December 8,The Ethiopian Constitution day.

UNION INTERPARLEMENTAIRE    INTER-PARLIAMENTARY UNION

Association of Secretaries General of Parliaments

COMMUNICATION

from

MR H. NINI ABINO

Head of the Secretariat of the House of Federation of Ethiopia 

on

Lessons from the work of the House of Federation in celebrating Ethiopian Constitution Day 2011

Session

Kampala 2012

Ladies and Gentlemen, 

Until the system change in 1991, Ethiopia throughout its long history has failed to develop a system of governance that embraces its diversity- one that helps it to transform its extraordinary diversity from an existential threat to a deep well of strength and dynamism. Indeed the non-management of its diversity has for centuries constituted a primary challenge- a challenge that has massively contributed to its centuries long journey backwards from the frontline of world civilization to one of the poorest countries on earth. 

In 1991 we embarked on Democratic Federalism. This has to be seen as a new way in achieving unity in diversity. All indications so far suggest that this is at last a successful undertaking. Our federal system has allowed us to introduce a democratic system of governance that is fast maturing and consolidating.

It has enabled all the peoples of Ethiopia to maintain and celebrate their individual identities while at the same time constituting the bigger family of Ethiopians. It has empowered all the peoples of Ethiopia to manage and to mobilize their local affairs autonomously and to mobilize all their resources to improve their livelihoods and develop their communities while at the same time becoming active participants in common national affairs. It has allowed us to design our governance system to fit the circumstances of each locality and thus serves the people better while consolidating our common democratic governance. 

Democratic Federalism has enabled us to create a common Ethiopian identity- one that is not separated and above our diverse identities but one that is constituted by the magnificence of such diversity. It has become the bedrock upon which a stable and peaceful nation is being constituted. It has become the solid basis upon which we are building a young and dynamic nation out of one of the oldest states on earth. 

Dear Colleagues, 

Ladies and Gentlemen,

The House of Federation is Ethiopia’s Second Chamber of the federal Parliament, representing Ethiopia’s 75 ethnic groups, the Nations, Nationalities and Peoples of Ethiopia. While the ethnic, cultural and religious diversity of our country has been suppressed during previous regimes, the Nations, Nationalities and Peoples became the founders of the new, federal and democratic Ethiopia in 1994. The Ethiopian Constitution is based on the principle of self-determination and focuses strongly both on group as well as individual rights.

The constitution strongly promotes equality, democracy and social justice and binds governments to the development of the country. The Nations, Nationalities and Peoples are granted an unconditional right to self-determination up to secession. For this reason, the Second Chamber of Parliament, the House of Federation is representing the Nations, Nationalities and Peoples and not the regional states.

While many second chambers have strong legislative mandates, the House of Federation’s mandates are different. The House of Federation resolves conflicts between regional states and between regional governments and the federal government, it designs and decides the larger part of the fiscal transfer system, it promotes the unity of the country through equitable development and last but not least, it interprets the constitution and promotes democracy and constitutionalism.

Dear Colleagues,

Ladies and Gentlemen,

The House of Federation has embarked on immense and intense activities promoting constitutionalism and democracy throughout the last six years. Huge efforts have been undertaken in popularizing the democratic principles of the constitution. Among many others we have designed radio and TV programs which are both entertaining and educational. Most of them are quiz-shows, participating the audience. We have designed a series of animated cartoons for children, explaining democratic principles through short stories around the life of school-children. This includes equal rights of men and women, children’s rights, fair elections and the like. The resonance from children and adults towards this program but also to other is immense.

In 2006, the House of Federation has initiated the commemoration of the signing of the constitution by representatives of the Nations, Nationalities and Peoples on December 8, 1994.

Since then the House in cooperation with at least one regional government has organized the federal celebration of this day. The federal celebration has been organized since in a number of regional capitals – the cruising being similar to Germany’s National day celebration.

While the commemoration has been focusing on a relatively small number of participants at the beginning, the celebration consisting of discussions and cultural shows have been enlarged significantly over time.

This year, target-group oriented conferences have been organized across the country in order to reach are far larger number of people. 

This included a symposium for women (Addis Ababa), media and artists (Addis Ababa), civil servants (various conferences across sectors and regions), students (31 workshops, one in each university). The final symposium in Meqelle drew participants from all sectors. All in all, we managed to participate 5382 people in seven different sectors on the federal level. The details of the conferences and number of participants were: The private sector event attracted 470 participants, the women conference 521, the youth conference 1112, the media and art professionals conference has been attended by 500, the Civil Service at Federal Level including video conferences to the Regional States 500 and lastly, the National Conference at Meqelle 1800 participants. These numbers do not include the participants of Defense and Justice Sector conferences, workshops in 31 Universities, 28,000 schools, and sub-national Civil Service institutions, Women and Youth at sub-national and local level. On these levels we reached hundreds of thousands of people.

All symposia and workshops discussed the question "Why do we need a constitution and constitutionalism?" The discussions have been induced through target-group specific presentations towards this question and through a common booklet explaining the principles of the constitution.

The lessons we can learn from our continuous efforts are manifold. First of all, we were drawing attention towards the constitution and its objectives and principles in a more general manner. Through linking all constitutional awareness creation activities, we have been able to engage a large number of people from all layers of society in a dialogue with both, political leaders and intellectuals. Alongside with a fast growing literacy rate, we also obtain stronger feedback regarding constitutional awareness, so to say an increasing constitutional literacy rate.

While these activities are very budget-intensive, we have also learned that people are getting more confident in democratic institutions through these efforts. For example, requests for constitutional review and interpretation have risen by 100 percent between 2006 and 2011.

The change we observe is not only remarkable in terms of quantity but also in terms of quality. While 2011’s celebration of the Constitution Day has attracted by far more people than in any previous year, the level of discussion has also reached a quality we have not been observing previously. The questions and comments raised and made by participants showed a strongly increased level of information and an increasing level of identification with democracy and constitutionalism.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Dear Colleagues,

Summarizing, we can note that we went a long way in a relatively short period of less than 20 years. We have learned that learning and teaching democratic rights takes time but we have also learned the lesson that it can be accomplished provided a strong political will and the commitment to participate citizens in this endeavor. The commemoration of Ethiopia’s Constitution Day is one good example for this.

Thank you very much.

The Battle of Mekele and It's implications for Ethiopia.

Center for Strategic & International Studies.

The Battle of Mekelle and Its Implications for Ethiopia

December 4, 2020

On November 28, Ethiopian prime minister Abiy Ahmed congratulated the Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) for seizing control of Mekelle, the capital of Ethiopia’s restive Tigray region, after nearly a month of mounting violence between the government and rebel Tigrayan forces. Abiy declared that he would focus on “rebuilding the region and providing humanitarian assistance while Federal Police apprehend the [Tigray People’s Liberation Front] TPLF clique.” The prime minister’s triumphant message, however, underplays the human toll of the conflict; dismisses the risk of an insurgency and regional spill over; and discounts damage to the country’s democratic transition.

Q1: How did the conflict begin?

A1: Prime Minister Abiy and the TPLF share responsibility for the tragedy in Tigray. Both sides have been confrontational and uncompromising, heedlessly escalating tensions until fighting inevitably broke out in early November. Prime Minister Abiy, whose daring commitment to reconciliation and reform awed many Ethiopians and international observers, including the Norwegian Nobel Committee, was decidedly less magnanimous toward Ethiopia’s previous regime dominated by the TPLF. He swiftly moved against ethnic Tigrayan officials—who represent 6 percent of the population—arresting more than 60 officials, some from the intelligence services and some from a military-run industrial conglomerate. The TPLF responded in kind, rejecting Abiy’s leadership and refusing to join the prime minister’s new Prosperity Party. When Abiy delayed the election due to the pandemic, the TPLF ignored his order and defiantly proceeded with its own election on September 9, which it won by a landslide.

The election was a turning point. In response, the federal government declared the TPLF’s rule unlawful and the Tigray government indicated it would no longer recognize Abiy’s leadership. The TPLF claimed that federal troops had started to mass on Tigray’s southern flanks, presumably precipitating the raid on a federal military base. Abiy in turn accused the TPLF of “crossing a red line” on November 4, deploying his military to capture the region’s major towns and infrastructure and arrest the TPLF. The ENDF subsequently swept through Tigray, conducting air strikes and warning civilians there would be “no mercy” during the final assault on Mekelle. The TPLF, meanwhile, fired rockets at least three times into Eritrea to internationalize the conflict. A communications blackout has made it difficult to independently verify whether Mekelle is completely under federal government control.

