Leadership Without Compass – The Crisis of Governance in Ethiopia
Introduction
Governing a complex, multiethnic country like Ethiopia requires more than occupying a position of power. It requires a deep understanding of constitutionalism, federalism, diplomacy, security, and public administration. Yet Ethiopia has repeatedly suffered from a leadership vacuum, where those in power lack even the "ABCs" of governance. This knowledge deficit has allowed informal networks, militarised actors, foreign interests, and ethnic elites to dominate national decision-making—often with destabilising consequences.
1. The Hollow Throne: Office Without Governance
In Ethiopia, titles like Prime Minister, Minister of Defense, or Speaker of Parliament do not always reflect the capacity to lead effectively. Instead, appointments are often driven by loyalty, ethnic balance, or personal networks, not qualifications or experience. The result is:
Poor policy design and implementation
Incoherent diplomatic strategies
Inability to manage complex inter-regional tensions
Case Example: 2020-2022 Tigray War
Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s administration launched a military operation in Tigray in November 2020, claiming it would be a "law enforcement operation" lasting weeks. However, the war spiralled into one of the most devastating conflicts in Ethiopia's modern history, revealing a lack of crisis planning, a misunderstanding of federal dynamics, and an absence of post-conflict governance frameworks.
International Crisis Group (2021). Finding a Path to Peace in Ethiopia’s Tigray Crisis.
2. Informal Power Brokers and the Deep State
When formal leaders lack knowledge, informal actors step in. In Ethiopia, absolute power is often held by:
Military and intelligence commanders (e.g., INSA, NISS)
Senior party officials behind the scenes
Business elites tied to ruling coalitions
Advisors with no public mandate
These actors operate in opacity, influencing national security, resource allocation, and appointments without oversight or accountability.
Case Example: The Role of INSA and Military Commanders
During the Tigray conflict and subsequent crises in Oromia and Amhara, military generals and intelligence leaders often made strategic decisions, not by parliament or cabinet. Civilian institutions became sidelined as Ethiopia’s governance entered a state of emergency rule and command-based decision-making.
Human Rights Watch & Amnesty International (2022). Investigative Report on War Crimes in Northern Ethiopia.
3. The Party-State Merger: Prosperity Over Democracy
The Prosperity Party (PP), which succeeded the EPRDF in 2019, inherited the old party-state structure. The merging of the party with state institutions means:
Ministers are often party appointees first, professionals second
Decisions are made in party rooms, not public chambers
Loyalty to party leadership outweighs legal or constitutional obligations
Case Example: PP’s Selection of Regional Leaders
In 2021, the Prosperity Party appointed new regional presidents in Oromia and Amhara without genuine local consultation or competitive internal processes. Many appointments were questioned by regional activists for lacking legitimacy or local grounding.
Addis Standard (2021). Prosperity Party Appoints New Leadership Amid Controversy.
4. Ethno-Federalism and De Facto Fragmentation
Ethiopia’s federalism, while designed to empower nations and nationalities, has in practice led to:
Ethnic-based political fragmentation
Regional governments acting as semi-sovereign entities
Local militias and special forces overriding national forces
Case Example: Amhara and Oromia Special Forces
Despite federal restructuring efforts, regional states have retained heavily armed special forces. In Amhara, these forces defied federal orders and clashed with the ENDF in 2023, illustrating the fractured sovereignty of the federal government.
Reuters (2023). Ethiopia's Amhara Conflict Undermines National Security Reform.
5. The Military Ascendancy: Rule by the Gun
In the absence of effective civilian rule, Ethiopia has seen increasing militarisation of governance. Military actors are now major players in internal security, border diplomacy, and even economic planning.
Case Example: Command Posts and State of Emergency
From Tigray to Oromia and Amhara, the federal government has repeatedly declared states of emergency, setting up command posts that bypass local governments. These posts are led by generals who act as de facto governors.
Ethiopian Human Rights Commission (EHRC, 2021). Monitoring Reports from Conflict Zones.
6. Foreign Influence and Sovereignty Erosion
Weak and uninformed leadership allows foreign actors to shape domestic affairs. Ethiopia’s geostrategic location makes it a target for:
Gulf states seeking influence in the Red Sea region
China investing in infrastructure and debt diplomacy
The U.S. and EU pushing democratic reforms or counterterrorism agendas
Egypt and Eritrea intervening in the Nile and border politics
Case Example: UAE Drone Support
During the Tigray war, the United Arab Emirates reportedly provided drone support to the Ethiopian military[^6]. This military aid was not publicly debated or publicised, showing how foreign powers exploit weak governance structures.
The New York Times (2021). UAE’s Role in Ethiopia’s Conflict Raises Regional Concerns.
7. Populism, Propaganda, and the Illusion of Legitimacy
When competence is absent, leadership often uses populist messaging and propaganda to maintain support. Narratives of:
“Ethiopian unity vs. division”
“Foreign conspiracy vs. sovereignty”
“Development vs. insurgency”
…are commonly used to suppress dissent and avoid accountability.
Case Example: Media Control and Dissent
State media and affiliated outlets have been used to discredit political opposition, civil society, and human rights defenders—rather than foster informed dialogue. This deepens polarisation and isolates leadership from public reality.
Reporters Without Borders (2024). Press Freedom Index – Ethiopia.
Conclusion: The Price of Ignorance
Ethiopia’s governance crisis is not merely political—it is epistemic. A lack of basic knowledge about statecraft has allowed informal power networks, militarised actors, and foreign interests to dominate. It has led to:
Recurrent civil conflict
Erosion of public institutions
Undermining of federal legitimacy
A public increasingly distrustful of both federal and regional elites
To reclaim a stable and sovereign future, Ethiopia must:
Invest in civic and political education
Prioritise merit-based leadership selection
Reform its party-state structure
Empower regional governments within constitutional boundaries
Encourage transparent, inclusive national dialogue
Secret Visit of TPLF Criminal Political Leadership and Rogue Generals to Eritrea During the 34th Independence Day Celebration — Strategic Pact with Eritrean Regime Against Ethiopian Federal Interests
Date: 30 May 2025
Source: Horn of Africa Geopolitical Review (HAGR) – Intelligence and Diplomatic Division
Classification: HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL – EYES ONLY
I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Intelligence gathered by Horn of Africa Geopolitical Review (HAGR), corroborated by multiple human and digital sources from Asmara, confirms that a high-level TPLF criminal network, including senior political leaders and remnants of rogue TDF generals, covertly travelled to Eritrea’s capital, Asmara, during the Eritrean regime’s 34th Independence Day celebrations.
The visit, intentionally hidden from public and media scrutiny, involved secret negotiations and strategic meetings with President Isaias Afwerki and PFDJ’s top military and intelligence officials.
