The Philosophical Meaning of the “Pillars of Integration”: A Critical Interpretation

 The “Pillars of Integration” shown in the images from a philosophical perspective.

The Philosophical Meaning of the “Pillars of Integration”: A Critical Interpretation

In recent years, Ethiopia’s political discourse has introduced a new conceptual framework called the “Pillars of Integration,” presented through seven English terms: Synergy, Synchrony, System, Symmetry, Symbiosis, Syntropy, and Synopsis. Although packaged in managerial language, these concepts carry distinct philosophical implications about how society, government, and national identity should function. They reflect an attempt to build a meta-narrative of unity—yet they raise deeper questions about coherence, purpose, and political intent.

This essay analyzes these seven pillars through classical philosophy, systems theory, and political thought, demonstrating what they mean and what they seek to achieve within Ethiopia’s current political context.

1. Synergy: The Claim of Unified Strength

Synergy implies that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. It assumes that individuals, groups, and institutions are not merely separate units but interconnected contributors to a larger purpose. In philosophical terms, this echoes Aristotle’s holism—the belief that understanding society requires seeing its collective identity, not just individual components.

However, synergy also carries a political message: regional differences should dissolve into a unified whole. It promotes harmony, but it risks minimizing diversity. In a multinational federation like Ethiopia, the push for synergy may mask a desire for centralization under the name of cooperative strength.

2. Synchrony: The Alignment of Time and Action

Synchrony represents coordinated timing and order—people, institutions, and systems moving in unison. Philosophically, this aligns with Hegel’s dialectical view of historical progress, where development occurs when different forces move in alignment toward a common end.

In governance, synchrony suggests that:

Regions must follow the federal timeline

Institutions must obey central pace

Political actors must align with national objectives

Thus, synchrony supports political uniformity, not pluralism.

3. System: The Return of Systems Thinking

A system is a structured whole where each part has a function. This pillar reflects Ludwig von Bertalanffy’s General Systems Theory, which argues that societies behave like living organisms with interconnected subsystems.

In political philosophy, emphasizing “system” can either promote:

Institutional rationality, or

Technocratic central control

When promoted by a governing party, “system integration” often means that all political units must adjust to the central system’s priorities, risking the suppression of regional autonomy.

4. Symmetry: Ordered Balance and Uniformity

Symmetry is a concept drawn from mathematics and aesthetics, representing balance and proportion. In philosophy, symmetry symbolizes structural order and the beauty of uniformity.

In politics, symmetry implies:

Equal behavior

Equal movement

Equal orientation

But Ethiopia is not symmetrical—it is defined by asymmetry, diversity, and differentiated identities. Forcing symmetry where asymmetry is natural and historical undermines federal principles. Philosophically, symmetry can be used to justify a unitary political imaginary under the mask of balance.

5. Symbiosis: Mutual Dependence as Political Logic

Symbiosis stems from biology, describing relationships where distinct organisms depend on one another. Philosophically, it resonates with interdependence theory—the idea that cooperation is essential for survival.

As a political metaphor, “symbiosis” means regions cannot survive alone and must depend on the center. The message is subtle:

autonomy without dependence is impossible.

This distorts federal theory, which treats regions not as dependents but as co-equal sovereign units forming a shared state.

6. Syntropy: Order, Growth, and Directed Energy

Syntropy is the opposite of entropy—it describes energy moving toward order and higher complexity rather than decay. Philosophers like Whitehead and Teilhard de Chardin used similar ideas to explain human progress toward higher unity.

Syntropy in the Ethiopian political frame appears to suggest that:

Ethiopia is moving toward a single, unified destiny

Diversity must flow toward uniform growth

Fragmentation is equivalent to entropy and must be reversed

This serves as a metaphysical justification for political centralization, presented as “scientific” or “natural.”

7. Synopsis: The Grand Narrative

A synopsis is a summary, an overarching view. In philosophy, it reflects the God’s-eye perspective—the claim to see the whole truth at once. When used politically, “synopsis” suggests that leadership possesses a unique understanding of national purpose.

The risk:

What is called synopsis may simply be a single-party narrative presented as national truth.

Synopsis therefore becomes ideological consolidation disguised as holistic understanding.

Overall Philosophical Meaning: A Shift Toward Centralized Unity

Examining these seven pillars collectively, a pattern emerges:

Synergy → collective over individual

Synchrony → alignment with a central rhythm

System → governance as a top-down organism

Symmetry → uniformity over diversity

Symbiosis → dependence, not autonomy

Syntropy → “progress” defined by central authority

Synopsis → one national narrative framed as truth

Philosophically, this framework is less about integration and more about centralized nation-building through systems vocabulary. It borrows from holism, systems theory, biological metaphors, and metaphysics, but its political meaning leans toward unitary state logic, not pluralistic federalism.

The seven pillars, then, represent an attempt to construct:

A philosophical justification for centralized uniformity under the language of harmony and integration.

They are not purely philosophical principles; they are political tools presented as scientific inevitabilities.

Conclusion

The “Pillars of Integration” combine concepts from biology, systems theory, metaphysics, and aesthetics to create a narrative of national unity. While the language appears modern and philosophical, the deeper meaning reveals a shift toward centralization, homogenization, and the weakening of the federal idea. Philosophy, in this context, is used not to liberate thought but to authorize power.

Ethiopia’s future stability requires frameworks that respect diversity, autonomy, and constitutional federalism—not metaphors that subtly erase them.

NEGATION WITHOUT TRANSFORMATION:A DIALECTICAL CRITIQUE OF ETHIOPIA’S FAILED 2018 TRANSITION

NEGATION WITHOUT TRANSFORMATION:

A DIALECTICAL CRITIQUE OF ETHIOPIA’S FAILED 2018 TRANSITION

Author: Shumet Nigus Mengist 

ABSTRACT

This article critically examines Ethiopia’s political crisis following the 2018 transition through the philosophical lenses of Hegelian dialectics and the Marxian Law of the Negation of Negation. It argues that Ethiopia’s attempted democratic opening failed because it negated the TPLF-led EPRDF model without replacing its structural logic. As a result, the transition produced not synthesis but fragmentation marked by institutional collapse, ideological polarization, militarization, and the return of pre-1991 political currents. Using the methodological tools of dialectical analysis, this study evaluates how contradictions embedded within the EPRDF state, combined with incoherent reform strategies and opportunistic political alliances, generated a cyclical negation without progressive transformation.

INTRODUCTION

The 2018 political transition in Ethiopia was globally celebrated as a historic democratic awakening. Western governments, international organizations, and African partners described it as a beacon of liberalization in an authoritarian region. Domestically, it inspired hope among millions who had suffered under the repressive structure of the TPLF-led Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). However, within a few years the transition collapsed into a protracted multi-front conflict involving the federal government, Tigray forces, Oromo Liberation Army (OLA), Amhara Fano militias, and other regional armed actors. Rather than democratization, Ethiopia experienced state fragility, political fragmentation, and civil war. This article argues that the failure was not accidental but rather rooted in structural contradictions and a flawed understanding of political negation.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: HEGELIAN DIALECTICS

Hegelian dialectics posits that historical progress emerges from contradictions embedded within social and political structures. A “thesis” is confronted by its “antithesis,” and from their conflict emerges a higher “synthesis.” However, synthesis is not guaranteed; failure to resolve contradictions leads to regression or cyclical instability. In the Ethiopian context, the EPRDF state functioned as a “thesis”—a centralized, developmental authoritarian regime built on the rhetoric of constitutional federalism. The 2018 transition was positioned as its “antithesis,” but lacking structural grounding, it never produced a stable synthesis. Instead, contradictions were magnified.

THE LAW OF THE NEGATION OF NEGATION

Marx conceptualized the Law of the Negation of Negation as the process by which old structures are negated, then re-negated, ultimately producing transformation. However, negation alone is insufficient; it must generate a qualitatively new form. The Ethiopian transition negated EPRDF rule rhetorically but preserved its institutional DNA. The second negation, carried out by armed groups and counter-elites, produced disorder rather than synthesis.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: THE EPRDF ORDER (1991–2018)

The EPRDF established a federal system recognizing ethnic autonomy on paper while enforcing strict authoritarian control through party networks. Despite economic achievements, the EPRDF state was defined by:

1. Party supremacy over the constitution

2. Centralization of security and intelligence agencies

3. Ethno-party dominance, especially by TPLF

4. Limited democratic space

5. Overreliance on coercive stability

Mass protests between 2014–2018 revealed deep governance failures that the EPRDF could not resolve internally.

ANTITHESIS: THE 2018 TRANSITION

The rise of Abiy Ahmed as prime minister symbolized the negation of old authoritarian methods. Reforms included:

- Release of political prisoners

- Return of exiled political groups

- Liberalization of the media environment

- Peace agreement with Eritrea

- Appointment of new technocrats and activists

However, these steps were incoherent. The transition invited former imperial elites, Derg-era generals, ultra-nationalist figures, and Eritrean intelligence networks into the political sphere. Rather than creating pluralism, it opened multiple fronts of ideological and security contestation.

