Assessing Canada's Strategic Responses to the Uncertainties Associated with the Trump Administration

Assessing Canada's Strategic Responses to the Uncertainties Associated with the Trump Administration

On Wednesday, Canada’s premiers were in Washington, D.C., to underline a "Team Canada" approach and convince U.S. President Donald Trump that tariffs on Canadian products are bad for both Countries.

 

The erratic approach of the Trump administration toward international trade and diplomatic relations has engendered a climate of uncertainty that poses challenges to Canada's economic interests. Consequently, Canada is compelled to explore a range of strategies to safeguard its economy. This analysis examines four potential scenarios: establishing an economic union with the United States, accession to the European Union, the proposition of becoming the 51st state of the United States, and the diversification of trading partnerships.

 Option 1: Formation of an Economic Union with the United States

 Establishing an economic union with the United States would necessitate the integration of Canada's economy with that of its southern neighbour, potentially resulting in a unified market characterised by the unrestricted movement of goods, services, and labour. Although this arrangement may enhance Canada's access to the US market, it would entail substantial concessions, including adopting US trade policies and regulations.

 Advantages: Enhanced market access; potential for economic growth.

 Disadvantages: Erosion of economic sovereignty; risk of cultural and regulatory assimilation. 

 Option 2: Accession to the European Union

 Joining the European Union would afford Canada access to a substantial and stable market, thereby increasing trade and investment prospects. However, this option would require Canada to comply with EU laws and regulations, which may present significant challenges and financial implications.

 Advantages: Access to a large, stable market; potential for heightened trade and investment opportunities.

 Disadvantages: There is a need to adopt EU regulations and a potential compromise of economic sovereignty.

 Option 3: Embracing Statehood as the 51st State of the United States

 The status of becoming the 51st state of the United States would imply Canada surrendering its sovereignty and conforming to the US Constitution. This scenario is highly improbable, as it would necessitate profound alterations to Canada's political and economic framework.

 Advantages: None.

 Disadvantages: Loss of sovereignty, cultural assimilation, potential reduction in economic autonomy.

Option 4: Diversification of Trading Partners

 Diversifying Canada’s trading partners necessitates reducing its reliance on the United States market by enhancing trade relations with other nations, particularly those in Asia, Latin America, and Europe. This strategy would entail substantial investments in trade promotion, infrastructure development, and diplomatic initiatives.

 Advantages: This approach would diminish reliance on the US market while potentially fostering enhanced trade and investment opportunities.  

 Disadvantages:The process may be time-intensive and costly, demanding considerable trade promotion and infrastructure resources.

 Conclusion

 Given the uncertainties associated with Trump's trade policies, Canada must explore multiple strategies to safeguard its economic interests. Although forming an economic union with the United States or joining the European Union might offer improved market access, these options also present considerable risks to Canada’s economic sovereignty. The prospect of Canada becoming the 51st state of the US is implausible and would necessitate profound modifications to its political and economic frameworks.

 In summary, diversifying Canada’s trading partners emerges as the most feasible strategy, as it would lessen dependence on the US market and create avenues for increased trade and investment. Nonetheless, this strategy demands significant investment in trade promotion, infrastructure, and diplomatic efforts. Ultimately, Canada must meticulously evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of each alternative and devise a comprehensive strategy to uphold its economic interests amidst prevailing uncertainties.

Dominic LeBlanc is the 41st and current finance minister, assuming the role on December 16, 2024, following the resignation of Chrystia Freeland.

Liberal Party of Canada | Parti libéral du Canada 

@highlight

Liberal Party of Canada | Parti libéral du Canada 

@highlight

What is Fascism

By: Habtamu Abino

February 08,2025

Ottawa, ON

Fascism is an extreme right-wing authoritarian political ideology distinguished by dictatorial governance, radical nationalism, and the systematic suppression of opposition. The following are the core components of a fascist state and its leadership:

Components of a Fascist State:

Authoritarian Leadership: This entails the concentration of power within a single, charismatic leader who demands absolute loyalty from their followers. 

Nationalism:A profound allegiance to the nation often characterised by xenophobic sentiments and the assertion of national superiority over others.

Militarism:An emphasis on military power and using violence to implement policies or extend influence.

Suppression of Opposition: The active repression of political dissent through censorship, propaganda, and control over mass media.

Propaganda: The pervasive dissemination of propaganda aimed at shaping public opinion and reinforcing the regime's ideological framework.

Cult of Personality:

The leader's elevation to a near-divine status through various means, including propaganda, public rallies, and iconography.

Scapegoating: The attribution of societal challenges to specific groups (whether ethnic, religious, or political), which frequently results in their persecution.

Anti-Democratic Sentiments: A dismissal of democratic institutions and principles perceived as inherently weak or ineffective.

Economic Control: While complete state ownership is not always present, the regime often enforces substantial regulation favouring corporations that align with its interests.

Anti-Intellectualism: A scepticism towards intellectuals and academic institutions, promoting traditionalist values while critiquing modernist ideologies.

