By Habtamu Nini Abino
Recent remarks by Massad Boulos during an interview with [Al Jazeera Mubasher](https://mubasher.aljazeera.net/?utm_source=chatgpt.com) offer one of the clearest windows yet into Washington’s evolving diplomatic strategy toward Africa and the Middle East. The conversation, aired on May 11, 2026, focused on three major regional files: Sudan’s devastating war, the future of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), and renewed efforts toward political stabilization in Libya.
Taken together, the remarks suggest that Washington is moving from reactive crisis management toward a broader diplomatic architecture in the Horn of Africa and North Africa. Whether such efforts can succeed remains uncertain, but they indicate an important recalibration of U.S. engagement.
Sudan: Humanitarian Catastrophe and Search for Political Transition
Boulos characterized Sudan as the world's largest humanitarian disaster. The conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) has generated immense human suffering, leaving millions displaced and dependent on humanitarian aid.
He pointed to the April 2026 Berlin Conference as a significant diplomatic achievement. According to Boulos, participants reached a broad international agreement on a 12-point “Declaration of Principles” intended to guide a future political settlement.
Yet he acknowledged a central contradiction undermining peace efforts: both warring sides continue receiving extraordinary levels of external military and political support. Such backing sustains the illusion that victory can still be achieved militarily despite nearly three years of conflict.
According to the U.S. assessment, a military solution no longer appears realistic. Washington, instead, favours what Boulos described as a “Sudanese-Sudanese” process that would eventually lead to an independent civilian authority. Notably, he signalled flexibility regarding transitional arrangements, indicating that existing actors could participate if accepted by the Sudanese people.
The immediate U.S. priority remains humanitarian. Washington is pushing for a three-month ceasefire designed to enable aid delivery to over thirty million civilians. The broader objective would then be a permanent ceasefire, followed by an inclusive national dialogue.
GERD: From Technical Engineering to Political Negotiation
On the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, Boulos suggested a major shift in American thinking.
The dispute surrounding the dam has transformed substantially since earlier U.S.-mediated talks in 2020. At that time, negotiations centred heavily on technical concerns related to filling schedules and water management mechanisms.
Today, the dam exists as a completed strategic reality.
As a result, Boulos argued that the issue has evolved from a primarily engineering and technical question into a political challenge requiring new diplomatic approaches.
He noted that Washington had hosted Ethiopian officials for discussions covering bilateral relations and the GERD issue. Yet he also indicated caution, stating that the United States intended to await outcomes of Ethiopia's anticipated electoral process before pursuing further practical measures toward a final legal arrangement.
This statement may indicate recognition that durable agreements require political legitimacy and stable domestic conditions within the region.
Libya: Signs of Cautious Optimism
Unlike his comments on Sudan, Boulos expressed unusually strong optimism concerning Libya.
He highlighted what he called unprecedented progress in rebuilding national institutions. For the first time in approximately fifteen years, Libya reportedly adopted a unified national budget, assisted by technical support from the U.S. Treasury.
He also emphasized security cooperation through the April 2026 Flintlock military exercises conducted in Sirte. The exercises reportedly brought together eastern and western Libyan forces within a joint operational framework.
Such cooperation is significant because divisions between eastern and western institutions have long prevented political consolidation.
Based on current trends and support for the UN roadmap, Boulos suggested that national elections might become possible by late 2026 or early 2027.
A Broader Strategic Picture
Viewed collectively, these remarks reveal more than separate policy discussions. They suggest that Washington increasingly sees conflicts in Sudan, Libya, and the Horn of Africa as interconnected components of a broader regional security architecture.
The challenge, however, remains substantial. External actors continue competing for influence across Sudan, the Red Sea, and the Horn. Regional rivalries involving Gulf states, Egypt, Turkey, and other powers complicate diplomatic calculations.
The critical question is whether diplomacy can move faster than geopolitical competition.
Washington appears to be signalling renewed engagement. But history in the region suggests that declarations of principles alone rarely end wars. Durable peace ultimately depends on whether local actors—and their external supporters—choose compromise over confrontation.
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