By Habtamu Nini Abino
In recent remarks given to Roha Media, Fantahun Wake—an Orthodox Church religious teacher and a key ideological voice within the Amhara Fano movement—declared that the driving political doctrine behind the Fano armed struggle is “Mo’a Thewahido”, meaning “Orthodox is the winner.” According to Wake, the objective of the Fano movement is not merely to advocate for Amhara rights or freedom, but to establish a government in Ethiopia guided by Orthodox Christian doctrine, akin to religious regimes in countries like Saudi Arabia and Iran. This ideology marks a dangerous fusion of militant nationalism and theocratic ambition, threatening both Ethiopia’s constitutional order and its multi-religious, multi-ethnic federal framework.
1. Understanding Mo’a Thewahido: From Faith to Political Ideology
The term Mo’a Thewahido historically refers to a deeply spiritual and theological principle within the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church, emphasising the unity of Christ’s divine and human natures. However, Fantahun Wake and his ideological allies have politicised this concept, converting it into a militant nationalist creed. Under this reinterpretation, the Orthodox Church is no longer just a spiritual institution but becomes the central authority for political legitimacy and governance. This marks a dangerous departure from Ethiopia’s secular constitutional order, moving toward the model of a religious state where dissenting beliefs and identities could be delegitimised or suppressed.
2. Religious Theocracy vs. Secular Constitutionalism
Ethiopia’s federal constitution, adopted in 1994, recognises the equality of all nations, nationalities, and peoples, and affirms the state's secular character. It guarantees freedom of religion and protects cultural and linguistic diversity. By design, a government based on Orthodox theology would contradict this pluralistic framework.
Religious theocracies, like those seen in Iran or Saudi Arabia, have historically resulted in the institutional oppression of minorities, suppression of dissent, and marginalisation of women and non-adherents. Implementing a similar model in Ethiopia would not only violate the constitutional rights of Muslims, Protestants, Waaqeffannaa followers, Catholics, and non-believers, but it would also unravel the already fragile social fabric of the Ethiopian state.
3. Amhara Nationalism and the Weaponisation of Religion
The Fano movement emerged in response to perceived marginalisation and security threats facing the Amhara people. While the defence of communal rights is legitimate within a federal system, the transformation of this movement into a vehicle for religious domination reveals a darker agenda. By wrapping Amhara nationalism in Orthodox theology, leaders like Fantahun Wake attempt to reassert a historical dominance reminiscent of the imperial era when state and church operated hand-in-hand to maintain centralist hegemony.
This is a nostalgic return to the past and an attempt to revive a feudal-imperial identity cloaked in religious absolutism. It seeks to undermine the hard-won recognition of ethno-linguistic rights and erase the diversity of belief and identity that defines modern Ethiopia.
4. Implications for National Unity and Regional Stability
Ethiopia is beset by ethnic conflict, economic instability, and authoritarian governance. The rise of a religious-political ideology such as Mo’a Thewahido risks further polarisation. Oromos, Sidamas, Afars, Somalis, and many others will not accept a system that enshrines one religion and one ethnic group as superior. It will almost certainly trigger resistance, deepen national disintegration, and provoke further international condemnation.
Moreover, Ethiopia’s neighbours and international partners would view a theocratic shift as a step toward regional destabilisation. Theocratic radicalism masquerading as nationalist liberation would imperil Ethiopia’s diplomatic, peacekeeping, and trade partner roles.
5. Conclusion: The Path Forward
Fantahun Wake’s advocacy for a theocratic Orthodox-Amhara regime under the Mo’a Thewahido ideology is a direct challenge to Ethiopia’s secular, federal, and democratic aspirations. It is a call for religious supremacy, not national salvation. The international community, domestic civil society, and pro-democracy actors must take this threat seriously.
Ethiopia needs not a religious dictatorship but a renewed social contract, grounded in equality, the rule of law, and mutual respect among its diverse peoples. The path to peace and stability lies in inclusive governance, not in a theocratic vision that isolates and excludes the majority.
Religious nationalism, no matter how sacred its symbols, must be resisted wherever it threatens to become the engine of tyranny.
Habtamu Nini Abino is the author of "The Second Republic and the Politics of Article 39 in Ethiopia" and "Liberal Democracy and the Constitution of 1994: The User’s Handbook."
Part 2
Mo’a Tewahedo and the Collapse of Myth: Unmasking the Religious-Political Cult of Ethiopia’s Extremist Unravellings
The unraveling of Mo’a Tewahedo — an ideological movement embedded within Ethiopian Orthodox extremism and Amhara ethno-nationalism — has reached a moment of reckoning. According to revelations by journalist Meaza Mohammed and spiritual dissident Mamihir Fantahun Waqe, the Mo’a Tewahedo structure is not a religious institution in the traditional sense, but a clandestine political cult masquerading as sacred tradition. It thrives on historical deceit, theological fraud, and ethnic manipulation. Its ultimate mission: to re-establish a fraudulent Solomonic order by appropriating religious symbols, distorting, and weaponising Orthoanalyseshis essay analyses the complex mythology surrounding Mo’a Tewahedo, its alleged violent instrument FANO, and the identity crisis of its supposed foot soldiers — particularly Mamihir Fantahun Waqe himself — to show how the movement's foundation is not only built on falsehood but is collapsing under the weight of its own contradictions.
