The Red Sea Crisis Goes Beyond the HouthisTo Avoid a Spiral of Violence,

The Red Sea Crisis Goes Beyond the HouthisTo Avoid a Spiral of Violence, America Must Help Stabilize the Greater Horn of Africa By Johnnie Carson, Alex Rondos, Susan Stigant, and Michael Woldemariam

 July 19, 2024A U.S. helicopter flying over the Red Sea, February 2024Hamad I Mohammed / Reuters

The Red Sea is in crisis. At the center of the storm are Yemen’s Houthi rebels, who have unleashed a wave of attacks on ships traversing one of the world’s most pivotal maritime straits, putatively in support of Hamas’s war against Israel. The Houthi gambit in the Red Sea is imposing serious costs on global trade, as did the problem of Somali piracy, which reached its peak in 2010. The United States and some of its allies have stepped in to militarily suppress the threat, bombing Houthi positions inside Yemen. But although this episode is illustrative of the difficulties of Red Sea security, the crisis extends far beyond the trouble emanating from Yemen.The political violence and state fragmentation that fueled the Houthis’ rise in Yemen is now wreaking havoc across the broader Horn of Africa. A metastasizing web of intrastate and interstate conflicts stretching from Sudan to Somalia could bring unprecedented chaos across the Horn, creating space for extremist militant networks and countries hostile to Western interests and a free and open Red Sea. Preventing the situation from growing even worse will require a broad-based diplomatic coalition to de-escalate the Horn’s multiple conflicts. But such an effort cannot succeed without aggressive U.S. diplomatic support. An American-led push would have to deter destabilizing interventions on the part of outside parties such as the United Arab Emirates and Iran, which have extended military support to warring actors in places like Sudan. It would also need to avert a regionwide famine, the threat of which is most acute in Sudan and Ethiopia. Taking on these daunting tasks will require a boost of diplomatic outreach by senior U.S. officials, including U.S. President Joe Biden. If the region’s interconnected crises worsen, parties hostile to U.S. interests and a free and open Red Sea may gain strategic advantage in this important maritime corridor.A REGION AT WARMultiple wars are causing deep instability in the Horn of Africa and contributing to the crisis in the Red Sea. From 2018 to 2019, popular revolts toppled long-standing authoritarian regimes in Ethiopia and Sudan, but both states have since descended into astonishing levels of violence. A two-year war between Ethiopia’s federal authorities and forces from the Tigray region killed over 500,000 people and displaced millions more. The November 2022 agreement that ended that conflict is under increasing strain as many of its most contentious provisions await implementation. Ethiopia’s two biggest regions—Oromia and Amhara—are suffering from intractable insurgencies, and talks to peacefully resolve the conflict in Oromia ended in failure in November. Although the country’s capital, Addis Ababa, remains stable, insecurity is a constant across much of the rural hinterland.Stay informed.In-depth analysis delivered weekly.Internal tensions in Ethiopia are the backdrop to its deteriorating ties with Eritrea, which faces its own looming questions about an aging leader and a potentially volatile political transition. Eritrea’s President Isaias Afwerki, 78, has been in power for three decades, presiding over a highly personalized autocracy with few viable mechanisms for managing succession. In January, landlocked Ethiopia signed a memorandum of understanding on port access with Somaliland, which seceded from Somalia in 1991 but whose sovereignty is not recognized by any country. At the time of the signing, Somaliland President Muse Bihi Abdi said the agreement would involve Ethiopia’s recognition of Somaliland as an independent state, which could lead to a serious dispute between Addis Ababa and Mogadishu and derail fragile efforts to stabilize Somalia. Djibouti, the traditional port outlet for Ethiopian goods and services, could also face political and economic repercussions from deepening Ethiopia-Somaliland ties, at the same time it also faces uncertainties about political succession.As this has been playing out in Ethiopia, the Sudanese state has effectively collapsed. Sudan’s fractious security apparatus toppled the transitional administration of Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok in October 2021 and then descended into devastating internal strife in April 2023. By early 2024, the country was the site of the world’s largest displacement crisis, with violence driving an estimated 10 million people to flee their homes. For much of the war, the capital and the country have effectively been partitioned in two, with the main belligerents—the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF)—locked in a costly stalemate that both believe they can break. Alarmingly, this already brutal war is set to become even more deadly, as the RSF launches offensives into eastern Sudan, both sides exhibit signs of internal fragmentation, and each seeks to mobilize constituencies along sectarian lines.The war in Sudan has also disrupted the transit of South Sudanese oil to the Red Sea and cut more than 75 percent of revenue flowing to authorities in Juba, South Sudan’s capital. The loss of this money is collapsing the patronage-based deals that anchor the war-torn country’s politics. Civil servants, as well as the military and security services, have already gone months without pay, and this worrying development comes ahead of an ill-defined and potentially volatile electoral process expected later this year. To the east and north, Sudan’s disarray is adding to three-way tensions between Ethiopia’s federal government, Tigrayan authorities, and Eritrea, which are all intimately invested in the balance of power in eastern Sudan. It has also paralyzed the negotiations over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, an enormous infrastructure project that affects the water supply of Egypt and Sudan. The last round of talks collapsed in December amid charges of bad faith between Egypt and Ethiopia.Kenya is facing its own political inflection point with leaders under pressure to balance their budget while responding to citizen priorities, as evidenced by recent tax-related protests and subsequent dissolution of the cabinet. The storm gathering along Kenya’s frontiers also increasingly requires its leaders’ time, attention, and diplomatic leadership.SOURCES OF DISORDERThis region is no stranger to instability. But the current crisis is unprecedented in scale and scope. It is also exacerbated by three emerging problems of the twenty-first century’s changing global order. The first and most relevant to the Horn and Red Sea is the growing strength of middle powers keen to assert themselves in their backyard and on the international stage. The explosion of civil war in Yemen in 2014 and the crisis among Gulf countries three years later (which saw Qatar placed under a blockade by its neighbors) precipitated a flurry of financial and military interventions across the Horn by Middle Eastern powers intent on cultivating local clients and denying strategic advantage to their regional competitors. Even as the rivalries that animated this scramble have waned, the pattern of aggressive intervention and its debilitating effects have not. Flush with money and military hardware, local actors across the Horn are doubling down on coercion at the expense of negotiation. The United Arab Emirates is at the center of this problematic activity, as its recent interventions in Sudan (where it backs the RSF) and Ethiopia (where it backs Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed) demonstrate. But many others have also been culpable, including Egypt, Iran, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey.Converging demographic, climate, and macroeconomic pressures serve as additional catalysts for disorder. A regionwide youth bulge and rapid urbanization are creating new demands for economic mobility that many governments cannot meet. Between 2020 and 2023, the Horn of Africa suffered five failed rainy seasons, causing the worst drought since the 1980s; meanwhile, South Sudan and Kenya have suffered from debilitating floods. These environmental shocks, combined with conflict, are producing acute hunger crises in Sudan, South Sudan, and Tigray, with nearly 30 million at risk of starvation. And nearly all countries in the region are suffering from a toxic combination of debt, high inflation, and severe hard currency shortages brought on by global economic forces beyond their control, from supply chain disruptions to increased borrowing costs.Meanwhile, the crumbling of global multilateralism has undermined international responses to the Horn’s multiple crises. For four years, geopolitical competition between China, Russia, and the United States has thwarted any serious UN Security Council action on the wars in Sudan and Ethiopia. Power brokers at the African Union have largely scrapped the organization’s founding principle of “non-indifference,” doing little of substance to address these conflicts even as they demand prominent roles in any peace processes. The Intergovernmental Authority on Development, the Horn’s regional trade organization, is paralyzed by internal rivalries and is uninterested in rocking the boat by pursuing peace initiatives that alienate some member states. And even if African multilateral organizations were willing to act, success would require collaboration with powerful players from the Middle East at a moment when there is no forum for the Red Sea that brings together African and Middle Eastern states and makes transregional solutions possible.The Sudanese state has effectively collapsed.This growing instability has been disastrous for the region’s people. It will also be exploited by a constellation of actors hostile to Western interests and a free and open Red Sea. The jihadist group al Shabab, for example, is poised for a breakout in Somalia. President Hassan Sheikh is struggling to suppress the group and reduce its ability to shape the national narrative. He is distracted by the growing closeness between Ethiopia and Somaliland and the rivalry between his administration and Somalia’s member states. He is also facing a drawdown of military support from international partners. Some observers openly contemplate al Shabab’s return to Mogadishu, where it had a strong presence between 2009 and 2012—an outcome that would be comparable to the Taliban’s 2021 return to Kabul in Afghanistan. This reality would immediately imperil neighboring Kenya and even Ethiopia, which has historically been immune to attacks from the group but witnessed a major incursion in July 2022. In Sudan, Western intelligence officials openly worry that the prevailing chaos will create new openings for homegrown terror networks or affiliates of al Qaeda and the Islamic State (also known as ISIS) from the Sahel and Libya.Revisionist states are also making tangible bids for power in and around the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. The Wagner paramilitary group, the Russian mercenary outfit, has provided support to the RSF, but the Kremlin is now cultivating both sides of the Sudanese war in a bid to retain its stakes in the country’s gold economy and realize a 2020 agreement that would grant Moscow a Red Sea naval base on Sudan’s coast. Russia’s influence in Sudan is now significant. Russia is also exploiting Eritrea’s insecurities regarding Ethiopia to deepen ties with this strategic Red Sea state. Meanwhile, Iran is also on the march. In 2015, Saudi pressure led states across the region to downgrade their bilateral relations with Tehran, but it is now an active player in the Sudan war, providing armaments to the SAF in recent months in a bid to reconstitute historical ties with the country’s security apparatus. This comes on the back of evidence that Iran supplied drones to the Ethiopian military at the height of the Tigray war.LEAN ON FRIENDSThe Horn’s multiple crises can be sustainably resolved only by actors within the region. Yet most of them recognize that the United States must be the critical catalyst for peace. The Biden administration, to its credit, appreciates this reality. It is at the center of diplomatic efforts to resolve the wars in Sudan and Ethiopia and de-escalate tensions regarding the Ethiopia-Somaliland agreement. It continues to be a leading source of humanitarian assistance to the region, and it remains a key supporter of regional counterterrorism efforts.But it is also evident that these efforts have not arrested the region’s slide. To avert the looming strategic catastrophe, which would involve U.S. adversaries leveraging the Horn’s instability to expand their political and military influence along the Red Sea, the United States must enhance its efforts to de-escalate regional tensions and address the Red Sea arena—the maritime route and the surrounding countries (littoral and beyond) in the Horn and Gulf—as a connected geopolitical space. For too long, the activity of Middle Eastern states in the Horn has been a concern of Africa-focused diplomats within the U.S. government but deprioritized by their counterparts in Near East‒focused bureaucracies and the broader foreign policy apparatus. A first step would be a strong U.S. effort to discourage the destabilizing Middle Eastern interventions that are at the heart of much of the chaos. Since many of the key transgressors are U.S. partners, such as the UAE, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar, Washington’s concerns about their conduct must be significantly elevated in bilateral dialogues. The United States should make the case to these friends that their interventions harm their long-term economic interests, damage their reputations in ways that make it harder for the United States to deepen bilateral cooperation, and expand the influence of malign actors across the region. The U.S. Congress, which has demonstrated some awareness of the problematic activity of Middle Eastern states in Sudan and across the Horn, must reinforce this message of disapproval and press the administration when it is not being delivered. Hearings and legislation requiring the administration to publicly report on the nature and consequences of Middle Eastern interference in the Horn, as well as U.S. responses, should be put in play.The United States should also mobilize to prevent famine across the Horn, which is a direct symptom of the depth of the crisis and violence in the region. To do so, the appointment of a coordinator for humanitarian relief in the Horn is needed, tasked with reaching deals with armed actors, international relief organizations, and local humanitarians and business interests to secure safe passage of food and basic goods. The most urgent challenge is currently in Sudan, where warring parties have obstructed the movement of aid across the country’s international borders and lines of control.The United States should mobilize to prevent famine across the Horn.A diplomatic initiative of this nature succeeds only with a demonstrable and sustained engagement by U.S. President Joe Biden and Secretary of State Antony Blinken, as well as key defense and intelligence officials that carry weight across the region. The visible role of senior-most U.S. leaders can strengthen the hand of U.S. envoys on the ground in the region, who must be better staffed and resourced to match the complexity of the crisis. Unless the crisis receives this level of attention, U.S. credibility in this strategic zone will continue to be undercut by the impression, widespread across the Horn, that top U.S. policymakers are too preoccupied by the problems of Gaza and Ukraine (not to mention the American presidential election) to consistently engage and try to solve an African crisis. And, as a corollary, the United States is willing to defer to Gulf countries, which do not necessarily share core American interests in the region.The United States should not go it alone. Instability in the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa is a direct economic and security threat to European business and commercial interests. Migration has come to dominate European political debates, and an intensification of instability in the Horn risks exacerbating this problem, further skewing European politics in ways that complicate the transatlantic alliance. The United States must leverage Europe’s direct interests in the region by partnering with the European Union, its member states, and the United Kingdom in active efforts to secure regional peace, with a specific focus on supporting mediation to end the twin wars in Sudan and Ethiopia. Similarly, UN Secretary-General António Guterres, working in close partnership with the African Union and its member states, can play a high-level role in averting a deeper crisis by facilitating better coordination between the array of international envoys attempting to manage the Horn’s multiple hot spots.It is not too late to stabilize the Red Sea, but the window is closing as violence and state fragmentation spread and the influence of U.S. competitors expands. The United States and its partners must act to stop widening crises on land or risk chasing a current of further instability into one of the world’s most vital waterways.You are reading a free article.Subscribe to Foreign Affairs to get unlimited access.Paywall-free reading of new articles and over a century of archivesUnlock access to iOS/Android apps to save editions for offline readingSix issues a year in print and online, plus audio articlesJOHNNIE CARSON is Senior Adviser to the President of the U.S. Institute of Peace. From 2009 to 2013, he served as U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs.ALEX RONDOS is a Senior Adviser with the Africa Center at the U.S. Institute of Peace. He formerly served as the European Union’s Special Representative for the Horn of Africa.SUSAN STIGANT is Director of Africa Programs at the U.S. Institute of Peace.MICHAEL WOLDEMARIAM is an Associate Professor at the University of Maryland’s School of Public Policy.MORE BY JOHNNIE CARSONMORE BY ALEX RONDOSMORE BY SUSAN STIGANTMORE BY MICHAEL WOLDEMARIAMMore:Somalia Sudan United States Yemen Diplomacy Geopolitics Economics Trade Security Defense & Military Strategy & Conflict U.S. Foreign Policy HouthisRecommended ArticlesHow Washington Emboldened the HouthisAnd How It Can Prevent Its Fight With the Group From EscalatingNoam Raydan and Grant RumleyIran’s New Best FriendsThe Houthis Have Become Key Partners in Tehran’s Quest for Regional DominanceMohammad Ayatollahi TabaarGET THE MAGAZINESave up to 55%on Foreign Affairs!FOREIGN AFFAIRSWeekly NewsletterGet in-depth analysis delivered right to your inboxABOUTCONTACTSUBSCRIPTIONFOLLOWGRADUATE SCHOOL FORUMFrom thepublishers ofForeign AffairsElection 2024: Will Joe Biden Exit the Presidential Race?James M. 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3. Ethiopia (1942-present)

