Lords of poverty

have hijacked our kindness. The bureaucracies I refer to are those that This book is an attack on a group of rich and powerful bureaucracies that administer the West,s aid and then deliver it to the poor of the Third World in a process that Bob Geldof once described as 'a perversion of the act of human generosity'. 1 I want to make it clear at the outset that my attack is principally focused on official aid organisations. Other than passing references to the disaster-relief operations of some charities in Part One, I have deliberately refrained from mounting an offensive against the voluntary agencies - for example, Oxfam, Save the Children Fund and Band Aid in Britain, or Catholic Relief Services, Operation California and Africare in the United States. I do have criticisms of the long-term development work of almost all of these smaller 'nongovernmental' organisations; however, by and large, I believe their staff to be well motivated and their efforts worthwhile. Furthermore, they are funded on a voluntary basis by contributions from the general public and thus are under considerable pressure to use properly the money they receive. They rarely do significant harm; sometimes they do great good. The same, however, cannot be said for official aid agencies. Whether 'multilateral' - like the World Bank - or 'bilateraJ' (USAID or Britain's Overseas Development Administration), such agencies are financed involuntarily by tax-payers who are then allowed absolutely no say in how their money is spent. Official aid also involves the transfer of very large sums of money- so large, in fact, that the resources of the voluntary sector look puny and insignificant by comparison. It would thus seem sensible, at the very least, for the official agencies to be directly accountable to the public - to be 'transparent', open and honest in their dealings. This, unfortunately, is not the case. Indeed, critical study is sharply and effectively discouraged. Those of us, for example, who wish to evaluate the progress, or effectiveness, or quality of development assistance will soon discover that the aid bureaucracies have already carried out all the evaluations that they believe to be necessary and are prepared to resist - with armourplated resolve - the 'ignorant', or 'biased' or 'hostile' attentions of outsiders. Even the few apparently independent studies in this field tum out in the Lords of POfJ� majority of cases to have been financed by one or other of the aid agencies or by institutes set up with aid money. And, where there is no such direct link, more subtle influences are generally at work. Academics at schools of development studies, for instance, often aspire to highly-paid jobs in the United Nations or the World Bank and can be forgiven for not biting too hard a hand that may be about to feed them. Western journalists investigating projects in poor countries usually do so under aid-agency auspices and tend to come away with a partisan view of what they have seen. Likewise appeals for disaster-relief, which have played a particularly important role in shaping public perceptions of aid issues in recent years, portray the agencies and their staffs in a light that is entirely positive-if not actually saintly. At a more general level, foreign aid - now worth almost $6o billion a year has changed the shape of the world in which we live and had a profound impact on all our thinking. Consciously or unconsciously we view many critical global problems through lenses provided by the aid industry. When we come to analyse these problems we draw on a vast data-base that the aid industry has generated - and that the aid industry controls. If, as individuals, we choose to act to solve these problems then we will find that the aid industry has already defined and determined most of the directions in which we may move. What we have here, therefore, is a publicly-funded enterprise, charged with grave international responsibilities, that has not only been permitted to wall off its inner workings from the public view but that also sets its own goals, establishes how these goals are to be attained and, in due course, passes judgement on its own efforts. Perhaps inevitably in such a hermetically-sealed universe, these judgements tend to be favourable and seek to reassure us that all is well, that formidable difficulties are slowly but surely being overcome and that aid is fundamentally good. Indeed, the promotion of such anodyne, cheerful and uplifting messages has become a massive international exercise employing thousands of people and absorbing public-relations budgets worth hundreds of millions of dollars a year. It is a tribute to the success of this PR campaign that foreign aid is now a sacred cow. In all Western countries, irrespective of their wealth, and irrespective also of their ideological stance, 'overseas development' has been elevated above political debate to become the 'least questioned form of state spending'. 2 Perhaps this lack of examination explains why foreign-aid budgets always increase. The rate of expansion may be relatively slow here, relatively fast there; in all donor countries, however-even in times of general austeritymore gets spent on overseas development every year. Thus, while we may cut our military spending, pare our education systems to the bone, and put our health services under the microscope, foreign-aid allocations regularly escape cost-benefit analysis and efforts are seldom made to link further funding to the achievement of results in the field. As Professor Bauer of the London School of Economics accurately observes: 'Whatever happens in the recipient countries can be adduced to support the maintenance or extension of aid. Progress is evidence of its efficiency and so an argument for Introduction its expansion; lack of progress is evidence that the dosage has been insufficient and must be increased. Some advocates argue that it would be inexpedient to deny aid to the speedy (those who advance); others, that it would be cruel to deny it to the needy (those who stagnate). Aid is thus like chainpagne: in success you deserve it, in failure you need it. '3 There is, of course, criticism of the aid industry- but such criticism tends to be confined within a rather narrow range. Most commonly we hear the voices of those who say that aid is insufficient and that it should be increased. Some detractors single out specific types of aid as being inappropriate (food aid, for example, or programme aid, or aid for the development of heavy industries). Others focus on particular instances in which aid has been used wastefully, or corruptly, or has gone to governments that are not politically popular in the West. All these different criticisms have one thing in common: they fail, as Professor Bauer puts it, 'to question aid as such'. 