Ambassador Mohamud Drir and Habtamu Abino in Toronto, September 6,2025
PART ONE
Constitutional Amendments and “Red Line” Provisions in Ethiopia’s Constitution
This agenda is submitted to the Ethiopian National Dialogue Commission (ENDC) for the National Dialogue session scheduled in Toronto, Canada, on September 6, 2025. The agenda focuses on discussing the Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE), enacted in 1995, specifically addressing provisions considered “red lines” that are politically or socially sensitive to amend. While the FDRE Constitution does not explicitly designate any articles as unamendable, specific provisions are foundational to Ethiopia’s federal and democratic structure, making them critical to the state’s identity and unity. Drawing from the Constitution’s text, historical context, and political discourse, particularly around ethnic federalism and national unity, this submission identifies key articles for discussion during the dialogue.
Key Articles Considered as Potential “Red Lines”
The following articles are deemed critical due to their role in Ethiopia’s federal, multi-ethnic framework and are proposed for discussion to assess their significance and implications for amendment:
Article 1: Nomenclature of the State
Provision: Establishes Ethiopia as a Federal Democratic Republic with a federal and democratic state structure.
Why a Red Line? This article defines Ethiopia’s federal framework, accommodating ethnic diversity through regional states. Amending it could undermine the federal system, a core compromise for Ethiopia’s multi-ethnic society, including groups like the Oromo. Proposals to shift to a unitary state or confederation, as suggested by some scholars, are highly contentious and could destabilise ethnic balances, risking tensions among diverse groups.
Article 2: Ethiopian Territorial Jurisdiction
Provision: Defines Ethiopia’s territorial boundaries as determined by international agreements.
Why a Red Line? Any amendment altering territorial integrity could provoke disputes with neighbouring countries or internal ethnic groups tied to specific regions, such as the Oromia Region. This article is foundational to national sovereignty and unity, making it a sensitive issue for discussion in the dialogue.
Article 8: Sovereignty of the People
Provision: Vests all sovereimovement, preservation ofpeoples of Ethiopia, exercised through elected representatives and direct democratic participation.
Why a Red Line? This article underpins Ethiopia’s ethnic federalism, recognising the collective rights of ethnic groups like the Oromo, Amhara, and Tigray. Changing it could erode the principle of self-determination, a core demand of historically marginalised groups, including the Oromo, and is likely to face significant opposition.
Article 9: Supremacy of the Constitution
Provision: Declares the Constitution as the supreme law, invalidating any law, custom, or decision contrary to it.
Why a Red Line? This ensures the Constitution’s authority over all governance, safeguarding against arbitrary rule. Amending it could weaken the legal framework protecting ethnic and individual rights, which is critical for groups like the Oromo under Ethiopia’s federal system and vital for ensuring legal stability.
Article 39: Rights of Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples
Provision: This provision grants every nation, nationality, and people the right to self-determination, including secession, cultural development, and self-governance within a federal structure.
Why a Red Line? This is perhaps the most sensitive article, codifying ethnic federalism and the right to secession, a cornerstone of Ethiopia’s accommodation of ethnic diversity. It ensures cultural identity (e.g., Oromummaa) and regional autonomy for the Oromo and other groups. Amending or removing it could inflame ethnic tensions, as it is seen as a safeguard against centralised domination, a historical grievance from the imperial era. However, its secession clause is controversial, with some arguing it threatens national unity, making it a critical point for dialogue.
Articles 13–44 (Chapter Three): Fundamental Rights and Freedoms
Provisions: Encompass human and democratic rights, including equality (Article 25), freedom of religion (Article 27), and freedom of movement (Article 32), applicable to all persons, including foreigners, except for specific Ethiopian-only rights (e.g., voting).
Why a Red Line? These articles enshrine universal human rights and are aligned with international treaties like the UDHR and ICCPR, which Ethiopia has ratified. They protect individual and collective rights, such as the Oromo’s freedom to practice Islam or Christianity and maintain cultural practices like Irreechaa. Amending these could undermine Ethiopia’s human rights commitments and alienate diverse groups, making them essential for discussion.
Constitutional Amendment Process and Implicit Red Lines
The FDRE Constitution outlines its amendment process in Article 104 (Initiation of Amendments) and Article 105 (Amendment Procedures):
Article 104: Amendments can be proposed by a two-thirds majority of the House of Peoples’ Representatives, the House of Federation, or one-third of the State Councils.