WHY THE ANTITHESIS FAILED

The key factors behind the failure include:

1. Lack of institutional reforms: The judiciary, security sector, and civil service remained EPRDF-era structures.

2. Ideological incoherence: Competing visions—unitary nationalism, multinational federalism, Oromo liberation discourse, and pan-Ethiopian revival—clashed without mediation.

3. Rapid political liberalization without institutional safeguards.

4. External influence: Eritrea’s involvement deepened elite fragmentation.

5. Overcentralization of decision-making in the Office of the Prime Minister.

NEGATION OF NEGATION: RETURN OF OLD FORCES

Instead of producing a new governance system, Ethiopia witnessed:

- The return of imperial-era rhetoric

- Militarization of regional politics

- Revival of TPLF as an insurgent force

- Escalation of Oromo grievances and rise of OLA

- Emergence of Amhara Fano militias opposing both TPLF and the federal government

- Erosion of trust in federal institutions

THE DIALECTICAL STALEMATE

Ethiopia became trapped between contradictory forces:

- Federalism vs. Unitary nationalism

- Reformist rhetoric vs. authoritarian practice

- Regional autonomy vs. centralization

- Political inclusion vs. elite capture

Without reconciliation of these contradictions, synthesis became unattainable.

INSTITUTIONAL COLLAPSE AND GOVERNANCE FAILURE

The conflict was accelerated by the decay of:

1. Judiciary (lack of independence)

2. National Defense Forces (factionalization)

3. Regional governments (paramilitary capture)

4. Electoral institutions (politicization)

5. Civil service (purges and incompetence)

This collapse turned political disputes into armed confrontations.

TPLF, OLA, FANO, AND THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

Each actor embodies a different ideological challenge:

- Tigrayan forces fight to restore status and security.

- OLA represents unresolved Oromo national questions.

- Fano symbolizes Amhara communal insecurity.

- The Prosperity Party pursues centralized control.

These forces function as competing antitheses without a shared framework for synthesis.

PROSPECTS FOR SYNTHESIS: A DIALECTICAL PATH FORWARD

A viable synthesis requires:

1. Constitutional renewal through inclusive dialogue

2. Institutional reconstruction

3. Demilitarization of regional politics

4. Stabilization of civil–military relations

5. Rebuilding trust through transitional justice

6. National consensus on Ethiopia’s multinational identity

CONCLUSION

Ethiopia’s 2018 transition failed because it attempted a superficial negation without structural transformation. Hegelian and Marxian dialectical theory reveals that Ethiopia remains trapped in unresolved contradictions. True democratic transformation requires a conscious, institutionalized synthesis rooted in inclusive governance, constitutionalism, and federal democracy.

 

A Critical Reflection on Historical Violence: Why Selective Memory Cannot Build a Democratic Ethiopia

A clear, critical, historically grounded article that responds to Dr. Yonas Biru’s selective narrative by placing both the Gadaa system and the Ethiopian feudal order under objective scrutiny. It exposes the double standards, the historical omissions, and the moral inconsistencies in demonizing one system while romanticizing another.

A Critical Reflection on Historical Violence: Why Selective Memory Cannot Build a Democratic Ethiopia

Public intellectuals have an obligation to analyze history with intellectual honesty, consistency, and contextual depth. Yet some contemporary commentators—such as Dr. Yonas Biru—deploy a selective narrative that magnifies episodes of violence associated with the 16th-century Gadaa system while minimizing or entirely ignoring the far more systematic, continuous, and institutionally sanctioned brutality embedded within Ethiopia’s feudal imperial order from 1270 to 1974.

Such an approach is not historical scholarship; it is political myth-making, designed to delegitimize a people rather than illuminate the past.

1. Feudal Ethiopia Was Structurally Violent, Hierarchical, and Anti-Human

If we apply the same “critical lens” Dr. Biru uses against the Gadaa system, the Ethiopian imperial era emerges as one of the most brutal and unequal sociopolitical systems on the African continent.

From the rise of the Solomonic dynasty in 1270, society was formally divided into rigid, hereditary castes:

Negash – the royal bloodline

Angach / Mesafint / Mekuanint – aristocrats and feudal lords

Qedash – clergy, monastic hierarchy, church servants

Army nobles

Occupational castes – blacksmiths, tanners, weavers, potters, hunters (treated as ritually impure)

Slaves and serfs – the backbone of the feudal economy, owned, traded, and exploited

This system legally enforced inequality, normalized human bondage, and created a multi-layered hierarchy where millions were treated not as citizens but as instruments of labour.

It is historically documented that slavery persisted in Ethiopia until 1974, and even beyond informally. No Gadaa era compares to the 600-year endurance of feudal domination.

2. Violence Was Not Episodic — It Was Institutional

If we examine the records without bias, imperial Ethiopia’s brutality far exceeded the episodic warfare of the Gadaa age. Notable examples include:

• Emperor Tewodros II (1855–1868)

Known for exemplary leadership in some reforms, yet also infamous for extreme punishments such as burning entire families inside locked huts (tukuls), mass hangings, and public floggings.

• Emperor Yohannes IV (1872–1889)

Recorded for harsh campaigns against:

Wallo Muslims, forcing mass conversions

Gojam peasants, where hand and neck mutilation was used to instill fear

No comparable institutional record exists in Gadaa history.

• Emperor Menelik II (1889–1913)

His southern campaigns included:

Mutilation of Arsi Oromo captives

Mass killings of war resisters

Burning villages with people inside

Brutal punishment of Eritrean POWs

Eradication of entire communities refusing forced conversion to Orthodoxy

Over centuries, from the 14th to 18th, numerous peoples were decimated for rejecting Orthodox Christianity. This was not incidental violence, but state-sanctioned religious warfare.

If violence is the criterion of judgment, then Ethiopian feudalism stands as a monument of systematic cruelty.

3. Why Selective Judgment Is Intellectually Dishonest

Dr. Biru selectively weaponizes history by:

1. Highlighting Oromo violence of the 16th century,

2. Ignoring the centuries-long systemic violence of the feudal rulers,

3. Framing one people as inherently violent,

4. Sanitizing or overlooking atrocities committed under emperors he implicitly identifies with,

5. Converting historical complexity into political propaganda against a modern identity (Oromummaa).

This is not academic critique; it is political targeting masquerading as scholarship.

Every society in the region—Oromo, Amhara, Tigray, Somali, Afar, Sidama—has a history shaped by warfare, migration, state-building, and resistance. The only ethical approach is to analyze all histories with equal critical distance.

4. What a Responsible Historical Method Should Do

A genuine historical critique must:

Recognize context, not weaponize it

Distinguish between episodic violence and institutionalized oppression

Compare systems fairly, rather than selectively

Avoid using the past to stigmatize present identities

Seek accuracy, not political convenience

The purpose of history is understanding, not assigning eternal guilt

5. Conclusion: Ethiopia Needs Honest Memory, Not Selective Demonization

The Ethiopian political crisis today is fueled by selective memory, elite mythology, and politicized interpretations of the past. Demonizing the 16th-century Oromo while romanticizing a feudal system that oppressed millions for centuries is both intellectually fraudulent and politically toxic.

Ethiopia can only heal when all histories are acknowledged, not just those that serve ideological agendas.

What we need is not historians who divide, but scholars who illuminate.

THE ROOT CAUSE OF ETHIOPIA’S POLITICAL CRISIS: A DIALECTICAL-PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS

THE ROOT CAUSE OF ETHIOPIA’S POLITICAL CRISIS: A DIALECTICAL-PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS

Introduction

Ethiopia’s political turbulence is not a recent accident—it is a historical product of unresolved contradictions. The country continues to oscillate between competing political identities, clashing historical narratives, and mutually exclusive visions of statehood. To identify the true root cause, Ethiopia must be examined through the philosophical tools of dialectical analysis: thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, and the law of negation, which explains how an old order collapses and a new one emerges.

The Ethiopian crisis is fundamentally a struggle between the remnants of an imperial-feudal order and the forces of self-determination seeking to dismantle it. The failure to resolve this contradiction is the seed of today’s political chaos.

1. Thesis: The Imperial–Feudal Order and the Birth of Antagonism

From the late 19th century onward, Ethiopia was not formed as a consensual political community, but as a hierarchical imperial project. This project produced:

A ruling class concentrated mainly in the highland Amhara nobility

An imposed state identity centred on Amharic language, Orthodox Christianity, and monarchic culture

A structure of domination imposed on nations, nationalities, and peoples incorporated through conquest

This thesis established a rigid social order:

rulers vs. ruled, masters vs. serfs, civilizers vs. “uncivilized” subjects, according to imperial ideology.