Q2: What have been the conflict’s humanitarian and human rights consequences?

A2: Since the conflict started early last month, there have been significant outflows of people and accusations of human rights abuses perpetrated by both sides. More than 40,000 people so far have fled to Sudan, and the United Nations estimates that it could rise to 200,000 within the next six months. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) is developing a Humanitarian Preparedness Plan to target 1.98 million people with multi-sector assistance in Tigray, Afar, and Amhara regions. This includes the existing humanitarian caseload, as well as an additional 1.1 million people expected to need assistance as a result of the conflict.

There have been hundreds of casualties from the fighting, but the media blackout has prevented a more accurate accounting. Following the siege of Mekelle, the ICRC indicated it "found approximately 80 percent of patients to be suffering from trauma injuries” at a local hospital. Ethnic Tigrayan and Amhara militias, as well as government forces, have allegedly committed human rights abuses; Amnesty and the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission (EHRC) have accused—with varying levels of certainty—Tigrayan forces for massacres of non-Tigrayans. In Sudan’s Um Raquba refugee camp, individuals blamed the ENDF and Amhara militias for attacking Tigrayan villagers.

Equally alarming has been the level of disinformation and hate speech on social media, fueling discrimination and hostility toward certain ethnic groups. According to the BBC, social media users have posted manipulated photos of an S-400 Russian missile defense system in Tigray region and claimed the Tigrayan downed an Ethiopian fighter jet. In the Washington Post, Claire Wilmot analyzed Twitter data in early November, revealing how pro-Tigray and pro-Ethiopia activists promote their opposing narratives about who is responsible for the conflict. The Ethiopian government’s recall of Tigrayan soldiers deployed in Somalia and South Sudan, as well as at least one civilian at the African Union, has reinforced an ethnic dimension to the conflict. The UN’s special advisers on the prevention of genocide and the Responsibility to Protect warned that the current situation heightens the risk of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity.

Q3: What are the prospects for an insurgency and widening of the war?

A3: With the ENDF in control of most towns in Tigray, the TPLF is likely to regroup as an insurgency. Tigray regional president Debretsion Gebremichael told the Associated Press that his forces “will continue until the invaders are out.” William Davidson, the International Crisis Group’s senior analyst on Ethiopia, explains that the TPLF can count on a regional paramilitary force led by former national army generals and a large militia full of war veterans to support the rebellion. The TPLF’s apparent decision to minimally defend key towns, including Mekelle, parallels its tactics almost four decades ago; in 1984, a declassified CIA assessment judged that the TPLF “avoided setpiece battles in favor of small-unit, classic guerilla operations against isolated garrisons and lines of communication, a major factor in its success.” It added that the TPLF established an effective intelligence network among a largely sympathetic population. If the TPLF reprises its old playbook, it could continue fighting for several few months and contribute to further dislocation, deaths, and ethnic polarization.

In addition, the conflict risks spreading to other Ethiopian regional states. The Amhara government, which has a long-running dispute over its border with Tigray, is already involved; the TPLF fired rockets into the cities of Bahir Dar and Gondar while Amhara militia have supported federal forces in operations in Tigray. Davidson, in an interview with the Africa Report, expressed his fear that Abiy’s opponents in Oromia region may ramp up attacks if they “sense weakness.” Even before the fighting in Tigray, there had been incidents of violence in Afar, Amhara, Benishangul-Gumuz, Oromia, Somali, and Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples’ Region (SNNPR). Many of these conflicts involve territorial disputes, ethnic tensions, and power struggles between rival rebel and militia groups.

A wider conflict with Eritrea is also possible. The TPLF and Eritrean president Isaias Afwerki—once allies in their struggle against Ethiopia’s former ruling military junta, the Derg—fell out in the late 1990s and fought a devastating border war from 1998–2000. Abiy, on the other hand, is close to Isaias, and is credited for overseeing rapprochement between the neighboring states. There have been rumors that Abiy and Isaias coordinated the assault on their mutual enemy in Tigray, and the TPLF has alleged that Eritrean soldiers crossed the shared border to support government operations. The TPLF launched strikes into Eritrea presumably in retaliation, as well as to draw Eritrea further into the conflict. The TPLF has an interest in exploiting Tigrayan animosity toward Eritrea to ensure its fighters and the general Tigrayan public continue to side with the TPLF. Abiy, Isaias, and Debretsion are playing a dangerous game, and the risk of miscalculation and greater regional instability is high.

Q4: How does the fighting affect Ethiopia’s democratic transition?

A4: Prime Minister Abiy’s security operation to tame the rebellious TPLF may backfire, postponing or even ending Ethiopia’s transition to democratic rule. Abiy has justified his government’s actions as a response to an “unconstitutional” and “illegal” decision by the TPLF to prematurely hold elections. He appointed a provisional administrator to lead the region for the foreseeable future because, as his attorney general claimed, the people of Tigray have said “enough is enough.” While ostensibly these measures seek to remove the insubordinate TPLF and restore the electoral calendar, it raises questions about Abiy’s commitment to an inclusive, consultative process.

In the past two years, Abiy has moved to centralize power through his Prosperity Party and has cracked down on dissidents, including those from his own ethnic group. These steps already have fueled skepticism about his willingness to listen and incorporate the views of others in steering Ethiopia toward a stable, free, and democratic future. With the ENDF’s initial success in Tigray, Abiy is likely to adopt a more imperious manner in his dealings with opponents and subordinates. He probably will be less open to compromises, and other regions and ethnic groups may fear dire consequences if they cross the federal government.

Prior to the conflict, the Ethiopian government proposed to hold its postponed parliamentary election in May or June 2021. Abiy’s pledge to “rebuild what has been destroyed” in Tigray and the specter of more fighting may necessitate further election delays. If Abiy opts to run roughshod over other regions in the wake of his “victory,” it almost will certainly undercut his credibility as a democratic reformer.

Judd Devermont is the director of the Africa Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.

Critical Questions is produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s).

© 2020 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.

Judd Devermont

Director, Africa Program.

Ethiopian's hidden War in Tigray threatens return to ethnic violence and instability.

 Meaza Gidey hasn't spoken to or heard from her family in weeks.

The 26-year-old goes to graduate school in the United States, but she was born and raised in Tigray, the northernmost region of Ethiopia, where a deadly conflict broke out last month between federal troops and rebellious regional forces. While a communications blackout, though now partially restored, has made it difficult for journalists and humanitarian actors to obtain or verify information, it's also prevented people from getting in touch with loved ones.

"I don't know what's happening to them. They might be dead or they might be alive," Gidey recently told ABC News in a remote interview. "But to be quite honest, I'm not just worried only about my family at this point. I don't think any Tigrayan is only worried about their immediate family members. We're worried about our collective existence."

On Nov. 4, Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed announced a military offensive against the Tigray People's Liberation Front, a powerful ethnically based political party that dominated the East African nation's federal government for almost 30 years, until Abiy came to power in 2018. The prime minister alleged that forces loyal to TPLF had attacked the headquarters of the Ethiopian military's Northern Command in Tigray's regional capital, Mekelle. Abiy's cabinet declared a six-month state of emergency in Tigray and ordered airstrikes that knocked out the region's electricity grid as well as telephone and internet services.

"This has been brewing for decades, if not more than three decades," Mesfin Negash, a formerly exiled Ethiopian journalist turned Sweden-based human rights analyst, recently told ABC News in a remote interview. "But for keen observers, what's happening in Ethiopia now is not surprising."

"As an Ethiopian myself," he added, "it worries me because the distrust between ethnic elites is very high."

Rise and fall of the TPLF

After Emperor Haile Selassie was overthrown by members of the Ethiopian army in 1974, the Soviet-backed military junta that took power -- known as the Derg -- imposed a brutally repressive regime. Meanwhile, a grassroots resistance emerged in the Tigray region that would ultimately become the most powerful armed movement in Ethiopia. The TPLF, at its inception in 1975, "was grounded in an ethno-nationalist consciousness generated by the cumulative grievances of Tigrayans against successive central governments of Ethiopia," according to a 2004 article written by one of the leading founders, Aregawi Berhe.