Characteristics of a Fascist Leader:

Charismatic Authority:The leader is perceived as a messianic figure, often positioning themselves as transcendent to legal and political norms.

Manipulative Communication: A proficient orator employing emotionally charged rhetoric to resonate with public anxieties and sentiments.

Intolerance: An overtly hostile attitude towards dissenters, minorities, and foreign influences.

Populism: A stance that claims to embody the interests of the general populace while attributing societal problems to elites or outsiders.

Militant nationalism:is characterised by a pursuit of national revitalisation or a resurgence to a prior state of prominence, frequently pursued through militaristic approaches."

Donald Trump has demonstrated specific authoritarian and nationalist characteristics that bear resemblance to those of fascist leaders; however, the question of whether he can be classified definitively as a fascist remains contentious among historians and political analysts. To analyse this issue, we can examine key elements associated with fascism:

Similarities to Fascism

1. Strongman Leadership & Cult of Personality – Trump positions himself as capable of "fixing" America and frequently frames his adversaries as threats to the state. His campaign rallies, branding strategies, and demands for personal loyalty reflect aspects of fascist-style leadership.

2. Nationalism & Scapegoating– His "America First" narrative corresponds with nationalist ideologies, and he often attributes societal issues to immigrants, minority groups, and the media.

3. Propaganda & Media Attacks – Trump routinely assails the media, labelling it as "fake news" and "the enemy of the people," a strategy analogous to those employed by fascist regimes to undermine independent journalism.

4. Populism & Anti-Elite Sentiment – He presents himself as an outsider combating corrupt elites, an everyday populist appeal found in fascist movements, despite his substantial wealth and political influence.

5. Undermining Democracy– His efforts to challenge the legitimacy of the 2020 election, incite political violence (as evidenced by the events of January 6), and disregard democratic norms reflect authoritarian methodologies.

Differences from Full Fascism

1. No Complete State Control – In contrast to historical fascist regimes that completely dismantle democratic institutions, Trump did not entirely undermine these frameworks, with the U.S. system of checks and balances constraining his authority.

2. Lack of Militarization* – Although he admired military prowess, he did not establish paramilitary forces or seek overarching military dominance.

3. No Fully Centralized Economy – Trump maintained adherence to capitalist policies and did not advocate for state-controlled economic systems typical of historical fascist regimes.

Conclusion

While Trump displays authoritarian and nationalist traits that coincide with certain fascist tendencies, he does not entirely conform to the established historical definitions of fascist leaders such as Mussolini or Hitler. Some scholars have characterised his approach as "authoritarian populism" or "proto-fascism."

Korybko To Sputnik Brasil: USAID Is A Premier Weapon Of US Hybrid Warfare In The HemisphereAndrew Korybko Feb 6,2025

1. How has USAID been used by the government of the United States through the years to meddle in other countries, mainly Brazil and other countries from Latin America?

USAID is infamous for funding political programs under the cover of human rights and democracy to meddle in the recipient country’s domestic affairs. This popularly takes the form of funding movements, including media projects, to expose alleged corruption in Latin American states. The purpose is to artificially generate a groundswell of grassroots opposition to incumbent governments through street protests and/or surprise election showings to bring about political change.

Some locals collaborating with these foreign-funded political projects sometimes become advisors or even figures in the more pro-American governments that replace the targeted ones. Therefore, USAID doesn’t just work to remove Latin American governments, it also sometimes provides trained advisors and personnel for the next governments. This makes it a premier weapon of US Hybrid Warfare in the hemisphere.

2. Does the end of USAID mean the end of US interference in other countries’ domestic affairs? Will they change their method instead?

New Secretary of State Marco Rubio declared that he’s the acting administrator of USAID as it goes through radical reforms. Per Trump’s Executive Order suspending foreign aid for 90 days, with the exception of emergency humanitarian aid, an assessment is taking place to determine their efficiency and consistency with policy. Accordingly, many programs dealing with socio-cultural issues like LGBT will likely be cut, while foreign media funding and the training of foreign political cadres will likely continue.

3. How do you evaluate Trump’s decision to end USAID?

USAID made sense from the perspective of older American interests when it was first founded. Still, it was hijacked by liberal-globalist ideologues to proselytise radical socio-cultural policies that don’t objectively align with the US national interests. Examples of the most ridiculous programs are being shared across X. Many Americans are enraged to discover what they were funding and surprised that a lot of the money also went to domestic “NGOs” for implementing these projects.

Ending USAID was necessary since that’s the only way to implement the radical reforms that the Trump Administration envisages, which are most immediately reducing government expenditures via the Elon Musk-led “Department Of Government Efficiency” (DOGE) and then realigning those that remain with policy. Many employees are also diehard ideological opponents of Trump and all that he represents, so keeping them around runs the risk that they’d try to sabotage his second term like they did his first one.