Even after the fall of feudal monarchy, the ideological infrastructure—Amhara cultural hegemony, Orthodox supremacy, political centralism—survived. Thus, the imperial class did not disappear; it simply reproduced itself within the bureaucratic, military, and intellectual institutions of the modern state.

This is the root contradiction:

a society built on domination resisted by those who were dominated.

2. Antithesis: The Rise of Self-Determination Movements

Dialectics teaches that every oppressive structure generates its own resistance—the antithesis.

From the Oromo, Sidama, Somali, Tigray, Afar, Benishangul, Gambella and others emerged liberation movements calling for:

self-rule

cultural recognition

linguistic rights

equitable federalism

freedom from monolithic Ethiopianism

The 1995 multinational constitutional order was the first formal negation of imperial Ethiopia. But the remnants of the reactionary class, though weakened, never disappeared. They reorganized themselves intellectually, economically, and politically.

This old elite now wages a cultural and psychological counteroffensive. They romanticize imperial Ethiopia, downplay historic atrocities, and demonize the rise of identities—especially Oromummaa, which challenges their ideological supremacy.

This resistance to equality is the historical antithesis of Ethiopia’s democratization.

3. The Law of Negation: Why Crisis Persists

According to the law of negation, an old order collapses only when it is truly negated—not symbolically, but structurally.

Ethiopia attempted partial negation but never completed it:

The imperial language (Amharic) remained dominant.

Orthodox Christianity continued as the ideological fortress of “true Ethiopian identity.”

Narratives of conquest were sanitized and celebrated.

Old elites re-emerged as “intellectuals” preaching Ethiopian unity against federalism.

Thus, Ethiopia lives in a half-negated political structure—neither fully imperial nor fully democratic. The old feudal ideology continues to haunt the modern state like a ghost that refuses to die.

This incomplete negation is the root cause of Ethiopia’s permanent instability.

4. The Role of Reactionary Intellectuals: The Case of Dr. Yonas Biru

In any dialectical struggle, the old order does not collapse quietly—it produces ideological warriors who defend its legacy under modern language.

Dr. Yonas Biru represents this phenomenon:

He attacks Oromummaa, the cultural and political awakening of the Oromo.

He labels it a “cancer,” weaponizing pathology as rhetoric.

He systematically demonizes Oromo scholars, leaders, and institutions.

He works to delegitimize the multinational federal arrangement.

He rewrites history to sanitize feudal conquest and elevate imperial Ethiopia as the ideal model.

His critique is not intellectual inquiry—it is a counterrevolutionary effort to restore ideological supremacy, using updated versions of old imperial narratives.

Every liberation movement produces its opposite.

Dr. Biru represents the ideological negation of Oromo and other marginalized nations' political awakening.

5. Synthesis: What Ethiopia Needs to Move Forward

A stable Ethiopia will not emerge by reverting to the old imperial thesis nor by living in permanent antagonism. A new synthesis must arise—one that resolves the historical contradiction instead of suppressing it.

This synthesis requires:

1. Full negation of imperial ideology

No glorification of feudal lords

No celebration of Minilik as a nation-builder

No privileged language or religion

2. Genuine multinational democracy

True equality of languages

Self-rule for nations and nationalities

Federalism protected from centralist sabotage

3. Secular statehood

Orthodox Christianity cannot continue functioning as the cultural backbone of state ideology.

4. Intellectual honesty and historical truth

The crimes of empire must be acknowledged, not rewritten.

5. Liberation from outdated elites

Those who profit from imperial nostalgia—including ideological actors like Yonas Biru—must lose their power to shape the national discourse.

This synthesis is not anti-Ethiopia; it is the only path to building a just, inclusive, and stable Ethiopia.

Conclusion

The root cause of Ethiopia’s political problems is the unresolved contradiction between imperial domination and the struggle for self-determination. Ethiopia stands at the crossroads of an incomplete dialectical process:

Thesis: Imperial-feudal domination

Antithesis: National liberation and multinational federalism

Incomplete Negation: Survival of old elites and ideologies

Future Synthesis: A democratic federation rooted in equality, truth, and justice

Until Ethiopia fully negates the ideological remnants of the feudal-imperial order—its language supremacy, its religious domination, its historical distortions—it will remain trapped in cycles of violence and fragmentation.

Those who attack Oromummaa or federalism are not offering solutions—they are protecting the past.

A new Ethiopia can emerge only when the old Ethiopia is finally, decisively, and permanently negated.

Dr Yonas Biru, Ethiopianist Politics, and the Amhara Nationalist Sphere:

Dr. Yonas Biru, Ethiopianist Politics, and the Amhara Nationalist Sphere:

By:Shumet Nigus Mengist

Alexandria ,Virginia 

A Contextual Analysis of His Relationship With ADP/APP and His Post-2018 Political Role**

The political role of Dr. Yonas Biru in the last seven years occupies a unique place in contemporary Ethiopian discourse. His critics accuse him of functioning as an ideological amplifier for Amhara nationalism and Ethiopianist anti-federalist narratives, while his own statements present himself as an independent technocrat whose political evolution was shaped by disappointment with institutional governance and the escalation of the Tigray conflict. Assessing this requires a contextual, historical, and philosophical analysis, situating his actions in the broader political environment of ADP/APP and the struggle over Ethiopia’s multinational constitutional order.

1. The Pre-Prosperity Context: ADP, Amhara Nationalism, and the Anti-Federalist Agenda

Before the merger that formed the Prosperity Party in 2019, the Amhara Democratic Party (ADP) was undergoing a profound ideological transformation. Influenced heavily by diaspora networks, its leading elites began promoting the argument that the 1995 FDRE Constitution was never endorsed by the Amhara people, and therefore lacked legitimacy. This position was not a mere legal critique but a political project aimed at:

delegitimizing the multinational federal system, and

undermining Oromo political consciousness, including Oromummaa.

During this pivotal moment, diaspora commentators who could articulate Ethiopianist centralization arguments in Western policy language became valuable to ADP circles. This is where Dr. Yonas Biru entered the ecosystem—not necessarily as a formal party member, but as a useful ideological intermediary, whose writings and interviews aligned with the broader anti-federalist framing emerging from Amhara elites.

These groups saw in Biru a polished intellectual voice capable of translating their core message—“federalism is a mistake; Oromummaa is a threat”—into internationally respectable language.

2. The Economic Advisory Council: Biru’s Own Account

Dr. Yonas Biru has stated that the only role he considered upon returning to Ethiopia in 2018 was membership in an Independent Economic Advisory Council (IEAC). According to his account:

He negotiated for two years with Mamo Mihretu and former Minister Girma Biru.

He refused to join unless the Council was fully independent from the government.

Eventually, the government agreed to his conditions.

After the Council was formed, “some members started pushing to make it a government organ,” leading to his resignation after five months.

He claims the government asked him not to resign.

He published two articles at the time defending his decision.

This account illustrates that he did hold real influence in the policy space of 2018–2019. It also shows that he perceived himself as a principled technocrat who resisted political capture.

However, even within this period of collaboration, his ideological proximity to Amhara elites remained evident through consistent alignment with Ethiopianist narratives in the diaspora.

3. Informal Advisory Relationships: A Parallel Network

Ethiopian intelligence sources, as well as political insiders, have long observed that Biru maintained informal advisory relations with senior Amhara figures:

Demeke Mekonnen, then Deputy PM and Foreign Minister

Gedu Andargachew, Foreign Minister

Belene Seyoum, PM’s press secretary

Mamo Mihretu, senior policy advisor and later Governor of the National Bank

These relationships were not random. They reflected ideological compatibility, especially regarding:

suspicion of multinational federalism,

resistance to Oromo-led political transformation, and

interest in using diaspora intellectuals to shape international narratives.

Multiple sources indicated that Biru helped draft diplomatic correspondence for Demeke and Gedu—work that later blended into his broader public rhetoric attacking Oromummaa.

4. Biru’s Own Claims of Continued Government Cooperation (2019–2020)

Contrary to accusations that he “returned to the U.S. and immediately started an anti-Oromo campaign,” Biru offers another timeline:

In November 2019, Billene Seyoum emailed him requesting

 “a formal analysis reviewing Ethiopia in a time of political transitions and reforms … for international news agencies.”

 Biru says he agreed and contributed.

In 2020, Mamo Mihretu similarly asked him to prepare analyses for international audiences.

In May 2020, at the height of the GERD diplomatic crisis, he claims:

He helped secure the involvement of Rev. Jesse Jackson.

He drafted a letter for Jackson addressed to the Congressional Black Caucus.

The letter gained traction in Washington.

Prime Minister Abiy called to thank him for this contribution.

