The Ethiopia-Eritrea Agreement and Its Consequences: A Path to War

The Ethiopia-Eritrea Agreement and Its Consequences: A Path to War

On December 27, 2023, a significant development in the Horn of Africa was reported by the Emirate Policy Center, marking a turning point in the longstanding relationship between Ethiopia and Eritrea. The leaders of the two nations agreed to a historic arrangement that would provide Ethiopia with access to the sea and the use of Eritrean ports. However, this agreement came with controversial political undertakings that have since ignited a devastating conflict within the region.

The deal included a commitment to dismantle the existing Ethiopian multinational federation, reverting the country to a pre-1991 unitary state structure. This decision was met with widespread opposition, particularly from groups that had benefited from or supported the federal system, such as the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) and various Oromo nationalist organizations. 

Eritrea's role in this agreement was not that of a passive observer; the Eritrean government agreed to become part of the governance of this new unitary Ethiopia. This integration was seen by some as a means to solidify peace between the two nations, but to others, it represented an alarming expansion of Eritrean influence and a threat to the autonomy of certain Ethiopian regions.

The architects of this agreement, according to the article, included the Amhara National Democratic Movement (ANDM), a faction of Ethiopia's ruling party, and the Ethiopianist Ginbot 7 (G7) party. These parties, along with Eritrea, have been accused of laying the groundwork for conflict since the Asmara peace agreement in 2018, which had initially ended two decades of hostilities between Ethiopia and Eritrea.

The ambition to eliminate the TPLF and Oromo nationalist organizations was a clear signal of the brewing political storm. As the Ethiopian government, with the support of ANDM and G7, prepared for war, it unleashed a propaganda campaign to sway public opinion and justify its actions. The narrative was that the TPLF and similar groups posed a threat to the unity and stability of Ethiopia, and thus their removal was necessary.

The result of these political maneuvers was a bloody civil war, which, as of the writing of this article, has led to the loss of millions of lives and continues to cause destruction and suffering across Ethiopia. The conflict has not been limited to any single region; its impact has been felt nationwide, with reports of atrocities and human rights violations emerging from multiple fronts.

The ANDM, G7, and the Eritrean government have been identified as major contributors to the Ethiopian crisis, with Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and his inner circle bearing significant responsibility for the decisions that led to the conflict. Their strategy, aimed at consolidating power and creating a unitary state, has instead resulted in a fractured nation, where ethnic tensions and political grievances have been exacerbated.

In conclusion, the agreement between Ethiopia and Eritrea has had profound implications for the region. What was intended to be a strategic partnership for economic and political integration has become a catalyst for one of the most severe civil wars in recent history. As the conflict continues, the international community faces the challenge of addressing a complex humanitarian crisis and finding a pathway to peace for the embattled Ethiopian people.

Taking Ethiopia-Eritrea Tensions Seriously

Taking Ethiopia-Eritrea Tensions Seriously

A formal, transparent peace and of tangible benefit to the peoples of both countries is required.

Friday, December 15, 2023. 

BY: Michael Woldemariam

 Analysis and Commentary

The historically fraught relationship between Ethiopia and Eritrea is deteriorating once again. A seemingly momentous peace deal that brought the two sides together in 2018 now appears to have been a brief interlude in a longer arc of enduring rivalry. The sources of recent tension include Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s public posturing around sea access and dynamics seeded by the 2018 peace deal itself. Neither side can afford escalation, but open conflict remains a possibility and even outcomes well short of direct hostilities — perhaps a return to the “no war, no peace” situation of preceding decades — would be disastrous for the two nations and the broader region.

A poster depicts Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed (left) and Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki in Asmara, Eritrea, on September 7, 2018. Tensions between the two countries have been rising again. (Malin Fezehai/The New York Times)

A poster depicts Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed (left) and Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki in Asmara, Eritrea, on September 7, 2018. Tensions between the two countries have been rising again. (Malin Fezehai/The New York Times)

Concerned international actors should act urgently to deescalate tensions between Abiy and Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki; but over the longer term only a transparent, inclusive and well-institutionalized framework for Ethiopia-Eritrea ties can deliver sustainable peace.

Red Sea Power Play

Abiy’s recent public claims that his landlocked nation should control a port are the immediate backdrop to recent tensions. In an October speech, the prime minister insisted Ethiopia’s claim to sea access was backed by history, as well as a practical necessity due to the economic, demographic and security vulnerabilities its landlocked status imposed on its 120-million strong population. Although Abiy played down the use of force in this speech and in a November statement before parliament, he warned that a failure to resolve the issue through negotiation could lead to conflict. State-run media, and some Ethiopian officials and pro-government personalities, have since echoed this agenda. Notably, in the months leading up to this public campaign, Abiy had pressed the need for an Ethiopian port in closed-door engagements with several foreign and Ethiopian interlocutors.

Littoral neighbors implicated in Abiy’s emerging port discourse responded with terse rejections, in effect signaling that sovereign control of their coastlines was nonnegotiable. This included Eritrea, which joined Djibouti and Somalia in the public pushback. But Eritrea has special reason to be concerned by Abiy’s port agenda, and in particular the restorationist impulse in which much of it is grounded. From 1952 to 1993, Eritrea and its Red Sea ports had been part of Ethiopia, and it was only a bloody national liberation struggle that delivered Eritrean statehood. Although much of the Ethiopia body politic has moved on from the Eritrea question, there is a current of Ethiopian nationalist thought that regards Eritrea’s departure — which made Ethiopia the most-populous landlocked country in the world by a considerable margin — a historic error. At a November Saudi-Africa summit in Riyadh, Abiy held dialogues with the presidents of Djibouti and Somalia, and later signed a defense memorandum of understanding with the former that same month, perhaps in a bid to reassure these two neighbors of Ethiopia’s intentions. Ominously, similar engagements with the Eritrean leadership have not been forthcoming.

Layered Tensions

The emerging fallout between Addis Ababa and Asmara is about more than sea access. Abiy had signaled that the issue was a priority just two months into his tenure, an agenda that did not appear to trouble Eritrean leaders and which they did little to discourage. Perhaps the honeymoon of the 2018 Eritrea-Ethiopia peace deal suppressed early doubts Asmara might have had; others think the Eritrean president may have supported a confederal arrangement that would facilitate Ethiopian access to the Red Sea. Whatever the reality, more proximate bilateral tensions were rooted in the 2018 peace deal itself, which at its heart was an alliance between Addis Ababa and Asmara to contain, corral and perhaps defeat the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). This alliance was fully activated when open war broke out in Tigray in November 2020, but the conflict soon created tactical and strategic differences between Addis Ababa and Asmara about how to prosecute it.

Abiy’s eventual decision to make peace with the TPLF in Pretoria in November 2022, over and above the resistance of Isaias, sharpened these disagreements. Although Eritrean leaders have been careful not to formally oppose the Pretoria agreement — lest they position themselves as spoilers — they view it as generating three dynamics dangerous to Eritrean national security: the survival of the TPLF, the maintenance of a large Tigrayan militia force and closer strategic alignment between Addis Ababa, Tigray and Asmara’s bête noire, the United States.