Pre-Crisis Phase (January 31, 1942-December 12, 1960): Ethiopia was liberated from Italian control by British troops, and the British government recognized the independence of Ethiopia on January 31, 1942.  Tigray rebels led by Haile Mariam Redda, known as the Woyane, launched an insurgency against the government of Emperor Haile Selassie in May 1943.  The British Military Mission in Ethiopia (BMME), which was established as a result of the Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement of 1942, provided military assistance in support of the Ethiopian government.  The U.S and Ethiopian governments signed a mutual assistance agreement on August 9, 1943.  Ethiopian military forces, along with British military forces, suppressed the Woyane rebellion in October 1943, resulting in the deaths of thousands of individuals.  The U.S. government provided some $9 million in economic assistance to the government of Emperor Haile Selassie between April 2, 1948 and March 31, 1955.  Government troops and peasants clashed in Gojjam region on August 2, 1950. The United Nations (UN) General Assembly approved the federation of Ethiopia and Eritrea on December 2, 1950. Government troops suppressed a rebellion, and eight individuals were sentenced to death for their involvement in the rebellion on July 26, 1951.  Ethiopia requested military assistance from the U.S. government in October 1951.  Elections to the Representative Assembly were held in Eritrea on March 25-26, 1952. The Representative Assembly adopted a constitution for Eritrea on July 10, 1952, and Emperor Haile Selassie ratified the constitution on August 11, 1952.  Tedla Bairu was elected chief executive of Eritrea on August 28, 1952. Emperor Haile Selassie signed the Eritrean-Ethiopian Federation Act on September 11, 1952, and Eritrea joined the federation with Ethiopia on September 15, 1952.  The U.S. government agreed to provide military assistance (military training for some 4,000 Ethiopian military personnel in the U.S. and some 300 U.S. military advisors in Ethiopia) to the government of Emperor Haile Selassie on May 22, 1953.  The U.S. government provided military assistance to the Ethiopian government from 1953 to 1977, and some 4,000 U.S. military personnel were stationed at the Kagnew communications station in Asmara.  Emperor Haile Selassie issued a revised constitution on November 4, 1955, which prohibited political parties and established a Council of Ministers. The U.S. government provided some $12.5 million in economic assistance to the Ethiopian government between July 1, 1955 and June 30, 1957.  Legislative elections were held between January 9 and March 9, 1957, and independents won 210 out of 210 seats in the Chamber of Deputies.  The Chamber of Deputies convened in Addis Ababa on November 3, 1957.

Crisis Phase (December 13, 1960-March 31, 1961): Government troops commanded by General Merid Mengesha suppressed a military rebellion led by Brigadier General Mengestu Newaye in Addis Ababa on December 13-16, 1960, resulting in the deaths of some 500 individuals.  Legislative elections were held on January 9, 1961, and independents won 250 out of 250 seats in the Chamber of Deputies. On March 31, 1961, General Newaye was executed for his involvement in the December 1960 rebellion. Some 500 individuals were killed during the crisis.

Post-Crisis Phase (April 1, 1961-September 11, 1974):  Emperor Haile Selassie appointed Aklilou Habte Wold as prime minister on April 17, 1961.  The Chamber of Deputies voted to abolish the federation with Eritrea on November 14, 1962, and Ethiopia annexed Eritrea on November 16, 1962.  Legislative elections were held on January 9, 1965, and independents won 250 out of 250 seats in the Chamber of Deputies.  Government military forces suppressed armed peasant resistance in Mota and Bichena districts in Gojjam region in July and August 1968, resulting in the deaths of hundreds of individuals.  On August 2, 1968, two government military officers were sentenced to death for subversion. Government police and student demonstrators clashed in Addis Ababa on April 3-24, 1969, resulting in the deaths of two students. Legislative elections were held in 1969, and independents won 250 out of 250 seats in the Chamber of Deputies.  Government police uncovered a plot against the government led by General Takele Woldehawariat on November 27, 1969.  Government police and student demonstrators clashed in Addis Ababa on December 29, 1969, resulting in the deaths of three students.  The Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Party (EPRP) was established in opposition to the government on April 2, 1972.  Legislative elections were held between June 23 and July 7, 1973, and independents won 250 out of 250 seats in the Chamber of Deputies.  Government police and demonstrators clashed in Addis Ababa on February 20-25, 1974, resulting in the deaths of three individuals. Prime Minister Aklilu Habte Wolde resigned on February 27, 1974, and Emperor Haile Selassie appointed Endalakatchew Makonnen as prime minister on February 28, 1974.  Government police and students clashed in Addis Ababa on March 1-11, 1974, resulting in the death of one student.  Prime Minister Endalkatchew Makonnen resigned on July 22, 1974, and Emperor Haile Selassie appointed Mikhail Imru as prime minister on July 23, 1974.

Crisis Phase (September 12, 1974-September 30, 1976):  Emperor Haile Selassie was deposed in a military coup on September 12, 1974, and the Provisional Military Administrative Council (PMAC) headed by General Aman Michael Andom took control of the government on September 13, 1974.  The Tigray National Organization (TNO) was established in Addis Ababa on September 14, 1974.  President Omar Bongo of Gabon condemned the military coup on September 15, 1974.  Government troops arrested 21 individuals, including several former government officials, on October 10, 1974. General Aman was overthrown on November 22, 1974.  General Aman, Prince Eskinder Desta, and 58 former government officials and military officers were executed in Addis Ababa on November 23, 1974.  The Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), which consisted of Oromo Muslims from eastern Ethiopia and mostly Oromo Christians from western Ethiopia, was established in opposition to the military government in 1974.  Members of the TNO, known as the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), launched a rebellion against the military government on February 18, 1975.  The government of Yugoslavia provided military assistance (supplies) to the military government beginning on April 10, 1975.  Government troops suppressed a rebellion led by Lt. Colonel Negussie Haile and Captain Debessu Beyene on April 20-21, 1975, resulting in the arrests of 20 individuals.  Twenty individuals were executed by the military government on August 3, 1975, and some 200 individuals were executed by the military government between September 1974 and August 1975.  Former Emperor Haile Selassie died in prison on August 27, 1975.  Government troops and demonstrators clashed in Addis Ababa on September 25, 1975, resulting in the deaths of seven individuals.  The military government declared a state-of-emergency in Addis Ababa on September 30, 1975.  The military government lifted the state-of-emergency in Addis Ababa on December 6, 1975.  Government troops fired on demonstrators in Addis Ababa on April 21, 1976, resulting in the death of one individual.  On July 10, 1976, Brig. General Getachew Nadew and 19 other individuals were killed by government troops following a failed coup attempt.