These points show that the Prosperity Party government continued to use him as a diplomatic asset even after he left the Economic Council, and even while he was informally advising Amhara leaders.

This dual role—critic outside but collaborator inside—strengthened the perception that he occupied a liminal space between technocratic service and ideological activism.

5. The Turning Point: The Tigray War and Biru’s Radicalization

According to Biru, his break with Abiy Ahmed came with the Tigray conflict:

He says he supported the original “law enforcement operation.”

He claims he became critical when Abiy allegedly turned it into a “civil war.”

However, his public commentary after late 2020 did not target Abiy directly. Instead, it increasingly:

attacked Oromo identity,

portrayed Oromummaa as a civilizational danger,

dismissed Oromo intellectuals as extremists, and

framed multinational federalism as a historic mistake.

In practice, criticizing “the Oromo” became a surrogate for criticizing Abiy, echoing the messaging of Amhara Prosperity Party elites and Ethiopianist diaspora media.

Whether intentional or not, Biru’s rhetoric aligned perfectly with:

NAMA’s anti-federalist agenda,

ADP/APP’s historical rejection of the 1995 Constitution,

diaspora Amhara activists’ portrayal of Oromummaa as a tribal cult.

Thus, even if Biru personally claims neutrality, his public output strengthened the ideological narratives of Amhara nationalism and the Ethiopianist anti-Oromo messaging ecosystem.

6. Conclusion: 

A Dual Legacy—Technocrat or Ideologue?

Dr. Yonas Biru’s political identity since 2018 reflects a dual legacy:

1. Technocratic Collaborator (2018–2020)

He engaged with government leaders, contributed to international messaging, and played a limited diplomatic role.

2. Ideological Instrument (2020–2024)

Whether by design or by political drift, he became:

a central voice for anti-federalist Ethiopianism,

a preferred commentator in the Amhara nationalist sphere,

a consistent critic of Oromo identity, institutions, and culture,

a rhetorical tool in the wider assault on Oromummaa.

His personal narrative of principled independence does not erase the impact of his public discourse over the last seven years. His writings—often framed as scholarly critiques—have provided intellectual cover for efforts to delegitimize multinational federalism and demonize Oromo political identity.

In the end, the contradiction remains:

He presents himself as an independent professional betrayed by the government.

Yet his public rhetoric has become central to a political project long pursued by Ethiopianist and Amhara elites.

This is why, despite his claims, many perceive him not as a neutral economist but as a partisan ideologue whose work disproportionately targets Oromo identity and fuels the ongoing war of narratives against Oromummaa.

Yonas Biru and the Politics of Manufactured Outrage

 

Yonas Biru and the Politics of Manufactured Outrage

How an economist became the loudest microphone for Ethiopianist anti-federalism

By :Shumet Nigus Mengist

In Ethiopia’s toxic political arena, there is no shortage of loud voices. But few have reinvented themselves as dramatically—or as opportunistically—as Dr. Yonas Biru. Once known as a World Bank technocrat with modest influence, Biru has transformed into the diaspora’s most aggressive attack dog against Oromummaa, multinational federalism, and any political arrangement that threatens the old unitary Ethiopian idea.

Today, his commentaries circulate like scripture across Ethiopianist and Amhara-dominated social media spaces. Yet behind the performance lies a deeper political story—one that ties Biru to the ideological ambitions of the former ADP (now Amhara Prosperity Party) and the anti-federalist diaspora.

Let us be clear: this is not a personal story. This is a political ecosystem.

A Useful Technocrat at a Critical Moment

When Abiy Ahmed came to power in 2018, the ADP leadership—Demeke Mekonnen, Gedu Andargachew, and their diaspora echo chambers—were already campaigning against the 1995 Constitution. Their narrative was simple: the Amhara never endorsed the constitution; therefore, the federal system is illegitimate.

Their deeper goal was even clearer: dismantle multinational federalism and delegitimize Oromo political consciousness.

Enter Yonas Biru—a Western-based economist hungry for relevance and eager to speak the language of “national unity” in a way palatable to Washington and Brussels. He became, for lack of a better term, a useful intermediary. A polished voice to sanitize the raw nationalism of Amhara elites.

Even Biru’s own admissions confirm his proximity to power. He negotiated for two years to join an Independent Economic Advisory Council. He exchanged regular communications with policy heavyweights like Mamo Mihretu and Girma Biru. He received invitations from Billene Seyoum to write analyses for international media. He drafted diplomatic letters for Demeke Mekonnen and Gedu Andargachew.

These are not the footprints of an outsider. They are the fingerprints of an insider who operated quietly within the political architecture of the Prosperity Party.

The Turning Point: Ambition Denied

Then came the disappointment.

Biru did not secure the position he desperately wanted—the governorship of the National Bank of Ethiopia. The position went elsewhere, and Biru’s tone shifted sharply.

He now claims principled independence, insisting he resigned from the Economic Council because the government wanted to turn it into a political appendage. Maybe. But his transformation from a quiet technocrat to a full-time cultural warrior was too dramatic, too convenient, and too perfectly aligned with the agenda of anti-Oromo Ethiopianists.

When his political hopes faded, Biru redirected his critique—not at Abiy Ahmed, the man who denied him influence, but at the Oromo identity itself. This is not coincidence; it is political substitution.

When some cannot confront power directly, they attack the community associated with it.

The Anti-Oromo Crusade Disguised as Analysis

Since 2020, Biru has reinvented himself as the philosopher-king of Ethiopianist resentment. His commentary is predictable, repetitive, and serves one core purpose:

Delegitimize Oromummaa and weaken multinational federalism.

His claims:

Oromummaa is a “lie.”

Gadaa is “half democracy, half apartheid.”

Oromo identity politics are “the cancer of Ethiopia.”

Oromo intellectuals are extremists or frauds.

This is not analysis. It is propaganda with an academic accent.

Amhara elites and Ethiopianist activists use his work as intellectual cover to justify their broader assault on federalism and on Oromo political legitimacy. His writing functions exactly as it is intended: to injure the dignity of a people and to re-center the old imperial narrative as the only acceptable Ethiopian identity.

A Convenient Selective Memory

Biru wants the world to believe that his fierce opposition to the government began with the Tigray conflict. He says he supported the initial operation but opposed the “civil war” that followed.

But his writings tell a different story: his sharpest attacks have always targeted Oromo identity, not state policy. He critiques “Oromummaa” far more than he critiques war crimes, corruption, or authoritarianism.

Why?

Because his audience—Amhara elites and Ethiopianist diaspora networks—reward him for attacking Oromo identity, not for challenging centralized power.

The Legacy of Manufactured Outrage

In the end, Yonas Biru’s political relevance does not come from his economics degree, his brief advisory roles, or his abandoned Council seat. It comes from something much simpler:

He says out loud what Ethiopianist centralists want to hear, in English, with confidence.

He became their microphone.

Their translator.

Their intellectual veneer.

But loudness is not wisdom.

Insults are not analysis.

And no amount of academic vocabulary can hide the political truth:

For seven years, Yonas Biru has fueled an ideological crusade against Oromo identity—because attacking Oromummaa became the easiest substitute for confronting the failures of Ethiopia’s ruling elites.

History will not remember him as the economist who changed Ethiopia.

It will remember him as the man who mistook bitterness for principle and propaganda for scholarship.

Ethiopia’s Economy and the Enron Analogy.

Ethiopia’s Economy and the Enron Analogy

The story of Enron Corporation in the United States is one of meteoric rise and catastrophic collapse. Once celebrated as a model of innovation and growth, Enron built its reputation on financial engineering, manipulated reporting, and artificial expansion. When the truth emerged, the company collapsed almost overnight, leaving behind a trail of destroyed wealth, broken trust, and shattered livelihoods. The Ethiopian economy today shares troubling similarities with this cautionary tale, reflecting a pattern of inflated promises, hidden vulnerabilities, and systemic mismanagement.

Illusion of Growth

Enron projected itself as a dynamic, ever-expanding enterprise. It reported soaring profits, created new market categories, and convinced investors that it was ahead of its time. In reality, much of its growth was based on accounting tricks and off-balance-sheet structures designed to hide debt. Ethiopia, likewise, has presented itself as one of the fastest-growing economies in Africa, boasting impressive GDP numbers. Yet, this growth often masks underlying weaknesses—such as rising external debt, heavy reliance on imports, and limited industrial productivity. The glowing statistics conceal deep structural fragilities, much like Enron’s balance sheets once did.

Debt, Manipulation, and Over-Confidence

Enron borrowed heavily to finance its expansion, hiding liabilities through shell companies while projecting an image of strength. Ethiopia, too, has relied heavily on massive foreign loans to build infrastructure and support state-led projects. Chinese loans for railways, dams, and industrial parks created an illusion of unstoppable progress, but they left the country trapped in a cycle of debt servicing without corresponding productivity gains. Just as Enron executives believed their own myth of invincibility, Ethiopia’s leadership often portrays economic strength while ignoring the structural imbalances that make the economy fragile.