4 In writing Lords of Poverty it has been my explicit purpose to do just that- to question aid as such. In consequence, this is not a book that campaigns for more aid; in my view, more of a bad thing can only be a worse thing. Neither is this a book that argues for a redirection of aid - for example, to better-designed projects or to more worthy countries. I do not accept that aid can be made to work if only method X is used in place of method Y, if only this is done instead of that, if only the political or commercial strings attached are forthwith removed, if only the poor are properly 'targeted' rather than the better-off and so on. Such formulas, much loved by the aid industry, have about as much intellectual validity as the facile excuses of tribal rainmakers who deny the basic absurdity of dancing beneath the breathless sky and seek instead to explain the failure of their efforts in terms of obscure but correctable errors in their performance of the ritual. Like rainmakers, too, the high priests of foreign aid are always ready to claim the credit if, by some freak coincidence, things end up going right for a change instead of wrong. In tribal society it is such dexterous dodging of the real issues that allows the rainmakers to stay in business even though they don't make rain; likewise, in W estem public-spending, the same tricks of the trade ensure that huge sums of our money continue to be transferred to aid organisations that seldom -if ever - produce any tangible results. Despite the fads, fancies, 'new techniques', 'new directions' and endless 'policy rethinks' that have characterised the development business over the last half-century, and despite the expenditure of hundreds of billions of dollars, there is little evidence to prove that the poor of the Third World have actually benefited. Year in year out, however, there can be no doubt that aid pays the hefty salaries and underwrites the privileged lifestyles of the international civil servants, 'development expens', consultants and assorted freeloaders who staff the aid agencies themselves. Because I single out these personnel for particular vilification in Lords of Poverty it is inevitable that some will see this book as an unprincipled attack on a basically caring and worthy group of people. Equally, I am well aware that in deliberately drawing attention to the unsavoury, greedy, stupid and dangerous Lords of Pov� aspects of the aid industry's behaviour I am swimming against the tide of received wisdom- and in some ways being 'ungentlemanly'. What I have to say will bitterly offend many people. I make no apologies for that. In democratic societies, we have the right to know the whole truth about publicly-funded institutions - rather than just the partial truths that the bureaucrats who staff those institutions want us to know. PART ONE MASTERS OF DISASTER? And you must know this law of culture: two civilisations cannot really know and understand one another well. You will start going deaf and blind. You will be content in your own civilisation .. . but signals from the other civilisation will be as incomprehensible to you as if they had been sent by the inhabitants of Venus. Ryszard Kapuscinski, The Emperor THE WHITE WOMAN, exactly is she doing? Beneath the hot foreign sun, a trickle of perspiration tired but pretty, the one in the blue paisley frock, what on her brow, busy and wan, harassed and concerned, what can she be up to? She's measuring the circumference of black children's arms, she's weighing marasmic babies in a sling, she's distributing high-energy biscuits to listless and demoralised kids, she's mixing a life-saving solution of oral-rehydration salts, she's supervising the share-out of a grain ration , she's digging a pit latrine. She's a nutritionist or a nurse, or a construction engineer, she's a volunteer with no particular skills or a professional with many, she's an evangelist or an atheist, she's with Ox:fam or UNICEF, with World Vision or the Red Cross. In 1989 she was in Mozambique, in the Sudan, in Ethiopia , and in refugee camps along the border between Kampuchea and Tlµiland. She'd been in all these places in 1988, too, and in 1987. She'll still be in them in 1990 and in 1991. The personification of faith and hope, delivered to developing countries by our charity, she's to be found wherever and whenever disaster strikes. She's the one the camera focuses on briefly ministering to cholera victims in a field-hospital, the one the reporter gets a quote from in front of the feeding station, the one whose weary eyes tell you that she's seen it all before and that she expects to go on seeing it again and again and again. FRIENDS IN DEED? Western relief workers in Third World disasters have become potent symbols of the fundamental decency and rightness of international aid. Of course we must help when people are suffering, when lives are in terrible jeopardy, when the sky falls or the earth dries up. Tight-fisted though we may be at other times, a sudden crisis makes us kind. Charities established to do good works amongst the poor know that they can benefit from this powerful but transitory altruism and go into public-relations overdrive when there is a relief operation in prospect. It's a simple fact of life in the voluntary sector: with appropriate media hype, famines, dramatic influxes of refugees, floods, earthquakes and other such catastrophes can be real money-spinners . A look at the accounts of Oxfam bears this out. After several years of Lords of PO'Derty relatively slow expansion, the world-renowned British voluntary agency doubled its takings over the period 1978-80; it achieved this through high-pressure fund-raising for victims of famine and war in Kampuchea following the Vietnamese invasion of that South-East Asian country in 1979. Thereafter public donations remained fairly static until 1985 when appeals on behalf of the starving in Ethiopia multiplied Oxfam's earnings again - to an all-time high of £51.1 million, up from less than £20 million in 1983-4.1 Clearly, emergency relief work has a much greater capacity to mobilise public generosity than Oxfam's more routine long-term development activities. The same holds true for other charities as well. In 1985, for example, Band Aid raised £16 million for the starving from the British public. 2 Americans each year hand over slightly more than $1 billion to private voluntary organisations engaged in the Third World, largely spurred on to do so by poignant televised appeals for famine and disaster relief. All in all, voluntary agencies like War on Want, Oxfam and Christian Aid in Britain, World Vision, CARE Incorporated and Project Hope in the United States, and M�decins Sans Frontieres in France, can count on a total of $2.4 billion a year in charitable donations to finance their projects and programmes in the developing countries. 3 The international media ballyhoo surrounding the Ethiopian famine raised this figure, albeit briefly, to almost $4 billion in 1985.4 Our support for the humanitarian endeavours of the voluntary agencies is also reflected in opinion polls. A recent survey conducted in the United States for the World Bank concluded that 'scepticism about government efficiency in handling aid leads to a preference for non-governmental channels in the distribution of aid'. 5 Likewise, in Europe, people in ten countries were asked the question: 'Which agencies provide the most useful help to developing countries?' Only 12 per cent of the respondents said 'the government'; 25 per cent said 'private organisations' .6 Another US survey concluded, 'Americans clearly favor aiding the poor countries for moral and humanitarian reasons,' and added: 'public support is strongest to alleviate such basic problems as hunger and malnutrition, disease and illiteracy'. 