Conflict Phase (October 1, 1976-May 28, 1991):  The Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Party (EPRP) launched a rebellion against the military government on October 1, 1976.  Brigadier-General Teferi Bante and six members of the PMAC were killed during a power struggle on February 3, 1977, and Lt. Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam took full control of the PMAC on February 4, 1977.  The government of South Yemen expressed support for Lt. Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam on February 7, 1977, and the Libyan government expressed support for Lt. Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam on February 8, 1977. The U.S. government imposed economic sanctions (suspension of economic assistance) and military sanctions (suspension of military assistance) against the military government in February 1977.  In April 1977, the Ethiopian government ordered the closure of U.S. military facilities in Ethiopia and the withdrawal of U.S. military advisors from Ethiopia.  Government troops killed some 2,500 individuals throughout the country beginning in April 1977.  The Cuban government deployed 50 military advisers in support of the military government in May 1977.  The government of the Soviet Union provided 60 million tons of military assistance (aircraft, tanks, artillery, and ammunition) to the military government from November 1977 to February 1978.  The Cuban government deployed some 17,000 Cuban troops, including three combat brigades, to Ethiopia beginning in November 1977.  On April 12, 1978, Amnesty International (AI) condemned the military government’s “red terror” against the citizens of Ethiopia.  In November 1978, the governments of Ethiopia and the Soviet Union signed a 20-year Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in which the Soviet Union agreed to provide military assistance (military training and military advisors) to the Ethiopian military government.  Eventually, some 1,700 Soviet military advisors, which were organized in a Military Advisory Group (MAG), were deployed in Ethiopia.  Berhane Meskel Reda Wolde, a leader of the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Party (EPRP), was executed by the government on July 12, 1979.  The military government released 1,000 political prisoners in September 1981, and the government released 716 political prisoners on September 11, 1982.  A new constitution was proposed on June 7, 1986, and the People’s Democratic Republic of Ethiopia was established on December 12, 1986.  Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Party (EPRP) rebels killed some 40 civilians in Gojjam region on December 27, 1986.  EPRP rebels killed 32 government soldiers on February 19, 1987. The constitution was approved in a referendum on February 1, 1987.  A national legislature (Shengo) was elected on June 14, 1987, and the Shengo convened in Addis Ababa on September 9, 1987. Colonel Mengistu was elected president without opposition by the Shengo on September 10, 1987.  Tigre People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) rebels launched a military offensive against government troops in March 1988.  In order to combat the TPLF, the military government established the Third Revolutionary Army (TRA) commanded by Major-General Mulatu Negash, on April 9, 1988.  The military government declared a state of emergency on May 14, 1988.  The military government launched an aerial bombing campaign and ground military offensive against TPLF-held areas of northern Ethiopia beginning on June 1, 1988.  Government forces attacked several towns between June 4 and August 29, 1988, including Harako, Seqota, Amdo, Samre, Dande, Abi Adi, Hausien, Enticho, Mai Kenetal, Adwa, Hagerai Selam, Netsege, Mai Mekden, Adi Nebrid, Kelish Emni, Mai Mado, and Adi Hagerai.  More than 2,175 civilians were killed in the attacks.  Government troops launched an unsuccessful military offensive (Operation Adwa) against TPLF rebels from June 19 to August 10, 1988.  TPLF rebels captured the town of Rama from government troops on September 29, 1988, resulting in the deaths of 21 government soldiers.  Government forces bombed the town of Sheraro in northern Ethiopia on December 12, 1988, resulting in the deaths of eight individuals.  Government troops launched a military offensive (Operation Aksum I) against TPLF rebels on December 28, 1988.  Government troops launched another military offensive (Operation Aksum II) against TPLF rebels on February 8, 1989.  Several opposition groups, including the Tigre People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and Ethiopian People’s Democratic Movement (EPDM), formally established the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) in January 1989.  TPLF rebels defeated the government military offensive following the Battle of Shire on February 19, 1989, resulting in the deaths of at least 10,000 government soldiers.  Some one million individuals fled as refugees to neighboring countries.  Government troops suppressed a military rebellion led by Major-General Merid Negusie and Major-General Amha Desta on May 16-18, 1989, resulting in the deaths of several individuals.  Defense Minister Haile Giorgis Habte-Mariam, along with the rebel military leaders, were killed during the rebellion.  The EPRDF launched a military offensive against government troops, and captured the towns of Maichew and Korem by September 8, 1989.  Government forces killed 148 individuals in the town of Chercher in Tigray region on September 9, 1989.  Government security forces killed 22 individuals in the town of Gobye in Wollo region on September 9-10, 1989.  After nearly 12 years, the Cuban government withdrew its remaining military personnel from Ethiopia on September 17, 1989.  Government forces killed 31 individuals in the town of Meqele in Tigray region on October 27-29, 1989.  The Italian government facilitated preliminary negotiations between government and TPLF representatives in Rome from November 4, 1989 to March 29, 1990.  Government forces killed 31 individuals in the town of Sheraro in Tigray region on November 21, 1989.  The Oromo People’s Democratic Organization (OPDO) was established in opposition to the government in April 1990.  EPRDF rebels launched a military offensive (Operation Teodros) against government troops in Gonder and Gojjam regions on February 23, 1991, and EPRDF rebels captured Gondar on March 8-9, 1991.  EPRDF rebels captured Mezezo in the Shoa region on March 19, 1991.  President Mengistu appointed Tesfaye Dinka as prime minister on April 26, 1991.  President Mengistu resigned as head-of-state on May 21, 1991, and Vice-President Tesfaye Gebre-Kidan assumed the presidency on May 22, 1991.  EPRDF rebels captured Adis Alem on May 21, 1991 and Debre Birhan on May 23, 1991.  U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Herman Cohen mediated negotiations between representatives of the government and EPRDF in London on May 27-28, 1991.  The federal government was overthrown by EPRDF rebels on May 28, 1991.  Some 250,000 individuals were killed, and some one million individuals were displaced during the conflict.