Lack of Transparency

One of Enron’s fatal flaws was its opaque financial system. Investors and regulators struggled to understand its complex web of transactions. Ethiopia faces a similar problem of opacity. The centralisation of economic control within the ruling elite, combined with unreliable reporting, makes it difficult for citizens and even international partners to assess the real state of the economy. Inflation is underreported, the national currency is repeatedly devalued without sustainable backup, and corruption undermines official data. Like Enron, Ethiopia is caught in a cycle where truth becomes the most significant threat.

Collapse of Trust

Enron’s downfall was not only financial but moral. Its executives betrayed employees, investors, and the public by prioritising personal gain over honesty. Similarly, the Ethiopian economy suffers from a crisis of trust. Citizens see rampant corruption, illicit capital flight, and elite enrichment while ordinary people face skyrocketing prices, unemployment, and shortages. The gap between official rhetoric and lived reality erodes public confidence. Internationally, investors are hesitant to trust Ethiopia’s economic policies, fearing political instability and a lack of accountability.

Lessons and Warnings

The Enron scandal reminds us that unsustainable growth built on manipulation cannot last. Ethiopia today risks a similar reckoning. Inflation, food insecurity, political instability, and mounting debt point to a potential economic unravelling if transparency, reform, and accountability are not prioritised. Just as Enron’s bankruptcy became a symbol of corporate deception, Ethiopia could become a symbol of state-level economic mismanagement if corrective measures are not taken.

In conclusion, the Ethiopian economy bears resemblance to Enron not because of identical circumstances, but because of similar patterns: the illusion of prosperity, manipulation of truth, debt-fueled expansion, and erosion of trust. The cautionary tale of Enron should serve as a warning. Without honesty, transparency, and structural reform, Ethiopia risks repeating the same tragic trajectory—an empire of illusion collapsing under the weight of its own falsehoods.

 

AGENDA SUBMITTED TO THE NATIONAL DIALOGUE COMMISSION, TORONTO, CANADA – SEPTEMBER 6, 2025.

Habtamu Nini Abino 

 

 Ambassador Mohamud Drir and Habtamu Abino  in Toronto, September 6,2025

PART ONE

 Constitutional Amendments and “Red Line” Provisions in Ethiopia’s Constitution

This agenda is submitted to the Ethiopian National Dialogue Commission (ENDC) for the National Dialogue session scheduled in Toronto, Canada, on September 6, 2025. The agenda focuses on discussing the Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE), enacted in 1995, specifically addressing provisions considered “red lines” that are politically or socially sensitive to amend. While the FDRE Constitution does not explicitly designate any articles as unamendable, specific provisions are foundational to Ethiopia’s federal and democratic structure, making them critical to the state’s identity and unity. Drawing from the Constitution’s text, historical context, and political discourse, particularly around ethnic federalism and national unity, this submission identifies key articles for discussion during the dialogue.

Key Articles Considered as Potential “Red Lines”

The following articles are deemed critical due to their role in Ethiopia’s federal, multi-ethnic framework and are proposed for discussion to assess their significance and implications for amendment:

Article 1: Nomenclature of the State

Provision: Establishes Ethiopia as a Federal Democratic Republic with a federal and democratic state structure.

Why a Red Line? This article defines Ethiopia’s federal framework, accommodating ethnic diversity through regional states. Amending it could undermine the federal system, a core compromise for Ethiopia’s multi-ethnic society, including groups like the Oromo. Proposals to shift to a unitary state or confederation, as suggested by some scholars, are highly contentious and could destabilise ethnic balances, risking tensions among diverse groups.

Article 2: Ethiopian Territorial Jurisdiction

Provision: Defines Ethiopia’s territorial boundaries as determined by international agreements.

Why a Red Line? Any amendment altering territorial integrity could provoke disputes with neighbouring countries or internal ethnic groups tied to specific regions, such as the Oromia Region. This article is foundational to national sovereignty and unity, making it a sensitive issue for discussion in the dialogue.

Article 8: Sovereignty of the People

Provision: Vests all sovereimovement, preservation ofpeoples of Ethiopia, exercised through elected representatives and direct democratic participation.

Why a Red Line? This article underpins Ethiopia’s ethnic federalism, recognising the collective rights of ethnic groups like the Oromo, Amhara, and Tigray. Changing it could erode the principle of self-determination, a core demand of historically marginalised groups, including the Oromo, and is likely to face significant opposition.

Article 9: Supremacy of the Constitution

Provision: Declares the Constitution as the supreme law, invalidating any law, custom, or decision contrary to it.

Why a Red Line? This ensures the Constitution’s authority over all governance, safeguarding against arbitrary rule. Amending it could weaken the legal framework protecting ethnic and individual rights, which is critical for groups like the Oromo under Ethiopia’s federal system and vital for ensuring legal stability.

Article 39: Rights of Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples

Provision: This provision grants every nation, nationality, and people the right to self-determination, including secession, cultural development, and self-governance within a federal structure.

Why a Red Line? This is perhaps the most sensitive article, codifying ethnic federalism and the right to secession, a cornerstone of Ethiopia’s accommodation of ethnic diversity. It ensures cultural identity (e.g., Oromummaa) and regional autonomy for the Oromo and other groups. Amending or removing it could inflame ethnic tensions, as it is seen as a safeguard against centralised domination, a historical grievance from the imperial era. However, its secession clause is controversial, with some arguing it threatens national unity, making it a critical point for dialogue.

Articles 13–44 (Chapter Three): Fundamental Rights and Freedoms

Provisions: Encompass human and democratic rights, including equality (Article 25), freedom of religion (Article 27), and freedom of movement (Article 32), applicable to all persons, including foreigners, except for specific Ethiopian-only rights (e.g., voting).

Why a Red Line? These articles enshrine universal human rights and are aligned with international treaties like the UDHR and ICCPR, which Ethiopia has ratified. They protect individual and collective rights, such as the Oromo’s freedom to practice Islam or Christianity and maintain cultural practices like Irreechaa. Amending these could undermine Ethiopia’s human rights commitments and alienate diverse groups, making them essential for discussion.

Constitutional Amendment Process and Implicit Red Lines

The FDRE Constitution outlines its amendment process in Article 104 (Initiation of Amendments) and Article 105 (Amendment Procedures):

Article 104: Amendments can be proposed by a two-thirds majority of the House of Peoples’ Representatives, the House of Federation, or one-third of the State Councils.

Article 105: Amendments require a two-thirds majority in both federal houses and, for specific provisions, approval by a majority of State Councils. Notably, amendments to Chapter Three (Fundamental Rights and Freedoms) and Article 105 require approval by a majority of State Councils representing Ethiopia’s ethnic regions.

While no article is explicitly unamendable, the stringent requirements for amending Chapter Three and the federal structure suggest these are de facto “red lines.” Changing them requires a broad consensus across ethnic groups, which is politically challenging given Ethiopia’s diverse and polarised landscape. For instance, altering Article 39’s secession clause could face opposition from groups like the Oromo or Tigray, who view it as a safeguard. In contrast, others may advocate for its revision to strengthen national unity. This tension warrants careful discussion in the dialogue.

Political and Social Context

The “red lines” concept emerges from political discourse rather than the constitutional text. Ethiopia’s ethnic federalism, established to address the historic marginalisation of groups like the Oromo, makes articles related to ethnic rights (e.g., Article 39) and the federal structure (e.g., Article 1) politically sensitive. Discussions around constitutional reform, as noted in sources like borkena.com, suggest that while some articles (e.g., nomenclature in Article 1) could be reviewed, changes to foundational principles like ethnic federalism or self-determination risk national stability. With their history of resistance and strong cultural identity (Oromummaa), the Oromo would likely view amendments to these articles as threats to their autonomy and cultural rights.

The ongoing National Dialogue (2022–2025) highlights debates over constitutional amendments. Some groups advocate revising Article 39 to remove secession rights, arguing it undermines unity, while Oromo nationalists defend it as essential to ethnic self-determination. The dialogue’s inclusivity challenges underscore the difficulty of amending these provisions without alienating key stakeholders, a key issue for this session in Toronto.

Critical Perspective

The absence of explicit “unamendable” articles balances flexibility and stability but leaves room for interpretation. The establishment narrative, rooted in the 1995 Constitution’s ethnic federalism, emphasises diversity, but critics argue it entrenches ethnic divisions. For the Oromo, these articles protect their cultural and political marginalisation in Oromia, yet some may see rigid adherence to ethnic federalism as limiting national cohesion. The lack of clear “red lines” allows dialogue but risks instability if sensitive provisions are targeted without consensus, a point for stakeholders to address.

