State Authority, Capacity, and Legitimacy under Kleptocracy, Kakistocracy, Deep-State Dominance, and Dystopian Orders: A Comparative Analysis

 

State Authority, Capacity, and Legitimacy under Kleptocracy, Kakistocracy, Deep-State Dominance, and Dystopian Orders: A Comparative Analysis

Abstract

The triad of authority, capacity, and legitimacy constitutes the core analytic framework for assessing state performance and durability. While these dimensions are mutually reinforcing in stable polities, they are frequently distorted under pathological governance forms such as kleptocracy, kakistocracy, deep-state dominance, and dystopian political orders. This essay examines how each of these environments reshapes the exercise of authority, the deployment of capacity, and the construction (or erosion) of legitimacy. Drawing on contemporary political theory and comparative politics, the analysis demonstrates that these regimes do not simply represent weak states; rather, they often exhibit selective strength—coercive or extractive—paired with systemic deficits in public accountability and normative justification.

1. Conceptual Framework: Authority, Capacity, and Legitimacy

In Weberian terms, authority refers to the recognized right to rule, underpinned by legal-rational, traditional, or charismatic foundations (Weber, 1978). State capacity denotes the ability to implement decisions, deliver public goods, and enforce rules across territory (Mann, 1984; Fukuyama, 2013). Legitimacy, following Suchman (1995) and Beetham (2013), reflects the normative acceptance of rule by the governed, grounded in legality, justification, and consent. In well-functioning states, these dimensions are mutually reinforcing: authority is exercised through capable institutions, and legitimacy arises from effective, rule-bound governance.

However, in distorted regimes, these relationships become disarticulated. Authority may persist without legitimacy; capacity may be reoriented toward extraction or repression rather than service delivery; and legitimacy may be simulated through propaganda or coercion rather than earned through performance.

2. Kleptocracy: Extractive Authority and Instrumental Capacity

A kleptocracy is a system in which ruling elites systematically appropriate public resources for private gain (Rose-Ackerman, 1999; Johnston, 2005). In such regimes, authority is often formalized through legal institutions but substantively hollowed out by patronage networks and corruption.

Authority in kleptocracies is maintained through a combination of legal façade and coercive enforcement. Formal rules exist but are selectively applied, creating a dual system of governance: one for elites and another for ordinary citizens.

Capacity is not absent but redirected. The state often retains strong fiscal and coercive apparatuses, yet these are deployed to extract rents, suppress dissent, and maintain elite coalitions rather than to provide public goods (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012).

Legitimacy is typically weak in normative terms but may be partially sustained through performance legitimacy (e.g., economic growth) or distributive patronage. Where performance falters, regimes increasingly rely on coercion or nationalist narratives to compensate.

Thus, kleptocracies exhibit what might be termed “predatory capacity”: a capacity that is effective in extraction but deficient in equitable governance.

3. Kakistocracy: Authority without Competence

Kakistocracy, or rule by the least qualified, represents a degeneration of elite selection mechanisms. While less frequently theorized in formal political science literature, it is closely related to concepts of elite decay and institutional erosion (Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2018).

Authority in kakistocratic systems is often contested and unstable, as leaders lack the competence or credibility to command sustained compliance. Authority may be personalized rather than institutionalized, leading to volatility.

Capacity deteriorates due to poor decision-making, mismanagement, and the politicization of bureaucracies. Administrative systems become inefficient, and policy implementation is inconsistent or ineffective.

Legitimacy declines rapidly as governance failures accumulate. Unlike kleptocracies, which may maintain a degree of strategic coherence, kakistocracies suffer from systemic incoherence, undermining both performance and procedural legitimacy.

In such environments, the state risks sliding toward dysfunction not primarily because of deliberate extraction, but due to incompetence and the erosion of meritocratic norms.

4. Deep-State Dominance: Dual Authority and Shadow Capacity

The notion of a deep state refers to entrenched networks within security, intelligence, or bureaucratic institutions that exercise de facto power independent of, or in tension with, formal political authorities (Scott, 1998; North, Wallis, & Weingast, 2009).

Authority becomes bifurcated between formal, visible institutions and informal, opaque actors. This duality undermines transparency and accountability, as real decision-making authority may lie outside constitutional frameworks.

Capacity may remain relatively high, particularly in coercive and surveillance domains. However, it is selectively deployed to preserve the interests of entrenched networks rather than to serve the public interest.

Legitimacy is compromised by the perception (and often reality) of unaccountable power. Even if formal institutions retain a veneer of legality, the existence of shadow governance erodes trust and democratic norms.

Deep-state environments thus produce a paradox: high operational capacity coexisting with low democratic legitimacy and fragmented authority.

5. Dystopian Orders: Totalized Authority and Manufactured Legitimacy

A dystopian political order, often explored in both political theory and literature, represents an extreme form of authoritarianism characterized by pervasive surveillance, ideological control, and the suppression of autonomy (Arendt, 1951; Zuboff, 2019).

Authority is totalizing, extending into both public and private spheres. It is enforced through advanced surveillance technologies and ideological indoctrination, leaving little room for dissent.

Capacity is highly developed, particularly in information control, coercion, and behavioral regulation. The state’s administrative and technological apparatus enables comprehensive monitoring and enforcement.

Legitimacy is largely manufactured rather than genuine. Through propaganda, censorship, and the manipulation of information, regimes attempt to construct a perception of consent. However, this “simulated legitimacy” lacks the normative grounding of genuine public acceptance.

In dystopian systems, the triad is reconfigured into a closed loop: authority is enforced by capacity, and legitimacy is artificially produced to sustain both.

6. Comparative Insights and Implications

Across these regimes, several patterns emerge:

1. Decoupling of the Triad: Authority, capacity, and legitimacy no longer reinforce one another. Instead, they are selectively combined or substituted—coercion for legitimacy, extraction for service delivery, or opacity for accountability.

2. Selective Strength: These systems are not uniformly weak. They often exhibit strong coercive or extractive capacities while remaining weak in inclusive governance.

3. Legitimacy Substitution: Where normative legitimacy is lacking, regimes rely on alternative sources—performance, nationalism, patronage, or propaganda.

4. Instability Risks: The misalignment of the triad generates long-term instability, as deficits in legitimacy or capacity eventually undermine authority.

Conclusion

The functioning of authority, capacity, and legitimacy in kleptocratic, kakistocratic, deep-state, and dystopian environments reveals the adaptability—and fragility—of state structures under stress. These regimes demonstrate that the state can persist, and even appear strong, despite profound distortions in its foundational elements. However, such configurations are inherently unstable, as the erosion of legitimacy and the misdirection of capacity ultimately constrain the sustainability of authority. For scholars and practitioners, the challenge lies not only in diagnosing these distortions but in identifying pathways toward re-aligning the triad in ways that restore accountable, effective, and legitimate governance.

References

Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. A. (2012). Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty. Crown.

Arendt, H. (1951). The Origins of Totalitarianism. Harcourt, Brace & Company.

Beetham, D. (2013). The Legitimation of Power (2nd ed.). Palgrave Macmillan.

Fukuyama, F. (2013). What is governance? Governance, 26(3), 347–368.

Johnston, M. (2005). Syndromes of Corruption: Wealth, Power, and Democracy. Cambridge University Press.

Levitsky, S., & Ziblatt, D. (2018). How Democracies Die. Crown.

Mann, M. (1984). The autonomous power of the state: Its origins, mechanisms and results. European Journal of Sociology, 25(2), 185–213.

North, D. C., Wallis, J. J., & Weingast, B. R. (2009). Violence and Social Orders. Cambridge University Press.

Rose-Ackerman, S. (1999). Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences, and Reform. Cambridge University Press.

Scott, J. C. (1998). Seeing Like a State. Yale University Press.

Suchman, M. C. (1995). Managing legitimacy: Strategic and institutional approaches. Academy of Management Review, 20(3), 571–610.

Weber, M. (1978). Economy and Society. University of California Press.

Zuboff, S. (2019). The Age of Surveillance Capitalism. PublicAffairs.

Beyond Antagonism: A Hegelian Path to Reconciling Unitarian Imperialism and Federalist “Unity in Diversity”

 

Beyond Antagonism: A Hegelian Path to Reconciling Unitarian Imperialism and Federalist “Unity in Diversity”

The Ethiopian constitutional debate—often framed as a clash between unitarian imperial centralism and ethnic federalism—is not merely a policy disagreement. It is a historical contradiction rooted in competing narratives of legitimacy, identity, and statehood. To move beyond cyclical instability, this conflict must be understood not as a zero-sum struggle, but as a dialectical process in the Hegelian sense—where antagonism is not an endpoint, but a necessary stage toward synthesis.

1. History as Context, Explanation, and Instrument

History in Ethiopia operates simultaneously on four levels:

Context: It shapes institutional memory—from imperial centralization to the post-1991 federal restructuring.

Explanation: It accounts for contemporary fears—marginalized groups recall exclusion under imperial rule; centralists fear fragmentation.

Justification: Competing actors invoke history to legitimize claims—whether to territorial sovereignty or self-determination.

Instrument: Political elites selectively mobilize historical narratives to unite or divide.

This layered use of history creates what may be called an “elite war of narratives”, where legitimacy is contested through memory rather than performance. In such a setting, policy frameworks—unitary or federal—become symbolic proxies for deeper existential anxieties.

2. Hegelian Antagonism: Thesis vs. Antithesis

In Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s dialectical logic, historical development unfolds through contradiction:

Thesis (Unitarian Imperial Model):

A centralized state rooted in a universalist conception of Ethiopian identity (Ethiopiawinet), emphasizing unity, continuity, and sovereignty.

Antithesis (Ethnic Federalism):

A decentralized model institutionalizing the “nationality question”, recognizing nations, nationalities, and peoples as sovereign units with rights to self-rule and even secession.

This contradiction is not accidental—it is historically necessary. The imperial thesis generated the conditions for its own negation by marginalizing peripheral identities. The federalist antithesis, in turn, exposes the limits of fragmentation, risking state incoherence.

3. The Law of Negation of Negation

Hegel’s deeper insight lies in the law of negation of negation:

The first negation (federalism) overturns the original system (imperial centralism), but it too must be transcended by a second negation—one that preserves essential elements of both while overcoming their limitations.

This leads to Aufhebung (sublation):

Not destruction, but simultaneous abolition, preservation, and elevation.

Applied to Ethiopia:

From the unitarian model, preserve:

National cohesion

Institutional continuity

Shared economic and security frameworks

From federalism, preserve:

Cultural autonomy

Linguistic right

Local self-governance

The synthesis is neither a return to empire nor a continuation of rigid ethnic federalism. It is a post-ethnic constitutional order grounded in pluralistic citizenship.

4. Toward a Synthetic Constitutional Model

A Hegelian synthesis would involve:

a) Dual Legitimacy Framework

Legitimacy must derive from both:

Citizenship (individual rights)

Community (collective recognition)

b) Functional Federalism (De-ethnicized)

Shift from identity-based federalism to function-based decentralization:

Regions defined by administrative efficiency and economic logic, not ethnicity alone

Cultural rights protected constitutionally, not territorially monopolized

c) Shared Sovereignty

Reconceptualize sovereignty as layered:

Federal authority for macro-functions (defense, currency)

Regional autonomy for governance and cultural expression

d) Historical Reconciliation Mechanism

Institutionalize history:

Truth commissions

Inclusive historiography

Recognition of past injustices without weaponization

5. The 2026 Electoral Moment: From Force to Legitimacy?

The upcoming June 1, 2026 general election represents a potential dialectical turning point:

Can democratic legitimacy replace coercive dominance as the organizing principle of the state?

Yet structural realities—millions of internally displaced persons, inflationary pressures linked to global financial restructuring, and elite fragmentation—suggest that elections alone cannot resolve the contradiction. Without a deeper synthesis, the cycle of thesis–antithesis will persist.

6. Human Cost and the Failure of Synthesis

The absence of synthesis has tangible consequences:

Mass displacement

Cycles of insurgency and repression

Economic instability

Erosion of institutional legitimacy

In Hegelian terms, the system remains trapped in “bad infinity”—repeating conflict without resolution.

7. Conclusion: From Antagonism to Ethical Statehood

The reconciliation of unitarian and federalist ideologies requires moving beyond both. The goal is not compromise in the political sense, but transformation in the philosophical sense.

A truly modern Ethiopian state must become what Hegel called an “ethical state” (Sittlichkeit)—one in which freedom is realized not through domination or fragmentation, but through institutions that harmonize individuality and universality.

The question is no longer which ideology should win—but whether Ethiopia can transcend the logic of victory itself.

Call to Reflection

Can the 2026 elections serve as the second negation—a moment where democratic legitimacy synthesizes competing historical visions? Or will they merely reproduce the cycle of antagonism under a different guise?

References

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit (1807)

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Science of Logic (1812–1816)

Karl Marx, Capital (Vol. I, dialectical method)

Alexandre Kojève, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel (1947)

Taylor & Francis Online resources on conflict and federalism

Politorbis Issue #45 (History in Conflict Contexts)

Strategic Pragmatism or Moral Drift? Rethinking U.S. Engagement with Eritrea

Strategic Pragmatism or Moral Drift? Rethinking U.S. Engagement with Eritrea

By Habtamu Nini Abino 

Recent commentary by Cameron Hudson has reignited debate over a possible recalibration in U.S. policy toward Eritrea. At issue is whether Washington’s reported willingness to ease sanctions reflects a pragmatic response to shifting geopolitical realities—or a troubling departure from its longstanding commitment to human rights and democratic governance.