The TPLF formed a multi-ethnic coalition with other liberation groups, called the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front, and led a years-long insurgency to topple the Derg, securing victory in 1991. The TPLF's leader, Meles Zenawi, became president of Ethiopia's transitional government and constructed a federal system explicitly based on ethnicity that still exists today. The 1995 constitution devolved political power to the country's ethnically defined regional states, stipulating that each had the "unconditional right to self-determination, including the right to secession."

Zenawi served as prime minister until his death in 2012. His handpicked successor, Halemariam Desalegn, resigned unexpectedly in 2018 amid widespread anti-government protests that broke out in the Oromio and Amhara regions. The ruling EPRDF coalition chose Abiy, a former army intelligence officer from Oromia, to be the new party leader and hence prime minister, despite opposition from its dominant member party, the TPLF.

Abiy was appointed with a mandate to oversee Ethiopia's transition to democracy and rebalance power that had long been distributed on ethnic lines. He spent his first few months in office freeing thousands of the country's political prisoners, lifting media censorship and appointing female ministers to a record 50% of his cabinet. He also spearheaded a peace agreement to end 20 years of frozen conflict between his nation and neighboring Eritrea, which led to him being awarded the 2019 Nobel Peace Prize.

But Abiy also made a number of controversial decisions that angered the TPLF as the party lost its grip on power. Last year, he dissolved the EPRDF and formed a pan-Ethiopian party in a move to distance the country's politics from ethno-federalism. All former member parties of the EPRDF merged to join Abiy's new Prosperity Party, except the TPLF.

Then in late March, Ethiopia's electoral commission announced it would postpone general elections scheduled for August due to the coronavirus pandemic. Lawmakers approved the decision in June, voting to extend the mandate of the current government, which was set to expire in October. Tensions apparently came to head when the Tigray region held parliamentary elections in September that Abiy deemed illegal. The TPLF argued that Abiy no longer had a mandate and thus his government was illegitimate.

Opponents of Abiy have accused him of taking an authoritarian turn, while others have suggested the current conflict in Tigray is fundamentally underpinned by the dissatisfaction of the TPLF, who themselves had governed Ethiopia with an iron fist.

"The prime minister himself made some mistakes in how he handled the reform process," said Negash, who is now the senior program officer of the Africa Department at Civil Rights Defenders, a Stockholm-based international human rights organization.

"The relationship was largely of undermining and outmaneuvering the other party from the get-go," he continued. "On the other hand, we have seen from the TPLF side that they couldn't accept that they lost and it became very personal."

'Nothing but the clothes on their backs'

Tens of thousands of people have fled the ongoing conflict in Tigray, crossing Ethiopia's border into Sudan and arriving at refugee camps. Abu Obeida El Siddig Mohamed, chief field officer for the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund in Kassala, eastern Sudan, said the Tigrayan refugees he's screened -- many women and children -- are "exhausted," "traumatized" and "in dire need of assistance."

"Looking at their faces, you can see that it's not easy," Mohamed recently told ABC News in a remote interview. "I have actually seen a few of them injured."

They were students, farmers, teachers and doctors who were unexpectedly forced to flee their homes, becoming refugees overnight. Many were separated from their families, including at least 121 unaccompanied children, according to Dana Hughes, a spokesperson for United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees who was at the Sudan-Ethiopia border interviewing newly arrived refugees.

"It's not hyperbole to say -- and I saw it myself -- that people literally fled with nothing but the clothes on their backs," Hughes recently told ABC News in a remote interview. "They were living ordinary lives."

There's also growing concern about the fate of some 100,000 Eritrean refugees living in camps within the Tigray region who will have now run out of food and supplies.

"With refugees being in that area, we are worried that they have been caught in the conflict," Hughes said. "And we do know that without having access to cash, fuel, food, that supplies were very much running out if they hadn't run out already."

For weeks, Ethiopia's federal government has denied humanitarian groups and aid workers access to Tigray. But the United Nations signed an agreement on Wednesday with Abiy to allow "unimpeded, sustained and secure access for humanitarian personnel and services" to the parts of Tigray now under the federal government's control, according to Jens Laerke, a spokesperson for the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.

Laerke said the U.N. and its humanitarian partners in Ethiopia will engage with the federal government and all parties to the conflict to ensure humanitarian action "will be strictly based on needs and carried out in compliance with the globally agreed principles of humanity, impartiality, independence and neutrality."

"The U.N. and humanitarian partners will work to ensure that people impacted by the conflict are assisted without distinction of any kind other than the urgency of their needs," Laerke told ABC News in a statement Wednesday.

Abiy declares victory, TPLF vows to fight on

The development comes just days after federal forces took control of Tigray's capital, as Abiy declared victory in the war. But reports of clashes between federal troops and Tigrayan forces are still emerging, and the TPLF has vowed to continue fighting.

In a memo obtained by ABC News late Wednesday, a senior Tigrayan official said the region's special forces have been "on a defensive mode for the past month" but soon "will be taking offensives to leverage its land and people" and "will mount a full-scale operation of liberating the territories currently under occupation."

In the meantime, the region "has managed to undertake strategic retreat with all its military, government and party structures in tact," the official said. Tigrayan forces have captured "nearly 15,000 prisoners of war, most of whom have been handed over to the International Committee of the Red Cross," according to the memo.

The official said the federal government's capture of Tigrayan cities "has been proceeded by the evacuation of many of the residents fleeing indiscriminate heavy artillery attacks and horror committed by the invading army."

"The shutting down of telecommunication in the state by the Abiy regime has further emboldened the invading forces to commit war crimes of great proportion," the official said in the memo. "We believe the denial by the Abiy regime for access to a humanitarian corridor is a testament of the disregard the Abiy regime has shown for the protection of civilians throughout this conflict."

ABC News requested an interview with a spokesperson for Abiy but was unable to agree to demands that any interview be broadcast or published in its entirety.

'Tip of the iceberg'

Both sides have been accused of committing atrocities against civilians in Tigray, with reports of massacres and ethnically targeted killings. ABC News has been unable to independently verify the claims, and the exact number of civilian causalities from the conflict is unknown.

However, in one of the few independently verified reports from Tigray, the International Committee of the Red Cross found that food, medical supplies and even body bags for the dead were running "dangerously low" at one hospital in the regional capital, Mekelle, due to an "influx of injured."

And according to a report from human rights watchdog Amnesty International, it appears "scores, and likely hundreds, of people were stabbed or hacked to death" in the southwestern town of Mai-Kadra on the night of Nov. 9. The victims appeared to be daily wage workers who were not involved with the conflict. Amnesty International said it had not been able to independently confirm who was responsible but that several witnesses blamed fighters loyal to TPLF, apparently after they had suffered a defeat by federal troops.

The Ethiopian Human Rights Commission, a state-appointed but independent body, later dispatched its own team to the scene to investigate. Citing accounts from survivors and witnesses, the commission estimated that at least 600 civilians of non-Tigrayan ethnic origin were slaughtered in Mai-Kadra. The commission said the "massacre" was carried out by a Tigrayan youth group in collusion with local security forces.

But there have been other reports that ethnic Tigrayans also have been targeted for attacks in the war-torn region, according to Fisseha Tekle, a researcher for Amnesty International in Ethiopia, who called the situation "extremely concerning."

"What we have managed to document in Mai-Kadra town can be foretelling of the situation in other places," Tekle recently told ABC News in a remote interview. "And this conflict can be a fertile ground for ethnic violence."

Tekle said there are fears of potential genocide, "but it needs further investigation," adding, "what Amnesty knows about the situation is just the tip of the iceberg."

MORE: Ethiopia appoints 1st woman president, after approving gender-balanced Cabinet

Ravina Shamdasani, a spokesperson for the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, said the accounts of violence and civilian casualties in Tigray are incredibly difficult to corroborate but nonetheless alarming.

"We're receiving very worrying reports of mass killings," Shamdasani recently told ABC News in a remote interview. "We're receiving reports of people in very dire humanitarian situations, but we're not able to verify them. Now, we do have 43,000 who have crossed the border over into Sudan. So we are conducting interviews there to try to understand what exactly it is they are fleeing, and what we're hearing is that there have been indiscriminate attacks from both sides."

"Again, we're not able to really verify these reports," she added, "but we are hearing people fleeing fighting, people fleeing shelling, people complaining of racial profiling as well."

The communications blackout makes accountability "very unlikely" and has caused misinformation to spread like wildfire, according to Negash.

