PM Netanyahu addresses Institute for National Security Studies

MFA Newsletter

Opening statement to the International Conference on Security Challenges of the 21st Century 29 May 2012 Photo: GPO [Translated from Hebrew] I would like to speak about the goals of peace, the manner in which to attain it, and above all, the conditions necessary to uphold it. A peace agreement with the Palestinians is necessary first and foremost to prevent a bi-national state. It is preferable to live in peace. Peace is better than any other situation, but we need to prevent a bi-national state, as well as strengthen the future of Israel as a Jewish and democratic country. We do not want to rule over the Palestinians, nor do we want the Palestinians to be citizens of the State of Israel. That is why three times - in my speech at Bar-Ilan, in my speech in the Knesset and later in my speech at the American Congress - I declared that I support and welcome peace between two nation-states - a demilitarized Palestinian state that recognizes the Jewish state, and Israel, the nation-state of the Jewish people. I believe there is very broad support among the people for such a peace agreement, one based on mutual respect and security for Israel. By security, I mean substantive security arrangements on the ground that provide a response to the ongoing threats and any new threats that are introduced. I believe that the unity government under my leadership is an expression of this broad support, and I call again on Mahmoud Abbas not to miss this unique opportunity and give peace a chance. Let me clarify - I have not set any conditions to enter into negotiations. Certainly I will have conditions to conclude negotiations, and so will Mahmoud Abbas. This is natural and it is the reason we conduct negotiations. But this is why I say to Abbas - don't miss out on this opportunity to extend your hand in peace. If I had to say it another way, I would say, "President Abbas, all we are saying is 'give peace a chance'." This is a real opportunity. It will not necessarily be repeated in general or political history, but it exists now and peace negotiations need two sides. One side is ready and willing. Peace between Israel and the Palestinians is in the clear interest of both peoples, but it must be said clearly that there are things that peace with the Palestinians will not bring. Despite popular opinion, peace with the Palestinians will not ensure regional peace. Tremendous historic forces are working in the area in opposition to regional peace, and they will continue to unsettle our environment. On a day to day basis, they work to destroy the State of Israel and they are interested in undermining any peace agreement - those that have been signed and those that we hope to sign in the future. These extremist forces are motivated by religious fanaticism and a fundamental objection to Western culture, of which Israel is a clear representative. So far we have been successful in overcoming these and other forces that have opposed our existence. We did so by maintaining our qualitative advantage. Today we face new challenges that obligate us to find new ways of maintaining this advantage. In order to have peace in situations of conflict, a balance of power or excess of power is needed. In our case with regard to the extremist religious fanaticism that is directed at us, we need an excess of power. We must safeguard our advantage in the fields that I will detail later. There are four threats that challenge the State of Israel today and threaten it and peace. We are prepared to provide a response for each and every one of them. The four threats are nuclear, missiles, cyber and vast weapons reserves that are being stockpiled in our region. There is also a fifth threat that I will discuss later. As to the nuclear issue, let me address the talks between the superpowers and Iran. Not only do the sanctions need to be harsher, the demands on Iran for which the sanctions are imposed must be strengthened and the powers must insist that Iran fulfill these demands in full. Iran must stop all enrichment of nuclear material; it must remove all materials enriched to date from its territory; and it must dismantle its underground nuclear enrichment plant at Qom. Only a specific Iranian commitment during negotiations to meet all three demands and a clear confirmation that they have been executed can stop Iran's nuclear plan. This should be the goal of the negotiations. But I must say regretfully that this is not what is asked of Iran today. To date, there have been several rounds of talks in which the Iranians were required to stop low levels of uranium enrichment, this is to say, to stop enrichment of 3.5%. Even though that is a low level, it is a significant part of the enrichment process needed to prepare fissile material for a bomb. Not only did the Iranians not do this, they continued enriching uranium without interruption and increased their level of enrichment to 20%, and as it has recently become apparent, even higher than that. In other words, they are constantly advancing their nuclear program to create atomic bombs. One would expect that the powers demand that Iran stop all enrichment in light of its serial violations and in light of the fact that they are currently enriching at a level of 20%, but instead they are reducing their demands. In the first round, they demanded that the Iranians stop the 3.5%, and even that is not happening now. In this round, they are not even insisting that the Iranians stop all enrichment. On the one hand, it is good that they are imposing heavy economic sanctions on Iran. This is a positive and important thing. We asked for it, and I must say with satisfaction that this pressure is being put on Iran. However, on the other hand, these sanctions must be accompanied by the demands I outlined. It is the combination of the two that will lead to the stopping of the Iranian nuclear program. It is very possible that the Iranians will temporarily stop their enrichment at 20%, but that is not enough. The test will be if the Irania! ns will agree to stop all enrichment, remove all enriched material and to dismantle their underground nuclear facility at Qom. This is the test and there is no other. Regarding the missile threat, from the moment our enemies understood they cannot beat us on the military battlefield, they turned to missile and rocket weapons that they use against our cities and communities. No other country is more threatened by missiles than the State of Israel, and no other country is as advanced in building a missile defense system as Israel. We employ two kinds of defense. In the field of active defense, we invested in the Iron Dome system and we are expanding its deployment. We appreciate America's important support in this regard. This is in addition to developing new systems - David's Sling and the Arrow missile system for multi-layered defense. With regard to passive defense, we installed sirens across the country and we are preparing a warning system that will directly dial the mobile phones of each and every citizen. There was a trial run of this in Netanya today, and it will not take long before we are able to warn people about the firing of missiles. This will allow us to prevent the entire country from becoming paralyzed and focus on the threatened area. These passive and active systems - but first and foremost active - not only improve defense, they improve our offensive and deterrence capabilities because they expand our maneuvering space for activating our offensive capabilities. We are not being dragged into unconsidered responses. We have more time, and I think that we use it with great consideration in choosing the appropriate action. The defense systems against the missile threat will be able to do what the separation fence against suicide bombers did. However, I would like to point out something that I say at every opportunity, and I will say it again today - defensive force is not enough. Offensive force is needed to strike at the enemy and deter further action. The combination of offensive and defensive force can prevent war or shorten it. The third field, the cyber field, also affects the first two threats. It is certainly wrapped up in the nuclear and missile problems. The cyber capability that we are developing increases the State of Israel's defensive capability. In the cyber field, a country's size has little meaning, but there is great meaning to its scientific power, and in that, Israel is blessed. We are investing a great deal of capital in this - human and fiscal capital alike - and I expect that these investments will grow in the coming years. It must be said also that all advanced, developed countries are currently under threat from cyber attack systems. Because we are one of the most computerized countries in the world, we are especially exposed to cyber attacks, and in order to improve our ability to defend ourselves, this year I established a national cyber headquarters. Like any other matter of importance, I set a goal: that Israel be one of the five leading countries in the cyber field worldwide. I believe we can achieve this goal. The nuclear, missile and cyber threats are new threats that we are preparing for, but unfortunately there is a fourth threat - an old threat, one that is familiar to the veterans here who served in the IDF and our defense establishment and that is the vast weapons stockpiles in the region. We cannot entirely rule out the possibility that weapons supplied today to other countries in the region will not be used against us in the future. We cannot rule out the possibility that extremist forces will take over regimes that today do not pose a threat to us and that these forces will not use the weapons found there against us. After all, this is not a theoretical matter. It has already happened - quite prominently in Iran - and it can also happen given the tremendous shock our region is experiencing, and it can certainly happen in other places. This is why maintaining Israel's qualitative advantage is a central component in our national security. It is an issue we discuss constantly with our allies and our friends in the United States, and we will continue to do so. That is how to deal with the fourth threat, but as I mentioned earlier, there is a fifth threat that can endanger the future of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state. This threat is the breaching of our borders by illegal infiltrators seeking work. At the beginning of this government's term, I already began to deal with this problem. As early as 2005 or 2006, people spoke about it. Shortly after we withdrew from Gaza, people said that a fence must be built. In 2009, when this government began its work, there was still no fence, not even the beginning of a fence. There was no budget for a fence and there was no agreement about the need for a fence. It was said that a fence would be ineffective, that it would not stop anyone, that it was too expensive, that it was superfluous. When I insisted, people said, "Well then, we'll build two sections." I insisted otherwise. People told me, "But it will cost two billion shekels." I said that we would allocate funds without breaching the budgetary framework as this was a matter of priority. And it is a national priority, because otherwise we will be swamped. We will have not tens of thousands, but rather hundreds of thousands of infiltrators, and our country is too small. Other countries lost control of their borders at costs that they still cannot fully assess, but we know that ! we cannot allow ourselves to do so. Therefore, less than a year after the government's establishment, we decided to erect the fence, allocate funds for it and complete its construction from Gaza to Eilat. This fence will be completed in several months of extraordinary work. I go down there every few months with my military secretary, Johanan Locker, who played an important role in expediting and pushing the system, but today, the systems is already pushing itself. My policy with regard to the illegal infiltrators seeking work is clear - first to stop their entry with the fence, while at the same time deporting the infiltrators who are in Israel. We will begin by deporting the South Sudanese infiltrators dependent on the court's approval, which I hope we will receive over the next several days. Later, we will continue with other groups. It is important to understand that international law makes deportation very difficult. It states that if one wants to return illegal infiltrators to their countries of origin, one needs the approval of the country. If one wants to return them or deport them to a third country, one must obtain the country's approval. In both cases, one must ensure that no harm comes to them; in other words, that the conditions in the country do not threaten their lives. In order to uphold this condition, we are in contact with many countries. It is not a matter that can be resolved overnight, but unlike what I read today, it is also not a problem with no solution and no action to be taken. It is true that if we had not decided to erect the fence two years ago, then we would not be dealing with 60,000 illegal infiltrators; within several years we would be dealing with 600,000 - the problem would be magnified by a factor of ten. So first of all, we are stopping them, and although it is difficult and it is not a problem that can be solved overnight, we can deport them and we will. Just as we solved other problems, we will solve this problem methodically and responsibly, in accordance with international agreements. I am aware of the distress suffered by the residents of South Tel Aviv and Eilat. I visited them and spoke with them, and with the residents of Arad and of other communities and cities in Israel suffering from this problem. However, I reiterate my call to public figures and to the residents to show restraint and act responsibly. We are a moral people and we will act accordingly. We denounce violence; we denounce invective; we respect human rights. Refugees have rights and we respect them. People who do not have the right to be here still have certain rights, and we respect those too, but we will deport them according to the law, responsibly. We will not lose our humanity and we will not deprive anyone of their humanity. However, at the same time, we will not accept a reality in which infiltrators from an entire continent come here en masse to work. We are committed to defending our borders in order to defend the future of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic country. Ladies and Gentlemen, There are people who, when they hear about these threats that I outlined, do not think that we should devote most of our efforts to thwarting them. They think that we do not have to concentrate so much effort against a nuclear Iran, or against the missile threat or the cyber threat or the breach of our borders. They claim that if we just sign a peace agreement with the Palestinians, everything will fall into place and that somehow things will work out. I do not share this opinion. Once people told us that if we only solved the Syria problem everything would work out, do you remember that? That same Syria is currently slaughtering its people with horrible brutality, with, of course, the assistance of Iran and Hizbullah - real assistance, not just political support: assistance in murder. Well, I do not share that opinion. We do not share that opinion about Syria, but we do share the opinion that we need to act simultaneously against the threats, while at the same time trying to advance the peace process with the Palestinians. We strive for peace with our Palestinian neighbors at the same time that we are thwarting the threats against our security. These actions do not conflict. On the contrary, they are complementary. The great American historian and gifted author Will Durant expressed my approach to ensuring our existence well. In 1968, towards the end of his life he wrote a small book of 100 pages, which he called, The Lessons in History. In it, he wrote, "These faiths and Christianity assured their followers that the good spirit would win in the end, but of this consummation history offers no guarantee. Nature and history do not agree with our conceptions of good or bad; they define good as that which survives, and bad as that which goes under; and the universe has no prejudice." Later on, he writes, "In the present inadequacy of international law and sentiment a nation must be ready at any moment to defend itself and when its essential interests are involved it must be allowed to use any means it considers essential to its survival." He wrote this in 1968. My friends, I thank you for this opportunity to present you the principles that guide me in ensuring the existence and future of the State of Israel in security and peace.

