Key Takeaways
- American President-elect Donald Trump has chosen hardline Republicans to hold key positions in his administration. This has dashed any optimism in Iran, sparking renewed concerns about the desire of the new American administration to reinstate the maximum pressure campaign against Tehran, potentially pushing it toward bankruptcy.
- The Trump administration is likely to focus on alienating Iran from its Russian and Chinese allies. This strategy could involve reaching a settlement in Ukraine to diminish Moscow’s support for Iran, disrupting the flow of Iranian oil to China and denying Beijing access to cheap Iranian oil.
- The scenario of pushing the Iranian regime toward bankruptcy is likely to force Tehran to look for ways to thwart it. Likely responses include applying pressure on Washington’s regional allies and pursuing strategies to enhance deterrence – most notably, accelerating efforts to acquire a nuclear bomb.
US President-elect Donald Trump has preoccupied Iranian circles for over a year prior to his election victory. This preoccupation extends beyond Iranian think tanks analyses, influencing official positions and producing tangible effects. Iran now anticipates the return of the maximum pressure campaign – this time with more coordination within the new American administration and between Washington and its European allies.
The Significance of the Return of ‘Hardline Conservatives’
Iran was one of the most interested parties globally in the outcome of the US presidential election. Iranian markets reacted sensitively to fluctuations in Trump’s odds at returning to the White House. Some analysis centers have suggested that the Iranian Supreme Leader’s endorsement of a reformist candidate in Iran’s mid-2024 presidential election was a calculated move to prepare for Trump’s anticipated presidency.
While some observers have downplayed the challenge posed by Trump’s return, citing his alleged desire to reach an understanding with Tehran and revive the nuclear deal, his appointments of hardline Republicans to key positions have erased any optimism. These selections have reignited concerns in Tehran about a renewed maximum pressure campaign designed to push Iran toward bankruptcy.
Iranian circles have described Marco Rubio, Trump’s nominee for secretary of state, as Iran’s nightmare. Rubio has been sharply critical of the Biden administration’s efforts to revive the nuclear deal, arguing that the Democrat’s leniency in enforcing sanctions bolstered Iran’s regional influence. Tehran’s fears deepened further when Trump selected Pete Hegseth as his defense secretary. Hegseth has previously advocated for Washington to permit Tel Aviv to take decisive action to destroy Iran’s nuclear program, a position echoed by the president-elect in the broader context of the Iranian-Israeli confrontation.
Iranian concerns have continued to mount with Trump’s nomination of Mike Waltz as national security advisor and John Ratcliffe as director of the Central Intelligence Agency. Both individuals are well-known for their hawkish stances on Iran.
The alignment within the new American administration on adopting a hardline approach toward Iran is only part of Tehran’s anxiety. The other significant concern stems from a noticeable shift in Europe’s position compared to Trump’s first term. While Europe previously supported Tehran and actively worked to disrupt Trump’s plans as much as possible, European nations now appear more inclined to collaborate with Washington in exerting pressure on Iran.
Iran Preparing for the Coming Storm
Iran has responded swiftly to the shifting political landscape in Washington, signaling its willingness to return to negotiations. Iranian markets have also reacted to Trump’s return to power, reflecting growing economic uncertainties. In addition, Iranian analysis centers have highlighted the potential for a significant public budget deficit due to a projected decline in oil exports for next year. Abdolnaser Hemmati, the minister of economic and financial affairs in President Masoud Pezeshkian government, has acknowledged that achieving high growth rates and reducing unemployment to less than 30% are not likely next year. This statement has extinguished the optimism that accompanied the start of Pezeshkian’s presidency.
Complicating matters further, recent developments in the EU suggest an increasingly hardline stance toward Iran. Data related to the nuclear issue and the growing political rifts following the October 7 war indicate a hardline European stance in the next phase, particularly as European parties appear poised to intensify the nuclear confrontation. It is also likely that they may consider additional measures against Tehran, such as designating the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a terrorist organization.
Key Determinants of Iranian-American Confrontation in Trump’s Era
The nuclear question is one of the most critical items on the agenda for American President-elect Donald Trump. This was underscored by current President Joe Biden during his White House meeting with Trump. The Iranian issue holds such prominence because it intersects with several trajectories that occupy the attention of American decision-makers. It also influences Washington’s status in the broader international competition, particularly with China emerging as a key strategic challenge. These trajectories can be summarized as follows:
1. The Nuclear Track: The nuclear issue remains the central pillar of the American-Iranian confrontation, as it has defined their dynamic for over a decade and culminated in the 2015 nuclear deal. Tehran continues to view this track as the primary avenue for engaging with Washington, shaping the Pezeshkian government’s foreign policy priorities. Pezeshkian’s appointment of a diplomatic team led by Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi reflects this approach, with its roots in the earlier negotiations involving the P5+1 and the European Troika under Mohammad Javad Zarif. The inclusion of Zarif in this government, despite opposition by extremists, highlights Tehran’s intent to keep diplomacy central to its strategy.
