by:Dr. Gizachew Asrat and Dr. Gashaw Ayferam
Ethiopia’s quest for sovereign access to the sea is not merely a geographical ambition; it is a profound struggle for identity and belonging in a world that has often relegated it to the margins. As Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed revitalizes this long-held aspiration through the recent Memorandum of Understanding with Somaliland, the stakes rise beyond trade routes and economic growth—this journey symbolizes Ethiopia’s fight against historical isolation and its desire to reclaim its rightful place within the global community.
Following the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between Ethiopia and Somaliland in January 2024, which will grant Ethiopia access to the sea, the federal government of Somalia responded in a different manner. While Mogadishu has chosen to securitize the MoU, portraying it as a threat to its sovereignty, Ethiopia has long regarded access to a permanent seaport as an existential necessity. As a result of Somalia’s securitization, the issue has been escalated, with Somalia linking it to other issues such as the Post-ATMIS transition and inviting other actors, including Egypt and Eritrea, who have an adversarial mentality and perception towards Ethiopia. This has led to the entanglement of bilateral issues, including the MoU, Post-ATMIS transition, and the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), resulting in a sort of trilateral alliance. This piece examines Ethiopia’s journey towards accessing a permanent sea port, its policy choices, and the responses of Somalia and other regional actors.
For centuries, Ethiopia’s quest for access to the sea has been a tumultuous journey marked by periods of progress and setbacks, as well as unwavering perseverance and resilience. While the physical geography of the sea and the country’s physical security are undoubtedly crucial aspects of this journey, the story of Ethiopia’s pursuit of the sea is ultimately rooted in a deeper need: the need to maintain a sense of biographical continuity that includes the narratives that have shaped the country’s identity and its relationship with the world.
For Ethiopia, except during the EPRDF era, accessing the sea was considered an existential matter. However, the Red Sea-centered foreign policy orientation was tactically silenced following Eritrea’s independence in 1991, de facto, and in 1993, de jure. This marked a significant departure from the pre-existing narrative, as the government (EPRDF period 1991-2018) voluntarily abandoned Ethiopia’s claim to the sea and politicized the issue, characterizing those who raised it as expansionists and war-monger.
Although Ethiopia’s loss of sea access was caused by a combination of historical, geopolitical, and international factors including the 16th-century Portugal-Ottoman Empires rivalry and the 19th and late 20 century British-Italian-French rivalry it was primarily the policy orientation of the EPRDF that transformed Ethiopia into a landlocked country and ended the struggle for permanent sea access. This EPRDF’s siloed worldview curtailed the generations-long quest for a permanent seaport, aligning with the intended policy objectives pursued by Ottoman Empire, European colonial powers, and post-independent Egypt. It was not the aspirations of the people that were realized, but rather those of Egypt, a country that supported insurgents and secessionists, including the EPLF and TPLF, from the beginning. Under the EPRDF’s siloed worldview, the narratives that regarded access to the sea as an existential matter were reduced to viewing ports as mere tradable commodities.
The regime also delinked access to the sea from its existential necessity for development and national security, believing that it had no strong causal link. This was further legitimized by the double-digit economic growth of the time. As the late PM Meles Zenawi stated: “If we don’t use the two ports [Misewa and Aseba], we lose nothing…. Being landlocked does not make us poor…. We cannot and should not suffer from being a landlocked nation…In terms of development and growth, Ethiopia experienced its quickest results ever”. However, this view overlooks the reality that the country’s economic growth and strategic interests have been constrained by its lack of direct access to the sea, creating a dependency on a single sea outlet.
Ramification of being landlocked
Landlocked developing countries like Ethiopia engage in 30% less trade, on average, compared to their coastal counterparts, leading to slower economic growth—about 1.5% lower due to their landlocked status.This situation has resulted in higher import prices and decreased export revenues, with transportation costs being a major challenge. Ethiopia heavily depends on Djibouti for nearly 80-90% of its imports and exports, which has driven up transport expenses. In 2023, the country faces an enormous annual cost of $1.6 billion in port fees due to its lack of direct sea access.Additionally, the port of Djibouti struggles to keep up with Ethiopia’s rising trade demands and its rapidly expanding economy. Issues such as lengthy transit times (averaging around 50 days), high logistics costs for imports, inconsistent customs practices, and delays at the port all contribute to Ethiopia’s elevated logistics expenses for bulk imports.
In addition to the economic ramifications of being landlocked, Ethiopia’s geographical status positions it as a passive observer in the geopolitical dynamics of the Red Sea Theater, where major and regional powers actively engage. This landlocked condition exacerbates Ethiopia’s security vulnerabilities, as it becomes increasingly reliant on the maritime strategies and decisions of its neighboring coastal states, thereby diminishing its own strategic autonomy.
Furthermore, the country’s lack of direct access to the sea significantly constrains its military capabilities, limiting it to land and air power. This geographical limitation hampers its ability to project power and influence maritime security in the region. As a result, Ethiopia is compelled to rely on land and air power, which may not adequately address evolving security challenges from non-state actors like terrorists and pirates.
Hence, Ethiopia’s quest for sovereign, permanent access to a seaport emerges as a panacea for the strategic and economic challenges that constrain its physical and ontological security. This pursuit is not merely about enhancing trade routes or gaining a physical advantage; it represents a fundamental effort to reclaim a sense of belonging in the global community that has been eroded by geographical isolation. Ethiopia’s lack of coastline has historically fostered feelings of disconnection from the strategic dynamics of the Red Sea region, intensifying the country’s sense of vulnerability.
In the wake of the post-2018 reforms, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has rejuvenated these longstanding aspirations, framing access to the sea as not only a national priority but also a matter of survival. This strategic rebranding has shifted the discourse from questioning the importance of maritime access for development to a widely accepted understanding that it is an existential imperative for Ethiopia.