Post-Conflict Phase (May 29, 1991-November 2, 2020):  Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) troops and demonstrators clashed in Addis Ababa on May 29-30, 1991, resulting in the deaths of ten individuals. The EPRDF convened a national conference with representatives from more than 20 political movements, including the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), on July 1-5, 1991. The conference established an 87-member Council of Representatives headed by Meles Zenawi of the EPRDF.  The OLF was provided four cabinet positions in the Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE).  EPRDF troops and OLF troops clashed in 1991.  The U.S. government provided $95.2 million in economic assistance to the federal government in June 1992.  The provisional government of Eritrea and the U.S. government mediated a ceasefire on April 15, 1992.  Regional assembly elections were held on June 21, 1992, but the OLF had withdrawn from the elections on June 17, 1992. The Joint International Observer Group (JIOG), which consisted of 74 observers from the U.S., 24 observers from the United Nations (UN), 18 observers from the Organization of African Unity (OAU), and 18 observers from Germany, was established to monitor the regional elections. The OLF withdrew from the TGE on June 23, 1992.  The OLF mobilized some 15,000 troops against the TGE on June 24, 1992. The United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) established a mission to provide repatriation assistance to some one million Ethiopian refugees in Djibouti, Kenya, and Sudan beginning in 1993. The UNHCR assisted in the repatriation of some 30,000 Ethiopian refugees from Sudan, 32,000 from Djibouti, and 4,000 from Kenya between 1993 and December 1995.  TGE troops and OLF troops engaged in military hostilities.  Former U.S. President Jimmy Carter, representing the Carter Center (CC), offered to mediate between the TGE and opposition political groups in March 1994, but the offer was rejected by the TGE.  Elections were held on June 5, 1994, and the EPRDF won 484 out of 547 seats in the Constituent Assembly.  Several opposition political parties boycotted the elections.  On October 27, 1994, the government formally charged 73 former military government officials, including Mengistu Haile Mariam, with genocide and human rights violations.  The Constituent Assembly convened on October 28, 1994, and approved a draft constitution on December 8, 1994.  The trial of former military government officials, including Mengistu Haile Mariam, began in Addis Ababa on December 13, 1994.  Parliamentary elections were held on May 7, 1995, and the Oromo Peoples’ Democratic Organization (OPDO) won 176 out of 547 seats in the House of People’s Representatives.  The Amhara National Democratic Movement (ANDM) won 133 seats in the House of People’s Representatives.  Several opposition political parties boycotted the elections. The OAU sent 81 observers to monitor the elections. On May 12, 1995, the OAU mission reported that the elections had been free and fair.  The Council of People’s Representatives proclaimed the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia on August 22, 1995, and elected Meles Zanawi of the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Party (EPRP) as prime minister on August 23, 1995.  Oromo rebels clashed with government troops in eastern Ethiopia on August 10-19, 1999, resulting in the deaths of some 300 rebels.  Some 2,000 individuals were killed in political violence in 1999.  Parliamentary elections were held on May 16, 2000, and the Oromo Peoples’ Democratic Organization (OPDO) won 183 out of 547 seats in the House of People’s Representatives.  The Amhara National Democratic Movement (ANDM) won 143 seats in the House of People’s Representatives.  Several opposition political parties boycotted the elections.  Five individuals were killed in election-related violence.  Local and regional elections were held on March 4, 2001. Seven opposition political parties boycotted the elections.  Government police and students clashed in Addis Ababa on April 17-18, 2001, resulting in the deaths of 41 individuals.  Girma Wolde-Giorgis was elected president by the parliament on October 8, 2001.  After twenty-five years, the U.S. government resumed military assistance (military equipment, military training, and some 100 military advisers) to the Ethiopian government in 2002.  Government police clashed with demonstrators in the town of Teppi on March 11, 2002, resulting in the deaths of some 125 individuals.  Government police clashed with demonstrators in Awassa on May 24, 2002, resulting in the deaths of some 15 individuals.  OLF rebels launched a military offensive against government troops in western Ethiopia beginning in May 2002.  Government troops suppressed the Oromo military offensive on July 4, 2002, resulting in the deaths of some 200 government soldiers and rebels.  The United Ethiopia Democratic Forces (UEDF) began operations in Ethiopia on September 15, 2003.  Several hundred individuals were killed and some 10,000 individuals were displaced in ethnic violence in the Gambella region in western Ethiopia in December 2003 and January 2004.  Parliamentary elections were held on May 15, 2005, and the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), including the Oromo Peoples’ Democratic Organization (OPDO) and the Amhara National Democratic Movement (ANDM), won 327 out of 546 seats in the House of People’s Representatives.  The Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD) won 109 seats, and the United Ethiopian Democratic Forces (UEDF) won 52 seats in the House of People’s Representatives.  The European Union (EU) sent ten election experts, 50 long-term observers, and 100 short-term observers headed by Ana Gomes of Portugal to monitor the parliamentary elections from March 15 to September 15, 2005.  The African Union (AU) sent 30 observers headed by Amani Waldi Kabourou of Tanzania to monitor the parliamentary elections.  The Carter Center (CC) sent 50 observers to monitor the parliamentary elections from March 19 to May 16, 2005.  The CUD claimed election fraud on June 1, 2005.  Government police clashed with demonstrators in Addis Ababa on June 8, 2005, resulting in the deaths of 26 protesters.  On June 13, 2005, the U.S. government condemned the government for the use of “excessive force” against the demonstrators.  On June 15, 2005, the British government imposed economic sanctions (suspension of economic assistance) against the Ethiopian government.  Government police clashed with demonstrators in Addis Ababa on November 1-2, 2005.  Some 193 civilians and six government police were killed in political violence in 2005.   At least four individuals were killed in a series of explosions in Addis Ababa on May 12, 2006.  On May 26, 2006, the British government agreed to lifted economic sanctions (suspension of economic assistance) against the Ethiopian government.  More than 100 individuals were killed, and some 90,000 individuals were displaced in ethnic violence in southern Ethiopia in May and June 2006.  At least 14 individuals were killed in an ambush of a passenger bus near the village of Bonga in western Ethiopia on June 12, 2006.  Brigadier-General Kemal Geltu defected to the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) in August 2006.  Brigadier-General Hailu Gonfa and Colonel Gemechu Ayana defected to the OLF in September 2006.  At least 15 individuals were killed in Christian-Muslim violence near the town of Jimma in the state of Oromia in September and October 2006.  On December 12, 2006, former Ethiopian leader Mengistu Haile Mariam, who was living in exile in Zimbabwe, was found guilty of genocide following a 12-year trial.  Mengistu Haile Mariam was sentenced to life-imprisonment on January 11, 2007.  On June 11, 2007, thirty leaders of the opposition Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD), including five individuals who were tried in absentia, were convicted of crimes connected to the mass protests that followed the 2005 parliamentary elections.  All thirty of the convicted CUD leaders were sentenced to life imprisonment on July 16, 2007.  The CUD leaders were pardoned and freed from prison on July 20, 2007.  President Girma Wolde-Giorgis was re-elected to a second six-year term by the parliament on October 9, 2007. The OLF was blamed for a bomb explosion in Addis Ababa on May 20, 2008, resulting in the deaths of three individuals.  On May 26, 2008, former Ethiopian leader Mengistu Haile Mariam was sentenced to death by the Ethiopian Supreme Court, overturning the previous sentence of life imprisonment.  On December 30, 2008, opposition leader Birtukan Medeksa was sentenced to life imprisonment after her previous pardon was revoked by the government.  Some 300 individuals were killed, and some 100,000 individuals were displaced as a result of ethnic violence (Borana and Gheri) near the town of Moyale on February 5, 2009.  Two individuals were killed by government police during violence between Christians and Muslims in the town of Dessie on July 1, 2009.  On November 19, 2009, twenty-six individuals were convicted of plotting a coup and assassinations of government officials.  On December 22, 2009, five individuals were sentenced to death and several other individuals were sentenced to life imprisonment for plotting a coup and assassinations of government officials.  Parliamentary elections were held on May 23, 2010, and the EPRDF won 499 out of 546 seats in the House of People’s Representatives.  Opposition political parties won two seats in the House of People’s Representatives.  The EU sent 90 long-term observers and 60 short-term observers from 28 countries led by Thijs Berman of the Netherlands to monitor the parliamentary elections from April 14 to June 21, 2010.  The AU sent 59 observers from 25 countries led by former President Ketumile Masire of Botswana to monitor the parliamentary elections from May 16 to May 28, 2010.  Government police killed two individuals in election-related violence in the state of Oromia on May 23-25, 2010.  Opposition leader Birtukan Mideksa was released from prison on October 6, 2010.  Islamic extremists burned several Christian churches in the state of Oromia on March 2-3, 2011, resulting in the deaths of two individuals.  Some 4,000 individuals fled their homes in the town of Jimma.  In June 2011, more than 500 individuals were sentenced to prison for their involvement in the March 2011 Christian church burnings.  Government police clashed with Muslim protesters in Addis Ababa on July 21, 2012.  Prime Minister Meles Zenawi died of an illness in Brussels, Belgium on August 21, 2012.  Hailemariam Desalegn Boshe of the EPRDF was sworn in as acting prime minister on September 21, 2012.  Government police clashed with Muslim protesters in the town of Kofele in the state of Oromia on March 2-3, 2013, resulting in the deaths of several protesters and government policemen.  Some 10,000 individuals demonstrated against the government in Addis Ababa on June 2, 2013.  Mulatu Teshome was elected to a six-year term as president by the parliament on October 7, 2013.  Two Somali suicide bombers were accidentally killed prior to an attempted suicide bombing in Addis Ababa on October 13, 2013.  Four individuals were killed in a vehicle bombing in the western Benishangul Gumuz region on November 5, 2013.  Nine individuals were killed in an attack on a vehicle in the western Benishangul Gumuz region on April 15, 2014.  On April 28, 2014, nine individuals, including six bloggers and three journalists, were charged by the government with attempting to incite violence.  At least nine students were killed by government security forces during protests in Ambo in the state of Oromia on May 2, 2014.  Parliamentary elections were held on May 24, 2015, and the EPRDF won 500 out of the 547 seats in the House of Peoples’ Representatives.  The Somali People’s Democratic Party (SPDP) won 24 seats in the House of Peoples’ Representatives.  The AU sent nine long-term observers and 50 short-term observers headed by Hifikepunye Pohamba of Namibia to monitor the parliamentary elections from April 19 to June 7, 2015.  On August 3, 2015, 17 Muslim activists were sentenced to prison terms ranging from seven to 22 years for plotting to establish an Islamic state in Ethiopia.  Government police clashed with student protesters in the state of Oromia beginning on November 12, 2015, resulting in the deaths of dozens of protesters.  On February 28, 2016, a government minister accused leaders of the Oromo Federal Congress (OFC) of instigating the recent violence in the state of Oromia.  Ten individuals were killed in clashes between locals and government security forces in the Gonder region on July 17, 2016.  Clashes between demonstrators and government security forces in the regions of Ambo, Dembi Dolo and Nekemt, as well as the city of Bahir Dar, resulted in the deaths of dozens of individuals on August 8, 2016.  Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn Boshe declared a six-month state of emergency in response to protests on October 9, 2016.  Over the following five weeks, more than 11,000 individuals were arrested by government security forces.  The Ethiopian parliament voted to end the state of emergency on August 4, 2017.  Ten individuals were killed in the town of Ambo in the Oromia region on October 26, 2017. The government of Ethiopia declared a state of emergency on February 21, 2018. On April 2, 2018, the Ethiopian parliament voted to end the state of emergency.  Violence between ethnic Somalis and Oromos in Moyale, a town bordering Kenya, in southern Ethiopia resulted in the deaths of at least 21 individuals.  The Ethiopian government confirmed that more than 260 people were arrested following a failed coup in the northern region of Amhara on June 28, 2019.  The chief of staff of the Ethiopian army, General Seare Mekonnen, was killed by his own bodyguard in Addis Ababa on June 29, 2019.  Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed was named as the winner of the Nobel Peace Prize in Oslo on October 11, 2019.  Some 150 people were killed during clashes following the killing of singer Hachalu Hundessa in the Oromia region of Ethiopia on July 5, 2020.

Conflict Phase (November 3, 2020-November 3, 2022):  Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) forces attacked Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) forces in Tigray’s capital Mekele on November 3, 2020.  On November 4, 2020, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo called for an immediate end to military hostilities in the Tigray region.  On November 6, 2020, government troops launched an airstrike against Tigray military forces.  On November 9, 2020, Moussa Faki Mahamat, Chairman of the AU Commission, urged the Ethiopian government and Tigray rebels to engage in dialogue.  On November 10, 2020, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed rejected the AU’s call for dialogue.  More than 500 mostly ethnic Amhara civilians were massacred by local militias and police loyal to the TPLF in the town of Mai Kadra in the Tigray region on November 9-10, 2020.  Eritrean Defense Forces (EDF) troops intervened in support of the Ethiopian government, and EDF troops entered the city of Axum in the Tigray region on November 19, 2020.  Government troops captured Mekele on November 28, 2020, resulting in the deaths of more than 25 civilians.  More than 300 individuals were massacred in Axum by EDF troops on November 28-29, 2020.  The EU imposed economic sanctions (suspension of financial assistance) to the Ethiopian government on December 16, 2020.  On April 2, 2021, the Group of Seven (G-7) condemned the “killing of civilians, sexual and gender-based violence, indiscriminate shelling and the forced displacement of residents of Tigray and Eritrean refugees.”  The federal government declared a state of emergency in the southern part of Amhara regional state on April 19, 2021. The U.S. government voiced concern about the reported atrocities committed in Ethiopia’s Tigray region on April 20, 2021.  On April 22, 2021, the UN Security Council expressed its concerns over the deteriorating humanitarian situation and human rights abuses in the Tigray region.  On April 23, 2021, the U.S. government appointed Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman as U.S. Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa. On May 23, 2021, the U.S. government imposed economic sanctions (visa restrictions) against Ethiopian government and military officials, including TPLF officials, responsible for wrongful violence or human rights abuses in the Tigray region.  The U.S. government also imposed military sanctions (suspension of security assistance) against the Ethiopian government.  Parliamentary elections were held on June 21, 2021, and the Prosperity Party led by Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed won 410 out of the 436 contested seats in the House of Peoples’ Representatives.  The National Movement of Amhara won five seats in the House of People’s Representatives.  The AU deployed eight long-term and 34 short-term observers from 24 countries led by former President Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria to monitor the parliamentary elections from June 2 to June 23, 2021.  Tigray rebels recaptured Mekele from government forces on June 28, 2021.  At least 30 individuals were killed in a government airstrike on a marketplace in the town of Togoga in the Tigray region on June 22, 2021.  The U.S. Department of State and the EU condemned the federal government for the airstrike.  On June 30, 2021, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed declared a unilateral ceasefire.  On July 12, 2021, U.S. Secretary of State Tony Blinken condemned retaliatory attacks against civilians in the Tigray region.  Tigray rebels launched attacks in the Afar region beginning on July 17, 2021.  Tigray rebels took control of the town of Lalibela in the Amhara region on August 5, 2021.  More than 200 individuals were killed in ethnic violence in the Oromia region in western Ethiopia on August 18-20, 2021.  On August 19, 2021, UN Secretary General António Guterres called for an immediate ceasefire in the conflict.  Former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo was appointed as AU Special Envoy to the Horn of Africa on August 27, 2021.  On September 30, 2021, the U.S. government condemned the Ethiopian government for expelling seven UN officials from the country.  Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed was sworn in for a second five-year term on October 4, 2021.  Tigray rebels claimed to have captured the towns of Dessie and Kombolcha in the Amhara region on October 30-31, 2021.  On November 2, 2021, the federal government declared a six-month nationwide state of emergency.  On November 3, 2021, Tigray rebels captured the town of Kemise.  On November 5, 2021, the UN Security Council urged the Ethiopian government and the TPLF to “put an end to hostilities and to negotiate a lasting ceasefire”.  On November 14, 2021, AU Special Envoy Olusegun Obasanjo called for an immediate ceasefire in the conflict.  More than 20 individuals were killed in ethnic violence in Nonno District on November 20-21, 2021.  On November 24, 2021, UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres called for an “unconditional and immediate ceasefire” in the conflict.  On November 28, 2021, the government announced that it had taken control of the town of Chifra in the Afar region from Tigray rebels.  On December 6, 2021, the federal government announced that it had taken control of the towns of Dessie and Kombolcha in the Amhara region from Tigray rebels.  On December 18, 2021, the federal government announced that it had taken control of the towns of Kobo and Waldia in northern Ethiopia from Tigray rebels.  On December 19, 2021, the federal government announced that it had once again taken control of the town of Lalibela from Tigray rebels.  On December 20, 2021, the TPLF announced that it would be withdrawing its military forces from the neighboring regions of Amhara and Afar.  Replacing Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman, the U.S. government appointed Ambassador David Satterfield as U.S. Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa on January 6, 2022.  Some 56 individuals were killed in a government drone attack against a camp for displaced individuals in Dedebit in the Tigray region on January 7, 2022.  Some 17 individuals, mostly women, were killed in a government drone attack against a flour mill in the town of Mai Tsebri in the Tigray region on January 10, 2022.  The federal parliament voted to lift the nationwide state of emergency on February 15, 2022.  On February 22, 2022, the Chinese government appointed Xue Bing as Chinese Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa.  On March 2, 2022, militants attacked a civilian and military vehicle convoy near the town of Metekel in the Benishangul-Gumuz region in western Ethiopia, resulting in the deaths of some 20 government soldiers, three civilians, and 30 militants.  Eleven more individuals were killed in the Benishangul-Gumuz region the following day.  On March 3, 2022, the UN Human Rights Council appointed Fatou Bensouda of Gambia to head the three-member International Commission of Human Rights Experts on Ethiopia, including Kaari Betty Murungi of Kenya and Steven Ratner of the U.S.  On March 24, 2022, the Ethiopian government announced an “indefinite humanitarian truce effective immediately” in the conflict against Tigray rebels.  The following day, the TPLF agreed to a cessation of military hostilities so that humanitarian assistance could be provided to the people of the Tigray region.  On March 31, 2022, suspected Amhara militants ambushed a vehicle carrying militiamen in the town of Korke in the Oromiya region, resulting in the deaths of 26 individuals.  On April 25, 2022, the TPLF announced that it had completed its withdrawal of military forces from the Afar region.  On April 26, 2022, armed men attacked Muslims and Islamic mosques in the town of Gondar in northern Ethiopia on April 26, 2022, resulting in the deaths of 20 Muslims.  Government police clashed with Muslim in Addis Ababa on May 2, 2022.  The AU appointed former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo as chief mediator for the conflict.  The AU mediated peace negotiations in Pretoria, South Africa beginning on October 25, 2022.  Representatives of the government and TPLF signed an AU-mediated peace agreement, which was called the Permanent Cessation of Hostilities Agreement, in Pretoria, South Africa on November 2, 2022.  The peace agreement included provisions for a permanent cessation of military hostilities, protection of civilians, humanitarian access, and disarmament/demobilization of TPLF soldiers.  The permanent ceasefire went into effect on November 3, 2022.  More than 160,000 individuals, including more than 3,000 federal government soldiers and more than 5,000 TPLF rebels, were killed during the conflict.  More than two million individuals were displaced during the conflict.