Crisis jolts globalization process

Crisis jolts globalization process

Economic and financial globalization and the expansion of world trade have brought substantial benefits to countries around the world. But the current financial crisis has put globalization on hold, with capital flows reversing and global trade shrinking.

Some analysts see the drivers of the recent globalization wave getting undermined, with protectionism on the rise.

Even supporters of globalization agree that the benefits of globalization are not without risks—such as those arising from volatile capital movements. The IMF works to help economies manage or reduce these risks, through economic analysis and policy advice and through technical assistance in areas such as macroeconomic policy, financial sector sustainability, and the exchange-rate system.

Expelled ANCYL president Julius Malema

"For a diamond to shine it goes through a thorough process of being polished."
"It doesn't matter what time it takes, I will lead the African National Congress,"
"I will lead this ANC. You must put it on the archive. I am going to be a leader of the African National Congress,"
 

Mali's Political Stalemate and the fallacy of a national conference

Summary of Briefings

West Africa: 

Mali's Political Stalemate and the fallacy of a national conference

It is gradually becoming clear that developments in Mali are proving extremely challenging for the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to resolve. To date, there has been no consensus over who should assume the interim presidency and the role of the junta in the transition. The question on the minds of many observers, therefore, is how to resolve the imbroglio in the country.

On 08 May 2012, delegates representing the ECOWAS visited Mali to negotiate with the leaders of the junta. The delegation comprising Foreign Ministers Adama Bictogo from Cote d'Ivoire and Djibril Basssole from Burkina Faso, were tasked to push for consensus with the junta on the modalities and timeframe for the transition. The bone of contention here appears to be the 'stricto sensu' interpretation of the constitution and the political agreement reached on 06 April 2012. According to the Malian constitution, the current interim president, Dioncounda Traore, was to govern for the initial period of 40 days. Within this time a new government was to be elected in order to lay the foundations for the return of constitutional normalcy.  However, neither the constitution nor the political agreement prevents an extension of the interim period from 40 days to one year if the transition is to usher in a coherent political dispensation in Mali.