"I think for the government, the communication blackout is one strategy of winning the war, by denying the other party the ability to communicate with the external world, and, for that matter, probably even with the population that is in the region," Negash told ABC News, adding that it's "very harmful not only to those in the region but for their families in other parts of Ethiopia and outside."

"There is a high risk of losing evidences to bring perpetrators to account," he said.

As of Wednesday, internet and telephone services were partially restored in six towns of Tigray, including Mai-Kadra, and fully restored in one town, Alamata, according to Ethiopia's state-owned telecommunications provider. All seven towns were overtaken by federal forces.

"Currently, we are able to resume telecom service using alternative power solutions and after conducting necessary maintenance and rehabilitation works on damaged telecom infrastructures," Ethio Telecom said in a statement to customers Wednesday. "We would like also to inform you that we are working to restore telecom services in all areas of the region within short period of time."

The trickle of information about alleged atrocities will have an impact on how Abiy and his government move forward, according to Bronwyn Bruton, director of programs and studies of the Atlantic Council's Africa Center, an international affairs think tank in Washington, D.C.

"The big question is whether the people of Ethiopia will emerge from this conflict more or less united, and a lot will depend on whether the government is found to have committed atrocities against the Tigrayan people," Bruton recently told ABC News in a remote interview. "Any perception that ordinary Tigrayans have been targeted on the basis of ethnicity would make a grassroots insurgency in Tigray more likely, and it will inform opinion across the country about the nature of Abiy's government itself -- whether this battle was part of a necessary struggle to create a more effective democracy, or preparation for an authoritarian turn."

'There's a lot at stake'

Despite decades of authoritarian leadership, Ethiopia has long been seen as the biggest driver of peace and stability in the Horn of Africa, a region plagued by armed conflict, drought and terrorism. The outcome of what's happening in Tigray will be "a critical factor" in deciding the future of Ethiopia and, by extension, the region, according to Negash.

"I can link the risk of this conflict [in Tigray] to the American experience of 9/11," he told ABC News. "If things deteriorate and go out of control, this region can create a safe haven for future terrorists."

Since a devastating famine in the 1980s, which was estimated to have claimed more than 1 million lives, Ethiopia has come a long way, and the situation in Tigray "could set the country back decades," according to Shamdasani.

"There's a lot at stake," she said. "We fear that such a conflict could be a huge setback."

'The worst is yet to come'

Blen Mulu lives in Ethiopia's capital, Addis Ababa, where she works for an insurance company. Her father is ethnic Amhara while her mother is ethnic Tigrayan. Although she hasn't been able to get in touch with her relatives in Tigray since the conflict began last month, Mulu said she's not worried because her family lives in a town now under the control of the federal government.

"They are free from TPLF so they will be fine," Mulu recently told ABC News in a remote interview. "TPLF is definitely against the civilians."

The 26-year-old called the TPLF "evil" and "corrupt," accusing the party of coordinating the slaughter of ethnic Amharas in recent years. She also blamed the TPLF for starting the current conflict and putting civilian lives at risk.

"What they are doing is mostly risky for Tigrayans because they start the war when they are in Tigray," she said. "They are not in forest, they are not in dessert, they are in the middle of civilians."

"I'm not saying the federal government is innocent," she added, "but mainly, the main responsibility is TPLF."

Part Tigrayan herself, Mulu said the TPLF and its actions can "never ever" be representative of the Tigray region and its people, that "TPLF doesn't mean Tigrayan, and Tigrayan doesn't mean TPLF."

"If TPLF does not surrender," she thought aloud, "the worst is yet to come."

In Gidey's eyes, a TPLF defeat could mean death for any Tigrayan civilian who at one point supported the party.

"I am an activist and we have some activists on the ground who try to feed us with some information from time to time," Gidey told ABC News. "But the the one thing that we're hearing predominantly is the cities that are controlled by forces loyal to Abiy Ahmed are going through horrific, horrific experiences. Mothers are being raped, properties and houses are being looted. The young generation, particularly those who are believed to have the capacity to mobilize the youths, are being shot at."

Gidey said there are old photos in her family's home -- and in many homes -- in Tigray of TPLF soldiers and of Zenawi, the late Ethiopian prime minister and TPLF leader. She worries what federal forces will do to her loved ones if they find those photos.

"I am scared," she said, tears streaming down her face. "I am scared for everyone."

ABC News' Dragana Jovanovic contributed to this report.

Ethiopia's hidden war in Tigray threatens return to ethnic violence and instability originally appeared on

Ethiopia's mismanaged transition.

The war in Tigray is a result of Ethiopia’s mismanaged transition

By JAWAR MOHAMMED 2 days ago.

The myriad political problems facing Ethiopia cannot be resolved through a war. To prevent further mayhem, the international community and regional players should exert maximum pressure on all parties for an immediate ceasefire and all-inclusive national dialogue.

Ethiopia is back in the global spotlight once again with the outbreak of the war in Tigray. I am saddened but not surprised. For anyone with a cursory understanding of the fragility of Ethiopia’s transitional politics, the escalation of tensions between the federal government and the Tigray state into a full-blown military conflict does not come as a surprise. The tell-tale signs were there for everyone to see as the warring parties openly prepared their respective forces for the eventuality of an all-out armed confrontation.

While the specter of war had been hanging over our heads for at least two solid years, the weeks before the formal commencement of the war were particularly alarming. As antagonisms between the federal government and the Tigray state reached a climax, federal and Tigray state media outlets regularly showed military parades, highly drilled commando paratrooper units, and red-beret Special Forces performed in mock-operations in an apparent show of force. All indications were that clashes were in the offing in a not so distant future. Then came November 4, 2020: The country woke up to the news of yet another deadly war.

We, in the Oromo Protest movement, had precisely anticipated this danger long before the drums of war began to reverberate between Finfinne and Mekelle, and put a considerable amount of effort in a desperate attempt to avert the unfortunate bloodshed. Regrettably, all political actors and outside stakeholders -including us- failed to prevent the war despite having ample time and incentive to do so in what now appears to be a collective failure of imagination. But why did we fail?

Below I will highlight some of our efforts and reflection as to why we could not attain the desired outcome in the interests of setting the record straight and as a useful lesson as we continue to navigate the treacherous terrains of Ethiopia’s utterly mismanaged political transition. Note that since I don’t have access to my journal and other useful reference materials as I sit inside the four walls of a prison cell, I rely on retrieved recollections from memory to outline the sequence of events on the topic.

Long before Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed emerged as chairman of the then ruling coalition and eventually took over the stewardship of the transitional process -in fact way before the Oromo Protests erupted- we knew that one of our main tasks was designing a strategy to dislodge the principal handlers of the authoritarian regime from power without plunging what was already a polarized country into a civil war, or even worse, without turning it into a failed state.

We believed that the process of inducing change into a minority-dominated authoritarian rule and its aftermath would have extremely dangerous consequences if not carefully handled. Our fear of a carelessly handled regime change possibly leading to a civil war and/or state collapse, was based on the following assessments of present and historical factors.

History of Ethiopian state formation

Ethiopia is a polity created via the conquest of various national groups, and the successive nation-building projects attempted through forced assimilationist policies aborted with the rise of the national question. The last attempt at nation and state-building through the formation of a multinational federation was also undermined by the authoritarian nature of the regime. Thus, the failure to build a state whose legitimacy is unquestioned by constituent national groups led to the birth of competing nationalisms.

In such a situation, the contest between the power holders and its challengers is highly likely to take an ethnic dimension as each side taps into those competing nationalist narratives, paving way for horizontal conflicts among various national groups. By the time we were designing the strategy against the ruling Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), these competing nationalisms were already robust and institutionalized. The risk for horizontal conflicts to arise and transform into a civil war was very high.

Nature of the regime 

EPRDF was dominated by the coalition’s senior partner, the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), whose political base is a minority ethno-linguistic group representing merely six percent of Ethiopia’s population. When such minority political groups disproportionately dominate power, as much as holding power yields disproportionate material and sentimental dividend to members and affiliates of this group, the loss of this power or threat thereof, poses perceived or real existential threat both to their accumulated wealth and/or to their safety.

Although authoritarian rules of this type mostly enrich only a small clique of voracious sharks in the upper echelons of power, the fear of existential threat is usually shared by the rank and file within the party structure as well as by the entire population from which the dominant group hails.