Eritrea’s strategic importance is undeniable. Situated along the Red Sea, adjacent to one of the world’s most vital maritime chokepoints, the country occupies a position of considerable interest to global powers. The Red Sea corridor is essential not only for international trade but also for military logistics and energy flows linking Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. As competition intensifies among actors such as the Gulf states, China, and Western powers, the Horn of Africa has become an arena of overlapping strategic ambitions. In this context, Washington’s interest in re-engaging Asmara appears less an anomaly than a reflection of broader geopolitical recalibration (International Crisis Group, 2023; U.S. Congressional Research Service, 2024).

However, critics—including Hudson—warn that such engagement risks undermining U.S. credibility. Eritrea, under the long-standing leadership of Isaias Afwerki, has faced persistent allegations of authoritarian rule, indefinite national service, and severe restrictions on civil liberties. Reports by organizations such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International have documented systemic human rights abuses, while the United Nations has previously characterized aspects of Eritrea’s governance as potentially constituting crimes against humanity (UN Human Rights Council, 2016).

Easing sanctions in such a context raises difficult questions. Does strategic access justify engagement without reform? And what message does this send to other states in the region where governance standards remain contested? A policy that appears to privilege geography over principle risks reinforcing perceptions of inconsistency in U.S. foreign policy—particularly in regions where democratic norms are already fragile (Lefebvre, 2021).

The broader regional context further complicates this calculus. Ethiopia continues to grapple with internal political fragmentation following the Tigray conflict and subsequent tensions between federal and regional forces. Sudan remains engulfed in a protracted civil war that has drawn in multiple external actors. Meanwhile, Gulf states such as United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia have expanded their economic and military footprint across Red Sea ports and infrastructure projects. In such a volatile environment, a narrowly transactional U.S. approach risks exacerbating regional rivalries rather than stabilizing them (Verhoeven, 2019).

Moreover, engagement without clearly defined conditions may weaken reformist constituencies both within Eritrea and across the Horn of Africa. Civil society actors and pro-democracy movements often rely on external pressure to sustain momentum. A shift toward unconditional engagement could dilute that pressure, signaling that international accountability is negotiable. As scholars of international relations have long argued, credibility in foreign policy is not merely about power—it is about consistency and perceived legitimacy (Keohane & Nye, 2012).

This does not mean that engagement with Eritrea should be categorically rejected. Isolation has its own limits and may entrench rather than moderate authoritarian behavior. However, a more effective approach would be conditional, incremental, and transparent. The United States could pursue a phased strategy linking diplomatic normalization to measurable benchmarks—such as improvements in human rights practices, regional non-interference, and steps toward political liberalization. Such an approach would balance strategic interests with normative commitments, rather than subordinating one to the other.

Coordination with international partners is equally essential. Multilateral engagement—through institutions such as the African Union and collaboration with European allies—can help ensure that policy toward Eritrea is not fragmented or contradictory. A unified framework would strengthen leverage while minimizing the risk of competitive diplomacy among external actors.

Ultimately, the debate over Eritrea reflects a broader tension in U.S. foreign policy: the balance between realism and idealism. The Horn of Africa, with its complex interplay of security challenges, governance deficits, and external interventions, is a testing ground for that balance. A policy rooted solely in strategic expediency may deliver short-term gains but risks long-term instability and reputational cost.

As Washington considers its next steps, the question is not whether to engage but how. A principled, coherent, and regionally informed strategy offers the best prospect for aligning U.S. interests with its values. Anything less risks turning strategic pragmatism into moral drift.

References

International Crisis Group. (2023). The Horn of Africa: Regional Dynamics and External Actors.

U.S. Congressional Research Service. (2024). Eritrea and U.S. Policy: Strategic Considerations.

Human Rights Watch. (2023). World Report: Eritrea.

Amnesty International. (2023). Eritrea 2023 Report.

United Nations Human Rights Council. (2016). Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in Eritrea.

Lefebvre, J. A. (2021). Arms for the Horn: U.S. Security Policy in Ethiopia and Somalia. University of Pittsburgh Press.

Verhoeven, H. (2019). The Gulf and the Horn: Changing Geopolitics of the Red Sea. Columbia University Press.

Keohane, R. O., & Nye, J. S. (2012). Power and Interdependence. Longman.

Collective Narcissism, Elite Fragmentation, and the Limits of Identity Mobilization in Amhara Politics: Toward a Civic Democratic Framework in Ethiopia

Collective Narcissism, Elite Fragmentation, and the Limits of Identity Mobilization in Amhara Politics: Toward a Civic Democratic Framework in Ethiopia

Abstract

This article examines contemporary Amhara political discourse within Ethiopia’s ethnic federal system through the analytical lenses of collective narcissism, elite fragmentation, and victimhood rhetoric. Drawing on recent analytical frameworks developed by Habtamu Nini Abino and situating them within broader theories of nationalism and political psychology, the paper argues that identity-based mobilization—while emotionally potent—often substitutes for institutional reform. The study highlights how narrative dominance without strategic coherence undermines democratic transformation and proposes a shift toward civic nationalism grounded in shared institutions, legal equality, and mutual recognition.

1. Introduction

Ethiopia’s post-1995 political order, structured under ethnic federalism, has transformed the terrain of political competition. The system institutionalized identity as a primary axis of political organization, granting nations, nationalities, and peoples constitutional recognition, most notably under Article 39 of the 1995 Constitution. While this framework addressed historical marginalization, it also intensified inter-ethnic contestation and elite-driven identity mobilization (Vaughan, 2003; Aalen, 2011).

Within this context, Amhara politics occupies a paradoxical position. Historically central to state formation, sections of the Amhara elite now articulate grievances of marginalization, dispossession, and symbolic exclusion. This duality—historical dominance versus contemporary victimhood—creates fertile ground for what political psychology terms collective narcissism (Golec de Zavala et al., 2009).

2. Collective Narcissism and Nationalist Discourse

Collective narcissism refers to an inflated belief in the greatness of one’s group combined with a persistent sense of external disrespect. As theorized by Golec de Zavala et al. (2009), such groups demand recognition but remain hypersensitive to perceived slights, often interpreting equality as humiliation.

Applied to Amhara nationalist discourse, this framework reveals several recurring features:

Mythologized historical consciousness: Ethiopia’s imperial past is reframed as a civilizational project uniquely tied to Amhara identity.

Selective memory: Narratives emphasize unity and glory while minimizing the experiences of domination reported by other groups.

Emotional nationalism: Cultural production, particularly music, becomes a vehicle for collective mourning and symbolic restoration.

The cultural influence of Teddy Afro illustrates this dynamic. His music often evokes Ethiopia as a wounded yet sacred entity, fostering emotional solidarity. While such artistic expressions serve legitimate cultural and psychological functions, their politicization risks transforming mourning into exclusionary ideology.

3. The “Teddy Afro Syndrome”: Narrative Without Transformation

Building on this critique, Abino conceptualizes what may be termed the “Teddy Afro Syndrome”—a condition where:

Narrative production is maximized,

Institutional reform is minimized.

This imbalance produces a feedback loop:

 Past glory → perceived humiliation → emotional catharsis → symbolic resistance → absence of structural change

Such dynamics align with Anderson’s (1983) concept of “imagined communities,” but diverge in that imagination becomes static rather than transformative. Emotional release replaces political strategy, draining urgency for institutional reform.

4. Elite Fragmentation and Strategic Incoherence

Ethiopia’s political crisis is not confined to a single ethnic group; rather, it reflects a broader pattern of elite fragmentation across Oromo, Amhara, and Tigrayan political spheres. However, in the Amhara case, a distinctive contradiction emerges:

High narrative coherence (clear messaging about victimhood and identity),

Low strategic coherence (limited institutional or coalition-building capacity).

This results in:

1. Binary framing of politics (e.g., “Oromo government” vs. “Amhara resistance”),

2. Reduced coalition space,

3. Unintended reinforcement of securitized governance.

As Habtamu Nini Abino notes, rhetorical dominance without institutional strategy leads to political stagnation rather than transformation.

This phenomenon reflects what Levitsky and Way (2010) describe as competitive authoritarian drift, where weak institutions amplify elite opportunism rather than democratic consolidation.

5. Victimhood Rhetoric and the Logic of “Menu Politics”

A central critique in recent analyses is the notion of “menu politics”—the framing of political life as a zero-sum distribution of power among ethnic groups. Within this logic:

History is reduced to narratives of domination (“one group eating another”),

Political demands become framed as entitlement rather than rights,

Grievances are essentialized into permanent identity claims.

Such rhetoric has three major consequences:

1. Dehumanization: Opponents are cast as existential threats rather than political competitors.

2. Radicalization: Emotional mobilization escalates into cycles of revenge.

3. Analytical distortion: Complex historical processes (e.g., Derg repression, EPRDF authoritarianism) are reduced to ethnic conspiracies.

Empirical evidence suggests that state violence in Ethiopia has historically affected multiple groups, undermining mono-ethnic explanations (Clapham, 2018). Thus, victimhood narratives, while grounded in real suffering, become politically counterproductive when absolutized.

6. Implications for Democratic Reform

The persistence of collective narcissism and elite fragmentation poses significant obstacles to democratic transformation:

Erosion of shared political space: Identity absolutism undermines civic trust.

Institutional weakness: Focus on narratives diverts attention from governance reform.

Polarization: Competing victimhood claims create a hierarchy of suffering.

A sustainable democratic framework requires a shift from identity-based mobilization to civic institutionalism, defined by:

1. Equal citizenship under the rule of law,

2. Independent institutions (judiciary, electoral bodies),

3. Cross-ethnic political coalitions,

4. Historical reconciliation grounded in plural narratives.

This aligns with Habermas’s (1996) concept of constitutional patriotism, where loyalty is directed toward democratic principles rather than ethnic identity.

7. Conclusion

Amhara politics, as analyzed through the lenses of collective narcissism, elite fragmentation, and victimhood rhetoric, reflects broader structural challenges within Ethiopia’s ethnic federal system. While identity-based narratives provide emotional resonance and historical meaning, they often fail to translate into effective political strategy or institutional reform.

The central argument of this article is clear:

Narrative power without institutional transformation is politically sterile.

A democratic Ethiopia cannot be built on competing collective egos or hierarchies of victimhood. Instead, it requires a deliberate transition toward civic nationalism, grounded in shared institutions, legal equality, and mutual recognition across all communities.

References

Aalen, L. (2011). The Politics of Ethnicity in Ethiopia: Actors, Power and Mobilisation under Ethnic Federalism. Brill.

Anderson, B. (1983). Imagined Communities. Verso.

Clapham, C. (2018). The Ethiopian State at the Crossroads. James Currey.

Golec de Zavala, A., et al. (2009). “Collective Narcissism and Its Social Consequences.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology.

Habermas, J. (1996). Between Facts and Norms. MIT Press.

Levitsky, S., & Way, L. (2010). Competitive Authoritarianism. Cambridge University Press.

Vaughan, S. (2003). “Ethnicity and Power in Ethiopia.” PhD Dissertation, University of Edinburgh.

Metaphor, State Decay, and Governance Crisis: Interpreting “The Death of a Country” in Contemporary Ethiopia

Metaphor, State Decay, and Governance Crisis: Interpreting “The Death of a Country” in Contemporary Ethiopia

Abstract

The assertion that “a country is dead,” as articulated by Tewodros Kassahun, is best understood not as a literal claim but as a metaphorical critique of governance failure. Drawing on theories of statehood, legitimacy, and institutional capacity, this article examines the conceptual meaning of “state death” and situates the Ethiopian case within broader debates on state fragility and resilience. It argues that the “death” of a country refers to the erosion of authority, legitimacy, and capacity—the core pillars of effective governance. While Ethiopia exhibits symptoms of institutional strain, it remains analytically more accurate to characterize its condition as a governance crisis rather than state collapse. The article concludes that such metaphors function as normative warnings, urging institutional reconstruction rather than signaling irreversible demise

1. Introduction

Political discourse often employs existential metaphors to describe moments of acute crisis. The claim that a country is “dead” belongs to this rhetorical tradition, reflecting not biological cessation but institutional breakdown. In contemporary Ethiopia, such expressions have gained prominence amid intensifying political fragmentation and security challenges. This article seeks to reinterpret such claims through the lens of political theory and governance analysis, asking: under what conditions can a state be said to “die,” and how applicable is this concept to Ethiopia?

2. Conceptualizing “State Death” in Political Theory

In classical political theory, the state is defined not by territory alone but by its capacity to exercise authority, maintain legitimacy, and deliver public goods (Weber, 1978; Fukuyama, 2013). A state is “alive” when it performs these functions effectively. Conversely, what is metaphorically described as “death” corresponds to a condition of state failure or institutional collapse (Rotberg, 2004).

Max Max Weber conceptualized the state as the entity that successfully claims the monopoly of legitimate violence within a territory. When this monopoly is contested or lost, the foundational basis of statehood is undermined. Similarly, modern governance theorists emphasize three interdependent pillars:

Authority: The ability to formulate and enforce rules

Legitimacy: The societal acceptance of those rules

Capacity: The institutional ability to implement policy and deliver services

The simultaneous erosion of these pillars signals not immediate disappearance but progressive institutional decomposition.

