ELECTION VIOLENCE ,USIP

ELECTION VIOLENCE USIP

 Election violence goes beyond clashes between political parties and their supporters and can assume many different forms. The eight types of violence we introduce may not present an exhaustive list. Other variations may exist. But if you are tasked with capturing the scope of violence, this typology may provide a good foundation. The first type of election violence we cover is inter-party violence. Violence between political parties and their supporters presents a common challenge, especially during tense election campaigns or after the announcement of a close result. Inter-party violence is often considered the most “traditional form” of election violence as it reflects the opposing ambitions of each party. Isolated clashes or fights may break out between supporter groups, or an incumbent may instruct armed individuals to attack his challenger. A less visible and less studied form of election violence is intra-party violence. This violence type usually peaks in the pre-election period as candidates within a political party fight internally for the nomination. Intra-party violence is more likely when parties have a realistic chance of winning the seat. An incumbent may decide to jail a rising star within his party, or install new party rules that bars others from running. A third form of election violence is violent street protest. While protests and demonstrations are legitimate political activities, at times they escalate into violence. This can occur spontaneously, or as certain elements within the group are instructed by spoilers. After an election result is announced, losing candidates may also call their supporters to the streets. One of the most common forms of election violence is the disproportionate use of force by police and other state actors. Police are usually responsible for election security and maintaining public order. But at times security providers are used as an instrument to protect the incumbent or intimidate the opposition. Police may also overreact in the face of peaceful protest because of poor training. A fifth form of election violence is the targeted assassination of key candidates or election officials. Well-known examples include the killing of Benazir Bhutto during a campaign rally in Pakistan in 2007, and the torture and killing of Chris Msando, an IT specialist for Kenya’s election commission in 2017. Assassinations may also target journalists or NGO leaders for their role in supporting transparent elections or serving as watchdogs holding individuals and institutions accountable. Election violence can also target physical property. Common forms include the destruction of election infrastructure, like registration centers and polling stations, and the theft or destruction of ballots. A worldwide phenomenon is the destruction of election posters. Another distinct form of election violence are attacks perpetrated by extremist organizations against the election process. Elections represent a democratic practice that run counter to the ideology of extremist organizations. Elections also present strategic targets, as groups of people or high-profile candidates convene in crowded spaces. As an example, the Afghanistan 2014 Presidential election saw over 400 attacks by the Taliban, targeting registration centers, polling stations, political candidates and polling facilities. The final type of election violence is cyber attacks. With elections increasingly dependent on modern technology, cyber security becomes a vital shield against election violence and manipulation. Attacks may target critical infrastructure, like the servers of an election commission. Perpetrators may compromise digitally automated processes, steal vulnerable data, or manipulate the result. Identifying the perpetrators is challenging, and actors in foreign countries are often accused. Tracking these eight different forms of election violence throughout the electoral cycle requires careful documentation by human rights organizations, the media, and election observers. Local observers may be particularly well-suited to map the violence given their nation-wide presence and familiarity with election. Systematically tracking the different types of election violence throughout an election allows for more effective future prevention. Election Violence Election violence can take many forms, and may occur at any time during the election process. That is right, elections are a process, and not an event. We need to look beyond election day, when elections usually hit the news or grab international attention. Election violence can occur in the long planning stage, and even days or weeks after the votes have been cast. However, it is important to recognize that not all forms of violence that occur during an election should be categorized as “election violence”. Election violence is distinct in its intention to affect the process or influence the outcome.Many definitions of election violence exist. International organizations such as the United Nations (UN), non-governmental organizations such as the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), and several scholars, have all come up with different definitions. They are generally quite similar, but differ in the types of violence or victims they feature, and the focus on timing or the motivation of the perpetrators.At the U.S. Institute of Peace, we define election violence as “any form of intimidation or physical violence directed against electoral stakeholders, the disruption of events, or damage to materials that is intended to affect an electoral process or influence the outcome.”Let us unpack that definition, and zoom in closer on three core ideas it captures. First, our definition lists several types of violence, including both intimidation and physical violence.Physical violence is a broad category that may include murder, injury and abuse. A police officer guarding the polling station may be attacked and killed, or women lining up to register may be harassed. Intimidation is used to frighten an individual or group into submission or compliance. A female candidate may receive anonymous threats, or may be forced to withdraw her candidacy. A religious minority may be intimidated to discourage the entire group from voting. At times intimidation can be very discrete, and difficult to observe. From these two categories, we already gather that election violence can take both lethal and non-lethal forms. When journalists or election observers comment on the scope of election violence, they should cover more than the death toll during election day. Fraud, vote-buying, and bribery will damage the integrity of elections. While these practices may trigger conflict, they are usually not considered a form of election violence.Second, our definition highlights that election violence can be perpetrated against individuals, groups, events and materials. Our definition identifies the most common victims or targets, including candidates, election officials, voters, protesters and campaign materials, such as ballot papers. Certain election events also present a window of risk. For instance, during voter registration, people may by lining up at registration centers, presenting a good target for violent groups looking to disrupt the election.The third and most critical part of the definition is the motivation of the violence. Once again, the objective is to affect an electoral process or influence the outcome. The violence must have an election-related motivation, which distinguishes election violence from other forms of political violence, like counter-insurgency or terrorism. The motivation may be difficult to determine, particularly in violent societies, or when the local capacity to investigate violent incidents is minimal. Different election types – such as national and local polls, or referendums – present distinct risks. Referendums are particularly sensitive, as they often see divisive campaigning, pushing voters into a binary decision.Election violence means different things to different people. When operating in a country where the term is not widely known, or where elections are not associated with violence, it is important to carefully socialize the term. We hope that our definition offers a better sense of the distinctive features of election violence. In the next session, we will introduce eight common types of election violence. @@@@@@@@@@@ 