Article 105: Amendments require a two-thirds majority in both federal houses and, for specific provisions, approval by a majority of State Councils. Notably, amendments to Chapter Three (Fundamental Rights and Freedoms) and Article 105 require approval by a majority of State Councils representing Ethiopia’s ethnic regions.
While no article is explicitly unamendable, the stringent requirements for amending Chapter Three and the federal structure suggest these are de facto “red lines.” Changing them requires a broad consensus across ethnic groups, which is politically challenging given Ethiopia’s diverse and polarised landscape. For instance, altering Article 39’s secession clause could face opposition from groups like the Oromo or Tigray, who view it as a safeguard. In contrast, others may advocate for its revision to strengthen national unity. This tension warrants careful discussion in the dialogue.
Political and Social Context
The “red lines” concept emerges from political discourse rather than the constitutional text. Ethiopia’s ethnic federalism, established to address the historic marginalisation of groups like the Oromo, makes articles related to ethnic rights (e.g., Article 39) and the federal structure (e.g., Article 1) politically sensitive. Discussions around constitutional reform, as noted in sources like borkena.com, suggest that while some articles (e.g., nomenclature in Article 1) could be reviewed, changes to foundational principles like ethnic federalism or self-determination risk national stability. With their history of resistance and strong cultural identity (Oromummaa), the Oromo would likely view amendments to these articles as threats to their autonomy and cultural rights.
The ongoing National Dialogue (2022–2025) highlights debates over constitutional amendments. Some groups advocate revising Article 39 to remove secession rights, arguing it undermines unity, while Oromo nationalists defend it as essential to ethnic self-determination. The dialogue’s inclusivity challenges underscore the difficulty of amending these provisions without alienating key stakeholders, a key issue for this session in Toronto.
Critical Perspective
The absence of explicit “unamendable” articles balances flexibility and stability but leaves room for interpretation. The establishment narrative, rooted in the 1995 Constitution’s ethnic federalism, emphasises diversity, but critics argue it entrenches ethnic divisions. For the Oromo, these articles protect their cultural and political marginalisation in Oromia, yet some may see rigid adherence to ethnic federalism as limiting national cohesion. The lack of clear “red lines” allows dialogue but risks instability if sensitive provisions are targeted without consensus, a point for stakeholders to address.
Proposed Discussion Points for the National Dialogue
Assessing Sensitivity: Which articles (e.g., Article 39, Chapter Three) are most critical to maintaining Ethiopia’s federal and democratic structure, and why?
Balancing Unity and Diversity: How can the dialogue address tensions between ethnic self-determination (e.g., Article 39) and national unity without destabilising the country?
Inclusivity in Amendments: How can the amendment process (Articles 104–105) ensure representation of diverse groups, like the Oromo, in constitutional reform?
Safeguarding Rights: How can amendments to foundational articles protect human rights and cultural identities (e.g., Oromummaa) while fostering cohesion?
Conclusion
The FDRE Constitution does not formally designate articles as unamendable. Still, Articles 1, 2, 8, 9, 39, and Chapter Three (Articles 13–44) are considered “red lines” due to their foundational role in Ethiopia’s federal, multi-ethnic framework and human rights commitments. These provisions are critical for groups like the Oromo, ensuring their cultural identity and autonomy. Amending them requires extraordinary consensus, making changes politically sensitive. This agenda calls for the National Dialogue Commission to facilitate inclusive discussions in Toronto to address these provisions, balancing ethnic diversity with national unity.
PART TWO
Oromo Perspective on Constitutional “Red Line” Provisions and the National Dialogue
The Oromo, as Ethiopia’s largest ethnic group, have a significant stake in the National Dialogue scheduled for September 6, 2025, in Toronto, particularly regarding the “red line” provisions of the FDRE Constitution (1995). These provisions—Articles 1, 2, 8, 9, 39, and Chapter Three (Articles 13–44)—are critical to their cultural identity (Oromummaa), political autonomy, and historical struggle against marginalisation. Below, I elaborate on the Oromo perspective, their priorities for the dialogue, and how these constitutional articles shape their engagement.
Oromo Perspective on Key “Red Line” Provisions
Article 1: Nomenclature of the State (Federal Democratic Republic)
Oromo View: The federal structure is non-negotiable for many Oromo, as it grants regional autonomy through the Oromia Region, allowing self-governance and cultural expression (e.g., use of Afaan Oromo). Historical centralisation under imperial and Derg regimes suppressed Oromo identity, safeguarding this article against reverting to unitary rule.
