Gulf Rivalries and the Reconfiguration of Security in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea
Abstract
Over the past decade, rivalries among Gulf powers—principally between the and , alongside the involvement of , , and —have reshaped the geopolitical landscape of the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea basin. These rivalries, expressed through proxy engagements, economic investments, and strategic alignments, have transformed local conflicts into extensions of broader Middle Eastern competition. This article examines the structural drivers, operational modalities, and regional consequences of these rivalries, with particular focus on Sudan, Ethiopia–Eritrea tensions, and Somalia/Somaliland dynamics.
1. Strategic Drivers of Gulf Engagement
The Horn of Africa occupies a pivotal geostrategic position adjacent to the —one of the world’s most critical maritime corridors. Gulf states initially expanded their presence in the region in response to perceived Iranian influence, especially following the . Their objectives can be broadly categorized into three domains:
- Maritime Security: Ensuring uninterrupted trade flows through the Red Sea.
- Resource Acquisition: Access to agricultural land, minerals (notably Sudanese gold), and logistics corridors.
- Geopolitical Competition: Countering ideological and strategic rivals, including Islamist movements and Iranian proxies.
However, intra-Gulf competition—intensified during the —transformed these engagements into zero-sum contests.
2. Competing Blocs and Modes of Influence
The rivalries in the Horn are structured around loosely defined blocs:
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UAE محور (Axis): The UAE has pursued an assertive, often revisionist strategy, supporting anti-Islamist actors and leveraging military logistics, port infrastructure, and post- ties with Israel.
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Saudi–Egypt محور: Saudi Arabia, frequently aligned with Egypt, emphasizes regime stability, Red Sea security, and the containment of Islamist networks such as the Muslim Brotherhood.
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Qatar–Turkey محور: Qatar and Turkey tend to support Islamist-leaning or status-quo actors, combining financial aid, political backing, and in some cases drone capabilities.
These alignments are fluid rather than fixed, often shifting in response to evolving regional crises.
3. Sudan: A Theatre of Proxy Convergence
The ongoing exemplifies the convergence of Gulf rivalries. The conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) has been internationalized through external support:
- The UAE has been widely accused (though it denies) of providing logistical and military support to the RSF.
- Saudi Arabia and Egypt have leaned toward supporting or mediating alongside the SAF.
- Iran has reportedly supplied drones to SAF elements, with logistical routes involving Eritrean ports such as Assab and Massawa.
- Turkey and Qatar have also extended varying degrees of support to SAF-aligned actors.
This multiplicity of external patrons has entrenched a military stalemate, exacerbating humanitarian crises and fragmenting Sudan’s territorial integrity.
4. Ethiopia–Eritrea and Red Sea Geopolitics
Tensions between and have been increasingly influenced by Gulf alignments. UAE support for Ethiopian Prime Minister —particularly in economic and security domains—has intersected with Ethiopia’s ambitions for Red Sea access, including agreements with Somaliland.
Conversely, Saudi Arabia has cultivated closer ties with Eritrea, partly as a counterbalance to UAE influence. Eritrean ports, notably Assab and Massawa, have thus become critical nodes in both Gulf and Iranian strategic calculations, raising the risk of militarization along the Red Sea littoral.
5. Somalia, Somaliland, and Fragmented Sovereignty
In and Somaliland, Gulf rivalries intersect with fragile state structures:
- Turkey and Qatar have supported the Somali federal government, including military training and infrastructure.
- The UAE has engaged with Somaliland, particularly through port investments in Berbera.
- The ’s recognition of Somaliland in December 2025 has been interpreted by some analysts as aligning with UAE strategic interests in securing Red Sea access.
These overlapping engagements complicate Somalia’s sovereignty and risk deepening fragmentation.
6. Broader Red Sea Militarization
The Red Sea is increasingly characterized by:
- Expansion of foreign military bases.
- Intensification of port diplomacy.
- Proxy militia activity.
These dynamics intersect with Iranian influence and the activities of the , particularly in the context of escalating Iran–Israel–U.S. tensions. The Horn of Africa thus functions as both a logistical corridor and a strategic buffer zone in wider Middle Eastern conflicts.
7. Implications for Regional Stability
The consequences of Gulf rivalries in the Horn are profound:
- Conflict Prolongation: External arms flows sustain military stalemates.
- Humanitarian Crisis: Displacement, famine risks, and civilian casualties intensify.
- Diplomatic Fragmentation: Competing external agendas undermine African Union and UN mediation efforts.
- Economic Distortion: Infrastructure investments are often tied to patronage networks rather than inclusive development.
Moreover, shifting alliances—such as evolving Saudi–UAE relations—introduce unpredictability into an already volatile environment.
8. The Iran Factor and Future Trajectories
The broader confrontation involving Iran introduces both constraints and risks:
- Short-term: Gulf states may reduce proxy engagement in the Horn to prioritize internal security.
- Long-term: Iran may exploit governance vacuums, particularly through Eritrean or Sudanese corridors.
- Maritime Risk: Escalation could disrupt Red Sea shipping, with global economic implications.
Conclusion
Gulf rivalries have effectively reconstituted the Horn of Africa as an extension of Middle Eastern geopolitics. While these engagements have brought investment and strategic attention, they have more often intensified conflicts, undermined local governance, and complicated peacebuilding efforts.
Sustainable stabilization requires a recalibration of external involvement—prioritizing coordinated diplomacy, African-led mediation frameworks, and development-oriented investment. Sudan remains the critical test case: without a cessation of external military support to both SAF and RSF, the risk of a broader Red Sea conflagration will persist.
In this evolving geopolitical theatre, the Horn of Africa is no longer peripheral; it is central to the future architecture of regional and global security.
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