What’s essentially happening is that Trump 2.0 entered power with a detailed plan for purging hostile elements of the US “deep state”, which refers in this context to its permanent military, intelligence, and diplomatic bureaucracies, with some also including its administrative and others. USAID was a significant component of the US power structure for decades before Trump’s second term, so dismantling it is considered crucial for the success of his team’s foreign policy.

4. Some US politicians have criticised the Trump Administration’s reforms of federal agencies, fearing that confidential information might leak out and even describing the overall gist of what’s going on as a “serious threat to national security”. What do they fear? Like Musk mentioned, is this a sign of USAID’s connection with the CIA?

Not every USAID employee and project is connected to the CIA. Still, the CIA does indeed sometimes employ the aforesaid in advance of its goals due to the relative ease with which their democracy and human rights covers enable US spies to infiltrate and/or destabilise foreign countries. Those criticising Trump’s reforms are elements of the US power structure who stand to lose from his and Musk’s campaign to expose irresponsible government spending and political meddling abroad.

Some of them do have a point, namely that innocent USAID employees might be suspected of being spies, and this could lead to credible threats against them. Still, the Trump Administration is willing to risk those consequences to pursue its ambitious reform campaign. Purging USAID, the State Department, and the “deep state” more broadly is the only way to prevent them from sabotaging Trump’s foreign policy the second time around, which he envisages revolutionising the US relations with the world.

Excerpts from this interview were published in Sputnik Brasil’s report titled “'Arma principal da guerra híbrida': o que muda na política externa dos EUA com o fim da USAID?”

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What Trump’s Trade War Would Mean, in Nine Charts

What Trump’s Trade War Would Mean, in Nine Charts

President Trump’s tariffs on Canada, China, and Mexico could upend U.S. trade. These nine charts show what’s at stake, what comes next, and why it matters.

Article by Shannon K. O'Neil and Julia Huesa

Last updated February 1, 2025 6:38 pm (EST)

    

On February 1, President Donald Trump imposed tariffs on Canada, China, and Mexico—the United States’ largest trading partners. U.S. importers will pay a 25 per cent tax on all goods from Canada and Mexico as Trump tries to force both countries to curb migration and drug trafficking into the United States. Imports from China, meanwhile, will face 10 per cent tariffs—punishment for Beijing’s failure to rein in the smuggling of fentanyl precursor chemicals to Canada and Mexico, where they are made into U.S.-bound fentanyl.

Here are nine graphics that show the potential economic effects of such tariffs on all four countries.

How could tariffs affect the United States?

Nearly half of all U.S. imports—more than $1.3 trillion—come from Canada, China, and Mexico. However, analysis by Bloomberg Economics shows that the new tariffs could reduce overall U.S. imports by 15 per cent. While the Washington, DC-based Tax Foundation estimates that the tariffs will generate around $100 billion per year in extra federal tax revenue, they could also impose significant costs on the broader economy: disrupting supply chains, raising costs for businesses, eliminating hundreds of thousands of jobs, and ultimately driving up consumer prices.

Specific sectors of the U.S. economy will be hit particularly hard, including the automotive, energy, and food sectors. Gas prices could surge as much as 50 cents per gallon in the Midwest, as Canada and Mexico supply more than 70 per cent [PDF] of crude oil imports to U.S. refineries. Also at risk are cars and other vehicles, as the United States imports nearly half its auto parts from its northern and southern neighbours. 

A 25 per cent tariff on Canada and Mexico will raise production costs for U.S. automakers, adding up to $3,000 to the price of some of the roughly sixteen million cars sold annually. Grocery costs could rise, too, as Mexico is the United States’ most significant source of fresh produce, supplying more than 60 per cent of U.S. vegetable imports and nearly half of all fruit and nut imports.

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Still, the United States relies less on trade than many other industrialised economies, including Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom. Imports and exports make up just a quarter of the U.S. gross domestic product (GDP), and the United States sources what it does import from a relatively broad set of nations.

How could tariffs affect Canada and Mexico?

Tariffs will hit Canada and Mexico much harder, as trade makes up about 70% of both economies’ GDP. 

Canada and Mexico Are Far More Dependent on the U.S. Than Vice Versa

Trade in goods, 2023

Source: UN Comtrade.

The two countries are mainly dependent on trade with the United States. More than 80 per cent of Mexico’s exports—including cars, machinery, fruits, vegetables, and medical equipment—head north, accounting for 15 per cent of total U.S. imports. This dependence is especially pronounced on Mexico’s northern border. There, industrial states Chihuahua, Coahuila, Nuevo León, and Baja California account for nearly half of Mexico’s exports to the United States, sending more than $200 billion worth of computers, electronics, transportation equipment, and other products each year.