Dialogue Priority: Oromo stakeholders may advocate for strengthening federalism to ensure equitable resource distribution and political representation, resisting any push toward a unitary state, which some fear could marginalise ethnic groups.
Article 2: Ethiopian Territorial Jurisdiction
Oromo View: Ethiopia's territorial integrity, including the Oromia Region, is vital for maintaining Oromo lands, which are central to their economic and cultural survival. Historical land dispossession during Menelik’s era remains a grievance, and any amendment threatening regional boundaries could be seen as undermining Oromo rights.
Dialogue Priority: A key focus will be to ensure that territorial discussions respect regional boundaries and address land-related grievances, particularly in Oromia.
Article 8: Sovereignty of the People
Oromo View: This article’s recognition of sovereignty for “nations, nationalities, and peoples” aligns with Oromo demands for self-determination. It empowers them to participate in national governance while preserving regional authority.
Dialogue Priority: Oromo participants may push for mechanisms to enhance direct democratic participation, such as stronger regional representation in federal institutions, to reflect their population size and historical contributions.
Article 9: Supremacy of the Constitution
Oromo View: The Constitution’s supremacy protects against arbitrary governance, which historically disadvantaged the Oromo through cultural assimilation policies. It ensures legal recourse for rights violations, a critical issue for a group with a history of political exclusion.
Dialogue Priority: Oromo stakeholders may emphasise maintaining this article to safeguard constitutional protections, particularly cultural and linguistic rights, while addressing enforcement gaps.
Article 39: Rights of Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples
Oromo View: This article is central to Oromo identity, guaranteeing self-determination, cultural development (e.g., Oromummaa), and regional autonomy. The right to secession, though controversial, is seen as a symbolic safeguard against centralised oppression. Oromo nationalists, drawing on historical resistance to imperial rule, view this article as non-negotiable.
Dialogue Priority: The Oromo may fiercely defend Article 39, particularly its self-determination clauses, while discussing the secession clause. They may seek clarity on balancing ethnic rights with national unity to prevent misinterpretations that fuel ethnic tensions.
Articles 13–44 (Chapter Three): Fundamental Rights and Freedoms
Oromo View: These articles protect the Oromo’s rights to practice their religion (Islam, Christianity, or Waaqeffannaa), maintain cultural practices like Irreechaa, and enjoy equality and freedom of movemepreservation ofntiontiontiontiontionng Oromummaa within a multi-ethnic state.
Dialogue Priority: We will focus on ensuring these rights remain robust and on mechanisms to address violations (e.g., discrimination against Oromo in urban areas). Oromo participants may advocate for more vigorous enforcement of cultural and linguistic rights.
Oromo Priorities for the National Dialogue
The National Dialogue (2022–2025) provides a platform for the Oromo to address constitutional and historical issues. Key priorities include:
Inclusivity: Ensuring Oromo representation, including urban, rural, and diaspora voices, to reflect their diversity. The Toronto session, targeting the diaspora, is critical for incorporating global Oromo perspectives.
Historical Grievances: These concerns include land dispossession, cultural suppression, and political marginalisation during the imperial and Derg eras, which fuel demands for stronger constitutional protections.
Balancing Oromummaa and National Unity: Navigating tensions between Oromo cultural identity and Ethiopian unity, particularly regarding Article 39’s secession clause, which some view as divisive.
Economic Equity: Advocating for fair resource allocation to Oromia, addressing disparities that have sparked protests (e.g., Oromo Protests, 2014–2016).
Cultural Preservation: Reinforcing constitutional protections for Afaan Oromo, Irreechaa, and the Gadaa system, ensuring they are not diluted by amendments.
Challenges and Opportunities
Challenges:
Inclusivity Gaps: Some Oromo groups, particularly opposition factions, may feel excluded from the dialogue, as seen in criticisms of the ENDC’s process. Ensuring broad representation is critical.
Polarisation: Debates over Article 39 (secession) could polarise Oromo nationalists and pro-unity groups, requiring careful mediation.
Implementation: Past dialogues have struggled with follow-through, as seen in Yemen. The Oromo will likely demand precise mechanisms for implementing agreements.
Opportunities:
Consensus-Building: The dialogue can bridge divides between Oromo and other groups (e.g., Amhara, Tigray) by addressing shared concerns like governance and equity.
Diaspora Engagement: The Toronto session offers a chance to include Oromo diaspora voices, strengthening global support for their priorities.
