Federalism is a constitutional arrangement where at least two levels of government rule the same territory and people in a framework of shared rule and self-rule.1 The question of why a political community forms a federal state rather than a unitary one has been the subject of normative federal theory. One reason why political communities opt for federalism is that it gives them “the best of both worlds: the advantages of being a relatively small, homogeneous polity, along with the advantages of being part of a stronger, more secure larger state; while at the same time avoiding some of the worst disadvantages of being either too small or too large.”2 For example, while being part of a larger state could provide military security and economic prosperity, being part of a small one could enable effective democratic self-government. The “best of big, best of small” rationale explains the origin of federalism in the United States of America, which, in turn, has inspired many nations worldwide, including regional organizations such as the European Union, to follow a similar course or to incorporate some federalist principles and practices. With the emergence of new states after the Second World War (especially those associated with decolonization) and the Cold War, federalism has been used to accommodate ethnic, religious, linguistic, and racial diversity within states. Therefore, in addition to offering the “best of big, best of small” service to political communities, federalism has been mediating and managing diversity and pluralism within such societies.3 Ethiopia adopted federalism in 1995 primarily to hold together the ethnolinguistic groups it includes, of which there are more than 80. Although this was not the first time Ethiopia had resorted to federalism, the 1995 federal experiment is by far the most complex one, involving novel normative commitments and institutional configurations. The first Ethiopian experience with federalism was with Eritrea in the 1950s when the latter obtained its independence from Italy. After a decision by the United Nations General Assembly, a federation between Eritrea and Ethiopia was formed in 1952.4 From 1952-1962, Ethiopia was a federal state until the federation was dissolved to form a unitary one.5 The dissolution of this federation led to the Eritrean War of Liberation, which also inspired many other ethnic liberation movements, such as those of the Tigray, the Oromo, and the Somali. Beyond this formal experiment of federation, the empire of Ethiopia had operated under a federal logic that recognizes that the provinces have substantial power.6 However, with a rationale of modernization, Emperor Haile Selassie I dismantled the pre-existing regional powers of the Rases, or the governors of the provinces, by reconstructing feudalism in a way that enhanced the political power of the monarchy and his direct descendants.7 As such, the turn to federalism in 1995 to regulate the ethnic diversity of the Ethiopian state was a logical and necessary step in the right direction. The 1995 federal experiment, as David Turton has observed, is “both radical and pioneering.”8 It is radical because it restructured the Ethiopian state anew based on the principle of ethnic groups having self-determination. It is pioneering because “Ethiopia has gone further than any other African state, and further than ‘almost any other state worldwide’ in using ethnicity as its fundamental principle.”9 Ethiopia has established a federalism in line with ethnicity, dubbed ethnic federalism.”10 Ethiopia’s ethnic federalism is as contested today as it was when it was first established more than a quarter of a century ago. Ethiopian scholars, politicians, and the public hold different and sometimes contradictory views on the nature, operation, and usefulness of the federal system to the country.11 On the one hand, proponents of the federal system—mostly ethnonational political groups—claim that if Ethiopia is to continue as a unified nation, it must maintain its current federal structure, which is undergirded by ethnicity and the corporate conception of group rights.12 The argument states that the contemporary political problem in Ethiopia is not related to the ethnic character of the federal system but, instead, is connected to the lack of democracy and accountable government.13 For this group, what is needed is democratization and constitutionalism, not federal reform. On the other hand, opponents of the federal system—mostly pan-Ethiopian political groups—contend that if Ethiopia is to persist as a unified nation, it must change its ethnic-based federal system to a non-ethnic one that considers the individual the primary subject of the political order, as is the case in other liberal democratic states.14 For this group, ethnic federalism does not only intensify ethnic conflicts and tensions across the country, but it also erects some structural barriers to the practice of democracy and constitutionalism.15 Without federal reform, this group posits, it is difficult to establish and operate a democratic constitutional order in the country. The ethnic character of this federal system has dominated political debate and scholarly discussion about federalism in the country from its establishment to the present. Indeed, this is justified, as the normative innovations and institutional setups of the 1995 Constitution were shaped by the quest to address the issue of ethnicity and ethnic diversity. From the preamble to the basic principles of the Constitution, including the bill of rights and the structural parts of the Constitution, all the elements emphasize the primacy of ethnicity. Ethnicity animates the very foundation of the constitutional order, and the ethnic federal arrangement is just one manifestation of it.16 The exclusive focus on the ethnic aspect of Ethiopian federalism, however, ignores its other important and interesting aspects, which should have been included in the discourse regarding federalism. In this article, I argue that ethnic federalism, or as I call it here, “Ethiopian federalism,” is so much more than “ethnic federalism” and even more than federalism itself. Ethiopian federalism has four main faces, and indeed, federalism may have many faces across federal states. For example, J. R. Mallory identifies the five faces of Canadian federalism—the quasi- federalism of the Macdonald era, the classic, emergency, and co-operative federalism types, and, finally, double-image federalism—all of which characterize the different forms of Canadian federalism across different time periods.17 Similarly, Byron Dailey reveals the five faces of federalism the United States Supreme Court Justices adhere to in deciding major federalism cases.18 These faces of federalism in Canada and the United States sit within its broader domain and largely arise in its application. But the four faces of Ethiopian federalism I expound in this article extend beyond the contours of federalism and are mainly found in the constitutional text. By taking the Ethiopian Constitution and the political theory that underpins it seriously, this article explores and examines the four faces of Ethiopian federalism, which have thus far been systematically and comprehensively understudied and have different implications for the operation of a federal and democratic state and government. First, when we consider Ethiopian federalism while viewing ethnic groups as corporate entities, it is a federation of convenience, a potentially destructible and divisible federal union. Second, when we examine it within the context of power allocation between the tiers of government or from the vantage point of regional states, Ethiopian federalism is a centralized federation—closer to a unitary state. Third, when we observe it from the perspective of citizenship or individuals, Ethiopian federalism is a confederation. Fourth and finally, when we analyze it by assessing ethnic relations as collective entities, Ethiopian federalism has institutionalized an ethnocracy rather than a democracy. These four faces of Ethiopian federalism have brought about a novel political and constitutional experiment in the form of a “new state system” that has unitary, federal, confederal, and ethnocratic elements. In this article, I develop these four faces of Ethiopian federalism in their order and explain how each of them may affect the experimentation with federal democracy in the country.