3. Conditions of State “Death”

A state may be considered functionally “dead” when governance loses coherence across both territory and population. The literature on fragile states identifies several key indicators:

3.1 Loss of Monopoly on Violence

The proliferation of non-state armed actors—insurgencies, militias, or regional forces—indicates a breakdown in centralized coercive authority (Tilly, 1992).

3.2 Collapse of Legitimacy

When citizens withdraw consent and no longer perceive the state as representing a shared political community, legitimacy erodes (Habermas, 1975).

3.3 Fragmentation of Authority

Multiple competing centers of power emerge, each claiming sovereignty, thereby diluting the coherence of governance (Jackson, 1990).

3.4 Institutional Paralysis

Judicial, legislative, and administrative institutions cease to function effectively, often replaced by informal or coercive mechanisms.

In such contexts, the state may persist juridically—retaining international recognition and formal sovereignty—while becoming substantively hollow

4. Pathways of Institutional Decay

State “death” is rarely abrupt; it unfolds through cumulative processes:

4.1 Erosion of Political Consensus

A shared national narrative weakens, and identity-based cleavages—ethnic, regional, or ideological—supersede civic cohesion (Anderson, 1983).

4.2 Personalization of Power

Governance shifts from institutional frameworks to individual authority, undermining rule-based systems and reducing predictability (Bratton & van de Walle, 1997).

4.3 Decline of Rule of Law

Selective application of laws erodes judicial independence, transforming legal disputes into political or coercive conflicts.

4.4 Militarization of Politics

Political competition increasingly relies on force rather than negotiation, elevating the role of armed actors in governance.

4.5 Economic Dislocation

Governance failure produces economic decline, which in turn exacerbates grievances and further weakens state capacity (Collier et al., 2003).

These dynamics interact in a feedback loop, deepening institutional fragility.

5. Ethiopia in Analytical Context

Applying this framework to Ethiopia reveals a complex picture. Contemporary political dynamics exhibit elements associated with state fragility:

Fragmentation of authority across federal and regional actors

Contestation of legitimacy amid competing national narratives

Expansion of armed actors influencing political outcomes

However, Ethiopia retains key attributes of statehood: functioning administrative structures, international recognition, and ongoing policy implementation. Thus, it does not meet the threshold of full state failure as defined in comparative political analysis.

The metaphor of “death” therefore reflects a perceived crisis of coherence and effectiveness, rather than an empirical condition of state extinction.

6. Metaphor as Political Diagnosis

Artistic and cultural expressions often serve as diagnostic tools in political life. The metaphor of “death” amplifies perceptions of crisis, translating complex institutional failures into accessible emotional language. Such narratives can mobilize public discourse, but they also risk oversimplification if interpreted literally.

In this sense, the statement attributed to Tewodros Kassahun functions as a normative critique, highlighting governance deficits rather than declaring irreversible collapse.

7. Prospects for State Recovery

Historical experience demonstrates that states can recover from severe crises through deliberate institutional reform. Three pathways are particularly critical:

Rebuilding Legitimacy: Inclusive political settlements and credible representation mechanisms

Restoring Institutional Autonomy: Strengthening rule-based governance and judicial independence

Re-establishing Security Monopoly: Integrating or neutralizing non-state armed actors under unified command

Successful recovery depends on reconstituting the relationship between state and society around trust, accountability, and effectiveness.

8. Conclusion

The notion that a country can “die” is best understood as a metaphor for governance breakdown rather than a literal condition. In political terms, state “death” occurs when authority, legitimacy, and capacity erode to the point of systemic incoherence. Ethiopia’s current trajectory reflects significant institutional strain but does not constitute terminal collapse.

Rather than an obituary, such claims should be read as warnings—calls for institutional renewal and political recalibration. The future of the state depends not on its formal existence, but on its ability to restore effective governance and reestablish a shared political community.

References

Anderson, B. (1983). Imagined Communities. Verso.

Bratton, M., & van de Walle, N. (1997). Democratic Experiments in Africa. Cambridge University Press.

Collier, P., et al. (2003). Breaking the Conflict Trap. World Bank.

Fukuyama, F. (2013). What Is Governance? Governance, 26(3).

Habermas, J. (1975). Legitimation Crisis. Beacon Press.

Jackson, R. (1990). Quasi-States. Cambridge University Press.

Rotberg, R. I. (2004). When States Fail. Princeton University Press.

Tilly, C. (1992). Coercion, Capital, and European States. Blackwell.

Weber, M. (1978). Economy and Society. University of California Press.

Primordialism, Social Construction, and the Re-Ethnicization of Amhara Identity in Contemporary Ethiopia

Primordialism, Social Construction, and the Re-Ethnicization of Amhara Identity in Contemporary Ethiopia: 

Abstract

The theoretical divide between primordialism and social constructivism has long shaped scholarly debates on ethnicity and nationalism. In contemporary Ethiopia, however, this debate has transcended academic boundaries and become a central axis of political mobilization, conflict, and survival. This article examines the ongoing re-ethnicization of Amhara identity in the context of post-Tigray War political dynamics, the rise of movements such as Fano, and the pressures of Ethiopia’s ethnic federal system. Drawing on classical and modern theories of nationalism, the study argues that Amhara identity—historically articulated through a civic and imperial Ethiopian framework—is undergoing a transformation into a more bounded, ethnically defined category. This shift reflects not a simple return to primordial roots but a strategic reconfiguration of identity under conditions of insecurity and political competition. The article concludes that the Ethiopian case illustrates a hybrid model in which constructed identities are re-essentialized in response to perceived existential threats.

1. Introduction

The nature of ethnic identity—whether primordial or socially constructed—remains one of the most enduring questions in political anthropology and nationalism studies. While early scholarship emphasized the deep, affective, and quasi-biological roots of identity, later work challenged this assumption, demonstrating the historical contingency and political construction of ethnic categories.

In Ethiopia, this debate has acquired renewed relevance. As the country approaches the 2026 general elections, identity has become a central organizing principle of political competition. Among the most significant developments is the transformation of Amhara identity from a historically expansive and integrative framework often associated with Ethiopiawinet into a more explicitly ethnic and territorially bounded form.

This paper addresses the following research questions:

1. What explains the shift from civic Ethiopian identity to Amhara ethno-nationalism?

2. How do primordialist and constructivist frameworks help interpret this transformation?

3. What are the broader implications for Ethiopian statehood and political stability?

2. Theoretical Framework

2.1 Primordialism

Primordialism conceptualizes ethnic identity as rooted in deep, enduring ties such as kinship, language, religion, and shared ancestry. Scholars such as Clifford Geertz argue that these “primordial attachments” carry an emotional weight that cannot be reduced to rational calculation. From this perspective, ethnic conflict emerges when these inherent identities are threatened.

2.2 Social Constructivism

In contrast, constructivist scholars emphasize the historical and political production of identity. Benedict Anderson famously described nations as “imagined communities,” while Ernest Gellner linked nationalism to processes of modernization and state formation. Identity, in this view, is neither fixed nor natural but contingent and malleable.

2.3 Instrumentalism and Hybrid Approaches

Instrumentalist theorists, such as Paul Brass, bridge these perspectives by highlighting the role of political elites in mobilizing identity for strategic purposes. Contemporary scholarship increasingly adopts hybrid models, recognizing that identities are constructed yet experienced as deeply rooted.

3. Historical Context: Amhara Identity and the Ethiopian State

Amhara identity has historically been intertwined with the Ethiopian state. During imperial periods, particularly under Haile Selassie, the Amharic language, Orthodox Christianity, and court culture became central pillars of state identity. However, this did not necessarily translate into a clearly bounded ethnic category.

Instead, Amhara identity functioned as:

A linguistic-cultural framework

A political-administrative elite identity

A civilizational core of Ethiopian statehood

This aligns with constructivist interpretations: Amhara identity was less a primordial ethnicity and more a state-forming cultural matrix.

4. Ethnic Federalism and Identity Reconfiguration

The introduction of ethnic federalism in 1995 marked a critical turning point. By constitutionally recognizing “Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples,” the system institutionalized ethnicity as the primary basis of political organization.

This had two major effects:

1. Ethnicization of politics: Political competition became structured along ethnic lines.

2. Marginalization of supra-ethnic identities: Civic Ethiopianism lost institutional support.

Within this framework, Amhara identity faced a paradox: it was both historically dominant and institutionally underdefined as a distinct ethnic category.

5. Conflict, Crisis, and the Return of Ethnicity

5.1 The Impact of War

The Tigray War and its aftermath fundamentally reshaped Ethiopia’s political landscape. Territorial disputes in areas such as Welkait and Raya intensified identity-based mobilization.

5.2 Emergence of Armed Mobilization

Groups such as Fano became central actors in articulating a new form of Amhara nationalism. Their discourse emphasizes:

Historical land claims

Collective victimhood

Existential threat narratives

These elements reflect a shift toward primordialist framing, even if strategically constructed.

6. The Politics of Victimhood and Identity Hardening

The re-ethnicization of Amhara identity is closely linked to narratives of victimization. In contemporary discourse, claims of marginalization, displacement, and violence are used to justify a more rigid and defensive identity.

From a theoretical standpoint:

Constructivist narratives are viewed as politically dangerous, as they imply reversibility

Primordialist narratives provide moral and political legitimacy for collective action

This dynamic illustrates a key paradox: identities become more rigid precisely when they are most contested.

7. Secularization and Expansion of Ethnic Identity

Historically associated with the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church, Amhara identity is increasingly being secularized.

7.1 Inclusion of Religious Minorities

Amhara Muslims and Protestants are now explicitly incorporated into nationalist discourse, expanding the identity’s demographic base.

7.2 From Religion to Ethnicity

The shift from religious to ethnic markers reflects a broader transformation:

From faith-based belonging → to ancestry-based belonging

From cultural identity → to political identity

This transition aligns with global patterns of modern nationalism.

8. Polarization of Identity Discourses

The Ethiopian political field now exhibits three competing frameworks:

1. Primordialist Ethno-Nationalism

Identity as fixed and ancestral

Emphasis on land, blood, and protection

2. Constructivist Civic Nationalism

Identity as historically contingent

Emphasis on shared citizenship

3. Strategic Hybrid Approaches

Recognition of constructed identity

Simultaneous ethnic mobilization for survival

This polarization reflects deeper structural tensions within Ethiopia’s federal system.

9. Discussion: Identity as Strategy and Structure

The Ethiopian case demonstrates that identity is both:

A structural outcome of institutional design (ethnic federalism)

A strategic tool used by political actors

The re-ethnicization of Amhara identity is therefore not an anomaly but a predictable response to:

Political competition

Security dilemmas

Institutional incentives

10. Implications for the 2026 Elections and Beyond

As Ethiopia approaches the 2026 elections, the hardening of identity carries several risks:

Increased ethnic polarization

Fragmentation of national politics

Escalation of territorial conflicts

At the same time, it may also produce:

Stronger political organization

Greater clarity in representation

New forms of negotiation and alliance

The long-term outcome remains uncertain.

11. Conclusion

The transformation of Amhara identity in contemporary Ethiopia illustrates the dynamic interplay between primordialism and social construction. Rather than confirming one theory over the other, the case demonstrates their mutual entanglement.

Amhara identity is not simply reverting to an ancient essence; it is being reconstructed as primordial in response to modern political pressures. This process underscores a broader theoretical insight: identities are most likely to become rigid and essentialized when they are perceived to be under threat.

Ethiopia’s future will depend on whether its political system can accommodate these evolving identities without descending into deeper fragmentation. The challenge lies not in choosing between primordialism and constructivism, but in understanding how both operate simultaneously within the lived realities of political life.

References

Anderson, B. (1983). Imagined Communities. Verso.

Brass, P. (1991). Ethnicity and Nationalism. Sage.

Geertz, C. (1963). “The Integrative Revolution.”

Gellner, E. (1983). Nations and Nationalism. Cornell University Press.

Young, C. (1976). The Politics of Cultural Pluralism. University of Wisconsin Press.

Horowitz, D. (1985). Ethnic Groups in Conflict. University of California Press.

Force-field analysis: Is momentum for change gathering in Ethiopia?

 A force-field analysis suggests that Ethiopia is experiencing strong pressure for political change, but that pressure is still contested, fragmented, and not yet consolidated into a single national momentum. In other words, the system is under strain, but strain alone is not the same as a coherent transition.

Force-field analysis: Is momentum for change gathering?

In Kurt Lewin’s terms, political movement depends on the balance between driving forces pushing change and restraining forces preserving the status quo. In Ethiopia today, the driving forces are substantial: prolonged conflict in Amhara and Oromia, instability in Tigray, economic hardship despite reform, shrinking civic space, and widening distrust between society and state. These do not automatically produce regime change, but they do increase pressure for political reconfiguration.

Driving forces pushing change

1. Multi-front armed conflict is eroding state legitimacy.
The federal government still faces insurgent violence in Amhara and Oromia, while Tigray remains politically fragile after the 2022 Pretoria agreement. The Ethiopian Human Rights Commission has also warned about renewed fighting around the Tigray-Amhara-Afar borderlands. This means the state is not confronting a single crisis but a layered security burden, which historically increases demand for political change.