According to Bloomberg Economics, a unilateral 25 per cent tariff on these goods could slash Mexico’s GDP by some 16 per cent, with Mexico’s auto industry bearing the brunt. Mexico sends nearly 80 per cent of the cars it produces to the United States alone, amounting to some 2.5 million vehicles annually. Duties will also threaten Mexico’s energy sector; the United States receives roughly 60 per cent of Mexico’s petroleum exports, most of which is crude oil bound for U.S. refineries. At the same time, Mexico is the top destination for U.S. refined oil exports, which meet over 70 per cent of domestic demand. U.S. tariffs will likely make fuel more expensive, raising prices at the pump and straining Mexico’s broader economy.

Canada faces a similar challenge. The United States buys more than 70 per cent [PDF; in Spanish] of Canada’s exports, with these goods making up 14 per cent of total U.S. imports. Under the new tariffs, Canada’s energy sector will take the biggest hit, as exporters send 80 per cent of their oil south. 

These asymmetries in the cost of tariffs at home give the U.S. significant leverage over its North American partners in negotiations.

How could tariffs affect China?

China is comparatively less dependent on the United States and less reliant on trade overall. Over the past two decades, the country has steadily reduced the importance of trade to its economy as Beijing has ramped up domestic production. Today, imports and exports account for only about 37 per cent of China’s GDP, compared to more than 60 per cent in the early 2000s. 

China Is Not as Reliant on U.S. Trade

Trade in goods, 2023

Source: UN Comtrade.

In recent years, U.S.-China trade has declined, particularly in sectors hit by previous tariffs and export controls, such as auto parts, data servers, furniture, and semiconductors. China has instead ramped up trade with other partners including the European Union, Mexico, and Vietnam. The country’s share of global trade had climbed roughly 4 per cent since 2016, when President Trump first took office, even as the United States share has dipped. Combined, these factors will lessen the shock of an additional 10 per cent tariff on Chinese exports to the United States.

Get the Background

The Contentious U.S.-China Trade Relationship

What could happen the day after?

Each country’s currency could weaken further, lessening the bite of import tariffs and raising the effective price of U.S. exports to other nations. A weakened yuan has already softened the blow for Chinese producers, helping their exports remain competitive worldwide. The roughly 30 per cent depreciation of Mexico’s peso since April and the Canadian dollar’s 8 per cent drop since September also lessen the potential impact. Markets could potentially drive the peso and the Canadian dollar further down, not that tariffs are in place.

Additionally, Canada, China, or Mexico could respond in kind, imposing tit-for-tat tariffs on the United States. Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum has already suggested that Mexico could retaliate with its own tariffs, and the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), which underpins North American free trade, would likely allow it.

This wouldn’t be the first time countries have reciprocated. In 2018, Mexico and Canada placed retaliatory tariffs on more than $15 billion worth of U.S. goods—including steel, pork, yoghurt, and tablecloths—after Trump imposed tariffs on their steel and aluminium. Likewise, the United States lost $20 billion in annual farm exports when China hit back against several U.S. tariffs from 2018 to 2019.

If either Canada or Mexico retaliates, U.S. fuel exporters would likely take the biggest hit alongside automakers and other advanced manufacturers, including pharmaceutical producers.

Some States Are More Dependent on Canada, Mexico, and China

U.S. exports by destination country, 2023

Source: U.S. Census Bureau.

Retaliatory tariffs on the United States would predominantly affect manufacturing-heavy states. Mexico buys 70 per cent [PDF] of New Mexico’s exports, including billions of dollars in U.S. semiconductor chips and electrical components that return to the United States in Mexican-made cars and appliances. Texas sends more than $20 billion in chips, auto parts, and electrical equipment to Mexico; overall, its southbound exports account for 5% of its GDP. Tariffs would also dent Ohio’s $5 billion worth of auto and metal exports to Canada and Maine’s $320 million in northbound lumber and paper exports.

Eritrea Is the North Korea of Africa: America Must Act

Eritrea Is the North Korea of Africa: America Must Act

By Michael Rubin

19fortyfive.com

January 06, 2025

 

The United States Should Openly Support Regime Change in Eritrea: Africa may be the world’s second most-populous continent and a growing economic powerhouse but, for too long, the White House and State Department have treated it as an afterthought.

Often, this manifests itself in missed opportunities: Africa is the world’s second most populous continent and potentially a wealthy one. The Democratic Republic of Congo alone has $214 trillion in untapped mineral wealth. At other times, U.S. officials do not hold Africans to the same standards as they would Europeans or Asians.

Consider the case of Eritrea: Upon winning its independence in 1993, Eritrea should have thrived. Its capital Asmara is one of the world’s loveliest, a world heritage site with a moderate climate and some of the best preserved art deco architecture. Eritrea’s independence leader, Isaias Afwerki, was genuinely popular. Eritrea also had a cohesive enough history and population that its religious and ethnic diversity could be more assets than a source of instability. Its strategic position along the Red Sea imbued Eritrea with commercial potential about which landlocked African countries could only dream. Culturally, Eritreans were primed to thrive. 

Unfortunately, Isaias had other ideas. While he could have won any election initially, he chose to forego them entirely, not even undertaking a pantomime process as dictators do in Egypt or Azerbaijan. Nor do war heroes or liberation necessarily make good stewards of government. Such was the case with Isaias. He did not understand economics, nor did he care. Eritrea’s standard of living plummeted.