7 A United States Presidential Commission on World Hunger established that when assistance was described as 'aid to combat hunger' 77 per cent of Americans were in favour of · maintaining it or increasing it; however, when the question was put in terms of 'economic aid' to developing countries, support dropped to 49 per cent. The emotional demand of mass suffering is strong and direct. It compels us to reach for our cheque books in response to disaster appeals by the voluntary agencies. Also - through us - it influences the behaviour of our elected governments: although Britain and the United States have imposed a political ban on long-term development assistance to socialist Ethiopia, both were generous with 'humanitarian' assistance during the 1984-5 famine and again during 1987-8. Governments control the purse-strings of official aid budgets that dwarf the resources available to the charities.8 It should not be forgotten, however, that these budgets, too, are provided by 'us' - all official aid, whether earmarked for Masters of Disaster? 'long-term' or 'emergency' purposes is financed out of tax revenues. It is then channelled to the Third World through two rather different types of organisation : 'bilateral' (for example, Britain's Overseas Development Administration and the United States Agency for International Development) and 'multilateral' (for example, the EEC's Directorate General for Development, the World Bank and the various agencies of the United Nations system like the Food and Agriculture Organisation, the World Health Organisation and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees). Generally speaking, the more that an official agency's work can be packaged as humanitarian and charitable in focus, the more likely it is to receive the mandate of popular approval . One senior staffer at UNICEF (the United Nations Children's Emergency Fund) told me that he found it both exciting and fulfilling to be employed by an agency that had such a 'sexy' subject matter. 'Of course most of our finances come directly to us from member governments of the UN,' he said, 'but Joe Public gets worked up and concerned about children in trouble; that's why people buy our Christmas cards. We're seen as being amongst the good guys.' The charitable impulse at the root of much aid-giving is at its most potent during disasters and emergencies. It is, however, a double-edged sword. On the one hand it raises lots of money . On the other it stifles questions about the uses to which this money is put - and makes those who ask such questions look rather churlish . Criticising humanitarianism and generosity is like criticising the institution of motherhood; it is just not 'the done thing' . One observer has expressed the problem particularly well: Humanitarians ask individuals and gove�ents, out of charity, to give funds to allow them to bind up wounds, comfort the weak, save lives. Compassion expects everyone to agree on the method . Since they are guided by a moral virtue, compassion, any obstacle in the path of carry ing out humanitarian objectives must be immoral. And since the objective 9 is so good, it is inconceivable that recipients will fail to be grateful. But what is it, precisely, that the recipients are expected to be grateful/or? In some cases it is a good deal less than donors and tax-payers are led to expect. In August 1988, for example, Sudan (previously drought-stricken) was hit by severe flooding of the River Nile and, overnight, more than a million people were rendered homeless in Khartoum , the capital city. As the waters continued to rise, epidemics of diseases like cholera and typhoid posed an ever-increasing threat. In addition many of the flood victims were completely destitute and without any kind of food or shelter. Aid agencies in the industrialised countries responded to this disaster with strident newspaper and television appeals for help and millions of dollars were quickly donated. Two weeks after the flooding, however, almost no tangible signs of the relief effort could be seen on the ground: a dozen or so plastic sheets here, a few blankets from the Red Crescent Society there, and a grain-distribution station with just twelve sacks of flour in hand. Visiting reporters were proudly shown a newly s Lords of P(J'l)erty erected camp of 300 tents provided by Britain: for reasons that no one on the spot could explain, all the tents turned out to be empty and under armed guard - even though tens of thousands of homeless people were milling about on mudflats nearby. By this time no fewer than eighty-five relief Bights had arrived from Europe and the US bringing 1 ,200 tonnes of supplies. What was unfortunate was that these consignments had included just 400 tonnes of food (against a UN estimate of 12,000 tonnes to cover the immediate need). 'That's why, if we go to any comer, we will find that the majority of people have received nothing,' said Al Haj Nugdalla Rahman, a local MP. Amongst the food that was sent was a large container-load of fresh meat which- in the absence of refrigeration quickly began to rot. By the time it was distributed it was 'really smelling' according to one relief worker. By contrast much more durable-and necessary - items like clothing, soap and hospital tents were almost completely missing from the relief deliveries during the first two weeks. 10 Despite such failings in the crucial early days, genuine efforts were subsequently made during the Sudan floods to help those in need. All too often, however, appeals for money are not followed up by action of any practical kind. One agency that has mastered the art of saying much and giving little is The Hunger Project, a massive international undertaking which raises funds in the United States, Britain and many other countries with the claim that it is dedicated to the 'eradication of the persistence of hunger and starvation' in the Third World;11 in fact it sends almost no money to the starving at all. According to the US National Charities Information Bureau, The Hunger Project received donations totalling $6,981,005 in 1985 . Out of this, $210,775 was passed on in the form of grants to other organisations involved in relief work in hungry countries. All the rest was spent in the US under such headings as 'enrollment and committee activities', 'communication, information and education services', 'publications', 'management and general' and 'fundraising'. Telephone expenses for the year approached half a million dollars. 12 In 1984 The Hunger Project's British office raised £192,658 from the public of which just £1,048 went to the Third World.13 In 1985, International Christian Aid, a large US voluntary organisation, was accused by officials at the UN and at the State Department of failing to send a single cent to Ethiopia out of $18 million raised for famine relief in that African country.14 ICA denied the allegations: according to its own accounts 28 per cent of its income is spent on fund-raising and administration in the United States; all the rest, i.e. 72 per cent, goes to the Third World.15 However, an investigation of the charity by an agency of the US Better Business Bureau had previously concluded otherwise: a close analysis oflCA's expenditure for 1983 showed that just 41 per cent of its income in that year went to support the programmes cited in its fund-raising solicitations. 