The power holding political elite also tap into this fear to mobilize the mass and thereby insulate themselves from potential harm. Given this scenario, power contestations between those in power and their challengers could easily turn into a horizontal ethnic conflict. The fact that institutions of the federal government were dominated by elites of TPLF’s minority group meant that such a sense of existential threat and subsequent horizontal conflict could fracture those institutions, risking state collapse. I have written about this in 2010 on Tigrayan Nationalism. Our concern was exacerbated when we witnessed events in Syria and how a threatened power holding minority could wreak havoc, as I argued here in September 2012.

The above factors weighed heavy on our minds when designing a strategy to induce change towards a democratic transition in Ethiopia. The core principles of our strategic approach were as follows:

While demanding that the TPLF cede power by mounting pressure through popular protests that indicated that change was inevitable, we also advocated that they should be given assurances against a punitive redistribution of wealth, aggressive persecution, and prosecution for past crimes should they give up federal power without further bloodshed. The assurances would also include a guarantee of autonomy for the Tigray Regional State so it could continue to be protected by federal forces against external threats. It was agreed to clearly and repeatedly communicate this to them formally and informally.We were very much aware of the gross human rights violations and corruption the TPLF dominated EPRDF had been engaged in. After all, Oromos and Oromia were the primary victims of brutality and exploitation. Yet, as painful as it is, we felt that sacrificing justice would be necessary to avoid a catastrophic civil war and broaden the chance for the transition into a sustainable democratic system.

To reinforce this assurance and reduce uncertainty, it was believed that we should adopt a non-violent popular movement rather than an armed struggle. We believed civil disobedience posed less existential threat than armed confrontations. Furthermore, the transition should be through reform rather than overthrowing the regime entirely, and that is it should be led by reform-minded elements or factions within the ruling party who hold onto power rather than the opposition. We thought it would be simpler to assuage fears by the TPLF leadership of aggressive persecution, if they relinquished power to members of their ruling coalition than opposition groups that they considered more hostile.

During the resistance movement, civilian members of the minority group should be protected to reduce the development of a sense of collective insecurity among the Tigrayan people. This was effectively implemented during the four and half years of the Oromo Protest. No Tigrayan was harmed by protesters. Even senior political and security elites were spared from direct attack. These strategies worked better than we could hope for. The resistance movement overall cost us thousands of lives but the TPLF finally understood that it was no longer tenable to cling on to power in the face of mounting pressure. The leaders wisely accepted the golden parachute, agreeing to hand over power to then OPDO, and retreated to their home state.

It all went according to plan thus far but our scheme had a second phase. The first, as discussed above, was dislodging the TPLF from power without causing a civil war in the process. The second phase was reintegrating and reconciling TPLF members to be part of the new democratic multinational federation. We believed that reconciling and reintegrating them was as crucial for the success of the transition as carefully dislodging them from power was.

It was the failure to effectively implement this second phase that significantly contributed to the current crisis. There are many reasons and enough blame to go around on why this phase failed. From my perspective, the following are a few of them:

The plan to implement the second phase began to falter from the very beginning of the transition. On the eve of the transition, tension began to increase between TPLF hardliners and the incoming reformist team. At the ruling coalition council’s meeting convened to elect new leadership, the TPLF lodged a harsh and abusive criticism on the designated chairman and Prime Minister-elect, Abiy Ahmed, and went as far as refusing to cast even a single of their 45 votes for him. This created a bitter rift between the group that needed to be reconciled and the person responsible for presiding over the reintegration process.

Another reason is that those tasked with implementing the second phase had different understandings, motivations, and tactics from those who planned it. In other words, those who came to power to lead the transition and those at the forefront of the protest movement had a different understanding of the way forward. The freshly minted “reformist” leaders saw the TPLF as a mortal threat to consolidating power rather than an old regime that could be useful to facilitate the transition process if properly reconciled with and reintegrated into the plan.Part of the problem was that individuals who came to play a decisive role in government were not active participants in the negotiations that led to the transition – not only did they not share our concerns nor did they feel that they should abide by the terms of those agreements. Instead of actively reassuring TPLFites and the larger Tigrayan elite, they pursued aggressive purging, harsh criticisms of their track records, and persecution of many key members of the TPLF including army generals and businesses. This led the TPLF and majority Tigrayan elites to believe they were deceived into giving up power with false promises strengthening the position of hardliners and silencing moderates.

They immediately resorted to aggressive and combative rhetoric, having felt that they immediately became a target despite holding onto their end of the bargain to relinquish power. Their fear was exacerbated by how the peace deal with Eritrea was handled. Their exclusion from the peacemaking process with their archenemy made the TPLF feel the reproach was motivated by the desire to create an alliance against them rather than a sincere effort to end the decade’s long hostility between the two countries.

Those who ascended to federal power also had reasons to feel insecure and threatened by TPLF’s deep state. They suspected TPLF operatives to be behind several acts of violence, such as communal clashes and the attempted assassination of Abiy himself. For the new power holders, the TPLF was sabotaging the reform effort as a means of blackmailing and undermining the federal government. The TPLF did not do much to reassure them either. In fact, harsh criticisms forwarded by some of its senior officials against the Prime Minister further heightened the sense of insecurity by the central government.

The grenade attack at the rally organized in support of the new Prime Minister in June of 2018 was officially blamed on former chief of intelligence, Getachew Assefa, yet he was re-elected to the Executive Committee in a clear act of aggression. The fact that key elites in both camps had known each other for long has also resulted in personalized animosity. More importantly, leaders of the two sides grew up under an authoritarian culture where imposing one’s views and interests on the other with the use of force was a norm, and reaching compromises to bridge differences was regarded as a sign of weakness.

It was obvious that the ruling coalition needed to reform, or at least rebrand itself, to remain in power and remain relevant. In fact, the coalition partners had agreed to reform the party even before the transition had begun. It was also obvious that TPLF’s dominant role would be reduced to reflect the new power order. And such reduction of power would create sour feelings in various sectors, hence the need for careful negotiations, power bargains, and discussions. Yet no such negotiations and discussions were undertaken during the early period of the transition.

On the contrary, such possibilities were deliberately avoided in favor of false harmony. For instance, at the 11th EPRDF Congress in Hawassa, the TPLF gave 100% of its vote to PM Abiy to continue as chairman of the coalition; this was despite their increasing resentment and fear towards his actions such as the purging of Tigrayan security and military officials and his right-wing leaning political rhetoric that contradicted EPRDF’s core leftist ideology and the perceived threat Abiy’s rhetoric carried to their regional autonomy.

During the early months of the transition, at the time when deeper discussion and negotiations were needed, the coalition stopped its usual culture of holding regular meetings and debates guided by the coalition’s principles of ‘democratic centralism’ in which differences are supposed to be ironed out internally rather than exposed to the public.

The EPRDF’s Executive Committee of the 36 powerful individuals rarely met. Even the crucial issue of merging the party, which was agreed upon in Hawassa, was avoided until the last minute. There was no real and genuine discussion and negotiation about the matter. When the issue was finally tabled, it was presented as a take it or leave it to matter on both sides with no desire for finding a middle ground.

Instead of negotiations, power bargains, and persuasions, deceptions and threats were deployed in public from both sides. After such a badly managed merger affair, the bond that tied the Tigray region and the new power holders in the federal government was all but severed. In a polity where a single party rule from federal to village level was the norm, two parties with an ugly break up began ruling the federal and regional governments, making their relationship more cumbersome than that between two sovereign countries hostile to one another. After the merger fiasco, the enmity between the two sides became official and preparations to forcefully assert their respective interests began to be pursued publicly.

To say that the postponement of the regional and national elections due to the COVID-19 is the single most important factor that ignited the current conflict is to arrive at an erroneous conclusion.

The relationship between the two had been severely damaged way before the arrival of the COVID-19 pandemic. As I have argued in several interviews the two sides were already preparing for war long before election politics gripped public consciousness.

One could safely argue that the election postponement was a missed opportunity to reset the relationship and to negotiate an amicable political settlement but the two sides only used it as an opportunity to further de-legitimize each other as they prepared behind the scenes for today’s armed showdown. The postponement might have sped up the war, but for anyone closely observing Ethiopia, it was obvious that the two sides had made up their mind to settle their differences by the barrel of the gun rather than around the negotiating table. The writing was on the wall.