Proposed Discussion Points for the National Dialogue

Assessing Sensitivity: Which articles (e.g., Article 39, Chapter Three) are most critical to maintaining Ethiopia’s federal and democratic structure, and why?

Balancing Unity and Diversity: How can the dialogue address tensions between ethnic self-determination (e.g., Article 39) and national unity without destabilising the country?

Inclusivity in Amendments: How can the amendment process (Articles 104–105) ensure representation of diverse groups, like the Oromo, in constitutional reform?

Safeguarding Rights: How can amendments to foundational articles protect human rights and cultural identities (e.g., Oromummaa) while fostering cohesion?

Conclusion

The FDRE Constitution does not formally designate articles as unamendable. Still, Articles 1, 2, 8, 9, 39, and Chapter Three (Articles 13–44) are considered “red lines” due to their foundational role in Ethiopia’s federal, multi-ethnic framework and human rights commitments. These provisions are critical for groups like the Oromo, ensuring their cultural identity and autonomy. Amending them requires extraordinary consensus, making changes politically sensitive. This agenda calls for the National Dialogue Commission to facilitate inclusive discussions in Toronto to address these provisions, balancing ethnic diversity with national unity.

  

PART TWO

Oromo Perspective on Constitutional “Red Line” Provisions and the National Dialogue

The Oromo, as Ethiopia’s largest ethnic group, have a significant stake in the National Dialogue scheduled for September 6, 2025, in Toronto, particularly regarding the “red line” provisions of the FDRE Constitution (1995). These provisions—Articles 1, 2, 8, 9, 39, and Chapter Three (Articles 13–44)—are critical to their cultural identity (Oromummaa), political autonomy, and historical struggle against marginalisation. Below, I elaborate on the Oromo perspective, their priorities for the dialogue, and how these constitutional articles shape their engagement.

Oromo Perspective on Key “Red Line” Provisions

Article 1: Nomenclature of the State (Federal Democratic Republic)

Oromo View: The federal structure is non-negotiable for many Oromo, as it grants regional autonomy through the Oromia Region, allowing self-governance and cultural expression (e.g., use of Afaan Oromo). Historical centralisation under imperial and Derg regimes suppressed Oromo identity, safeguarding this article against reverting to unitary rule.

Dialogue Priority: Oromo stakeholders may advocate for strengthening federalism to ensure equitable resource distribution and political representation, resisting any push toward a unitary state, which some fear could marginalise ethnic groups.

Article 2: Ethiopian Territorial Jurisdiction

Oromo View: Ethiopia's territorial integrity, including the Oromia Region, is vital for maintaining Oromo lands, which are central to their economic and cultural survival. Historical land dispossession during Menelik’s era remains a grievance, and any amendment threatening regional boundaries could be seen as undermining Oromo rights.

Dialogue Priority: A key focus will be to ensure that territorial discussions respect regional boundaries and address land-related grievances, particularly in Oromia.

Article 8: Sovereignty of the People

Oromo View: This article’s recognition of sovereignty for “nations, nationalities, and peoples” aligns with Oromo demands for self-determination. It empowers them to participate in national governance while preserving regional authority.

Dialogue Priority: Oromo participants may push for mechanisms to enhance direct democratic participation, such as stronger regional representation in federal institutions, to reflect their population size and historical contributions.

Article 9: Supremacy of the Constitution

Oromo View: The Constitution’s supremacy protects against arbitrary governance, which historically disadvantaged the Oromo through cultural assimilation policies. It ensures legal recourse for rights violations, a critical issue for a group with a history of political exclusion.

Dialogue Priority: Oromo stakeholders may emphasise maintaining this article to safeguard constitutional protections, particularly cultural and linguistic rights, while addressing enforcement gaps.

Article 39: Rights of Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples

Oromo View: This article is central to Oromo identity, guaranteeing self-determination, cultural development (e.g., Oromummaa), and regional autonomy. The right to secession, though controversial, is seen as a symbolic safeguard against centralised oppression. Oromo nationalists, drawing on historical resistance to imperial rule, view this article as non-negotiable.

Dialogue Priority: The Oromo may fiercely defend Article 39, particularly its self-determination clauses, while discussing the secession clause. They may seek clarity on balancing ethnic rights with national unity to prevent misinterpretations that fuel ethnic tensions.

Articles 13–44 (Chapter Three): Fundamental Rights and Freedoms

Oromo View: These articles protect the Oromo’s rights to practice their religion (Islam, Christianity, or Waaqeffannaa), maintain cultural practices like Irreechaa, and enjoy equality and freedom of movemepreservation ofntiontiontiontiontionng Oromummaa within a multi-ethnic state.

Dialogue Priority: We will focus on ensuring these rights remain robust and on mechanisms to address violations (e.g., discrimination against Oromo in urban areas). Oromo participants may advocate for more vigorous enforcement of cultural and linguistic rights.

Oromo Priorities for the National Dialogue

The National Dialogue (2022–2025) provides a platform for the Oromo to address constitutional and historical issues. Key priorities include:

Inclusivity: Ensuring Oromo representation, including urban, rural, and diaspora voices, to reflect their diversity. The Toronto session, targeting the diaspora, is critical for incorporating global Oromo perspectives.

Historical Grievances: These concerns include land dispossession, cultural suppression, and political marginalisation during the imperial and Derg eras, which fuel demands for stronger constitutional protections.

Balancing Oromummaa and National Unity: Navigating tensions between Oromo cultural identity and Ethiopian unity, particularly regarding Article 39’s secession clause, which some view as divisive.

Economic Equity: Advocating for fair resource allocation to Oromia, addressing disparities that have sparked protests (e.g., Oromo Protests, 2014–2016).

Cultural Preservation: Reinforcing constitutional protections for Afaan Oromo, Irreechaa, and the Gadaa system, ensuring they are not diluted by amendments.

Challenges and Opportunities

Challenges:

Inclusivity Gaps: Some Oromo groups, particularly opposition factions, may feel excluded from the dialogue, as seen in criticisms of the ENDC’s process. Ensuring broad representation is critical.

Polarisation: Debates over Article 39 (secession) could polarise Oromo nationalists and pro-unity groups, requiring careful mediation.

Implementation: Past dialogues have struggled with follow-through, as seen in Yemen. The Oromo will likely demand precise mechanisms for implementing agreements.

Opportunities:

Consensus-Building: The dialogue can bridge divides between Oromo and other groups (e.g., Amhara, Tigray) by addressing shared concerns like governance and equity.

Diaspora Engagement: The Toronto session offers a chance to include Oromo diaspora voices, strengthening global support for their priorities.

Reform Advocacy: The Oromo can push for constitutional reforms that enhance federalism while preserving national cohesion, aligning with their vision of Oromummaa within Ethiopia.

Recommendations for the Toronto Session

Facilitate Oromo Representation: Ensure diverse Oromo voices (youth, women, diaspora) are included, with translation services for Afaan Oromo to encourage participation.

Focus on Article 39: Hold working groups to discuss balancing self-determination with national unity, addressing Oromo concerns about centralised oppression.

Address Historical Grievances: Create a sub-session on land and cultural rights, allowing Oromo participants to propose constitutional safeguards.

Ensure Transparency: Publicly share dialogue outcomes to build trust and address Oromo scepticism about government-led processes.

Engage Neutral Facilitators: Given historical mistrust between Oromo groups and the state, use international mediators to ensure impartiality.

Conclusion

The Oromo perspective emphasises the importance of Articles 1, 2, 8, 9, 39, and Chapter Three as “red lines” that protect their autonomy, cultural identity (Oromummaa), and rights within Ethiopia’s federal system. The National Dialogue in Toronto offers a critical opportunity to address these provisions, ensuring they balance Oromo aspirations with national unity. The dialogue can strengthen Ethiopia's multi-ethnic framework by prioritising inclusivity, historical redress, and robust constitutional protections.

PART Three

Enhancing Linguistic Equality in Ethiopia: 

Adopting Multiple Federal Working Languages

The Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE), enacted in 1995, enshrines linguistic diversity as a cornerstone of national identity. Article 5 explicitly states that "All Ethiopian languages shall enjoy equal state recognition," while designating Amharic as the working language of the Federal Government and allowing regional states to determine their own.f50a66 This provision acknowledges Ethiopia's rich tapestry of over 80 languages. Yet, the exclusive use of Amharic at the federal level creates practical inequalities, limiting access for non-Amharic speakers to government services, education, and justice. To truly uphold constitutional equality, the Federal Government must adopt at least five major languages as working languages, including Afaan Oromo, Tigrinya, Somali, Sidama, Afar, and Wolayta, fostering inclusivity in a multi-ethnic society. Drawing from South Africa's successful multilingual policy, this reform could bridge divides and promote national unity.

