This chapter explores key and contested concepts such as nation building, state building and the nation state in the context of deeply divided societies. It is partly a deconstruction of the nation state, or at least the nation state has to be problematized because the single nation assumed to exist in the nation state is an anomaly when confronted by rival ethno national and regional groups that assert self-government and recognition, common issue in deeply divided societies. Yet before it is deconstructed it has to be explained. In societies that are deeply divided like Ethiopia, it is critical to understand the nation and nation building and explain how they are used or misused in the discourse. Their normative assumptions are also contested and since the 1960’s alternative theories and concepts have been on the rise. Part one discusses the concept of nation building and how it is understood across time while part two explores the nation state, its origins, normative assumptions and its limitations. This chapter provides the framework for polity building for the case studies covered in the book and connects the different chapters. There is a rich separate literature on nation building and comparative federalism but these two concepts are treated as distinct fields as if there is no link between them. Indeed this is an important missing link that this chapter aims to address laying the foundation here but with more details in other chapters. This chapter creates a bridge between the two concepts and analyses how federalism and devolution could be used for polity building in diverse societies. Polity building is all about nesting different identities by nurturing shared values and as will be shown later this is best done by designing an inclusive political, economic and public policy system. Federalism and devolution are ideally about designing a more inclusive political and economic system. There is thus strong link between polity building and federalism or devolution. If properly designed and implemented, federalism and devolution could be deployed for successful polity building in divided societies and conflicts could be minimized or prevented. More importantly, this chapter lays the explanation for the distinct nature of federal and devolved systems in the Global South. Federal and devolved systems in Africa cannot be understood in isolation from the nature of state power in the continent. The nature of state power impacts federal and devolved systems in Africa in many ways than one. The big man and hegemonic party system make institution building, division of power (hall mark of federations), sub state autonomy and constitutionalism difficult, if not meaning less. 1.1 Nation Building or Nation Destroying? Nation building is one of the least understood, most confusing and abused concepts in the literature. There is little clarity on what it means and authors continue to use it to mean different things. Some experts use it interchangeably with state building.1 The two concepts are related but are not one and the same. State building as outlined by Weber refers to a state that has a monopoly over the legitimate use of force and that is able to deliver basic services such as security and crucial public goods.2 It is about building tangible and functioning state institutions. This is normally assumed to exist in the west but in many developing countries within the African continent, it is one of the daunting tasks as the institutions continue to suffer under hegemonic one party system and big men. In most cases the institutions also serve factional interests. Building functioning state institutions that are able to deliver basic services is on its own a significant progress but is not enough. The legitimacy of the institutions and how they are perceived by citizens remains critical. Nation building refers to socio-political cohesion and the legitimacy of the institutions (more in later sections)3; it is intangible software that we invest on the people to build nested and shared belongingness to the polity shared cutting across divides. The distinction is important because when one writes about state failure, it is beyond the failure of state institutions.4 It also implies that there is crisis of legitimacy and the social contract needs to be revisited because it is broken, betrayed or is not enough. Most countries are inhabited by diverse societies and tension often exists between national identity projected by the state and ethno national, regional, religious identities pursued by sub state entities. The center may pursue for national integration while sub units may push for accommodation and pluralism objecting integration and the identity crafted by the state. Thus integration and disintegration may happen at the same time unless one balances the divergent forces.5 Nation building is thus a complex process that states and leaders invest on the people to ensure socio-political cohesion by crafting right ideology, designing appropriate institutions that address the legitimacy issue and promoting shared values that cut across the different divides. It is not a top-down process but a collective effort at constructing common destiny built on shared and inclusive values. Over the last three decades several states collapsed including Somalia, Yemen, Iraq, Libya and Afghanistan. The international community invested a lot of resources and expertise to restore ‘law and order’ in these countries and most of it was done in the name of ‘nation building.’6 Yet, a careful reading to this approach does show that the effort is related to building state institutions to be able to ensure security and provide basic services. It is also more about democratization and the conduct of elections than nation building. Besides, the efforts were largely conducted in western or other capitals detached from the very society meant to benefit from the process. In the case of South Sudan both during the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (2005–2011) and after independence, the focus was on peace and state building. With the exception of post Second World War nation building project in Japan and Germany by the allied forces, it is rare to find a successful state and nation building imposed from outside by a third party. Iraq was supposed to be a show case for democracy in the Middle East before it faltered. The tragedy in Afghanistan and Libya is well known. The success in Japan and Germany was possible because both countries already had competent and functioning state institutions well before their destruction. Both countries had also the core nation, missing in many deeply divided societies. In addition to the US’s unchallenged authority, absent in the fragmented societies of Afghanistan or Iraq, the necessary human skill was already in place when the allied forces began the reconstruction. In the past nation building was used to mean the conscious creation of homogenous society out of many diverse societies often through coercion and assimilation.7 The governing core group (‘the nation’) designs and pursues polices over the non-core group(s) constructing and promoting a particular narrative over any other. That becomes the sole and single public identity to which the non-core groups are required to assimilate or integrate. The goal, although it remained contested, was to ensure integration and individual’s loyalty to the nation. This is how the concept of nation building was used between the nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth century until it was challenged by the human rights revolution and minority rights discourse in the 1960s.8 The tools and instruments used vary but included assimilation (A plus B equals A or B, one group disappearing), fusion (A plus B equals C- an attempt to forge a new identity as in Swahili in some East African countries), partition (as in India and Pakistan), segregation (South Africa and USA in the past), pan Africanism, pan Arabism, patriotism and in the worst cases ethnic cleansing and genocide.9 Homogenizing the culture and language of the subjects to the core nation by promoting the language, culture, religion of the chosen nation and standardization of education constituted core part of the nation building project. In an award winning publication Crawford Young (1976) and recently Will Kymlicka (2007) have attacked this model and since then new approaches to nation building have been introduced.10 Wimmer wrote political equality between ethnic groups is a key defining element of nation building. Oppressing or even physically harming minorities’ shows that a nation-building project has failed.11 As rightly argued by Connor assimilation and marginalization of ethno national minority is not nation building but nation destroying.12 As part of his relational and exchange theory, Wimmer defines nation building as ‘extending networks of political and other forms of alliances, whatever their nature, across a territory between the state and society and forge political ties between citizen and state that reach across ethnic divides and integrate ethnic majorities and minorities in an inclusive power arrangement to imagine and then realize that they are nested together as a political community and feel loyal to co-nationals, above and beyond their attachment to an ethnic group, a tribe, a village community, or a religion.’13 He further wrote nation building entails national identification: citizens begin to see themselves as members of a ‘national’ community. Following the French Revolution, the nation determines and identifies itself with the state, the state is the creation of the nation and identification with it is assumed, not contested.14 The nation then has an identity and this very identity is what becomes contested as will be elaborated later. Ethno-national and regional forces challenge that very identity as belonging to the core nation only and not to all. As a result of colonialism, open immigration policy, globalization or other socio-political factors the core nation may continue to face new diversity but that does not make the nation state obsolete, it makes polity building more problematic.15 Two brief remarks here. Firstly, those who have written on nation building do rightly identify inclusion as key to the process of nation building but the ‘how’ issue is simply left as a side matter or is advocated to the limited transitional process of political settlement phase only. As will be shown in other chapters, the ‘how’ remains central to nation building and it is here where non-centralized forms of governance come into the picture.16 Institutional design issues come here in many forms. Inclusion is also problematized from the perspective of the citizen and civil society (in the old liberal sense) and misses group based politically mobilized cleavages, a major focus of Chapter 4. As indicated in the last section of this chapter, this is the most potent force challenging the nation state. Secondly, while Wimmer’s conception of nation building is an advanced one, it suffers from some limitations. Identification with the state is contested in divided societies as they could identify more with something else than the state. Nation building in the sense he adopted is a deliberate state act and policy invested on the people living in a country to build the sense of shared and nested belongingness as a political community to the polity, beyond and above their bond to other forms of attachments such as language, ethnicity, region, religion or other forms of diversity, through inclusive power sharing arrangement. With right and inclusive political ideology, and functioning state institutions, it ensures that centrifugal forces remain loyal to the overarching state despite their sub state national identity. One of the major limitations of Wimmer’s concept of nation building is the fact that he refers to ‘identification with national identity’ when that concept in itself is part of the controversy. There may or may not be a ‘national identity’ in countries that are deeply divided. Possibly there are more than one national identities competing each other in the political space. He does not make a distinction between different categories of societies. While analyzing nationality in divided societies David Miller makes three useful classifications.17 Rajeev Bhargava also adopts similar notion to discuss India’s complex diversity.18 A typical nation state, that is a political community bounded by single culture (be it ethnic or religious) with its defined territory and having its own state and government. Some of the west European nation states are classic examples. Recent developments in India under Modi show there is shift from India as multiethnic democracy to one based on militant Hindu nationalism which some regret as ‘ethnic democracy’ that turns Muslims and other minority groups to secondary class.19 Five decades of non-centralized and inclusive Indian multiethnic democracy is now being reshaped based on Hindu nationalism which is a tragic regression. Within the comparative federal studies, some federations are as well nation state federations under the control of one core nation as in USA, Germany, Austria and have no aim of granting autonomy to a territorially based identity. The second one is coalescent nationalism or also called multiethnic countries where the constitution recognizes each separate culture and identity in the country and at times each federal sub unit is composed of distinct society yet each distinct society sees itself as part of a larger and overarching common identity. There may be one or more manifestations of local identity but such groups also happily identify themselves with the overarching state. Some countries are