Asmara has responded to these unfavorable trends by pursuing balance-of-power politics. Within the region, Isaias has moved closer to Presidents William Ruto and Hassan Sheikh, of Kenya and Somalia, respectively, and may be quietly rehabilitating historically difficult ties with Djibouti’s president, Ismaïl Omar Guelleh. In the Red Sea, Eritrea has shifted into the orbit of Cairo and Riyadh. And Isaias’ performances during May-July 2023 visits to Russia and China demonstrate an eagerness to cultivate great-power support. Similar logic applies to Eritrea’s alleged security relationship with Amhara militia opposed to the Ethiopia’s ruling Prosperity Party, a connection that remains opaque but is of significant concern in Addis Ababa.

Genuine Conflict Risks

Open conflict between the governments of Eritrea and Ethiopia is a distinct possibility. Reports of military movements in the Eritrea-Ethiopia borderlands, always challenging to verify, underscore the risks. But armed confrontation at this juncture remains unlikely for the simple reason that neither party can afford it. Abiy faces intractable rebellions in Amhara and Oromia and generalized insecurity across the country. Mobilizing the requisite force against the Eritrean leadership would likely involve Tigray’s participation, but the region is exhausted by war and distrustful of Abiy’s intentions. Ethiopia’s economy is also in serious distress, encumbered by inflation and debt, and any war would jeopardize support packages from the International Monetary Fund and World Bank it needs to remain afloat.

Eritrea is also in no position to entertain conflict. Although its regional stature has risen by default — most of its neighbors are in deep political crisis — it remains a small country with a fragile economy. Decades of youth migration have likely eroded the manpower of the Eritrean military, and it is unclear how the country’s armed forces would respond to a call to action scarcely a year removed from the bloody conflagration in Tigray. There are also major diplomatic risks: while Asmara is in much better international position than a decade ago, the last time it fell out with its much larger southern neighbor it soon found itself isolated in the region and beyond.

The tragic history of Eritrea-Ethiopia relations between 1998 and 2018 teaches us three important lessons. First, while war might leave all parties worse off, that is no guarantee of restraint. Second, the potential for inadvertent escalation cannot be dismissed. In 1998, when the last war between Eritrea and Ethiopia broke out, it was a disaster that neither side anticipated nor sought, with small border incidents soon morphing into a cataclysmic struggle that killed tens of thousands. And third, even in the absence of open conflict, a return to the rivalry of previous decades — the “no war, no peace” stalemate — would be bad for both countries and the region more broadly, reinforcing domestic authoritarianism and fueling proxy wars from Somalia to Sudan.

De-escalation and Sustainable Peace

It is imperative that concerned international stakeholders act to de-escalate tensions between Eritrea and Ethiopia. This includes African actors and of course extra-regional players like the United States. U.S. policymakers should encourage direct dialogue between Addis Ababa and Asmara; convey to Ethiopian leaders that Washington will support peaceful efforts to enhance Ethiopian port access, but that threats to forcibly revise the territorial status quo are a non-starter; and communicate to Asmara that its relations with the United States cannot improve until it fully disengages from Ethiopia’s domestic affairs. Recent U.S. public commitments to the Algiers Agreement (which ended the 1998 Eritrea-Ethiopia war) and Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s November 2 statement that “Both Ethiopia and Eritrea must refrain from provocation and respect the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of all countries in the region” echo what the United States has been saying privately for months, but the message must be pointedly conveyed by senior-most U.S. officials on a consistent basis. U.S. military and intelligence officials should assist this diplomatic effort, as they are likely to command the attention of the parties and can speak with credibility on the practical realities of de-escalation on the ground. Given the state of U.S.-Eritrea relations, diplomatic approaches to Asmara have been difficult, but the Kenyans and Saudis can be helpful intermediaries if approached by appropriately senior U.S. interlocutors.

Similar de-escalatory messages need to also be registered with the United Arab Emirates, which remains Ethiopia’s main military backer and a major disrupter across the Horn region. Here, frank conversations are required that to this point senior U.S. policymakers have been unwilling to have. The reality is that the portfolio of U.S.-Emirati ties is deep and wide-ranging, and the Horn is not an item prioritized in engagements with Abu Dhabi. This should change and quickly.

Over the longer term, those with an interest in promoting peace and stability between Eritrea and Ethiopia must recognize there are no quick fixes. Previous eras of cooperative ties between Addis Ababa and Asmara have mostly been elite pacts, wherein ruling establishments have forged private cross-border understandings that would aid their respective bids to consolidate power at home and further their ambitions abroad. This was as true of relations between the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front and TPLF in the 1990s as it was of the Isaias-Abiy thaw in 2018. But bilateral ties built upon the narrow elite interests, weak institutional foundations and little to no popular legitimacy are not a recipe for sustainable peace and can often seed future wars. In this sense, what must be asked of those that occupy state power in Ethiopia and Eritrea is not simply de-escalation and a return the status quo ante of 2018; but rather, a peace that is formal, transparent and of tangible benefit to the peoples of both countries.

Michael Woldemariam is an associate professor at the University of Maryland’s School of Public Policy.

United Status Instute of Peace

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Title: The Key Players Contributing to Ethiopia’s Complex Problems Since 2018.

Title: The Key Players Contributing to Ethiopia’s Complex Problems Since 2018

Ethiopia, a country with a rich history and diverse culture, has been facing significant challenges in recent years. Since 2018, several key players have contributed to the nation's complex problems, exacerbating existing tensions and divisions. Among these players, the Amhara National Democratic Movement (ANDM) and the so-called "Ethiopianists," primarily led by individuals associated with the G7, have played prominent roles in shaping the country's political landscape. Their actions have had far-reaching consequences, fueling internal strife and undermining the prospects for sustainable peace and development.

The ANDM, historically a major political force in Ethiopia, has been at the center of controversy and criticism. Accused of enabling the brutality of the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) during the rule of the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), the ANDM has faced allegations of complicity in various atrocities committed under the previous regime. Furthermore, following the 2018 political shift that brought Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed to power, the ANDM's actions have drawn widespread condemnation.

Critics argue that the ANDM failed to curb the excesses of the new administration and, instead, enabled Prime Minister Abiy to pursue his agenda unchecked. Their reluctance to hold the government accountable and their perceived acquiescence to Abiy's policies have led to accusations of the ANDM acting as puppets, prioritizing their interests over the well-being of the Ethiopian people. Moreover, the ANDM's response to the conflict in the Amhara region has further fueled discontent, with many viewing the party as complicit in the suffering of their people.

Meanwhile, the so-called "Ethiopianists," prominently associated with the G7, have also come under scrutiny for their role in exacerbating Ethiopia's challenges. These individuals, who rallied support for Prime Minister Abiy and his administration, have been accused of stifling dissent and discouraging meaningful political discourse. Critics argue that rather than fostering inclusive dialogue and constructive debate, the Ethiopianists promoted blind allegiance to a singular authority, effectively sidelining alternative perspectives and marginalizing dissenting voices.