Tim Farley (Host): In Afghanistan, they’re preparing for their parliamentary elections. Originally, they were scheduled to take place in October 2016, then moved to July of 2018, but they’re scheduled to happen now on the 20th. Just back from Afghanistan is Scott Worden. He’s director of Afghanistan and Central Asia Programs at the United States Institute of Peace, tweeting at USIP, and joining us this morning. Scott, thanks for being here. Scott Worden: Good morning. Thanks for having me. Tim Farley: These elections have been postponed now … Are we pretty sure or are you pretty sure they’re going to happen? Scott Worden: I am pretty sure they are going to happen. I was in Kabul. There are campaign posters all over the city. People are cautiously optimistic that this will be an opportunity for change, and they think they’re ready to go, so I think they will happen. Tim Farley: Explain the process, because this is not the presidential election. This is a parliamentary election, but, in some ways, the two are interrelated, although they are about six months apart. Scott Worden: That’s correct. Afghanistan run by, like our system, a President as head of one branch of government, parliament co-equal branch of government. Parliamentary election matters significantly for governing, taxing, laws, and so forth. There are 34 provinces in Afghanistan. Each one has a separate parliamentary delegation, and there are 2,500 candidates running for 250 seats, so it’s an intensely competitive process, and what we’ll see from the parliamentary election is a few things. One, how good is the security around the country? The presidential election, as you mentioned, is six months later, so security’s not going to change that much between the two, and one big benchmark is how many people can get out to vote, how many polling stations are closed because of violence. The other thing that you’ll see is a bit of an indicator of demographic and political shifts in the country. More of the candidates for this election are young. They tend to be better educated, so it’ll be an interesting benchmark to see whether the old warlords, the older, less educated candidates still hold onto seats or whether a more youthful parliament gets elected, and maybe that would be a sign for voters’ demand for change. Tim Farley: Interesting that you note that security’s important, participation, how many people are actually going to get there, and I guess fraud is a part of it. So if participation, security, and actual or perceived fraud are big factors, why is it different there from, say, in the U.S. where also how many people show up, whether or not their votes are secure, and whether or not there’s fraud? It’s obviously, I guess, a member of or a difference of gradation, but I wonder how serious are all of these issues in Afghanistan? Scott Worden: All those issues are just amplified from what we experience in our own elections. Participation there is not so much a function of voter enthusiasm. That’s certainly part of it, and in candidate popularity, but it’s really a reflection of how much control of the country do the Taliban have. There are probably at least two dozen districts where there will be not really effective voting because of Taliban control. The Taliban have opposed the election process. They have said that they will disrupt it, although they don’t want to kill a lot of civilians. Thank you very much. They are really an obstacle to this process. That’s an amplified circumstance from a normal election. The fraud issue has plagued Afghan elections for the last three election cycles, up to I’d say, about a quarter of the votes in 2009 were thrown out because of fraud. About 11% of the votes in the last presidential election were thrown out because of fraud. And with so many candidates running for a few seats, the margin of victory will be very small, so a little fraud can go a long way to changing the results, and that, if it’s not managed carefully, will result in protests, it’ll result in boycotts of the election result process, and that can de-legitimize the election commission, if you don’t handle it right in front of the presidential election, when their credibility really matters. Tim Farley: As you say, big props, tongue-in-cheek, for the Taliban for saying they don’t want to kill a lot of people during these elections. I wonder … Again, Scott Worden with us, director of the Afghanistan and Central Asia Programs of the United States Institute of Peace. The U.S. still has a military presence there. Do they try to make themselves as unobtrusive as possible when elections are taking place? Are they asked to participate in security? What is their role in this, if any? Scott Worden: The U.S. military is very much behind the scenes in this. They will not be visible or present at any of the polling stations. Partly, that’s because we have a significantly reduced presence from 2014, so there aren’t the numbers of troops, even if we wanted to, to really get out and secure polling stations. But, really, this needs to be an Afghan process, and so the U.S. military is, one, supporting the election commission on logistics and helping them to distribute the ballots and the other materials that need to get all over the country, and then, secondly, they’re focusing on countering the Taliban’s pledge to disrupt these elections by going after checkpoints that they might have on key roads that would prevent people from going to polling stations, trying to prevent attacks before they happen, so they have an aggressive tempo right now to try to go after clusters of Taliban troops, supply areas, and so forth, so that the Taliban cannot execute their plan to disrupt the election. Tim Farley: I’m just curious about this, Scott. We’ve talked about the elections and the voting and so on. What’s a campaign like in Afghanistan right now? We think of American campaigns with posters and TV ads and so on. What’s it like? How do people get their votes … How do they go out and solicit voters? Scott Worden: Well, really depends on where you are, and that depends on the security situation. In Kabul, where I