2. Political space is narrowing rather than widening.
A joint statement by 41 countries at the UN Human Rights Council warned that full civil and political rights, plus a free civil society and media environment, are preconditions for free and fair elections in Ethiopia. Human Rights Watch likewise said the government intensified pressure on independent media and civil society ahead of the 2026 elections. When legal channels narrow, pressure often moves into informal, oppositional, or insurgent channels.

3. Economic reform is real, but socially costly.
Ethiopia’s IMF-backed reform program has continued, with the IMF board completing its fourth review in January 2026 and releasing another tranche of funding. At the same time, debt restructuring remains contentious, and external shocks are weighing on African economies broadly. So the government has reform momentum, but reform also creates losers, inflationary pain, and public impatience if security and livelihoods do not improve fast enough.

4. Regional entanglements are raising strategic pressure.
Relations with Eritrea have sharply deteriorated, with Ethiopia accusing Eritrea of sending ammunition to Amhara rebels. Reuters also reported evidence pointing to Ethiopia’s involvement with Sudan’s RSF, which, if accurate, deepens regional militarization and stretches state capacity. External entanglement often amplifies domestic instability instead of containing it.

Restraining forces holding the current order

1. The federal state still retains the core instruments of coercion.
Despite multiple insurgencies, there is no clear evidence that the central state has lost national command capacity. The government still controls the federal security architecture, the formal bureaucracy, the fiscal relationship with international lenders, and the election machinery. That matters because momentum for change usually succeeds only when state cohesion breaks at the center.

2. Opposition pressure is fragmented, not unified.
The anti-government space is divided geographically, ideologically, and organizationally: Amhara insurgency, Oromo insurgency, Tigrayan internal splits, formal opposition parties, diaspora actors, and civil-society critics do not form one coherent bloc. Tigray itself remains divided, and conflict dynamics differ sharply between Amhara and Oromia. Fragmented opposition can generate pressure, but it often cannot convert pressure into orderly transition.

3. Elections may absorb some pressure without resolving the crisis.
The National Election Board is preparing for the 7th general election in 2026, so there is still an institutional channel on paper. But external observers have already warned that shrinking civic space undermines the conditions for genuinely free and fair competition. That makes elections a possible safety valve, but not necessarily a transformative one.

4. Economic stabilization gives the government breathing room.
The IMF program, debt talks, and official growth projections provide the government with an argument that reform is working, at least macroeconomically. Even if ordinary citizens do not fully feel the benefit, macro-financial support can delay political rupture by sustaining the state’s ability to pay, borrow, and govern.

Net assessment

My assessment is this: momentum for change is gathering structurally, but not yet converging politically. Ethiopia today resembles a system under cumulative pressure rather than a system facing one decisive revolutionary wave. The driving forces are stronger than they were a few years ago in breadth, but the restraining forces remain stronger in organization. Put differently, the desire for change is diffuse; the machinery of change is not yet unified. This is an inference from the current pattern of conflict, civic restriction, economic reform, and elite fragmentation.

What would indicate that momentum has truly crossed the threshold?

Three signs would matter most.

First, elite fracture at the center: defections or open splits inside the ruling coalition or security establishment. Second, cross-regional convergence: if grievances in Oromia, Amhara, Tigray, and urban centers begin to align around a shared political program instead of parallel anger. Third, institutional blockage: if the 2026 electoral process is widely seen not merely as flawed, but as incapable of channeling political competition at all. Those are the conditions under which accumulated pressure becomes real transition momentum.

Bottom line

So, is Ethiopia gathering momentum for change?
Yes—socially, militarily, and structurally.
Not yet—organizationally, institutionally, and strategically.

The country is moving closer to a pre-transition condition, but it has not yet reached a point where the forces for change clearly outweigh the forces of regime survival. The present danger is therefore not only abrupt change, but also prolonged unstable stalemate.

A Hegelian thesis–antithesis–synthesis analysis of the current political dynamics in Ethiopia:

A Hegelian thesis–antithesis–synthesis analysis of the current political dynamics in Ethiopia:

Ethiopia’s Political Crisis Through a Hegelian Lens

Thesis: The Centralizing State and the Promise of National Unity

The thesis in contemporary Ethiopia is represented by the project of state centralization, most visibly embodied in the Prosperity Party and the political vision of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed. This thesis presents itself as a corrective to the weaknesses of the post-1991 federal order. It argues that Ethiopia cannot survive as a coherent state if political authority remains excessively fragmented along ethnic and regional lines. In this view, a stronger center, a unified national narrative, and a post-ethnic political imagination are necessary for peace, development, and sovereignty.

The attraction of this thesis is understandable. Ethiopia has long suffered from weak institutions, regional rivalries, and competing nationalisms. The centralizing project therefore claims to offer order over fragmentation, citizenship over ethnicity, and national purpose over centrifugal politics. Its language is that of unity, stability, prosperity, and state restoration.

Antithesis: Ethno-National Resistance and the Demand for Self-Determination

Yet every thesis generates its antithesis. In Ethiopia, the antithesis is the enduring force of ethno-national self-determination, rooted in the constitutional order of 1995 and in the historical grievances of various nations and nationalities. For many Oromo, Amhara, Tigrayan, Somali, and other political actors, centralization is not experienced as national renewal but as the return of domination in another form.

This antithesis insists that Ethiopia is not merely a nation-state in the classical sense, but a contested multinational polity. It argues that peace cannot be built by suppressing identity-based claims, but only by recognizing them. Hence the persistence of armed insurgencies, regional defiance, and identity-based mobilization. What the center defines as disorder, the periphery often defines as resistance. What the state calls unity, others interpret as homogenization. The antithesis therefore emerges not simply as rebellion against power, but as a rejection of an unbalanced political settlement.

Synthesis: Toward a Democratic Multinational State

A genuine synthesis cannot be the victory of one side over the other. If the thesis crushes the antithesis, Ethiopia risks authoritarian centralism. If the antithesis destroys the thesis, Ethiopia risks disintegration into mutually hostile sovereignties. The synthesis must therefore preserve what is rational in both: the necessity of a functioning common state and the legitimacy of multinational self-rule.

Such a synthesis would require Ethiopia to move beyond both rigid centralism and unmediated ethnic competition. It would mean building a democratic multinational federation anchored in constitutionalism, institutional trust, and negotiated coexistence. The state must be strong enough to guarantee security and equality before the law, but limited enough to respect regional autonomy and collective rights. Likewise, ethno-national movements must transform themselves from instruments of grievance into participants in a shared constitutional order.

Conclusion

In Hegelian terms, Ethiopia’s crisis is not accidental; it is dialectical. The country is caught between the universal claim of the state and the particular claims of its nations and nationalities. The tragedy of the present moment is that both forces remain locked in mutual negation. The hope of the future lies in synthesis: not the erasure of difference, but its reconciliation within a just political whole.

Habtamu Nini Abino

 

Legal Scholar | Former Secretary General, House of Federation | Author and Researcher (Canada)

About

Habtamu Nini Abino is an Ethiopian legal professional, public administrator, and author with extensive experience in constitutional governance, judicial systems, and parliamentary administration. His career spans regional and federal institutions, where he has contributed to the development of legal frameworks, institutional coordination, and public sector leadership.

He is currently based in Canada, pursuing doctoral research focused on constitutional law, federalism, and governance in Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa.

Professional Experience

Secretary General

House of Federation

Approx. 2006 – 2012

Led the administrative and institutional operations of Ethiopia’s constitutional upper chamber

Coordinated legislative processes and intergovernmental relations

Supported constitutional interpretation mechanisms and federal-regional dialogue

International Parliamentary Engagement (ASGP/IPU)

Participant in the Association of Secretaries General of Parliaments (ASGP) meetings held in conjunction with the Inter-Parliamentary Union Assemblies (2007–2012)

Contributed to global dialogue on parliamentary governance and institutional best practices

Participated in meetings hosted in Bali, Geneva, Cape Town, Addis Ababa, Bangkok, Panama City, Bern, Kampala, and Quebec City

High Court Judge (Oromia)

Appointed 2002

Presided over judicial proceedings and contributed to regional legal development

Strengthened judicial administration and rule of law practices

Senior Government Roles – Oromia & Dire Dawa Administration

2003 onward

Served in leadership roles in justice, security, and governance sectors

Assigned to Dire Dawa Administration under Prime Minister Meles Zenawi

Led capacity-building and public administration initiatives

Board Chairperson (Public Enterprises)

Harar Brewery

Dire Dawa Cement Factory

Provided strategic oversight and governance leadership in state-affiliated enterprises

Education

MBA, Open University (United Kingdom)

LL.B, Ethiopia

Diploma in Teaching Geography, Kotebe Teachers Education College (1992)

Executive Training, Public Administration & Good Governance – Erasmus University Rotterdam

Publications

The Second Republic and the Politics of Article 39 in Ethiopia

Liberal Democracy and the Constitution of 1994: The User’s Handbook

Areas of Expertise

Constitutional Law & Federalism

Parliamentary Administration

Judicial Systems & Rule of Law

Governance & Public Sector Reform

Ethiopian & Horn of Africa Politics 

Current Focus

 Research and writing on constitutional governance, institutional design, and political development in Ethiopia.

 

የጠቅላይ ሚኒስትር ዐቢይ አሕመድ ስምንት ዓመታት በሥልጣን ማማ ላይ

Wednesday, April 1, 2026

የጠቅላይ ሚኒስትር ዐቢይ አሕመድ ስምንት ዓመታት በሥልጣን ማማ ላይ

(በበፍቃዱ ዘ. ኃይሉ)

ዐቢይ አሕመድ ተቃዋሚ መስለው፣ ተቃዋሚ ለብሰው ሥልጣን ከተቆናጠጡ እነኾ ዛሬ ድፍን ስምንት ዓመታቸው።

ዐቢይ አሕመድ ጠቅላይ ሚኒስትር ከሆኑ ወዲህ በየሁለት ዓመቱ አስተዳደራቸውን የሚገመግም መጣጥፍ እየጻፍኩ ነው። ዘንድሮም ባሕሉን ለማስቀጠል ይህንን መጣጥፍ እነኾ ብያለሁ። በቅድሚያ የቀደምት ጽሑፎቼን ዐውድና ምላሽ በጨረፍታ ላስታውሳችሁ።

ዐቢይ አሕመድ በሥልጣን ጎዳና ሁለት ዓመት ሲሞላቸው በጻፍኩት ጽሑፍ  ሃይማኖታዊ ሰበካን ከአነቃቂ ንግግር ጋር በሚቀይጥ የንግግር ዘይቤያቸው አታላይ አንደበት አባታዊ (paternalistic) አገዛዝ ስርዓት እንደገነቡ ለመከራከር ሞክሬ ነበር፤ ክርክሬ መንግሥታቸው እኛን ዜጎቹን ልክ በራሳቸው መወሰን የማይችሉ ሕፃናት ይመለከተናል የሚል ነበር። ይህንን ጽሑፍ በጻፍኩበት ወቅት ዐቢይ አሕመድ በመሐል አገር ከፍተኛ ድጋፍ ስለነበራቸው፣ ምንም እንኳን ትችቴ የመረረ ሊባል የሚችል ዓይነት ባይሆንም እንዲህ ያለ ትችት ከመሐል አገር ሰው ጭራሹኑ አልተለመደም ነበርና ከአንዳንድ ወዳጆቼም ሳይቀር ብዙ ነቀፌታዎችን አስከትሎብኝ ነበር። 

አራት ዓመት ሲሞላቸው የጻፍኩት ግን በተቃራኒው የመረረ ትችት ሊባል የሚችል ነበር። “ከድጡ ወደ ማጡ” የሚል ርዕስ የሰጠኹት ሲሆን፣ መጀመሪያ በፍትሕ መጽሔት ላይ የሽፋን ገጽ ታሪክ (cover-story) ሆኖ ታትሟል። ከዚያም በብዙ ዩቱብ ገጾች ተባዝቷል። በወቅቱ ኢትዮጵያ ከፍተኛ ፈተና ውስጥ የገባችበት ነበር። የእርሳቸውን አራት ዓመታት ስገመግመው፣ ዐቢይ አሕመድ የብልፅግና ፓርቲ ብቸኛ ሰው መኾንን “ፓርቲው ራሳችው ናቸው” በሚል በመግለጽ - ወደ ፈላጭ ቆራጭነት ማደጋቸውን፣ ትግራይ ከኢትዮጵያ ወደ መሰናበት እያመራች መሆኗን፣ ኦሮሚያ አኬልዳማ ሊያስብላት የሚያስችል በታጣቂዎችና መንግሥት መሐል የተያዘ ሕዝብ መኖሩን፣ እና የሕግ የበላይነት መንኳሰስ እና የነውጠኝነትን መንሰራፋት (እንዲሁም  የእርሳቸውን አመራር “የነውጥ ቀዛፊነት” በሚል) ጠቅሼ - ለዚህ ሁሉ ዋናው ተጠያቂው እርሳቸው መሆናቸውን ደምድሜ ጻፍኩ። ይህን ጊዜ ብዙ ወዳጆቼ “ክክፉ ይጠብቅህ” ከማለት በቀር ከድምዳሜዬ እምብዛም የተለየ ድምዳሜ አልነበራቸውም። 

