This article has shown that Ethiopian federalism is so much more than ethnic federalism, and even more than federalism itself. It has revealed the four faces of Ethiopian federalism, the unitary, federal, confederal, and ethnocratic, that have brought about a novel constitutional experiment in a “new state system.” The experiment with such a federal system for more than a quarter of a century did not bring democracy, nor did it address the concerns over treatment of both ethnic groups and individuals throughout the country. It also failed to resolve the “issue of peace and war,” the overarching goal of the 1995 Constitution according to its chief architect, the late Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi.109 Twenty-five years after the adoption of the Constitution, Ethiopia is at war with itself, again in Tigray, the epicenter of conflict some three decades ago. Pursuing constitutionalism within such a federal arrangement could further entrench an ethnocracy, not a democracy, at both the national and subnational levels. While the legitimacy deficit associated with the Constitution may be a sufficient reason to undertake a constitutional reform,110 its unitary, confederal, and ethnocratic features could be even stronger reasons to revise and rethink some of its normative assumptions and institutional features. With this federal structure, it is difficult, if not impossible, to operate a democratic state and government within a competitive multiparty system that equally respects and protects the rights of all individuals and all ethnic groups at both the national and subnational levels. Thus, it may be advisable to reform the federal system to ensure peace and practice democracy in one political and economic community. If constitutional reform is pursued, then it should seriously consider and engage with the four faces of Ethiopian federalism this article has expounded.