In the absence of mutually reassuring communication and negotiation, insecurity on both sides, that is TPLF’s fear of retribution for past misdeeds and Abiy’s concern of losing control due to acts of sabotage by TPLF’s deep state was worsening. Hence each side focused on taking defensive actions to neutralize perceived threats. Abiy by purging them from security and bureaucracy and TPLF by building its military capability and attempting to broaden its political and security alliance outside Tigray.

The securitization of the relationship facilitated for hardliners to dominate TPLF’s decision making while pushing Abiy and the federal government to rely on and come under increasing influence personalities and entities that advocated violent resolution of the TPLF issue. Sadly, international actors, perhaps underestimating the likelihood of a war breaking out, did little to diffuse the ever-growing tension. Even worse some foreign states and ambassadors took sides emboldening the quarreling forces to be more aggressive and combative.

Thus, the war in Tigray did not suddenly erupt due to the attacks on the Northern Command of the National Defense Forces. The Northern Command has been a hostage of the Finfinne – Mekele political gridlock for the last two years. The Tigray regional government had openly declared that no weapon could leave the region and the army’s movement had been severely restricted. As the tension increased, Tigray feared the federal government would use the Northern Command to forcefully take over the region from within the territory, while the federal authorities were worried that the heavy armament in possession of the Northern Command could be used by the TPLF to launch an attack not only within the regional state but even on the center.

In other words, the Northern Command was seen as a crucial element that could tip the balance of force in the power struggle between Finfinne and Mekelle. After squandering opportunities to negotiate a mutually reassuring deal during the early months of the transition and with external actors fanning the tension rather than pressing for resolution, the war was inevitable.

Finally, at the risk of self-praise, let me highlight some of those little efforts. As one of the people involved in designing the Oromo Protests strategies, I spent a considerable amount of time pondering, writing, and speaking to stakeholders about how to dislodge TPLF from power and safely reintegrate them. I played an active role in the first phase – in dislodging the TPLF – and tried to play a bit of an advisory (mediator) role in the second.

In the first phase, I had direct participation in the discussions and negotiations. In the second phase, I tried to urge the two sides charged with the matter to take reconciliation and reintegration as a priority. For instance, when PM Abiy and President Lamma came to the US, one of the main topics of our discussion was how to handle the TPLF conundrum.

Having had a positive reaction from them, I called President Debretsion while Abiy and Lemma were still in the U.S. and explained to him the urgency of this task. I also informed both Abiy and Debretsion that activists and public intellectuals would wage campaigns to shape public opinions in favor of reconciliation and reintegration. To work towards this end we would travel to Mekelle right after my return to Ethiopia. Both sides thought this was a good idea.

Upon my return, I communicated with both sides to arrange the trip to Mekelle. Those in Finfinne advised me to travel to Bahir Dar first to prevent possible suspicion and negative reactions from the Amhara side. Mekelle also agreed and I first traveled to Bahir Dar. However, my travel to Mekelle was repeatedly delayed and postponed primarily as the relationship between the two sides deteriorated. Those at the federal government were reluctant while Mekelle also grew suspicious of our true intentions. The plan was finally canceled when the former spy chief, Getachew Assefa, was elected to TPLF’s Executive Committee (EC) in defiance of the federal government’s arrest warrant against him.

Although the plan to travel to Mekelle to help with public opinion did not materialize, I did not give up lobbying for the two sides to solve their differences through negotiations. That tragic day the chief of armed forces and the president of the Amhara region were assassinated, I was extremely alarmed by how state media in Amhara and Tigray regional states were fanning the tension. I decided to reach out to veterans of the ANDM and TPLF in the respective regional states to plead with them to tone down the hostility and honor the martyrs of both sides.

This conversation developed into an idea of veteran politicians, drawn both from the EPRDF and opposition side, conducting back door negotiations between Mekelle and Finfinne to facilitate formal negotiations among the officials. Six individuals from both sides were selected. The plan was endorsed both by PM Abiy and president Debretsion. But for reasons I still don’t know it was abandoned before any face-to-face meeting was held. After the effort failed, I realized any effort to solve the problem amicably would prove futile. When we talked to them, officials of the two sides were more interested in soliciting our support for the inevitable confrontation.

Reconciliation and reintegration of TPLF was one of the primary focuses of my advocacy when meeting foreign diplomats as well. For instance, a few days after returning to Ethiopia I had meetings with ambassadors of some 20 countries including that of the U.S. and the European Union. In those meetings, I emphasized the crucial importance of resolving the TPLF/ Tigray issue for the success of the transition and emphasized that failure to reconcile would have serious ramifications for the country and regional stability. I urged these diplomats to put pressure on both sides to negotiate. In several meetings with foreign diplomats and officials in the last two and half years in the Horn Region, Europe, and the US, I have been pleading the same point, but I am not sure if it was taken seriously.

Conclusion

We dreamed of and planned for a peaceful transition to democracy. Nonviolently dislodging and then reintegrating the power holders in TPLF’s base was the centerpiece of our plan. We strongly believed successfully dislodging followed by reconciliation would be an essential component of not only successfully transitioning Ethiopia to democracy but also building on the multinational federal state by avoiding falling back into a catastrophic civil war. It did not work as we hoped.

While our plans to weaken and dislodge the TPLF turned out to be more successful than we had anticipated, efforts to reintegrate them into the transitional set up proved inadequate, forcing us to confront our worst fear – a civil war. Ironically, we choose to let EPRDF, the party that tyrannically ruled, continue to lead the transition believing that opposition taking over through regime change carries more risk of war.

Yet it is the split within the ruling coalition that brought about what we hoped to avoid. This reminds me of what the chairman of Oromo Federalist Congress (OFC), Professor Merera Gudina, said at the start of the transition that ‘Abiy’s main difficulty was managing the EPRDF rather than dealing with the opposition’ or something to that effect.

As I jot down this piece, the war is raging and the federal government has said it was marching to capture Mekelle. Regardless of which side wins in key battlefronts or the war itself, it’s obvious that Ethiopia loses on multiple fronts. Even before the war erupted the much-hoped-for transition was severely harmed by confrontations of the two sides and several other factors.

The main reason why we wanted to ease out TPLF with the offer of a golden parachute – assuring them that they would not be targets of vengeful persecutions and punitive redistribution of wealth, they would preserve their regional autonomy as well as receive protection from foreign adversaries – was to save the federation from eventual fragmentation.

We operated with a working assumption that any perception of an existential threat by the TPLF, which dominated the political and security apparatus of the Ethiopian state for almost three decades, could lead to the collapse of some of the federal institutions it built and held together. A look into the impact this war is having on the cohesion of the Ethiopian army provides a glimpse into the disastrous outcome of this fallout.

The war in Tigray is a direct result of a poorly managed transition into a democratic dispensation, which should not be viewed as an isolated problem. It is a tragic collective failure of the country’s political leadership – all of us, not just Abiy and the TPLF. There is enough blame to go around. One person or party could bear larger or lesser responsibilities but we all played a role. Through our acts of omission and commission, we squandered this great opportunity for a peaceful democratic transition and placed the country at a horrible civil war that could rip it apart.

From my prison cell, I cannot pretend to be up to speed with everyday developments on the war and the efforts of external actors to end it before it causes irreversible damage. It would therefore be presumptuous of me to try to offer concrete recommendations with limited information at hand. All I could do for the time being is plead with all sides to give peace a chance; remind various political groups to refrain from fanning the war and instead exert pressure to end the hostility.

Even if this war ends with the defeat of the TPLF leadership, genuine efforts must be made to reconcile and reintegrate the disenfranchised Tigrayan political, security, and economic elites into the country’s governance structures. The defeat of TPLF does not necessarily mean the end of the ‘Tigrayan problem’ for the Ethiopian state. The resurgence of wounded Tigrayan nationalism is inevitable unless extra care is given to avoid the victimization of Tigrayans. For instance, the disputed border between Amhara and Tigray states should be carefully handled not to leave cause for future conflict.

The unfinished issue of the Eritrean border also requires sensitive handling. In both border disputes, a ‘winner takes it all’ approach must be avoided.

The international community and regional players should exert maximum pressure to save this country from further mayhem by insisting on the immediate cessation of hostilities and encouraging Ethiopia’s political forces to resolve their differences through an all-inclusive national dialogue.