In effect, he followed Zimbabwean leader Robert Mugabe’s model. When Mugabe established Zimbabwe upon the ashes of Rhodesia, he inherited a state with good physical infrastructure, a stable currency, a productive agricultural sector, and a good manufacturing base. By the end of his tenure 37 years later, Zimbabwe was in total economic collapse, with its currency devalued by the second worst case of hyperinflation in history (after Hungary 1946) and its agriculture grinding to zero after race-motivated land redistribution.

Eritrea: The North Korea of Africa? 

Isaias also took a page from late Iraqi President Saddam Hussein’s playbook. To distract from his own mismanagement, Isaias launched a war against Ethiopia, sending forces into territory he disputed. That 1998-2000 border war, likened by contemporary analysts as “two bald men fighting over a comb” because of the insignificance of the land involved, killed up to 100,000. That war devastated Eritrea and sent Isaias into a spiral of tightening authoritarianism. Isaias also implemented a system of indefinite national service, essentially reducing Eritrea’s youth to slavery. In 2024, Freedom House ranked Eritrea alongside North Korea in its “freedom in the world” rankings; North Korea even scored marginally higher in civil liberty measurements.

Rather than subject themselves to manual labor to benefit Isaias only rather than build a state, many chose instead to flee, risking their lives to flee across the desert and Mediterranean Sea to Europe and perhaps onward to the United States. For Isaias, this is a win-win situation, for those who make it to the West send remittances home to keep his economy afloat. Eritrean embassies tax the Eritrean diaspora, even those who have renounced their citizenship.

For most countries, embassies are mechanisms with which to conduct diplomacy. Ambassadors and more junior diplomats engage with counterparts and host government officials, and sponsor cultural events to advance their country’s interests. Both North Korea and Eritrea, however, treat embassies as criminal enterprises. North Korean diplomats seldom mix, but instead use their status to engage in everything from narcotics to trade in endangered species. Eritrea uses its posts to extort the diaspora under threat of harm coming to their relatives back in Eritrea, illicit surveillance, and fundraising under false pretenses, 

On November 26, 2024, Yohannes Teklemicael, Eritrea’s ambassador to South Sudan gave an interview that highlighted many of his activities. While the Eritrean embassy removed the video within 12 hours, the Eritrean opposition was able to preserve it.

He described how Eritrea operates on four fronts: three within Eritrea and the fourth among the diaspora. The ambassador admitted that the primary job of Eritrean embassies is to “administer this fourth front.” When Eritreans need any item from the embassy, they must sign a “regret form” to acknowledge they fled Eritrea illegally, pay the two percent tax retroactively, and join an embassy-mandated association: All Eritreans under 40 must join Isaias’ People’s Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ) Youth Association, the corollary Women’s Association, or the Mahberekom Association that organizes the remaining men. In addition to the two percent tax, each of these associations requires membership dues that it transfers to the PFDJ-controlled Himbol Bank in Eritrea. The embassy also operates a school to continue the indoctrination of local students.

Eritrea is increasingly a problem not only for its neighbors and the United States, but also for the broader region. Isaias has long been arrogant. While Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed won a peace prize for burying the hatchet with Eritrea, Isaias sees their partnership not as one between equals but rather between mentor and student. Indeed, in his interview, Teklemicael described Abiy as “childish” and predicted his imminent loss of power. 

Isaias continues to hold Djiboutians that Eritrean forces kidnapped from within Djibouti itself, but also arms two separate Sudanese tribes to involves himself in what is the world’s bloodiest ongoing conflict. Previously, Isaias trafficked in Somali army recruits to use as cannon fodder for his own adventurism in Ethiopia, much as Russian President Vladimir Putin uses involuntary North Korean units. By any definition, Eritrea is a state-sponsor of terrorism.

Don’t Ignore Eritrea 

The incoming Trump administration may choose to ignore Eritrea, but this would be a mistake given the instability it can catalyze and terrorism is sponsors, as well as the financial impropriety in which Eritrean officials engage in the United States.

While Congress is polarized, Democrats and Republicans both from the “Squad” to the MAGA fringe should have common interest in countering a regime that runs roughshod over U.S. law and is alongside North Korea, the world’s greatest violator of human rights. In 1998, Congress united to pass the Iraq Liberation Act which, among other facets, authorized the United States to work with, fund, and otherwise empower opposition groups. While U.S. forces have no business in Eritrea nor would their deployment be wise, Congress might authorize funding to build the capacity of the Blue Revolution movement among other groups.

Eritrean diplomats including those at the United Nations are already subject to the Foreign Missions Travel Control Program that limits them to a 25-mile radius of their embassy or mission. The Justice Department should crackdown on Eritreans who act as unregistered foreign agents, however. The Asmara regime may not care if the U.S. expels such agents; as they can always compel others from within the Eritrean community. Instead, it will be essential to prosecute, fine, and jail those who violate U.S. law.