The mission, held under extreme secrecy with facial masks and dark sunglasses to avoid identification signifies a renewed subversive alliance between TPLF’s anti-reform elements and the Eritrean genocidal regime — posing an imminent threat to Ethiopian national security, federal unity, and Tigray’s fragile peace.
II. KEY INDIVIDUALS INVOLVED
The following individuals were confirmed to have participated in this covert operation:
Fetlework Gebregziabher – Senior TPLF Political Operative
Allegedly reactivating her political network for external coordination against Tigray Interim Government and Federal authorities. Held direct talks with Eritrean military intelligence.
General Haileselassie Girmay (“Wdi Embyetey”) – Notorious Rogue Commander Known for his allegiance to the old TPLF guard and resistance to military reform. Involved in confidential operations planning with Eritrean generals.
General Mahsho Beyene – Eastern Tigray Zone Militarized Instigato Engaged in coordinating parallel armed group support within eastern corridors. Repeated prior communications with the Eritrean defence sector.
Colonel Gebre Gebresdekan (alias “Gebere Adiete”) – Intelligence-Linked Actor Known as a facilitator between rogue TDF networks and Eritrean operatives.
Berhane Gebregiorgis – Previously Arrested for his illegal visit to Asmara for Espionage/Smuggling Released under suspicious circumstances, it was reportedly orchestrated by TPLF military elites. I was present in Asmara again during this covert visit.
Tekelay Gebremedhin – Administrator of Northeastern Tigray
The political arm of the rogue faction consolidates regional destabilisation efforts.
Stalin Gebreselassie – Head of Zara Media (TPLF-affiliated propaganda arm) They flew to Asmara separately but held closed-door meetings with PFDJ officials. Discussed coordinated media warfare and disinformation campaigns targeting the Tigray Interim Government and Federal system.
Additional Unidentified Escorts and Operatives Estimated 4–6 individuals accompanied the core group. Observed by local intelligence wearing face masks, sunglasses, and using diplomatic Eritrean vehicles.
III. PURPOSE OF THE VISIT
HAGAR sources confirm that the core agenda included:
Strategic Anti-Federal Alliance Formation: Drafting a clandestine framework to coordinate against the Ethiopian Federal Government’s influence in the Tigray region and nationally.
Undermining the Pretoria Peace Agreement Renewed efforts to dismantle the Pretoria Accord by reactivating armed networks and aligning military tactics with Eritrean support.
Military Reconfiguration Talks:
Discussion of rearming select rogue TDF units with logistics and intelligence support from Eritrea.
Political Sabotage & Media Warfare Strategy:
Propaganda coordination between Zara Media and PFDJ-linked outlets to spread disinformation, discredit reformist elements in Tigray, and create confusion within the Federal structures.
IV. INTELLIGENCE VALIDATION
This intelligence was confirmed by: Trusted Human Assets in Asmara with access to high-level Eritrean circles. Digital Intercepts and movement analysis matched with entry records and vehicle tracking.
Cross-verification with Tigray-based Reformist Intelligence Officers.
The recent reported theft of Debretsion Gebremichael’s encrypted laptop has added further alarm. Sources indicate it contained high-level communications, operational planning drafts, and foreign contact files — now feared to be compromised, prompting internal panic among PFDJ and TPLF hardliners.
V. STRATEGIC WARNING AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
To Ethiopian Federal Authorities:
This report must be treated with the utmost urgency. Ignoring these developments would be a strategic miscalculation with severe national security consequences.
Immediate recommendations:
Initiate a Covert National Counter-Intelligence Operation to trace returning individuals from Eritrea and monitor their communications and financial transactions.
Launch the Diplomatic Pressure Campaign via IGAD and AU mechanisms to hold Eritrea accountable for continued interference and regional destabilisation.
Publicly Reaffirm Pretoria Agreement Compliance by isolating and exposing rogue actors inside Tigray and their external backers 4. Reinforce Internal Federal Security Briefings on emerging TPLF–PFDJ axis threats to civil peace and national cohesion.
Investigate Media Outlets like Zara Media for involvement in foreign-aligned destabilisation and coordinate with cyber/intel units for content tracing.
VI. CONCLUSION
The TPLF criminal remnants’ secret visit to Asmara — confirmed by multiple intelligence layers — represents a betrayal of Tigray’s sacrifice and Ethiopia’s fragile post-war recovery. These actors are conspiring with one of the region’s most brutal and genocidal regimes.
The Ethiopian Federal Government must act decisively, wisely, and without delay.
Prepared by:
Horn of Africa Geopolitical Review – Intelligence and Diplomatic Experts Team Cape Town | Nairobi | Mekelle | Brussel
The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia: A Blueprint for National Salvation
Ethiopia’s political trajectory has long been defined by cycles of authoritarian rule, exclusionary governance, and deep-rooted national grievances. Yet, within its own constitutional framework, the country possesses a path toward peace, justice, and national unity—the principles enshrined in the name of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. These four words are not symbolic; they hold profound political, historical, and moral significance. They offer a comprehensive remedy for Ethiopia’s enduring political crises if genuinely implemented with political will and integrity. Rather than searching for new models, the solution lies in faithfully applying the promises already made to the Ethiopian people.
The first pillar—Federal—is central to Ethiopia’s constitutional identity. The country has over 80 nations and nationalities, each with distinct languages, cultures, and histories. Ethiopia’s federal structure, designed to recognise and empower these groups, is not a luxury but a necessity for coexistence. It represents a covenant of trust between the state and its constituent peoples.
However, federalism in Ethiopia has often been applied inconsistently and sometimes undermined by centralised forces. If truly embraced, federalism can ensure equitable development, protect cultural rights, and foster local governance. It offers marginalised communities a stake in the national project and thus strengthens, rather than weakens, the Ethiopian state.
To abandon or dilute federalism would be to betray this covenant. Instead, political leaders must work to deepen federal practice—by respecting regional autonomy, supporting local institutions, and ensuring fair distribution of resources and power.
Democracy: The Will of the People as Sovereign Law
The second foundational principle—democracy—remains more aspirational than realised. Ethiopia’s political landscape has been marred by repression, restricted civil liberties, rigged elections, and limited civic participation. Yet democracy is not only a constitutional obligation but the only sustainable path to peace and legitimacy.
A democratic Ethiopia would allow free expression, genuine political pluralism, and accountable governance. It would mean that power emanates from the people, not from military might or political manipulation. Implementing democracy requires more than holding elections; it involves building independent institutions, ensuring media freedom, protecting minority rights, and upholding the rule of law.
With political will, democracy can transform Ethiopia from a country of imposed rule to one of consensual governance. Without it, the risk of rebellion, instability, and fragmentation will persist.
Republicanism: Leadership with Accountability
The third concept—a republic—signifies a government of laws, not individuals, a system where no one is above the law, and public office is a responsibility, not a privilege. For Ethiopia to function as a true republic, power must be accountable, transparent, and exercised in the public interest.