16 A similar example is the Dallas-based relief organisation, Priority One International; in one year it sent overseas just 18 cents out of every dollar that it received in donations.17 Fortunately, humanitarianism is not always the last refuge of the scoundrel. Masters of Disaster! Figures from the Charities Aid Foundation show that most of Britain's top twenty-one voluntary agencies only divert about 10 pence out of each pound raised to pay for their overheads, administration and fund-raising. Band Aid did particularly well during the Ethiopian famine of 1984-5; it kept its costs down to just 7 pence in every £100 received. War on Want, which came under attack in October 1986 with charges that its then Director, George Galloway, bad spent £20,000 in eighteen months staying in luxury hotels, in fact spent only 1. 7 per cent of its income on administration and fund-raising in 1984-5. Save the Children Fund, with costs running at 7 .42 per cent of moneys received in the same year, says: 'We have a policy of keeping our overheads down to below 15 per cent of our income .•. We want maximum income to give maximum aid.'18 FREELOADERS, FOOLS AND THE GOD-SQUAD Whether the aid is charitable or official, however, whether it is funded out of direct public donations or out of taxes, the employees of all the agencies concerned inevitably play a crucial role in the field and bear a tremendous responsibility. They must interpret correctly the needs of the poor and they must meet those needs quickly and competently. It is generally taken for granted that they do both of these things, and do them well. Press and television reports tend to play up relief workers as hard-pressed saints. Some recipients of emergency assistance have, however, been heard to express ungracious doubts about those who come to help. As one African refugee asked petulantly: 'Why is it that every US dollar comes with twenty Americans attached to it?'19 In many Third World disasters, a great deal of aid money is spent purchasing the expertise that Americans - and Europeans - provide. According to a detailed study of refugee relief in South-East Asia: The agencies' 'operating', 'logistics' and 'miscellaneous' costs are enormous and almost impenetrable. Each agency calculates them on a different basis. Somewhere among them are the considerable costs of personnel. The International Commission of the Red Cross treats its staff superbly. In Phnom Penh much of their food was imported from Europe; in Thailand UN officials constantly complained that the Swiss, with their air-conditioned cars, their weekends on the beach, lived far better than anyone else ... One World Health Organisation official asked for a fee of $50,000, a generous per diem, and a ticket for his wife, to come for a short assignment to Phnom Penh. Eventually he compromised on $16,000, the per diem, and no wife . .. UN officials would get more iii two days' allowances than the relief programme would provide for the average Cambodian over a twenty-seven-month period. 20 The aid personnel who consume these resources come in all shapes and sizes, all kinds and varieties. Some are very good indeed - and undoubt Lards of POfJerty edly earn their pay. Others are extraordinarily bad, their motivation is questionable and their input is negligible or even harmful. All too often, during Third World disasters, staff, experts and consultants are not subjected to any kind of careful scrutiny before they are sent into the field; common sense gets abandoned in the rush to help. It should be said at the outset that much of this help is barely tangible to the victims of the catastrophe. Many Western 'disaster experts' turn out to be merely on expensive fact-finding missions. What this means in practice is that they arrive with empty hands and leave with their heads full of information which may, or may not, later be translated into action. At the height of the Sudanese drought in February 1985 the Khartoum Hilton (where a single room costs $150 a night without breakfast) seethed with delegations which had come 'to assess the situation'. Despite critical water shortages in many pans of the country, and despite the fact that the devastating extent of the emergency had been thoroughly assessed over the preceding four months, not one additional drilling rig had by then arrived. 21 Worse than this, as an anthropologist who spent several years living amongst African refugees has observed: 'During an emergency, whatever their background, almost any white face which arrives on the scene has the chance of a job.'22 I came across an example of the accuracy of this remark during the famine that afflicted the East African country of Somalia in 1987. In charge of one highly reputable British voluntary agency's emergency ·feeding operations there I found a bronzed globe-trotter whose only qualification for the position appeared to be the fact that he had an African wife (she was not a Somali but he employed her in the field anyway, causing massive resentment amongst locally recruited staff who rightly believed they could do her job better). He told me that the agency had first taken him on to its payroll in Ethiopia, which he had been visiting as a tourist in 1985 ('piece of luck, that'). Later he had been transferred to a more senior position in Tanzania- where he was keen to return as soon as possible since that was where his wife came from. When I expressed my doubts that he could be of much use to anyone in Somalia - which he had never visited before and claimed to dislike intensely - he reasstlred me that he was only there on a short-term secondment. His absolute lack of any relevant technical experience (he'd studied philosophy at university) was thus compounded by a sublime ignorance of Somali conditions and customs. In Somalia again, but some years earlier, International Christian Aid, World Vision and a number of other US charities wasted valuable donor dollars by recruiting Christian zealots to manage their programmes in the refugee camps that had been set up following fighting along the border with Ethiopia. In addition to antagonising and outraging the Muslims amongst whom they worked, these people were generally young, untrained and inexperienced. Robert Smith, a born-again World Vision official in Somalia, caused puzzlement - and some hilarity - amongst suppliers of equipment and materials by signing all his requisition telexes with the words 'God Bless Robert'. 23 The Masters of Disaster? extent to which God complied is not known. What is clear, however, is that requisitions from the US charities were frequently wasteful and badly thought out. ICA had a penchant for constructing shelters with imported materials that were not properly treated with insecticides - most of them collapsed on their occupants after being weakened by termites. According to one ICA nurse, who resigned in disgust: 'The camp managers were completely untrained in this kind of business. Some of them appeared to place a higher priority on evangelising than on administering to the refugees' physical needs. '24 Many other crass errors were made as a result of putting evangelism before good management. For example, one of the American agencies ordered $100,000 worth of equipment and supplies for the camps, and then cancelled when - rather belatedly - it was realised that the relevant budget was badly overspent. What was much worse was that the Christian staff involved in this snafu chose to make additional savings by suddenly cancelling their ongoing work in the health sector - including all the vital booster shots in the second stage of an inoculation campaign which had made initial rounds in eleven camps. Thousands of children in whom the immunisation process had been started but not completed were thus rendered more susceptible to deadly epidemics than they would have been if they had simply been left alone. 