1. Mo’a Tewahedo: Religion or Cult of Power?
In public perception, “Mo’a Tewahedo” invokes the deeply revered Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church. But the Mo’a Tewahedo exposed in this discourse is a deviation — an extremist ideology clothed in religion but fundamentally aimed at resurrecting an ethno-theocratic state under a Solomonic illusion.
Meaza Mohammed’s testimony points to a secretive network of operatives — including figures like “Moa Anbessa” — who served within government and military institutions while pledging loyalty to a hidden religious-political agenda. This agenda was never about spiritual salvation, but about restoring a monarchy infused with Orthodox symbols and Amhara supremacy. Meaza’s account suggests that these actors manipulated even Fantahun Waqe, an alleged insider, until the truth caught up with him.
2. The Ethnic Illusion and the Mo’a Paradox
A central paradox emerges: Isn’t Fantahun Waqe himself Oromdestabilisesstion destabilises the rigid ethnic framework within which Mo’a Tewahedo operates. Those involved claim to transcend ethnicity through “Mo’a Gez” ideology, yet they actively promote an Amhara-coded nationalism based on Solomonic and Judaic mysticism. Fantahun's own Oromo roots contradict the narrative of an ethnically homogenous vanguard. So do historical claims that even Emperor Haile Selassie himself was of Oromo descent — yet led an imperial regime under the name of the It becomes clear that Mo’a Tewahedo, like the Solomonic narrative it appropriates, erases and re-engineers identities to fit a political theology. It is not Amhara identity that drives the movement, but a supremacist mythology that exploits the Amhara name and Orthodox faith to dominate and manipulate.
3. Orthodoxy as a Political Weapon
According to Meaza Mohammed, the Orthodox Church has been instrumentalised. Leaders wear black not for mourning alone, but under command, symbolic of the Mo’a structure’s control. The religious dress code, chants, liturgies, and public processions are all tools in a campaign of political reprogramming and organisation that has allegedly been preparing for 44 years, waiting for the right time to “restore Tazlo to his throne” — in other words, to reinstall an imperial system disguised as divine redemption. But Orthodoxy itself, as Meaza notes, is now in a state of being weaponised by Mo’a’s cultic order. Even devout believers are waking up to the manipulation.
4. The Fraud of Solomonic Descent
The historical claim that the Amhara people are descendants of King Solomon has long been central to imperial Ethiopian propaganda. But this claim is increasingly emphasised. Meaza emphasises, “Amhara is not a Solomonic descendant.” The supposed Judaic heritage of the monarchy — embodied in the myth of the Queen of Sheba and Menelik — is not supported by factual lineage but fabricated to sanctify political domination.
This theological marginalisation marginalised non-Amhara groups, particularly the Oromo, Tigrayans, and Muslims, whose historical agency was presumed under the pretence of divine hierarchy. The Solomonic legacy, therefore, is not a spiritual heritage but a political project rooted in ethnic and religious exclusion.
5. The Self-Destruction of FANO and the Cult of Violence
FANO, the paramilitary group tied to Mo’a Tewahedo ideology, symbolises both resistance and ruin. As Meaza reveals, the cruelty and violence it commits are not spontaneous acts, but rituals of vengeance derived from the cult’s foundational mythology. “The spirit of cruelty has destroyed us since Moa came to power through 800 years of fraud,” she writes. FANO’s legacy is not the liberation of the Amhara people, but the spiritual and physical destruction of its own youth, driven to die for a false kingdom.
6. The Collapse of the Mo’a Illusion
The tragedy is not just political — it is existential. Mo’a has convinced many to die for a myth. Meaza's reflection — “Orthodoxy is being robbed, and now it is dying” — is both literal and symbolic. The cannibalising itself. Even Fantahun Waqe, once a spiritual authority within this structure, now seems to be awakening to its deception.
The call to “return to your homes where you knew the plot of Moa” is a moral reckoning. Ethiopian youth, Amhara Muslims, Protestant Amharas, and Oromo citizens must reject the myth that has turned them against one another in the name of a lost empire that never was.
Conclusion: A Way Forward Beyond the Mo’a Mirage
Ethiopia’s healing depends on burying the myth of Solomonic supremacy and dismantling the ideological scaffolding. It requires honesty about history, courage to break with inherited dogmas, and solidarity among Ethiopians of all faiths and ethnicities.
As Meaza Mohammed says, “Fantahun Waqe Waqa Yawqlhal” — even Fantahun knows now. May others follow.
By: Habtamu Nini Abino
Author and Political Analyst | Advocate for Federal Democracy and Oromo Rights
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