The U.S. Department of the Treasury should also tighten sanctions on Eritrean banks, financial institutions, and money transfer agencies such as Himbol. That an Eritrean ambassador identified Himbol’s operation is significant; that the Eritrean government scrambled to erase that video highlights its sensitivity to the regime.

The State Department should make clear to the United Arab Emirates that it should cease its partnership with Africa’s most destabilizing state, one which is increasingly a partner for China. It might also convene, perhaps in conjunction with the National Endowment for Democracy, a “Future of Eritrea” project to identify and assess the areas of greatest need upon Isaias’ exit.

It is also essential to sanction Isaias, his family members, and key confidants among his military and intelligence service. As Isaias nears the end of his life—he is 78-year-old, has suffered a stroke, and is generally in ill-health—it is time the United States plan for transition. Eritrea is less a state than a criminal enterprise. Eritreans deserve better. The money Isaias and his cronies have stolen and sent abroad should be identified, seized, and placed in a fund that a provisional Eritrean government can utilize and apply to the country’s reconstruction.

It is easy for U.S. officials to say Eritreans deserve better. Rhetoric is cheap and business as usual only preserves the status quo, however. President Donald Trump need not engage actively in Africa. Still, he should empower his incoming National Security Council and assistant secretary of State for African Affairs to do so to help Eritreans rid the world of one of its worst regimes. 

Michael Rubin 

Senior Fellow

Latest Work

Trump Can't Bully the Entire World

ARGUMENT

An expert's point of view on a current event.

Trump Can't Bully the Entire World

Loudly making threats doesn't amount to a foreign policy.

By Stephen M. Walt, a columnist at Foreign Policy and the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University.

In books and movies, predicting what will happen to a bully is easy. They will torment the hero for a while, but eventually, someone will stand up to them, expose their weaknesses, and deliver their comeuppance. You've seen it repeatedly: Harry Potter humiliates Draco Malfoy and defeats Voldemort; Marty McFly bests Biff not once but thrice; Cinderella gets the handsome Prince Charming and her mean stepsisters get nothing; Tom Brown triumphs over Flashman, Elizabeth Bennet defies Lady Catherine de Bourgh and wins Mr. Darcy's love.    

Bourgh and wins Mr. Darcy's love. This

the familiar plotline is comforting

a reminder that good eventually

triumphs over evil.

The problem is, alas, that real life isn't a

book or a Hollywood movie. Indeed,

2024 has been a damn good year for

bullies. Russian President Vladimir

Putin is winning in Ukraine, albeit at a

frightful cost. Hungarian Prime

Minister Viktor Orban's illiberal brand

of populism is on a roll in Europe

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin

Netanyahu is still in power in Israel,

despite exposing his country to

Hamas's attack in October 2023,

 

The problem is that real life isn't a book or a Hollywood movie. Indeed, 2024 has been a damn good year for bullies. Russian President Vladimir Putin is winning in Ukraine, albeit at a frightful cost. Hungarian Prime

Minister Viktor Orban's illiberal brand of populism is on a roll in Europe. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is still in power in Israel, despite exposing his country to Hamas's attack in October 2023, presiding over a genocidal campaign

that has taken tens of thousands of

innocent Palestinian lives, and an arrest warrant from the International

riming

warrant from the International

Criminal Court. And U.S. President-elect Donald Trump is returning to the White House with the world's richest bully-Elon Musk-at his side (for now).

 

Trump, Musk, and their minions appear to be convinced that they can bully the entire world. He hasn't even been sworn in, and he's already threatening foreign countries with tariffs and other sanctions if they don't give him whatever he demands. He's threatening to sue newspapers criticising him and punish corporate leaders who don't fall in line. Trump's nominee to head the FBI and some Republican lawmakers seem eager to go after his political opponents. This approach goes well beyond quid-pro-quo

transactional; it's a blatant attempt to blackmail, bully, and cow others into 

They made preemptive concessions based on their fear of what Trump might do to hurt them.

It's not surprising that Trump thinks this approach will work. The Republican Party to which I once belonged has been exposed as a sorry collection of unprincipled opportunists with the collective backbone of a bowl of Jello. Wealthy corporate leaders are tripping over themselves to curry favour with Trump, once-distinguished news organisations like ABC and the Los Angeles Times are running up white flags, and spineless pundits with their fingers in the wind are pivoting to

 

They made preemptive concessions based on their fear of what Trump might do to hurt them.

It's not surprising that Trump thinks this approach will work. The Republican Party to which I once belonged has been exposed as a sorry collection of unprincipled opportunists with the collective backbone of a bowl of Jello. Wealthy corporate leaders are tripping over themselves to curry favour with Trump, once-distinguished news organisations like ABC and the Los Angeles Times are running up white flags, and spineless pundits with their fingers in the wind are pivoting to

The stars in the global firmament seem to be lining up behind them, too. Europe is economically stagnant and politically divided. The Trudeau government in Canada is on life

support. Russia is overstretched.