diverse but the diversity does not have any political meaning. As such it is not politically mobilized and no particular region, sub unit or political party pushes for territorial autonomy, self-government or secession.20 There is no prior history of discrimination and thus ordinary citizens live as happy ones despite differences in language or religion identifying themselves with the overarching state and its institutions. Creating a common sense of belongingness that prevails over sub state identity becomes not a difficult task.21 At times this may include countries with politically conscious diversity but is not as such politically mobilized for self-determination. In the literature this is sometimes called as multiethnic society and Switzerland with the Cantons cutting across linguistic and religious divides is mentioned as a classic example.22 As such the different identities are nested to one another.23 The third category refers to countries that are not only diverse but the diversity is also politically mobilized. In the literature these are also referred as deeply divided societies, multi-nation societies, pluri national or countries with assertive and rival nationalism.24 Within this last category, Liam Anderson makes a further useful distinction between ethnic federations and ethno-territorial federations. Ethnic federations are federations that explicitly provide each of the major ethno national groups with their homeland ensuring self-government and ethnicity is the defining feature of the system. It is also likely that as they often are inhabited by several rival groups, there is no one dominant core nation but several ethno national groups none of them constituting a majority. This raises chronic issues to both democracy and federalism. How does one establish a legitimate and inclusive central government in this context and how do we accommodate the different groups both in the center and subunit level becomes very complicated because of the absence of the core nation. Ethno-territorial federations, on the other hand, combine both the ethno-national and the territorial features. ‘Ethno-territorial federations are those in which one or more territorially concentrated ethnic groups are accommodated via the provision of a subunit homeland, but the numerically dominant ethnic group (the core nation) is carved up (cracked) among multiple subunits. Examples include Canada (the English speaking part is divided to nine provinces), Spain (Castilian Spanish exist in fourteen autonomous communities, and India (Hindi speaking population are divided into nine provinces). Ethno-territorial federations fuse the logic of territorial and ethnic federalism to produce systems that are structurally and functionally distinguishable from both. In other words, they constitute a separate category of federal system.’25 Within these last sub classification one can also make a distinction between bi-communal federations such as Canada that are ethno-territorial in which the English speaking part is divided to several provinces while the French speaking part is found in one province and yet there is competition and rivalry between the two communities. There is a core nation (the English speaking part that is divided into several provinces) and an ethno national minority. Ronald Watts argues bi-communal federations pose a peculiar challenge compared to those ethno-territorial federations that are home to many diverse groups. In the latter, possibility for shifting alliances among groups on issues makes political deadlock less likely while in the former it is common challenge.26 The above distinction is vital because the nature of the issues vary. In the ethno-territorial federations because of the existence of the core nation, it is only one of the members that is raising concerns. If we assume a family with many children, it is only one child in the family that feels mistreated and may think of staying in or has to leave. In the ethno national federation that has no core nation, it is the entire family: parents and all the children that are not feeling well and that need treatment. While the link between such rival nationalism and institutional design is discussed in Chapter 4 in detail, suffice to mention here the fact that the kind of constitutional politics in the third category is different from the former two groups. In the last category a particular group or groups identify themselves with a particular nation that is different from the one projected by the state. Different identities are politically mobilized and often are found territorially based making claims for political autonomy, self-determination and possibly secession. Unlike normal constitutional politics that emerges in homogenous states, here the claim by the ethno national group is for self-government possibly with a sovereign state of its own. It is not simply a change of government within an existing state but change to the territorial and political system and assertion of state of one’s own.27 The constitution and the values that it claims to promote are contested because it is perceived as promoting the identity of a single nation: constitutional identity is part of the debate. Self-determination is thus central and enduring element and as a result the existence of the state itself is questioned and if it should exist, the terms are debated. Political mistrust and rivalry between the different segments is integral to the political process: political power, the nature of democracy, institutional design, nature of political party, identity and public policy are often the areas of contestation. The ‘segmental identities’ seek to enhance their political and territorial autonomy, mobilize resources and institutions at their disposal against the center while the central government’s focus is on the overarching identity, unity and territorial integrity that may lead to deadly conflict. In short, as a result of the rival nationalism one projected by the state and the other by segmental identities, the very existence of the state, its territory and symbols are often contested.28 While in the two categories discussed above the nation and national integration concepts may make sense, in the third category, it is problematic. There is no one nation (demos) but many rival nations (demoi). The nature and type of political party configuration also differs. It is likely that there will be political parties whose sole purpose is articulating and defending the interests of the political community they claim to represent. A study shows that the birth of a new nation state from an existing multinational state is very high in particular if the ethno national minority had already existing sub unit institutions called ‘segmental institutions.’ Roeder wrote, ‘From 1901 to 2000, 177 new states were created and 153 of them (86%) had been segmental states prior to independence.’29 The logic is political institutions have significant effect in shaping and framing identities as they provide platform for national mobilization and political ambitions for collective action and secession is as such an upgrade of the existing segmental institutions to a new nation state. If rival nationalism exists, there is possibility for will and ambition to have own state or at least self-government. The fact that segmental institutions exist provides capacity and resources to sub state elites to achieve what they plan to achieve. The opposite is also true. Society also shapes institutions and indeed it is the major claim of this chapter and Chapter 4 that cleavages have impact on the design of institutions. The making and unmaking of constituent unit boundaries and the principles and processes for doing so remains contested because it either aims to frustrate the ambition of segmental identity as it breaks a potential nation state into pieces (Nigeria, Kenya, South Africa) often rejected by the ethno national elites as part of divide and conquer or promises to empower the segmental identity (Ethiopia: the promise never implemented). As will be illustrated in Chapter 4, this reality shapes constitutional politics and has impact on constitutional design and can be managed before causing conflict and fragmentation. Coming back to nation building, the question in the third category is how does one build a sense of shared and nested belongingness to the polity and instill it on the people so that they develop shared vision that prevails over other forms of loyalties: ethnic, region, religious or otherwise? There surely are competing nationalism: one led by the state called nation building and the other by the sub state group sometimes called ethno nationalism, minority right etc. leading to clash of two nationalisms unless carefully managed. Is it even possible to build a shared and nested political community above and beyond ethnic or religious identity in those cases? And can the project be rightly called ‘nation building’? As will be outlined later in this chapter, there is no one nation but two or more nations in a state and each nation is perhaps in search of its own statehood as is the case in many countries (French speaking Canada, Flemish part of Belgium, Scotland and Northern Ireland of UK, Catalan of Spain and the countless national liberation fronts of Ethiopia). There are nations without a state. Thus when one refers to national identity, the question comes: which national identity? The one espoused by the state or by the ethno nationalist/segmental state? Because the project of nation building refers to both efforts: one led by the state and the other by the ethno nationalist often in reaction to repressive state policy and action. For purposes of avoiding such confusion, we have to find a more neutral concept that we can employ to the state led effort in constructing the shared and nested belongingness to the overarching state. Polity building is a preferred concept in this respect. It is relational and part of exchange theory between the state and society and as will be demonstrated shortly, it has several elements: among others political integration, state and institution building and public policy. Andreas Wimmer asks ‘why did some countries fall apart, often along ethnic fault lines, while others held together over decades and centuries, despite hosting a diverse population?’ in his fascinating book on nation building published in 2018.30 One should add why do some countries deliver public goods better than others? These are two major and separate but very much interlinked issues: one deals with what Wimmer calls nation building (referred here as polity building) and the other on state building.31 State building refers to the building of institutions to enhance the ability of the state to deliver basic public goods such as security (army, police), services (bureaucracy) roads, education and health. It is about building tangible and visible institutions of the state that continue to serve society regardless of changes in political parties as a result of elections.32 State building is not the major focus of this chapter but is implied in several sections (delivery of public goods) and chapters, for example with respect to second chambers, minority rights and on constitutional adjudication. Yet we should note that state building is an integral part of polity building. There are many experts that analyze polity building from different aspects. Some focus on the onset and the process while others on outcome.33 Wimmer argues that polity building has several major components and he analyses the components within the framework of exchange relationship between state and society while focusing on political inclusion.34 1.2 Instruments of Polity Building 1.2.1 Political Integration and Representation For purposes of this chapter, we classify the components of polity building into hardware and software of polity building. The terminology is carefully crafted to show the importance of both categories of instruments for polity building while conveying the message that the hardware is considered as foundational and the software as catalyst. In most cases they are not clearly stipulated as distinct concepts. Experts continue to ask why some people positively identify themselves with the state, its institutions and symbols while others do not or even identify more with their ethno national, regional or religious identity than with the overarching state. This is not an abstract and complex question although that is how many prefer to stipulate it. A fundamental element of the social contract between the state and society that impacts the process of polity building is whether the political and economic system of the polity is inclusive or not. Studies on minority rights, ethnic conflicts and nation building have shown that inclusive political systems and representation of all sections of society in public institutions builds the sense of ‘we belong to the system’ mentality and the corollary of positive identification of citizens with the overarching state above and beyond allegiances to ethno national, regional or religious identity.35 Wimmer as well reinforces this finding and argues identification with the overarching state and its institutions and success in polity building is related to political representation and inclusion. He wrote, it is a matter of ‘power and politics, rather than the demographic makeup of the population.’36 This is fundamental because earlier studies have focused on the nature of society in the polity and whether it is heterogeneous or homogenous.37 Depending on the nature of the cleavage and its level of mobilization states need to design appropriate institutions and polices to accommodate and manage their diversity. The idea of political inclusion and