Post-Conflict Phase (November 4, 2022-present):  The African Union Monitoring, Verification, and Compliance Mission (AU-MVCM) was deployed in Mekelle, Tigray Region of Ethiopia on December 29, 2022.  Major General Stephen Radina of Kenya served as head of the AU-MVCM, which consisted of ten monitors.  The mandate of the AU-MVCM was to monitor the ceasefire agreement and verify the disarmament/demobilization of TPLF soldiers.  Military forces from the Amhara region completed their withdrawal from the Tigray region on January 12, 2023.  On March 23, 2023, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed established an interim administration for the Tigray region headed by Getachew Reda of the TPLF.  On April 6, 2023, the federal government announced plans to to integrate regional special forces into the federal government-controlled military and police forces.  Protests against the federal government’s plans began in the Amhara region on April 9, 2023.  Ethnic-Amharic militiamen, known as Fano, launched an insurgency against the federal government in the Amhara region on August 1, 2023.  The government declared a state of emergency in response to the insurgency in the Amhara region on August 4, 2023.  More than 25 individuals were killed in a federal government military airstrike in the town of Finote Selam in the Amhara region on August 13, 2023.  Federal government troops captured the town of Majete from Fano militiamen on September 3, 2023, resulting in the deaths of 70 civilians.  On October 3, 2023, the EU announced a package of economic assistance worth 650 million euros to be provided to the federal government.  Five civilians were killed in a government military drone strike in the town of Wegel Tena in the Amhara region on November 30, 2023.  Federal government troops clashed with Fano militiamen in the city of Gondar on January 8, 2024.  Fano militiamen launched a military offensive against federal government troops in Bahir Dar on February 29, 2024.

[Sources: ABC News, April 20, 2021; Africa Diary, May 27-June 2, 1976; AfricaNews, October 26, 2018; Africa Research Bulletin (ARB), February 1-28, 1974, September 1-30, 1974, October 1-31, 1974, December 1-31, 1974, February 1-28, 1977, May 1-31, 1977; African Union (AU), May 18, 2010, May 26, 2010, May 26, 2015, June 4, 2021, June 18, 2021, June 23, 2021; Agence France Presse (AFP), October 9, 2007; Al-Arabiya News, November 5, 2020; Al Jazeera, May 27, 2015, December 8, 2015, October 10, 2016, April 17, 2017, April 19, 2021, May 24, 2021, May 27, 2021, July 10, 2021, July 19, 2021, August 26 2021, October 4, 2021, October 30, 2021, October 31, 2021, November 2, 2021, November 5, 2021, November 14, 2021, November 25, 2021, December 6, 2021, December 18, 2021, December 20, 2021, December 24, 2021, January 6, 2022, January 8, 2022, January 11, 2022, February 15, 2022, March 14, 2022, March 24, 2022, March 25, 2022, April 25, 2022, April 27, 2022, May 2, 2022, October 18, 2022, November 2, 2022, November 3, 2022, January 13, 2023, March 23, 2023, April 7, 2023, August 2, 2023, August 4, 2023, August 7, 2023, August 8, 2023, August 9, 2023, August 14, 2023, November 2, 2023, November 9, 2023, December 29, 2023, February 13, 2024; Amnesty International, September 17, 2018; Associated Press (AP), May 17, 1989, February 8, 2000, April 22, 2021, May 30, 2021, August 4, 2023, August 7, 2023, August 10, 2023, August 14, 2023, September 22, 2023, September 25, 2023, October 3, 2023; Banks and Muller, 1998, 303-310; British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), August 12, 1999, August 19, 1999, April 17, 2001, April 18, 2001, April 26, 2001, June 8, 2001, May 24, 2002, June 29, 2002, July 5, 2002, July 16, 2002, August 21, 2002, December 16, 2003, January 13, 2004, February 4, 2004, February 11, 2004, February 12, 2004, May 6, 2004, May 18, 2004, April 21, 2005, April 27, 2005, May 6, 2005, May 15, 2005, May 17, 2005, May 28, 2005, June 14, 2005, June 15, 2005, August 9, 2005, August 25, 2005, November 7, 2005, November 9, 2005, January 19, 2006, May 13, 2006, May 22, 2006, June 12, 2006, June 30, 2006, August 4, 2006, August 10, 2006, September 15, 2006, October 15, 2006, October 19, 2006, December 12, 2006, January 11, 2007, April 24, 2007, April 25, 2007, April 29, 2007, May 21, 2007, May 28, 2007, June 11, 2007, July 16, 2007, July 20, 2007, October 23, 2007, May 20, 2008, May 26, 2008, December 30, 2008, February 26, 2009, April 16, 2009, July 1, 2009, November 19, 2009, December 22, 2009, May 24, 2010, May 25, 2010, May 26, 2010, October 6, 2010, August 21, 2012, September 21, 2012, February 6, 2014, May 2, 2014, June 22, 2015, October 20, 2016, October 29, 2019, October 11, 2019, November 11, 2020, April 2, 2021, May 30, 2021, June 29, 2021, July 11, 2021, August 19, 2021, August 26, 2021, August 27, 2021, October 4, 2021, October 28, 2021, November 2, 2021, November 3, 2021, November 22, 2021, November 24, 2021, December 6, 2021, January 8, 2022, January 11, 2022, January 20, 2022, January 26, 2022, February 15, 2022, March 3, 2022, March 24, 2022, April 20, 2022, April 27, 2022, April 29, 2022, May 2, 2022, May 3, 2022; Brogan, 1992, 27-39; Cable News Network (CNN), June 24, 2021; Carter Center (CC), May 16, 2005; Degenhardt, 1988, 99-106; Deutsche Welle (DW), July 17, 2016, October 8, 2016, November 17, 2016, June 28, 2019, December 16, 2020, June 18, 2021; European Union (EU), December 7, 2019; Facts on File, December 15-21, 1960, July 27, 1974, September 14, 1974, November 30, 1974, May 3, 1975, August 16, 1975, October 11, 1975, December 13, 1975, February 12, 1977, April 2, 1977, June 4, 1977, May 19, 1978, May 3, 2001; Human Rights Watch (HRW), May 10, 2001, October 2, 2016, August 4, 2017, February 21, 2018; Jessup, 1998, 188-190; Keesing’s Record of World Events, November 16-23, 1957, September 11-18, 1971, July 30-August 5, 1973, March 25-31, 1974, July 29-August 4, 1974, September 30-October 6, 1974, March 24-30, 1975, March 1991, May 1991, June 1991, June 1994, July 1994, August 1995; Langer, 1972, 1281; Los Angeles Times, May 18, 1989, May 19, 1989; Medicins Sans Frontieres (MSF), February 8, 2000; New York Times, February 6, 1988, May 17, 1989, May 19, 1989, June 8, 2005, July 27, 2015, December 16, 2015, June 30, 2021; Panafrican News Agency (PANA), May 11, 2000, May 14, 2000, May 15, 2000, June 16, 2000; Reuters, May 15, 2000, March 4, 2001, April 21, 2001, April 27, 2001, June 13, 2005, November 3, 2009, May 24, 2010, May 26, 2010, March 13, 2011, March 24, 2011, July 1, 2011, May 11, 2012, July 21, 2012, March 26, 2013, June 2, 2013, August 8, 2013, October 14, 2013, November 6, 2013, December 19, 2013, April 16, 2014, April 28, 2014, May 27, 2015, June 22, 2015, August 3, 2015, March 8, 2016, December 15, 2018, December 8, 2020, March 1, 2021, May 27, 2021, June 23, 2021, July 12, 2021, August 5, 2021, August 20, 2021, September 30, 2021, October 4, 2021, October 5, 2021, October 6, 2021, November 2, 2021, November 6, 2021, November 25, 2021, November 29, 2021, December 20, 2021, January 5, 2022, January 7, 2022, January 10, 2022, February 15, 2022, February 22, 2022, March 3, 2022, March 14, 2022, March 25, 2022, March 28, 2022, March 31, 2022, April 25, 2022, April 27, 2022; Schwab 1972; Sudan Tribune, October 5, 2006, March 9, 2011, March 1, 2016; United Nations (UN), April 22, 2021; United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), April 11, 1996; U.S. Department of States, April 23, 2021, September 30, 2021; USA Today, January 8, 2007; Voice of America (VOA), March 7, 2011, September 24, 2013, May 20, 2015, May 27, 2015, December 10, 2015, December 19, 2015, April 2, 2018, July 5, 2020, March 12, 2021, May 30, 2021, June 17, 2021, January 5, 2022, January 6, 202; Washington Post, May 25, 1977, May 15, 2005, May 26, 2006, January 2016; Xinhua News Agency, May 27, 2006, June 5, 2021, June 23, 2021.]