Currently, Amharic's dominance marginalises Ethiopia's linguistic diversity. With Oromo spoken by over 36 million people (about 34% of the population), Amharic by 31.8 million (29%), Somali by 6.7 million, Tigrinya by approximately 7 million, and others like Sidama (4 million), Afar (1.8 million), and Wolayta (2.4 million) representing significant communities, the single-language policy excludes millions.3e0c9a4bfa85 Non-Amharic speakers face barriers in federal institutions, perpetuating historical marginalisation from imperial eras when Amharic was imposed. Adopting multiple working languages would democratize access, enabling citizens to engage in governance without linguistic hurdles. For instance, official documents, parliamentary proceedings, and public services in Afaan Oromo—the most widely spoken language—would empower Oromo communities. At the same time, Tigrinya and Somali would include northern and eastern regions, respectively. Sidama, Afar, and Wolayta, spoken in southern and eastern zones, would ensure representation for smaller but vital groups, aligning with Article 5's equality mandate.

South Africa's Constitution provides a compelling model. Section 6 recognises 11 official languages (now 12, including South African Sign Language), mandating "parity of esteem" and equitable treatment.6df37f314f5f post-apartheid, this policy addressed linguistic divisions, promoting reconciliation by rotating languages in government and education. National departments adopt at least three languages based on regional demographics, enhancing public participation and reducing alienation.0acc28 Similarly, Ethiopia could implement a rotational system system system system systemtem contextual system, where federal communications use Amharic alongside Oromo, Tigrinya, Somali, Sidama, Afar, and Wolayta in relevant contexts. This would not dilute Amharic but elevate others, fostering economic opportunities, cultural preservation, and social cohesion.

The benefits are multifaceted: improved governance efficiency, as citizens interact in native tongues; reduced ethnic tensions by affirming equal rights; and enhanced national identity through diversity. As in South Africa, challenges like translation costs could be mitigated via technology and phased implementation.

In conclusion, to fulfil Article 5's promise, Ethiopia must expand federal working languages beyond Amharic. Adopting Afaan Oromo, Tigrinya, Somali, Sidama, Afar, Wolayta, and others would create equitable opportunities, mirroring South Africa's inclusive approach. This reform is essential for a truly federal democracy, ensuring no language—and no people—is left behind.

 

Kleptocracy, kakistocracy, and deep state networks, and how these terms relate to perceptions of governance like those expressed about Ethiopia today.

 Kleptocremainskakistocracy, deep state networks, and how these terms relate to perceptions of governance, like those expressed about Ethiopia today.

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1.Understanding the Concepts

1.1. Kleptocracy

Kleptocracy comes from the Greek kleptēs (thief) and kratos (power or rule). It literally means “rule by thieves.”
In a kleptocracy, political leaders and their networks systematically use public office for personal enrichment. This form of government prioritises:

• Looting of public resources – diverting national wealth into private hands.
• Institutional capture – ensuring that courts, police, tax offices, and state companies are staffed by loyalists who enable or cover up corruption.
• State–business collusion – where political elites hold stakes in companies that benefit from state contracts and licenses.

Kleptocracy is not merely corruption on a small scale; it is structural. The entire political system is geared toward extraction rather than service delivery.
Common signs include:

• Sudden enrichment of officials after assuming office.
• State contracts are consistently awarded to politically connected individuals or companies.
• Public funds are disappearing with little to no accounting.

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1.2. Kakistocracy

Kakistocracy combines the Greek kakistos (worst) with kratos (rule). It means “rule by the worst, least qualified, or most unscrupulous citizens.”
While kleptocracy focuses on self-enrichment, kakistocracy emphasises incompetence. In a kakistocracy:

• Leaders lack the skills, education, or ethical foundation to govern effectively.
• Public appointments are based on loyalty, ethnicity, or personal loyalty rather than merit.
• Policy failures are frequent because decision-makers cannot understand or manage complex systems.
• Critical institutions—education, health, economy, and justice—deteriorate under poor leadership.

Kakistocracy often overlaps with kleptocracy: the worst leaders may be the most corrupt. However, a state can be incompetent without being systematically looted (or vice versa).

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1.3. Deep State

The “deep state” refers to informal, hidden networks of power within a country that operate beyond the control of formal democratic or constitutional institutions.
While the term is sometimes used conspiratorially, in political science, it describes:

• Security and intelligence agencies, or parts of them, act independently of elected officials.
• Elite economic or political networks that manipulate policy outcomes regardless of official procedures.
• Military factions or foreign intelligence assets with long-term influence on state decisions.

The deep state is not necessarily a single conspiracy; rather, it can be a set of overlapping power centres:

• Influential generals with loyal armed units.
• Intelligence officers with compromising files on politicians.
• Business elites who fund and direct key ministries.
• Foreign governments leverage aid, loans, or covert operations to shape domestic politics.

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2. How These Concepts Intersect in Practice

These three forms of governance failure often reinforce one another:

• A kleptocratic elite needs to remain in power to continue looting, so they fill government posts with loyal but often incompetent (kakistocratic) officials who will not challenge them.
• Incompetence leads to public discontent, so the elite depends on deep state security and intelligence networks to suppress dissent and control narratives.
• The profound state benefits from kleptocracy because it can siphon resources without oversight, and it benefits from kakistocracy because weak leaders are easier to manipulate.

This creates a self-sustaining system:

1. Corruption drains public resources.
2. Incompetence prevents effective governance.
3. Hidden networks protect the corrupt and incompetent from accountability.

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3. Why People Apply These Terms to Ethiopia

When people say Ethiopia today is run by kleptocracy, kakistocracy, and a deep state, they are expressing a perception that:

• The formal government institutions—parliament, ministries, courts—do not genuinely exercise power.
• Real decision-making happens in informal networks of security officials, ethnic-political elites, and business tycoons.
• Many leaders in public office are unqualified or indifferent to public welfare.
• Public resources—from state enterprises to foreign aid—are diverted into private accounts or used to reward political loyalty.

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3.1. The Kleptocratic Dimension

Ethiopia’s political economy is highly centralised in terms of power but fragmented in terms of loyalty. In such a system:

• State-owned enterprises can be used as cash cows for ruling elites.
• Foreign investment contracts (mining, telecom, agriculture) may be negotiated secretly, with rents flowing to a few insiders.
• Aid and loans from international donors can be misused when monitoring is weak, often funnelled into patronage systems.

Historical precedents exist—from the imperial era through the Derg and into the EPRDF and Prosperity Party era—of elites enriching themselves while the public struggles.

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3.2. The Kakistocratic Dimension

Kakistocracy manifests when:

• Political appointments are based on ethnic affiliation or personal loyalty rather than competence.
• Ministers and agency heads have little technical expertise in their areas.
• Critical institutions (health, education, infrastructure) are mismanaged, leading to crises despite available resources.
• Policies are reactive and short-term, driven by political survival rather than national development.

Incompetence often deepens ethnic and regional inequalities, fuels conflict, and erodes state legitimacy.

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3.3. The Deep State Dimension

In Ethiopia, the concept of the “deep state” is linked to:

• Security and intelligence structures built up over decades that retain influence regardless of political transitions.
• Factions within the military and police with autonomous agendas.
• Networks of diaspora financiers, foreign lobbyists, and business elites who shape domestic politics from behind the scenes.
• Ethno-political militias aligned with parts of the security apparatus.

This perception is strengthened when:

• Key decisions are made without public debate.
• Military operations, security deals, or political settlements occur outside the formal legislative process.
• Governments change leaders, but policies and patterns of control remain the same.

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4. Consequences for Governance and Society

When these three features combine:

1. Erosion of Trust – Citizens stop believing in state institutions because they see them as tools of self-enrichment and repression.
2. Weak Service Delivery – Education, health care, and infrastructure suffer because funds are diverted and leadership is inept.
3. Entrenched Inequality – Wealth and power concentrate in the hands of a few, deepening divisions between ethnic, regional, and class groups.
4. Cycle of Instability – Public frustration leads to protests or insurgencies; the deep state responds with repression, which fuels more resistance.

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5. Breaking the Cycle

To move away from a system perceived as kleptocratic, kakistocratic, and deep state–controlled, several conditions must be met:

• Institutional Reform – Strengthening independent courts, audit bodies, and media.
• Merit-Based Appointments – Depoliticising the civil service and prioritising competence.
• Transparency and Accountability – Making public procurement and contracts open to scrutiny.
• Security Sector Reform – Ensuring the military and intelligence agencies are accountable to elected authorities.
• Civic Engagement – Empowering citizens to participate in governance beyond ethnic or partisan lines.

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Conclusion

When Ethiopians or observers describe the current state as one of kleptocracy, kakistocracy, and deep state control, they are pointing to a pattern in which:

• Public power is used for private enrichment.
• Leadership quality is deliberately degraded to preserve control.
• Absolute authority lies in hidden networks rather than constitutional institutions.