representation is primarily about creating a just political and economic order in a polity but it is also part of human psychology. Take print out of a group photo circulating among the group. There could be a few Marxist’s who may argue, I see the photo as an entity (to mean people first), yet every member of the group instinctively looks at his/her own photo first and then sees it as an entity. It is part of human nature to see our own images in public institutions, the same way we prefer to see our own picture in the group photo. Public institutions in diverse societies need to reflect the diversity on the ground following the logic of the group photo. It impacts the legitimacy of the institutions and more importantly their performance. It is unrealistic to expect a public institution that suffers from legitimacy crisis to deliver an effective service. So the inclusion and representation logic has direct relations with creating just political and economic order. It has also symbolic importance in addition to the core aim of creating a just political and economic order.38 It is for this reason that political integration of society through inclusion and representation particularly in diverse societies is considered as foundation for polity building: it is the hardware of polity building. Yet it is vital to note at this stage, the inclusion and representation issue should be genuinely addressed. As will be shown in later chapters, within the African context, central governments select puppets in the name of representation and inclusion and the puppets neither deliver nor genuinely represent they very society meant to be represented. Such systems are exposed to legitimacy crisis and in the end to violence. Ethiopia is a classic example but it is also a concern in many African countries.39 In addition to the nature of state power in the continent (discussed later), lack of inclusion and representation has been a major concern throughout post-colonial Africa leading to wars, conflicts and at times secession. Since the 1960s, nation building and the nation state have been put to test and alternative theories for polity building have been on the rise. Whether it is possible to ensure democracy, stability, peace and social cohesion in countries with deep societal divisions and the appropriate institutional arrangements is one of the central political issues of our time.40 This is particularly so in many diverse countries in Africa where nation-building is linked with coercive and arbitrary processes by which the same communities are subdivided into different countries by artificial colonial borders.41 In some African countries with deep cleavages, the state continues to suffer from structural problems where the central government is often accused of centralisation of power under an imperial center (big man, hegemonic party), weak institutions, corruption, abuse of rights and marginalization of the bulk of society. By the end of 1980s, there was already solid study showing the African state is weak and in crisis and needs overhauling, leading to the Third Wave42 and other reforms such as liberalization and decentralization.43 Thus, claims for accommodation, ethnic conflicts, violence, civil war, threats of secession and state fragmentation remain major challenges. Some post-colonial African countries attempted to address these challenges by resorting to some form of federation and autonomy but with the exception of Nigeria, all such efforts collapsed within a decade of their establishment.44 The failure of the federal experience resulted in centralized unitary governments, imperial presidents and one party rule.45 The respective federations failed because they were confronted by strong one-man leadership who thought federalism would lead to state fragmentation and was thus against their own vision of centralized nation building.46 The political leaders of such a diverse continent thought federalism in the context of artificially drawn borders might lead to polarization and may in the end put unity and territorial integrity at stake.47 Post-colonial African leaders thus resorted to integration as the new leaders thought ethnic divisions will be obstacles to unity and national integration. Integration remained dominant trend within the African continent practised in 80% of the countries.48 The big men leaders of post-colonial Africa espousing nation building for the newly independent states aimed to construct single national identity through centralized national institutions and policies. One party state, dissolving federal and quasi-federal arrangements (Ethiopia, Sudan Cameroon, Kenya, Uganda and several other federations in West and central Africa), the banning of multiparty until the end of the Cold War, imposing national services such as sending high school, university students and peasants to places outside of their ethnic origin were part of the integration project and common trend throughout the continent.49 Kenneth Kaunda, former President of Zambia is quoted to have said ‘multiparty system would bring chaos, bloodshed and death;’ Cameroon’s long serving President Paul Biya defended one party system as follows ‘a united Cameroon devoid of ethnic, linguistic and religious cleavages.’50 An expert observing this dominant trend wrote integration is the existing framework in Africa that has to be pursued because departing from it will not be easy or power holders may react with violence.51 Yet we know integration (presidential unitary system that imposes one national identity) induced many of the civil wars and conflicts that engulfed African states in the 1980s. The Sudan was the classic example but remained pervasive throughout the continent. Integration and state led nation building in the context of diverse reality was associated with repression and marginalization, major causes of ethnic conflict. It often leads to unstable political system because it promotes centralization often in the hands of the President that represents only a fraction of society combined with winner takes all electoral system making elections explosive; marginalization of non-core groups and the construction of single national identity often through coercion fuelling conflicts.52 Ethiopia, Sudan, Chad, Liberia, Somalia, Sera Leon, Congo have among other countries gone through this failed integration projects in the 1980s. In many cases, the state is visible in the capital but beyond that it does not have monopoly over use of violence- one of the pillars of a state. Control over territory is also contested as it is possible that rebels and factional groups may control part of the state. The state is not able to deliver key services (absent state). In some countries such as Ethiopia, some even questioned whether the assumption about the state as provider of security holds water within the African continent as it became a source of abuse and insecurity. The state in Africa is at times framed as ‘criminal state.’53 That was how the countless national liberation fronts’ in Ethiopia were born and brought the regime to its knees in 1991 and wondered whether they should stay in the union or leave leading to the (in) famous article 39 on the right to self-determination and secession: let us see if it works and we go if it fails. The nature of state power in Africa has thus to be problematized, it cannot be assumed. The concept of nation building and national integration came into attack by various groups particularly in countries that are deeply divided in the 1960s. Instead of nation building, the new perspective became how to manage diversity and ensure unity while accommodating diversity. The chapter on federalism and devolution in Africa: do institutions matter goes to greater detail to explore what form the idea of inclusion and representation takes in federal and devolved systems. It also discusses whether cleavages matter and how it impacts institutional design. For now it is enough to state that political inclusion and representation is fundamental element of polity building and takes different forms. The most common manifestations include devolution, autonomy (federacy), federalism (many varieties) and power sharing schemes. The compelling message is the political systems matter most in polity building. It is a fundamental element of polity building. If this core issues is not addressed, all other relational and exchange theories between the state and society will not bear much fruit. It is also likely that if the political elite in power misses the political integration hardware, it will likely miss the software component of the polity building. The political integration framework impacts all other subsidiary polices of polity building. In other words, if the political system is framed along centralization, it is likely that other supportive polices such as media, language, culture, education and history will also be framed accordingly impacting polity building negatively. If the political system is framed in an inclusive manner, the likelihood of having accommodative and supportive polices is also very high. The political framework defines public policies and remains decisive. It is for this reason that we argue there is strong link between polity building and inclusive political systems. It is the hardware of polity building. At its core is the ideal of creating a just political and economic order in a society. A society living under a just political and economic order owns the thick social contract whose bond can rarely break. Thus, if we unmask all the pretensions, polity building is about having inclusive and representative institutions that have a goal of creating a just political and economic order in a polity. In those systems citizens in return support their government and happily identify themselves with the overarching state, its flag, the institutions, army, anthem and other symbols of the state. As will be elaborated in detail, this is not about the framework alone but also about the lived reality. The experience of federalism and devolution in the African continent including Ethiopia is not a happy one both in the past and the present. So promise and design alone will not help, lived reality is what matters. Ethiopia promised autonomy to Eritrea following a UN Resolution (1952–1962) and yet the center’s grand agenda of centralized Amharic speaking nation building framed the federation as an obstacle to its absolute rule and dissolved it within a decade. What followed was not polity building but polity destroying: the secession of Eritrea. The Derg pursued a centralized political system by and large and this was followed by military solution to political issue. As a result, by 1991 Ethiopia was on the verge of collapse. The Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF 1991–2018) promised a federal system and yet was very centralized and its system of representation had serious flaws. Representatives from Amhara or Oromia were perceived as puppets and party handpicked cadres than genuine representatives of the people they claim to represent. Thus despite the promise, both its operation and its system of representation failed and led to wide spread protests in 2015. It got worst under Abiy who assumed power in 2018 following the protests and resignation of Haile Mariam Desalegn (Ethiopia’s prime minster 2012–2018). Self-rule was fully obliterated and replaced by appointees from Addis in the name of ‘command post’ and representation becomes a farce. Tigray was a living example and as they say, the rest is history. Polity building ended up becoming polity destroying. The lesson is clear: if politics goes wrong, polity building also goes wrong and once again, political integration of society through inclusive institutions and policies (devolution, federalism, power sharing and accommodative public polices) is the hardware of polity building. It is fundamental element of the social contract that defines the power relations between the state and society. It is the thick component of the social contract. All other elements of polity building we argue are supportive ones. The rest are the software of polity building. The software reinforces the hardware and both combined could make polity building a success. 