Furthermore, the Ethiopianists' efforts to normalize and justify the actions of the Abiy administration have raised concerns about the erosion of democratic principles and the rule of law. By advocating for an unchecked concentration of power in the hands of the prime minister, they have been accused of contributing to a political environment characterized by authoritarian tendencies and a lack of accountability.

In conclusion, the actions of key players such as the ANDM and the so-called "Ethiopianists" have significantly influenced Ethiopia's trajectory since 2018, contributing to a complex web of challenges. Their roles in enabling or endorsing certain policies and actions have deepened existing divisions and hindered the prospects for genuine reconciliation and progress. As Ethiopia seeks to address its multifaceted issues and build a more inclusive and stable future, it is imperative to critically examine the actions of these players and work towards fostering genuine dialogue, accountability, and respect for diverse perspectives. 

 TPLF's Role in Ethiopian Suffering: A Strategic Misstep that Fueled Conflict

The Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) has long been a central player in Ethiopian politics, exerting significant influence and power. However, recent events have brought to light the complex and tumultuous relationship between the TPLF and other Ethiopian ethnic groups, particularly the Amhara, Tigre, and Afar. The fallout from these relationships has had profound and far-reaching consequences, contributing to the suffering of countless Ethiopians and exacerbating existing conflicts.

One of the key points of contention is the TPLF's handling of its relationship with the Amhara ethnic group. The failure to address historical grievances and conflicts with the Amhara has been a critical misstep for the TPLF. Had the TPLF worked to resolve these issues early on, they could have potentially garnered support from the Amhara community in countering the ethno-nationalist policies of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, who has been criticized for pursuing divisive and exclusionary politics.

Instead, the TPLF's actions and rhetoric have only served to alienate the Amhara, driving them closer to Abiy's government. By threatening the Amhara and pursuing a confrontational approach, the TPLF inadvertently pushed the Amhara towards aligning with Abiy, particularly as tensions escalated. This dynamic created a "lesser of two evils" scenario for the Amhara, who ultimately found themselves compelled to choose sides in a deeply polarized political landscape.

The eruption of conflict between the TPLF, the Amhara, and the central government further underscored the TPLF's miscalculations. The TPLF's decision to engage in hostilities with both the Amhara and Abiy's administrations simultaneously deepened the rift, exacerbating an already fragile situation. This move effectively forced the Amhara to align with Abiy's government, reshaping the political landscape and perpetuating the cycle of violence and suffering.

As a consequence of these strategic missteps, the TPLF has indirectly and directly contributed to the suffering of Ethiopians, including the Amhara and Tigre. The TPLF's actions have not only heightened tensions and conflict but have also inadvertently enabled the perpetuation of a genocidal regime, further compounding the humanitarian crisis in the region.

The ramifications of the TPLF's approach are far-reaching and continue to impact the lives of countless individuals, highlighting the critical importance of pursuing inclusive and collaborative approaches to conflict resolution and governance. Moving forward, addressing historical grievances and fostering dialogue and reconciliation among different ethnic groups will be essential in charting a path toward sustainable peace, stability, and prosperity for all Ethiopians.

In conclusion, the TPLF's failure to effectively navigate its relationships with the Amhara and other ethnic groups has had significant repercussions, contributing to the suffering of Ethiopians and exacerbating existing conflicts. By acknowledging these missteps and working towards inclusive and collaborative solutions, there is hope for a more peaceful and prosperous future for all Ethiopians.

Ethiopia-Eritrea Tensions and Likely Scenarios.

Ethiopia-Eritrea Tensions and Likely Scenarios. 

Horn Of Africa Research Unit

|

27 Dec 2023

Key Takeaways

Ethiopia’s approach to relations with Eritrea is based on two principles: First, Asmara’s significant political influence in Ethiopia needs to be curbed. Second, Eritrea is the most fitting neighbor to fulfill Addis Ababa’s geopolitical maritime ambitions.

The Eritrean regime believes that Addis Ababa acts like a hegemon, trying to isolate Eritrea politically. 

Asmara deals cautiously and vigilantly with the sudden shift in its neighbor’s politics about wanting a seaport in Eritrea, considering it a direct threat amounting to a declaration of war.

There are three potential scenarios for the future of Ethiopia-Eritrea relations: Sliding into war, soft containment, or stalemate.

The Ethiopian prime minister’s changed tone might mean his government is re-assessing its options and ruling out military action to spare the region another conflict.

 

The Ethiopia-Eritrea relations started worsening after the peace agreement between Addis Ababa and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) in November 2022. Addis Ababa and Asmara have very different positions on how the war they both waged against the TPLF ended and the role of Washington and the West in the peace arrangements. Eritrea has been accused of trying to torpedo these arrangements because it refused to withdraw all its forces from Tigray. Asmara’s influence in Ethiopia has been growing, and its presumed support of Amhara rebels who rejected the federal government’s plans to dissolve and disarm their forces to integrate and unify Ethiopian armies caused tensions.

Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s campaign to secure access to a seaport announced on October 13, 2023, has further fueled tensions. Ahmed’s plan has brought the two countries to the edge of a military confrontation with consequences for the Ethiopian and Eritrean people and the regional and international actors and stakeholders, especially with more signs that the two sides are preparing for such a confrontation.

This paper highlights the main reasons behind the gradual split between the two previous allies, Ahmed and Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki, and how the two countries are inching toward war. The paper also explores likely scenarios for future Ethiopia-Eritrea relations.

Reasons Behind the Abiy-Afwerk Alliance Collapse

The main reasons why the Ahmad-Afwerki alliance collapsed and tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea arose can be summarized as follows:

Outcomes of War and Peace with Tigray

The Pretoria peace agreement in November 2022 that ended almost two years of destructive war in northern Ethiopia led to dramatic changes in the alliance’s map. Abiy Ahmed’s government, Eritrea, and the Amhara nationalists shared the same goals and fears, bringing them to a block and a war against their common enemy, the TPLF. The TPLF has been an obstacle to the ambitions of the three forces, especially to the Addis Ababa-Asmara rapprochement and to Ahmed’s project to change the country’s ruling system from ethnic federalism to centralism.

Initially, Ahmed’s project aligned with the Eritrean regime’s outlook and served the nationalist Amhara, boosting its chances to rule the country again. However, disagreements surfaced later on the degree and type of change. Afwerki and the Amhara wanted to change the federal system radically, as it was viewed as the source of Ethiopia’s troubles. Eritrea and the Amhara considered Ahmed’s efforts as an adjustment by the regime to weaken the federal dimension to serve his long-term dual objectives: the domination of his ruling party and his Oromo ethnicity.