25 Whenever religion is mixed injudiciously with relief work there are human costs to be paid. Despite ample evidence of this, however, the onward march of Christianity remains an abiding concern of many voluntary agencies. According to Ted Engstrom, who was President of World Vision until 30 June 1987: 'We analyse every project, every programme we undertake, to make sure that within that programme evangelism is a significant component. We cannot feed individuals and then let them go to hell. '26 During 1980-1 this policy led to grave charges being levelled against the giant American charity's refugee programme in Honduras, which was being carried out under the overall direction of UNHCR (the branch of the United Nations mandated with international responsibilities for refugees). The charges, most of which were strenuously denied, came from other relief workers on the spot. According to these witnesses, World Vision employees frequently used the threat of withholding food supplies to coerce Salvadorean refugees into attending Protestant worship services. It was also alleged- and again denied - that World Vision employed several ex-members of the local secret police (DNI) and had a policy of allowing the Honduran military free access to the refugee camps that it administered. The most serious accusation was that, on the night of 22 May 1981, two Salvadorean refugees who sought sanctuary at the Honduran village of Colomoncagua were picked up by World Vision, installed in a vehicle and told that they were being taken to the refugee camp at Limones. Instead they were handed over to the military. A few days later the same two refugees were found dead at the border.27 World Vision once again denied involvement in these events. Lords of Poverty A VERY HIGH COM.MISSIONER In refugee relief, as illustrated by the Honduran example, UNHCR cooperates with and finances the activities of a host of private voluntary organisations. Although this is not widely understood, HCR is not itself an implementing agency; it simply raises money from UN member governments which it then passes on to charities contracted to do the actual fieldwork. Thereafter, standards of supervision are often very slack, or completely absent, and abuses can easily occur. Recently, for example, one voluntary organisation carrying out HCR programmes in Beirut used UN funds to buy tents, beds, blankets and bedsheets through four fictitious companies at mark-ups of as much as 300 per cent. In most cases, as auditors subsequently discovered, 'the quantities purchased were considerably more than the number of refugees and there were substantial differences between the quantities paid for and those actually received'. The loss resulting from these transactions was in the region of half a million dollars. 28 Sometimes HCR's money never even reaches the country hosting the refugees - let alone the refugees themselves. One American voluntary agency working in East Africa received $400,000 from the world body payable entirely in the USA as 'relief staff support costs'. The relief staff concerned were mostly recent graduates of Columbia University, still wet behind the ears;29 none of them had been in Africa before and they had no relevant experience. Nevertheless they were sent into the field at the UN's expense (for UN read Western tax-payers) and there given power and authority as camp managers over the lives of hundreds of thousands of 'helpless refugees' - many of whom were far better qualified than they were. In a similar fashion, in Sudan in 1985, an expatriate with no appropriate skills was employed at UNHCR's expense to recruit medical staff to work on refugee programmes. Some of the refugees themselves - they were Ugandans did have medical qualifications. However, neither the expatriate concerned, nor the voluntary agency for which he worked, bothered to consult them. As a result many errors were made. 30 UNHCR's own officials are not immune to this kind of arrogance and stupidity. In 1987 Bishara Ali, a Somali living in Canada (where he had obtained economics, sociology and social work degrees), applied for the job of Field Assistant at HCR's office in the central Somali town ofBelet Weyne. He was turned down by Robin MacAlpine, HCR's Assistant Representative in Somalia, on the astonishing grounds that he was too well qualified. 'With your broad experience in Canada,' MacAlpine wrote, 'it is considered unlikely that you would be able to spend years in such a post without considerable frustration.'31 Bishara told me in 1988: After receiving that letter I felt angry, humiliated and rejected. It proved to me that whatever we [Third World] people do in achieving academically, professionally and technically we would still not be acceptable to the white bureaucracies who enjoy the good life at our expense. 32 IO Masters of Disaster� It is interesting to note the kind of people that HCR does consider suitable for jobs in Belet Weyne. Sydney Waldron - a construction engineer who was employed by an American charity implementing HCR programmes in Somalia _recalls once being summoned to deal with a 'sanitary emergency' in the central Somali town. At that time Waldron was extremely busy on HCR construction work near Mogadishu, the capital; since his orders came from no less a person than UNHCR's regional head in Belet Weyne, however, he thought he had better respond. Besides, the town stands on the banks of the floodprone Shebelle River, close to several refugee camps, and cholera is an everpresent risk. 'Sanitary emergency' was thus most likely the UN's diploillatic euphemism for a killer epidemic. Fearing this to be the case, Waldr'>n hastily consulted with a Somali sanitary engineer about 'basic slit-trench and pit construction, labour recruitment, payment plans, tool availability, and other plans essential to the provision of sanitary facilities for some 200,000 refugees'. He then records: After a seventeen-hour trip of memorable discomfort (six persons and support equipment in a short wheelbase Toyota), I arrived in Belet Weyne to discover the nature of the sanitary emergency which had called me away. The regional head of UNHCR had been forced to relocate his residence to a temporary encampment after the town of Belet Weyne had flooded out. My task, in its entirety, was to provide him with a latrine pit and enclosure, and a shower enclosure. He had, in essence, diverted me from responding to construction needs which he, himself, had outlined in the UNHCR construction requirement report, in order to satisfy his personal comforts. My approach to this construction problem was a model of efficiency: I conveyed a packet of shillings from his hands to those of four Somali labourers, who dug the necessary pit. 33 That night Waldron slept in an unusu� place- on top of two refrigerators in the house that had been rented in Belet Weync by the voluntary agency for which he worked. The refrigerators, he observes, had been 'flown in from the United States at considerable expense' but were 'useless except for sleeping on since they had been purchased with I 10-volt electrical systems; like most of Africa, Somalia operates on a 220-volt electrical current'. 