Analysis: Scenarios of an Ethiopia–Eritrea Conflict over Assab

 Analysis: Scenarios of an Ethiopia–Eritrea Conflict over Assab

The three scenario diagrams offer an illustrative geopolitical mapping of possible alignments if Ethiopia and Eritrea entered into open conflict over the strategic port city of Assab, accompanied by a regime-change agenda in Asmara. By modelling relationships in three configurations—limited war, proxy escalation, and de-escalation—they reveal the fluidity and constraints of alliances in the Horn of Africa and its extended geopolitical theatre.

Scenario A: Limited War

In this initial phase, Ethiopia and Eritrea emerge as clear belligerents, with Ethiopia drawing explicit support from Somalia and Turkey, while Eritrea receives backing from Egypt, Iran, and Russia. The Gulf monarchies—UAE and Saudi Arabia—occupy a hedging position, preferring mediation to escalation, partly to safeguard Red Sea trade routes. Major powers like the USA, China, and Israel lean toward neutrality, prioritising stability over direct involvement. Ethiopia’s internal cohesion is weakened by insurgencies (OLF-OLA, Fano) and unresolved political tensions with the OFC and TPLF, which erode its ability to concentrate on the external front.

Scenario B: Regional Proxy Escalation

Here, alignments harden. Eritrea’s ties with Egypt, UAE, Iran, and Russia deepen, creating a counterweight to Ethiopia’s coalition of Somalia, Turkey, Israel, and the USA. The shift of Israel and the USA into Ethiopia’s camp suggests a regionalisation of the conflict driven by security concerns—maritime chokepoints and countering Iranian influence. Internal Ethiopian actors remain destabilising, prolonging the war and complicating military focus. Saudi Arabia maintains a mediator role, attempting to contain escalation without alienating either side.

Scenario C: De-escalation and Corridor Deal

Almost all actors adopt a mediation or neutral stance in the most optimistic configuration, leveraging diplomacy to secure a Red Sea access arrangement without regime change. Including Ethiopia’s internal armed and political actors in the mediation track suggests a broader peace process that addresses domestic insurgencies and interstate disputes. This scenario aligns with the strategic interests of China, the Gulf states, and global powers prioritising uninterrupted trade through the Bab el-Mandeb.

Strategic Implications

The diagrams underscore three constants across scenarios:

1. Ethiopia’s internal fractures are a persistent liability in war and negotiation.

2. Eritrea’s external support network shifts significantly with escalation, suggesting that Asmara’s survival depends heavily on outside backers.

3. Maritime security interests of global powers (USA, China) and Gulf states push them toward mediation unless escalation threatens shipping lanes.

Ultimately, the model shows that Ethiopia’s best prospects for securing Assab without catastrophic regional escalation lie in a de-escalation framework that couples external diplomacy with internal political settlements. Without such an approach, the risk of a drawn-out, proxy-fueled conflict rises sharply, drawing in actors far beyond the Horn.

I built three scenario-model graphics for a potential Ethiopia–Eritrea war over Assab (purely illustrative). Line styles show posture:

Solid = supports Ethiopia

Dotted = supports Eritrea

Dashed = mediates / neutral

Dash-dot = internal opposition to Ethiopia (OFC shown as legal opposition leaning to mediation)

Scenario A — Limited war: scenario_A_assab_limited.png

Scenario B — Regional proxy escalation: scenario_B_proxy_escalation.png

Scenario C — Rapid de-escalation & corridor deal: scenario_C_deescalation.

 PART II

Strategic Policy Paper

 Navigating the Ethiopia–Eritrea Assab Dispute: Strategies for Conflict Prevention, Maritime Security, and Regional Stability

Executive Summary

The possibility of open conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea over Assab and a regime change agenda in Asmara carries profound implications for the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea maritime corridor. The strategic port of Assab sits at the intersection of regional rivalries, great power competition, and internal Ethiopian instability. Using the three modelled scenarios—Limited War, Proxy Escalation, and De-escalation Corridor Deal—this policy paper outlines risk assessments, strategic objectives, and actionable recommendations for Ethiopia, Eritrea, and external stakeholders to mitigate escalation and safeguard regional stability.

1. Strategic Context

Geopolitical Importance of Assab:

Assab offers Ethiopia direct maritime access, bypassing dependence on Djibouti.