These dynamics are not unique to Ethiopia—they have appeared in various forms in other countries experiencing governance crises. However, Ethiopia’s situation is intensified by its ethnic federal structure, history of a centralised security apparatus, and ongoing political instability. Understanding these terms helps clarify the critiques and points the way toward reforms that could restore legitimacy, competence, and transparency to governance.

PART I

The historical case study tracing how kleptocracy, kakistocracy, and deep state elements have appeared across Ethiopia’s modern political eras, connecting the theory I gave you to actual events and patterns.

Case Study: Ethiopia’s Political Evolution Through the Lens of Kleptocracy, Kakistocracy, and Deep State

1. Imperial Era (Haile Selassie, 1930–1974)

Kleptocratic Features

The imperial court and nobility maintained vast landholdings acquired through conquest and royal grants.

Land taxes and rents enriched the elite while peasants bore heavy burdens.

Public resources often funded royal patronage—lavish palaces, elite schools for the aristocracy, and ceremonial projects—while rural infrastructure lagged.

Kakistocratic Features

Ministerial positions were frequently assigned based on loyalty to the emperor rather than administrative skill.

Many provincial governors were appointed from the nobility with little local governance training, resulting in poor public service delivery.

Centralised decision-making slowed urgent reforms, including land redistribution.

Deep State Elements

The imperial security apparatus, especially the police and military intelligence units, acted to preserve the monarchy.

Political dissent was closely monitored, and influential provincial lords operated semi-autonomously, controlling local resources and security forces.

2. The Derg / Military Socialist Era (1974–1991)

Kleptocratic Features

Officially, the Derg pursued socialism, abolishing private land ownership. But in practice, the top military and party officials enjoyed privileged access to the state housing, vehicles, and goods.

Nationalised companies often served as personal revenue streams for senior officers.

Corruption flourished in the black-market networks controlled by politically connected figures.

Kakistocratic Features

Governance was dominated by military officers with little training in economics, education, or health policy.

Ideological purity outweighed competence, leading to disastrous economic and agricultural policies, including the poorly planned villagisation program.

Central planning was rigid, ignoring local needs and expertise

Deep State Elements

The security state became all-encompassing: military intelligence, state security (Kebur Zebegna), and local surveillance committees tightly controlled the population.

Decisions were concentrated within a small group around Mengistu Haile Mariam, with minimal transparency or institutional checks.

Factional rivalries inside the military leadership meant that key policies often reflected power struggles rather than public interest.

3. EPRDF Era (1991–2018)

Kleptocratic Features

The party–state fusion allowed the ruling TPLF/EPRDF to control lucrative state enterprises in telecom, construction, and agriculture.

Corruption scandals emerged around public works, sugar projects, and dam construction contracts.

Business elites tied to party structures benefited disproportionately from privatisation and foreign investment deals.

Kakistocratic Features

Ethnic loyalty and party discipline outweighed merit in appointments.

Regional leaders were sometimes chosen for political reliability rather than technical ability, leading to uneven governance capacity across federal states.

Policy debate within the ruling coalition was often staged rather than substantive, discouraging innovative governance.

Deep State Elements

The intelligence and security network, inherited from the Derg but modernised with surveillance technology, retained outsized influence over political life.

Military procurement and operations were often opaque, run by trusted insiders.

Even after leadership reshuffles, the same security and economic elite circles remained dominant behind the scenes.

4. Prosperity Party Era (2019–Present)

Kleptocratic Features

Reports of elite capture of state contracts and aid funds persist, now involving networks tied to new political factions.

Some regional administrations have been accused of diverting humanitarian supplies and public budgets to fund militias or enrich local officials.

State-owned enterprises continue to be leveraged for patronage and political financing.

Kakistocratic Features

Political appointments are often made to satisfy ethnic alliances rather than selecting the most capable administrators.

Critical ministries, including health, education, and infrastructure, have faced management crises due to inexperienced or politically beholden leadership.

Policy implementation is inconsistent, hampered by poor coordination between federal and regional levels.

Deep State Elements

The security sector remains a powerful political actor, with military, police, and intelligence services deeply involved in political decisions.

Informal networks—linking parts of the diaspora, military officers, and business elites—shape strategic policies without public debate.

Parallel power structures, including ethnic militias and politically connected business cartels, sometimes override official state authority.

Patterns Across the Eras

Looking at these four periods, some commentators stand out:

1. Continuity of Informal Power – Regardless of ideology (monarchist, socialist, federalist), Ethiopia’s political order has consistently featured hidden networks that shape governance outside formal institutions.

2. Resource Capture – State resources have often been treated as spoils for the ruling coalition, whether aristocrats, military officers, or party elites.

3. Weak Institutional Checks—Courts, legislatures, and the media have rarely been fully independent, allowing kleptocratic and deep state practices to flourish.

4. Meritocracy Undermined – Across eras, loyalty—whether to the emperor, the party, or an ethnic coalition—has outweighed competence in public appointments.

Implications for the Present

When Ethiopians today describe the government as kleptocratic, kakistocratic, and controlled by a deep state, they are drawing on this long history:

The kleptocracy label reflects the entrenched habit of resource diversion for elite benefit.

The kakistocracy label reflects decades of prioritising loyalty over skill in public service.

The deep state label reflects the persistence of hidden, informal networks that can outlast formal leadership changes.

These perceptions are not only about the last few years—they tap into a political legacy that spans the imperial court, revolutionary militarism, one-party dominance, and today’s fragile federal order.

PART III 

Enemies of Good Governance and Democracy: Kleptocracy, Kakistocracy, and Deep State Networks

Good governance and democracy rest on transparency, accountability, merit-based leadership, and the supremacy of formal institutions over informal power. When these foundations are compromised, governance becomes significant and disconnected from the public interest. Three forces—kleptocracy, kakistocracy, and deep state networks—are particularly corrosive, and in countries like Ethiopia, their perceived presence has become a major obstacle to democratic progress.

Kleptocracy: Rule by Theft

Kleptocracy occurs when those in power use state institutions to enrich themselves and their networks rather than serve the public. It goes beyond petty corruption; it is a system in which resource extraction is the primary function of government. Public contracts, aid, and state-owned enterprises are diverted to benefit elites, leaving essential services underfunded and infrastructure neglected. In Ethiopia, perceptions of kleptocracy stem from allegations of elite capture of state resources, opaque foreign investment deals, and the diversion of humanitarian aid into patronage systems. Such practices erode public trust, distort economic priorities, and hollow out institutions based on the public interest.

Kakistocracy: Rule by the Worst

Kakistocracy describes governance by the least qualified or most unscrupulous leaders. It thrives when political appointments are made on the basis of loyalty, ethnic affiliation, or personal allegiance rather than competence and integrity. In Ethiopia’s current political climate, critics point to unqualified individuals holding senior positions in ministerial and regional administrations and public enterprises. This results in poor policy design, weak service delivery, and inability to manage crises effectively. Kakistocracy not only undermines efficiency—it normalizes mediocrity and erodes the principle that leadership should be earned through merit and capability.

Deep State Networks: Rule from the Shadows

The term “deep state” refers to entrenched, informal networks of power—often involving military, intelligence, and economic elites—that operate beyond the control of elected or constitutional bodies. In Ethiopia, perceptions of a deep state are linked to the continuing influence of security institutions, politically connected business cartels, and diaspora-linked financiers who can shape policy and security decisions without public scrutiny. These networks can bypass formal checks and balances, undermine civilian authority, and perpetuate elite interests regardless of who holds office. The deep state thrives in secrecy, making it exceptionally resistant to reform.

How They Interact to Undermine Democracy

When kleptocracy, kakistocracy, and deep state power overlap, they form a self-reinforcing system:

Kleptocracy requires protection from oversight, which deep state networks provide.

Deep state actors prefer weak, loyal leaders, which perpetuates kakistocracy.

Kakistocracy’s incompetence creates crises that kleptocrats and deep state operatives exploit to consolidate control.

The result is a vicious cycle where democratic institutions are hollowed out, public participation is reduced to ritual, and governance becomes a tool for elite survival rather than national development.

Breaking, depoliticising, and fronting these enemies of good governance requires:

Strengthening independent institutions, especially the judiciary and media.

Enforcing transparency in state contracts and public spending.

Depoliticizing the civil service and adopting merit-based appointments.

Reforming the security sector to ensure full civilian oversight.

Empowering civic movements to hold leaders accountable beyond ethnic or partisan lines.

Conclusion

Kleptocracy, kakistocracy, and deep state networks represent not just flaws in governance—they are systemic threats to democracy itself. In Ethiopia, their perceived influence explains much of the public’s disillusionment with formal politics. Unless these forces are dismantled through institutional reform and civic empowerment, Ethiopia’s path toward genuine democracy will remain blocked by the enemies within.