What Trump’s Trade War Would Mean, in Nine Charts
President Trump’s tariffs on Canada, China, and Mexico could upend U.S. trade. These nine charts show what’s at stake, what comes next, and why it matters.
Article by Shannon K. O'Neil and Julia Huesa
Last updated February 1, 2025 6:38 pm (EST)
On February 1, President Donald Trump imposed tariffs on Canada, China, and Mexico—the United States’ largest trading partners. U.S. importers will pay a 25 per cent tax on all goods from Canada and Mexico as Trump tries to force both countries to curb migration and drug trafficking into the United States. Imports from China, meanwhile, will face 10 per cent tariffs—punishment for Beijing’s failure to rein in the smuggling of fentanyl precursor chemicals to Canada and Mexico, where they are made into U.S.-bound fentanyl.
Here are nine graphics that show the potential economic effects of such tariffs on all four countries.
How could tariffs affect the United States?
Nearly half of all U.S. imports—more than $1.3 trillion—come from Canada, China, and Mexico. However, analysis by Bloomberg Economics shows that the new tariffs could reduce overall U.S. imports by 15 per cent. While the Washington, DC-based Tax Foundation estimates that the tariffs will generate around $100 billion per year in extra federal tax revenue, they could also impose significant costs on the broader economy: disrupting supply chains, raising costs for businesses, eliminating hundreds of thousands of jobs, and ultimately driving up consumer prices.
Specific sectors of the U.S. economy will be hit particularly hard, including the automotive, energy, and food sectors. Gas prices could surge as much as 50 cents per gallon in the Midwest, as Canada and Mexico supply more than 70 per cent [PDF] of crude oil imports to U.S. refineries. Also at risk are cars and other vehicles, as the United States imports nearly half its auto parts from its northern and southern neighbours.
A 25 per cent tariff on Canada and Mexico will raise production costs for U.S. automakers, adding up to $3,000 to the price of some of the roughly sixteen million cars sold annually. Grocery costs could rise, too, as Mexico is the United States’ most significant source of fresh produce, supplying more than 60 per cent of U.S. vegetable imports and nearly half of all fruit and nut imports.
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Still, the United States relies less on trade than many other industrialised economies, including Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom. Imports and exports make up just a quarter of the U.S. gross domestic product (GDP), and the United States sources what it does import from a relatively broad set of nations.
How could tariffs affect Canada and Mexico?
Tariffs will hit Canada and Mexico much harder, as trade makes up about 70% of both economies’ GDP.
Canada and Mexico Are Far More Dependent on the U.S. Than Vice Versa
Trade in goods, 2023
Source: UN Comtrade.
The two countries are mainly dependent on trade with the United States. More than 80 per cent of Mexico’s exports—including cars, machinery, fruits, vegetables, and medical equipment—head north, accounting for 15 per cent of total U.S. imports. This dependence is especially pronounced on Mexico’s northern border. There, industrial states Chihuahua, Coahuila, Nuevo León, and Baja California account for nearly half of Mexico’s exports to the United States, sending more than $200 billion worth of computers, electronics, transportation equipment, and other products each year.
According to Bloomberg Economics, a unilateral 25 per cent tariff on these goods could slash Mexico’s GDP by some 16 per cent, with Mexico’s auto industry bearing the brunt. Mexico sends nearly 80 per cent of the cars it produces to the United States alone, amounting to some 2.5 million vehicles annually. Duties will also threaten Mexico’s energy sector; the United States receives roughly 60 per cent of Mexico’s petroleum exports, most of which is crude oil bound for U.S. refineries. At the same time, Mexico is the top destination for U.S. refined oil exports, which meet over 70 per cent of domestic demand. U.S. tariffs will likely make fuel more expensive, raising prices at the pump and straining Mexico’s broader economy.
Canada faces a similar challenge. The United States buys more than 70 per cent [PDF; in Spanish] of Canada’s exports, with these goods making up 14 per cent of total U.S. imports. Under the new tariffs, Canada’s energy sector will take the biggest hit, as exporters send 80 per cent of their oil south.
These asymmetries in the cost of tariffs at home give the U.S. significant leverage over its North American partners in negotiations.
How could tariffs affect China?
China is comparatively less dependent on the United States and less reliant on trade overall. Over the past two decades, the country has steadily reduced the importance of trade to its economy as Beijing has ramped up domestic production. Today, imports and exports account for only about 37 per cent of China’s GDP, compared to more than 60 per cent in the early 2000s.
China Is Not as Reliant on U.S. Trade
Trade in goods, 2023
Source: UN Comtrade.
In recent years, U.S.-China trade has declined, particularly in sectors hit by previous tariffs and export controls, such as auto parts, data servers, furniture, and semiconductors. China has instead ramped up trade with other partners including the European Union, Mexico, and Vietnam. The country’s share of global trade had climbed roughly 4 per cent since 2016, when President Trump first took office, even as the United States share has dipped. Combined, these factors will lessen the shock of an additional 10 per cent tariff on Chinese exports to the United States.
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The Contentious U.S.-China Trade Relationship
What could happen the day after?
Each country’s currency could weaken further, lessening the bite of import tariffs and raising the effective price of U.S. exports to other nations. A weakened yuan has already softened the blow for Chinese producers, helping their exports remain competitive worldwide. The roughly 30 per cent depreciation of Mexico’s peso since April and the Canadian dollar’s 8 per cent drop since September also lessen the potential impact. Markets could potentially drive the peso and the Canadian dollar further down, not that tariffs are in place.
Additionally, Canada, China, or Mexico could respond in kind, imposing tit-for-tat tariffs on the United States. Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum has already suggested that Mexico could retaliate with its own tariffs, and the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), which underpins North American free trade, would likely allow it.
This wouldn’t be the first time countries have reciprocated. In 2018, Mexico and Canada placed retaliatory tariffs on more than $15 billion worth of U.S. goods—including steel, pork, yoghurt, and tablecloths—after Trump imposed tariffs on their steel and aluminium. Likewise, the United States lost $20 billion in annual farm exports when China hit back against several U.S. tariffs from 2018 to 2019.
If either Canada or Mexico retaliates, U.S. fuel exporters would likely take the biggest hit alongside automakers and other advanced manufacturers, including pharmaceutical producers.
Some States Are More Dependent on Canada, Mexico, and China
U.S. exports by destination country, 2023
Source: U.S. Census Bureau.
Retaliatory tariffs on the United States would predominantly affect manufacturing-heavy states. Mexico buys 70 per cent [PDF] of New Mexico’s exports, including billions of dollars in U.S. semiconductor chips and electrical components that return to the United States in Mexican-made cars and appliances. Texas sends more than $20 billion in chips, auto parts, and electrical equipment to Mexico; overall, its southbound exports account for 5% of its GDP. Tariffs would also dent Ohio’s $5 billion worth of auto and metal exports to Canada and Maine’s $320 million in northbound lumber and paper exports.