This alliance was a “marriage of convenience.” Although it succeeded in removing and weakening the TPLF, it also brought to the fore the contradictions in Ethiopia’s internal politics, serving further to add to historical grievances and hostilities and sowing anxiety and mistrust among former allies (particularly between Addis Ababa, the Eritrean regime, and the Amharic Fano militia). When hostilities between the Ethiopian government and the TPLF ended, the Ahmed-Amhara-Afwerki alliance crumbled. The Amhara and Afwerki view the peace agreement as a “stab in the back,” which failed to address their concerns. They saw this as the cause behind a shift in Ahmed’s alliances that made him close to the TPLF, still a significant threat to them.

Asmara, in particular, prefers to subjugate the Tigray region by force, eradicating the TPLF and destroying its capabilities. This is why Eritrea was dissatisfied with the agreement. It tried to undermine it and show Addis Ababa as untrustworthy and submissive to Washington. In an interview in February 2023, Eritrean President Afwerki was shockingly apparent in the agreement’s criticism, describing it as engineered by Washington to help the TPLF avoid a military defeat, giving it another chance to rule the country. Afwerki claimed that “Washington’s clique” had brought a “document ready to sign,” and the role of negotiators was merely to implement American orders.

The different positions and calculations of the Ethiopian and Eritrean regimes about how the conflict was settled caused a dispute. This dispute included the failure to provide Eritrea with enough security guarantees to convince it to withdraw all of its forces from Tigray and maybe compensate for the cost it incurred because of the war. There was a likely disagreement on other thorny issues, such as the possibility of keeping the two peace agreements and the growing Eritrean influence inside Ethiopia.

Border Disputes: A Growing Headache for Addis Ababa

Eritrea exploited the war in the northern parts of its neighboring country to achieve two strategic objectives:

First, cement its influence inside Ethiopia by weakening its historical rivals (Tigray) and strengthening its alliances with their ethnic competitors, especially the Amhara.

Second, regain and impose a de facto situation in areas where a UN-supported commission to demarcate the borders between the two countries. Moreover, the Ethiopian army helped its Amhara allies to take control of Welkait and Raya and their surroundings disputed by Amhara, west and south Tigray. This choked off the TPLF, closing its western outlets with Sudan.

Addis Ababa ignored the behavior of its allies because it needed their military capabilities. However, the Asmara-Amhara alliance, especially after tensions built up in Amhara since April 2023, became a cause of concern for Ahmed’s government, thwarting plans to strengthen centralism and impose centralist sovereignty all over the country, especially its efforts to dissolve regional forces and militias to stop problems they caused with the center and solve border disputes among ethnic regions.

The Amhara-Tigray border dispute is another polarizing issue. It places a significant responsibility on Addis Ababa to fulfill its commitments related to a critical article in the Pretoria Peace Agreement, calling for restoring the constitutional order disrupted due to the Tigray conflict. The Ethiopian government’s centralist policies inflame the armed rebellion of the Amhara nationalists, who refuse to withdraw from areas under their control to pave the way for peace, including resettling hundreds of thousands of displaced people ahead of a referendum to determine the fate of these areas.

Ethiopia’s Campaign to Secure Sea Port Access

Ethiopia’s maritime ambition became clear with leaks from a July 20, 2023, meeting between the Ethiopian prime minister and business people in Addis Ababa. During the conference, Ahmed said all options, including using force to secure a seaport for his country, were on the table. This worsened the already tense Ethiopian-Eritrean relations, further turning friendship into hostility. Ahmed’s speech before the Ethiopian parliament on October 13, 2023, started a “frank” debate among Ethiopians about an outlet to the Red Sea agenda. 

The prime minister said this had become a “life or death” matter. Later, Ahmed tried to assure neighboring countries of Ethiopia’s good intentions and dispel regional concerns. On more than one occasion, he reiterated that his government would not pursue its interests “through force” but instead through a “win-win approach for both sides.” However, the Ethiopia-Eritrea relationship continues to deteriorate alarmingly.

Reports said both armies went on high alert, and their presence beefed up along the borders, especially close to northern Djibouti. Meanwhile, Addis Ababa is trying to increase Western pressure on the Eritrean regime under the pretext that Asmara undermines the implementation of the peace agreement, continues to occupy parts of Tigray, and arms the Amharic Fano militia.

Complications of Geopolitical Harmony

Regional and international factors drive Ethiopia and Eritrea further apart. Washington and the West are trying to punish the regime in Asmara and isolate it regionally and internationally because it participates in the war against Tigray and its support for the Russian-Chinese axis, among other things.

Since the start of 2023, the Eritrean president has engaged in significant diplomatic activities, including visits to Kenya, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, China, Russia, and South Africa. These visits were part of the concerted Eritrean efforts to adjust to the emerging realities, especially considering developments in Ethiopia. The Eritrean president sensed the potential unraveling of his alliance with Ahmed, particularly after the latter signed a peace agreement with Tigray and improved relations with the United States.

Going by the past, Asmara’s improving ties with certain regional powers have usually meant some distancing from these powers’ rivals. For instance, Afwerki’s outreach to Kenya, shown in his visit on February 8 and the announcement of Eritrea’s return to the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), implied tacit support for Nairobi’s regional leadership ambitions at Ethiopia’s potential expense. Similarly, Eritrea’s rapprochement with Cairo and Khartoum, particularly after the Sudanese civil war erupted, suggested opposing interests at the regional level.

Asmara’s frustration with the IGAD approach, shaped by power dynamics within the organization, including its handling of the Sudanese crisis, is evident. Afwerki’s reservations extend to anything that might contribute to Ethiopia reclaiming historical hegemony and imposing conditions on Eritrea, particularly concerning border issues and Ethiopia’s aspirations for a seaport through Eritrean waters.

Approaches Intensifying Tensions

Two key considerations drive Addis Ababa’s strategy in managing its evolving relationship with its neighbor: Firstly, Eritrea’s influence on Ethiopian internal dynamics pushes Addis Ababa to curtail Eritrea’s role and influence in the region. This aims to neutralize Asmara’s potential support for Ethiopian opponents, mitigate various sources of tension, and protect the fragile peace process within Ethiopia. Secondly, Ethiopia perceives Eritrea as a strategically located neighbor that can contribute to its maritime ambitions and, simultaneously, as the most resistant and independent actor against those ambitions.

The Ethiopian prime minister hinted that “the popular sentiment that led to Eritrea’s independence from Ethiopia in 1993 no longer exists now,” a statement interpreted by observers as a violation of Eritrean sovereignty. According to a significant segment of Ethiopian elites, including Ahmed and Amhara nationalists, this assertion is legally questionable, contending that not all Ethiopians endorsed Eritrea’s independence during drafting the Federal Constitution in 1995.

Ahmed suggests that granting Eritrea independence without securing a port was a historical mistake by the former ruling coalition dominated by the Tigray front (1991-2018). He argues that legal ambiguities exist, allowing negotiations on specific points, such as maritime access or even a return to the pre-war situation (1993-1998), during which Ethiopia used the Assab Port without paying as a form of acknowledgment for recognizing its neighbor’s independence.