Pezeshkian also signaled Iran’s willingness to engage when he attended the UN General Assembly meetings in New York in September. While Trumps has hinted at a desire to resolve the nuclear issue and bridge the gap with Tehran, the path forward is fraught with complexity because the situation at the present is completely different. Unlike in 2015, Iran now possesses hundreds of kilograms of uranium enriched up to 60%. Iran also has the capability to produce uranium metal and hundreds of advanced centrifuges, bringing Tehran closer to achieving nuclear weapon capability. Additionally, Iran has also enacted laws that prohibit relinquishing its nuclear accomplishments, further complicating negotiations. Data shows that sovereign decision-making centers in Iran do not agree on giving up these nuclear achievements nor on engaging in negotiations that include issues other than the nuclear one. This evolving landscape has led to a clear change in the global discourse, asserting the need to activate the snapback mechanism included in the nuclear deal and reimpose international sanctions canceled after reaching the 2015 deal.
2. The Comprehensive Agreement Track: The incoming Republican administration does not intend to simply revive the nuclear deal but aims to push Iran into talks that lead to a broader, more encompassing agreement. Washington and its allies are determined to avoid repeating the Obama administration’s perceived shortcomings, where limitations were imposed on Iran’s nuclear program while other contentious issues were left unaddressed.
From Tehran’s perspective, the nuclear deal is a potential gateway to mending relations with the international community, escaping isolation and improving ties with Washington. However, for the US and its partners this gateway is a strategic means to compel Tehran into a comprehensive deal that restrains its regional ambitions and curtails its influence.
All of this means that the new American administration needs an effective strategy to force Tehran and push it toward comprehensive negotiations. In this context comes the widespread talk these days about going back to the maximum pressure campaign, designed to force Iran to choose between economic collapse and returning to the negotiating table. Such a campaign aims to exhaust Iran’s resources and leverage its economic vulnerabilities to secure a broader deal.
3. The Regional Track
Iran's regional activities have long been a source of contention between Tehran, on the one hand, and Washington and its regional allies, on the other. Many of these allies opposed the 2015 nuclear deal for failing to address these activities. The importance of this track has gained additional importance over the past year, particularly following the escalating confrontation between Iran and Israel following October 7, 2023.
Iran has consistently refused to negotiate its regional policies or include them in any comprehensive dialogue involving multiple stakeholders. At one end of the table is Iran, which views regional expansion as both an ideological imperative – to support the Shiite presence in the region – and a strategic necessity for ensuring depth in its confrontation with the United States and regional rivals. This expansion is also central to Iran’s existential struggle against Israel.
At the other end is Israel, which sees Iran – along with its militia proxies that openly call for Israel's destruction, its advanced missile arsenals and drone capabilities – as an urgeeeeent and existential threat requiring immediate action. Other regional actors also have a seat at the table, aiming to counter Iran’s hegemonic ambitions and respond to the periodic threats Tehran poses to their security.
The United States finds itself squarely at the table, compelled to address the Iranian dilemma that deeply concerns its regional partners and its strategic ally, Israel. The experience of the 2015 nuclear deal demonstrated that neglecting the regional dimension – which encompasses Iran's missile program and militia network – results in incomplete solutions. These truncated approaches have fueled frustration among US allies, prompting them to seek support from other global powers, as evidenced by the recent Gulf-Chinese rapprochement. In this context, a Trump-led United States is likely to pursue a strategy aimed at pressuring Iran into making concessions. This strategy could involve several steps, including:
- Reinstating a maximum pressure campaign to force the Iranian regime to the negotiating table as a matter of survival. The goal would be to leave Tehran with a stark choice: face economic collapse or relinquish critical assets, including its missile arsenal and militia network.
- Conducting a coordinated field campaign alongside the maximum pressure initiative to dismantle the network of militias through which Iran exerts regional dominance. This could include measures to neutralize Iran's missile capabilities by deploying advanced missile defence systems across the region and fostering military alliances aimed at bolstering a unified regional stance against Iran’s missile and drone programs. As part of this broader strategy, it is likely that the United States would grant Israel more freedom of action to address the Iranian threat directly, including launching intensified operations to degrade Iran’s regional influence and even its nuclear capabilities.
4. The International Track:
The United States’ confrontation with Iran is not solely to placate its regional allies but is deeply rooted in broader strategic challenges. Chief among these is the concern over diminishing US influence in the Middle East amid efforts by the Eastern bloc – led by China – to establish a foothold in the region.
From a US strategic perspective, Iran's growing alignment with the Eastern bloc is alarming due to its potential role as a stepping stone for future Chinese dominance – considered the primary long-term threat. For over a decade, Iran has actively pursued integration into the Eastern bloc under its "Look East" strategy, heavily promoted by its deep state. As a result, Iran is now on the verge of finalizing two strategic partnership agreements with Beijing and Moscow. Additionally, Tehran has secured membership in significant organizations, including the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, BRICS and the Eurasian Economic Union.