1.2.2 Delivery of Public Goods: Functioning State Institutions The second component of polity building is the political economy aspect that refers to the resources that are traded between the state and society. These are the public goods provided by the government to society. The provision of impartial security to its citizens (competent army and police), roads, bridges, schools and hospitals as tangible goods are part of the hardware (state building) while the interconnected society and the bond created as a result of the tangible goods is part of the software of polity building. Irrespective of whether the state is federal or unitary, democratic or authoritarian, there is a tie established through the provision of public goods. In return for the critical services and public goods provided by the state, citizens can support government, offer military services and pay taxes. This one may refer as the thin social contract between the state and society. Thin because the state could offer better than service delivery through respect for human rights and democratic elections that can better enhance the quality of the social contract. For now let us remain within the thin social contract based on the provision of public goods. A state that is able to deliver such crucial services on equal basis and both in rural and urban areas has already created a bond with its citizens. It surely is not strong bond but fair enough there is a tie created. This is one form of relational network or exchange network articulated by Wimmer. The state needs strong institutions (army, security, police, bureaucracy) to deliver public goods and services to society on an equal basis. It is here that state and polity building overlap. State building through strong institutions enhances the sense of relationship between state and society. It builds the software, the invisible bond between state and society. As argued by Wimmer ‘nation building is easier in states capable of providing public goods.’54 In most western states, capable state institutions were created way before the start of polity building and democratization during the nineteenth and early twentieth century. In most developing countries, institution building, democratization and polity building is supposed to be done simultaneously and this complicates the matter. The capacity of the state to collect revenue and mobilize resources to ensure basic services and bring economic growth alongside the private sector sounds simple but remains Africa’s major challenge. Most states in Africa have little control over their territory, continue to face legitimacy crisis and do not deliver much outside of their capital. Capacity of the state to deliver (functioning state institutions) which is more about state building than polity building makes a wealth of difference among states. Provision of public goods and services ‘bridge divides, reduce the salience of ethnicity in politics, undermine support for separatism, make violent conflict and war less likely, and eventually lead citizens to identify with the overarching state and perceive it as a community of lived solidarity and shared political destiny despite diversity of one form or another.’55 Provision of public goods and services and the socio-economic infrastructure is a network that connects citizens among themselves and with the state. It is a bridge that connects communities otherwise divided by language, ethnicity, region or religion. They serve as bridges cutting across divides and walls. There is already a well-established data that shows strongly connected communities or countries rarely go to conflict.56 They have a lot to lose. State that delivers public goods on equal basis binds its people irrespective ethnic, religious or other differences. If one gets the services right, one has less to complain and more to identify with the overarching state, citizens know what it means to miss them. Efficient service delivery to citizens on equal basis leaves little incentive for ethno national mobilization. Functioning state institutions thus matter for polity building. If there is no ground to complain, why mobilize in the first place? Botswana has been mentioned as a shining example with in the African continent (African miracle) and this is compared with Somalia or South Sudan that lack functioning state institutions owing to years of civil war, destruction of institutions and neo-patrimonial political systems where clan or ethnic affiliation obstructs state institutions.57 Functioning state institutions rob the many causes of mobilization. 1.2.2.1 State Power in Africa This chapter does not aim to explain the nature of state power in Africa and how it impacts the delivery of services. A brief discussion is however relevant to hint how it impacts governance, federalism, devolution (Chapter 4) and constitutionalism (Chapter 6). One of the most difficult issues in Africa is ensuring that power is exercised for public purposes and safeguarding constitutional governance that requires the institutionalization of power. That is ensuring that public institutions established by the constitution exercise their mandate as defined in the constitution while respecting the limits of power expressed in the form of enforceable human rights, federalism, checks and balances and the rule of law. One of the daunting tasks is to shift the exercise of power from personal rule/party hegemony to institutions by enforcing the supreme law. Without shifting and institutionalizing power, separation of power, rule of law, checks and balances make little sense because the locus of power is elsewhere. If it is the army (as is the case in Egypt, Zimbabwe, Sudan and Nigeria in the past) or the party chair (Ethiopia and South Africa) behind the scene that is king maker, what purpose will serve introducing separation of powers or federalism? Power has to be first institutionalized before it can be separated or divided. While the link between constitutional adjudication and governance and in particular the use and exercise of power is a major issue generally, it brings distinct challenges in the African context. Max Weber has explained the nature of patrimonial regimes long before Europe shifted to modern state that respects rule of law and exercises checks and balances among the different branches of governments to ensure that power is used for public purposes.58 The modern state is impersonal state in which the relationship between the ruler and the citizen is not based on personal ties but on merit and technical knowledge.59 The state emerges as distinct entity with its autonomy and claims to serve every one impartially and does not promote factional interests.60 This is the general framework although big companies and the economic class have over the years somehow compromised this basic foundation. In the patrimonial regimes however, the polity remains the personal property of the ruler that could be an emperor, a big man or one party. According to Fukuyama, in this system ‘the state administration is essentially an extension of the ruler’s household.’61 As such there is little distinction between private and public sphere. It lacks autonomy and is in the service of political elite and factional interests. In today’s global world, most African states would not call themselves as patrimonial as there is formal pretension to adopt constitution with some element of separation of powers, democracy and claim for the rule of law. Yet behind such crude formality the use of public power for private gains and its exercise based on personal, party or ethnic ties is pervasive. Formal rules and institutions cannot stand in the way of the big man or the big party and that is one of the reasons why institution building, federalism and rule of law become difficult because the powerful actors do not adhere to the formal rules.62 This state of affairs has been brutally called by Bayrat as ‘politics of the Belly.’63 The merger between crude formality and patrimonial practice is referred by some as neo-patrimonial regime or the extractive state.64 The political elite in power continues to control (capture) state institutions and through that the massive resources that it commands, creates patronage at different levels. In what Alex De Waal calls ‘political budget’ the rulers spend a big part of the country’s resources to pay for political loyalist with little left for public goods without accountability as if it is private resource.65 Informal and personalized power, the conception of power and the country’s asset as if it is the ruler’s private affair, the resources at its disposal creates favorable condition for the incumbent to win elections.66 Beneath the formal institutions, the ruling party (imperial president or big man) distributes the spoils of office to its supporters and punishes dissenters.67 Despite constitutional principles, it also determines who may be engaged in politics and the space available for such engagement, most often used tool being to divide and rule the opposition and weaken it. The informal networks weaken (or even override) formal institutions undermining their ability to deliver impersonal public services.68 African leaders exhibit the above features but some are outrageous than others. Nigeria’s oil wealth and the corruption associated with it are well known. Transparency international ranks Nigeria 154 out of 180 in the 2021 corruption index, in the high list.69 Prime Minister Abiy boldly and arrogantly explained (Chaka Project) his new palace project estimated to cost nearly equal to the country’s annual budget to members of parliament in 2022 briefing them they can visit the project site but have no mandate to ask where the money comes from and how the project is being executed.70 At a time where no less than twenty million people are in need of aid71 and more than 5.1 million are internally displaced (one of the highest in the world)72 due to drought, brutal civil war and conflicts, he is fascinated by palace project, parks and tells parliament, he is not going to account to them and the members listen and laugh! To ensure that political power is used for public purposes, there is a need to shift the locus of power from personal or party level to impersonal institutions and regulate it through the rule of law and the system of checks and balances. Meritocratic bureaucracies in the civil service, system of checks and balances (both horizontal and vertical) and independent bodies such as Supreme Court or constitutional court with a mandate to enforce the constitution (both to the ruler and ruled) are time tested institutional safe guards against neo-patrimonial regimes. Without these reforms, it is hardly possible to speak and write about federalism (and autonomy of sub-units) and constitutionalism as they remain victims of hegemonic center. 1.2.3 Public Policy The third component of polity building relates to public policy. Here we include language, culture, media, anthem, flag, symbols and monuments, museums, legal and education systems and not least, history. Each of them merits a book on their own but the intention here is to show the link with polity building. Whoever thinks public policy is a neutral crafting of policy has to rethink his/her perspective seriously. These policies are results of the political framework we identified already. Public policy is an instrument of a political project and its link with polity building is direct. Gellner wrote, at the height of the centralized nation state, centralized education system was the most important tool for nation building.73 Public policy also demonstrates whose story is being institutionalized and narrated and which ones are thrown to dustbin of history.74 Those reflected in the policy remain in the institutional memory for generations, they are nurtured and promoted using state resources while those not included are erased from history. That explains very well why issues related to identity and public policy such as language, symbols, culture, religion and history remain emotionally provocative. They are strongly linked to identity and symbols. What do we want to achieve by using these policies? Are these policies instruments of centralized political project or an accommodative policy that complements the political integration project? Public policy has both practical and symbolic importance. For example, the symbols that we put in currency and coins are sometimes carefully crafted to manifest diversity. If crafted carefully to be inclusive, citizens often identify themselves with the state particularly if the political integration project is crafted right. It is also possible to have such symbols representing only a section of society. In Sudan, the tension between north and south Sudan before its secession was partly related to the symbols inserted in the flag, streets (named in Khartoum after major traders of slaves from the South), coins and the currency with the South Sudanese elite rejecting the symbols set by the north. The northern elite identified itself as part of the Arab and Islamic world while the Southerners’ think they are Africans. The policies that emanate from these two divergent political frameworks cannot stand side by side thus combined with other factors resulted in the secession of South Sudan in 2011.75 Same is true with history. Is the history written in a more balanced and inclusive way or is it written to reflect the history of the state and its institutions alone, chronicling as it is often called in a selective way? A brief reflection is in order here. While conducting my PhD thesis in Utrecht in the Netherlands (2001–2005) writing the first chapter (the political and historical context that led to the federal system in Ethiopia) was the most difficult part. Here is the reason. I read several books on Ethiopia (history and politics). Teshale Tibebu,76 Gebru Tarekegn,77 Bahru Zewde,78 Mohamed Hassen,79 Richard Pankhurst80 and Harold Marcus.81 The books are predominantly on modern Ethiopia covering more or less the same period. One can include to this list John Markakis82 (anatomy on political history of Ethiopia, classic work published in 1974) and the careful analysis of history by Triulzi.83 After reading these books, one cannot help but conclude as if the books refer to the history of different countries, not the same country Ethiopia. One narrates the history of the state and its institutions following the trend of chronicling the ruler’s history: very centrist approach. It leaves out the history of the periphery and the peasant struggle. The other narrates about the suffering of Ethiopian peasants in the hands of brutal state. One narrates the life of the marginalized groups (‘people without history’) and one about history of Oromo trying to find their place within Ethiopia or beyond. Triulzi carefully explains the paradox and makes some sense linking the idea of history and how it relates to polity building and the political background of the authors. How do we reconcile the fundamental paradoxes? Ethiopia claims to be the only independent state in Africa and that should imply the people who have inhabited the country have a long history not so much disturbed by colonial history. The role of the historian is to demonstrate the rich history of the people and how they have interacted (both in the negative and positive sense) with the state and its institutions linking the part and the whole through synthesis in an inclusive and impartial way. We know from practice teaching history has become very controversial because some perceive, it is not reflective of the whole, only tells part of it and thus is not inclusive. In some cases it could even be pejorative. It is as controversial as the country’s political system. A more balanced, inclusive rewriting of history has an impact on the polity and kind of society we want to have. Exclusive and pejorative history and the chronicling of the history of the state and its centrist institutions is counterproductive for polity building, could indeed be tool for ‘nation destroying.’ Those who think their history is not included, deliberately neglected84 or has been misrepresented, will write (or rewrite) their history. The last five decades has been deconstruction of history. We will then have many histories, not one and different imagined or real communities will follow. That is the foundation for further crack in the system. Culture, media and language policies suffer from the same limitation. Indeed the controversy over history applies to these sectors as well. What is the language policy? Does it promote pluralism or force others to assimilate? Some talk even today on the need for ‘national language.’ This is not only counterproductive but it has been tried and failed. Haile Selassie and the Derg imposed Amharic as a national language and besides to the political crisis added fuel to fire ending in the failure of the project in 1991. Ethiopia as the chapters will show is multinational and one cannot impose one selected language to be ‘national’ and then nurture and promote it at the expense of other languages and identities. It is also good to realize the fact that even if all Ethiopians were to speak one language, our problems will not go away. Somalia is a text book example. It was considered in the 1960s, the only blessed African nation state with people speaking the same language and professing the same religion and having their own government. Speaking the same language and professing same religion did not however save Somalia from collapse in 1991. Whose culture is presented in public, in the media and formal events? Whose culture and language is nurtured and promoted and which ones are sidelined and why? Do we sense what the implications are? Is the cultural policy accommodative or is it still reflection of old Abyssinia?’ how does one create symbiosis between the individual cultures and the interaction among them and find a shared one? Symbols, museum and monuments could be part of the problem or the solution as well. Who are our heroes and heroines? Do we have shared ones or are we also divided on this? It seems some one’s hero is the other’s traitor? Emperor Menlik is portrayed as Ethiopia’s symbol of unity on one side and a ‘colonizer and traitor’ by the other. What is the role of the media in this regard? Is it promoting shared values or is it a tool for centralized policy and propaganda? Is it promoting tolerance and mutual existence or hatred and animosity? What is the guiding policy and is it inclusive or exclusive? Are we nesting or fragmenting society? The flag is even more controversial and since the new government came to power in 2018, we do not even know which one is Ethiopia’s flag? It is supposed to represent the people and the country but as we know it, it remains the most divisive one. We are divided at the point where we were supposed to be united. So our athletes suffer because of our division when they are supposed to celebrate after winning a race. Some chose one type over the other: they cannot be immune from our divisions. At the moment, it is the author’s view that we are in disarray when it comes to public policies, same way we are at the political level. Public policies are truly part of the software of polity building. They are results of deliberate political choice crafted to achieve a certain goal. Carefully crafted and inclusive public policies including the flag have the potential to nest different identities cutting across the divisions while the opposite happens when such policies are reflections of a narrow section of society. Inclusive public policies build the sense of belonging to the system, same way as inclusive political system. Exclusive and narrowly based public policies build the sense of isolation and ethno nationalism and thus could facilitate state fragmentation. Certainly quality of leadership remains critical for polity building. The differences between American founding father George Washington and Napoleon Bonaparte of France is visible although both led major Revolutions in their respective countries. The former served his country for eight years and despite popular call for another term, he resisted and chose a democratic way setting limited term for office and constitutionalism. The latter chose to be French emperor and military despot.85 Selfless leaders like Nelson Mandela, former President of South Africa can unify deeply divided country by race and inequality cutting across the divides. Divisive, corrupt and incompetent leaders could on the contrary fuel animosity and fragmentation in society. Often referred as banal nationalism, with supportive political and public policy instruments (otherwise could also be divisive) sporting activities such as football and athletics play as well their role in unifying people, despite differences of one type or another.86 Yet sport alone can do little, it can serve only as supportive instrument to the hardware of polity building. Yascha Mounk, in otherwise comprehensive work87 mentions patriotism (love and loyalty for one’s country) as unifying factor but does not explain how citizens and minorities treated as second class citizens in their country would love their country and become patriots. In some cases those citizens and minorities are victims of centuries of marginalization and to expect these sections of society to fall into an abstract love to an otherwise brutal political system (criminal state) is more myth than reality. As mentioned already, ethno national minorities resent such hierarchy and assert self-government and even aim to secede, if the social contract is not renegotiated. Patriotism comes only when there is an inclusive political and economic order, it does not come in the abstract. Polity building is not a onetime exercise. It is also not a job of one generation only. So long as the society exists, polity building should also exist in tandem with it. It is an incremental process where the new generation is supposed to build on it and hand it over to the new one. It is a never ending process unless the polity ends by fragmentation which on its own brings another issue of polity building in the new state. 1.3 The Nation State Experts make a useful distinction between the nation state and nation building. ‘Creating an independent nation-state with a flag, its government, territory, an army, an anthem, newly minted money, and freshly printed passports did not guarantee that citizens identified with the nation or that they accepted the authority of the state.’88 Creating a nation state does not mean nation building is accomplished. They are two separate political processes. Once the nation state is created, the state deploys enormous resources at its disposal to build the polity, that is, a massive work on the people to build a sense of shared common hood that prevails over and above other forms of manifestations of identity. The nation state has ideology that aims to turn ‘peasants to French men.’89 The Italian revolutionary Garibaldi is quoted to have said, ‘we now have Italy, let us make the Italians.’90 He united southern and northern Italy in 1861, created a country called Italy but he knew this does not make the Italian nation. The idea of instilling in very Italian the sense of nationhood, shared identity, the software that unites all citizens of the country despite other differences (religion, region, or other manifestations of identity) is a much more complicated matter. The peasants do not automatically become French even if the French territory with its flag and government is created. The same applies to other states. Getting the right ideology, that is, the framework for political integration, state building and public policy to build shared common hood is a daunting task and a never ending exercise. In this sense polity building is not a new concept. It is an old one. There were many advocates of the nation state (like John Stuart Mills), but the pioneer author is undoubtedly the German philosopher, Herder. He invoked the authority of God in his revelation that ‘best political arrangements obtain when each nation forms a state of its own.’ He also described as ‘unnatural’ states in which there is more than one nation; ‘they become oppressive and doomed to decay.’ He further stated that ‘only one language is implanted in an individual, only to one does he belong entirely, no matter how many he learns subsequently.’ Consequently he drew the conclusion that ‘A group which is a nation will cease to be one, if it is not constituted into a state.’91 Nationalism is one of the contested concepts. In the most widely used notion, it is ‘in general a necessary condition of free institutions that the boundaries of government should coincide in the main with those of nationalities.’92 Ernst Gellner, also wrote nationalism is a ‘political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent.’93 The process of establishing the nation state has gone through several courses. The nation state become prominent at the end of the eighteenth century and remained as hegemonic framework until 1960s.94 The genesis of the ‘nation state’ is widely associated with the rise of the European system of states beginning Westphalia in 1648 (no state shall interfere in the affairs of the other) and the next two centuries, particularly the eighteenth century with the emergence of popular sovereignty and self-determination (the French and American Revolutions95) giving birth to the nation states. Earlier on empires, kingdoms, caliphates dominated the world scene for centuries. In these forms of entities, the relationship between the ruler and ruled remained largely a relation of master and servant where the ruler could bring different entities together or break them apart without concern to the wishes of the people.96 The treaty of Westphalia brought to an end thirty years of civil wars in Europe and gave birth to the global order of nation states along with sovereign statehood. Although presented as religious war between Protestants and Catholics, the war was fought between emerging nation states (France, Netherlands, Sweden) on one hand and German and Spanish army on the other pushing for great empires with the latter losing the war.97 Indeed as Tilley wrote, ‘war and war settlements have been the great shapers of the European state system.’98 In addition to Westphalia, the Congress of Vienna (1815) that followed the defeat of Napoleon and reorganization of parts of Europe, the Treaty of Versailles (1919) that led to the collapse of Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires99 after WWI, the settlements that followed the Second World War,100 the decolonization process after WWII, the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia resulted in the making and unmaking of states. World War I and II and the end of the Cold War in particular resulted in the defeat of several empires and the birth of new nation states. The overall process resulted in fourfold increase in number of states (from 50 to 194) most of it related to collapse of empires or fragmentation of bigger states,101 so much so that the saying goes ‘nations are made by ‘blood and iron.’102 Since its emergence in Europe, the nation state has remained as a dominant framework not only in Europe where it was conceived but also elsewhere in the world.103 The marriage between the nation and the state is reinforced by the ideology of nationalism with its ideal of a culturally homogeneous society, reinforcing the state with legitimacy and loyalty. Alongside the making and unmaking of territorial boundaries, by the end of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, new political and philosophical ideas emerged that shifted the locus of power from divine right to rule claimed by emperors and caliphates to the idea of consent of the governed: the principle that power/sovereignty comes from the people. Self-government and self-determination made the nation to have its own government. The people who declare themselves as a nation become source of sovereignty and affirmatively identify themselves with it.104 The nation state is about identity- collective self-identity and subjective one that members of the nation think they share as a group.105 As Connor stated, ‘The essence of the nation is not tangible. It is psychological, a matter of attitude, rather than of fact… nation is a self-differentiating group…with a popularly held awareness or belief that one’s group is distinct’106 from others. A further point that distinguishes it from an ethnic group is that the nation makes territorially based claims for self-government (often internal self-determination that if denied and depending on state response or lack thereof could evolve into secession) and thus has a political ambition.107 It is not a mere anthropological fact. An ethnic group may share same language and culture based on myth or reality but has no political ambition for self-government or a claim to a particular territory.108 The