 

Selected Bibliography

Clapham, Christopher. 1968. “The Ethiopian Coup d’ Etat of December 1960. The Journal of Modern African Studies,  vol. 6 (4), pp. 495-507.

Gilkes, Patrick. 1975. The Dying Lion: Feudalism and Modernization in Ethiopia. New York: St. Martin’s Press.

Harbeson, John W. 1998. “Elections and Democratization in Post-Mengistu Ethiopia.” In Kumar, Krishna, editor. Postconflict Elections, Democratization, and International Assistance. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, pp. 111-131.

Lyons, Terrence. 1996. “Closing the Transition: The May 1995 Elections in Ethiopia.” Journal of Modern African Studies, vol. 34 (1), pp. 121-142.

Marcus, Harold G. 1983. Ethiopia, Great Britain, and the United States: The Politics of Empire. Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press.

Markakis, John and Asmelash Beyene. 1967. “Representative Institutions in Ethiopia,” The Journal of Modern African Studies, vol. 5 (2), pp. 193-219.

Schwab, Peter, editor. 1972. Ethiopia & Haile Selassie. New York: Facts on File, Inc.

Tareke, Gebru. 2004. “From Af Abet to Shire: The Defeat and Demise of Ethiopia’s ‘Red’ Army, 1988-1989,” Journal of Modern African Studies, vol. 42 (2), pp. 239-281.

 

Dr. Clay Arnold, Chair
Department of Government, Public Service, and International Studies

University of Central Arkansas
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Ethiopia’s next steps along a troubled road to democracy

9 July, 2024

 Nebiyu Daniel Meshesha

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Pluralism remains officially stifled

The upheaval of 2018 brought an opportunity for peace, democracy, and prosperity to thrive in Ethiopia. However, they have been frustrated by a combination of the old political culture and new emerging challenges.

The devastating war in Tigray, continuing deadly chaos in Amhara and Oromia, and communal conflicts elsewhere affirmed that, as in the past, violence was being employed to try and achieve political objectives.

A culture of tolerance, dialogue, and participatory democracy therefore still struggles to find a place in Ethiopian politics.

As democratic governance and pluralism have strong linkages with sustained peace and security, it is hardly a matter of choice for Ethiopians to establish democracy, including holding free and fair elections.

Currently, however, there are two years to the next general election, and there are multiple roadblocks in the way of a democratic transition.

National Dialogue

In December 2021, the government established the National Dialogue Commission with the proclaimed vision of seeing a national consensus emerge on the most fundamental disputes.

In countries like Ethiopia, where deep-rooted identity-based polarization and decades of authoritarian rule have prevailed, a broad-based national dialogue can—in theory—break the cycle of conflict and bring political transformation.

One of the most pressing issues is addressing the underlying causes of conflicts—which involve the authorities fighting armed groups as well as horizontal communal violence—that are rooted in historical, social, economic, religious, and political dynamics.

Additionally, reaching a consensus on constitutional reform and reconciling ethnonational consciousness with an Ethiopian identity—increasingly contentious since the constitution established an ethnolinguistic federal structure—would push Ethiopia along a democratic path.

Since the commission’s establishment, concerns and recommendations have been forwarded in line with the principles of the process. Major opposition parties such as the Oromo Federalist Congress, the Oromo Liberation Front, and the Ogaden National Liberation Front, however, declined to participate, citing issues of representation and with the commission’s independence. While recently invited by the commission, armed groups are also not part of the process.

Though not falling within its mandate, the commission should have called for a nationwide ceasefire and pushed for its implementation in coordination with stakeholders, including civil society organizations. This would have contributed to silencing the guns—a necessary step towards kickstarting a comprehensive national peace process.

Furthermore, when holding public consultations, the commission’s inability to organize sessions in conflict-affected regions, including Tigray, Amhara, and parts of Oromia, has excluded large segments of society. As a result, the national dialogue was launched without key stakeholders taking part. Who, then, will forward ideas and points of discussion on their behalf?

In addition, though the government has the right to forward its ideas as any other participant, the speech by Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed at the dialogue’s launch that ruled out any possibility of transitional government contradicts the principles of the process and so raises further questions of its credibility. More top-down edicts will not resolve our problems.

Though late, the federal government still has the opportunity to facilitate a genuine comprehensive dialogue.  More than two years since the commission’s establishment, the government has done little to bring armed groups and opposition parties who declined to participate to the national discussion. Continuing with the same situation would likely result in rejection of its outcome by key stakeholders, including a large segment of society.

Therefore, designing a comprehensive peace plan is needed to bring all stakeholders on board and create a better environment. The commission, within the remaining months of its task, must identify ways of including key stakeholders.

In coordination with them, it then needs to be courageous in pushing for silencing the guns. Its recent announcement that it started identifying participants in Amhara is a good start but should be accompanied by a call for a nationwide ceasefire.

Finally, as past experiences in, for example, Mali in 2024 and  Sudan in 2014-2016 show, governments can use national dialogues to delay elections and stall democratic progress. Ethiopia’s regional and international partners should verify all phases of the process and ensure that this is not occurring in this instance.

Transitional Justice

Long-suffering citizens and Ethiopian partners want the Ethiopian authorities to implement their transitional justice policy in order to redress a painful past, prioritizing recent events. The government recently crafted an implementation plan for the process—but several challenges remain.

Transitional justice has occurred with relative success in societies recovering from conflicts or dictatorial rule, such as in Rwanda following the 1994 genocide and Sierra Leone to address the cycle of impunity after its eleven years of civil war.

In Ethiopia, conflicts are ongoing and repression continues. This calls for all actors to immediately forego violence and instead use political means to resolve any differences. Doing so would allow the government, armed groups, opposition political parties, civil society organizations, and the wider public to think about how to consolidate peace and achieve justice for victims.

While achieving comprehensive transitional justice is a multi-year endeavor, starting with genuine intentions is essential. So far, we have not taken this vital first step.

Even though the government is planning implementation, fundamental questions relating to transparency and inclusivity continue to be raised by the media, opposition groups, and others.

To address these issues, the government should consider diverse voices and take on board all their concerns, such as opposition parties’ call to prioritize peace and national reconciliation. If the government proceeds with implementation phase without addressing the concerns, no legitimate outcome is expected from the process.

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As it was foreign governments that ended the mandate of the international inquiry into war crimes in Ethiopia, and considering the extent  of atrocities committed, the African Union, European Union, United Nations, United Kingdom and the United States, among others, have the responsibility to keep pushing the government and use any leverage they have—such as the decision whether to approve a new International Monetary Fund program—to ensure victim-based justice ensues.

One of the key drivers of the transitional justice policy was the devastating two-year war in Tigray. As the mandate of the international inquiry into that conflict was ended, establishing accountability for serious human rights violations and achieving other goals of transitional justice rests on local processes. How the transitional justice pillars, such as criminal prosecution and reconciliation, are implemented will determine the legitimacy of the process.

A United States Institute of Peace Transitional Justice handbook contains questions that are relevant to Ethiopia and should be considered: Were the crimes widespread, or focused on one region or ethnic group? Were the crimes acts of the State or, those of insurgents, or both? Are the perpetrators still more or less in power, or has there been a clean transition to a new government? And, are the courts credible?

Ultimately though, the critical question is the level of government commitment to comprehensive justice. Many are doubtful that political and military leaders from the various conflict parties are ready to risk prosecution. Failing to do so would mean Ethiopia continuing on the path of impunity—and pain. To avert this, maximum international scrutiny is essential.

Healthier Politics

The 2018 reforms led Ethiopia’s political landscape to widen, allowing opposition parties, including those engaged in armed conflicts, to join peaceful politics. The broad idea of the reforms was to change the longstanding undemocratic culture in Ethiopia.

Accordingly, the 2021 general election was expected to be a big step for Ethiopia along the democratic path. Despite the optimism, events showed Ethiopia was not ready for political pluralism.

An unprecedented war in Tigray, arrests of journalists and politicians, and communal violence, among others, indicated Ethiopia had not shed its old political culture. With prominent opposition parties boycotting the election, the ruling Prosperity Party ended up overwhelmingly dominating parliament.

The reality of the three years since the 2021 election has been the intensification of internal conflict and the continuation of opting for violence to achieve political objectives. Detention of political figures and widespread arrests under the pretext of supporting armed groups and opposition parties, among others, resulted in a re-shrinking of the political space. In addition, the recent killing of senior Oromo Liberation Front figure, Bate Urgessa, sent a chilling message that dissent was still not tolerated.

In general, the culture of suppressing pluralism has exacerbated grievances over perceived or actual socio-economic inequalities, insufficient political representation, and poor governance. These factors push ethno-political communities towards extremism, which can easily trigger conflict.

The government must take concrete steps to re-open political and civic space to ensure that citizens and opposition parties can engage in peaceful politics.

While the government is blamed for continuing repression, opposition parties also have a history of fragmentation, intolerance, and working to weaken one another, hindering them from establishing meaningful coalitions, or otherwise coordinating to challenge the ruling party. These parties should shed this unhelpful culture to better contribute to Ethiopia’s transition to democracy.

Civil Expression

Journalists also have a vital role and the government must allow them to perform it. Except for a brief improvement  following the 2018 changes, Ethiopia has witnessed numerous continued restrictions on media freedom and access to information, including the internet.

The states of emergency imposed in many parts of the country at different times played a significant role in hampering peaceful dissent and made the work of journalists difficult. Some of Ethiopia’s international partners recently expressed the need to uphold the role of journalism which they described “ instances of  journalists intimidated and unjustly detained for doing their job” and called for the release of detained reporters.

These factors urge the government to be wise enough to support press freedom and be open to criticism, another way to nurture the democratic culture that many Ethiopians desperately want to see develop.

Finally, Ethiopian civil society organizations, which still have to operate in a challenging political environment, have a crucial role. They need to employ tactics such as using social media platforms and regional and international mechanisms to influence national institutions, among others, to advocate for multi-party participatory democracy.

Beyond Boundaries

For Ethiopia to realize a pluralistic order, addressing boundary disputes is an imperative. The current multinational federalism allows what the constitution calls “nations, nationalities and peoples” to have an administrative homeland. While opponents criticize this for exacerbating ethnic divisions, supporters argue self-rule eases ethnic tensions and can strengthen horizontal cooperation.

Ethiopians who want to see the current state structure changed say that in the case of disputes such as Amhara and Tigray’s, creating a new administration not based on ethno-linguistic demographics would heal the divide. Still, this would require constitutional reform, which increasing ethnonationalism and polarization make hard to achieve in short order.

Resolving the Amhara-Tigray dispute continues to test the two regions and the federal government. Unfolding realities show little progress and recent reports of violence in Raya reveal the potential for serious conflict endures. The federal government is largely silent. Transparent triangular coordination between it and the Amhara and Tigray administrations is a must to prevent an almost unthinkable return to large-scale conflict.