While the Ahmed government invokes historical, demographic, and economic justifications for its maritime ambitions, asserting its right to Eritrean coasts, islands, and territorial waters, its current preferences center around securing a lucrative deal. This deal involves offering Asmara a stake in the shares of the Renaissance Dam or Ethiopian telecommunications and aviation companies. In return, Ethiopia seeks Asmara’s acceptance of providing permanent and reliable access to the Red Sea.

On the other hand, the Eritrean regime holds a complex vision of the ruling elites in Addis Ababa and the dynamics of the Ethiopian political landscape. It perceives Ethiopia as playing the hegemon and contributing to Eritrea’s isolation. Afwerki rejects regional marginalization and resents, for example, being excluded from peace arrangements in northern Ethiopia, given his decisive contribution to the federal government’s victory in the country.

In contrast to Djibouti and Somalia, Asmara is approaching this sudden shift in its neighbor’s position with caution and vigilance. The Eritrean regime sees it as a direct threat and a potential for war. It worries that the speech is primarily directed at Eritrea increased due to various suspicious Ethiopian actions. The Ethiopian army’s show of force on the 116th anniversary of its establishment on October 26, the Ethiopian government’s strengthening of security and defense cooperation with Djibouti (a defense agreement signed on November 20), and the renewal of a similar deal with Somalia on December 6 (concluded initially in 2014), reinforce this view. 

Eritrea has taken concrete steps to prepare for a potential Ethiopian invasion of its territory, particularly in areas adjacent to Djibouti. These measures include intensifying military meetings with tribal leaders, particularly the Afar community, internal military mobilization on both sides of the border, and external diplomatic efforts led by President Afwerki and Foreign Minister Osman Saleh. These diplomatic engagements, particularly with Cairo and Riyadh, reflect growing concern over the assertive Ethiopian ambition to access the Red Sea.

Following the historic reconciliation between the two countries in mid-2018, Afwerki initially preferred a robust centralized system in Addis Ababa led by an allied elite. The approach aimed to establish an Ethiopia-Eritrea confederation, realizing the dream of regional superiority and influence. Alternatively, the goal was to address existing problems, fortify the alliance, and enhance cooperation by implementing previous agreements and reaching new political, security, and economic arrangements.

However, this ambition has recently waned. Asmara is now more concerned with securing amicable relations with its neighbor without risking a loss of influence or resorting to force. It hopes that Addis Ababa’s leaders will not choose to threaten its sovereignty and territorial integrity. 

There is a particular concern about the potential mobilization of aggressive ethnic groups, including the Amhara, Oromo, and especially the Tigrayans and Afar, who share geographic, ethnic, social, cultural, and linguistic ties with their counterparts in Eritrea. They fear that these two ethnic groups, who make up the population’s majority, could be used to divide Eritrea in pursuit of Ethiopia’s maritime and geopolitical ambitions.

Possible Scenarios

Considering the factors above, three potential scenarios emerge for the future of Ethiopia-Eritrea relations:

Scenario 1 – Sliding into War: The likelihood of escalation into war could increase under one or more of the following conditions:

The Ethiopian government achieves significant success on internal security, political, and economic fronts. These successes may include national reconciliation, containing tensions and rebellions in the Amhara and Oromo regions, improved living conditions, and rallying Ethiopian people against Eritrea.

The formation of new alliances or the formalization of existing undeclared alliances, infusing them with pan-Ethiopian meanings such as the ones between the Oromo and Tigray ethnic groups or cooperation between the Ahmed government and the Tigray Front against the Asmara-Amhara alliance. This cooperation can be officially recognized, mainly if the goal is to forcibly remove Eritrean forces and Amharic militias from the Tigray region.

Miscalculations by one or both sides that push the already tense situation along the border, such as provocations or limited attacks, into an open war.

Escalation of tensions, hostile rhetoric, and mobilization, exacerbating mistrust and the continued rigidity of the two parties’ positions with opposing views on outstanding issues.

Contribution of some international and regional powers to inflaming the situation by supporting and encouraging the two sides to impose their conditions on each other.

Scenario 2: Soft Containment: For the realization of this scenario, one or some of the following conditions need to be met:

Some friends of the two countries and those concerned with security and stability in the region start mediating to reduce tensions and push forward normalizing relations between the two sides.

Both sides exercise great restraint and actively seize opportunities for calm and rapprochement. For instance, the two countries’ leaders meet on the sidelines of upcoming conferences and summits instead of avoiding each other, as has been the case in the past few months.

The two countries and the Horn of Africa region experience transformations that create new regional synergy and integration. Common threats and risks emerge, compelling the two sides to overcome them.

A change in the ruling elites in the two countries, especially in Asmara, occurs. These new elites become increasingly aware of the need to overcome historical grievances and initiate a new chapter of good neighborly relations. This transformative approach involves aligning common goals and interests with collective approaches for mutual benefit.

Scenario 3 – Continued Stalemate: In this scenario, the following are expected:

The current situation persists due to the two parties’ deep caution, particularly their fear of an unaffordable confrontation. Persistent mistrust hinders the possibility of rapprochement.

Addis Ababa may choose to cause trouble for the Eritrean government by co-opting and supporting the Afar tribes, especially those opposed to the Eritrean regime. This involves encouraging them to rebel and disengage from Asmara. This strategy aims to divert the Eritrean regime’s attention and resources to internal affairs or potentially push Asmara to seek assistance from Addis Ababa in exchange for concessions on outstanding issues such as borders and ports.

Eritrea might partially withdraw its forces from the Tigray region while retaining control over key areas like Badme, Airup, and some border areas in the region’s north. Using its expertise and tools of influence, Asmara could increase its sway on Ethiopia, creating additional security and geopolitical challenges for Addis Ababa. This includes ensuring that Addis Ababa’s rhetoric on the Red Sea does not alienate the Amhara region and weaken or dismantle the Eritrean-Amharic alliance.

 

Conclusions 

The Ahmed government’s pursuit of sea access for Ethiopia, potentially at the expense of Eritrean sovereignty, appears to have multiple objectives. It may reflect a strategy to mobilize the Ethiopian public and foster internal cohesion. The move could also weaken the Amhara-Asmara alliance, discouraging Asmara from interfering in Ethiopia’s internal affairs, particularly its presumed support for Amharic Fano rebel militias. Securing sea access may contribute positively to the peace agreement by facilitating the withdrawal of all Eritrean forces from the Tigray region.

The Ethiopian prime minister’s changed tone toward Eritrea suggests a reassessment of options, with the military force option likely ruled out to prevent another violent conflict in the region. The third scenario appears very probable in the foreseeable future, although the other two scenarios, especially scenario one, remain more likely.

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Here’s How Russia Could Help Ethiopia In Its Peaceful Quest For A Port

Modern Diplomacy

AFRICA

Here’s How Russia Could Help Ethiopia In Its Peaceful Quest For A Port

All landlocked countries have the international legal right to obtain reliable access to the sea.