This sovereign access to the sea has been driven by a complex interplay of domestic, regional, and international factors, including economic, demographic, and strategic considerations. The country sought a more diversified sea access, taking into account the country’s rapidly expanding economy, growing population, and desire for regional integration. Regionally, while the physical distance between Ethiopia and the Red Sea coast is relatively short, in reality, Ethiopia has become a distant observer of the Red Sea Theater, as the region has hosted several military bases of major and middle powers from distant regions. Furthermore, neither relying on Djibouti nor port diversification, which comes as a policy choice for Ethiopia’s dependency on Djibouti, has met Ethiopia’s import-export demands. Furthermore, the lack of a permanent seaport has impacted the country’s strategic and political interests.
One outcome of this policy choice is the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed between Ethiopia and Somaliland on January 2024. The MoU follows Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s statement on Ethiopia’s peaceful access to the sea, which marks a significant shift after 27 years of voluntary abandonment of Ethiopia’s claim to a permanent seaport. The agreement, according to the statement made by the Foreign Minister of Somaliland, grants landlocked Ethiopia access to the sea, and in return, Ethiopia reciprocates by recognizing Somaliland as an independent state. Under the terms of the agreement, Ethiopia will secure less expensive and more reliable access to the sea, leasing a 20-kilometer stretch of coastline for 50 years. The agreement also allows Ethiopia to build a naval base and develop a commercial port on the strategic Gulf of Aden.
However, the MoU paradoxically has become entangled with the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), reconfiguring the interstate relations in the region. Mogadishu has interpreted the MoU as an existential threat to its territorial integrity and sovereignty. In response, it has opted for the securitization of the MoU and alliance formation as deterrence. Egypt and Eritrea have also joined the securitization of the MoU aimed at countering Ethiopia’s sovereign access to the sea. The Cairo-led alliance escalated its subversive activities in the region following the recent entry into force of the Nile River Cooperative Framework Agreement.
The new geopolitical developments in the region seem to have offered Cairo a new geopolitical opportunity to initiate a tripartite coalition of Cairo, Asmara, and Mogadishu. The formation of a tripartite alliance to counter Ethiopia is a continuation of Cairo’s long-term strategy to undermine the position of Ethiopia in the region. While Cairo-Asmara-Mogadishu’s path has been one of securitization, Addis Ababa has taken a de-escalatory approach, employing tactical de-escalation and strategic de-securitization. Ethiopia has emphasized that its sovereign access to the sea is achieved through peaceful and diplomatic means based on give and take. Ethiopia’s strategy focuses on regional cooperation and economic integration, aiming to establish stability and mutual benefit in the Horn of Africa. Ethiopia’s emphasis on peaceful and diplomatic means contrasts with Cairo-Asmara-Mogadishu’s tripartite coalition’s more aggressive tactics, highlighting a fundamental difference in approach to regional issues. By prioritizing cooperation and integration, Ethiopia seeks to foster long-term stability and prosperity in the Horn of Africa.
In this connection, Ethiopia has offered its sovereign projects, including the GERD, Ethiopian Airlines, and Ethio-telecom as a concessions. Speaking to the parliament on October 31, 2024, PM Abiy Ahmed also outlined Ethiopia’s strategy, which is a win-win approach with the states of the Horn of Africa.
..Peaceful neighborliness is Ethiopia’s sole realistic approach to its neighbors, whether they are Somalia, Kenya, Eritrea, or others. Together, we must develop the give-and-take mentality. We are committed to helping any country establish a friendly and cooperative foundation. Peace with Eritrea is necessary. For Somalia to remain a state, thousands of Ethiopians have been sacrificed. Ethiopia will make greater efforts than before to promote peace, development, and the common good in the Horn of Africa…”
Ethiopia’s de-securitization approach aimed to deescalate tensions, but the government in Mogadishu has linked the MoU to several unrelated issues, including the GERD, the post-ATMIS transition, and broader regional peace and security concerns. This has not only complicated the situation but has also drawn external actors with malign intentions into the region, potentially jeopardizing peace in inter-state relations in the Horn.
The Mogadishu government is facing a constitutional crisis. The Hassen Shieke administration has been leaning towards a more centralizing and unitary approach in relations between the federal government and regional states in Somalia, taking lessons from Eritrea while ignoring the importance of de-centralization and federalism as the best options for stability in Somalia. It’s unlikely that Egypt will take a leading role in the fight against Al-Shabab; rather, Egypt has an interest in encircling Ethiopia rather than in helping to alleviate the security burden of fighting the Al-Shabab and bringing stability and peace to the Somali people.
Furthermore, the Mogadishu governments’ securitization methods failed to achieve their stated purpose of terminating the MOU. Mogadishu’s efforts to tie the MOU and complicate Ethiopia’s desire for a sea outlet appear to have failed, as it has failed to rally regional governments and significant donors to oppose Ethiopia. Despite Mogadishu’s attempts to garner support against Ethiopia, many regional governments and donors have chosen to remain neutral or support Ethiopia’s position.
Ethiopia’s access to the sea has the potential to boost regional connectivity and trade. Ethiopia’s diplomatic de-escalation and strategy to de-securitize should be analyzed in the context of state behavior and the motivations, strengths, and interests of regional actors. It is essential to adapt to shifting dynamics while pursuing diplomatic avenues to realize Ethiopia’s dream of open access to the sea.
About the Authors
Gizachew Asrat (PhD), African Affairs Research Director General at the Institute of Foreign Affairs (IFA).
Gashaw Ayferam (PhD), Senior Researcher of African Affairs at the Institute of Foreign Affairs (IFA).
Declaimer: The opinions stated in this article solely belong to the author and do not reflect the views or positions of the IFA