was, seems like, I don’t know, a high school election where you’ve got posters everywhere, you’ve got candidates going around in cars with loud speakers, saying, “Vote for me for these reasons.” Behind the scenes, you’ve got a mobilization of people with different networks, whether it’s in a particular neighborhood. Ethnicity is a big factor in the elections in terms of who supports who, so you’ll get endorsements from elders in a particular region or tribe or ethnic group. In the rural areas, it’s much more constrained because of these Taliban threats, and so, there, the campaigns are happening quietly indoors at key houses. Women have a particular constraint in campaigning, not just because of Taliban threats, but cultural norms say, “Well, you shouldn’t be out there with your face in public,” and so one innovation that women have used is to hand out business cards with their name and their platform and a few bullet points, so it can be circulated quietly among women without arousing the ire of either conservatives Afghans or the Taliban. Tim Farley: Wow. It’s a world we don’t see here, but I appreciate you’re taking us to it. Scott Worden, thanks for joining us on P.O.T.U.S. this morning. Scott Worden: Thanks for having me. Tim Farley: Scott Worden, just back from Kabul. He is director of Afghanistan and Central Asia Programs of the United States Institute of Peace, talking about the elections coming up this weekend, tweeting at USIP.Compared to electoral assistance, election violence prevention is a recent peacebuilding field that considers conflict dynamics throughout the entire election cycle. Organizations like UNDP, the National Democratic Institute (NDI), the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) and others do important work to support the credibility of elections. But their work is primarily technical in nature. Given the growing recognition that elections often turn violent in transitioning democracies, the focus on technical assistance has been complemented by election violence prevention as a related but distinct field of practice. The prevention of election violence is rooted in conflict resolution theory, and anticipates potential sources of violence at each phase of the election cycle. Election violence risk assessments help identify vulnerable populations and possible perpetrators or victims of violence. Based on the assessments, programs are designed to help address grievances, deter or apprehend spoilers, protect people, and create systems for peaceful dispute resolution. Dedicated units or individuals are now focused on election security or violence prevention. While election security often implies a narrow focus on the role of security forces, election violence prevention allows for holistic strategies that empower many actors in society to reduce the risk. For example, local women’s groups can be supported to ensure safe participation as voters or candidates. Business federations can raise their voice, calling out authorities to address an uptick of violence around elections as it harms their operations. The promotion of peaceful elections is a priority for the U.S. Institute of Peace, and a growing number of individuals and organizations with a dedicated focus on election-related conflict. At the United Nations, election-related violence lies at the intersection between the organization’s conflict prevention and electoral assistance mandates. USAID developed an election security framework that identifies possible electoral conflict and suggests corresponding programs in support of peaceful elections. Election observation groups increasingly cover security incidents across the pre- and post-election period. When you participate in an observation mission, remember to look beyond technical irregularities, and report on violent incidents or tension through the available channels. But why is a focus on elections relevant to peacebuilding? A growing percentage of elections is organized in the context of violent conflict and ethnic strife. The number of elections held in extremely fragile conflict environments, or countries that are in a state of war, is going up. With elections in some of the toughest environments, like Afghanistan, Nigeria or even Mexico, we have to be realistic about the level of credibility or peace we can achieve at the polls. Research shows that if elections are held amidst a violent conflict, or too soon after a conflict, then they or more likely to escalate violence or trigger a relapse. As a result, in many countries elections have become less associated with progress and democracy. Instead, violence may increase the appeal of authoritarian alternatives. There is a strong overlap between the structural drivers of election violence and other forms of violent conflict. But a dedicated focus on elections is merited because there are distinct risks related to election cycles that require tailored preventive measures. Whether you work on healthcare, humanitarian assistance, or violent conflict, prevention always implies that action is taken before an undesired outcome occurs. In the conflict resolution jargon, we use the term “upstream” or “primary” prevention in reference to those actions taken before the onset of violence, since other measures are mostly reactive in nature. Elections offer a great opportunity to realize our preventive ambitions, since an election date is set in the future, allowing us to work towards anticipated risks using the various approaches we have at our disposal. But do remember that election violence prevention is also a very sensitive stream of peacebuilding. There is always the risk that incumbents or the opposition perceive election programming, whether by international organizations or domestic NGOs, as intrusive. Elections decide upon the distribution of power, and get to the core of national sovereignty. For that reason, foreign involvement is often regarded with caution or suspicion. International or regional organizations should try to be transparent at all times, and remain cautious and respectful as they support the promotion of peaceful and credible elections. 