Finally, if any actor, be it state or non-state, believes they can achieve victory through a war in this country, they are mistaken. Certainly, one can defeat the other on the battlefield, but neither side would be victorious in building a peaceful and sustainable political order. We are poised to lose the country if we keep insisting on advancing our particular interest through the use of force. In our part, during the Oromo Protests, we consciously chose to wage nonviolent struggle because we believed it would give us a better chance of bringing about a transition to a multinational democratic federal system.

At the OFC, we firmly believe -as always-that nonviolent struggle and an all-inclusive dialogue remain Ethiopia’s best hope to successfully transition into a democratic order, ensure enduring stability and achieve sustainable development, and are committed to abiding by these principles. It has worked for us in the past. We hope it serves us better in the future as well.

Jawar Mohammed

November 2020

Qaliti Federal Prison, Ethiopia

Ethiopia on CBC News

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Tigray leader urges Ethiopian PM to withdraw troops from regionCBC NEWS

Tigray leader urges Ethiopian PM to withdraw troops from region

Days after Ethiopia's victory declaration, fears of humanitarian disaster growing

The Associated  

Posted: November 30, 2020

Last Updated: 11 Hours Ago

The leader of Ethiopia's Tigray region called on Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed on Monday to "stop the madness" and withdraw troops from the region as he asserted that fighting continues "on every front" two days after Abiy declared victory.

Debretsion Gebremichael, in a phone interview with The Associated Press, said he remains near the Tigray capital, Mekele, which the Ethiopian army on Saturday said it now controlled. Far from accepting Abiy's declaration of victory, the Tigray leader asserted that "we are sure we'll win."

He also accused Ethiopian forces of carrying out a "genocidal campaign" against the Tigray people. With the Tigray region still cut off a month after the fighting began, no one knows how many people have been killed, and it's difficult to verify the warring sides' claims.

Each government regards the other as illegal after Abiy sidelined the once-dominant Tigray People's Liberation Front after taking office in early 2018.

The fight is about self-determination of the region of about six million people, the Tigray leader said, and it "will continue until the invaders are out." He asserted that his forces held an undetermined number of "captives" among the Ethiopian forces, including the pilot of a fighter jet that his side claims to have shot down over the weekend

Ethiopia had launched a search for leaders of the Tigray People's Liberation Front. Experts say fighting will likely continue despite the government's announcement.  2:02

The Tigray leader also asserted that his forces still have several missiles, and "we can use them whenever we want" — although he rejected a question about striking at the Ethiopian capital, Addis Ababa, saying the primary aim is to "clear Tigray from the invaders." He again accused Abiy of collaborating with neighbouring Eritrea in the offensive in Tigray, something the Ethiopian government has denied.

As for the idea of talks with the government, something Abiy has repeatedly rejected, the Tigray leader said that "depends on the content," and Ethiopian forces would first have to leave the region.

UN raises concerns about refugees as Ethiopian military says it's completed offensive in Tigray

"Civilian casualties are so high," he said, though he denied having any estimate of the toll. He accused Ethiopian forces of "looting wherever they go."

"The suffering is greater and greater every day," he said, calling it collective punishment against the Tigray people for their belief in their leaders.

U.S., UN expresses concern over hostilities

The fighting has threatened to destabilize Ethiopia, the linchpin of the strategic Horn of Africa, and its neighbours.

In remarks to lawmakers on Monday, Abiy asserted that "the defence force has not killed a single person in any city. No nation's military could have shown better competency than us." But one of his own cabinet ministers, Zadig Abraha, told the AP on Saturday that "we have kept the civilian casualty very low."

Ethiopia says military has gained 'full control' of Tigray region's capital

U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo spoke with Abiy on Monday — the first known time since the fighting began — and reiterated the "grave concern regarding ongoing hostilities and the risks the conflict poses," a spokesperson said. Pompeo also "called for a complete end to the fighting and constructive dialogue to resolve the crisis" and for humanitarian access and protection of civilians, including refugees.

Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed spoke to U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo about the ongoing situation on Monday. (Mulugeta Ayene/The Associated Press)

United Nations Secretary General António Guterres received a call from Abiy on Sunday to update him on the situation in the country, UN spokesperson Stéphane Dujarric said.

"The secretary general once again underscored the need for the full respect for human rights, as well as for humanitarian access for ourselves and our humanitarian partners," Dujarric said. "The secretary general also said that Ethiopia needed a true reconciliation without discrimination and in a country where every community should feel respected and be part of Ethiopia."

Fears of widespread humanitarian crisis growing

Hospitals and health centres in the Tigray region are running "dangerously low" on supplies to care for the wounded, the International Committee of the Red Cross has said. Food is also running low, the result of the region being cut off from outside aid.

Fears of a widespread humanitarian disaster are growing. The UN has been unable to access the Tigray region. Human rights groups and others worry about the atrocities that might emerge once transport and other links are restored .

Refugees stand on the Ethiopian bank of a river that separates Sudan from Ethiopia near a transit camp that houses those fleeing the fighting in Tigray. (Baz Ratner/Reuters)

Nearly one million people have been displaced, including about 44,000 who fled into Sudan. Camps in Tigray that are home to 96,000 Eritrean refugees have been in the line of fire..

If Ethiopia descends into chaos:

I

f Ethiopia descends into chaos, it could take the Horn of Africa with it

Simon Tisdall

As conflicts rapidly unfold in Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia and Yemen, the US, UK and European states are being sidelined

The Ethiopian army’s assault on Tigray province marks a serious backwards step by the country’s prime minister, Abiy Ahmed, who has been feted internationally as a moderniser and Nobel peace prize winner. Abiy calls it a “law enforcement operation” – but he risks being blamed for an expanding refugee emergency and a burgeoning region-wide crisis.

An even bigger fear is the break-up of Ethiopia itself in a Libyan or Yugoslav-type implosion. The country comprises more than 80 ethnic groups, of which Abiy’s Oromo is the largest, followed by the Amhara. Ethnic Somalis and Tigrayans represent about 6% each in a population of about 110 million. Ethiopia’s federal governance structure was already under strain before this latest explosion.

While it’s easy to point the finger at Abiy, Tigray’s leadership – the Tigray People’s Liberation Front – is just as much at fault for allowing political rivalries to degenerate into violence. Tigrayans dominated Ethiopia’s politics in the decades following the 1991 overthrow of Mengistu Haile Mariam’s Soviet-backed Marxist dictatorship.

But after the death in 2012 of Meles Zenawi, an authoritarian leader who achieved impressive economic advances, the TPLF lost its grip on power. Since Abiy took over in 2018, Tigray’s leaders have complained of being marginalised and victimised. A lethal attack this month on a federal army base in Mekelle, Tigray’s capital, triggered the intervention.

The fighting has brought predictable US and EU calls for an immediate cessation amid concerns that Ethiopia’s democracy as well as its territorial integrity are at stake. Elections, already postponed due to the pandemic, are due next year. But neither side is listening. Such deafness reflects the west’s declining influence and neglect of the Horn of Africa. This is the geopolitical backdrop to the Tigray emergency.

Interviewed in Addis Ababa in 2008, Meles told me he welcomed British and other foreign assistance but spoke passionately about Ethiopians’ right to set their own path. “We believe democracy cannot be imposed from outside in any society... Each sovereign nation has to make its own decisions and have its own criteria as to how they govern themselves,” he said.

In rejecting outside calls to cease fire, Abiy likewise stresses self-determination. He argues he is trying to build a shared national identity and common citizenship transcending the ethnic politics which, his supporters say, have held Ethiopia back. Abiy’s critics say this is shorthand for a new dictatorship of the centre.

If Abiy’s approach is proven wrong, the mistake will be his own. Analysts suggest the offensive is unlikely to bring the swift victory he predicts, partly because the national army comprises many Tigrayans and other minorities that could follow the TPLF’s example. The longer it goes on, the more probable that instability will spread within Ethiopia and beyond its borders.

The Amhara region adjacent to Tigray was reportedly bombed last week. Neighbouring Eritrea has also come under fire. Its president, the reclusive dictator Isaias Afwerki, is said to be backing Addis Ababa out of enmity for the Tigrayans who led a war against Eritrea that took 20 years to settle. This was the peace-making feat that helped win Abiy his Nobel prize.

Sudan, to the west, only now emerging from the turmoil that followed last year’s revolution, has meanwhile become the unhappy recipient of tens of thousands of fleeing refugees. The UN warned last week of a “full-scale humanitarian crisis”. For its part, South Sudan is in a state of permanent upheaval. Both countries might easily be tipped into renewed chaos.