For Eritrea, Assab is both a sovereign asset and a strategic bargaining chip for regime survival.

External Stakeholder Interests:

USA, China, Gulf States: Maintain secure Red Sea trade routes and prevent regional destabilisation.

Egypt & Iran: Use Eritrea to counterbalance Ethiopia and project influence.

Turkey and Israel: Strengthen allies, counter adversaries, and maintain regional maritime leverage.

Internal Ethiopian Dynamics:

Armed insurgencies (OLF-OLA, Fano) and political disputes (OFC, TPLF) threaten national cohesion and military focus

2. Scenario Analysis

Scenario A: Limited War

Features: Contained hostilities; Ethiopia gains regional military support but faces domestic instability.

Risks:

Disruption of Red Sea trade routes.

Rapid militarisation of the Ethiopia–Eritrea border.

Spillover of internal Ethiopian conflicts into the war theatre.

Opportunities:

Diplomatic space for Gulf states and China to mediate before escalation.

Scenario B: Proxy Escalation

Features: External actors solidify opposing alliances; maritime and airspace security are threatened.

Risks:

A drawn-out proxy war with economic sanctions and arms races.

Increased likelihood of naval incidents and global energy price shocks.

Opportunities:

Limited—escalation erodes diplomatic trust, and post-conflict reconstruction becomes costlier.

Scenario C: De-escalation & Corridor Deal

Features: Negotiated Red Sea access agreement, no regime change; inclusive peace process involving internal Ethiopian actors.

Risks:

Compromise is perceived as a domestic political weakness.

Fragile implementation if trust between parties is not institutionalised.

Opportunities:

Long-term stability, economic integration, and infrastructure investment in the Red Sea corridor.

Boost to Ethiopia’s regional diplomacy and Eritrea’s economic diversification.

3. Strategic Objectives

For Ethiopia:

Secure uninterrupted maritime access without provoking a regional coalition against it.

Reduce domestic insurgencies to free military and political capital for external negotiations.

Maintain flexible alliances with Gulf states, Turkey, and global powers.

For Eritrea:

Preserve sovereignty and territorial integrity while extracting economic and political concessions.

Avoid overdependence on single external patrons (Egypt, Iran, Russia).

Position as a regional trade partner rather than an isolated security state.

For External Stakeholders:

Ensure freedom of navigation in the Bab el-Mandeb.

Prevent proxy escalation that undermines economic corridors.

Promote inclusive regional diplomacy by integrating Horn states into maritime security frameworks.

4. Policy Recommendations

Ethiopia

1. Two-Track Strategy:

Track 1: Engage in Red Sea access negotiations mediated by the UAE, Saudi Arabia, or China.

Track 2: Launch an inclusive national dialogue with OFC, TPLF, and Oromo leaders to undercut insurgent leverage.

2. Defensive Diplomacy:

Strengthen naval and coastal capacity through joint training with Turkey and neutral Gulf actors.

3. Economic Incentives:

Propose shared revenue arrangements for the Assab trade to reduce Eritrean resistance.

Eritrea

1. Diplomatic Hedging:

Avoid exclusive alignment with anti-Ethiopian coalitions to retain room for negotiation.

2. Port Development Partnerships:

Offer Assab as part of regional trade agreements rather than a zero-sum asset.

3. Domestic Stability:

Undertake modest internal reforms to reduce vulnerability to external regime-change narratives.

External Stakeholders

1. Red Sea Security Forum:

Establish a multilateral security coordination body that includes Ethiopia, Eritrea, the Gulf states, and the great powers.

2. Infrastructure Guarantees:

Invest in port and corridor development, conditional on peaceful dispute settlement.

3. Conflict Early-Warning Mechanisms:

Fund regional intelligence-sharing platforms to prevent accidental escalation.

5. Conclusion

The Ethiopia–Eritrea dispute over Assab is not simply a bilateral maritime issue—it is a flashpoint with the potential to reconfigure alliances across Africa, the Middle East, and global maritime trade. The scenario models make clear that Ethiopia’s success depends on coupling external diplomacy with internal stabilisation. For Eritrea, avoiding total alignment with any one bloc increases bargaining power. For global and regional powers, neutrality and mediation are not just strategic choices but imperatives to prevent a proxy war in one of the world’s most critical maritime corridors.