China's economy is flirting with

deflation and more vulnerable to pressure. The Axis of Resistance in the Middle East is in disarray, with the ouster of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad as merely the latest blow to its efforts to challenge U.S.-Israeli dominance. Not surprisingly, the incoming U.S. administration thinks

that now's the time for the United

States to impose maximum pressure on

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 TRUMP administration thinks that now's the time for the United States to impose maximum pressure on anyone and everyone who isn't willing to give Trump what he wants. And, at first glance, this approach seems to be working: Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau has already made the trek to Mar-a-Lago; NATO members are now talking about a 3 per cent of GDP target for defence spending; and Iran's president keeps saying he wants lower tensions with the outside world. The United States, by implication,

Trump seems to be on a roll.

Is the United States now poised to remake world politics in accordance with Trump or Musk's whims? Are we witnessing a return to the unipolar moment, minus the naive liberal idealism that got the United States into trouble the first time around? Can Trump bully the whole world?

I doubt it.

One reason I'm sceptical is that I've seen this movie before. Back in the 1990s, politicians and pundits in the United States assumed that history was running the United States' way and that country after country would bow before

the awesome might of U.S. power and the irresistible appeal of liberal democratic capitalism. The only holdouts would be a handful of "rogue states," whose leaders hadn't got the memo, and they would be contained and eventually compelled to go along. If that didn't work, there was always the option of regime change. Things didn't quite go as the optimists predicted, however, which is one of the reasons we ended up with someone like Trump in the first place.

Second, unchecked power makes others nervous, and overt bullying makes

people angry and resentful.  

Second, unchecked power makes otners nervous, and overt bullying makes people angry and resentful. The typical reaction is to balance against U.S. pressure, either overtly (as Russia, China, and Iran have done) or by "soft balancing,” as U.S. allies did during the last unipolar moment. Leaders who bend their knees repeatedly will face domestic pressures to resist, especially if acceding to Trump's demands imposes heavy costs on their public.

This problem is exacerbated by Trump's purely transactional approach to

politics. The United States has frequently used its superior power to pressure allies to do what it wanted. Still, it did so while emphasising a set of shared values and insisting that the country was acting not only in its self-interest but also in the interest of a broader community of primarily like-minded countries. The mailed fist was there, but so was the velvet glove. U.S. willingness to operate within a set of multilateral institutions that placed certain limits on its power made its position of primacy less threatening and its leadership more acceptable to others. Trump doesn't care about these things and even longtime U.S.

Partners will be wary of complying, too

 

Partners will be wary of complying too readily and thereby inviting new demands.

Moreover, although issuing bombastic threats doesn't cost Trump anything in the short term, carrying them out would. Because the United States is bigger and stronger than everyone else, imposing tariffs or other sanctions may hurt others more than it hurts the United States. However, imposing tariffs or other coercive measures is not cost-free, especially when dealing with larger countries such as China or states on which U.S. industry depends for key inputs or goods. And even far weaker.

Inputs or goods. And even far weaker states are sometimes willing to pay a large price when their vital interests are at stake, as Serbia did over Kosovo and as Iran has done for decades. There are limits, in short, to how much Trump can demand of anyone.

Fourth, a bully like Trump wants to deal

with his targets one-on-one because

Fourth, a bully like Trump wants to deal with his targets one-on-one because that maximises his leverage. He won't want to deal directly with the European Union (which he once described as one of the United States "foes"); he'd prefer to deal directly with separate European countries and strike deals with each of them independently. But that approach is inefficient and time-consuming, and I guess many of these new deals won't get done.

Fifth, states facing a bully have many ways to pretend to go along without complying. As we are already seeing, some astute foreign leaders will

Fifth, states facing a bully have lots of

ways to pretend to go along without

complying. As we are already

seeing some astute foreign leaders will

flatter Trump's ego and say they are

willing to discuss whatever's on his

mind, while offering only minor or

purely symbolic concessions. Canada

has said it's perfectly willing to tighten

the border and control shipments of

fentanyl precursors to the United

States, but this is a meaningless pledge

because Canada is not a significant source of

illegal immigrants or precursor

chemicals. Other countries will adopt a

a similar approach: telling Trump they

States, out thumpi

because Canada is not a significant source of illegal Comeuppance precursor chemicals. Other countries will adopt a similar approach: telling Trump they will do what he wants and then dragging their feet, as China did successfully during his first term. This is another way that a purely transactional and mostly bilateral approach breaks down: When dealing with the whole world one-on-one, monitoring who delivers on their promises and who is shirking becomes an onerous task.

   

Sixth, remember that Trump cares more about appearances than he does. About actual accomplishments. He thinks those reality-show summit meetings with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un were a great success: The entire world was watching, and the ratings were boffo. However, nothing came of all the hoopla, and it was Kim, not Trump, who was the big winner. He got the prestige and legitimacy that accrues from a direct meeting with a U.S. president, and Trump left empty-handed.