Far too many leaders have clung to power or exploited state institutions for personal or partisan gain in the country's past. To reverse this, Ethiopia must cultivate a republican ethos where leaders serve with humility and accountability, corruption is punished, and institutions function independently of political interference.
Ethiopia: A Nation for All Its Peoples
Finally, Ethiopia—the name that binds the federation, the democracy, and the republic—must be redefined as a collective identity that includes all its people equally and respectfully. For too long, “Ethiopia” was used as a tool of dominance by a few over the many. In its new form, it must become an inclusive home built on mutual recognition and shared destiny.
This demands a conscious political effort to rewrite the narrative of Ethiopia not as a single nation-state but as a commonwealth of nations, each with its own dignity and contribution to the whole. Ethiopia must stand not for assimilation but for solidarity.
Conclusion: The Political Will to Fulfill a Promise
The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia is not a dream but a promise, written in law and born from struggle. But it remains a broken promise, largely unfulfilled due to lack of political will, elite betrayal, and historical inertia. There is no need to invent new ideologies or import foreign systems to resolve Ethiopia's political crisis. What is needed is a genuine, consistent, and courageous application of the principles already agreed upon.
If Ethiopia’s leaders and institutions were to implement federalism, democracy, republican governance, and inclusive national identity with sincerity and resolve, the country could transition from crisis to stability, from fragmentation to unity. The answer is already in the name. The challenge is in the commitment to live up to it.
The Peril of Dismantling Federalism in Ethiopia: A Political Suicide in the Making
Ethiopia, a nation rich in history and cultural diversity, stands at a critical juncture in its political journey. The federal arrangement enshrined in its constitution is not merely an administrative system but a hard-won response to a long history of marginalisation, cultural suppression, and political exclusion experienced by its diverse nations, nationalities, and peoples. If the Prosperity Party, currently leading the country, were to dismantle this federal structure, it would not only ignite deep national discontent. Still, it could also mark the beginning of the end of Ethiopia’s unity. Such a move would be remembered as one of the most consequential political miscalculations in the country’s history—an actual political suicide.
Historical Context: Federalism as a Remedy for Historical Injustices
Ethiopia’s past is marked by the dominance of a centralised state that often imposed a singular identity on a diverse population. For over a century, the central government exercised authority that marginalised ethnic groups, suppressed languages and cultures, and denied entire communities access to political power and equitable development. The 1995 Constitution and the ethnic federalism it introduced were a direct response to these injustices. It recognised the distinct identities and rights of Ethiopia's various groups, granting them the right to self-administration, cultural expression, and even, in theory, secession.
Federalism in Ethiopia is not simply a political convenience but a foundational pillar of the modern state. It acknowledges the multiethnic nature of the Ethiopian polity and seeks to foster unity through recognition, not forced assimilation. It represents a social contract based on mutual respect and voluntary association.
The Risks of Centralization
The Prosperity Party’s attempts—or even rhetoric—toward decentralisation or weakening the federal structure threaten to unravel this delicate balance. Centralisation, in Ethiopia’s context, is not a neutral administrative shift; it is a political regression to a time when power was wielded by a few at the expense of many. Such a reversal would be seen not as reform but as a betrayal by the historically marginalised groups who viewed federalism as a pathway to dignity and inclusion.
Removing or diluting federalism would not lead to unity. Instead, it risks reigniting old grievances, fostering resistance, and potentially fueling calls for independence. The Horn of Africa is already a region marked by volatility, and a fragmented Ethiopia would have disastrous implications—not just for the country itself but for regional stability.
Federalism and National Unity
Critics of ethnic federalism argue that it fosters division and weakens national identity. While this concern is not without merit, the solution is not to dismantle federalism but to strengthen democratic institutions, ensure equitable development across all regions, and promote a unifying civic identity that does not erase ethnic diversity. Federalism does not preclude unity when practised with objectivity and accountability but enables it.
Unity through diversity must be the Ethiopian ideal. Rather than suppressing differences, the state should celebrate and empower them. A federal Ethiopia does not have to be a divided Ethiopia. Instead, it can model how multiple nations coexist within one sovereign state, provided justice, representation, and mutual respect exist.
Conclusion: A Cautionary Note
If the Prosperity Party chooses to dismantle federalism, it will not be remembered as a unifying force but as the architect of disintegration. Such a move would disregard millions' lived experiences and historical traumas and confirm fears that the centre seeks to dominate rather than serve.
Federalism is not a perfect system, but it is necessary in Ethiopia. It remains the most viable framework for maintaining peace, justice, and unity in a country as complex and diverse as Ethiopia. Undermining it would not only destabilise the political landscape but would also shatter the very fabric of national cohesion. The choice is clear: embrace federalism as a tool for inclusion and peace, or risk plunging the nation into deeper divisions and irreparable loss.
Ethiopia’s future depends not on erasing its diversity but on building a just and democratic state that embraces and empowers it. Anything less is a dangerous gamble that the country cannot afford.
A Parasitic History: Oromo Relations with Expansionist Forces.
By: Feleke Bogale Dibaabaa
The historical and contemporary relationship between the Oromo nation and expansionist groups has been profoundly parasitic rather than symbiotic. Contrary to the unsanitised narratives promoted by apologists—who cite intermarriage, mutual respect, or superficial cultural exchanges—the evidence overwhelmingly points to exploitation, domination, and subjugation. These rhetorical defences crumble under the lightest scrutiny of lived reality and historical records.
Understanding Parasitism in the Political Context
In biological terms, parasitism describes a relationship in which one organism benefits at the expense of another. Politically and socially, the same concept applies when one nation or group continuously extracts resources—both human and material—while suppressing the autonomy, identity, and well-being of another. This is the historical reality of the Oromo under expansionist regimes and settler-colonial configurations in the Horn of Africa.
Since the violent incorporation of Oromia into the Ethiopian empire, the Oromo people have suffered extensive loss: land dispossession, linguistic and cultural marginalisation, political disenfranchisement, and economic exploitation. The supposed “integration” was never mutual—it was imposed through violence and maintained through manipulation. The relationship has been, and remains, parasitic: one side feeds off the vitality of the other.
Settler Colonialism and the Myth of Unity
The myth of unity between the Oromo and expansionist forces is often disguised behind the narratives of coexistence. Yet, there is a stark power imbalance in these relationships. Whether colonial settlers, economic migrants, or environmental drifters have settled in Oromia, the pattern is the same: Oromo resources are extracted, Oromo identity is suppressed, and Oromo voices are silenced.
Even today, disparities in economic development, access to education, cultural representation, and political power expose the deep-rooted inequality. Towns built on stolen Oromo land remain hubs of wealth for non-Oromo elites. Oromo children are still punished—sometimes violently—for speaking their mother tongue in certain schools. Politically, the Oromo have been allowed token representation only when it serves the interests of the dominant power structure.