BY : ANDREW KORYBKO

DECEMBER 25, 2023

All landlocked countries have the international legal right to obtain reliable access to the sea. An estimated 95% of Ethiopia’s international trade is presently conducted via Djibouti, but that country reportedly charges onerous rates for using its commercial port facilities. The pandemic, the two-year-long Northern Conflict, and a severe draught led to financial problems for Ethiopia, which means the aforesaid rates risk holding back and possibly even capping the nation’s economic growth.

If this situation isn’t rectified to release Ethiopia’s full economic potential, its expected demographic explosion could then lead to a mass exodus that destabilizes the region, not to mention potential domestic instability that could threaten its neighbors, too. That’s why it’s imperative for Ethiopia to negotiate better terms for using Djibouti’s commercial port facilities to lessen the burden that negatively affects its growth and could catalyze these future crises.

In connection with these legitimate national interests, Ethiopia wants to rebuild its navy to secure the fertilizer and fuel maritime logistics upon which its economic stability depends. If they’re unexpectedly disrupted, perhaps due to Great Power games in the region, the economy could then immediately enter a crisis with all that would entail for domestic and regional stability. It’s therefore equally imperative for Ethiopia to rebuild its navy to preemptively avert economically driven crises.

Considering these dynamics, it might be in the neighboring countries’ objective interests to facilitate Ethiopia’s commercial and naval port plans, but the regional security dilemma poses a challenge. To explain, this refers to a concept in International Relations theory that draws attention to the mutually detrimental effect that countries’ suspicions of each other could have on their shared interests. What one regards as defensive and peaceful moves might be perceived by the other as offensive and warmongering.

In response, the country that perceives the other’s moves in that negative way might make its own defensive moves in response, which its counterpart similarly perceives in a negative way, does the same, and so on. If left unchecked, this could lead to a self-sustaining cycle of escalation that risks spiraling out of control into a regional war. In this case, Ethiopia’s peaceful port plans might be perceived by some coastal countries as being driven by ulterior warmongering motives.

From some of those countries’ perspective, Djibouti’s monopoly over Ethiopia’s global trade contains the latter and therefore averts latent threats to the coastal countries’ security as their policymakers see it. From Ethiopia’s perspective, however, these speculative containment intentions could potentially lead to cascading economic-security crises that risk “Balkanizing” the country and destabilizing the region. Since trust between Ethiopia and some of its neighbors is presently lacking, this worsens mutual suspicions.

International Relations scholars suggest that such regional security dilemmas as the one afflicting the Horn are best resolved through joint trust-building initiatives that are mutually beneficial to each party or at least to some of those involved in this dilemma without harming others’ legitimate interests. Prime Minister Abiy proactively sought to do just that by bravely broaching this previously taboo topic for the purpose of preemptively averting such potentially forthcoming crises through a series of deals.

He explained why he brought this up and why everyone should resolve these problems far ahead of time before they spiral out of control, after which he suggested giving any interested neighboring country stakes in GERD and national companies in exchange for commercial-military port rights. The regional security dilemma had already regrettably worsened by then, however, which is why their policymakers wrongly suspected that he secretly harbored offensive and warmongering intentions.

Their official responses to his proposal prove that they were reacting to it under the influence of the abovementioned perceptions that are attributable to the regional security dilemma that was described earlier. They therefore shouldn’t be interpreted as ruling out a series of mutually beneficial deals in principle such as the sort that Prime Minister Abiy proposed. Rather, all that those countries did was reaffirm their territorial integrity in reaction to fears that Ethiopia secretly intends to threaten them.

No such intentions exist, however, as Prime Minister Abiy recently made clear during his latest extended remarks that emphasized the purely peaceful nature of Ethiopia’s port plans. The combination of innocent concerns and malicious portrayals of this policy, both of which stem from the regional security dilemma, are why perceptions about it don’t reflect reality. This explains why Ethiopia continues clarifying its policy to discern which of these two reasons accounts for each neighbor’s reaction.

At this point, it’s arguably the case that Ethiopia’s peaceful port plans stand the best chance of success through a series of mutually beneficial deals with Djibouti, which already allows Ethiopia commercial port access notwithstanding its onerous rates and hosts several other states’ naval bases. The precedent therefore exists for renegotiating the first’s terms and opening negotiations on the second item, but Djibouti might be reluctant to cede its monopoly over Ethiopia’s global trade due to how lucrative it is.

Ethiopian and Djiboutian sources have shared different annual rates regarding the first’s commercial access to the second’s port, but regardless of whichever statistics one goes by, it’s indisputably the fact that the revenue derived from these rates accounts for a sizeable proportion of Djibouti’s budget. Accordingly, it’s understandable why it might not want to negotiate reduced rates out of fear that it could struggle to replace this lost revenue, with all that might entail for economic and domestic stability.

The shares that Prime Minister Abiy offered coastal countries in exchange for the commercial-military port rights that Ethiopia is seeking for the legitimate reasons that were earlier explained might not be considered by Djibouti to be adequate compensation for the annual revenue that it stands to lose. This observation could spoil the success of their talks or prevent them from beginning in the first place, unless a creative solution is proposed for resolving this financial dilemma.

Therein rests the importance of what the South Sudanese Ambassador to Russia recently revealed in his latest interview with TASS. He said that Russia had been contracted to map South Sudan’s natural resources across the next two years and that those two are considering building a pipeline to the Red Sea via Ethiopia and Djibouti. To be clear, such a pipeline has yet to be formally agreed to, but his confirmation of their talks about it is significant.

What it means is that Russia could possibly help resolve Djibouti’s financial dilemma that impedes progress on any potential commercial-military port talks with Ethiopia due to its strategic stakes in this. Djibouti might be willing to renegotiate a much less onerous rate for Ethiopia’s commercial port access if it was guaranteed the right to purchase oil from this prospective pipeline at privileged prices. This deal could be further sweetened if Russia agreed to build an oil refinery in Djibouti, too.

The proverbial cherry on the cake could be if Russia offers privileged prices on agricultural exports to Djibouti and/or stakes in some of its resource companies that might operate in South Sudan following the mapping of that country’s natural resources and the possible clinching of a regional pipeline deal. These stakes could generate enough annual revenue that Djibouti ends up making more money from this grand deal than if it refused to negotiate with Ethiopia and kept its presently onerous rates in place.

To clarify, the South Sudanese Ambassador was the one who told Russian media about those two’s regional pipeline talks, but no agreement has yet been reached and Russia hasn’t made any of the proposals suggested above to Djibouti. The purpose of the preceding two paragraphs is solely to suggest pragmatic and mutually beneficial ways for resolving the regional security dilemma and Djibouti’s supplementary financial one that impedes the first such dilemma’s resolution as was explained.

If any of these proposals are incorporated into future talks between those four parties – Ethiopia, Djibouti, Russia, and South Sudan – then Djibouti might consider this adequate compensation for the annual revenue that it stands to lose from renegotiating its commercial port deal with Ethiopia. From there, those two could then have a greater chance of agreeing to a military deal as well, which might even include a joint naval base with Russia in exchange for the stakes that it might offer Djibouti.