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A few years ago, USIP conducted a mapping exercise to identify those approaches that are commonly used with the explicit aim to reduce the risk of election violence. We identified eight practice areas or programming types that I will now introduce. Some of the approaches will be discussed in greater length later in the course. The first approach is election management and administration. Admittedly, election administration covers a broad set of activities usually led by the election management body, like the registration of candidates and voters, and the announcement of results. With election administration we also consider the technical assistance authorities receive, and the legal framework in which they operate. More concretely, an election commission can convene political parties to exchange information, or dispel rumors before they take hold. The chief commissioner can convene political leaders to reduce tension, and ensure the timely announcement of results. The second approach to violence prevention is election observation. Both short- and long-term observers are often deployed by local NGOs, embassies and international organizations to assess the quality of electoral processes in line with international standards. As a tool for the prevention of election violence, observers could theoretically inform effective security responses. The implementation of observer report recommendations could mitigate future risk; and the presence of observers in the field could deter possible perpetrators. Another avenue that allows internationals to help reduce tensions is preventive diplomacy. The UN secretary-general, country-based ambassadors or special envoys may recognize the threat of violence and encourage leading candidates to refrain from hate speech, campaign responsibly or accept defeat. Preventive diplomacy is often used as a crisis response mechanism, by issuing public statements in response to violent incidents, or through privately issued promises and threats. The fourth practice area we cover is peace messaging. This commonly used prevention approach targets the broader electorate, with a specific focus on populations vulnerable to violence or recruitment. Peace messaging can be implemented by civil society, media, or even political parties. The messages are disseminated during music concerts, arts gatherings, or media broadcasts. The goal is to alter citizen behavior away from violence prior to sensitive phases in the election cycle, and to encourage peaceful engagement in elections. Peace messaging is often combined with civic and voter education, the fifth approach we present in this overview. Civic education adopts a longer timeframe, and aims to increase awareness of the rights and responsibilities of voters in a democratic society. Voter education is more election-specific, and aims to disseminate practical information to voters on a concrete election process. Both education approaches help reduce the risk of rumor-mongering, and help ensure access to dispute resolution and avenues to report complaints. The sixth instrument, voter consultation, builds upon an ambitious logic. Political parties would engage their support base, allowing voters to vent their concerns. Through direct engagement or dialogue, party officials would reflect the needs of the people in party programs, and address their needs or frustration. Number seven is youth programming. Youth programs are broadly focused on ensuring improved education and youth employment. Some civil society organizations aim to improve their involvement in election processes. Workshops can be organized with the youth wings of political parties, or youth can be engaged in campaign or observation activities. Across these activities it is critical to engage youth constructively in the election process, as they are often the most easily recruited for violence. The last prevention approach we cover is security sector engagement. Once again, this measure covers a broad set of activities, including the role of security forces at elections events, the support they receive, and the regulatory frameworks structuring their operation. Coordination mechanisms should be in place between the police and the Electoral Management Body. In some cases, police officers and other law enforcement authorities may not be fully aware of their election-related responsibilities, and require further training. Some of these approaches we covered in this overview directly aim to protect communities or mitigate tension, like peace messaging or security sector engagement. Others, like observation or civic education, could plausibly help reduce the risk of violence indirectly, but violence prevention is not their primary purpose. Larger development actors or committed governments will often combine several approaches, as part of broad prevention strategies. Before designing a violence prevention strategy, or as part of your assessment, check with other international and domestic actors about their plans to avoid duplication, and identify synergies. To better plan their efforts, election practitioners often use the election cycle, which is the focus of our next video.