relationship between groups and the boundary for differentiation could be based on language as in Canada, Ethiopia or religion as in Northern Ireland (Catholic vs. Protestant) and the Sudan (South Sudan before 2011). As it is both self and others defined, interaction both vertical and horizontal (competition for power, resources and reaction to other groups and state policy) are critical part in the definition of the nation. The interaction and reaction process results in reconstruction of the nation. Having functioning state institutions is vital but is not enough for polity building. Belgium, the UK, Canada and Spain have those institutions but they have the Flanders, Scottish, Quebec and Catalan problems that continue to threaten the core nation. There, the nation projected by the state collides with the nation projected by Flanders, Scottish, Quebec and Catalan respectively. Many have thought nationalism will wither away, if political inclusion and access to economy are ensured but that never happened and the Scottish, Quebec, Catalan nationalism are living examples demonstrating that it goes beyond political and economic inclusion.109 In fact three of these sub-units are economically rich regions but that has not stopped them from asserting self-government and secession. Nationalism is dynamic and may take different forms across time. Yet, in most developing countries, political and economic injustice caused by the state remains at the heart of identity based mobilization (relative deprivation theory: systematic and identity based deprivation of groups from power and resources/economy110) but the search for dignity, demand for recognition, collective security and self-esteem are the core factors that flames and gives it the emotive force. While the relative deprivation theory focuses on the power and resource element, the human needs theory111 goes much further than that to include the need for collective security, right to exist as a group, prevention from threats of genocide and ethnic cleansing- the passions and emotions beyond the material interests of ethno national minorities.112 The gist as argued by Connor goes ‘Better a government run like hell by Filipinos than one run like heaven by Americans.’113 There is this pejorative that comes with the concept of a ‘minority’ framed by the majority (when there is one) that the former want to end. It implies such a group has no voice or has only less voice. The response from the non-core group or the ethno national minority is why become a mayor when one can be a president in a new nation state? Why remain as a minority of say 20% when one can be a 100% majority in one’s own new nation state. As indicated above, the nation state replaced the different kind of loose imperial and confederal political units that existed in Europe. It prescribes that the nation and its political boundaries should coincide so that states would be nation states.114 In its most extreme form, it required every state must contain within itself one and not more than one culturally homogenous nation, that every state should be a nation and that every nation should be a state.’115 This political framework (with a few exceptions) remained as dominant one across the globe until the 1960s. Yet the nation states ignores the fact that it was historically created to satisfy the particular historical needs of state formation in Europe where there existed shared history, culture, language and affiliation with the state constructed by nationalism. In many cases a majority nation existed that controlled the state or else the state constructed them by force.116 Two typical models of the nation state were France (with its assimilation policy) or the United States as integrationist state with its ‘melting pot’ ideology and rooted in individual rights. These were the two ‘nation state’ models that many aspired to replicate in their respective countries.117 There are wide spread claims about the American system being considered as ‘civic nation,’118 people sharing common political institutions irrespective of language, religion or other cultural markers.119 Yet Kymlicka120 and many others have disclosed that the ‘American nation’ has also ethnic origins: the white Anglo Saxon protestant (WASP) as a founding nation. This is clearly stipulated in the Federalist Papers No. 2 as follows ‘Providence has been pleased to give this one connected country to one united people–a people descended from the same ancestors, speaking the same language, professing the same religion, attached to the same principles of government, very similar in their manners and customs, and who, by their joint counsels, arms, and efforts, fighting side by side throughout a long and bloody war, have nobly established general liberty and independence.’121 The American system has slowly and painfully learned to open space for African Americans, women, the poor and the first nations (Aboriginals’) and yet only in the twentieth century. No surprise the same English speaking group enjoys majority at federal and constituent unit level and thus is rightly called as homogenous federation as it does not institutionally respond to minority rights. With the French, there is no such pretension. Thus, the nation started in France but was later adopted in Spain (1970s), Belgium (before it federalized in the 1990s), Portugal, Greece, Italy after unification and many more countries in Europe and the rest of the world.122 Westphalia focused on territory, interstate relations and sovereignty but gave little attention to the aspiration of the people. The link between the nation and state through self-determination had to wait until the French Revolution. Yet even then this was not realized in East Europe and the Soviet Union, it came after the end of the Cold War.123 In Africa, it made its way because of colonialism, modernization, and globalization in different periods but was framed as centralized integration scheme even if the core nation was absent or a particular minority controlled power and pushed the agenda of nation building. Markakis, Young and Schlee wrote the European model was ‘transposed to Africa, a vastly different world, without the slightest concession to its uniqueness and the results has been tragic.’124 Space will not allow diagnosing all source of governance crisis in Africa. Yet two factors stand tall as major causes of governance crisis. The nature of state power (treated in the previous section) and managing cleavages. The African continent continues to defend artificial colonial borders and thus conflicts continue between sub national and regional groups that demand adjustment to colonial borders and leaders that prefer to keep statuesque. While the Third Wave democratization and liberalization were hoped to improve the state of affairs in Africa, the reality is grim.125 An expert assessment shows ‘By the end of 1998 only nineteen countries had stable political conditions; at least eleven countries were encountering political crisis and turbulence, and eighteen countries were engaged in armed conflict or civil strife. This means that toward the end of the 1990s less than 40 percent of sub-Saharan African countries enjoyed relative political stability. Almost 25 percent faced serious political crisis, while a staggering 38 percent were wracked by violent conflicts.’126 A report issued by the Peace and Security Council of the African Union as recent as February 2023 confirms there is no progress since then. ‘As the analysis below reveals, the peace and security situation on the continent remains bleak with the deteriorating security and humanitarian situation showing no sign of abating.’ The Ethiopian case, being the most outrageous, resulting in the death of millions of people in so short period of time demonstrating its highest level of brutality.127 Sudan, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Mali and Niger (Tuareg), Morocco, Tanzania, Angola, Cameroon, Somalia, Senegal, Zambia and Namibia (Lozi) faced tragic conflicts and have insurgents of one type or another, albeit to varying degrees of mobilization.128 Next section explains the paradoxes that the nation state continues to face when confronted with rival ethno national groups. 1.4 The Pitfalls of the Nation State 1.4.1 Coercion and Polity Building The problem of the nation state begins from its process of formation, conception and its normative assumptions. In the first place, it was a coercive process that brought together communities into one political regime.129 This is not only true in the past as in the emergence of nation states in Europe but also in the newly born ones after the end of the Cold War, be it Eritrea, South Sudan or the Balkans. They are predominantly results of wars. The process of trying to achieve nation building through assimilation of non-core groups to the core nation was also coercive one. The normative prescription of the nation state was that state led project of assimilation or integration need to eradicate cultural differences of minorities for the nation state to prevail. The different public policy instruments were designed to achieve that goal. As McGarry, Keating and Moore argued, ‘The coercive policies to achieve linguistic and cultural homogeneity in France to create a single French nation attests to the fear and concern that cultural difference would translate into political difference and thus has to be eliminated.’130 Nation and state builders have always feared that ‘the failure to homogenize increased the likelihood that a state […] would fragment into its cultural subdivisions.’131 The defining element of the nation-state in addition to its coercive nature was thus its insistence for assimilation and homogeneity. Every state was to be congruent with its nation and every nation with its state. Where this was not the case (this was the most predominate one) public policy and political action had to force everyone to assimilate into the chosen nation. In some cases states had to go to war with minorities outside of their state boundaries in an effort to conquer the territories where their fellow nationals lived and either exterminate or expel those not of the same nationality. The greater Somalia project along with its five star blue flag was the classic case that aimed to bring all Somalis in the Horn under greater Somalia essentially leading to its collapse in 1991. We are aware of the nationalist wars designed to reunite parts of the nation with the national state in Europe and the rest of the world during the two World Wars. The state deployed enormous resources and an ideology to ‘nationalize’ non-core groups. Several theories were developed to serve this purpose. In the 1950s and 1960s all schools of thought such as Marxism, modernization, liberalism, globalization, irrespective of their differences predicted the demise of ethno cultural diversity and the triumph of the nation state. Marxists predicted with triumph of proletariat and universal socialism, nationalism will wither away. The proletariat is global and has no nationality was the slogan. Liberalism assumed with respect and protection of individual rights minorities will either assimilate or integrate into the dominant nation. Karl Deutsch representing the dominant American modernist view argued that modernization and increased social communication would erode differences (1953).132 Eric Hobsbawm as part of the left argued that the new transnational order (post nationalism) with its impact on nation states would put an end to all nationalisms, for example, through the European Union that gave birth to multiple identities.133 Ethno nationalism (tribalism being its pejorative name) is invariably cited as the source of political instability that has undermined modern government in Africa. As a result, almost all post-colonial African leaders employed several ideologies to ensure homogeneity in their respective countries.134 Yet, in the former USSR and Yugoslavia contrary to the predictions, it outlived socialism and may have contributed to their demise. Even in the west, we are witnessing the rise of populist and identity based movements gaining support more than main stream political parties from the right and the left.135 The European Union, giant confederal regional institution meant to check the ugly consequences of the two World Wars related to nationalism faced Brexit.136 Yet, with few exceptions, the nation state rarely resulted in homogenous nation states. In Africa this is even more problematic as there has not been a core nation in the process. Colonialism brought different communities and that were arbitrarily divided in different states. The reality today is most states are diverse and experts have since the 1960s shifted their analysis from nation building that forces non-core groups to assimilate to managing diversity that allows unity and yet has space for diversity. Thus who were coerced to assimilate into the dominant nation would at later stage resent the process and force the nation state into a new social contract, most of it conducted in the 1960s and subsequent years in the name of minority rights, multiculturalism, indigenous people’s rights etc. Coercion worked only at the formative stage. Once the empire or the nation state is created, there is always the need to revisit the social contract to change the coercive process of nation building to a democratic one. Force cannot ensure the continuity of the state and its territory, consent of the governed could, if combined with other right political framework, institutions and policies. Unhappy groups often want to break the chain imposed on them and we are aware of the tension between those who want to keep the state as created by the coercive process and those who