Once again, nobody should misinterpret this scenario forecast as confirming that Russia requested a naval base there since all that’s being done here is proposing what might come to pass but hasn’t yet. This suggestion could further alleviate the regional security dilemma since the coastal countries that distrust Ethiopia all trust Russia, which they know wouldn’t support any speculative acts of aggression against them from Ethiopia like their policymakers might fear that it’s supposedly plotting in secret.

To sum it up, Ethiopia’s peaceful quest for fair and reliable commercial-military access to the sea is legitimate in terms of international law and aimed at preemptively averting economically driven crises that could threaten regional stability. The regional security dilemma between this landlocked country and its coastal neighbors has impeded progress on this policy, as has Djibouti’s financial dilemma in not wanting to lose the sizeable revenue that it derives from charging Ethiopia onerous rates for port access.

These dilemmas might finally be resolved if Russia proposes a series of mutually beneficial deals between Ethiopia and Djibouti as part of the talks that it’s reportedly engaged in with South Sudan over a regional pipeline from that country to the Red Sea via those two. Djibouti might seriously consider granting Ethiopia the commercial-military access it’s seeking if Moscow is able to get all four parties to agree to a grand deal.

This could involve Ethiopia giving Djibouti stakes in its megaprojects and national companies while Russia could offer Djibouti stakes in its own resource ones that might soon operate in South Sudan. Djibouti would become the terminal point of South Sudan’s envisaged Red Sea pipeline and possibly have a Russian-built refinery too in exchange for giving Russia and Ethiopia a joint naval base. If Djibouti doesn’t agree to these generous terms, then Russia could also offer it privileged agricultural and oil prices too.

What’s being proposed represents the most peaceful, pragmatic, and mutually beneficial way for resolving the regional security dilemma between landlocked Ethiopia and its coastal neighbors. The intent is to encourage a series of Russian-led deals that bring peace and development to everyone in the Horn, and nothing contained in these proposals warmongers or threatens anyone’s legitimate interests. Those who might still oppose this proposal are ultra-nationalists obsessed with containing Ethiopia.

While the terms of this proposed deal can be constructively critiqued by anyone, its spirit can’t be criticized since it aligns with each state’s UN-enshrined right to negotiate whatever it might be with anyone that they’d like, with this only being immoral if it threatens a third party’s legitimate interests. That’s not the case with this proposed deal, however, hence why those who criticize its spirit are exposing their zero-sum divide-and-rule regional hegemonic interests.

No country’s legitimate interests are threatened by the proposed joint Ethiopian-Russian naval base in Djibouti, those two offering Djibouti stakes in their companies, Russia also offering it privileged agricultural and oil prices, nor by Djibouti serving as the terminal point of a South Sudanese pipeline. Only those obsessed with containing Ethiopia, potentially with the ultimate intent of “Balkanizing” it, would object to this proposed series of peaceful, legal, rational, pragmatic, and mutually beneficial deals.

 December 25, 2023

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The logical relationship between currency devaluation, imports and exports, trade balance, foreign direct investment (FDI), and gross domestic product (GDP)

The logical relationship between currency devaluation, imports and exports, trade balance, foreign direct investment (FDI), and gross domestic product (GDP) is complex and interconnected. Changes in one of these factors can have significant implications for the others, and understanding their relationship is crucial for assessing the overall economic health of a country.

Currency Devaluation:

Currency devaluation refers to the deliberate downward adjustment of a country's currency value relative to other currencies. This can be done through various mechanisms, such as central bank interventions or market forces. Devaluation makes a country's exports cheaper and imports more expensive in foreign markets, which can have several effects on the economy.

Import and Export:

Devaluation makes a country's exports more competitive in international markets because they become relatively cheaper for foreign buyers. Conversely, imports become more expensive for domestic consumers and businesses. Therefore, a devaluation often leads to an increase in exports and a decrease in imports, as domestic goods become relatively cheaper and foreign goods become relatively more expensive.

Trade Balance:

The relationship between currency devaluation and the trade balance is intricate. Initially, a devaluation tends to improve the trade balance by increasing exports and decreasing imports, which can lead to a surplus in the short term. However, if the demand for imports is inelastic (not very responsive to price changes) or if a country is heavily dependent on imported inputs for its exports, the trade balance may not improve significantly. Over time, other factors, such as changes in global demand, productivity, and domestic policies, also influence the trade balance.

Foreign Direct Investment (FDI):

Currency devaluation can influence FDI in several ways. A devalued currency can make a country more attractive for foreign investors, as it reduces the cost of investing and operating in that country. Additionally, a country's improved trade balance resulting from devaluation may signal a more competitive export sector, which can attract FDI. However, devaluation can also lead to higher costs for imported inputs and capital goods, potentially dampening the attractiveness of the country for FDI.

Gross Domestic Product (GDP):

The relationship between currency devaluation and GDP is multifaceted. Initially, a devaluation can boost GDP through increased export revenues and potential expansion of domestic industries benefiting from increased competitiveness in foreign markets. However, if a country is heavily reliant on imported inputs for its production, the higher cost of imports resulting from devaluation can lead to inflationary pressures and reduced domestic purchasing power, which can negatively impact GDP growth. Additionally, the impact of devaluation on GDP also depends on various other factors such as the elasticity of demand for exports and imports and the overall health of the domestic economy.

In summary, the logical relationship between currency devaluation, imports and exports, trade balance, FDI, and GDP is complex and dynamic. While devaluation can have positive impacts on export competitiveness and trade balance, its effects on FDI and GDP are contingent on a variety of factors, including the structure of the economy, the elasticity of demand for goods and services, and the overall business environment. Therefore, a comprehensive analysis of these factors is necessary to understand the full implications of currency devaluation on a country's economy.

Title: The Dark Side of Social Media: Implications on the Younger Generation and the Future of Ethiopia.

Title: The Dark Side of Social Media: Implications on the Younger Generation and the Future of Ethiopia

Social media has become a critical aspect of modern life, especially among the younger generation. While it offers a plethora of benefits, including instantaneous communication, access to diverse perspectives, and the ability to share and receive information globally, its overuse and misuse can lead to negative consequences. In developing countries like Ethiopia, this is particularly concerning, given the role of education and knowledge in driving socioeconomic progress.

The addiction to social media among young people is a growing concern. Much like any addiction, excessive use of social media can negatively impact various aspects of life, including physical health, mental well-being, and academic performance. Recent studies have shown an association between excessive social media use and negative health outcomes such as depression, anxiety, and low self-esteem. 

Moreover, social media addiction is altering not just our behaviours but also our cognitive abilities and learning patterns. The culture of instant gratification, epitomized by short posts, likes, retweets, and viral trends, is diminishing the patience and focus required for in-depth reading and thoughtful reflection. The dopamine-driven feedback loops of social media platforms encourage users to engage with more content, but that content is often shallow and unchallenging. As a result, young people are reading fewer books and engaging less with long-form content that encourages critical thinking, creativity, and innovation. 