34 JUNK, WASTE AND STUPIDITY Refrigerators were not the only costly and useless items that were freighted to Somalia at this time as a result of bad management and bad planning by humanitarians involved in refugee relief. Perhaps the most grandiose white elephants were a number of all-purpose health centres, prefabricated in Finland at an initial budget appropriation of $1 million each. Waldron again: By the time they were ready for shipment the cost of these health centre buildings had purportedly doubled, i.e. to the staggering price of $2 million each. The additional cost was associated with the decision to include two flush toilets rather than only one. There was no plumbing or II Lords of Pcroerry water source to which these might have been connected in the camps. When, finally, the health centres began to arrive in Mogadishu, another problem in design became apparent: their disassembled components were twice as wide as the available trucking could handle. I was offered the job (in all seriousness) of cutting these components in half on the docks of Mogadishu. The only such health centre to be erected during my stay in Somalia was virtually unusable since it was horribly hot inside. There was no electricity in the camp for its air-conditioners. 35 The folly, irrelevance - and sometimes dangerous idiocy - of much that passes as humanitarian a_ssistance is not publicised by the aid agencies at all, for understandable reasons. On the contrary, their press releases paint a rosy picture. Disaster victims, however, must live with the realities of relief. Perhaps because they do not read the press releases, some of them are beginning to be choosy about what they will accept. At about the same time that Sydney Waldron was confronting the daunting challenge of sawing health centres in half in Somalia, Detroit newscaster Beverly Draper was en route for that same benighted country aboard a US air force Hercules filled with food, pharmaceuticals and clothing she had collected for the refugee camps. The drugs, most of which were salesmen's samples donated by well-meaning doctors and pharmacists, were in due course destroyed by Somali public health officials who rightly considered them 'garbage'. 36 Other than useless drugs designed to remedy the ailments of affluent patients, the poor and hungry in what is one of the hottest countries in the world have also received frostbite medicine shipped from Minnesota,37 electric blankets, and huge consignments of Go-Slim soup and chocolateftavour drinks for dieters. 38 Even when appropriate in terms of content, emergency aid can still sometimes turn out to cause more trouble than it is worth. On Christmas Day 1986, for instance, a relief convoy left Khartoum, capital city of the Sudan, for the town of Wau in the far south where fighting and drought had led to famine. The convoy was carrying 200 tonnes of food when it set off; by the tiine it ar rived in late January 1987, however, 22 tonnes had mysteriously disappeared. A generator for the local hospital had been brought on one of the trucks but was found to have had so many parts removed from it that it was unusable. Adding a final insult to injury, it was then discovered that the fuel needed to get the convoy back to Khartoum had also been stolen; almost all the remaining food had to be sold to cover the cost of replacing it and to pay the wages of the troops who had made up the convoy's escort. Joseph Nykindi, Bishop of Wau and Chairman of the town's relief committee, subsequently wrote to donors: 'We appreciate your efforts, but if this is what you call food aid we don't want it. '39 Food from the European Economic Community is another gift horse that is frequently looked in the mouth, with complaints on record from a host of beneficiaries. According to Euro-MP Richard Balfe: 'It is completely unacceptable for us to export food that we would not eat ourselves.' Following widespread fall-out from the nuclear accident at the Chernobyl power plant in Russia in 1986, however, some badly contaminated Community food, illegal in Europe, has turned up in aid shipments. In 1987, for example, a pasta factory on the Red Sea had to be closed down after taking delivery of irradiated Italian Bour made from Greek wheat. A year later, in 1988, a number of impoverished African countries were forced to reject EEC food because it was found to be dangerously radioactive. 40 1During a disaster, all sorts of junk comes rolling in,' says Larry Simon of Oxfam-America. He is right. Food for Hungry Inc., an American private voluntary organisation, arranged a shipment of 19 tonnes of 'survival food and drugs' to Kampuchea during the great famine there in 1979-80. The food was so old that San Francisco zoo-keepers had stopped feeding it to their animals and some of the drugs had expired fifteen years earlier.41 One British charity's response to an African emergency included packs of tea, tissues and Tampax, while a West German· voluntary agency sent 1,000 polystyrene igloos which proved too hot for the intended recipients to live in. Since the igloos could not be dismantled they had to be burnt. 42 Famine victims in India were sent blankets which they neither needed nor used; in due course the Indian government donated the same blankets to Nepal which, subsequently, donated them back to India. 43 Laxatives and anti-indigestion remedies are other favourites amongst agencies that provide humanitarian relief to the starving. According to Mary de Zuniga, a public health official in Nicaragua, 'Whenever anybody donates a medicine, there just seems to be an overdose of milk of magnesia. We said we could probably use it to whitewash the building. '44 Recently, relief agencies shipped nearly 800 cases of outdated baby food and food supplement to a Honduran refugee camp. 45 Likewise, despite the well-known health risks posed to small malnourished children by unvitaminised dried skimmed milk, 46 this commodity remains a popular relief item in emergencies. According to a 1987 special report of the EEC Court of Auditors, 'Botswana received a delivery of 500 tonnes of non-vitaminised skim.med milk powder, which was contrary to the most basic dictates of common sense. Since the milk was intended for direct consumption by children in schools and small clinics, it should have been vitaminised to prevent the risk of serious gastric disorders. '47 Mauritius, too, got 500 tonnes of the unvitaminised DSM. In this case the auditors note: The addition of vitamins was essential - since the powder was for immediate distribution to more than 100,000 people from vulnerable categories. The supply agreement reached with the government definitely stipulated that the vitamins should be added, but the Directorate General for Development at the Commission omitted to mention this requirement in the mobilisation request which it sent to the Commission's Directorate General for Agriculture.48 Lords of P01Dert1 Other notable examples of EEC 'humanitarianism' gone wrong include 15 ,ooo tonnes of maize loaded at Le Havre bound for famine-stricken Mozambique. On arrival the consignment was found to be old, full of broken grains, impurities and mould- and was, as a result, totally unfit for human consumption. A shipment of 26,000 tonnes of maize sent as food aid to the people of Niger was also examined by the auditors, who concluded sadly: 'It was not even acceptable as animal fodder.' In 1982 the tiny drought-stricken African republic of Djibouti actually had the temerity to refuse delivery of an emergency shipment of 97 4 tonnes of European wheat flour, which it declared unfit for human consumption! The EEC, however, was determined to impose its food on hungry Africans somehow and finally got the same consignment of fiour accepted by Za1re - albeit two years later, in 1984. 