feel suffocated by it. Most European nation states have democratized the state and since the 1960s have opened up, albeit painfully, the nation state to allow sub units to enjoy political autonomy. Spain (Catalan), UK (Scotland and Northern Ireland), Belgium (for the Flemish), Canada (its French speaking part) are prime examples that amended their constitutions to accommodate left outs during the nation building process. One needs to note that it is a two-step process. Democratizing the nation state by revising the social contract and by detaching it from coercive process of nation building, then followed by autonomy to politically mobilized groups in the form of devolution, federation or political autonomy with or without power sharing at the center.137 Another feature of the nation state was its link with centralization. The first powerful nation-states were monarchies, advocates of the divine right of kings to protect central authority and power. The main ideologues of such absolute centralization included people like Hobbes, Jean Bodin and Spinoza.138 Divine Right to rule was later replaced by popular sovereignty and consent following the several revolutions in Europe but that did not change the centralized nature of the nation state. It took centuries of contentious struggle and even war to open up the nation state to allow ethno national groups exercise autonomy. The nation state has also strong link with individual citizenship. Modernization theory and liberalism remained its foundations. The concept of citizenship, based on the rights and duties of the individual, became central to membership in the political community constituted by the nation state. As it excluded other sub units139 outside of the dominant nation, its legitimacy was based on the consent of the individual.140 With the emergence of the notion of human rights and democracy, members of excluded or marginalized communities were given the right to citizenship. This did not imply the political incorporation of these communities, as such; instead citizenship became a means towards their assimilation in the wider political community. Melting pot was the metaphor for the process of assimilation. This process was then subject to criticism and there was a slow progress towards integration and soft multiculturalism that leaves diversity to the private sphere. In the civil or private domain, communities may organize their own social, religious, educational and economic life. They may converse with others in their own language, and may cultivate cultural and social links with members of their own ethnic or kin communities through vernacular newspapers, visits and other exchanges. In public, sub units were required to conform to uniformity set by the dominant nation and majoritarian democracy to the extent that both existed. This notion was later attacked based on minority rights resulting in revision of several western constitutions to allow political autonomy and representation to their cleavages. The new liberals such as Kymlicka wrote about multiculturalism and how it can extend to address group based demands.141 Liberal multiculturalism142 was advocated as norm and with it came the ‘salad bowl’ metaphor. In the salad bowl, the different ingredients of the salad are colorfully seen and states were supposed to promote pluralism (different identities) in society. Yet multiculturalism was criticized because it did not promote intergroup interaction in society. In some cases multiculturalism created parallel societies in a state with little or no interaction among them. A new thinking under the banner of inter-culturalism143 emerged to supplement multiculturalism focusing on intergroup interaction, dialogue and values that cut across divides. Some refer to inter-culturalism as ‘public park’144 model. Yet inter-culturalism or public park metaphor at times falls short of addressing the core reasons for ethno national mobilization: political and economic injustice in the hands of the titular nation. Such debates were often framed in relation to immigrants and had little contribution to rights of ethno national minorities.145 The nation state as a model has influenced several continents across the globe, had serious impact on Africa. African leaders borrowed modernization theory as a main theory of polity building that in effect meant transplanting the western nation state to Africa.146 That meant the post-colonial African states adopt democratic, capitalist, and individualist based political institutions. The theory assumed nation building as a challenge that arose wherever modernity brought previously smaller and self-contained social units into closer contact with each other. In Africa following the end of colonialism, it was the inspiring ideology for many ‘big men’ nation builders that faced the enormous challenge coming from loosely integrated diversity abandoned by colonialism in a context of artificially drawn borders that hardly reflected the living realities. Leaders thought the homogenization of the nation and its state came to be seen as an indispensable prerequisite for democracy, political stability and modernization. The motto was ‘kill the tribe to build the nation.’147 Some centrist nation builders like Syad Barre of Somalia even went to kill a person that he thought symbolized clanism and buried him in pubic signaling the end of clanism in Somalia only to get life after his removal from power in 1991.148 This reminds us of the prominent article by Walker Connor, who long time ago warned ‘Nation Building could be Nation Destroying?’149 He argued, and this was at the time when the nation building as a homogenizing concept was at its peak, that modernization, industrialization, respect for individual rights do not necessarily minimize ethnic loyalty and nation building may in the end be nation destroying in diverse societies. While demands of ethno national minorities and the attendant theory of nationalism may have destructive implications when pushed to its extreme as witnessed in the two World Wars, former Yugoslavia after the end of the Cold War and Rwanda (1994), the thinking that it will fade away seems far from reality. On the contrary, what we see is resurgence and hence the need for managing and accommodating it.150 1.4.2 The Nation State Promotes the Titular Nation’s Interest and Values We already noted the role of the core nation and how it has been used to assimilate or integrate non-core groups. This would imply that institutions and values set and promoted are reflective of the interests and values of the core nation. Kymlicka wrote ‘ethnic minorities have not fared well…under the nation state. Various policies of assimilation and exclusion have been directed at minorities in the name of constructing homogenous nation states.’151 Yet we know the reality that many states are diverse. There is tension between a de facto cultural, ethno national and religious diversity challenging the de jure model of cultural unity of the nation state. In the context of diverse societies the dilemma and limitations of the nation state are clear. Over the last three decades the nation state has been subject to various critiques. For example Will Kymlicka argued the state as a possession of a dominant national group (titular nation) that uses the nation state and public policy instruments such as media, history, education and language policy etc. as a mask for the ruling elite to keep power, resources and nurture its privileged identity and status. The nation state claims to treat all citizens as equal members of the nation, remains a disguise for the tyranny of the titular nation. The idea of benign neglect of minority cultures and the notion of separation of state and ethnicity is false as it’s values (language, culture, institutions and history etc.) are rooted in the titular nation.152 This state of fact was to serve as a trigger for the birth of ethno national/identity based political movements. That the nation state was a strange anomaly in divided societies was of course identified long time ago by John Stuart Mill. He wrote, ‘Free institutions are next to impossible in a country made up of different nationalities…Among people without fellow-feeling, especially if they speak different languages, the united public opinion, necessary to the working of representative government cannot exist.’153 One needs to only qualify Mill’s sharp observation by stating that the problem is more acute in countries with deep divisions. Ephraim also identifies the constitutive ‘deficiency of the nation state.’ When two or more national communities reside in the same territorial space…popular national sovereignty and territorial national self-determination become zero sum game. The gain of one is unavoidably the loss of the other. For this reason ethno national conflicts in mixed areas are bloody, extremely violent and protracted, for full victory and nation state for one means the expulsion or destruction of the other.’154 The liberal nation state in its initial phase knows only of two units: the sovereignty of the state and of the individual citizen and makes impossible mechanism of representation of different ethno national minorities which are left at the mercy of governmental institutions and bureaucracies under the command of the titular ethno national majority and hence the argument that nation state has democratic deficit. In short, the nation state is oppressive to outsiders of the dominant/titular national group and remains a disguise for the tyranny of the titular nation. It has democratic deficit to the extent that it does not address demands of ethno national minorities. While some are tempted to argue in favor of ensuring the right to equality and allowing minorities to exercise three D’s (dish, dance, dress) to address some of the issues, at the core of ethno national minority rights is political exclusion resulting in other forms of exclusions: economic injustice as well as identity and value marginalization. At the center of minority rights is ensuring political, economic justice and allowing space for recognition and accommodation of identity. The three D’s are thus an obliterated form of interpreting ethno national minority rights.155 As rightly depicted by Michael Keating, in divided societies there are ‘so many nations, but few states.’156 It is now clear that there exists ‘conspicuous discrepancy between the nation and the political borders of states in which there are close to two hundred states all of whom together contain 3,000 to 5,000 nations in which there exist at least six hundred potential nation states, a mismatch that at times leads to tension and conflicts between those who would like to exercise self-rule and those resisting it.’157 The Horn of Africa being a prime example in which the contradiction between state led and ethno national based mobilization takes acute form. The many sided conflicts in the Horn involved rival nation state building projects fought in a zero sum game, where one’s gain is another’s loss. The state, actual or imagined, was the prize in the manifold conflict, with the centrist elite’s seeking to preserve and expand existing states, sub state entities trying to secede and create their own states, irredentists yet fighting to secede from one state in order to join another, and others still to capture power within their own state. Markakis, Young and Schlee argue. The many sided conflict is fought under the banner of nationalism, involving several rival nation state building projects—Ethiopia, Eritrea, Sudan, South Sudan, Somalia, Somaliland, and Djibouti—working at cross purposes in a zero sum game. In the process thus far, the map of the region has been revised several times; two states were truncated and one collapsed, ending with a faithful restoration of the colonial map. At present, all the states face challenges to their sovereignty, identity, and territory. None has exercised effective control over its entire territory, secured its borders, possessed a monopoly over the use and instruments of force, enjoyed legitimacy and loyalty from a majority of the sub units that challenge the center, enforced law and maintained order throughout its domain, or protected the lives and liberty of its subjects.158 To date the struggle to revise the map in this region has gone through two major phases. The first phase, a typical of the African leaders in the 1960s, brought the consolidation of state units created by imperialism: Ethiopia, Sudan and Somalia annexing territories (Eritrea, South Sudan and Somaliland), and the second saw the reversal of the process of consolidation after the end of the Cold War. The first phase reduced the number of states in the Horn from seven to four after Eritrea, South Sudan and Somaliland were annexed. The second phase saw the fragmentation of Ethiopia, Sudan, and Somalia with the secession of the three annexed units: Eritrea, southern Sudan and Somaliland de facto, increasing the number of states to seven. In the second phase, it was caused by insurgents (ethno national and regional ones) challenging the state led nationalism. The effect being the full restoration of the colonial map after decades of violent conflict took the lives of millions, dislocated the region’s economy, and undermined its prospects for development. It also condemned its people to live under authoritarian rulers addicted to the use of force as the main instrument of government and polity building. The two phases demonstrate a head on clash between state led nationalism on one hand and ethno nation or regional based nationalism on the other, a clash of nationalism so to speak. Unsurprisingly, since the state led nationalism/nation building was chosen by the ruling elite, the