While the political agreement between ECOWAS and the junta was celebrated as a breakthrough, it might have escaped the negotiators' attention that no substantial progress could be made in 40 days, given the complexity of the issues at hand and the deterioration of security situation in Bamako and the north.

Obviously, ECOWAS has remained faithful to its 2001 Additional Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance, particularly Article 45, which provides for the normative framework to respond to political crises emanating from unconstitutional change of government. Initially, two important factors provided the regional organisation with the leverage to act decisively in pressing for a quick return to political coherence in Bamako. Firstly, the firm stance taken by regional leaders against the coup and the threat of sanctions forced the junta into negotiation. Secondly, the rapid deterioration of situation in northern Mali clearly exposed the weaknesses of the junta and its inability to assert its authority in Mali.

However, the seeds for the stalemate were planted by the decisions to remove the sanctions without guarantees that the junta will allow the transition to be completed without hindrance and interference.  As with Dadis Camara, the former junta leader in Guinea, Captain Sanogo has become a major threat to peace and stability in Mali. His insistence to remain in control of affairs is contrary to the position and will of regional leaders and development partners, making the negotiation process extremely delicate.

Whilst the junta initially agreed to step down and accept Dioncounda as the leader of a civilian government, they now want the leader of the coup, Amadou Sanogo to fill this post. With the ongoing resistance of the junta, the authority and the credibility of the regional organisation could be at stake. Moreover, groups operating in the northern regions have enough time to consolidate their control increasing the potential risk of protracted conflicts.

Captain Sanogo's call for a national conference to chart a new path for Mali's future is a fallacy that exposes the ambiguities of the junta's real intentions.  It should be seen as an attempt to neutralise the current interim president and his prime minister, whilst paving the way for Sanogo to impose himself as a head of state.  A hastened national convention will certainly contribute to further confusion while citizens in the occupied regions need urgent humanitarian assistance.

In such a scenario, ECOWAS will be justified in reactivating its sanctions. Whilst new sanctions may have some effect on the situation, the first sanctions should never have been lifted, nor should the junta have been granted amnesty. The junta is responsible for the deterioration of the security situation in Mali. This situation, coupled with their unwillingness to honour the original ECOWAS deal, which excluded military rule, calls for a very firm response from ECOWAS.

The regional organisation should consider the idea of a new transition without any of the current political and military actors to save what could still be saved in Mali. If Bamako does not manage to regain control of the north soon, the future could very well see the birth of a terrorist belt in the Sahel, a situation that could be detrimental to peace and security gains in the region.


End

Don't let today's disappointments
cast a shadow on tomorrow's dreams.

- Author Unknown -

South Africa: Competition for the AU Commission Leadership Intensifies

Summary of Briefings

South Africa: Competition for the AU Commission Leadership Intensifies

The African Union's (AU) Eight-member Ad hoc Committee of Heads of State and Government (Committee of Eight) met in Cotonou, Benin on 14 May 2012, to discuss the election of the Chairperson, Deputy Chairperson and members of the AU Commission. During the 18th AU Summit in January, the two candidates - Jean Ping of Gabon, who has served as the AU Commission Chairman since 2008 and Dr. Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, South Africa's Home Affairs Minister - failed to secure the two-third majority required to win and therefore the election was postponed till July. There was a call for consensus on the elected candidate to ensure that the AU as an organisation is united in addressing the challenges on the continent. The outcome of the election was due to multiple factors including the nature of the relationship between Nigeria and South Africa and South Africa's approach to the campaign for the chairmanship position.

The differences in foreign policy positions of Nigeria and South Africa may have contributed to the lack of consensus during the AU elections. This stems primarily from differing views by both countries on the international responses to the Libyan and Ivorian crisis.  There are also claims by pro-Ping supporters (including Nigeria) that South Africa may be breaching the so-called 'unwritten rule', which requires regional powers not to occupy the position of AU Chairperson. Besides, there are growing perceptions by some African states that South Africa has projected itself as the voice of Africa. Further, Nigeria is certainly one of the countries who feel that South Africa's aggressive campaign strategy for Dr. Dlamini-Zuma was unacceptable.

Questions are also being raised about the manner in which South Africa's current leadership is pursuing its foreign policy goals. For example, under the leadership of Presidents Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki it seems the quest for morality and African renaissance were central to South Africa's foreign policy, respectively. In contrast, there are perceptions that the foreign policy position under President Jacob Zuma has been unclear, inconsistent and is sometimes opposed to the views of other African states. This foreign policy disposition of South Africa seems to have overshadowed the benefits of Dr. Dlamini-Zuma as a potentially strong leader for the AU Chairperson owing to her experiences as a former Foreign Minister.

If Dr. Dlamini-Zuma is not elected, it would be a huge blow for South Africa and the Southern African Development Community (SADC), in general. This would, however, allow South Africa to rethink its foreign policy implementation strategy and importantly its relations with other influential African states. Although relations between South Africa and some other African states might be affected for a short while, it will not last for long as the relations are based largely on strong trade ties, which cannot be badly hampered by the competitive nature of elections and politics at the AU level.

If Dr. Dlamini-Zuma wins, there are speculations from opponents of South Africa's candidacy that there could be a potential abuse of power. Even if South Africa wanted to, the structure and rules of the AU clearly stipulates the roles and responsibilities of the chairperson and will not permit any attempt by South Africa to use the opportunity to enlarge its power base.

End

Strategic planning

Strategic planning

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Strategic planning is an organization's process of defining its strategy, or direction, and making decisions on allocating its resources to pursue this strategy. In order to determine the direction of the organization, it is necessary to understand its current position and the possible avenues through which it can pursue a particular course of action. Generally, strategic planning deals with at least one of three key questions^[1]:

1. "What do we do?"
2. "For whom do we do it?"
3. "How do we excel?"

In many organizations, this is viewed as a process for determining where an organization is going over the next year or—more typically—3 to 5 years (long term), although some extend their vision to 20 years.

Contents

Key components

Video explaining the strategic plan of the Wikimedia Foundation

The key components of 'strategic planning' include an understanding of the firm's vision, mission, values and strategies. The vision and mission are often captured in a Vision Statement and Mission Statement.

• Vision: outlines what the organization wants to be, or how it wants the world in which it operates to be (an "idealised" view of the world). It is a long-term view and concentrates on the future. It can be emotive and is a source of inspiration. For example, a charity working with the poor might have a vision statement which reads "A World without Poverty."

• Mission: Defines the fundamental purpose of an organization or an enterprise, succinctly describing why it exists and what it does to achieve its vision. For example, the charity above might have a mission statement as "providing jobs for the homeless and unemployed".

• Values: Beliefs that are shared among the stakeholders of an organization. Values drive an organization's culture and priorities and provide a framework in which decisions are made. For example, "Knowledge and skills are the keys to success" or "give a man bread and feed him for a day, but teach him to farm and feed him for life". These example values may set the priorities of self sufficiency over shelter.

• Strategy: Strategy, narrowly defined, means "the art of the general." A combination of the ends (goals) for which the firm is striving and the means (policies) by which it is seeking to get there. A strategy is sometimes called a roadmap which is the path chosen to plow towards the end vision. The most important part of implementing the strategy is ensuring the company is going in the right direction which is towards the end vision.

Organizations sometimes summarize goals and objectives into a mission statement and/or a vision statement. Others begin with a vision and mission and use them to formulate goals and objectives.