Yet perhaps the biggest regional concern is Somalia, to the east, where an Islamist insurgency, grinding poverty and warring factions have long rendered the country almost ungovernable. Meles repeatedly warned of an Islamist threat to the Horn of Africa. In 2007 he controversially sent 10,000 Ethiopian troops to crush what he termed “Somalia’s Taliban”.

Ethiopian forces are still there. But now 3,000 soldiers are reportedly being withdrawn to join the Tigray offensive. Worries about a consequent power vacuum that could be filled by the Islamist group, al-Shabaab, or Islamic State, which is also present, have been compounded by Donald Trump’s sudden decision to reduce US military involvement.

Trump’s move has nothing to do with a careful evaluation of current threat levels or Somalis’ best interests and everything to do with securing his America First legacy. Although US special forces will remain in Kenya and Djibouti, 700 American soldiers conducting counter-terrorism missions and training inside Somalia are expected to be recalled.

Analysts warn the withdrawals could jeopardise elections due in Somalia next year, viewed as a vital step towards normality, while boosting al-Shabaab. The group already controls large rural areas. It frequently attacks security and civilian targets in Somalia and Kenya despite US-led drone strikes and raids. Six people died last week when a suicide bomber blew himself up in a Mogadishu restaurant.

Reduced American commitment may accelerate another worrying trend: an ongoing competition among Gulf states for strategic influence and resources across the Horn. Fierce rivals Qatar and the UAE have interests in Somalia and Eritrea. Turkey has also increased its involvement in line with its post-Arab Spring interventions in Libya and Syria. It recently donated armoured personnel carriers to the Somali government. Meanwhile, Russia is planning a naval base at Port Sudan.

As events rapidly unfold in Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia and in war-torn Yemen, across the Gulf of Aden, the US, UK and European states are increasingly sidelined. They seem able to tolerate any amount of human suffering at a distance. But if region-wide turmoil increases refugee and migrant outflows and extends the reach of the terrorists, they may come to rue their role as passive spectators.

The rise and fall of TPLF.

Rise and fall of Ethiopia’s TPLF – from rebels to rulers and back

Bloody offensive aims to eliminate Tigray People’s Liberation Front, which dominated for nearly 30 years

Jason Burke Africa correspondent

Published:12:00 Wed 25 November 2020

In the centre of Mekelle, the highland capital of Tigray, is a complex of memorials and museums. Under the hot sun, old armoured vehicles, jets and helicopters rust quietly. On the city’s wide avenues, statues commemorate the “martyrs” and the victories of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), a small band of insurgents who became a guerrilla army, launched a successful rebellion and eventually ruled Africa’s second most populous country for almost 30 years.

This week federal Ethiopian forces have closed in on Mekelle in the final stages of a bloody offensive launched earlier this month by Ethiopia’s prime minister, Abiy Ahmed, with the aim of eliminating the TPLF as a political force.

The TPLF’s rise took 16 years, and its dominance of Ethiopian politics lasted nearly twice as long, but if Abiy’s “law enforcement operation” is successful, its fall will have taken less than 30 months. “It is really shocking. The decline is very dramatic,” said Yohannes Woldemariam, a US-based academic specialising in the Horn of Africa.

Analysis: why ‘final’ offensive may not end Ethiopian conflict

The TPLF was formed in 1975 at a time when hundreds of millions of people across Africa and the Middle East were demanding revolutions and liberation. Among those in Ethiopia calling for both were a dozen young men from the mountainous northern region of Tigray. Inspired by Marxist-Leninism, a profound sense of national identity, and the utopian slogans of the time, they imagined a brave new world for their country.

Only a year earlier, Haile Selassie, the last emperor of Ethiopia, had been deposed and murdered by hardline Marxist army officers, who immediately set about imposing a harsh authoritarian rule. In Tigray, there had long been resentment at the power of the centralised Ethiopian state. Many remembered the Tigrayan armed revolt of 1943, which had been brutally put down. This time, the TPLF leaders vowed, they would triumph.

Through the late 1970s the TPLF grew steadily. By 1978 the party had around 2,000 fighters, according to CIA estimates at the time. Two years later it could mobilise twice as many, the agency said.

Among them was Debretsion Gebremichael, who was then a wireless operator and propagandist for the insurgents and is now the group’s leader.

The TPLF’s success owed nothing to chance. Its leaders were ruthless and canny. They fought and destroyed rival rebel groups in Tigray and were careful to downplay their own Marxist views, which would be unpopular with the conservative, devoutly Christian rural populations that made up the TPLF’s initial support base. Instead, they emphasised the threat posed to local traditions and regional autonomy by the socialist policies of the regime in Addis Ababa.

 Why is Ethiopia facing civil war? explainer

An alliance with like-minded leftist nationalist rebels from the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) in the neighbouring province brought the organisation critical training and experience, which allowed it to resist the massive firepower of the Soviet-backed government regime.

“Ethiopian large-scale military operations to crush [the insurgency] have failed, with heavy losses of men and equipment,” noted the CIA in a 1983 assessment. “The government has paid a high political and economic price.”

But the suffering in Tigray was immense, with blunt and brutal counter-insurgency campaigns playing a significant role in the appalling famine of 1984. The TV reports that prompted global concern and the Live Aid concerts were filmed in Mekelle.

By the end of the 1980s, the TPLF was by far the biggest and most effective among the coalition of Ethiopian armed rebel groups that had united under the banner of the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) to fight the ailing Ethiopian regime. On 28 May 1991, TPLF troops backed by Eritrean forces seized control of Addis Ababa, the capital.

The fall of the regime left the TPLF’s leader, 36-year-old Meles Zenawi, in power and the army and intelligence services dominated by Tigrayans, who moved swiftly to consolidate their control in other sectors. Jobs were found for former comrades. Debretsion, the one-time wireless operator and by now a veteran close to Zenawi, was made the deputy head of the national intelligence agency, and later the minister of communications and information technology.

Debretsion’s career spans the two sides of Ethiopia under the TPLF-dominated coalition government from 1991. There was the construction of a carefully balanced ethnicity-based federal state, rapid development progress, massive infrastructure investment and stunning economic success, which has come close to banishing the hunger that once made the country infamous.

Mekelle thrived, its neat streets and electricity lines testament to the resources channelled to the TPLF’s stronghold.

But there was also repression so remorseless that it worried even the US, which saw Ethiopia as the cornerstone of its security strategy in the region and was prepared to tolerate most of the excesses of the TPLF leadership.

Meles died suddenly in 2012, and his handpicked successor, Halemariam Desalegn, proved too weak to manage growing tensions.

Discontent, especially among the two largest ethnic groups – the Oromo and Amhara – threatened the delicate compromise of the 1994 constitution, and representatives of the two communities eventually joined forces to outmanoeuvre the TPLF within the ruling coalition to get Abiy, who is of mixed Oromo-Amharic parentage, appointed as prime minister in 2018.

Abiy moved swiftly. Top TPLF officials were sacked from key security posts, generals were arrested on graft charges, and changes were introduced to counter the Tigrayan dominance of the armed forces. Political prisoners were freed from secret prisons, exiled dissidents were welcomed home, cumbersome state enterprises were privatised, and restrictions on the media were eased.

Abiy’s peace deal with Eritrea, which won him the Nobel peace prize, isolated the TPLF. By this summer, simmering tensions had risen further. The TPLF refused to hand over wanted fugitives or join a new political party set up by Abiy to replace the old ruling coalition, and it went ahead with local elections in Tigray despite polls being postponed nationwide owing to the coronavirus pandemic.

Ethiopian PM rebuffs mediation attempts as Tigray deadline nears

Observers said the decision was a “provocation”, even if supporters claimed it was a necessary defence of federal rights. Abiy’s office says the prime minister has tried to work with the TPLF but has been rebuffed.

The spark that set light to the tinder came in early November with an alleged raid by TPLF units on federal military bases in Tigray, in which many national army officers were killed and substantial quantities of hardware was seized. Abiy launched his offensive immediately.

It has taken federal troops three weeks to fight their way to within artillery range of Mekelle. It is unclear whether Debretsion and the TPLF’s other leaders are now in the city. Analysts think it likely they have scattered, seeking remote hideouts from which they can run a lengthy and costly insurgency.

“They are looking at the long term and trying to make Tigray a burial ground for Abiy’s troops,” Woldemariam said. “It is very tragic. A lot of people will suffer.”