49 In 198 3 Morocco ended up using 240 tonnes of EEC butter oil to make soapthe oil was found to contain four times the maximum level of aerobic germs permitted under European regulations. In the same year Tunisia received 345 tonnes of butter oil of even more dangerous quality-it contained a high level of peroxide and was, in addition, contaminated with faeces. 50 There was, on the other hand, nothing wrong with the 4,500 tonnes of EEC butter that Libya, a wealthy petroleum exporter, was allowed to buy at the heavily subsidised price of 16 UK pence a pound during 1986. The deal, worth more than £1 million, also included 700 tonnes of subsidised beef - no doubt a popular item on the dinner tables of the Libyan people, who have amongst the highest disposable incomes in the world. Defending its action, the Commission argued that it was cheaper to subsidise sales of first-class butter and meat to Libya than it was to store these surplus items in Europe. However, as British MP Tony Marlowe commented: 'What about the poor? What about the starving in the Third World?'51 The sad truth, as the auditors themselves regretfully conclude, is that the record of the EEC's humanitarian aid to the poor is just a 'catalogue of disasters', with bureaucratic errors and inefficiencies, wastefulness, inappropriateness and unforgivable lateness very much the order of the day. In June 1983 the Commission received a request for help from Indonesia, which had suffered a poor harvest. In response to this request, I 5 ,ooo tonnes of wheat were shipped- but not until August 1984, even though the next harvest was by then over. Following hurricanes in Mauritius the Commission granted 2,000 tonnes of cereals as 'immediate food aid' on 25 March 1981; the consignment actually arrived fifteen months later - on 20 June 1982. A March 1981 request from China for urgent help after drought in Hubei province did not produce any food shipments until July 1982. Likewise, although the EEC knew that local stocks of Zambian maize would run out in April 1983, deliveries of food aid did not begin until July of that year. 52 In Mozambique in 1988, emergency food aid from all sources, including the EEC, was found to be taking up to nine months to be delivered. Another phenomenon was also apparent: when a consignment did eventually arrive, the donor concerned would frequently insist that it be sent to the province it had originally been earmarked for - even if that province was by then oversupplied and other areas were in need. This caused serious problems for Mozambiquan farmers who, against all the odds, had succeeded in producing a crop: donors appearing with food to give away ruined the market for them and put them out of business . 53 In the hands of well-meaning but ignorant humanitarians, food aid frequently does more harm than good. According to a study by the US Agency for International Development, Guatemala received 41,000 tonnes of food from sympathetic outsiders after it had suffered a devastating earthquake. Very little of the Central American country's own food supplies had 0een destroyed by the quake, however, and local farmers had just brought in a record-breaking harvest. The most visible result of the humanitarian largesse dumped on Guatemala was thus the complete collapse of prices in the domestic grain market and greatly increased privation for rural producers. 54 Band Aid, the dynamic charity set up in Britain by Bob Geldof with the avowed intention of responding to the real needs of the Third World and avoiding such snafus, wasted more than $4 million of donated money on the purchase of eighty second-hand lorries for Sudan. The lorries, which were bought in Kuwait, proved to be in such bad condition that they were virtually unusable. It took five months - and many more dollars - to repair them. 55 In Ethiopia, Band Aid's determination not to allow local political problems to pollute its humanitarian endeavours led to a decision to get assistance directly to the people of Eritrea and Tigre through the rebel movements which control the countryside in those provinces. A lorry was sent on a ship going to Port Sudan so that it could be taken into Tigre overland . Unfortunately the ship stopped first at Assab, an Ethiopian port. With the provocative legend 'To the people of Tigre from the people of Watford' emblazoned on its side, the lorry stood on deck in full view of Ethiopian Customs officials who quickly requisitioned it - on the entirely reasonable grounds that Tigre is part of Ethiopia . 56 Despite such mistakes, however, Band Aid's efforts were generally effective and life-saving. By contrast, some humanitarian aid can kill. For example, Map International Inc. , of Wheaton, Illinois, received a donation of $17 million worth of heart-regulating pacemakers from the American Hospital Supply Corporation. The donation solved a problem for AHS by giving it a hefty tax write-off from an area of its operations that it had anyway decided to close down. The pacemakers, which duly went to the Third World, quickly began to give the recipient countries other problems, however: most of the units were susceptible to battery leakage and other life-threatening malfunctions. 57 FUND-RAISING The fund-raising methods that generate Western charity can be as reprehensible as the uses to which that charity is put. All too often what underlies the strident appeals, the images of starving babies and shell-shocked refugees, Lords of P()'l)erty turns out not to be a genuine concern for the wretched of the earth but, rather, a kind of capitalism of mercy in which aid organisations compete to boost their own size and prestige - with precious little reference to those who are meant to benefit from their programmes . It is doub tful in the extreme whether the end justifies the means, but this, in a sense, is irrelevant; what we have here is a situation in which the means has become an end in itself. In late 1984 a French television company organised a 'Trucks for Hope' convoy which sped across the Sahara Desert from the Mediterranean bringing medicines, equipment and food to the needy countries of the West African Sahel. Viewers were not told that almost as much money was spent on keeping the convoy in live satellite contact with France as was spent on the relief supplies. Most of the medical equipment carried was smashed to bits en route because of the dramatic requirement to maintain a fast pace for the cameras despite bad or non-existent roads. 'We chose the marathon format in order to keep the public in suspense,' explained the organiser of what was described at the time as the 'humanitarian equivalent of the Paris-Dakar rally'. 