The Anti-Oromo Campaign: A Continuation, Not a Creation
The recent surge in anti-Oromo sentiment from various corners is not a sudden or isolated phenomenon. It continues to have a long-standing strategy to control and weaken the Oromo nation. This campaign—whether through media narratives, policy exclusion, or direct violence—has been part of the deeper parasitic dynamic since its incorporation.
The role of OPDO (now OPP) must be understood in this context. Their failures are not the root cause but a symptom of the broader system designed to ensure Oromo subordination. The organisation was never built to empower Oromia but to pacify it from within and create an illusion of Oromo representation while maintaining control from above.
Systemic Resistance to Change
The entrenched interests of dominant groups inherently resist any shift that might challenge their historical advantages. These groups use economic monopolies, military hierarchies, and cultural institutions as control mechanisms. These groups understand that genuine Oromo empowerment threatens the system's foundation from which they benefit. Therefore, they deploy every available tool—legal, political, psychological, and even military—to suppress movements for Oromo liberation.
Internal Challenges and the Path Forward
It is also true that internal political divisions, weak institutions, and ineffective leadership within the Oromo camp hinder progress. However, these challenges are compounded—if not created—by the broader parasitic system. The lack of institutional capacity is not accidental; it results from generations of deliberate underdevelopment. Oromo political fragmentation is not a natural condition but a consequence of systemic infiltration and psychological warfare.
The path forward demands both internal renewal and external resistance. Oromia must build strong, independent institutions that are immune to external manipulation. Oromo political forces must unite around clear ideological commitments, prioritising national interest over personal ambition or party loyalty. Cultural revitalisation, economic self-sufficiency, and strategic alliances will also be key to weakening parasitism's grip.
Conclusion
The Oromo people are not natural victims; they are a nation with a proud history, resilient spirit, and the potential for profound transformation. But to move forward, the truth must be named: the Oromo's relationship with expansionist groups has never been mutual. It has been parasitic—extraction, domination, and resistance have defined the dynamic. Only by breaking this parasitic cycle can true freedom, dignity, and self-determination be achieved.
The causes behind the betrayal of Oromo identity and how individuals may unknowingly advocate for interests that harm their own people.
Causes of Betrayal of Oromo Identity and Unconscious Advocacy Against One’s Own People
Identity is not just a personal matter—it is a collective inheritance. For the Oromo, identity (Oromummaa) is deeply rooted in culture, language, values, and a long history of resistance, resilience, and unity. However, some Oromo individuals today find themselves disconnected from this identity. Some even consciously or unconsciously advocate for ideologies, systems, or groups directly harming Oromo's interests.
This phenomenon raises important questions: What causes someone to betray their Oromo identity? Why would anyone unknowingly promote others’ agendas that undermine their own people?
Understanding these questions requires thoroughly examining psychological, historical, social, and political factors.
1. Historical Oppression and Identity Suppression
For over a century, the Ethiopian state system operated through assimilation and repression. Oromo identity was systematically erased from official narratives, education, media, and politics. Afaan Oromo was banned in schools and public life. Expressing Oromummaa was criminalised.
This kind of long-term systemic oppression creates a deep psychological wound. When a person grows up being told—directly or indirectly—that their identity is inferior, they may begin to believe it. They internalise the dominant culture's values and slowly begin to see their heritage as backward or shameful. This leads some to reject or feel embarrassed about being Oromo.
2. Colonization of the Mind
Frantz Fanon, a prominent anti-colonial thinker, described how colonial systems do not only conquer land—they conquer minds. Colonisation of the mind happens when a person adopts the oppressor’s worldview and starts defending it as if it were their own.
In the Oromo context, this means individuals might see the oppressive systems of the past or present as “normal,” “necessary,” or even “better.” They may view Oromo struggles for self-determination, language rights, or cultural survival as “divisive” or “dangerous” simply because they have been conditioned to accept the dominant ideology.
3. Lack of Historical Awareness and Cultural Education
Another major cause of unconscious betrayal is ignorance—not willful ignorance, but a lack of access to Oromo history, philosophy, and values. Many young Oromos grow up in cities or diasporic communities where Oromo culture is not actively taught. Schools rarely offer accurate Oromo history. In such cases, people grow up knowing more about others than themselves.
As a result, they may absorb and repeat narratives that harm Oromo's interests—not because they intend harm but because they don’t understand the impact. They may unknowingly advocate for political agendas, media narratives, or religious interpretations that work against Oromo dignity and unity.
4. Desire for Social Acceptance and Upward Mobility
Some individuals attempt to distance themselves from their roots to gain acceptance or social advancement in societies where Oromo identity has been marginalised. Speaking a dominant language, adopting non-Oromo names, or aligning with non-Oromo political agendas may be seen as a way to climb the ladder of success.
Over time, this calculated distancing becomes internalised betrayal. What began as a survival tactic becomes a belief system in which the person no longer sees their own community as worthy of defence or pride.
5. Political Manipulation and Division
Political actors, both local and foreign, have historically used divide-and-rule tactics to weaken Oromo unity. Some Oromo individuals become tools—consciously or not—of these agendas. They are offered positions, platforms, or resources in exchange for echoing narratives that divide Oromos along religion, region, clan, or ideology.
Without realising it, such individuals become agents of disunity, speaking on behalf of systems that benefit from Oromo fragmentation. They often fail to understand that these platforms are temporary and discarded once they are no longer helpful
6. Loss of Moral Compass (Safuu)
In Oromo ethics, Safuu refers to a deep moral sense of right and wrong. It governs how we relate to each other, our ancestors, nature, and truth
When someone betrays their people or advocates against them, they often lose their sense of Safuu. The betrayal is not just political—it is ethical. Restoring Safuu requires introspection, education, and community healing.
Conclusion: The Path Forward
The betrayal of Oromo identity is not always born of hatred—it is often born of confusion, fear, or ignorance. But regardless of the cause, the impact is real. When one Oromo speaks against the nation's interests, it strengthens those forces that wish to see Oromummaa erased.
The path forward is not to curse those who have gone astray—but to awaken them. We must invest in Oromo education, cultural pride, and historical truth. We must create spaces where Oromummaa is not only safe—but celebrated.
Only then can we stop the cycle of unconscious betrayal and ensure that every Oromo stands tall—not just in name but in truth, ethics, and unity.
A well-structured article addresses whether Oromummaa is an identity or an ideology.
OROMUMMAA: Identity or Ideology?
By Falmataa Taarraqany
In the landscape of African sociopolitical thought and Indigenous resurgence, few concepts carry as much weight for the Oromo people as Oromummaa. Linguistically and philosophically rooted in the Oromo worldview, this term has been a central rallying point in cultural, political, and intellectual arenas. But what exactly is Oromummaa? Is it an identity to be inherited and embraced or an ideology to be advanced and defended?