Many people mistake the vision statement for the mission statement, and sometimes one is simply used as a longer term version of the other. However they are meant to be quite different, with the vision being a descriptive picture of future state, and the mission being an action statement for bringing about what is envisioned (i.e. the vision is what will be achieved if the company is successful in achieving its mission).

For an organisation's vision and mission to be effective, they must become assimilated into the organization's culture. They should also be assessed internally and externally. The internal assessment should focus on how members inside the organization interpret their mission statement. The external assessment — which includes all of the businesses stakeholders — is valuable since it offers a different perspective. These discrepancies between these two assessments can provide insight into their effectiveness.

Strategic planning process

There are many approaches to strategic planning but typically one of the following approaches is used:

Situation-Target-Proposal Situation - evaluate the current situation and how it came about. Target - define goals and/or objectives (sometimes called ideal state) Path / Proposal - map a possible route to the goals/objectives

Draw-See-Think-Plan Draw - what is the ideal image or the desired end state? See - what is today's situation? What is the gap from ideal and why? Think - what specific actions must be taken to close the gap between today's situation and the ideal state? Plan - what resources are required to execute the activities?

Tools and approaches

Among the most useful tools for strategic planning is SWOT analysis (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats). The main objective of this tool is to analyze internal strategic factors, strengths and weaknesses attributed to the organization, and external factors beyond control of the organization such as opportunities and threats.

Other tools include:

• Balanced Scorecards, which creates a systematic framework for strategic planning;
• Scenario planning, which was originally used in the military and recently used by large corporations to analyze future scenarios.
• PEST analysis (Political, Economic, Social, and Technological)
• STEER analysis (Socio-cultural, Technological, Economic, Ecological, and Regulatory factors)
• EPISTEL (Environment, Political, Informatic, Social, Technological, Economic and Legal).
• ATM Approach by Renger & Titcomb, 2002. (Antecedent Conditions, Target Strategies, Measure Progress and Impact). Once an understanding of the desired endstate is defined, the ATM approach uses Root Cause Analysis (RCA) to understand the threats, barriers, and challenges to achieving the endstate. Not all antecedent conditions identified through RCA are within the direct and immediate control of the organization to change. Therefore, a review of organizational resources, both human and financial, are used to prioritize which antecedent conditions will be targeted. Strategies are then developed to target the prioritized antecedent conditions. Linking strategies to antecedent conditions ensures the organization does not engage in activity traps: feel good activities that will not lead to desired changes in the endstate. Once a strategy is defined then performance measures and indicators are sought to track progress toward and impact on the desired endstate.

Situational analysis

When developing strategies, analysis of the organization and its environment as it is at the moment and how it may develop in the future, is important. The analysis has to be executed at an internal level as well as an external level to identify all opportunities and threats of the external environment as well as the strengths and weaknesses of the organizations.

There are several factors to assess in the external situation analysis:

1. Markets (customers)
2. Competition
3. Technology
4. Supplier markets
5. Labor markets
6. The economy
7. The regulatory environment

It is rare to find all seven of these factors having critical importance. It is also uncommon to find that the first two - markets and competition - are not of critical importance. (Bradford "External Situation - What to Consider")

Analysis of the external environment normally focuses on the customer. Management should be visionary in formulating customer strategy, and should do so by thinking about market environment shifts, how these could impact customer sets, and whether those customer sets are the ones the company wishes to serve.

Analysis of the competitive environment is also performed, many times based on the framework suggested by Michael Porter.

With regard to market planning specifically, researchers have recommended a series of action steps or guidelines in accordance to which market planners should plan.^[2]

Goals, objectives and targets

Strategic planning is a very important business activity. It is also important in the public sector areas such as education. It is practiced widely informally and formally. Strategic planning and decision processes should end with objectives and a roadmap of ways to achieve them. The goal of strategic planning mechanisms like formal planning is to increase specificity in business operation, especially when long-term and high-stake activities are involved.

One of the core goals when drafting a strategic plan is to develop it in a way that is easily translatable into action plans. Most strategic plans address high level initiatives and over-arching goals, but don't get articulated (translated) into day-to-day projects and tasks that will be required to achieve the plan. Terminology or word choice, as well as the level a plan is written, are both examples of easy ways to fail at translating your strategic plan in a way that makes sense and is executable to others. Often, plans are filled with conceptual terms which don't tie into day-to-day realities for the staff expected to carry out the plan.

The following terms have been used in strategic planning: desired end states, plans, policies, goals, objectives, strategies, tactics and actions. Definitions vary, overlap and fail to achieve clarity. The most common of these concepts are specific, time bound statements of intended future results and general and continuing statements of intended future results, which most models refer to as either goals or objectives (sometimes interchangeably).

One model of organizing objectives uses hierarchies. The items listed above may be organized in a hierarchy of means and ends and numbered as follows: Top Rank Objective (TRO), Second Rank Objective, Third Rank Objective, etc. From any rank, the objective in a lower rank answers to the question "How?" and the objective in a higher rank answers to the question "Why?" The exception is the Top Rank Objective (TRO): there is no answer to the "Why?" question. That is how the TRO is defined.

People typically have several goals at the same time. "Goal congruency" refers to how well the goals combine with each other. Does goal A appear compatible with goal B? Do they fit together to form a unified strategy? "Goal hierarchy" consists of the nesting of one or more goals within other goal(s).

One approach recommends having short-term goals, medium-term goals, and long-term goals. In this model, one can expect to attain short-term goals fairly easily: they stand just slightly above one's reach. At the other extreme, long-term goals appear very difficult, almost impossible to attain. Strategic management jargon sometimes refers to "Big Hairy Audacious Goals" (BHAGs) in this context. Using one goal as a stepping-stone to the next involves goal sequencing. A person or group starts by attaining the easy short-term goals, then steps up to the medium-term, then to the long-term goals. Goal sequencing can create a "goal stairway". In an organizational setting, the organization may co-ordinate goals so that they do not conflict with each other. The goals of one part of the organization should mesh compatibly with those of other parts of the organization.

Business analysis techniques

Various business analysis techniques can be used in strategic planning, including SWOT analysis (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats ), PEST analysis (Political, Economic, Social, and Technological), STEER analysis (Socio-cultural, Technological, Economic, Ecological, and Regulatory factors), and EPISTEL (Environment, Political, Informatic, Social, Technological, Economic and Legal).

SYSTEM:

System Pyramid

Successful and sustainable transformation efforts require leaders who know how to manage change. At the simplest level, managing change means:

• Knowing what you want to accomplish and creating a compelling vision that motivates others
• Understand stakeholders and communicating with them early, consistently and often
• Managing the varying levels of support and resistance that will inevitably emerge in response to any change
• Change Leadership is a skillset that is required throughout any deployment, from planning and executing to sustaining improvements.
• Change Leadership are essential for both high level executives and program leaders, who are responsible for setting the vision, communicate the vision and make the changes happen

References

1.      ^ J. Scott Armstrong (1986). "The Value of Formal Planning for Strategic Decisions: A Reply". pp. 183–185.

2.      ^ J. Scott Armstrong (1985). "Evidence on the Value of Strategic Planning in Marketing: How Much Planning Should a Marketing Planner Plan?". pp. 73–87.

