Summary of Briefings
West Africa:
Mali's Political Stalemate and the fallacy of a national conference
It is gradually becoming clear that developments in Mali are proving extremely challenging for the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to resolve. To date, there has been no consensus over who should assume the interim presidency and the role of the junta in the transition. The question on the minds of many observers, therefore, is how to resolve the imbroglio in the country.
On 08 May 2012, delegates representing the ECOWAS visited Mali to negotiate with the leaders of the junta. The delegation comprising Foreign Ministers Adama Bictogo from Cote d'Ivoire and Djibril Basssole from Burkina Faso, were tasked to push for consensus with the junta on the modalities and timeframe for the transition. The bone of contention here appears to be the 'stricto sensu' interpretation of the constitution and the political agreement reached on 06 April 2012. According to the Malian constitution, the current interim president, Dioncounda Traore, was to govern for the initial period of 40 days. Within this time a new government was to be elected in order to lay the foundations for the return of constitutional normalcy. However, neither the constitution nor the political agreement prevents an extension of the interim period from 40 days to one year if the transition is to usher in a coherent political dispensation in Mali.
While the political agreement between ECOWAS and the junta was celebrated as a breakthrough, it might have escaped the negotiators' attention that no substantial progress could be made in 40 days, given the complexity of the issues at hand and the deterioration of security situation in Bamako and the north.
Obviously, ECOWAS has remained faithful to its 2001 Additional Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance, particularly Article 45, which provides for the normative framework to respond to political crises emanating from unconstitutional change of government. Initially, two important factors provided the regional organisation with the leverage to act decisively in pressing for a quick return to political coherence in Bamako. Firstly, the firm stance taken by regional leaders against the coup and the threat of sanctions forced the junta into negotiation. Secondly, the rapid deterioration of situation in northern Mali clearly exposed the weaknesses of the junta and its inability to assert its authority in Mali.
However, the seeds for the stalemate were planted by the decisions to remove the sanctions without guarantees that the junta will allow the transition to be completed without hindrance and interference. As with Dadis Camara, the former junta leader in Guinea, Captain Sanogo has become a major threat to peace and stability in Mali. His insistence to remain in control of affairs is contrary to the position and will of regional leaders and development partners, making the negotiation process extremely delicate.
Whilst the junta initially agreed to step down and accept Dioncounda as the leader of a civilian government, they now want the leader of the coup, Amadou Sanogo to fill this post. With the ongoing resistance of the junta, the authority and the credibility of the regional organisation could be at stake. Moreover, groups operating in the northern regions have enough time to consolidate their control increasing the potential risk of protracted conflicts.
Captain Sanogo's call for a national conference to chart a new path for Mali's future is a fallacy that exposes the ambiguities of the junta's real intentions. It should be seen as an attempt to neutralise the current interim president and his prime minister, whilst paving the way for Sanogo to impose himself as a head of state. A hastened national convention will certainly contribute to further confusion while citizens in the occupied regions need urgent humanitarian assistance.
In such a scenario, ECOWAS will be justified in reactivating its sanctions. Whilst new sanctions may have some effect on the situation, the first sanctions should never have been lifted, nor should the junta have been granted amnesty. The junta is responsible for the deterioration of the security situation in Mali. This situation, coupled with their unwillingness to honour the original ECOWAS deal, which excluded military rule, calls for a very firm response from ECOWAS.
The regional organisation should consider the idea of a new transition without any of the current political and military actors to save what could still be saved in Mali. If Bamako does not manage to regain control of the north soon, the future could very well see the birth of a terrorist belt in the Sahel, a situation that could be detrimental to peace and security gains in the region.
End
West Africa:
Mali's Political Stalemate and the fallacy of a national conference
It is gradually becoming clear that developments in Mali are proving extremely challenging for the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to resolve. To date, there has been no consensus over who should assume the interim presidency and the role of the junta in the transition. The question on the minds of many observers, therefore, is how to resolve the imbroglio in the country.
On 08 May 2012, delegates representing the ECOWAS visited Mali to negotiate with the leaders of the junta. The delegation comprising Foreign Ministers Adama Bictogo from Cote d'Ivoire and Djibril Basssole from Burkina Faso, were tasked to push for consensus with the junta on the modalities and timeframe for the transition. The bone of contention here appears to be the 'stricto sensu' interpretation of the constitution and the political agreement reached on 06 April 2012. According to the Malian constitution, the current interim president, Dioncounda Traore, was to govern for the initial period of 40 days. Within this time a new government was to be elected in order to lay the foundations for the return of constitutional normalcy. However, neither the constitution nor the political agreement prevents an extension of the interim period from 40 days to one year if the transition is to usher in a coherent political dispensation in Mali.
While the political agreement between ECOWAS and the junta was celebrated as a breakthrough, it might have escaped the negotiators' attention that no substantial progress could be made in 40 days, given the complexity of the issues at hand and the deterioration of security situation in Bamako and the north.
Obviously, ECOWAS has remained faithful to its 2001 Additional Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance, particularly Article 45, which provides for the normative framework to respond to political crises emanating from unconstitutional change of government. Initially, two important factors provided the regional organisation with the leverage to act decisively in pressing for a quick return to political coherence in Bamako. Firstly, the firm stance taken by regional leaders against the coup and the threat of sanctions forced the junta into negotiation. Secondly, the rapid deterioration of situation in northern Mali clearly exposed the weaknesses of the junta and its inability to assert its authority in Mali.
However, the seeds for the stalemate were planted by the decisions to remove the sanctions without guarantees that the junta will allow the transition to be completed without hindrance and interference. As with Dadis Camara, the former junta leader in Guinea, Captain Sanogo has become a major threat to peace and stability in Mali. His insistence to remain in control of affairs is contrary to the position and will of regional leaders and development partners, making the negotiation process extremely delicate.
Whilst the junta initially agreed to step down and accept Dioncounda as the leader of a civilian government, they now want the leader of the coup, Amadou Sanogo to fill this post. With the ongoing resistance of the junta, the authority and the credibility of the regional organisation could be at stake. Moreover, groups operating in the northern regions have enough time to consolidate their control increasing the potential risk of protracted conflicts.
Captain Sanogo's call for a national conference to chart a new path for Mali's future is a fallacy that exposes the ambiguities of the junta's real intentions. It should be seen as an attempt to neutralise the current interim president and his prime minister, whilst paving the way for Sanogo to impose himself as a head of state. A hastened national convention will certainly contribute to further confusion while citizens in the occupied regions need urgent humanitarian assistance.
In such a scenario, ECOWAS will be justified in reactivating its sanctions. Whilst new sanctions may have some effect on the situation, the first sanctions should never have been lifted, nor should the junta have been granted amnesty. The junta is responsible for the deterioration of the security situation in Mali. This situation, coupled with their unwillingness to honour the original ECOWAS deal, which excluded military rule, calls for a very firm response from ECOWAS.
The regional organisation should consider the idea of a new transition without any of the current political and military actors to save what could still be saved in Mali. If Bamako does not manage to regain control of the north soon, the future could very well see the birth of a terrorist belt in the Sahel, a situation that could be detrimental to peace and security gains in the region.
End
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