The answer is not binary—but rather complex and deeply layered.
Defining Oromummaa
At its core, Oromummaa refers to the essence of being Oromo—a reflection of one's language, culture, values, worldview, historical memory, and collective destiny. The term comes from "Oromo", the name of the people, and "-ummaa", a suffix meaning “-ness” or “state of being.” Literally, Oromummaa means “Oromo-ness.”
Yet, over time, Oromummaa has evolved from a mere descriptor of ethnic belonging into a broader framework encompassing cultural identity, political aspiration, ethical responsibility, and social philosophy.
Oromummaa as Identity
As an identity, Oromummaa is about belonging to the Oromo nation through:
Language (Afaan Oromoo)
Culture (Aadaa Oromoo)
Values (Safuu, Nagaa, Tokkummaa, etc.)
Lineage and heritage
The collective memory of resistance and survival
In this sense, Oromummaa is inherited and experienced. It gives the Oromo people a sense of who they are and where they come from. It defines their historical continuity and spiritual connection to land, ancestors, and community.
It’s also lived daily through dress, music, proverbs, rituals, and most importantly, the enduring Gadaa system, which organises Oromo society and governance through egalitarian, age-based leadership.
Oromummaa as Ideology
However, Oromummaa is not just a passive state of being. It has also become an ideological framework—a political and cultural philosophy used to:
Resist oppression and marginalisation
Promote self-determination
Reclaim history and agency
Unify diverse Oromo communities
Assert sovereignty and freedom
As an ideology, Oromummaa is assertive, aspirational, and revolutionary. It calls for action: the revival of Oromo governance systems (like Gadaa), preserving Afaan Oromoo, and dismantling colonial and imperial systems that suppress Oromo dignity.
It promotes values like egalitarianism, communalism, justice, and spiritual harmony—positioning itself not just as an ethnic ideology but as a universal humanist framework grounded in indigenous ethics.
The Dynamic Nature of Oromummaa
What makes Oromummaa powerful is precisely its dynamic dual nature. It is who you are and what you believe in, the bloodline you inherit and the struggle you choose. This duality allows it to:
Unite Oromos across regions, religions, and political lines.
Serve as a cultural anchor and a political compass.
Act as a platform for Pan-Oromo solidarity and global indigenous thought.
Why This Question Matters
In academic and activist discourse, clarifying whether Oromummaa is identity or ideology matters because it affects:
Policy formulation in multi-ethnic states like Ethiopia.
Cultural preservation efforts by Oromo institutions.
Political strategy in the fight for self-determination.
Youth engagement, especially for diasporic Oromos seeking meaning and direction.
If viewed only as identity, Oromummaa may risk being romanticised or depoliticised. It may lose touch with its rich cultural depth and lived experience if seen only as ideology.
Conclusion: Oromummaa Is Both
In truth, Oromummaa is both an identity and an ideology. It is a way of being Oromo and a commitment to the liberation and flourishing of the Oromo people. Its power lies in connecting the past to the present and culture to politics, weaving memory, meaning, and mission together into a living philosophy.
In the words of an Oromo elder:
“Oromummaa is not just what you are—it is what you must become, again and again.”
BY:Habtamu Abino
2 / Oromummaa as an Ideology
“Oromummaa is not merely a cultural identity—a vision, a commitment, and a call to action rooted in ethical values and historical consciousness.”
Introduction
In the modern world, identity alone does not guarantee survival, dignity, or justice. While many cultural groups survive through tradition, it is those who shape their identity into a guiding worldview—an ideology—that influence the course of history. For the Oromo people, Oromummaa has matured beyond ethnic belonging into a full-fledged ideology: a system of thought that offers moral direction, political vision, and social cohesion.
This part explores what defines an ideology and how Oromummaa fulfils those criteria. It demonstrates that Oromummaa is a cultural expression and liberatory ideological framework with profound implications for Oromo resistance, governance, education, and ethical life.
1. What Is Ideology?
An ideology is a system of ideas and values that explain how society should be organised and what its goals are. Ideologies help people interpret the world and act within it. They provide:
A vision of an ideal society
A sense of right and wrong
A roadmap for political and social change
Classic examples include liberalism, socialism, nationalism, pan-Africanism, and feminism. Each offers a structured worldview rooted in values and goals. Ideologies, depending on how they are formed and applied, serve as tools of empowerment or control.
2. Historical Origins of Oromummaa
The concept of Oromummaa has roots as deep as the Oromo civilisation itself. At the heart of Oromo society is the Gadaa system, a uniquely democratic governance system that organises political, social, and spiritual life through age-based leadership, consensus, and power rotation. Oromummaa reflects these values while responding to the historical context of Oromo marginalisation, forced assimilation, and cultural suppression.
In the 20th and 21st centuries, as Oromo scholars, activists, and freedom fighters resisted domination, Oromummaa evolved from a cultural identity into a political and ethical project. It became a counter-narrative to the systems that tried to erase Oromo history and silence its voice.
3. The Core Elements of Oromummaa as an Ideology
To understand Oromummaa as an ideology, we must examine its foundational pillars:
a) Ethical Framework – Safuu
Oromummaa is deeply grounded in Safuu, the Oromo concept of moral integrity and responsibility. It defines acceptable behaviour toward people, nature, elders, and the divine. Unlike many modern ideologies driven by materialism or competition, Oromummaa promotes ethical coexistence.
b) Social Vision – Nagaa and Tokkummaa
Peace (nagaa) and unity (tokkummaa) are not just cultural expressions but ideological commitments. Oromummaa envisions a society free from exploitation and built on mutual respect among people and nations. These values are essential for any liberatory ideology.
c) Political Philosophy – Gadaa System
Gadaa is not merely a tradition but a structured, time-tested form of democratic governance. It embodies the principles of:
Participatory decision-making
Accountability
Power-sharing
Generational leadership
Oromummaa preserves and reinterprets Gadaa as a political vision for self-rule and justice.
d) Resistance to Oppression
Oromummaa is a liberation ideology that resists forced assimilation, colonial narratives, and internalised oppression. It asserts the Oromo's right to name themselves, govern themselves, and live in accordance with their own worldview.
4. Oromummaa vs. Passive Identity
Many ethnic or national identities are passive—they describe “who we are” but not “what we do.” Oromummaa is active and ideological. It demands:
Advocacy for Oromo rights
Protection of Oromo language and knowledge systems
Defence of collective dignity
Restoration of historical truth
This distinguishes Oromummaa from being simply an ethnic identity. It becomes a call to moral and political action,organisingg thought and struggle to pursue liberation.