This article needs additional citations for verification. Please help improve this article by adding citations to reliable sources. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed. (June 2009)

Further reading

• Erica Olsen (2012). Strategic Planning Kit for Dummies, 2nd Edition. John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
• Max Mckeown (2012), The Strategy Book, FT Prentice Hall.
• Patrick L. Burkhart and Suzanne Reuss (1993). Successful Strategic Planning: A Guide for Nonprofit Agencies and Organizations. Newbury Park: Sage Publications.
• Bradford and Duncan (2000). Simplified Strategic Planning. Chandler House.
• Stephen G. Haines (2004). ABCs of strategic management : an executive briefing and plan-to-plan day on strategic management in the 21st century.
• Kono, T. (1994) "Changing a Company's Strategy and Culture", Long Range Planning, 27, 5 (October 1994), pp: 85-97
• Philip Kotler (1986), "Megamarketing" In: Harvard Business Review. (March—April 1986)
• John Naisbitt (1982). Megatrends: Ten New Directions Transforming our Lives. Macdonald.
• T. Levitt (1960) "Marketing myopia", In: Harvard Business Review, (July—August 1960)
• M. Lorenzen (2006). "Strategic Planning for Academic Library Instructional Programming." In: Illinois Libraries 86, no. 2 (Summer 2006): 22-29.
• L. Fahey and V. K. Narayman (1986). Macroenvironmental Analysis for Strategic Management&rdquo. West Publishing.
• R. F. Lusch and V. N. Lusch (1987). Principles of Marketing. Kent Publishing,
• Brian Tracy (2000). The 100 Absolutely Unbreakable Laws of Business Success. Berrett, Koehler Publishers.
• Michael Allison and Jude Kaye (2005). Strategic Planning for Nonprofit Organizations. Second Edition. John Wiley and Sons.
• Renger, R., & Titcomb, A. (2002). A Three Step Approach to Teaching Logic Models. American Journal of Evaluation, 23(4), 493-503.

See also

• Military Strategy and The Art of War for the origins
• Business Strategy Mapping
• Decision making software
• Enterprise planning systems
• Hoshin Kanri
• Integrated Business Planning
• Strategic planning software

Decentralization

Decentralization

 Decentralization or decentralisation (see spelling differences) is the process of dispersing decision-making governance closer to the people and/or citizens. It includes the dispersal of administration or governance in sectors or areas like engineering, management science, political science, political economy, sociology and economics. Decentralization is also possible in the dispersal of population and employment. Law, science and technological advancements lead to highly decentralized human endeavours.

"While frequently left undefined (Pollitt, 2005), decentralization has also been assigned many different meanings (Reichard & Borgonovi, 2007), varying across countries (Steffensen & Trollegaard, 2000; Pollitt, 2005), languages (Ouedraogo, 2003), general contexts (Conyers, 1984), fields of research, and specific scholars and studies." (Dubois and Fattore 2009)

A central theme in decentralization is the difference between:

• a hierarchy, based on authority: two players in an unequal-power relationship; and
• an interface: a lateral relationship between two players of roughly equal power.

The more decentralized a system is, the more it relies on lateral relationships, and the less it can rely on command or force. In most branches of engineering and economics, decentralization is narrowly defined as the study of markets and interfaces between parts of a system. This is most highly developed as general systems theory and neoclassical political economy.

Contents

Organizational Theory

Decentralization is the policy of delegating decision-making authority down to the lower levels in an organization, relatively away from and lower in a central authority. A decentralized organization shows fewer tiers in the organizational structure, wider span of control, and a bottom-to-top flow of decision-making and flow of ideas.

In a centralized organization, the decisions are made by top executives or on the basis of pre-set policies. These decisions or policies are then enforced through several tiers of the organization after gradually broadening the span of control until it reaches the bottom tier.

In a more decentralized organization, the top executives delegate much of their decision-making authority to lower tiers of the organizational structure. As a correlation, the organization is likely to run on less rigid policies and wider spans of control among each officer of the organization. The wider spans of control also reduces the number of tiers within the organization, giving its structure a flat appearance. One advantage of this structure, if the correct controls are in place, will be the bottom-to-top flow of information, allowing decisions by officials of the organization to be well informed about lower tier operations. For example, if an experienced technician at the lowest tier of an organization knows how to increase the efficiency of the production, the bottom-to-top flow of information can allow this knowledge to pass up to the executive officers..

Political theory

Some political theorists believe that there are limits to decentralization as a strategy. They assert that any relaxation of direct control or authority introduces the possibility of dissent or division at critical moments, especially if what is being decentralized is decision-making among human beings. Friedrich Engels famously responded to Bakunin, refuting the argument of total decentralization, or anarchism, by scoffing "how these people propose to run a factory, operate a railway or steer a ship without having in the last resort one deciding will, without single management, they of course do not tell us".

However, some anarchists have, in turn, responded to his argument, by explaining that they do support a (very limited) amount of centralization, in the form of freely elected and recallable delegates. More to the point from the majority of anarchist perspectives are the real-world successes of anarchist communities, which for the majority only ended when they were defeated by the overwhelming military might of the State or neighboring States. All in all, we do not know what a truly decentralized society would look like over a long period of time since it has never been permitted to exist, however the Zapatistas of Mexico are proving to be quite resilient.

In "On Authority", Engels also wrote of democratic workplaces that "particular questions arise in each room and at every moment concerning the mode of production, distribution of material, etc., which must be settled by decision of a delegate placed at the head of each branch of labour or, if possible, by a majority vote."

Modern trade unions and management scientists tend to side strongly with Engels in this debate, and generally agree that decentralization is very closely related to standardisation and subordination, e.g. the standard commodity contracts traded on the commodity markets, in which disputes are resolved all according to a jurisdiction and common regulatory system, within the frame of a larger democratic electoral system which can restore any imbalances of power, and which generally retains the support of the population for its authority.

Notable exceptions among trade unions are the Wobblies, and the strong anarcho-syndicalist movement of Spain. However, a strategy of decentralization is not always so obviously political, even if it relies implicitly on authority delegated via a political system. For example, engineering standards are a means by which decentralization of supply inspection and testing can be achieved—a manufacturer adhering to the standard can participate in decentralised systems of bidding, e.g. in a parts market. A building standard, for instance, permits the building trades to train labour and building supply corporations to provide parts, which enables rapid construction of buildings at remote sites. Decentralization of training and inspection, through the standards themselves, and related schedules of standardized testing and random spot inspection, achieves a very high statistical reliability of service, i.e. automobiles which rarely stall, cars which rarely leak, and the like.

In most cases, an effective decentralization strategy and correspondingly robust systems of professional education, vocational education, and trade certification are critical to creating a modern industrial base. Such robust systems, and commodity markets to accompany them, are a necessary but not sufficient feature of any developed nation. A major goal of the industrial strategy of any developing nation is to safely decentralise decision-making so that central controls are unnecessary to achieving standards and safety. It seems that a very high degree of social capital is required to achieve trust in such standards and systems, and that ethical codes play some significant roles in building up trust in the professions and in the trades.