While implementing the Pretoria agreement  is the formal remedy, discussions and innovative approaches, including mobilizing people in coordination with civil society organizations to stand for peace, are needed.

Regardless of the eventual outcome, addressing such thorny challenges democratically would help pluralism to finally flourish in Ethiopia.

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civil society Ethiopia media freedom National Dialogue Transitional justice

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Nebiyu Daniel Meshesha

Nebiyu is a former Ethiopian diplomat. He served at the Ethiopian embassies in Nairobi and Washington D.C. His areas of expertise include African peace and security, mainly the Horn of Africa.

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The Unresolved Question of Identity in Ethiopia Bahru Zewde

Abstract

This article articulates an argument for pan-Ethiopian identity in understanding processes of state formation in Africa. The article is part of CODESRIA’s initiative to welcome intellectual reflections and dialogue around different, even contending, positions on the Ethiopian question and how comparative analyses of similar situations in Africa might shed light on attempts to end the crisis and explore suitable ways forward. CODESRIA Bulletin is a platform for ideas and opinion that contribute to better understanding of society and among many other topics, we aim here to discuss the challenge of nation-building in Africa. The Council welcomes contributions that will advance rigorous intellectual debate on these matter for review and publication as a way of facilitating intellectual dialogue on these issues. 

Introduction

The recent conflict in northern Ethiopia has put the country in the international spotlight. In a pattern rather reminiscent of Darfur in the first decade of this century, Tigray has become a household name and genocide the buzzword. Over a decade ago, Mahmood Mamdani wrote a scathing critique of the ‘Save Darfur’ movement (Mamdani 2010), highlighting the liberal use of the term ‘genocide’. But the world does not seem to have become the wiser for it. ‘Save Darfur’ has been replaced by ‘Stand with Tigray’. The agitprop value of the term genocide is so high that the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and its partisans have been harping on it. This has continued even after the joint investigation of the UN OHCHR and the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission established that, while atrocities were committed by all parties to the conflict, there was no act that justified the use of the genocide label. It has been sustained even after TPLF forces have committed large-scale atrocities, including rape, mass executions and looting and wanton destruction of health and educational facilities, in the wake of their incursions into the Amhara and Afar regions after the unilateral declaration of ceasefire by the federal government in June 2021.[2]

A proper understanding of the Ethiopian historical context has been woefully lacking in the media reports and the analyses of ‘pundits’. Aside from the longue durée of Ethiopian history, even the short span of the three decades when the TPLF held central political power has eluded most analyses. And yet those three decades form such an important backdrop to the current conflict. In the longer perspective, the conflict emanated from the as yet unresolved question of identity in Ethiopian politics. Since the middle of the twentieth century, Ethiopian identity, which had been almost axiomatic, has been subjected to a severe test. A counter-narrative has exposed the glaring deficiencies of that identity. The remedy prescribed to address those deficiencies, which gave primacy to ethnic identity, far from resolving the problem, seems to have aggravated it. The current conflict is the latest (and hopefully the last) episode in this tension between pan-Ethiopian and ethnonationalist identity. This article is intended to throw some light on the trajectory of identity politics in Ethiopia.

The Evolution of Pan-Ethiopian Identity

The Ethiopian state is notable for its antiquity and its resilience. Legendary origins aside, it can be traced back at least two thousand years. Aksum, which has come to assume such negative connotations in the recent conflict, was its foundation. It gave Ethiopia its monarchy, its two major religions (Orthodox Christianity and Islam), its unique Ge’ez syllabary, and its architectural and musical traditions. Just as the country’s medieval rulers (c. 1270–1529) traced their dynastic line back to Aksum and beyond, its modern emperors evoked the might and grandeur of the medieval kings. In a process that combined peaceful overtures with physical violence, Emperor Menilek (r. 1889–1913) forged the modern Ethiopian state. Haile Selassie I, who was crowned in 1930 after a protracted struggle for succession, initiated an unprecedented centralisation of power. Schools and the military were the two pillars of the process of nation-building, even if these were characterised by a high dosage of assimilation.

Not only did the Ethiopian state show remarkable continuity, but it was also resilient in the face of both external and internal stresses. It survived the devastating raids of Queen Yodit (Gudit) in the tenth century, the Wars of Ahmad Gragn and the massive population movements of the Oromo in the sixteenth century, the uncertainty that attended the ailment and eventual demise of the mighty Menilek, the tribulations of the 1974 Revolution, and the change of regime in 1991. Its rulers put aside their internal differences and fought as one to defeat Italian colonial intrusion at the Battle of Adwa in 1896. That victory not only guaranteed the country’s independence but also became a beacon of freedom and dignity to Africans in particular, and black people in general. Similarly, Ethiopians rallied against the Fascist Italian Occupation (1936–1941) by waging a guerrilla war that cut the enemy’s tenure short. They rallied yet again from 1977 to 1978 to reverse the Somali invasion, and from 1998 to 2000 during the Ethiopian-Eritrean border war.

Until about the middle of the twentieth century, regional affiliation was a more important marker than ethnic identity. This was particularly true of the Amhara, who identified themselves by their regions (Gojjam, Gondar, Shawa, Wollo) or even sub-regions (Damot, Gayent, Manz, Yefat, Bulga, Yajju, etc.) rather than as Amhara. Indeed, Shawa was the ethnic melting pot par excellence, blending the Amhara, Oromo and Gurage into a distinct geographical entity.[3] Among the Oromo as well, clan identity (Borana, Karayu, Leqa, Salale, Sibu, etc.) was more pronounced than pan-Oromo identity. Even in Tigray, where ethnos and region were relatively more coterminous, sub-regional identity (Adwa, Agame, Enderta, Shire, Tembien) was equally powerful.

The fluidity of ethnic identity was reflected in the high degree of interethnic interaction that prevailed, including interethnic marriages. The most ancient people of Ethiopia, the Agaw, became so fused with the Amhara that, except for a few pockets, they practically lost their identity. But the supreme example of interethnic mixing was provided by the Oromo, who experienced a process of reciprocal assimilation with the peoples they came across—assimilating as well as being assimilated (Yates 2020). Wallo is the supreme example of the acculturation of the Amhara and the Oromo. Farther to the west, in Gojjam, the Oromo not only intermingled with the Amhara population but also came to have a decisive role in the power politics of the centre. The boundary between the Amhara and Oromo is quite blurred in the district of Salale. Likewise, there was a great deal of acculturation between the northern Gurage (known variously as Soddo, Kestane or Aymallal) and the adjacent Oromo (Zewde 2008).

Interethnic marriages, particularly among the elite, have been common since the wedding of the Hadiya princess, Ite Jan Zela (more famously known as Queen Eleni), to Emperor Ba’eda Maryam (r. 1433–68). This became the norm in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries as interdynastic marriages were arranged to fend off opposition or ensure succession. Thus Emperor Takla Giyorgis of Wag (r. 1868–1971), successor of Emperor Tewodros, was married to the sister of Kassa Mercha of Tigray (the future Emperor Yohannes, r. 1872–1889). The latter’s son was married to the daughter of King Menilek of Shawa. Such arranged interethnic marriages were elevated to the level of an art by Menilek’s spouse, Taytu, who created a web of matrimonial relations to consolidate her power in her husband’s waning years. Likewise, Emperor Haile Selassie’s family was linked by marriage to the ruling houses of Wollo, Tigray, and Wallaga (see, for example, Serekeberhan 2002).

Ultimately, these intermarriages helped create a ruling class that had its members coming from different regions of the country. Oromo leaders came to play an important role in the power politics of the Gonderine period, culminating in the establishment of a power bloc that came to be known as the Yajju dynasty. Menelik’s campaigns of territorial expansion in the last quarter of the nineteenth century were spearheaded by his Oromo general, Ras Gobana Dachi. Fitawrari Habte Giyorgis Dinagde, of Oromo-Gurage parentage, emerged as a formidable power-broker during the interregnum between Menelik’s incapacitation and Haile Selassie’s ascent to the throne (Zewde 2008).

A cursory survey of Ethiopia’s national icons demonstrates their varied ethnic backgrounds. These include the already cited Habte Giyorgis (Oromo-Gurage), the legendary marathon runner Abebe Bikila (Oromo), the ‘King of Pop’ Tilahun Gessesse (Amhara-Oromo), Ethiopia’s most accomplished poet laureate, Tsegaye Gebre-Medhin (Amhara-Oromo), Emperor Tewodros (Amhara), Emperor Yohannes, the redoubtable general Ras Alula, and the most incisive intellectual of the early twentieth century, Gabra Heywat Baykadagn (all Tigrayans), and Emperors Menilek and Haile Selassie (of mixed Amhara and Oromo parentage). Also of interest is how ethnic culinary specialities attained national status. These include the Amhara (particularly Gondaré) doro wat (chicken curry), the Gurage kitfo, the Oromo chachabsa and the Tigrayan/Eritrean (h)ambasha.

The Ascendancy of the Counter-Narrative

The above trajectory of pan-Ethiopian identity came under serious challenge in the second half of the twentieth century. The icons became villains. Menilek, the victor of Adwa and the creator of modern Ethiopia, became the ruthless conqueror. His Oromo general, Ras Gobana, became the arch collaborator and traitor. In 1943, an anti-government protest in Tigray known as Wayane severely tested the authority of the newly restored government of Haile Selassie, following the end of Fascist Italian Occupation (1936–1941). While a number of factors contributed to its outbreak, the marginalisation that the province experienced after the death of Emperor Yohannes was a contributory factor. But it was largely confined to the southeastern part of the province and was quickly suppressed (Tareke 1991).[4]

Elsewhere, it was not so much marginalisation as downright oppression and exploitation that triggered ethnonationalist movements. In many parts of southern Ethiopia, the territorial campaigns of Menilek were followed not only by the imposition of administrative control but also the appropriation of economic resources (particularly land) and the exercise of various forms of cultural oppression. Although the Oromo on the whole fared relatively better than many of the other southern peoples, some of whom were subjected to enslavement, it was they who felt the first stirrings of ethnonationalism. A self-help association named after the two major branches of the Oromo, Mecha and Tulama, was formed in 1963. The government was uncomfortable with this development and became alarmed when the leaders of the association organised a hasty and ill-considered attempt to assassinate the emperor. The leaders were detained, one of them was subsequently hanged and the association was banned, only to resurface as the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) in 1974 (Hassen 1998). Simultaneously, for the better part of the 1960s, a peasant rebellion in the Oromo and Somali-inhabited province of Bale posed a serious challenge to central government authority.

A much more serious challenge to the pan-Ethiopian thesis emerged in Eritrea. Following the liberation of that country from Italian colonial rule in 1941, Eritreans were divided into those who favoured union with Ethiopia and those who opted for independence. As a sort of compromise, the UN resolved in 1950 to federate Eritrea with Ethiopia. Following the abrogation of the federal arrangement in 1962, a liberation movement emerged in Eritrea, first campaigning for the restoration of the federation but eventually fighting for independence. To give their movement international legitimacy, the Eritrean liberation fronts couched their struggle as an anticolonial one. The OLF took the cue and eagerly adopted the same rhetoric.