ስድስት ዓመት ሲሞላቸው “እየሰጡ መንሳት” የዐቢይ አሕመድ የአመራር ዘይቤ ነው የሚል ትንታኔ ጻፍኩ። በስድስት ዓመታት አስተውሎቴ፣ ዐቢይ አሕመድ በፖለቲካ አመለካከታቸው እና እንቅስቃሴያቸው የታሰሩ ሰዎችን ሲፈቱ አይተናል፤ መልሰው ደግሞ የርሳቸውን ፖለቲካ የሚቃወሙ ሰዎችን በየሰበብ አስባቡ በመንግሥታቸው ሲያሳስሩ አይተናል። ብዙኃንን ያስፈነደቁ የሰላም ስምምነቶች ውስጥ ሲገቡ አይተናል (ኤርትራ፣ ትግራይ)፤ እነዚያ የሰላም ሥምምነቶች መልሰው ውኃ ሲበላቸው አይተናል። እነዚህ እና መሰል የአመራር ዘዬአቸው መገለጫ  - እየሰጡ መንሳት - ሊባል እንደሚገባ ትንታኔዬን አቅርቤያለሁ። ይሄም ጽሑፍ በመጠኑ አንባቢ አግኝቷል። ተባዝቷልም።  

ዐቢይ አሕመድ አሁንም ገና እየተገለጡ ነው።  ትንታኔያችንም ይቀጥላል።

“Lost in Transition” ባሰኘሁት መጽሓፌ ውስጥም የዐቢይ አሕመድ አነሳስ (The Rise of Abiy Ahmed) በሚል ርዕስ የ18 ገጽ ትንታኔ አስቀምጫለሁ። በዚህ ትንታኔዬ ዐቢይ በምን ዓይነት ውስጣዊ እና ውጪያዊ ትግሎች ወደ ከፍተኛው የሥልጣን ማማ እንደተወጣጡ ለመተንተን ሞክሬያለሁ። ዐቢይ አሕመድ በብዕር ሥም ያሳተሙትን “እርካብና መንበር” አንብቤያለሁ። በሥማቸው ያሳተሟቸውን “የመደመር” ተከታታይ መጽሓፎችንም አንብቤያለሁ። ቶም ጋርድነር “The Abiy Project” በሚል ርዕስ የጻፈውን ባለ ትልቅ ጥራዝ መጽሓፍም አንብቤያለሁ። የተለያዩ የኅብረተሰብ ክፍሎችን እየሰበሰቡ የሚያደርጓቸውን ንግግሮችም እያሳደድኩ፣ ጊዜ በፈቀደልኝ ቁጥር ላደምጣቸው ሞክሬያለሁ። በነዚህ ሁሉ ንባቦቼ የተረዳሁት ዐቢይ አሕመድ የፈለጉትን ከማድረግ ምንም የማያስቆማቸው ሰው መሆናቸውን ነው ማለት እችላለሁ። ከዚህ በታች የምጽፈው እና ከዚህ ውጪም የምሰጣቸው አስተያየቶች በነዚህ ጥረቶቼ የወሰድኳቸው ግምገማዎቼ መሆናቸውን ቀድሜ ለማሳወቅ እወዳለሁ። 

ከ“ቲም ለማ” ወደ “መጋቢታውያን”

ለውጡን ስታስቡ ከ"ቲም ለማ" ውጪ ማሰብ ትችላላችሁ? ጠቅላይ ሚኒስትር ዐቢይ አሕመድ ግን ይችላሉ። “የመደመር መንገድ” የሚለው መጽሐፋቸው ስለለውጡ አመጣጥ የሚተነትን ነው። ዐቢይ ለውጡን ለማምጣት የዐሥር ዓመት ሴራ እንደተሠራ ይናገራሉ። አምናቸዋለሁ። ከባድ ሚዛን “የሸዋ ፖለቲካ” ተጫዋች ናቸው። በአንድ እግራቸው ከገዢው ፓርቲ መንደር፣ በሌላ እግራቸው ከተቃዋሚዎች መንደር ቆመው ነው ጨዋታውን የተጫወቱት፤ ለዚህ ነው መግቢያዬ ላይ “ተቃዋሚ መስለው፣ ተቃዋሚ ለብሰው” የሚል ገለጻ የተጠቀምኩት። እንደ እርሳቸው አባባል እኛ “አሮማራ” የምንለው ሕወሓትን ለመገርሰስ የተፀነሰው ትብብር በምክትል ጠቅላይ ሚኒስትር ደመቀ መኮንን የተመራው ልዑክ ራሺያ ሲጓዝ በዐቢይ እና ደመቀ የተጠነሰሰ ሴራ ነው። ስለዚህ ለለውጡ፣ የለማ መገርሳ ሚና እምብዛም እንዳልነበር እንደዋዛ ታልፏል። የመደመር መንገድ መጽሐፍ የለማን ስም አንድ ሁለቴ እንደዋዛ (anecdote) አንስቶ ነው የሚያልፈው። ይልቁንም መጽሓፉ ላይ ደመቀ መኮንን የተሻለ ተጠቅሰዋል። ዐቢይ፣ በዚህ መጽሐፍ ላይ “ቲም ለማ” የሚለውን የለውጥ ቡድን መጠሪያ ስም፥ “መጋቢታውያን” በሚል ሊተኩት ሞክረዋል። መጋቢት፣ እርሳቸው የተመረጡበት ወር ነው። በርግጥ ደመቀ መኮንን ከእጩነት ራሳቸውን ባልተጠበቀ መንገድ ባያገልሉ ኖሮ፣ ዐቢይ አሕመድ በሰፋ የድምፅ ብልጫ የማሸነፍ ዕድላቸው አጠያያቂ ይሆን ነበር፤ ስለዚህ የደመቀ መኮንንም መጠቀስ ትርጉም ይሰጣል። የለማ መገርሳ ግን እንደዋዛ ከታሪኩ መፋቅ በጣም አስገርሞኛል። ዐቢይ "ቲም ለማ" ከሚለው ይልቅ "መጋቢታውያን" የሚለውን መጠሪያ የወደዱት በለማ ስም መጠራቱ የእርሳችውን ሚና የሚያሳንስ ስለመሰላቸው ወይስ ከለማ መገርሳ ጋር መንገዳቸው ስለተለያየ?

ከ[ቀዳማዊ] ኢሕአዴግ ወደ ብልፅግና (ራብአዊ ኢሕአዴግ)

ኢሕአዴግ ከምርጫ 97 በፊት እና በኋላ አንድ አይደለም። ከምርጫ 97 በፊት ትርፍና ኪሳራው ሲወራረድ በዴሞክራሲያዊነት ረገድ ቀዳማዊ ኢሕአዴግ አዎንታዊ ደረጃዎችን አስመዝግቧል። ነፃ ሚዲያዎች እና ሲቪል ማኅበረሰብ ድርጅቶች በሰፊው የሚንቀሳቀሱበት፣ የፖለቲካ ፓርቲዎች ተደራጅተው የሚወጡበት ምኅዳር ፈጥሮ ነበር። ከምርጫ 97 በኋላ ያንን ምኅዳር መልሶ መቀልበስ ጀመረ፤ አሳሪ ሕጎች ወጡ፣ ዜጎች በፍርሐት ካቴና ታሰሩ። የተቃውሞ ፖለቲካ (opposition politics) ወደ እምቢተኝነት ፖለቲካ (resistance politics) ተቀየረ እና የ2010ሩ ለውጥ መጣ። ለውጡ የመጣው በተቃውሞ ግፊያ ቢሆንም፣ በኢሕአዴግ ውስጥ ከተደረገው ውስጣዊ ትግል ውጪ እውን ሊሆን አይችልም ነበር። ጠቅላይ ሚኒስትር ዐቢይ የተመረጡት በኢትዮጵያ ሕዝብ አልነበረም። የኢትዮጵያ ሕዝብ ፍትሓዊና ዴሞክራሲያዊ ምርጫ ለማድረግ አልታደለም። ይልቁንም፣ በኢሕአዴግ ውስጥ በነበረ የፓርቲ ውስጥ ዴሞክራሲያዊ ምርጫ ነው። ኢሕአዴግ እስከ 2011 አጋማሽ ድረስ ግንባር ሆኖ ዘልቋል። 

ዶ/ር በድሉ ዋቅጅራ “ጠርዝ ላይ” በሚል ባሳተሙት መጽሓፍ ሁለቱን ኢሕአዴጎች ሲያወዳድራቸው “ቀዳማዊ ኢሕአዴግ” እና “ዳግማዊ ኢሕአዴግ” በሚል ጠርተዋቸው ነበር። ነገር ግን የኢሕአዴግ አገዛዝም ቢሆን ቅድመ እና ድኅረ ምርጫ 97 መካከል ልዩነት ስለነበረው፣ የቅድመ ምርጫ 97ቱን “ቀዳማዊ” እንበለው፣ የድኅረ ምርጫ 97ቱን ደግሞ እስከ 2010 “ዳግማዊ” እንበለው እና ከ2010 እስከ ብልፅግና ያለውን “ሳልሳዊ” እንበለው። ቀዳማዊ ኢሕአዴግ ውስጠ ፓርቲ ዴሞክራሲ ያልነበረው፣ ነገር ግን ለኢትዮጵያ ዴሞክራሲያዊ ባሕሎችን ያለማመደ ግንባር ነበር። ዳግማዊ ኢሕአዴግ ውስጠ ፓርቲ ዴሞክራሲያዊነቱ እየጎለበተ የመጣ (ምሳሌ የሕወሓት የበላይነት እየተሞገተ የነበረበት እና የሥልጣን ክፍፍል በግንባሩ አባላት መካከል እየተስተካከለ የነበረበት እና ለአዲሱ የኢሕአዴግ ትውልድም ሥልጣን ማጋራት የጀመረበት ጊዜ ነበር)፣ ነገር ግን አገራዊ አፋኝነት የተፋፋመበት (ለምሳሌ ቢሮክራሲው እና ፓርቲው የተጋቡበት) ነበር። ሳልሳዊ ኢሕአዴግ ደግሞ ከድኅረ 97 በኋላ የነበሩ ጥፋቶች እርምት የሚመስል እርምጃ የተወሰደበት ነበር። እስረኞች ተፈቱ፣ አፋኞቹ ሕጎች መከለስ ጀመሩ፣ ያኮረፉ የፖለቲካ አካሎች ለእርቅ ተጋበዙ፣ የተሰደዱ ተመለሱ፣ የተጣሉ ታረቁ፣ ፓርቲውና ቢሮክራሲው ተፋትተው ባለሙያዎች (ሜሪቶክራቶች) በገፍ ተቀጠሩ (የፓርቲ አባላት ያልሆኑ ባለሙያዎች ሚኒስትር ዲኤታ ሆነው በገፍ የተቀጠሩበት ጊዜም ነበር)። ይህ ግን የቀጠለው ለአጭር ጊዜ ብቻ ነው፤ ከዚያ ራብአዊ ኢሕአዴግ ተወለደ። ሳልሳዊ ኢሕአዴግ ብዙ አሳይቶናል፤ ተስፋም ሰጥቶን ነበር። ግን ዕድሜው አጭር ነው።

ራብአዊ ኢሕአዴግ (ብልፅግና ፓርቲ) ኢሕአዴግ እና አጋሮቹ ሲቀነስ ሕወሓት ማለት ነው። ዛሬ ብልፅግና ውስጥ የምናያቸው ቁልፍ ሰዎች፣ ከጥቂት በሳልሳዊ ኢሕአዴግ ጊዜ ከተቀላቀሉት እንግዶች በቀር ነባር ኢሕአዴጋውያን ናቸው። ስለዚህ ብልፅግና ሙሉ ለሙሉ ከኢሕአዴግ የተነጠለ አድርጎ ማሰብ ስህተት ይሆናል። ይልቁንም፣ ሌሎቹ የግንባሩ አባሎች የሕወሓት ታናሽ (junior) አጋር ተደርገው ይታዩ ነበር። ዛሬ የብልፅግና መሠረት ሆነው የምናያቸው እነዚህን ነው። ዐቢይ አሕመድም የኢሕአዴግ ሚኒስትር እስከመሆን የደረሱ ጉምቱ ናቸው። ነገር ግን ይህንን ታሪካቸውን ማረሳሳት ችለዋል። ዕድሜ የሕዝብን ቀልብ ለገዛው ሳልሳዊ ኢሕአዴግ!