5. Why Ideological Oromummaa Matters Today
In an age of global ideological warfare—between nationalism, neoliberalism, imperialism, and cultural hegemony—people who lack a coherent worldview are easily absorbed or erased. Oromummaa provides:
Cultural confidence in the face of cultural colonisation
Political clarity in resisting both internal and external domination
Moral coherence in a world of confusion and ethical breakdown
It allows Oromos to think independently, organise effectively, and build a future on their own terms.
6. Challenges and Responsibilities
Turning Oromummaa into a full-fledged ideology also comes with responsibilities:
It must remain inclusive of all Oromo religions and regions
It must avoid becoming dogmatic or ethnocentric
It must be continually refined by scholars, elders, and the people
Furthermore, ideological Oromummaa must be taught to the new generation of Oromos—through curriculum, media, literature, and public discourse—both at home and in the diaspora.
Conclusion: Oromummaa as an Ideological Horizon
Oromummaa is not just who the Oromo are but who they strive to become. As an ideology, it unites life's spiritual, ethical, political, and social dimensions. It is a lens through which Oromo people can reclaim their past, assert their dignity, and build a just future.
In a world where many are rootless and ideologically disoriented, Oromummaa offers direction, rootedness, and purpose. It is an ideology of life, of justice, and of hope.
It Is Not Just Who We Are, It Is How We Rise: Oromummaa!
In a world where identity is often used to define boundaries and draw lines of difference, the Oromo people have turned identity into a philosophy of unity, resistance, and progress. Oromummaa is not merely an ethnic label; it is a living force — an ethos that connects history to hope, culture to consciousness, and struggle to strength. It is not just who we are. It is how we rise.
Oromummaa: More Than Identity
Oromummaa is often translated as "Oromo-ness," but the concept reaches far deeper. It is a worldview, a moral compass, and a cultural foundation. Rooted in the principles of Safuu (moral integrity), nagaa (peace), and wal-qixxummaa (equality), Oromummaa defines the values that shape how Oromo people relate to one another and to the broader world.
This identity is not confined to language or lineage — it expresses belonging, duty, and pride in a heritage built on Gadaa. This democratic governance system predates modern political theory. It is a commitment to justice, community, and the survival of people who have too often been marginalised.
A Rising Identity
To rise through Oromummaa is to transform identity into agency. Across Oromia and the diaspora, generations of Oromo youth are reclaiming their roots not as a nostalgic gesture but as a forward-looking mission. They are artists, scholars, farmers, activists, and professionals who carry the torch of Oromummaa into every field — not just to be seen but to shape the future.
Rising with Oromummaa means rising with dignity and purpose, not in opposition to others, but in affirmation of the Oromo people's right to exist freely, speak their language proudly, and live according to their values.
Resistance and Renewal
The Oromo's history is marked by resilience. Colonial suppression, linguistic erasure, and political exclusion have all tried to silence Oromummaa, but each attempt to bury it has only deepened its roots.
Resistance is not merely protest; it is cultural preservation. It is teaching Afaan Oromo to your children in exile. It is singing traditional songs in the face of censorship. It is writing Oromo stories when publishers hesitate. Every act of survival is an act of revolution.
And from resistance comes renewal. Today, Oromo voices are rising in literature, academia, and politics, reshaping not only how the world sees the Oromo but also how the Oromo see themselves.
The Call of Our Time
This generation has a duty — to carry Oromummaa as an identity and a mission. It calls us to build, not just remember; to act, not just speak; to unite, not just name ourselves.
We must ask: what does Oromummaa demand of us today? It demands vision, unity, discipline, and the courage to lift others as we climb. It demands that we rise for ourselves and those whose voices have been silenced and whose dreams have been deferred.
Conclusion: The Oromo Future
Oromummaa is our inheritance, but more importantly, it is our launching point. It reminds us that we are more than our wounds — we are our will. And in a world that often pressures us to forget who we are, Oromummaa reminds us not just to remember — but to rise.
Because it is not just who we are. It is how we rise. Oromummaa!
Manufacturing Division: Isaias Afwerki’s Weaponization of Ethiopian Identities
In a recent speech, Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki made reference to the “Oromummaa ideology,” a term central to contemporary Oromo political and cultural identity. While the term itself has been the subject of vibrant debate within Ethiopia, Afwerki’s invocation was anything but innocent. It continued its longstanding strategy: manipulating Ethiopia's complex ethno-political landscape to stoke division, weaken national unity, and maintain regional influence through disorder.
Isaias is not a passive observer of Ethiopia’s internal politics. His regime has consistently inserted itself into Ethiopian affairs—not for peace or regional solidarity, but to exploit fault lines and undermine collective sovereignty. His tactic is as old as authoritarian politics itself: divide and rule.
The Manipulation of “Oromummaa”
“Oromummaa” refers to a sense of Oromo identity, cultural revival, and political self-determination. It has multiple meanings and interpretations among Oromo scholars, activists, and citizens. Some have used it to push for equality and recognition in a historically centralised Ethiopian state. Others have co-opted it into exclusivist political rhetoric.
Referencing “Oromummaa ideology,” Afwerki is not contributing to intellectual dialogue; he is framing it as a threat to national unity or his preferred allies. This is a deliberate distortion. His goal is not to understand Oromummaa but to weaponise it: turning Oromo nationalism against Amhara interests and Oromweaponisealliances against Tigrayan identity—depending on what division serves him best at a given time.
Pitting Identities Against Each Other
Isaias’s broader strategy is built on triangulation. He encourages Oromo and Tigrayan nationalists to oppose a perceived “Amhara ideology”—a phrase that lacks clarity but is often used by critics to refer to centralist or imperial legacies. At the same time, he stokes fear of Tigrayan nationalism among Oromo and Amhara nationalists alike. This is not a strategy of peace or principled diplomacy but a cynical manipulation to keep Ethiopia fragmented and distracted.
This pattern was evident during the Tigray War when Eritrean forces actively participated in Ethiopia’s internal conflict. Rather than promoting stability, Afwerki used the chaos to settle scores with the TPLF and deepen Ethiopia’s internal fracture.
Undermining Regional Sovereignty
Isaias's interventions must be understood in the context of regional authoritarianism. Eritrea has become one of the world’s most repressive states, with no free press, no elections, and indefinite military conscription. Unable to project soft power or inspire regional leadership, Afwerki turns to brutal tactics—covert influence, militarised alliances, and rhetorical manipulation.
By exploiting Ethiopia’s ethnic politics, Isaias undermines the sovereignty of the Ethiopian people to solve their own problems through dialogue, reform, or democratic processes. His involvement does not lead to reconciliation but to more profound suspicion between groups—especially among youth who increasingly experience identity through exclusion rather than solidarity.