In the context of a developing country like Ethiopia, this trend is particularly worrisome. The country's future hinges on the development of well-rounded, informed, and creative individuals who can drive innovation and sustainable change. Social media, if used excessively and without discernment, could curtail this development by fostering intellectual laziness and a lack of creativity among the youth.

The impact of social media extends beyond individual users, influencing societal dynamics. In Ethiopia, social media has become a tool in ongoing civil conflicts. It allows for the rapid spread of misinformation and hate speech, which can fuel tensions and polarize communities. This, coupled with its addictive nature, can create an environment in which young people are exposed to negative influences, exacerbating societal conflicts and hindering peace-building efforts.

In light of these challenges, there is an urgent need to enact policies that mitigate the negative impacts of social media usage. These might include digital literacy programs that teach young people how to consume and share information responsibly, policies that regulate the spread of misinformation, and initiatives that encourage reading and critical thinking. 

Furthermore, parents and educators have a crucial role to play in coaching children on the responsible use of social media. Perhaps we need to foster a culture that balances online and offline activities, promoting reading and personal development alongside digital literacy.

In conclusion, while social media has the potential to be a powerful tool for development, its excessive and unregulated use can have substantial negative effects. It is particularly important for developing nations, like Ethiopia, to recognize and address these challenges to ensure a brighter future. After all, they must prepare their youth not just to survive in a global digital age, but to thrive and lead in it. The task, therefore, is to harness the potential of social media while mitigating its risks, fostering a generation of informed, creative, and responsible citizens.

Social media has become an integral part of life for many young people, but it does come with a variety of potential risks. Here are some of the key concerns:

**Cyberbullying:** This is one of the most common risks associated with social media. Young people may find themselves the targets of online harassment, which can lead to emotional distress and, in some cases, even self-harm or suicide.

**Privacy Issues:** Young people may not fully understand the importance of privacy settings on social media platforms and may unintentionally share private information. This could put them at risk of identity theft, stalking, or other types of exploitation.

**Exposure to Inappropriate Content:** The Internet is filled with content that may not be suitable for young viewers, from violent or graphic images to explicit sexual content. This exposure can occur accidentally or deliberately, but in either case, it can have harmful effects.

**Online Predators:** Social media platforms can be used by predators to groom or exploit young people. These individuals often disguise their identities and intentions, building trust with their victims before taking advantage of them.

**Mental Health Issues:** Excessive use of social media has been linked to a range of mental health issues, including anxiety, depression, low self-esteem, and body image concerns. The constant comparison with peers and celebrities, the pursuit of likes and comments, and the "Fear of Missing Out" (FOMO) can all contribute to these problems.

**Sleep Disruption:** Spending too much time on social media, especially before bed, can interfere with sleep. The light from screens can disrupt the body's natural sleep rhythms, and engaging with stimulating content can make it harder to fall asleep.

**Academic Performance:** Overuse of social media can lead to decreased productivity and lower academic performance. Time spent on social media can take away from studying, and the constant notifications can disrupt concentration.

**Misinformation and Radicalization:** Social media platforms can be a breeding ground for misinformation and extremist content. Young people can be easily influenced by such content, leading to a distorted view of the world and potentially harmful behaviours.

Overall, while social media can offer young people many benefits, it's important to be aware of these potential risks and take steps to mitigate them. This often involves a combination of parental oversight, education about online safety, and the development of critical thinking skills.

Social media has become an integral part of life for many young people, but it does come with a variety of potential risks. Here are some of the key concerns:

**Cyberbullying:** This is one of the most common risks associated with social media. Young people may find themselves the targets of online harassment, which can lead to emotional distress and, in some cases, even self-harm or suicide.

**Privacy Issues:** Young people may not fully understand the importance of privacy settings on social media platforms and may unintentionally share private information. This could put them at risk of identity theft, stalking, or other types of exploitation.

**Exposure to Inappropriate Content:** The Internet is filled with content that may not be suitable for young viewers, from violent or graphic images to explicit sexual content. This exposure can occur accidentally or deliberately, but in either case, it can have harmful effects.

**Online Predators:** Social media platforms can be used by predators to groom or exploit young people. These individuals often disguise their identities and intentions, building trust with their victims before taking advantage of them.

**Mental Health Issues:** Excessive use of social media has been linked to a range of mental health issues, including anxiety, depression, low self-esteem, and body image concerns. The constant comparison with peers and celebrities, the pursuit of likes and comments, and the "Fear of Missing Out" (FOMO) can all contribute to these problems.

**Sleep Disruption:** Spending too much time on social media, especially before bed, can interfere with sleep. The light from screens can disrupt the body's natural sleep rhythms, and engaging with stimulating content can make it harder to fall asleep.

**Academic Performance:** Overuse of social media can lead to decreased productivity and lower academic performance. Time spent on social media can take away from studying, and the constant notifications can disrupt concentration.

**Misinformation and Radicalization:** Social media platforms can be a breeding ground for misinformation and extremist content. Young people can be easily influenced by such content, leading to a distorted view of the world and potentially harmful behaviours.

Overall, while social media can offer young people many benefits, it's important to be aware of these potential risks and take steps to mitigate them. This often involves a combination of parental oversight, education about online safety, and the development of critical thinking skills.

Cyberbullying can have a significant impact on a child's emotional well-being, and often, children may not feel comfortable or even know how to express what they're going through. As a parent, it's essential to be aware of potential signs of cyberbullying. Here are some indicators to watch out for:

**Changes in Device Usage:** Sudden changes in a child's device usage patterns could suggest cyberbullying. A child may suddenly spend a lot more time online or conversely, might avoid devices altogether.

**Emotional Distress During/After Using Device:** If a child appears upset, frustrated, or angry after using the internet or a mobile device, it could indicate that they're experiencing online harassment.

**Secrecy About Online Activities:** If a child becomes unusually secretive about their online activities, it could be a sign that they are trying to hide something unpleasant, like cyberbullying.

**Withdrawal From Social Activities:** A child who is being bullied online might withdraw from social events, lose interest in their hobbies, or avoid school and other places where they usually interact with peers.

**Unwillingness to Discuss Online Activities:** If a child becomes particularly resistant to talking about what they're doing online or whom they're interacting with, it might suggest they're dealing with an issue like cyberbullying.

**Changes in Mood or Behavior:** Noticeable changes in a child's mood or behavior, such as becoming more sullen, angry, or anxious, could be a sign of cyberbullying.

**Unexpectedly Deleting Social Media Accounts:** If your child suddenly deletes their social media accounts or creates new ones, it might be a response to persistent online harassment.

**Trouble Sleeping or Frequent Nightmares:** Cyberbullying can cause significant stress and anxiety, which can lead to sleeping problems or nightmares.

**Declining Academic Performance:** If a child's grades start to drop, or they lose interest in schoolwork, it could be a sign of the distress caused by cyberbullying.

It's important to remember that these signs can also indicate other issues, such as depression or offline bullying. If you notice any of these signs, it's important to talk to your child openly and non-judgmentally, offering your support and help in addressing the situation. If necessary, consider seeking help from a counselor, teacher, or other trusted adult.