It was to accommodate these ethnonationalist and regional challenges that the Ethiopian Student Movement (ESM) began to tackle seriously what it called the question of nationalities. The upshot of the two-year debate was the adoption in the summer of 1971 of the Leninist-Stalinist principle of self-determination, up to and including secession. This became the credo not only of the ESM but also the leftist parties that sprouted from it, notably the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Party (EPRP) and the All-Ethiopia Socialist Movement (more commonly known by its Amharic acronym, Me’ison). The TPLF, which emerged on the fringes of that movement, also embraced self-determination wholeheartedly as it found it an effective weapon to mobilise the Tigrayan population for the armed struggle that it launched in 1975. The eclipse of the pan-Ethiopian organisations (notably EPRP and Me’ison) through their mutual destruction and the notorious ‘Red Terror’ paved the way for the ascendancy of ethnonationalist organisations like the TPLF and OLF (‘Quest’) (see Zewde 2014, 20018, especially Chapter 6).[5]

The victory of the TPLF-spearheaded EPRDF (Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front) over the Darg in 1991 paved the way for the legal consolidation of self-determination, which was first enunciated in the ESM—initially via the Charter of the Transitional Government and next in the 1995 Constitution that established the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. Ethiopia was divided into nine ethnolinguistic regions. Precedence was given to the ‘nations, nationalities and peoples’ of Ethiopia over the pan-Ethiopian entity. Sovereign power resided in the former rather than the latter. Most importantly, the first sub-article of Article 39 gave the entities an ‘unconditional right to self-determination, including the right to secession’ (Republic of Ethiopia 1995).

The principle of self-determination, although meant to address the long-standing problem of the oppression and marginalisation of many nationalities, was faulty in conception and devious in execution. To begin with, it was based on a blind imitation of the Leninist classics rather than a careful reading of Ethiopian history or ethnography. As a result, it accentuated the differences of the various ethnic groups and totally ignored the similarities and interrelationships that have been outlined above. This deficiency was reflected in the fact that the right to secession was prioritised over the advantages of living together, provided that the linguistic and cultural rights of the nationalities were respected. This ‘fixation on secession’ (to borrow a phrase from one of the student leaders of the time) was blissfully explained away as being the surest way of actually discouraging secession. Moreover, it was deemed imperative to bring the Eritrean liberation movement into the common struggle against imperial rule.

Secondly, no effort was made to disaggregate the collective appellation ‘nations, nationalities and peoples’, although it was meant to denote a descending order of social organisation. In fact, the fifth sub-article of the same controversial Article 39 gives a blanket definition for all three categories.

Thirdly, in view of the fact that some eighty ‘nations, nationalities and peoples’ are known to exist in Ethiopia, it is difficult to see where this splintering of the country into regional states will end. As it turned out, the period since the promulgation of the Constitution has been characterised by various demands for autonomous status, either as a region or zone or a ‘special zone’. Currently, with the breakaway of two new regions from the rather amorphous Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Region (quite a mouthful by itself!), the number of regions in the country has been raised from nine to eleven.

Fourthly, although it was stipulated in the Constitution that self-determination was to be exercised by means of a referendum, it was not always clear whether that referendum reflected the actual feeling of the people concerned or was the result of the manipulation of the many ‘liberation fronts’ that have mushroomed in the country. Self-determination comes not only with political autonomy but also with perks and privileges for the governing elite.[6]

Equally sobering has been the practical implementation of self-determination. Although the regions were theoretically deemed to be autonomous, they were actually controlled from the centre through the powerful EPRDF party apparatus. Behind every regional president was a TPLF functionary who exercised real power and ensured the party line was adhered to. The TPLF had such hegemonic control over the EPRDF that it became common to pair the two organisations as TPLF/EPRDF. The three other members of the coalition—the Amhara National Democratic Movement (ANDM), the Oromo People’s Democratic Organisation (OPDO) and the Southern Ethiopia Peoples Democratic Front (SEPDF)—had a manifestly secondary status. Even more marginalised were the so-called ‘allied parties’, mostly representing the nationalities on the periphery (Markakis 2011; Aalen 2001).

Further, an arrangement that was meant to bring about a harmonious relationship among the different nationalities actually ushered in an era of unprecedented ethnic conflict. Somalis were pitted against Oromo, Gujji against Gedeo and Oromo against Amhara. These conflicts escalated after the TPLF lost its hegemonic position and retreated to its Tigray stronghold, with most of the conflicts being attributed to its strategy to destabilise the Abiy Ahmed government. The relative weakness of that government to enforce its authority, partly emanating from the general spirit of liberalisation that was its birthmark, has accentuated the problem. As a result, hundreds of Ethiopians have lost their lives and hundreds of thousands have been internally displaced. Amhara settlers have suffered the most as they have been targeted by the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA), the armed wing of OLF, in Wallaga and northern Shawa, and armed Gumuz fighters in Beni Shangul.

Dénouement?

The war that erupted in Tigray in November 2020 is in a way the culmination of this unresolved problem of identity. The much-vaunted harmonious coexistence of nationalities has evaporated into thin air amidst the deafening roar of guns and mutual recriminations of genocide and ethnic cleansing. Tigray, the bedrock of Ethiopian statehood and civilisation, seems poised to break away from Ethiopia. There is nothing more disheartening for an Ethiopian than to see Tigrayans trampling the Ethiopian flag and expressing pride in being privileged to witness (somewhat prematurely, one should add) the breakup of Ethiopia. That is the same flag around which the Tigrayan Emperor Yohannes IV rallied Ethiopians against Egyptian invasion, Italian encroachment, and Sudanese Mahdist incursions.

Conversely, the war has reinforced the nascent Amhara nationalism and reinvigorated the residual pan-Ethiopian nationalism. If there were two protagonists of the imperial order, it was the Amhara and the Tigrayans. Now, they have become mortal enemies. Already, as a result of the harassment that the Amhara have suffered in many parts of the country and the inability of the Amhara contingent of the ruling party to come to their defence, a strident Amhara nationalist party known as the National Movement of Amhara (NAMA) has emerged (Tazebew 2021). The war, and in particular the TPLF depredations in the Amhara region, has strengthened Amhara nationalism. Even more significantly, the threat posed by the TPLF has reinvigorated the residual pan-Ethiopian nationalism. Ethiopians of almost all nationalities have rallied behind the federal government in a manner that is reminiscent of Adwa in 1896, the anti-Fascist resistance of 1936–41, the Somali invasion of 1977–78 and the Ethio-Eritrean War of 1998–2000. What is of particular interest is that this pan-Ethiopian patriotism is as strident (if not more) among historically marginalised nationalities, such as the Afar, the Gambellans and the southern peoples.

Yet, there are genuine apprehensions that the resolution of the Tigray conflict might not be the end of the story. The position of the Oromo elite has been somewhat perplexing. Its strategy in the past decades has ranged from the creation of an independent Oromia, articulated by the OLF, to achieving self-determination within Ethiopia, as encapsulated by the OPDO (now rechristened Oromo Prosperity). Yet, the boundary between the two has not always been watertight. The impunity with which the OLA has been killing and maiming in the past three years has led to speculation that it might be enjoying the connivance or benevolent neutrality of the ruling Oromo elite. The total destruction of the town of Ataye, only some 200km from Addis Ababa, in April 2021 lent credence to these suspicions. If the Oromo elite is not going to learn from the disastrous outcome of the TPLF’s hegemonic aspirations, Ethiopia will be heading for yet another round of conflict.

Hopefully, the much-anticipated national dialogue that is now being launched will address all these outstanding issues and come up with a set of recommendations that could move the country forward. That the 1995 Constitution has to be revised goes without saying. For far too long, it has been venerated like the tablets of Moses or the Holy Bible. That Ethiopia should have some form of federal arrangement has become an inescapable reality. Likewise, ethnic identity is not something to be wished away. Perhaps the solution is an arrangement that recognises ethnic identities but gives pride of place to a pan-Ethiopian identity. The student movement that cast such a spell on Ethiopian politics focused more on social justice (‘Land to the Tiller’) and equality (‘self-determination’) and less on freedom. The recent history of the country has shown that the accent should be placed on political pluralism rather than on self-determination.

Notes

[1] The ideas in this piece were first presented at a public lecture I delivered at the Stellenbosch Institute for Advanced Study in October 2021 as part of the Fellows’ seminar series. I am grateful to STIAS for granting me the fellowship to help me develop my research on the issue of identity in Ethiopia.

[2] See the following for TPLF’s ‘love affair’ with genocide: https://ethiopost.medium.com/tplf-and-genocide-a-love-affair-2e2d8c023e72 and https://www.the-star.co.ke/opinion/star-blogs/2022-01-12-wosen-melaku-tplfs-obsession-with-genocide-and-how-to-end-it/. There is now ample documentation on TPLF atrocities in the Amhara and Afar regions. See, among others, the following links: TPLF War Crimes- Rape- Massacres-90% of Public Infrastructures Ransacked and Deliberately Destroyed; www.theguardian.com/world/2021/sep/09/rebel-forces-accused-of-killing-civilians-north-ethiopia; https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/ethiopia-conflict-tplf/; https://youtu.be/7EckON-2PyQ.

[3] See Berhanu Abegaz (https://issuu.com/amharacouncil/docs/the_enigmatic_amara), who defines the Amhara as ‘arguably the most detribalized of Ethiopia’s cultural groups’, and Gerry Salole, 1979, Who are the Shoans?’ Horn of Africa Vol. 2, No. 3, for the unique historical status of Shawa.

[4] This is the standard work on the Wayane.

[5] See Chapter 6 for ESM’s handling of what it called the ‘national question’ or the ‘question of nationalities.

[6] I have discussed the troubled legacy of ESM’s handling of the question in an Amharic piece, ‘The Legacy of the Ethiopian Student Movement on the Question of Nationalities’, which recently got wide publicity online (cf. https://sebategna.com).

References

Aalen, L., 2001, Ethnic Federalism in a dominant party state: The Ethiopian experience 1991–2000, Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI) Report R 2002:2, University of Bergen.

Hassen, M., 1998, The Macha-Tulama Association 1963-1967 and the Development of Oromo Nationalism, in Jalata, A., ed., Oromo Nationalism and the Ethiopian Discourse: The Search for Freedom and Democracy, Lawrenceville, NJ: Red Sea Press

Mamdani, M., 2010, Saviors and Survivors: Darfur, Politics and the War on Terror, Dakar: CODESRIA.

Markakis, J. 2011, Ethiopia: The Last Two Frontiers, Oxford: James Currey.

Republic of Ethiopia, 1995, The Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 21 August 1995.

Serekeberhan, H., 2002, Building Bridges, Drying Bad Blood: Elite Marriages, Politics and Ethnicity in 19th and 20th Century Imperial Ethiopia, PhD dissertation, Michigan State University.

Tareke, G., 1991, Ethiopia: Power and Protest. Peasant revolts in the twentieth century, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Tazebew, T., 2021, Amhara Nationalism: The empire strikes back, African Affairs, Vol. 120, Issue 479.

Yates, B. J., 2020, The Other Abyssinians: The Northern Oromo and the Creation of Modern Ethiopia, 1855–1913, Rochester: University of Rochester Press.

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