ራብአዊ ኢሕአዴግ የቀዳማዊ ኢሕአዴግን ውስጠ ፓርቲ አፋኝነት እና የዳግማዊ ኢሕአዴግን አገራዊ አፋኝነት አጣምሮ ይዟል። በራብአዊ ኢሕአዴግ ውስጠ ትግል አድርጎ መሪ መለወጥ ቢያንስ በቅርቡ አይቻልም። በቀዳማዊ ኢሕአዴግ አብዮታዊ ዲሞክራትነት፣ በዳግማዊ ኢሕአዴግ ልማታዊ መንግሥትነት መንግሥታዊ ዲስኩር ነበር፤ እነዚህኞቹን ኢሕአዴጎች ምን፣ እንዴት፣ ለምን እንደሚወስኑ መገመት (predictability) ትችላላችሁ። በሳልሳዊ ኢሕአዴግ ሊበራሊዝም መሰል ነገር፣ በራብአዊ ኢሕአዴግ ደግሞ “ሰንበሌጣዊነት” ይስተዋላል፤ ብልፅግና ርዕዮተ ዓለም የለውም። ይህንን ፓርቲው በይፋ አውጆታል። ይህንን አንድ የፖለቲካል ሳይንስ መምህር “ሰንበሌጣዊነት” ይለዋል፤ በነፈሰበት መንፈስ። አንዳንዴ “መደመር” የሚባል ዲስኩር ርዕዮተ ዓለምን ሊተካ ይሞክራል። ነገር ግን አንድም ምሁር በመደመር “ፍልስፍና” የብልፅግናን ፖለቲካ ለመተንተን አይሞክርን። ምክንያቱም ሐሳቡ ቀደም ብዬ እንደጠቀስኩት ከመንፈሳዊ አነቃቂ ንግግርነት አያልፍም።

ግን ደግሞ በነፈሰበት መንፈስ ስንል ራብአዊ ኢሕአዴግ ድርቅ የሚልባቸው አቋሞች የሉም ማለት አይደለም። በሥልጣኑ እና በከተማ ውበት ጉዳይ ከማንም ጋር አይደራደርም - ፓርቲው፣ AKA መሪው፣ ዐቢይ አሕመድ። የሆነ ሆኖ ኢሕአዴግ በሰላማዊ መንገድ መሪ ቀይሯል። ብልፅግና በውስጣዊ ትግል መሪ መቀየር የሚችል ይመስላችኋል? እኔ ግን ይኼ የሚሆንበት ዕድል በቅርብ ርቀት አይታየኝም።

ከለውጥ ወደ ነውጥ 

የ2010ሩ ክስተት መጀመሪያ የመንግሥት ለውጥ ነበር። ነገር ግን ዘመኑ የመንግሥት ባለሥልጣናት እንደሚሉት 'የለውጥ' ከሚባል ይልቅ የ'ነውጥ’ ቢባል የተሻለ የሚያስኬድ ይመስለኛል።

ነውጡ የጀመረው ግለሰቦችን በድንጋይ በመውገር እና በአደባባይ ላይ ዘቅዝቆ በመስቀል በታጀበ የመንጋ ጥቃት (mob violence) ሲሆን፤ በመቀጠልም በሚሊዮን የሚቆጠሩ ሰዎችን ያፈናቀለ ብሔርን መሠረት ያደረገ ግጭት፣ ከዚያም የአማራ ክልል ፕሬዚዳንትን እና የካቢኔ አባሎቻቸውን፣ እንዲሁም አባ ቶርቤ በተባለ ገድሎ አደር የኅቡዕ ድርጅት የሚገደሉ ባለሥልጣናት፣ ከዚያም ታዋቂውን የኦሮሚያ ድምፃዊ ሃጫሉ ሁንዴሳን በመሳሰሉ ግለሰቦች ላይ ባነጣጠረ የፖለቲካ ግድያ ተስፋፍቶ፣ በስተመጨረሻም በትግራይ ወደተካሄደው ሙሉ ጦርነት አምርቷል። የትግራዩ ጦርነት በሰላም ሥምምነት የተጠናቀቀ ቢመስልም፣ ይህንኑ ተከትሎ በአማራ ክልል በታጠቁ ቡድኖች እና በመንግሥት መካከል ውጊያ ፈንድቷል። በኦሮሚያም በታጠቁ ቡድኖች እና በመንግሥት መካከል የሚደረገው ውጊያ ከትግራዩ ጦርነት በፊት ጀምሮ እስካሁንም ቀጥሏል። በመሆኑም የሽግግሩን ጊዜ የሚገልጸው "ነውጥ" የሚለው ቃል ነው ማለት ተገቢነት አለው።

ለዚህ “ዘመነ ዕብደት” ጠቅላይ ሚኒስትሩን ለብቻቸው ተጠያቂ ማድረግ አግባብ አይደለም፤ ሁላችንም የየራሳችን ድርሻ አለን። ነገር ግን ዋነኛ ተጠያቂ እርሳቸው ናቸው ቢባል ማጋነን አይሆንም። የደቦ ፍርዶች እና የደቦ ፍርዶችን የሚቀሰቅሱ ንግግሮቻቸው መሳ ለመሳ መሔዳቸውን አስተውያለሁ። በመጽሐፌ እንዳመለከትኩት፣ እርሳቸው በኢትዮጵያ ቴሌቪዥን ወጥተው ወጣቶች አካባቢያቸውን "ከፀጉረ ልውጦች" እንዲጠብቁ ባሳሰቡ ጥቂት ቀናት ውስጥ የጀመሩ የደቦ ፍርዶች ወደ ወል ግጭቶች አድገው ለወራት ዘልቀዋል። በወቅቱ የመንግሥታቸው ትርክት በአንድ በኩል ለሁሉ ነገር ሕወሓት ላይ ጣት የሚቀስር፣ ካልሆነ ደግሞ ታስሮ የቆየ ብዙኃን ነፃነት እና ዴሞክራሲን መሸከም እንዳቃተው የሚያመላክት ነበር፤ ይህም የሕግ የበላይነት ማስከበር የነበረበት መንግሥት ኃላፊነቱን ባለመወጣቱ የተከሰተውን ቀውስ ለማስቀየሻነት የዋለ ይመስለኛል። የሆነ ሆኖ፣ ነውጡ እና ሁካታው ለጠቅላይ ሚኒስትሩ ኃይል ማከማቻነት ውሏል። ያሻቸውን እርምጃ ቢወስዱ፣ ማንም ምንም የማይታዘባቸው ወቅት ነበር።

ይህ በእንዲህ እንዳለ ነውጦቹ ስፋታቸው እያደጉ መጡ። የሚያስገርመው ግን፣ የኢትዮጵያ መንግሥት ነውጡን ጀመረውም አልጀመረውም፣ የዐቢይ አሕመድ አስተዳደር ግን ሥልጣኑን ለማጠናከር ሁሉንም አጋጣሚዎች ተጠቅሞባቸዋል። መንግሥታቸው የ[መንጋ] ጥቃት መስፋፋትን የሕግ የበላይነትን ወደ ጎን ለማለት እንደ ማመካኛ ተጠቅሞበታል። በስምንት ዓመታት የሥልጣን ዘመናቸውም ሦስት የአስቸኳይ ጊዜ አዋጆችን አውጀዋል። መንግሥት ውይይት እና ድርድርን ከማድረግ ይልቅ ነውጥን እንዲመርጥ በማበረታታት፣ ነውጥን ሥልጣኑን ለማጠናከር እንዴት እንደተጠቀመበት ተጨማሪ ጥቂት ምሳሌዎች እንመልከት።

አንደኛ፣ መንግሥት በኦሮሚያ የተከሰተውን ነውጥ ዋነኛውን የኦሮሚያ የፖለቲካ ፓርቲ የሆነውን የኦሮሞ ነፃነት ግንባር (ኦነግ) እንዲከፋፈል ለማድረግ እና የኦሮሞ ፌደራሊስት ኮንግረስን (ኦፌኮ) ለማዳከም ለሚያደርገው እንቅስቃሴ እንደ ማመካኛ ተጠቅሞበታል። በርካታ የኦነግ አመራሮች ፍርድ ቤት በነፃ ካሰናበታቸው በኋላ ለበርካታ ወራት በእስር ላይ ቆይተዋል። ይህንን የኢትዮጵያ ምርጫ ቦርድም፣ የኢትዮጵያ ሰብዓዊ መብቶችም ያረጋገጡት ነገር ነው። በምርጫ 2013 ኦነግ እና ኦፌኮ ከምርጫ “ተገፍተናል” ብለው ሲወጡ የሰጡት ምክንያት እነዚህን ክስተቶች ሽፋን በማድረግ የብልፅግና መንግሥት አባላት እና አመራሮቻችንን አስሯል፣ የቅርንጫፍ ጽሕፈት ቤቶቻችንን ዘግቷል፣ መጫወቻ ሜዳችንን አጥብቧል በሚል ነበር።

በ2012 የሃጫሉ ሁንዴሳን ግድያ ተከትሎ የተቀሰቀሰውን ነውጥ ምክንያት በማድረግ እንደ ጃዋር መሐመድ (ከኦፌኮ) እና እስክንድር ነጋ (የባልደራስ ለእውነተኛ ዴሞክራሲ ፓርቲ በአዲስ አበባ) ያሉ ታዋቂ የተቃውሞ መሪዎችን መንግሥታቸው አስሯል። እነዚህ ሁለቱ ግለሰቦች በቅደም ተከተል በኦሮሚያ እና በአዲስ አበባ በተካሄደው ጠቅላላ ምርጫ ወቅት ትልቅ ተቃውሞን ሊመሩ ይችሉ ነበር። እነሱ በእስር ላይ እያሉ ገዥው ፓርቲ ምርጫውን በአብላጫ ድምፅ አሸንፏል (በወቅቱ በኦሮሚያ ሁሉም ተቃዋሚዎች ተደምረው ያቀረቡት የእጩ ብዛት ከጠቅላላው የእጩዎች ብዛት 35% ብቻ ነበር፤ በኦሮሚያ ብልፅግና ብቻውን ነበር የተወዳደረው ቢባል ማጋነን አይደለም)። ከዚያም ከአንድ ዓመት ተኩል ገደማ እስር በኋላ፣ ጠቅላይ ዐቃቤ ሕግ ክሳቸውን በማቋረጡ ጃዋር እና እስክንድር እንዲሁም አብረዋቸው የተከሰሱ ግለሰቦች ከእስር ያለ ፍርድ ተፈትተዋል። ይህም መንግሥት አስቀድሞ ግቡን ስላሳካ ተጠርጣሪዎቹን እስር ቤት ማቆየት የማይፈልግበት ሰዓት ሲደርስ እንደለቀቃቸው ያስጠረጥራል። በዚህ መሐል የተዘነጋው 200 ያህል ሕይወት የቀጠፈውን ነውጥ ተጠያቂ አካል አለመኖሩ ነው። 

አሁን ላይ እስክንድር ነጋ በአማራ ክልል የትጥቅ ትግል መሪዎች አንዱ ሲሆን፣ ጃዋር ደግሞ በዳግም ስደት ወደ በይነመረብ አክቲቪዝም ተመልሷል። በመሆኑም ሁለቱም በለውጡ ሰሞን ከቀሰቀሱት ሕዝባዊ መሠረታቸው በከፊል ወይም ሙሉ በሙሉ እንዲርቁ ተደርገዋል።

ሌላኛው ምሳሌ የትግራይ ጦርነት ነው። ጠቅላይ ሚኒስትር ዐቢይ የትግራዩን ጦርነት ተከትሎ ሕወሓትን እና አጋሮቹን ከመንግሥት ቢሮክራሲ እና ከደኅንነት መዋቅሩ አስወግደዋል፤ ይህ ማለት መንግሥታቸው ክፍት የሆኑትን ቦታዎች በታማኞቹ በመተካት በመንግሥት ሥርዓቱ ውስጥ ሊገጥመው የሚችለውን ተግዳሮት ቀንሷል ማለት ነው። በተጨማሪም መንግሥታቸው የመንግሥት እና የገዢው ፓርቲ ሚዲያዎችን እንዲሁም ማኅበራዊ ሚዲያን በመጠቀም ዒላማ ባደረጋቸው አካላት ላይ ሰፊ የፕሮፓጋንዳ ዘመቻ ያካሒዳል። እንዲሁም የደኅንነት መዋቅሩን ሙሉ በሙሉ ተቆጣጥሯል። አሁን፣ የትግራይ ጦርነት በመቶ ሺዎች የሚቆጠሩ ሕይወቶችን ከቀጠፈ በኋላ በሰላም ስምምነት (ለጊዜው) ተጠናቋል፤ እርግጥ ነው ይህንን ጽሑፍ ስጽፍ ሌላ ጦርነት ሊጀመር ይችላል የሚል ስጋት በሰፊው እያንዣበበ ነው። የሆነ ሆኖ፣ ከጦርነቱ በፊት ሕወሓት የነበረው አቅም አሁን ሞቷል። ሕወሓት ለዐቢይ አሕመድ ሥልጣን ይኼ ነው የሚባል ስጋት አይፈጥርም።