58 World Vision, which runs a successful operation in Britain as well as in the United States, regularly makes powerful and emotional appeals to our humanitarianism. Its high-pressure sales techniques often seem to be based more upon' the law of the jungle than upon anything else. Operating a survival-of-thefittest philosophy in a competitive market-place , and apparently defining 'fitness' not in terms of the work it does amongst the poor but, rather, in terms of the quantity of funds raised, World Vision is not above sabotaging the efforts of other charities in order to fill its own coffers. A classic example of this sort of strategy dates back to the early 1980s when Operation California, a relief agency based in Los Angeles, organised a pop concert to raise money for Kampuchean refugees. The concert was televised by CBS and, at the end of the programme, Operation California flashed its telephone number for viewers wishing to donate. What it did not at first know was that World Vision had purchased commercials - for screening outside the Los Angeles viewing area - to coincide with the concert, during which, at regular intervals, it flashed its own toll-free 800 number. According to Operation California Executive Director Richard Walden, many callers were not told that this toll-free number was World Vision's. Indeed, when Los Angeles Deputy District Attorney Edward Feldman called the 800 number and asked, 'Is this Operation California, the same people who had the concert on tonight?' he was told, 'Yes.' In Feldman's opinion this was not merely unethical: 'It was wire fraud. It was a federal crime .,.... the use of the airwaves and the phones to put out a phony message for the purpose of getting money . . . from our viewpoint it involved deceptive exploitation of the fund-raising concert.' Operation California, which was then working out of a one-room headquarters in Beverly Hills, quickly expressed its outrage to the larger and infinitely richer charity and threatened to go public with its complaint. World Vision's response was quietly to pass over a cheque for $250,000 . It did not make clear whether this was intended as compensation for the revenues that Operation California had lost as a result of the commercials or as hush money . 59 On 21 December 1984, unable to resist the allure of Ethiopian famine pictures, World Vision ran an Australia-wide Christmas Special television show calling on the public in that country to give it funds . In so doing it broke an explicit understanding with the Australian Council of Churches that it would not run such television spectaculars in competition with the ACC's traditional Christmas Bowl appeal. Such ruthless treatment of 'rivals' pays, however: the American charity is, today, the largest voluntary agency in Australia. 60 World Vision's competitive use of the media has been less successful in Britain where it has been frustrated on a number of occasions. In 1985, for example, the charity's Northampton-based British office paid $25,000 to Mohamed Amin, the cameraman who, in October 1984, had shot the first news footage of the Ethiopian famine. The money was a subsidy for a tear-jerking thirty-minute documentary that Am.in was making called 'African Calvary', and was given on the understanding that viewers of the film would be asked at the end to make their donations to World Vision UK. The funds would no doubt have come in useful to finance the agency's lavish aid programme in Ethiopia which, at that time, was spending large sums on running what was effectively a private scheduled air service in the northern provinces of Wollo and Tigre; the World Vision fleet of five planes included a Twin Otter with a price tag of more than $2 million. Unfortunately, however, the BBC - which screened the film in Britain - did not approve of the idea of a single charity getting all the benefit and wanted instead to direct the audience's money to the Disasters Emergency Committee, a non-partisan umbrella organisation set up by a group of British voluntary agencies including Cafod, Christian Aid, Oxfam , the Red Cross and Save the Children Fund. An hour before the show went on the air the BBC found itself threatened with legal action and was forced to reinstate the World Vision appeal; rightly, however, it also included details of the Disasters Emergency Committee - thus allowing viewers to make up their own minds. 61 Another World Vision scam is gross over-exaggeration of the extent of Third World disasters. An advertisement that the charity's US headquarters placed in the National Catholic Reporter on 2 October 1981 claimed that twelve million people in East Africa were 'on the verge of death. It's the greatest human-need crisis of our time.' The statement was not true - as World Vision admitted after officials from the UN complained to the publisher. In 1982 �e giant charity remained apparently unrepentant: it screened emotional television commercials across the USA breaking news of a massive refugee influx into Somalia from neighbouring Ethiopia . What the commercials failed to mention was that the pictures and information were almost three years old.62 World Vision was not the worst offender in this respect, however. At the same time International Christian Aid was running its own ads about Somalia's refugees. According to Anhur E. Dewey at the State Department's Bureau of Refugee Affairs, an ICA film 'erroneously claimed that 1. 5 million refugees lived in Somalia, when the actual number was one-third that amount; fighting had increased, when it had decreased; children received 6oo to 800 calories a day, when much of the refugee population actually was receiving too much food'. 63 Likewise, the Dallas-based relief group Priority One International successfully parted humanitarians from their money with the claim that its missionaries in the South American country of Colombia were so poor that they had to exist on popcorn. Contacted by telephone, however, the missionaries themselves were more honest. Asked why they were eating popcorn they replied, 'Because we like it,' and added that they received regular deliveries of US-style food flown in from a nearby city. 64 Perhaps the worst aspect of charitable advertising, however, is the temptation, which few voluntary agencies can resist during disasters , to make ever more mawkish appeals. Undoubtedly these do raise money but they also humiliate the supposed beneficiaries and misrepresent them as passive victims incapable of doing anything for themselves. Thus on television in the United States Maurice J. Mosley, the President of Priority One International, once unshrouded a dead Somali baby for the benefit of the camera while the baby's relatives held a wake in the background . 'No gift is too big,' Mosley told viewers .65 Neither is such schmaltzy and degrading sensationalism confined to the charitable sector of the aid industry. Similar examples from other areas include posters produced by UNHCR. What the posters all show is refugees in attitudes of submission or helplessness. Commenting on what he calls the persistent 'psychological reaction to refugees as people for whom "we must do something'' ', Martin Barber, Director of the British Refugee Council, had this to say about the subjects of the UNHCR campaign: 'They were waiting for something to happen. They were holding out their hands. The photographer was standing up and they were sitting down. '66