The consumer product markets, industrial product markets, and service markets that emerge in a mature industrial economy, however, still ultimately rely, like the simpler commodity markets, on complex systems of standardization, regulation, jurisdiction, transport, materials and energy supply. The specification and comparison of these is a major focus of the study of political economy. Political or other decision-making units typically must be large and leveraged enough for economy of scale, but also small enough that centralised authority does not become unaccountable to those performing trades or transactions at its perimeter. Large states, as Benjamin Franklin observed, were prone to becoming tyrannies, while small states, correspondingly, tended to become corrupt.

Finding the appropriate size of political states or other decision-making units, determining their optimal relationship to social capital and to infrastructural capital, is a major focus of political science. In management science there are studies of the ideal size of corporations, and some in anthropology and sociology study the ideal size of villages. Dennis Fox, a retired professor of legal studies and psychology, proposed an ideal village size of approximately 150 people in his 1985 paper about the relationship of anarchism to the tragedy of the commons.

All these fields recognize some factors that encourage centralised authority and other factors that encourage decentralised "democracy"—balances between which are the major focus of group dynamics. However, decentralization is not only a feature of human society. It is also a feature of ecology.

Another objection or limit to political decentralization, similar in structure to that of Engels, is that terrestrial ecoregions impose a certain fiat by their natural water-circulation, soil, and plant and animal biodiversity which constitutes a form of (what the United Nations calls) "natural capital". Since these natural living systems can be neither changed nor replaced by man, some argue that an ecoregional democracy which follows their borders strictly is the only form of decentralization of larger political units that will not lead to endless conflict, e.g. gerrymandering, in struggle between social groups.

Decentralization in European history

Decentralization and centralization have played major roles in the history of many societies. An excellent example is the gradual political and organizational changes that have occurred in European history. During the rise and fall of the Roman Empire, Europe went through major centralization and decentralization. Although the leaders of the Roman Empire created a European infrastructure, the fall of the Empire left Europe without a strong political system or military protection. Viking and other barbarian attacks further led rich Romans to build up their latifundia, or large estates, in a way that would protect their families and create a self-sufficient living place. This development led to the growth of the manorial system in Europe.

This system was greatly decentralized, as the lords of the manor had power to defend and control the small agricultural environment that was their manor. The manors of the early Middle Ages slowly came together as lords took oaths of fealty to other lords in order to have even stronger defense against other manors and barbarian groups. This feudal system was also greatly decentralized, and the kings of weak "countries" held little power over the nobility. Although some view the Roman Catholic Church of the Middle Ages as a centralizing factor, it played a strong role in weakening the power of the secular kings, which gave the nobility more power. As the Middle Ages wore on, corruption in the church, foreign trade, and new political ideas slowly strengthened the secular powers and brought together the decentralized society. This centralization continued through the Renaissance and has been changed and reformed until the present centralized system which is thought to have a balance between central government and decentralized power.

Decentralised governance

Decentralization—the transfer of authority and responsibility for public functions from the central government to subordinate or quasi-independent government organizations and/or the private sector^[1]—is a complex and multifaceted concept. It embraces a variety of concepts. Different types of decentralization shows different characteristics, policy implications, and conditions for success.

Typologies of decentralization have flourished (Dubois & Fattore 2009). For example, political, administrative, fiscal, and market decentralization are the types of decentralization.^[2] Drawing distinctions between these various concepts is useful for highlighting the many dimensions of successful decentralization and the need for coordination among them. Nevertheless, there is clearly overlap in defining these terms and the precise definitions are not as important as the need for a comprehensive approach (see Sharma, 2006). Political, administrative, fiscal and market decentralization can also appear in different forms and combinations across countries, within countries and even within sectors.

Political decentralization

Political decentralization aims to give citizens or their elected representatives more power in public decision-making. It is often associated with pluralistic politics and representative government, but it can also support democratization by giving citizens, or their representatives, more influence in the formulation and implementation of policies. Advocates of political decentralization assume that decisions made with greater participation will be better informed and more relevant to diverse interests in society than those made only by national political authorities. The concept implies that the selection of representatives from local electoral constituency allows citizens to know better their political representatives and allows elected officials to know better the needs and desires of their constituents. Political decentralization often requires constitutional or statutory reforms, creation of local political units, and the encouragement of effective public interest groups.

Administrative decentralization

Administrative decentralization seeks to redistribute authority, responsibility and financial resources for providing public services among different levels of governance. It is the transfer of responsibility for the planning, financing and management of public functions from the central government or regional governments and its agencies to local governments, semi-autonomous public authorities or corporations, or area-wide, regional or functional authorities. The three major forms of administrative decentralization—deconcentration, delegation, and devolution—each have different characteristics.

Deconcentration

Deconcentration is the weakest form of decentralization and is used most frequently in unitary states—redistributes decision making authority and financial and management responsibilities among different levels of the national government. It can merely shift responsibilities from central government officials in the capital city to those working in regions, provinces or districts, or it can create strong field administration or local administrative capacity under the supervision of central government ministries.

Delegation

Main article: Delegation

Delegation is a more extensive form of decentralization. Through delegation central governments transfer responsibility for decision-making and administration of public functions to semi-autonomous organizations not wholly controlled by the central government, but ultimately accountable to it. Governments delegate responsibilities when they create public enterprises or corporations, housing authorities, transportation authorities, special service districts, semi-autonomous school districts, regional development corporations, or special project implementation units. Usually these organizations have a great deal of discretion in decision-making. They may be exempted from constraints on regular civil service personnel and may be able to charge users directly for services.

Devolution

Main article: Devolution

Devolution is an administrative type of decentralisation. When governments devolve functions, they transfer authority for decision-making, finance, and management to quasi-autonomous units of local government with corporate status. Devolution usually transfers responsibilities for services to local governments that elect their own elected functionaries and councils, raise their own revenues, and have independent authority to make investment decisions. In a devolved system, local governments have clear and legally recognized geographical boundaries over which they exercise authority and within which they perform public functions. Administrative decentralization always underlies most cases of political decentralization.

Fiscal decentralization

Dispersal of financial responsibility is a core component. If local governments and private organizations are to carry out decentralized functions effectively, they must have an adequate level of revenues, either raised locally or transferred from the central government, as well as the authority to make decisions about expenditures. Fiscal decentralization can take many forms, including the following:

• self-financing or cost recovery through user charges,
• co-financing or co-production arrangements through which the users participate in providing services and infrastructure through monetary or labor contributions;
• expansion of local revenues through property or sales taxes or indirect charges;
• intergovernmental transfers that shift general revenues from taxes collected by the central government to local governments for general or specific uses; and
• authorization of municipal borrowing and the mobilization of either national or local government resources through loan guarantees.

In many developing countries local governments or administrative units possess the legal authority to impose taxes, but the tax base is so weak and the dependence on central government subsidies so ingrained that no attempt is made to exercise that authority.