ነገር ግን የዐቢይ መንግሥት አሁንም ሕወሓቶችን ለመውጋት አጋር እንዲሆኑት የታገሳቸው ኃይሎች ይቀሩ ነበር። ዐቢይ አሕመድ ከመምጣታቸው በፊት የነበሩት ክልላዊ ልዩ ኃይሎች የሶማሊ ልዩ ኃይሎች ብቻ ነበሩ። ከዐቢይ አሕመድ መምጣት በኋላ ግን ልዩ ኃይሎች በየክልሉ ፈሉ። ልዩ ኃይሎቹ በርግጥም ለአገራዊ ሰላምም፣ ለመንግሥት ሥልጣንም አደጋ ነበሩ (የአማራ ክልል መሪዎችን መገደል፣ በሶማሊና ኦሮሚያ ክልሎች ድንበሮች የነበሩ ግጭቶች፣ አፋር እና ሶማሊ፣ ወዘተ ዋቢ አርጎ መጥቀስ ይቻላል)። ነገር ግን ለትግራይ ጦርነት አጋር እንዲሆኑ ሲባል ቸል ተብለው ነበር። በተጨማሪም እንደ “ፋኖ” ያሉ ታጣቂ ቡድኖችም በይፋ ወደ ጦርነቱ ተጋብዘው ነበር። ችግሩ የመጣው ጦርነቱ ሲጠናቀቅ ነው። ታዲያ የዐቢይ አሕመድ መንግሥት ትኩረቱን ወደ እነዚህ በመቀየር፣ በድንገት መበተናቸውን አሳወቀ። ይህም በተለይ በአማራ ክልል ዛሬ ለተገባበት አሰቃቂ ውጊያ ምክንያት ሆነ። የትግራዩም ይሁን የአማራ ክልሎቹ ውጊያዎች፣ ቢያንስ እስካሁን፣ ከጠቅላይ ሚኒስትሩ ሥልጣን ይልቅ የክልሎቹን ማኅበራዊና ኢኮኖሚያዊ ቁመና ነው ያናጉት። እያንዳንዱ ነውጥ እና ነውጥ አዘል ግጭት በእርሳቸው ሥልጣን ዙሪያ ያደረሰው ጉዳይ ምናልባት የገጽታ እንጂ የኃይል ሚዛን መዛባት አይደለም።

እነዚህን ኹነቶች ስንገመግም  'ለውጡ' ከሚለው ቃል እኩል ውይም በላይ 'ነውጡ' የሚለው ቃል ዘመናቸውን ይገልጸዋል። ለውጡ ነውጡ ነው።

ለትንታኔ አስቸጋሪው ዐቢይ

ዐቢይ አሕመድ ወደ ሥልጣን የመጡበት ዘመን በማኅበራዊ ሚዲያ አተራማሽነት (disruption) ሲጦዝ፣ እንዲሁም የምዕራባውያንን ኃያልነት በምሥራቃውያን ኃያልነት (ቻይና) ተግዳሮት ሲገጥመው ነው። በመሆኑም ዘመኑ በአገር ውስጥ ብቻ ሳይሆን፣ በዓለም ዐቀፍ ወጀቦችም የታጀበ ነው። በዚያ ላይ በ2012 የተከሰተው የኮቪድ ወረርሽኝ የዓለምን ኢኮኖሚ አናውጦታል። ዐቢይ የተወዳጇቸው የዩናይትድ አረብ ኤሚሬትስ መሪዎች ጨምሮ የመካከለኛው ምሥራቅ ሰዎችም አካባቢያዊ ተፅዕኗቸውን ያሳደጉበት ዘመን ላይ ነን። ኢትዮጵያም ደሴት አይደለችም፤ ዓለማችን መርከብ ከሆነች እና ወጀብ ከመታት አብራ ትናጣለች። ከዓለም ዐቀፍ ትርምሶች ታተርፋለችም፣ ታጎድላለች።

 

ይህ በእንዲህ እያለ፣ እስራኤል እና አሜሪካ ኢራን ላይ ጦርነት ሲያውጁ፣ የአውሮፓ የኢትዮጵያ ተንታኞች (Ethiopia experts) ‘ዐቢይ ይህንን አጋጣሚ ከለላ አድርገው ኤርትራ ላይ ጦርነት ያውጃሉ’ በማለት ተነበዩ። ይህንን የተነበዩት በብዙ ምክንያቶች ነው። አንደኛ፣ ዐቢይ በነውጥ ቀዛፊ ስለሆኑና፣ ከነውጥ ውስጥ ጥቅማቸውን ፈልቅቀው እንደሚያወጡ እርሳቸውም የማይደብቁት ጉዳይ በመሆኑ  ነው። በቅርቡ እንኳን በዓለም ዙሪያ ስላንዣበበው የግጭት አደጋ ሲጠየቁ እኛ የሚጠበቅብን ከግጭቶቹ ውስጥ ዕድል (opportunity) ፈልቅቀን ማውጣት ነው ብለው ነበር። ሁለተኛ፣ ዐቢይ የትግራይ ጦርነት በሥምምነት ሲቋጭ ከተኳረፏቸው የኢሳያስ አፈወርቂ መንግሥት ጋር እሰጥ አገባ ውስጥ ገብተዋል፤ ይኸውም የባሕር በር ጥያቄን ግንባር ቀደም የውጭ ጉዳይ ፖሊሲያቸው አጀንዳ አድርጎታል። ምንም እንኳን የባሕር በር የምናመጣው “በሰላም ነው” እያሉ ቢዝቱም ማንም አላመናቸውም። ጉዳዩን በሰላም ለማድረግ ብዙ ዲፕሎማሲ የሚጠይቅ ስለሆነ ብቻ ሳይሆን እርሳቸው ኃይልን እንደ ሁነኛ የችግር መፍቻ መንገድ ይመለከቱታል ተብሎ ስለሚታመን ነው - ተንታኞቹ እንዲህ ማሰባቸው። ሦስተኛ፣ የትግራይ ጦርነት የጀመረው ልክ የአሜሪካ ምርጫ የተካሔደበት ቀን ስለሆነ፣ የዓለም ትኩረት አቅጣጫ ሌላ ሰፈር ሲሆን፣ ዐቢይ አሕመድ የሆነ ነገር ያደርጋሉ ብለው ገምተው ነው። ነገር ግን ትንቢታቸው አልሠራም። 

የኢራን ጦርነት ከጀመረ ከሁለት ሦስት ቀናት በኋላ ተንታኞቹ “ትንቢታቸው ለምን እንዳልሠራ” በመተንተን ፈንታ፣ ዐቢይ አሕመድ ለምን ጦርነቱን እንዳልጀመሩ ለመተንተን ሞክረዋል። ዐቢይ አሕመድ እንኳን በአስተርጓሚ እገዛ እና በእንግሊዝኛ ዜና መነፅር የሚመለከቷቸውን ሰዎች ቀርቶ እኛ በየቀኑ የሚሠሩትን እያየን፣ የሚናገሩትን እያደመጥንም ቢሆን ለትንታኔ ያስቸግሩናል። እዚህ ጋር ተንታኞቹ የሠሩት አንዱ ስህተት ዐቢይ አሕመድ ራሳቸው እንደተናገሩት ከግጭቶች ጥቅም ፈልቅቀው ያወጣሉ፤ ለፖለቲካ ዓላማቸው የትኛውንም አካል ወደ ነውጥ ይገፋሉ። ነገር ግን ግጭቶችን ራሳቸው እንደሚጀምሩ አንድም ማስረጃ የለንም። የምዕራብ ተንታኞች ከገመቱት በተቃራኒው የትግራይን ጦርነት ሁለቱም ወገኖች በትርዒት እና ፉከራ ሲቀሰቅሱት ቆይተው፥ የመጀመሪያውን ጥይት የተኮሱት ራሳቸው ሕወሓቶች ናቸው። ከዚያ አስቀድሞ በኦሮሞ ነጻነት ሠራዊት (ኦነሠ) እና መንግሥት መካከል ውጊያ የተጀመረው በራሱ ትጥቅ አልፈታም ብለው ባመፁ የኦነሠ አባላት ነው (ኦነግ ወደ ኢትዮጵያ ሲገባ የነበረውን ስምምነት ዝርዝር ባይታወቅም፣ በአንድ አገር ውስጥ ቅቡልነት ያለው ታጣቂ ኃይል መንግሥት ብቻ መሆኑን መከራከር አንችልም)። በፋኖ እና በመንግሥት መካከልም የተጀመረው ጦርነትም መነሻው ልዩ ኃይል መፍረስ የለበትም ብለው ባመፁ የፋኖ ታጣቂዎች ነው። ጦርነቱን ዐቢይ ናቸው ያወጁት ተብሎ ብዙ ክርክር ሊነሳ ይችላል። ነገር ግን እርግጡ ነገር ከሁሉም ግጭቶ እርሳቸው ሥልጣናቸውን ከትላንት የተሻለ ዛሬ ለማደላደያነት እንደተጠቀሙባቸው ብቻ ነው። 

አንድ የእንግሊዝ ዲፕሎማት ዐቢይ ወደ ሥልጣን የመጡ ሰሞን የተሰማቸውን ለተመራማሪዎች እንደተናገሩት፣ “Abiy was a disruptor… He was changing everything all the time… Ethiopians couldn’t keep up; we could not keep up.” (“ዐቢይ ማርሽ ቀያሪ ናቸው። … ሁሌም ሁሉንም ነገር እየቀያየሩት ነበር።… ኢትዮጵያውያንም በሳቸው ፍጥነት ምን እያደረጉ እንደሆነ ማወቅ አልቻሉም፣ እኛም አልቻልንም።” ዓይነት ነገር) ብለው ነበር። በዚህም “የነውጥ ቀዛፊው” ዐቢይ አሕመድ እስከ የሰላም ኖቤል ተሸላሚነት ደርሰዋል።  

ዐቢይ አሕመድ ነገሮችን በማይታመን ፍጥነት ማድረግ ይወዳሉ። ወደ ሥልጣን የወጡ ሰሞን በየቀኑ ሰበር ዜና ይሰጡን ነበር፤ አንዱን አውርተን ስንጨርስ ሌላኛው ይቀጥላል። በዚህ መሐል እርሳቸው ሥራቸውን ይሠራሉ፤ አንድም ሰው ከሰበር ዜና ጠለቅ ብሎ የድርጊቶቻቸውን እና የውሳኔዎቻቸውን ዘላቂ ጦስ መተንተን አልቻለም፤ ቢችልም አድማጭ የለውም። ብዙዎቻችን መለስ ብለን ስናስታውሰው፣ ባለፉት ስምንት ዓመታት እየታመስን የተንገረገብነው ብዙ ጊዜ ነው። አሁን ማን ይሙት፣ በ2014 ከጦር ሜዳ ሆነው እንዲያ ሲያብጠለጥሏቸው የነበሩት ጌታቸው ረዳ የመንግሥታቸው ሹመኛ እና ተከላካይ ይሆናሉ ብሎ ማን አሰበ? በርካታ የሕወሓት ሹመኞች የትግራይ ጊዜያዊ መንግሥት ሊሆኑ ሲሻሙ እርሳቸው ግን ለምን ጌታቸውን መረጡ? ጌታቸው ላይ የሕወሓት አንጋፋ አባላት ሲያምፁ እርሳቸው ለምን ቀጥተኛ ጣልቃ ሳይገቡ ቀሩ? ምን አስበው ነበር? አሁንስ ምን እያሰቡ ነው?

የኮሪደር ልማት እና የወንዝ ዳርቻ ልማቶች ጀምረዋል። ለነዚህ የልማት ሥራዎች በርካታ መኖሪያ ቤቶች መፍረስ እና ነዋሪዎች እንዲነሱ ተደርጓል። ይህን ሲያደርጉ የሚያደርጉበት ፍጥነት እና ስፋት ሁሉም ሰው ከአቅሙ በላይ (overwhelming) ይሆንበት ነበር። የተፈናቃዮቹ ዕጣ ፈንታ ሳይወራ፣ አዲስ የሚመረቁት ሰፈሮች ይመጣሉ፤ በዚሀ መሐል ሌላ ሰፈር ይፈርሳል። በአንድ በኩል ብዛቱ፣ በሌላ በኩል ፍርሐቱ፣ በዚያ ላይ ፓርቲያቸው ማኅበራዊ ሚዲያ ላይ ያሠማራቸው ካድሬዎች የሚነዙት ፕሮፓጋንዳ! ሁሉም ይህንን በሚያህል ስፋት እና ጥልቀት የሚሠራ ሥራ ማኅበራዊ፣ ፖለቲካዊ፣ እና ኢኮኖሚያዊ ፋይዳ እና ጦስ ሳይተነን እንዲያልፍ እያደረጉ ነው። 

ዐቢይ አሕመድ ጠላቶቻቸውን ሲችሉ የእርሳቸው ተከላካይ ጠበቃ፣ አልያም አቅመ ቢስ ያደረጉበት መንገድ የማይታመን ነው። ኢሳትና ኦኤምኤን የተባሉ ቴሌቪዥኖች በአንድ ወቅት አገር አንቀጥቅጥ እንዳልነበሩ፣ ዛሬ ተከፋፍለው እና ተመናምነው የከሸፉበት ጥበብ አልተተነተነም። ተቃዋሚ ፓርቲዎች ወደ አጋር ፓርቲነት የተቀየሩበት መንገድ ከተራ በሹመት ማባበል በላይ መመርመር አለበት። ማኅበራዊ ሚዲያን ከተቃዋሚዎች መድረክነት ወደ ገዢው ፓርቲ ካድሬዎች መፈንጫነት የቀየሩበት መንገድም አልተስተዋለም። ምክንያቱም ይህን ሁሉ ለመመርመር ጊዜ አልሰጡንም። እንደ አስማተኛ ማስቀየሻ ሰበር ዜናዎች አሏቸው፤ ይኼን ብልጭልጭ አይተን ዞር ስንል ያኛው ሔዷል። 