Despite US sanctions, Iran has emerged as China's largest oil supplier, with Iranian oil exports to China reportedly reaching approximately two million barrels per day. Moreover, Iran's involvement in the Russian-Ukrainian war through the provision of drones, ballistic missiles and logistical support has further strengthened its ties with Moscow. In return, Tehran has received advanced military technology, including hypersonic missile assistance and satellite launch capabilities. It is now on the cusp of acquiring Russian Su-35 fighter jets, bolstering its military capabilities within this Eastern alliance framework.
This dynamic does not alarm the United States in terms of immediate ground-level developments but raises significant concerns at the strategic level. Tehran is increasingly viewed as a pivotal player in the broader context of the Eastern bloc's efforts to strengthen its regional foothold and challenge the Middle East's traditional alignment with exclusive American influence. US, Western and regional pressures have prompted Tehran to deepen its alignment with the Eastern bloc, seeking refuge in its support to withstand sanctions and international isolation. The Trump administration is likely to attempt to sever Tehran's ties with its Russian and Chinese allies. This could involve pursuing a settlement on Ukraine that curtails Moscow's influence over Iran, restricting the flow of Iranian oil to China and denying Beijing access to cheap Iranian energy supplies.
Possible Scenarios
1. Return to ‘Maximum Pressure’
A Trump-led US administration would likely intensify its pressure campaign, targeting multiple fronts to ensure the strict enforcement of sanctions. Key priorities would include halting Iranian oil exports to China. This time, European nations are expected to align with Washington's approach. The European E3 group – France, Germany and the United Kingdom – might activate the snapback mechanism under the 2015 nuclear deal to reinstate international sanctions, while the EU may consider designating the Revolutionary Guard as a terrorist organization.
In addition, Washington might grant Israel significant leeway to counter Iran's regional influence through targeted actions. Simultaneously, the US could spearhead efforts to establish regional defence systems aimed at neutralizing Iran's missile capabilities, fostering a collective approach among its regional allies to confront Tehran's threats effectively.
The scenario of driving the Iranian regime toward bankruptcy appears to be the most likely course in the coming phase. However, it is expected to encounter significant resistance from Tehran, which is most likely seek ways to undermine the strategy. Among its potential countermeasures are applying pressure on regional allies and pursuing deterrent paths, most notably by accelerating efforts to obtain a nuclear weapon.
This scenario is also unlikely to proceed smoothly on the international stage, as it directly threatens the interests of key powers such as China and Russia, which have strategic partnerships with Iran.
2. Launching the Diplomatic Track and the Return Theorizing for ‘Heroic Flexibility’
Another possibility is that President Pezeshkian’s government could successfully reopen negotiations with the United States, convincing the Trump administration to delay escalation and explore compromise solutions in exchange for certain concessions. This scenario aligns with the preferences of the Iranian government at this stage and could gain traction among factions within the Iranian deep state as a means to avoid the collapse of the political system.
Regional actors might also favor this path to prevent further escalation in the region.
However, several significant hurdles stand in its way:
Internal Challenges: Any hypothetical negotiations would require significant concessions on critical issues for which the Pezeshkian government lacks sufficient authority or political backing.
External Resistance: The prospect of rapprochement between Iran and the United States is likely to face obstruction from external powers such as China, Russia and Israel, each with its own strategic interests in maintaining the status quo.
Even if Iran resorts to nuclear brinkmanship to force the international community into negotiations, substantial obstacles persist. Chief among these is the nuclear agreement itself, which has been rendered effectively obsolete due to Iran’s violations. Moreover, European nations are likely to preempt any negotiations by activating the snapback mechanism, closing the window for diplomatic solutions.
3. ‘Strategic Patience’ and China's Intervention to Save Iran
This is the least likely scenario but merits consideration. In this case, Iran would attempt to withstand US, Western and Israeli pressure by seeking shelter under the umbrella of its Eastern allies, particularly China. In this scenario, China would take the initiative to shield Iran and push back against the United States, viewing confrontation with Iran as part of the broader US-China rivalry and seeing Iran as a strategic ally that cannot be abandoned.
This scenario draws parallels to the US-Soviet standoff over Cuba in the 1960s.
However, this scenario faces several significant challenges. China does not appear ready to engage in a standoff akin to the Cold War confrontation between the US and the Soviet Union. Furthermore, China’s economic and strategic partnerships in the Gulf region limit its ability to take escalatory actions in the Middle East.
While China may intervene within reasonable limits to prevent Iran from being fully isolated or removed from its sphere of influence, it is unlikely to fully confront the US over Iran in the same way the Soviet Union did over Cuba.
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