Fiscal decentralization and fiscal federalism

The concept of fiscal federalism is not to be associated with fiscal decentralization in officially declared federations only; it is applicable even to non-federal states (having no formal federal constitutional arrangement) in the sense that they encompass different levels of government which have defacto decision making authority ( Sharma, 2005a: 44). This however does not mean that all forms of governments are 'fiscally' federal; it only means that 'fiscal federalism' is a set of principles, that can be applied to all countries attempting 'fiscal decentralization'. In fact, fiscal federalism is a general normative framework for assignment of functions to the different levels of government and appropriate fiscal instruments for carrying out these functions (Oates, 1999: 1120-1). These questions arise: (a) How federal and non-federal countries are different with respect to 'fiscal federalism' or 'fiscal decentralization' and (b): How fiscal federalism and fiscal decentralization are related (similar or different)? Chanchal Kumar Sharma (2005a, 2005b) clarifies: While fiscal federalism constitutes a set of guiding principles, a guiding concept, that helps in designing financial relations between the national and subnational levels of the government, fiscal decentralization on the other hand is a process of applying such principles (Sharma, 2005b: 178). Federal and non-federal countries differ in the manner in which such principles are applied. Application differs because unitary and federal governments differ in their political & legislative context and thus provide different opportunities for fiscal decentralization (Sharma, 2005a:44).

Fiscal federalism: the federal approach to governance

In common parlance political and constitutional aspects (e.g. giving citizens or their elected representatives more power in political decision-making, establishment of subnational political entities for decision making and making them politically accountable to local electorate which often entails constitutional or statutory reforms like providing for representation of the member states, the strengthening of legislatures, creation of local political units along with the encouragement of effective public interest groups and pluralistic political parties) are considered crucial for federalism.

Chanchal Kumar Sharma (2005b), however, argues that it is the fiscal side of the federalism (fiscal federalism) that is crucial for federal dynamism. This is because Federalism is not a fixed allocation of spheres of central and provincial autonomy (as assumed in federal finance models) or a particular set of distribution of authority between governments, it is a process, structured by a set of institutions, through which authority is distributed and redistributed.

A federalised system is a "balanced approach between the contrasting forces of centralisation and decentralisation for combining the political and economic advantages of unity while preserving the valued identity of the sub national units" (Sharma, 2005). Fiscal federal principles guide how boundaries, assignments, the level and nature of transfers should be revised from time to time to ensure efficiency and perhaps equity. Thus fiscal federalism provides the tools for "application of the federal approach to governance which lies in its ability to balance the contrasting forces of centralization and decentralization" (Sharma, 2005b: 177). In the age of globalization, when fiscal decentralization is in vogue, all countries (federal or not) are applying what may be called, in Sharma's (2005b) words "the federal approach to governance".

The only difference is that in federal countries the subnational governments may be involved in decision making process through some appropriate political or constitutional forum while the central government may dominate quite heavily in a unitary country. Its no surprise then argues Sharma (2005b:177; 2008) that fiscal federalism literature is far away from Centralization Vs Decentralization focus. Final aim is not to decentralize just for sake of it but to ensure good governance. Thus, in fiscal federalism, states Sharma (2008), "decentralization is not seen as an alternative to centralization. Both are needed. The complementary roles of national and subnational actors are determined by analyzing the most effective ways and means of achieving a desired objective".

Economic decentralization

Privatization and deregulation shift responsibility for functions from the public to the private sector and is another type of decentralization. Privatization and deregulation are usually, but not always, accompanied by economic liberalization and market development policies. They allow functions that had been primarily or exclusively the responsibility of government to be carried out by businesses, community groups, cooperatives, private voluntary associations, and other non-government organizations. Democratization however involves either state or private enterprises being transferred to employee-ownership and democratic control in the form of worker self-management, usually in the form of cooperatives and mutual businesses.

Privatization

Main article: Privatization

Privatization can range in scope from leaving the provision of goods and services entirely to the free operation of the market to "public-private partnerships" in which government and the private sector cooperate to provide services or infrastructure. Privatization can include:

• allowing private enterprises to perform functions that had previously been monopolized by government;
• contracting out the provision or management of public services or facilities to commercial enterprises indeed, there is a wide range of possible ways in which function can be organized and many examples of within public sector and public-private institutional forms, particularly in infrastructure;
• financing public sector programs through the capital market (with adequate regulation or measures to prevent situations where the central government bears the risk for this borrowing) and allowing private organizations to participate; and
• transferring responsibility for providing services from the public to the private sector through the divestiture of state-owned enterprises.

Privatization cannot in the real sense be considered equivalent to decentralisation.

Deregulation

Main article: Deregulation

Deregulation reduces the legal constraints on private participation in service provision or allows competition among private suppliers for services that in the past had been provided by the government or by regulated monopolies. In recent years privatization and deregulation have become more attractive alternatives to governments in developing countries. Local governments are also privatizing by contracting out service provision or administration.

Democratization

Main article: Economic democracy

Democratization typically involves either state-owned or privately-owned enterprises being placed in the hands of their employees who then become part-owners of the enterprises by participating in them. This can apply both to commercial cooperatives run for profit and to public services; which could be either employee-owned or under municipal ownership. Advocates see turning over economic institutions to those who run them as counteracting the negative effects of both state and private (particularly corporate) monopolies such as concentration of power and decision-making ability and negative externalities. Another benefit is seen as the increased efficiency gained through enabling those with immediate knowledge concerning the work environment to be made responsible for decisions.

Silent Decentralization

An often ignored dimension of decentralization is whether it emerged explicitly by policies, or not. Decentralization in the absence of reforms is also referred to as “silent decentralization.” Consequently, it distinguishes itself mainly by its potential origins: network changes, initiative shifts, policy emphasis developments, or resource availability alterations. (Dubois and Fattore 2009)

Measuring Decentralization

While diversity in degree of decentralization across the world is a fact yet there is no consensus in the empirical literature over the questions like ‘which country is more decentralized?’ This is because decentralization is defined and measured differently in different studies (Sharma, 2006).

Chanchal Kumar Sharma (2006: 54) finds in his literature survey:

"On the basis of ‘decentralization instrument’ there are two strands in the literature that argue for two different approaches to measure fiscal autonomy. One gives more weightage to devolution of tax authority as an instrument of decentralization and hold it crucial for subnational autonomy, the other gives more weight to the nature of intergovernmental transfers (discretionary or not) as an instrument impacting upon the subnational behaviour and affecting their autonomy and accountability. Thus former choose to focus on fiscal policy i.e., the relationship between expenditures and allocated revenues (vertical imbalance) while latter pay attention to regulatory or financial mechanisms i.e. the nature of intergovernmental transfers".

Out of these two approaches, observes Sharma (2006), "when it comes to the measurement of fiscal decentralization ‘the share of subnational expenditures and revenues’ is considered the best indicator. This is because fiscal instruments are easier to measure while regulatory and financial instruments are extremely complex and difficult to measure statistically because nowhere transfers remain strictly confined to the technical objectives. Transfers pursue a mix of objectives and politically motivated transfers remain key part of the intergovernmental relations across the globe" (Sharma, 2006: 54).

Arjan H. Schakel (2008) notes that various experts such as Akai and Sakata 2002; Breuss and Eller 2004; Ebel and Yilmaz 2002; Fisman and Gatti 2002; Panizza 1999; Sharma 2006, have found the fiscal indicators on the expenditure side to be quite problematic for capturing decision-making decentralization. This is because argues Schakel (2008) "it is difficult to tell whether the expenditure is coming from conditional or unconditional grants, whether the central government is determining how the money should be spent, whether it is setting the framework legislation within which subnational governments implement, or whether −indeed− subnational governments are spending the money autonomously".