“ሐሳብ አመንጪው” ጠቅላይ ሚኒስቴር

ባለሥልጣኖቻችን አዳዲስ የመንግሥት ሥራዎችን ሲያስተዋውቁ “በጠቅላይ ሚኒስትሩ ሐሳብ አመንጪነት” ብለው ይጀምራሉ። እኔና አንድ ጓደኛዬ፣ የኢቢሲ የቴሌግራም ዜና ዘገባዎች ላይ ባደረግነው ቀላል ሐሰሳ፣ በጠቅላይ ሚኒስትሩ “ሐሳብ አመንጪነት” የሚለው 14 ዜናዎች  ውስጥ፣ በጠቅላይ ሚኒስትሩ “አነሳሽነት” የሚለው ደግሞ 10 ዜናዎች ውስጥ ከነሐሴ 2012 ጀምሮ መጠቀሱን አስተውለናል። ጠቅላይ ሚኒስትሩ በሐሳብ አመንጪነት የተጠቀሱት በብዛት ከኮሪደር ልማቱ ጋር በተያያዘ ቢሆንም፣ ከአረንጓዴ አሻራ፣ ከኢቢሲ እድሳት፣ ከክብረ በዓሎች ዝግጅት፣ ከተቋማት መመሥረት፣ እና ከስታዲየም ግንባታዎች ዕቅድ ጋር በተያያዘ ተወድሰዋል። 

እርግጥ ነው ብዙ ከከተማ ማስዋብ ፕሮጀክቶች ጋር የተያያዙት ሥራዎች በእርሳቸው ፍላጎት ባይሆን አይሠሩም፣ ቢሠሩም አሁን በሚሠሩበት ፍጥነትና ስፋት አይከናወኑም ነበር። የሹማምንቱና የዘገባዎቹ አጠቃቀም ግን ዕውቅና ከመስጠትም በላይ ሰበብ እየፈለጉ የማወደስ ዓይነት ይመስላል፤ እንደሚመስለኝ የሹመት መንገዱ ታማኝነትን በተገኘው አጋጣሚ ሁሉ ማረጋገጥ ነው። ሹማምንቱ ጠቅላይ ሚኒስትሩን ሳይጠቅሱ መናገር 'ክሬዲቱን’ እንደመውሰድ እንዳይቆጠርባቸው ሰግተው፣ አልያም ጠቅላይ ሚኒስትሩ በመልካም ሥራዎች እና አፈፃፀሞች ላይ ካልተጠቀሱ ቅር ይላቸዋል በሚል ፍራቻ (ወይም ቅር እንደሚላቸው ከዚህ ቀደም ስላስተዋሉ) ሊሆን ይችላል። ያም ሆነ ይህ አገሩ ውስጥ ሰው የሌለ ይመስል ሁሉንም ነገር ጠቅልሎ ለአንድ ሰው መስጠት አሳሳቢ ነው። ጠቅላይ ሚኒስትሩ እውነትም ዜናዎቹ እና ሹማምንቱ እንደሚሉት የሁሉም ነገሮች ሐሳብ አመንጪ ከሆኑም አደገኛ ነው፤ ምክንያቱም ተደጋግሞ እንደተባለው ጠቅላይ ሚኒስትሩ አገራችንን በራሳቸው አምሳል መልሰው እየሠሯት ነው። እውነታቸውን ካልሆነና እየሸነገሏቸውም ከሆነ ያው ለራሳቸውም ቢሆን አደገኛ ነው።

ለንፅፅር እንዲረዳን፣ ትራምፕ የካቢኔ አባሎቻቸውን ሰብስበው ምስጋና ሲቀበሉ የሚያሳዩ ቪዲዮዎች አሉ። ይህ ለምን ሆነ ብዬ የተሰጡ ትንታኔዎችን ወዲያ ወዲህ እያልኩ ሳፈላልግ በርካታ መልሶች ተመለከትኩ። አንዳንዶቹ ታማኝነታቸውን ለማረጋገጥ ነው፣ ሌሎቹ ትራምፕ መወደስ እንደሚወዱ ስለሚያውቁ ሊያባብሏቸው ነው፣ ከፊሎቹ ትችት የበዛባቸውን የፕሬዚዳንቱን ሞራል ለመጠበቅ ነው፣ ቀሪዎቹ ደግሞ በተቀናቃኞቻቸው የተበላሸውን ገጽታቸውን ለመገንባት ነው የሚል ትንታኔ ሰጥተውበታል። የኛም ሹማምንት እነዚህን የ'ክሬዲት' ስጦታዎች የሚያዥጎደጉዱት ከነዚህ ምክንያቶች በተለየ ምክንያት ይሆናል ብዬ አልገምትም። ሆኖም፣ በአንድ ነገር መስማማት እንችላለን፤ እንዲህ ያለ የቁልምጫ እጅ መንሻ የሚጠብቀው አምባገነናዊ ማንነት ያለው የመንግሥት ሹመኛ ብቻ መሆኑን ነው። 

ጠቅላይ ሚኒስትር ዐቢይ አሕመድ በራሳቸው “ሐሳብ አመንጪነት” ኢትዮጵያን በራሳቸው ፍላጎት ልክ መልሰው ለመሥራት ቆርጠዋል ይባላል (የቶም ጋርድነር መጽሐፍም በዚሁ ዙሪያ ነው የሚያጠነጥነው)። ጦርነት እና ግጭት ቢፈነዳ፣ ትችት እና ማስፈራሪያ ቢዘንብ ማንንም የሚሰሙ አይመስሉም። የሚፈልጉትን ያደርጋሉ። “ታላቁ ትርክት” በሚል ርዕስ ለኢትዮጵያ እና ኢትዮጵያውያን የጋራ ትርክት ለመፍጠር ትርክቱንም ተቀባይነት እንዲያገኝ ለማድረግ እየሞከሩ ነው። አገራዊ ምክክሩን በመጠቀም እስከ ሕገ መንግሥት ክለሳ ለመድረስ ይሞክራሉም ተብሏል። መሐል አዲስ አበባን የዛሬ ስምንት ዓመት ያያት ሰው ዛሬ ገብቶ አይወጣባትም። የምኒልክ ቤተ መንግሥትን በከፊል ቀይረው ዩኒቲ ፓርክ ያሰኙት ሰሞን ለውጡ ከቢሮዬ ጀምሮ አገር ያዳርሳል ብለው ነበር። እንዳሉትም፣ በቤተ መንግሥቱ ዙሪያ ያሉት ሰፈሮች ሁሉ ተቀይረዋል። አዲስ ቤተ መንግሥትም ከተማዋ አናት ላይ እየተሠራ ነው። በየከተማዎቹ አዲስ አበባ የሚሠራው ዓይነት የመንገድ ዳርቻዎችን የማስጌጥ ሥራ እንዲባዛ ትዕዛዝ ተሰጥቷል፣ እየተሠራም ነው (“የኮሪደር ልማት” የተሰኘው የከተሞች ዕድሳት ቢያንስ በ54 ከተሞች እንደተከናወነ ሰምቻለሁ፤ ወደ ገጠርም እየዘለቀ እንደሆነ የሚያሳዩ ጅምሮች በደቡብ ኢትዮጵያ አሉ)። በግለሰብ ባለቤትነት የሚተዳደሩ ሕንፃዎች ቀለም ላይ ሳይቀር፣ የግድግዳው እና መስታወቱ ዓይነት ላይ ጭምር መንግሥታቸው የራሱ ምርጫ አለው። 

የኮሪደር ልማቱ ብዙ ወጪ ይጠይቃል። ኢትዮጵያ ደግሞ በግጭቶቹም፣ በኮቪድም፣ በዓለም ቀውስም፣ በፊስካል ፖሊሲ ለውጥም ከፍተኛ የዋጋ ንረት እየፈተናት ነው። እርሳቸው ሥልጣን ላይ ሲወጡ ሃያ ምናምን ብር የነበረው አንድ ዶላር፣ ዛሬ በባንክ መቶ ሃምሳ ምናምን ገብቷል። የደሞዝተኛ ዜጎች ገቢ በአንድ ዓመት ውስጥ በግማሽ እንደቀነሰ ቁጠሩት። ስለዚህ የኮሪደር ልማቱ አስፈላጊ ቢሆን እንኳን “ኢትዮጵያ እነዚያን ሁሉ ነዋሪዎች የማፈናቀል፣ መልሶ የማቋቋም አቅም አላት ወይ? አዲሶቹ ግንባታዎች እና በተለይ ረብጣ ሀብት የሚፈስባቸው ባለመብራት የውሃ ፏፏቴዎች የሚጨምሩ መዝናኛ ሥፍራዎችን የመሥራት አቅም አላት ወይ? ሰላምና መረጋጋት ሳይኖር ከከተሞች ርቀው የተሠሩት ቅንጡ ሪዞርቶች የሚያርፉባቸው ቱሪስቶች ይኖራሉ ወይ? የወጡባቸውን ወጪዎች ይመልሳሉ ወይ? ዘላቂ የገቢ ምንጭ ይሆናሉ ወይ?” የሚል ጥያቄ ቢነሳ የሚያስቀይም አይሆንም።  ሆኖም፣ ቀድም ብዬ እንዳልኩት ዐቢይ አሕመድን ከመንገዳቸው ማንም፣ ምንም አያስቆማቸውም።

የጫካ ፕሮጀክት የሚባለውን ቤተ መንግሥት የሚጨምር “ሳተላይት ከተማ” በአዲስ አበባ  አንድ አናት ላይ ሲገነቡ፣ ከ500 ቢሊዮን ብር በላይ እንደሚወስድ ተናግረዋል። የልማት ተነሺዎች ተበደልን ብለው ፍርድ ቤት መሔድ የሚችሉበት መንገድ ቀጭን ነው። ሕልማቸውን የሚያከናውኑት ከሕዝባቸው ጋር ተማክረው አይደለም። ለልጆቹ የሚበጀውን እንደሚያውቅ አባት የሕዝባቸውን ጫጫታ መስማት አይፈልጉም። ከዚህ በፊት ፓርላማው ገንዘብ ላልሰጠኝ የጫካ ፕሮጀክት ምንም ሊጠይቀኝ አይችልም እስከማለት ደርሰው ነበር። ጄኔራል ኦዲተሯ ባንድ ወቅት የነዚህ "ሜጋ" (ግዙፍ) ፕሮጀክቶች በጀት በገንዘብ ሚኒስቴር በኩል ስላማያልፍ ኦዲት የማድረግ ሥልጣን የለንም ሲሉ ሰምቻለሁ። ጠቅላይ ሚኒስትሩ የሚፈልጉትን የሚያሳኩት በእንዲህ ያለ ከሕግ የበላይነት ጭምር ነው።

ባለፉት ስምንት ዓመታት ያየነው የጠቅላይ ሚኒስትር ዐቢይ አሕመድ ጉዞ፣ የማይታመን ጥድፊያን ከማይታመን የፖለቲካ እና የኢኮኖሚ ነውጥ ጋር አጣምሮ የያዘ ነው። ዐቢይ አሕመድ ኢትዮጵያን በራሳቸው ምስል እና ምናብ ልክ ለመቅረጽ ሲተጉ፣ የዜጎች የዕለት ተዕለት ኑሮ፣ የዴሞክራሲ ተቋማት ግንባታ እና የሕግ የበላይነት ግን የዚሁ “ፈጣን ጉዞ” ሰለባ ሆነዋል። ዐቢይ ወደ ሥልጣን የወጡት በሰላማዊ ሒደት ቢሆንም፣ እንደ ቀደምት መሪዎች ሁሉ መሰንበቻቸው በነውጥ ሆኗል።  የነገዋ ኢትዮጵያ ዕጣ ፈንታም የሚወሰነው የተዋቡ የከተማ ኮሪደሮችና ወንዞች በዚህ በኩል፣ ጦርነትና የኑሮ ውድነት በወዲያ በኩል በሚያፈሩት ፍሬና በሚያስከትሉት ጦስ መካከል ነው። ስምንት ዓመታት አንድ የአሜሪካ ፕሬዚደንት ሁለት ጊዜ ተመርጦ አገልግሎቱን የሚያጠናቅቅበት ዘመን ነው። የእርሳቸው ሥልጣን ግን ገና እየጀመረ ይመስላል። ጥሩፋታቸውን ይኼ ነው ብሎ መተንበይ ይቸግራል። ነገር ግን በሰብዓዊ መብቶች ጥበቃ፣ በሕግ የበላይነት፣ በዴሞክራሲ እና መልካም አስተዳደር መልካም ሥም ጥለው ያልፋሉ ብሎ ለመገመት ምልክቱ የለም። የነውጦቹ መቋጫም ምን እንደሚሆን መገመት ነብይነት ይጠይቃል። ዐቢይ አሕመድ ፈረንጆቹ እንደሚሉት “he has won the battles but not the war” (“ጦር ሜዳው ላይ ቀንቷቸዋል፤ ጦርነቱን ግን አላሸነፉም” እንደማለት።) 

መጪውን አብረን የምናየው ይሆናል፣ ነገር ግን ትልቁ ጥያቄ “ቀጣዩ የጠቅላይ ሚኒስትር ዐቢይ አሕመድ ዕቅድ ምንድን ነው?” የሚለው ሳይሆን፣ “ኢትዮጵያውያን ይህንን ሁሉ ነውጥ፣ የኢኮኖሚ ጫና እና ያልተገደበ ሥልጣን እስከመቼ ተሸክመው መዝለቅ ይችላሉ?” የሚለው ነው።