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In a previous video, we introduced eight practices that are commonly used to prevent election violence. Let us now look at a few concrete examples of prevention in action by three different actors: local authorities, international diplomats, and civil society. You will notice that, to be effective, prevention needs to be strategic, and match the anticipated problem.

Our first example takes us to Liberia. The 2017 general elections in this West-African country were generally peaceful, thanks in large part to the efforts made by the Liberian National Police, and the international support it received. In the run-up to election day there were many doubts about the LNP’s capacity to ensure election security. But, they delivered. The LNP played a positive role during the campaign and was praised for its discrete and professional presence at the polls.

Liberian police officers were trained by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the United Nations (UN) and the election commission to improve their professionalism and crowd control tactics. The United States also supported community policing efforts. Our research on the effectiveness of prevention in Liberia, and several other countries around the world, shows that efforts to professionalize police engagement early in the election cycle pay off.

With the next example we look at the 2019 Presidential elections in Ukraine. Compared to Liberia, these elections faced challenges of a very different nature, with disinformation and cyber-attacks as some of the biggest threats.

This time, the efforts by Ukraine’s Central Election Commission were critical in protecting the election infrastructure, again with the help from international specialists. Cyber hygiene training and the replacement of outdated hardware helped against attacks on electoral servers and computers. The cases of Ukraine and Liberia both demonstrate that domestic authorities that are primarily responsible for organizing credible elections are also critical for the prevention of election violence. This speaks not only to the role of the police and the election commission, but also the entire court system and, in some rare cases, the armed forces.

The next example brings us to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where recent elections illustrated both the potential and limitations of international diplomacy as a violence prevention tool.

In 2006, diplomatic messaging was sustained throughout the election cycle in a coordinated manner. The International Committee in Support of the Transition, also known as C I A T, was critical as a standing mechanism for diplomacy. The Committee allowed the ambassadors of powerful countries, the African Union, the EU, and neighboring countries to speak with one unified voice.

In 2011, however, diplomatic efforts were more disjointed. UN and US officials engaged in high-level talks and publicly encouraged transparency and peaceful elections. Unfortunately, these efforts were unable to prevent the violence that tarnished the 2011 vote. Again, the limitations of preventive diplomacy were visible ahead of the 2018 DRC elections. For years, diplomats had been urging President Kabila to organize a new vote, as he overstayed his mandate by over two years. Efforts by the African Union and the International Contact Group for the Great Lakes Region produced few tangible results. The former U.S. Ambassador to the UN, Nikki Haley, made progress by warning Kabila to adhere to the timetable or face an international backlash. The elections that were eventually held in December 2018 were questionable in terms of their integrity and saw several violent incidents.The international experience in the DRC confirms the potential of diplomacy to reduce the risk of election violence, as long as there is leverage, consistency, and coordination among diplomats.