The Danger of Ethnic Triangulation
Ethnic identity in Ethiopia is complex, historical, and real—but it is also vulnerable to political abuse. When external actors like Isaias exploit these identities, they amplify distrust and polarise communities. Terms like "Amhara ideology," "Oromummaa," or "Tegaru nationalism" become caricatured and weaponised, stripped of their original meanings and reloaded with political toxicity.
This form of ethnic triangulation destabilises Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa. It disrupts efforts for peace, democratic reform, and economic integration. It also obscures the real issues—inequality, poverty, authoritarianism, and a lack of national reconciliation.
A Call for Ethical Leadership and Pan-Ethiopian Solidarity
Ethiopia must not allow its future to be shaped by those who thrive on division. The antidote to Isaias Afwerki’s strategy is not reactive ethnonationalism but principled unity rooted in justice, pluralism, and mutual respect. Oromummaa, Amhara identity, Tegaru pride—all must coexist within a framework that recognises difference as a strength, not a weakness.
Religious leaders, scholars, artists, youth movements, and political parties must resist the temptation to echo divisive rhetoric and promote dialogue transcending tribal lines. Ethiopia’s dignity will not be restored by foreign strongmen or internal scapegoating—it will be restored by Ethiopians together.
"Either With Me or Against Me": The Erosion of Political Dialogue in Ethiopian Culture
The phrase “either with me or against me” epitomises a polarising mindset where neutral ground, compromise, or dissent is interpreted as betrayal. In many political settings, such an outlook breeds division stifles dialogue and weakens democratic culture. In the context of Ethiopian political culture, this binary thinking—rooted partially in historical, cultural, and social factors—has deeply influenced the behaviour of political elites and discouraged the development of constructive political dialogue.
Historical and Cultural Roots of Polarization
Ethiopian history is characterised by a long-standing tradition of centralised power and imperial rule. From the Solomonic dynasty to the Derg regime and beyond, loyalty to the ruler or the regime was often demanded in absolute terms. Opposition was not tolerated but punished. Over time, this cultivated a political culture where questioning authority or holding differing views could be interpreted as rebellion. This legacy still lingers in the political attitudes of elites who regard compromise or ideological diversity as weakness or disloyalty.
Moreover, Ethiopian cultures emphasise communal loyalty, collective identity, and respect for elders and authority figures. While these values have social benefits, they can also suppress individual expression and dissent. In the political realm, these values may lead to environments where political loyalty is expected without question and criticism—however constructive—is unwelcome.
The Suppression of Political Dialogue
In Ethiopia’s multi-ethnic, multi-lingual, and religiously diverse society, political dialogue should ideally bridge differences. However, when elites adopt an “either with me or against me” posture, they undermine this potential. Political parties become echo chambers, suppressing internal debate and sidelining moderate voices. Negotiations across party lines become difficult or impossible because compromise is viewed as a betrayal.
This mentality has played a significant role in Ethiopia’s recurrent political instability. Whether in federal-regional conflicts, ethnic tensions, or disputes among political parties, the unwillingness to engage in honest dialogue has led to stalemates, violence, and mutual destruction. Political elites often treat each other not as rivals in a democratic contest but as existential threats. As a result, elections become zero-sum games, and political transitions are marked by mistrust, vengeance, and exclusion rather than reconciliation and cooperation.
Discouraging Dissent and Critical Thinking
Another consequence of this binary thinking is the erosion of political innovation. When dissent is not tolerated, new ideas struggle to emerge. Young leaders, intellectuals, and civil society voices are silenced or co-opted, hindering political dialogue and national progress.
In Ethiopia, political parties often discourage internal criticism, fearing it may weaken their image or unity. Yet, a healthy democratic culture depends on the ability to self-reflect, correct course, and adapt to new realities. A political environment that cannot tolerate critique or compromise is bound to stagnate or implode.
Toward a Culture of Dialogue
To move beyond this impasse, Ethiopian political culture must evolve. Several steps are necessary:
Civic Education: Citizens must be taught the value of pluralism, dialogue, and tolerance. A robust democratic culture begins with an informed populace.
Institutional Reforms: Political parties, parliament, and other institutions must be structured to encourage dialogue and inclusivity rather than adversarial domination.
Leadership Accountability: Political leaders must be accountable for inflammatory rhetoric promoting division. They must be encouraged—and if necessary, pressured—to adopt inclusive and dialogic approaches.
Cultural Reinterpretation: Traditional values such as respect, consensus (Araaraa), and community harmony (Nagaa) can be reinterpreted to support political dialogue rather than suppress it.
Conclusion
The “either with me or against me” mentality may offer short-term political gain but ultimately erodes trust, dialogue, and national unity. For Ethiopia to achieve lasting peace and democratic governance, its political elites must transcend this binary mindset. They must learn to engage with opponents as enemies and partners in a shared national project. Only then can Ethiopia fulfil its promise as a diverse yet united nation.
The Implications of U.S. Ambassador Ervin Massinga’s Statement on Ethiopian Politics
The statement by U.S. Ambassador Ervin Massinga, issued during a critical period of internal strife in Ethiopia, carries significant domestic and international political weight. By calling for a peaceful resolution, negotiation, and the cessation of military operations—including drone strikes—against civilians, the United States has positioned itself as both a critic of ongoing government actions and a potential mediator in Ethiopia’s political crisis. This statement reflects a shift toward prioritising human rights, peace-building, and inclusive political dialogue in Ethiopia’s complex and fragile landscape.
1. Legitimizing Armed Political Groups as Negotiation Partners
One of the statement's most striking implications is the recognition of the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) as a legitimate actor in the peace process. Historically labelled as a terrorist organisation by the Ethiopian government, the OLA’s inclusion in the ambassador’s call for negotiations challenges the government's narrative and pressures it to engage diplomatically rather than militarily. This may embolden the OLA and its supporters while opening space for a broader political solution in Oromia.
2. Pressure on the Ethiopian Federal Government
Ambassador Massinga’s direct criticism of the federal government’s use of drone strikes signals growing international concern over human rights violations. It reflects a broader shift in U.S. foreign policy prioritising civilian protection and conflict de-escalation. The U.S. urges the Ethiopian government to alter its counterinsurgency strategy and pursue a political solution by calling for an end to such military tactics. This could place the federal administration under pressure from both internal opposition and international donors and allies.
3. A Call for Inclusivity and Civilian-Centered Governance
The ambassador’s statement emphasises the need to “put people first,” referring to the internally displaced, children, and access to essential services. This focus on humanitarian concerns implicitly critiques the government’s priorities and calls for a reorientation of governance toward inclusivity, public service delivery, and civil rights. Such a message may strengthen civil society voices advocating for democratic reform and accountability in Ethiopia.