Nor is the United States all-powerful. The bond market has a mind of its own

Nor is the United States all-powerful. For example, the bond market has a mind of its own, and Trump may discover just how powerful it can be if the U.S. deficit explodes or inflation comes back significantly. Trump's grip on domestic politics is anything but firm: The GOP's margins in the House and Senate are razor-thin, and his election was nowhere near the landslide he claims it was. A few stumbles and every member of Congress who is up for

reelection in 2026 will start looking for ways to distance themselves. The willingness of several dozen

Republicans to defy Trump over the

Republicans to defy Trump over the recent government funding bill is another sign of the constraints he will face. And all the bluster and social media hype in the world can't change the laws of physics, chemistry, and biology: The environment pays no attention to whatever Trump spouts on Truth Social, and viruses will keep evolving no matter what his nominee

for secretary of the Department for Health and Human Services, Robert F. Kennedy Jr., believes, or what the

talking heads on Fox News say.

Finally, every U.S. president faces some nasty surprises-problems or crises that

 

Finally, every U.S. president faces nasty surprises-problems or crises they didn't expect or plan for. For George W. Bush, it was Sept. 11; for Barack Obama, it was the Arab Spring and the Russian seizure of Crimea; for Joe Biden, it was Russia's invasion of Ukraine and the carnage in Gaza, Lebanon, and the West Bank. In

Trump's first term was the COVID-19 pandemic, and his mishandling of that unexpected crisis is one of the main

 

Trump's first term was the COVID-19 pandemic, and his mishandling of that unexpected crisis is one of the main reasons he lost the 2020 election. Having assembled a clown show of an administration with incompetent oddballs in some key areas, Trump 2.0 may be ill-prepared for whatever unexpected problem lands on the Resolute Desk.

To be clear, I'm not saying Trump can't brandish the big stick and get some countries to give him some of what he wants. If you threaten enough people, a few of your targets will undoubtedly

comply. He'll take full credit whenever

few of your targets will undoubtedly comply. He'll take full credit whenever this happens (even if the benefits are modest) and hope everyone overlooks the threats that backfired or fizzled. Given his proven ability to convince people of many things that aren't true and our news media's equally well-proven inability to hold him accountable, this approach may even convince Americans he's doing a great job. But what it won't do is produce a steady series of genuine foreign-policy accomplishments. It might even lead to the 

comeuppance that novelists and

scriptwriters adore. That's a movie I'd

Comeuppance that novelists and scriptwriters adore. That's a movie I'd like to watch.

 

Stephen M. Walt is a columnist at Foreign Policy and the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University.

Bluesky: @stephenwalt.bsky.social X: @stephenwalt

   

The Great Crack-Up: Analyzing the Evolution of Western Political Dynamics

The Great Crack-Up: Analyzing the Evolution of Western Political Dynamics.

Recent developments within Canadian politics, epitomised by Justin Trudeau's resignation, indicate a more significant trend rather than isolated incidents. These events reflect a substantial disintegration of the long-standing consensus that has characterised Western political discourse for several decades. This consensus, which has traditionally upheld immigration as an unequivocal benefit and viewed multiculturalism as the paramount objective, is increasingly being repudiated across various Western nations.

Central to this transformation is mounting dissatisfaction with progressive social ideologies and the marginalisation of dissenting perspectives. The categorisation of opposing viewpoints as "disinformation," coupled with heightened online censorship, has fostered an atmosphere of enforced conformity. However, this strategy has proven counterproductive, as individuals and communities are beginning to resist the imposition of progressive principles assertively.

The emergence of leaders such as Donald Trump, Giorgia Meloni, and Nigel Farage exemplifies this intensifying backlash. These figures have effectively harnessed the frustrations of working-class demographics who feel overlooked by the progressive elite. In Italy, Meloni now heads one of the most stable administrations in Western Europe. At the same time, in the United Kingdom, Labour leader Keir Starmer has garnered voter support by addressing immigration concerns.

The ramifications of the previously dominant consensus are also evident in Germany, where Chancellor Angela Merkel's decision to welcome over a million asylum-seekers in 2015 has catalysed a notable shift toward right-wing politics. The far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) party is now positioned to become the second-largest faction in the Bundestag.

The fragmentation of the old consensus transcends mere political realignment; it underscores a broader inability to adequately address critical issues such as Islamic fundamentalism, the societal repercussions of mass immigration, escalating crime rates, and stagnant economic conditions.

Trudeau's efforts to amend his immigration policies have proven to be belated, positioning him as a notable casualty of this evolving landscape.

As Western nations continue to confront these challenges, it is evident that the previously established consensus is no longer sustainable. The pressing inquiry now pertains to the nature of the forthcoming paradigm. Will it usher in a new phase of pragmatic governance that reconciles diverse values and interests, or will it lead to an ongoing descent into polarisation and division? Only time will provide clarity on this matter.