projected nation’s identity was to be the same as with the ruling elite’s narrow identity. National integration, therefore, became a political imperative.159 This required the dissolution of quasi autonomous kingdoms and traditional systems of sociopolitical organization and of ethnic identities, as well as the effacement of ethnic languages and replacement by the identity, culture, tradition, and language of the nation state builders. This was followed by national integration, that is the chosen identity being diffused throughout the state via a process of acculturation, assimilation, and if need be, forced conversion.160 The result as indicated above is endless war and the making and un making of state boundaries certainly at a heavy cost. In the context of diverse countries with deep divisions, this calls for a more inclusive governance system that provides space for non-titular minorities to exercise political autonomy, share power at the center and enjoy cultural/language based autonomy, short of fragmentation. The growing interest in the protection of ethno national minorities outside of the titular nation that controlled the state is largely explained by the need to ensure peace and security, reducing conflict through inclusive government. It is about reducing global, regional and local conflicts that arise from political, economic and identity based injustices. After the collapse of Communism in many countries, third wave of democracy did not as promised bring liberal democracy to triumph but was instead followed by wave of inter group conflicts in the Balkans, the Caucasus and many parts of Africa including the genocide in Rwanda and recently in Ethiopia (2020–2022), state failure in Somalia and the opening of political space for terrorists and mass refugee flows and thus becoming threat to international and regional peace and security.161 Reduction of poverty and under development that comes with marginalization of ethno national minorities, shift from individual rights to ethno national minorities in the discourse on human rights particularly in divided societies and more importantly enhanced democratization that goes beyond majority rule through proportional electoral systems and power sharing schemes emerged on the menu of options.162 Threats coming from ethno national minorities are not restricted to specific geographic zone but remain in the words of Walker Connor ‘truly universal’ challenging both developed (for example Belgium, Canada, Spain and United Kingdom) and many developing countries albeit to varying degrees.163 The toughest critique of the nation state comes from territorially based and politically mobilized ethno national groups; the following section summarizes the main points. 1.4.3 Cleavages and the Nation State The other limitation of the nation state is the fact that it is antithesis to politically mobilized cleavages. Perhaps this is where one observes a head on clash between state led nationalism vs. sub national ethno nationalism or regionalism more visibly. Politically mobilized cleavages continue to threaten the nation state. Following the end of the Cold War, such cleavages caused what Arend Lijphart dubs a ‘wave of ethnic conflicts,’164 instead of the promised ‘third wave of democracy.’165 Mobilized ethno national minorities are ‘regionally concentrated ethnic groups who once enjoyed or aim to enjoy political autonomy and have become part of states in which they constitute an ethnic minority through conquest, annexation, colonization or incorporation during the coercive process of nation building.’166 They mobilize politically around assertions of national identity and self-determination. The goal of such mobilization is to recover the extensive self-government they claim to have enjoyed historically or they aspire to have now. The degree of self-government they seek ranges from autonomy, national self-government to independent statehood. Countries that have politically mobilized ethno national groups cannot assume to have stable territory. The demands of such groups are framed and entrenched in relation to a particular territory over which they aim to exercise self-government and the very existence of the unity and territorial integrity of the state is put to test.167 We noted already how the map in the Horn has been made and unmade in the last decades. Ethno national based mobilisation is a very potent force that, if not managed carefully could result in fragmentation. It has resulted in the formation of some twenty seven states that have joined the United Nations following the end of the Cold War.168 Contrary to several predictions of its demise, it has survived and at times threatened nation states. Experts have challenged the effort to eradicate sub state nationalism as ‘post national illusion’169 and counselled actors to properly understand this force and to design appropriate institutions and policies to manage it. Territorially based and politically mobilized cleavages continue to challenge the process of nation building both in the developed (Canada, Spain, Belgium, United Kingdom) and the developing world. The countries discussed in Chapter 4 (Nigeria, Ethiopia, South Africa and Kenya), despite differences in the degree of mobilization, all continue to face challenges related to group based cleavages. According to Horowitz, divided societies refer to cases in which identity-based politics have a high degree of salience exceeding that accorded to alternative forms of political mobilization such as ideology, class, and gender, and the relationship between groups is affected by deep levels of mistrust and antagonism, making it less cooperative.170 As argued by Sujit Choudhry ‘a divided society is not merely a society which is ethnically, linguistically, religiously or culturally diverse….it is hard to imagine a state today that is not diverse.’171 What makes a society divided is when the differences are politically salient and an identity based distinct group uses it as basis for political mobilization. As such identity becomes the prime source of political mobilization around which political claims for recognition, resource control, accommodation, and self-government are framed, political parties formed, elections contested and governments composed.172 These forces affect the process of constitution making and constitutional design. A distinct identity based political mobilization demands for a more autonomous self-government. The nation is famously defined as a community that shares common identity and claims a particular territory, believes in belonging together173 and wants to determine its political destiny through a concerted political action directed at self-government and possibly statehood. The nation’s main goal is self-government and statehood and that serves a basis for political action linking the elite and the masses. Less mobilized groups and countries that are not deeply divided could be managed through integration and other softer options.174 As a result of cleavage, deeply divided countries, continue to face a threat of fragmentation, albeit to varying degrees. Ethiopia lost Eritrea and the threat of secession is still a problem as it harbours many national liberation movements such as the Oromo, the Ogaden/Somali, and the Tigray among others. Some ten ethno national groups that used to administer themselves at local government level in the South have following the winds of change in 2018 demanded a constituent unit status and four new states have already been established increasing the number of states from nine to thirteen. The war between the federal government and Tigray although has multiple causes is very much related to Tigray’s age old demand for genuine self-government175 and fair representation in federal institutions. Ethno national groups are thus demanding more, not less even after two and half decades of federal practise. Nigeria’s split between north–south, Muslim-Christian remains visible in particular during presidential elections. The split is kept at delicate balance based on an unwritten convention that guides presidential elections to commonly rotate the office of the president between the north and south.176 Nigeria faced secession threat from Biafra towards the end of the 1960s and Igbo nationalism has not withered away. There is also an insurgent group in the Niger Delta (Ijaw) that claims for self-government and local control of resources. In reaction to extremely centralized federation and suppressed marginalization during the military era, a demand for ‘true federalism,’ that grants genuine political autonomy and resource control is now fully expressed by ethno regional groups (Yoruba, Igbo, Niger Delta region) in Nigeria.177 South Africa has cleavages based on race, language and class. It faces Zulu nationalism that over the years, seem to be diluted both because of lack of internal cohesion and as a result of the African National Congress’s (ANC’s) penetration in its social base through a democratic process. Kenya has its North East Frontier Somali problem and the rift valley region where ethnic conflicts have erupted on several occasions, in addition to the Indian Ocean coastal region where there is strong demand for self-rule.178 Ethnic rivalry for controlling the overbearing presidency in a winner-take-all politics resulted in ethnic conflicts in 2007 and subsequent elections and continues to divide Kenyans along ethnic lines. A precaution is in order here. First, cleavages do not automatically translate into a political project. Political and economic injustice that is reinforced by deep cleavages, elites that frame the issues, and state response or the lack thereof play their own roles in the process of transformation. As argued by Anderson and Choudhry, cleavage or diversity could remain as an anthropological fact having little or no political implications. Identity based mobilization for a political aim is the essence that shows transformation of the nature of identity from an anthropological fact to a political mission. It needs agency- political entrepreneurs that read into the political dynamics of the country and frame the issues in a way that appeals to their audience. These political entrepreneurs are critical in ‘framing of narratives,’179 articulating perceived or real exclusion and subjugation. ‘Political entrepreneurs are critical to the success of political mobilization by framing the case (of ethno nationalism), developing strategies, and marshalling resources.’180 They articulate alternative narratives that seek to deconstruct any centrist narrative about the past, present and the future (fears and possible hopes) addressing the grievances and the entitlements of the population they claim to represent including territorial entitlements. Through that an ideology is framed and a plan set for concrete action. These way ethno national based cleavages confront the nation state and if peaceful political solution is not on the menu, conflict, war, and secession are the results. 1.4.3.1 Links with State Policy and Legitimacy of Institutions Ted Gurr argues that conflict between competing nationalisms typically escalates in stages and it is here that one finds direct link with state policy.181 Eritrea’s secessionist elite demand in the mid-1980s was limited to restoration of the federation (1952–1962) that was unilaterally abolished by Emperor Haile Selassie in 1962. With the military regime’s failure to respond and its insistence on violence as means to quash it, radical issues such as secession emerged. Thus, cleavages often start with non-violent modest demands and, when regimes fail to respond, evolve into violent protest and finally to rebellion. The ‘escalation occurs through a pattern of demands and responses: non-violent protest is met with a lack of political responsiveness, which in turn leads to violent protest, which is met with a violent reaction, and which then leads to rebellion and an armed conflict and civil war.’ We noted already the political framework and public policy are deployed by the state to create ‘homogenous nation state’ during the heydays of the nation state and that has sparked counter ethno nationalism. State policy and action or inaction is thus a major factor that can escalate or moderate ethno nationalism. We noted how in Sudan vs. South Sudan contrasting visions of the nation state (also in Ethiopia) led to legitimacy crisis and secession of South Sudan in 2011. The process of transformation from a diversity as an anthropological fact to a political project is therefore heavily associated with the imposed nation building project pursued by the central government against rival ethno national and regional groups. Left outs from the process design a defensive response to central state led project of nation building.182 In other words, ethno national based cleavage and political mobilization is often a reaction to centrist elite’s project and a search for finding a political and identity space.183 It is a sub state nationalism framed in reaction to the central government’s nationalism. There are thus competing nationalisms within the nation state that if not addressed could lead to violence, civil war and state fragmentation. Both are pursued in the name of nationalism and have the potential to fuel the passions and emotions from both sides of the political spectrum to cause political instability and state collapse. This one may call is a clash of nationalism, one pursued by the central government in the name of nation building, patriotism, civic nationalism, unity, ensuring territorial integrity and the other by the ethno nationalist elite aiming self-government, representation and possibly secession.
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