Chanchal Kumar Sharma (2006:49) states,

"...a true assessment of the degree of decentralization in a country can be made only if a comprehensive approach is adopted and rather than trying to simplify the syndrome of characteristics into the single dimension of autonomy, interrelationships of various dimensions of decentralization are taken into account."

Decentralisation of Environmental Management

Decentralisation has also moved into the environmental management sphere. Since neo-liberalism in the 1970/1980s and the emergence of the climate change crises, there has been abrupt evidence that the State is failing to effectively manage our environmental resources. Hardin’s Tragedy of the commons (1986) shows people cannot be left to do as they wish with land. Decentralisation offers an alternative solution as theory states, it: “aims to increase popular participation to promote more equitable and efficient forms of local management and development... key to effective decentralisation is increase broad-based participation in local public decision making. Theorists believe that downwardly accountable or representative authorities with meaningful discretionary powers are the basic institutional elements of decentralisation that should lead to local efficiency, equity and development.” ^[3] Ribot, 2003; 53 Therefore, with the right opportunities to share knowledge and gain the appropriate powers local communities have a greater chance of success than the State. This leads from the assumption that people are excluded (Ribot, 2007) by the state in decision-making, causing them to appear to not care, when in fact they do but can do little about it. Hence, environmental governance should be at the lowest possible level. One, in many cases the environmental is central to local communities, especially in developing nations. Secondly, it creates a sense of citizenship and democracy (Ribot, 2002). Depending on the type of decentralisation used (see above and ^[4] Oyono, 2004; 92), in many circumstance local people are represented by others; these could be elected or local authorities chosen by the government. Either way, they must be accountable and have the power to do what they promise; if not people will not support them. Yet, this can also be affected by the decentralisation of fiscal power which can create limitations as many environmental management strategies require some degree of fiscal input. Within environmental management the most effective form of decentralisation is devolution. As state releases all control to the lowest possible level (^[5] Larson, 2003). However, there are still factors that can limit its success: Political infrastructure, history, territory, culture and society. In any given community there will be multiple environmental issues that need to be managed alongside diversity in opinion and people. Subsequently, decentralisation is more effective in communities where achieving consensus is relatively straightforward. As processes will move smoother with fewer objections. This was put to practice in the Aga Khan Rural Support Programme (AKRSP)http://www.akdn.org/AKF in the Gujarat province of India.^[6] Shah, 1994 found that non-governmental organisations, within decentralisation acted as a catalyst to aid villagers in a community water management programme which was deemed a success as there was no State involvement. Thus, decentralisation opens up opportunities for local people to make a difference by coming together and giving them the resources to effect the local governments (^[7] Larson, 2002). Unfortunately, this is not always the case in reality.

The theory of environmental governance by decentralisation relies on assumptions and in practice, these may not deem true. Until discourse advocates decentralisation as a priority in policy, the “potential benefits of decentralisation (will) remain unrealized” (^[8] Ribbot, 2002; 2).^[9]

For decentralization in industry, creating new companies, see startup company.

Notes

1.         ^ Meenakshi Sundaram, SS:Decentralisation in Developing Countries. P11 Concept,1994

2.        ^ World Bank:Overview of Decentralisation in Indi Vol I P 3 World Bank,2000

3.        ^ Ribot, J (2003). "Democratic Decentralisation of Natural Resources: Institutional Choice and Discretionary Power Transfers in Sub-Saharan Africa". Public Administration and Development 23: 53–65.

4.        ^ Oyono, P (2004). "One step forward, two steps back? Paradoxes of Natural Resource Management decentralisation in Cameroon". Journal of modern Africanstudies 42 (1): 91–111.

5.        ^ Larson, A (2003). "Decentralisation and Forest Management in Latin America: Towards a Working Model". Public administration and development 23: 211–226.

6.        ^ Scoones, I (1994). Beyond Farmer First. London: Intermediate technology publications.

7.        ^ Larson, A (2002). "Natural Resource Management and Decentralisation in Nicaragua: Are Local Governments up to the job?". World Development 30 (1): 17–31.

8.        ^ Ribot, J (2002). Democratic Decentralisation of Natural Resources: Institutionalising Popular Participation. Oxon: Routledge.

9.        ^ Larson, A (2002). "Natural Resource Management and Decentralisation in Nicaragua: Are Local Governments up to the job?". World Development 30 (1): 17–31.

References

Frischmann, Eva (2010), 'Decentralization and Corruption. A Cross-Country Analysis.' Grin Verlag, 978-3640710959.

Akai, Nobuo and Masayo Sakata (2002), ‘Fiscal Decentralization Contributes to Economic Growth: Evidence from State-Level Cross-Section Data for the United States’, Journal of Urban Economics, Vol.52, No.1, pp. 93–108.

Breuss, Fritz and Markus Eller (2004), ‘Fiscal Decentralisation and Economic Growth: Is There Really a Link?’, CESifo DICE Report, Journal of Institutional Comparisons, Vol.2, No.1, pp. 3–9.

Dubois, H.F.W. & Fattore, G. (2009), 'Definitions and typologies in public administration research: the case of decentralization', International Journal of Public Administration, 32(8): pp. 704–727.

Ebel, Robert D. and Serdar Yilmaz (2002), ‘On the Measurement and Impact of Fiscal Decentralization’, Policy Research Working Paper, 2809, Washington: World Bank.

Fisman, Raymond and Roberta Gatti (2002), ‘Decentralization and Corruption: Evidence Across Countries’, Journal of Public Economics, Vol.83, No.3, pp. 325–45.

Oates, Wallace E (1999), ‘An Essay on Fiscal Federalism.’ Journal of Economic Literature 37(3): 1120-49.

Panizza, Ugo (1999), ‘On the Determinants of Fiscal Centralization: Theory, and Evidence’, Journal of Public Economics, Vol.74, No.1, pp. 97–139.

Schakel, Arjan H. (2008), 'Validation of the Regional Authority Index', Regional and Federal Studies, Routeledge, Vol. 18 (2).

Sharma, Chanchal kumar.2005a 'When Does decentralization deliver? The Dilemma of Design', South Asian Journal of Socio-Political Studies6(1):38-45.

Sharma, Chanchal Kumar.2005b. 'The Federal Approach to Fiscal Decentralization: Conceptual Contours for Policy Makers', Loyola Journal of Social Sciences, XIX(2):169-88 (Listed :International Bibliography of Social Sciences, London School of Economics and Political Science)

Sharma, Chanchal Kumar (2006), ‘Decentralization Dilemma: Measuring the Degree and Evaluating the Outcomes, The Indian Journal of Political Science, Vol.67, No.1, pp.49-64.[1]

Sharma, Chanchal Kumar (2008), ‘EMERGING DIMENSIONS OF DECENTRALIZATION DEBATE IN THE AGE OF GLOCALIZATION’, MPRA Paper 6734, University Library of Munich, Germany. REPRINTED (MPRA prepublication version) IN : Glocalization - Thinking Global, Acting Local Gopalakrishnan P S ( ed.) ICFAI University Press, 2008. pp. 23–44. [2] Revised version Published as "Emerging Dimensions of Decentralization Debate in the Age of Globalization" in Indian Journal of Federal Studies Vol. 19 No.1 pp 47–65( year 2009). [3]

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