The final example comes from Mexico. In the run-up to the 2018 Mexican general election, both civil society and Mexican authorities prioritized the prevention of political violence against women. Prior to the election, 165 federal and local candidates requested protection from police during the campaign period, realizing the threat posed by targeted assassinations. Police also heightened their surveillance at road sections, toll booths, and other strategic locations. Despite these efforts, approximately 100 political actors were killed, and almost 22,000 ballots stolen or destroyed.

The one bright spot was the focus on gender-based election violence. With the support of federal agencies, international organizations and local civil society, a Protocol was established on political violence against women based on gender. While it elevated the topic on the political agenda, few concrete steps were taken to effectively protect women candidates at the local level. The illustrations from Liberia, Ukraine, the DRC and Mexico are all unique, and demonstrate the variety of actors engaged in violence prevention. However, it is important to design strategies based on the type of violence that is anticipated, the space available for civil society, and the openness to international engagement.

4444444444444444 If you work for an organization with a global or regional mandate, it is important to prioritize your efforts and select those countries with an established risk of violence. Even when you focus on just one country, it is relevant to understand how the risk evolves over time, and how it compares to other countries in the region. After introducing the general global scanning approach, we will present a few databases that may help shape your country selection.

Sound analysis is the cornerstone of effective prevention programming. But even as an organization with a global presence you can’t cover every election. To help prioritize your selected countries it is advisable to consult relevant risk indicators and adopt a global scanning approach. Global scanning helps to identify those elections at elevated risk, using evidence-based risk factors to determine the level of concern. It puts the risk into perspective, using a comparative approach. Research shows that certain security conditions, governance or regime characteristics, and economic and social factors play a crucial role in determining the risk of election-related violence. We will now briefly introduce the strongest indicators of future election violence.

The first and most reliable risk indicator is a country’s history of political violence. Election violence is cyclical in nature, so countries that have experienced election violence in the past are more likely to experience it in the future. In the minds of voters and candidates, elections become associated with violence over time, inviting former victims to engage in revenge attacks. Large-scale violence can have the opposite effect, as voters realize its human cost. For example, in Kenya the 2013 elections remained relatively stable in part because of the memory of widespread violence in 2007, and the fear of a repeat of that scenario.

A second set of indicators relates to the governance or regime type of a country. Whereas democracies or autocracies usually display some level of political stability, transitioning or nascent democracies seem particularly vulnerable to political violence. Countries do not become democratic overnight, and the danger is in the transition, as formerly authoritarian states enter a turbulent phase, with the gradual opening of society and imperfect elections. Grievances will not be fully addressed, but the space to air them is growing. This tension can make regimes anxious, leading them to push back on the emerging freedom of expression and association. This is not to say that autocracies, on the far left of the scale, are desirable. They often remain in a state of negative peace and repressive stability, where people have no space to freely elect their leaders.

The third and final category of risk indicators relates to social and economic conditions. Two socio-economic indicators that stand out in determining the risk of election violence are a country’s politically salient diversity and the level of horizontal inequality. Now what does that mean? Horizontal inequality refers to inequalities between groups, in contrast to vertical inequality which is inequality among households or individuals, as measured by a country’s GINI coefficient. Whether a country is diverse, for example in terms of ethnicity or religion, does not in itself present a risk. What does raise a red flag is diversity that is easily exploited by charismatic politicians, who mobilize their support base through divisive campaigning.

We should think of these risk factors in probabilistic, and not in causal terms. A nascent democracy with a history of election violence, and high levels of horizontal inequality is not guaranteed to experience election violence. But the country would merit special attention, and benefit from prevention. Global risk scanning does not offer a prediction model, since multiple paths can lead to the same outcome. When selecting countries, one should pay special attention to countries that have moved up significantly in the rankings from the previous years, and those whose risk is consistently high across multiple years.

Currently no risk index exists that compiles all the relevant data, and ranks countries based on their risk of election violence. However, there are political instability, peace and governance rankings with indicators that serve as a helpful proxy. Other resources can inform your global scanning as well. The National Elections across Democracy and Autocracy (NELDA) dataset is one of the best resources currently available, as it provides detailed information on all election events from 1945 to 2012. Another helpful source of conflict data, analysis and maps is the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED) Project. The U.S. State Department’s Instability Monitoring and Analysis Platform, known as I-MAP, uses the ACLED data, and presents it on a public platform that can be used for predictive analysis. These resources may inform your global scanning and prioritization based on evidence.

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