Saturday, July 13, 2024

Ethiopia's Political Maneuvering in Sudan: Balancing Relations with Sudan and UAE.

Ethiopia's Political Maneuvering in Sudan: Balancing Relations with Sudan and UAE.


In the midst of Sudan's evolving political landscape, reports are emerging that one of the key motivations behind Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed's recent visit to Port Sudan is to address rising concerns over the Rapid Support Forces' (RSF) expansion in Sudan's eastern regions. This move comes at a critical juncture for Ethiopia, which finds itself navigating complex regional dynamics while maintaining crucial diplomatic ties.
Ethiopian Concerns

The RSF, a powerful paramilitary group, has significantly grown its influence in eastern Sudan, raising alarms in neighboring Ethiopia. Addis Ababa views the RSF's expansion as a potential threat to regional stability and its own national security. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed's visit to Port Sudan is likely a strategic attempt to engage directly with Sudanese authorities and seek assurances or cooperation to counterbalance the RSF's influence.

Sudan’s Fortified Leadership

Ethiopia's outreach to Sudanese leaders, particularly General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, marks a notable shift. General Burhan, who has been a dominant figure in Sudan's transition post-2019, commands significant control over Sudan's military and political apparatus. By aligning more closely with Burhan, Ethiopia aims to secure a reliable ally who can offer support in curbing the RSF's reach. This move could also help Ethiopia exert greater regional influence, promoting stability along its borders.

 Strained Relations with UAE
However, this diplomatic pivot might strain Ethiopia's relationship with the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The UAE has historically supported various factions within Sudan, including some elements within the RSF, as part of its broader strategic interests in the Red Sea and Horn of Africa region. Ethiopia's new closeness with Burhan, who may have divergent interests from the UAE-backed entities, could potentially pit Addis Ababa against Abu Dhabi's regional agenda.

Balancing Act

Ethiopia's challenge will be to balance this new alignment without alienating the UAE, an influential economic and political partner. Maintaining strong bilateral relations with the UAE is crucial for Ethiopia, not just for economic investments but also for geopolitical stability. This delicate act requires astute diplomacy to ensure that Ethiopia's national interests are safeguarded on multiple fronts.

Conclusion

Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s visit to Port Sudan underscores Ethiopia’s proactive stance in addressing regional security concerns. As Ethiopia deepens its engagement with Sudanese leadership, it will need to carefully navigate its relationship with the UAE to maintain regional equilibrium. The coming months will reveal how Ethiopia manages these intricate diplomatic threads to foster stability and sustain its national interests.

Friday, July 12, 2024

Ethiopia’s national dialogue needs a reset.



 

Ethiopia’s national dialogue needs a reset

Considering that major political movements and actors reject the ongoing dialogue, a temporary pause and recalibration should be considered.

Since the 2018 power transfer in the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (the former ruling party) and the two-year war between the federal government and Tigrayan forces, Ethiopia has tried implementing three conflict transformation mechanisms. These are the national dialogue initiative; transitional justice; and disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of armed combatants.

All three face hurdles – but stakeholders should perhaps prioritise solving the issues hampering the legitimacy and credibility of the national dialogue process. The dialogue was launched last month as a first step towards peacebuilding.

Key political organisations and actors have rejected the process since its inception. Despite this, more than two years after its formation, the Ethiopian National Dialogue Commission recently embarked on an agenda selection phase. The commission plans to replicate this process at the regional state level, and select community representatives to take part in the national plenary.

But this process is proceeding without the involvement of key opposition political organisations. At the launch of the process in Addis Ababa, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed stressed the importance of citizens’ participation and urged the opposition to seize the opportunity to contribute. His words are a testament to the fact that a lack of involvement from key opposition groups would undermine the legitimacy of the process and its outcomes.

Given this grave situation, the Ethiopian National Dialogue Commission and government could ensure that national dialogue serves its valuable purpose by temporarily pausing the process. They should readjust their approach, involve major actors and earn legitimacy.

The government says the process leading to the commission’s formation was participatory, transparent and inclusive. It accuses the opposition of determinism and engaging in boycotting and rejection politics. Opposition parties counter that from the start, the whole process was exclusive, insincere and meant to legitimise the government’s predetermined outcomes. Some of these opposition forces are in armed conflict with the state. Continuing with the national dialogue in this context would be unwise.

Besides these challenges, there are at least three interconnected process- and design-related reasons for the Ethiopian National Dialogue Commission and government to hold back and change tack.

First, Ethiopia’s various parties have contradicting and seemingly irreconcilable interpretations of the country’s past and its aspirations for the future. The commission and government need to reassess their analysis of the root causes of the country’s political predicaments. The commission’s proclamation defines these as ‘disagreements among various political and opinion leaders and also segments of society in Ethiopia on the most fundamental national issues … that have been simmering for centuries.’

Both the commission and government assert that ‘Ethiopia converses’ more with ‘citizens’ and less with elites. But to achieve lasting transformation, the dialogue process should engage the political elite. Citizens are, after all, often mobilised and represented by political elites.

Second, the commission should revise its participant and agenda selection approach. It seems to follow a vertical strategy, which involves selecting participants at the local level to represent that particular community – first at regional state- and then at federal-level meetings. This approach is questionable because it seemingly glosses over local inter-group tensions. That means the process bypasses major horizontal inter-communal rivalries and key conflict actors.

Third, the way the commission groups participants into blocs doesn’t take into account that Ethiopia’s political conundrum is rooted in competing nationalisms and identities along ethnic and religious lines. Identification along religious lines sometimes accentuates ethno-regional tensions, so religion cannot unite multitudes of groups across ethnic identities. The commission’s categorisation of Ethiopians as blocs of participants overlooks these competing modes of identification and in doing so, disregards one of the root causes of the conflict.

The rejection of the process by major political movements claiming to represent different ethnic groups complicates the problem. Recent complaints from the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church, a significant institution in the country, about being excluded reflects the commission’s failure to involve identity groups – whether ethnic or religious – as a collective.

The Ethiopian National Dialogue Commission and federal government believe the dialogue process is the solution to managing the country’s political fault lines and reaching a negotiated political settlement. However, the opposition holds a different view, which makes it impossible to imagine talks or a political settlement.

While the commission and government see a stable post-dialogue Ethiopia, the opposition warns that the process will impose outcomes predetermined by government and lead to another cycle of violence. The competing political elites seem to be reading from different scripts.

This calls for a reassessment of the current dialogue and a new vision for a more inclusive, transparent and participatory process. The government and commission could use the Addis Ababa process as a ‘pilot project’ to review its analysis of Ethiopia’s political dilemma, the role of the political elite in the process, and the method for selecting participants and setting the agenda.

A temporary pause should not be construed to mean that the commission is being dissolved or that national dialogue is being abandoned. A well-planned communication strategy for public outreach is vital to ensure national dialogue remains, considering that it is the most effective mechanism for conflict transformation.

Such a reset could help the process gain credibility and deliver more positive outcomes. If the government and commission agree to a review, opposition groups should reconsider their strategy of rejecting and boycotting the national dialogue process.


Exclusive rights to re-publish ISS Today articles have been given to Daily Maverick in South Africa and Premium Times in Nigeria. For media based outside South Africa and Nigeria that want to re-publish articles, or for queries about our re-publishing policy, email us

Published on 11 July 2024 in ISS Today


By :Tegbaru Yared

Researcher, Horn of Africa Security Analysis, ISS Addis Ababa