Reform Advocacy: The Oromo can push for constitutional reforms that enhance federalism while preserving national cohesion, aligning with their vision of Oromummaa within Ethiopia.
Recommendations for the Toronto Session
Facilitate Oromo Representation: Ensure diverse Oromo voices (youth, women, diaspora) are included, with translation services for Afaan Oromo to encourage participation.
Focus on Article 39: Hold working groups to discuss balancing self-determination with national unity, addressing Oromo concerns about centralised oppression.
Address Historical Grievances: Create a sub-session on land and cultural rights, allowing Oromo participants to propose constitutional safeguards.
Ensure Transparency: Publicly share dialogue outcomes to build trust and address Oromo scepticism about government-led processes.
Engage Neutral Facilitators: Given historical mistrust between Oromo groups and the state, use international mediators to ensure impartiality.
Conclusion
The Oromo perspective emphasises the importance of Articles 1, 2, 8, 9, 39, and Chapter Three as “red lines” that protect their autonomy, cultural identity (Oromummaa), and rights within Ethiopia’s federal system. The National Dialogue in Toronto offers a critical opportunity to address these provisions, ensuring they balance Oromo aspirations with national unity. The dialogue can strengthen Ethiopia's multi-ethnic framework by prioritising inclusivity, historical redress, and robust constitutional protections.
PART Three
Enhancing Linguistic Equality in Ethiopia:
Adopting Multiple Federal Working Languages
The Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE), enacted in 1995, enshrines linguistic diversity as a cornerstone of national identity. Article 5 explicitly states that "All Ethiopian languages shall enjoy equal state recognition," while designating Amharic as the working language of the Federal Government and allowing regional states to determine their own.f50a66 This provision acknowledges Ethiopia's rich tapestry of over 80 languages. Yet, the exclusive use of Amharic at the federal level creates practical inequalities, limiting access for non-Amharic speakers to government services, education, and justice. To truly uphold constitutional equality, the Federal Government must adopt at least five major languages as working languages, including Afaan Oromo, Tigrinya, Somali, Sidama, Afar, and Wolayta, fostering inclusivity in a multi-ethnic society. Drawing from South Africa's successful multilingual policy, this reform could bridge divides and promote national unity.
Currently, Amharic's dominance marginalises Ethiopia's linguistic diversity. With Oromo spoken by over 36 million people (about 34% of the population), Amharic by 31.8 million (29%), Somali by 6.7 million, Tigrinya by approximately 7 million, and others like Sidama (4 million), Afar (1.8 million), and Wolayta (2.4 million) representing significant communities, the single-language policy excludes millions.3e0c9a4bfa85 Non-Amharic speakers face barriers in federal institutions, perpetuating historical marginalisation from imperial eras when Amharic was imposed. Adopting multiple working languages would democratize access, enabling citizens to engage in governance without linguistic hurdles. For instance, official documents, parliamentary proceedings, and public services in Afaan Oromo—the most widely spoken language—would empower Oromo communities. At the same time, Tigrinya and Somali would include northern and eastern regions, respectively. Sidama, Afar, and Wolayta, spoken in southern and eastern zones, would ensure representation for smaller but vital groups, aligning with Article 5's equality mandate.
South Africa's Constitution provides a compelling model. Section 6 recognises 11 official languages (now 12, including South African Sign Language), mandating "parity of esteem" and equitable treatment.6df37f314f5f post-apartheid, this policy addressed linguistic divisions, promoting reconciliation by rotating languages in government and education. National departments adopt at least three languages based on regional demographics, enhancing public participation and reducing alienation.0acc28 Similarly, Ethiopia could implement a rotational system system system system systemtem contextual system, where federal communications use Amharic alongside Oromo, Tigrinya, Somali, Sidama, Afar, and Wolayta in relevant contexts. This would not dilute Amharic but elevate others, fostering economic opportunities, cultural preservation, and social cohesion.
The benefits are multifaceted: improved governance efficiency, as citizens interact in native tongues; reduced ethnic tensions by affirming equal rights; and enhanced national identity through diversity. As in South Africa, challenges like translation costs could be mitigated via technology and phased implementation.
In conclusion, to fulfil Article 5's promise, Ethiopia must expand federal working languages beyond Amharic. Adopting Afaan Oromo, Tigrinya, Somali, Sidama, Afar, Wolayta, and others would create equitable opportunities, mirroring South Africa's inclusive approach. This reform is essential for a truly federal democracy, ensuring no language—and no people—is left behind.
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