authoritarian state with no national elections since its independence.

This matters because port projects require long-term predictability. Investors need transparent regulation, enforceable contracts, stable policy, and credible institutions. Eritrea's prolonged transitional governance, lack of elections, weak regulatory clarity, and limited policy predictability all raise investor risk.

The issue is not only political openness. It is whether the rules of investment can be trusted for decades.

Financial and Legal Isolation

Eritrea's financial system is underdeveloped. The United States Investment Climate Statement says Eritrea's investment climate is not conducive to United States investment, citing sanctions, the lack of a commercial code, and disconnection from international financial systems.

This supports several structural constraints: weak banking capacity, limited access to global finance, weak currency convertibility, underdeveloped capital markets, and difficulty repatriating profits.

Legal risk compounds the financial problem. Large port projects require contract enforcement, dispute resolution, investor protection, mechanisms to enhance the credibility of arbitration, and mechanisms to compensate for damaged or lost cargo. Weak legal institutions raise borrowing costs, increase insurance premiums, and discourage long-term infrastructure commitments.

 Absence of a Commercial Ecosystem

A port requires a surrounding commercial ecosystem. This includes freight forwarders, customs brokers, warehousing networks, trucking firms, maintenance companies, banks, insurers, repair yards, industrial zones, and free zones.

Eritrea lacks this ecosystem. Its private sector is weak, its logistics sector is thin, its integration into global supply chains is limited, and it has no major free zone or industrial cluster comparableeeeeeableableableableableableableable to successful port economies.

Without this commercial ecosystem, even a renovated port would remain isolated infrastructure.

Competition, Shipping Networks, and Late Entry

Eritrea is a late entrant into a regional system that has already consolidated. Djibouti dominates Ethiopia's trade corridor, and World Bank documents identify Djibouti as Ethiopia's dominant port gateway. Other regional ports have foreign investment, established shipping relationships, and stronger logistics systems.

Eritrea lacks a cost advantage, a demand advantage, major shipping line partnerships, global port operator partnerships, economies of scale, and strong liner route inclusion. Shipping routes are already optimized around existing hubs. Once carriers, insurers, importers, and freight forwarders trust a corridor, they do not shift without a strong commercial reason.

Eritrea does not currently offer that reason.

 Administrative, Urban, and Environmental Constraints

Administrative inefficiency further weakens competitiveness. Inefficient customs, bureaucratic delays, lack of procedural transparency, and high transaction costs all undermine port reliability.

Urban capacity is also limited. Port cities require housing, water systems, public services, roads, health services, and workforce support. Weak urban services reduce the ability to host large-scale port operations.

Environmental conditions add another burden. Coastal heat, salt, corrosion, and climate-related infrastructure stress increase maintenance costs. Ports require constant upkeep. In a weak financial and technical environment, maintenance becomes a structural challenge.

Trade, Diplomacy, and Strategic Orientation

Eritrea also faces trade and diplomatic constraints. Limited trade agreements, weak global trade integration, limited economic diplomacy, and historically strained regional relations reduce the country's ability to build port-based partnerships.

State priorities have long emphasized security and control over commercial openness. This means ports are often treated more as strategic assets than commercial hubs. That orientation limits private participation, foreign operator involvement, and integration into global trade systems.

Security prioritized over economic development may preserve state control, but it weakens maritime competitiveness.

 Execution Risk

Port development requires more than ambition. It requires the proven ability to deliver large infrastructure projects on time, within budget, and at commercial standard.

Eritrea faces a high perceived execution risk. Investors would question whether major projects could be completed efficiently, maintained properly, and integrated into global logistics systems. Weak project delivery history, possible delays, and perceived inefficiency further reduce investor confidence.

 Conclusion

Eritrea's coastline provides geographic potential, but not maritime power.

The country is economically locked. It lacks verifiable economic data, demand, capital, technology, expertise, electricity, infrastructure, legal certainty, container security assurance, investor trust, commercial networks, shipping partnerships, and regional integration.

Ports do not create economies. Economies create ports.

Eritrea has access to the sea. It does not have access to the systems that make that access meaningful.