4. Implications for Regional Stability and Foreign Relations
The mention of Fano, an Amhara militia group, underscores the ethnic complexity of Ethiopia’s conflicts. By calling on Fano to adopt peaceful objectives, the U.S. acknowledges the multi-front nature of the crisis while pushing all parties toward dialogue. This could help de-escalate ethnic tensions and signal to regional governments that the U.S. supports a unified but federal Ethiopia responsive to its diverse populations.
Moreover, this diplomatic posture may recalibrate Ethiopia-U.S. relations. The Ethiopian government may view the statement as interference or support for insurgent groups, potentially straining ties. However, it also presents an opportunity for Ethiopia to regain international trust by committing to inclusive peace talks and reforms.
5. Encouraging a New Political Culture
Finally, the ambassador’s message calls for a political culture rooted in negotiation, realism, and peace. It promotes the idea that sustainable governance in Ethiopia must move away from zero-sum politics and militarised conflict toward pluralism and accountability. This could strengthen institutions like the National Dialogue Commission and inclusive transitional justice mechanisms if embraced.
Conclusion
Ambassador Massinga’s statement is a diplomatic gesture and a powerful signal that Ethiopia’s internal conflicts require urgent and inclusive political solutions. By advocating for peace, dialogue, and protection of civilians, the U.S. lays the groundwork for potential mediation efforts and a broader realignment of Ethiopian politics. Its implications are profound: they challenge the current militarised approaches, recognise the legitimacy of marginalised voices, and call for a politics centred on the well-being of all Ethiopians.
Diplomatic and Economic Analysis: South Africa vs. Ethiopia in France (May 2025)
Context Overview
On Wednesday, 22 May 2025, Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and South African Deputy President Paul Mashatile were in France for separate diplomatic engagements with President Emmanuel Macron. These meetings reflect both nations’ efforts to deepen economic and diplomatic cooperation with one of Europe’s most influential powers.
Economic Advantage: South Africa vs. Ethiopia
1. South Africa’s Diplomatic and Economic Position
Strong Business Ties: Over 400 French companies currently operate in South Africa, employing over 65,000 South Africans. This signals a deep and structured economic relationship built over time.
Institutionalised Economic Forums: The SA–France Investment Conference has succeeded and is now set to become a biennial institutional mechanism—showcasing South Africa as a reliable, long-term partner.
Macron’s Upcoming Visit: President Macron's planned visit to South Africa for the G20 Summit underscores the country’s importance in global diplomacy and Africa’s economic agenda.
Mature Diplomatic Channel: The conversation involved high-level multilateral cooperation, showing that France and South Africa view each other as partners in bilateral terms and broader international frameworks.
2. Ethiopia’s Diplomatic and Economic Engagement
Warm Political Ties: Prime Minister Abiy emphasised the continuity and positivity of discussions with Macron, reflecting a growing diplomatic warmth.
Focus on Trade Enhancement: Abiy clearly stated that enhancing commercial ties is a central priority, which shows intent to deepen economic relations. However, it suggests that the existing economic linkage may not yet match South Africa’s depth.
Follow-Up from Addis Ababa Talks: The visit continues discussions held in December 2024, indicating consistent engagement. However, no clear institutional outcome or investment figure has been shared from this engagement.
Strategic Aspirations: Ethiopia is clearly positioning itself for expanded investment and commercial engagement, but this remains aspirational compared to South Africa’s already active portfolio of French investment.
Comparative Summary
Aspect South Africa, Ethiopia
French companies on the ground 400+ companies Not specified
Jobs linked to French investment 65,000+ Not specified
Institutional mechanisms SA–France Investment Conference Not established yet
Economic relationship status Established and mature Growing and aspirational
Diplomatic depth Bilateral and multilateral (G20, etc.) Strong but more bilateral for now
Macron's travel plans Visiting South Africa No reciprocal visit announced
Conclusion
South Africa has a greater diplomatic and economic advantage in its relationship with France than Ethiopia. The presence of hundreds of French companies, high employment impact, institutional investment frameworks, and Macron’s upcoming visit all point to a deeper and more structured relationship.
However, Ethiopia is making strong diplomatic strides, and Prime Minister Abiy’s emphasis on trade and continuity in discussions indicates a strategic move to elevate Ethiopia’s economic profile with France. If Ethiopia manages to institutionalise economic dialogues and attract concrete investments, it could close the gap shortly.
The government of Abiy Ahmed demonstrated strategic patience in addressing the evolving situation in the Tigray region. It has approved key amendments to laws governing the federal intervention in the region’s local affairs, enabling the extension of the interim administration’s term for an additional year and facilitating the appointment of a new president for this administration.
The future of Tigray – including its efforts to reorganise power and renew political and security structures – depends on the ability of key elites in Mekelle and Addis Ababa to navigate shifting dynamics, enhance critical aspects of the peace process and advance the implementation of the Pretoria Agreement.
The most formidable challenge for Tigray’s interim administration is its ability to develop a unified and coherent strategy to advance an ideological assessment and internal reform of the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF). Successfully aligning political objectives with the Ethiopian state's central priorities and the Tigrayan people's urgent needs will be critical for long-term stability.
In a remarkable shift in the ongoing power struggle within the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) and its relationship with Ethiopia’s central government, Gen. Tadesse Werede was appointed as Chief Administrator of the Interim Regional Administration of Tigray (IRAT), whose mandate was extended for an additional year.
During his inauguration ceremony in Addis Ababa on April 8, 2025, Werede acknowledged the formidable challenge ahead, describing his role as a “hard test.” However, he voiced confidence in receiving broad support from the people of Tigray, the federal government, and the international community.
There are high hopes that the new leadership will chart a stable and prosperous future for Tigray by adopting a more balanced strategic approach and collectively introducing practical solutions to pressing issues. These could include national reconciliation, rebuilding and reorganising power structures, governance and security reforms, normalising the situation throughout Tigray and building constructive relations with the central and regional governments.
Background and Context of Political Change
Since August 2024, the Tigray region has been a flashpoint due to deep divisions and power struggle between TPLF’s two key factions: one led by Debretsion Gebremichael, TPLF’s longstanding leader and Tigray’s former president, and the other led by Getachew Reda, the former president of IRAT.
This internal conflict marks one of the most significant challenges in TPLF’s five-decade history, raising fears of renewed violence and the possibility of turning Tigray into a battleground for a proxy war between Ethiopia and Eritrea.
Concerns escalated after senior commanders of Tigray forces relinquished their neutrality and joined Gebremichael’s faction. Gebremichael made intensive moves to entrench authority in local councils and administrations, including Mekelle and Adigrat. He also dismantled the interim administration in Tigray by mid-March.
In response, Reda fled to Addis Ababa and called for direct federal intervention to stop a coup d’état against his authority. Reda also accused his rivals of aligning with the Eritrean regime in a rebellion against the central government.
This rift inside TPLF was not only a genuine test for the fragile peace between Mekelle and Addis Ababa but also risked reigniting hostilities between Ethiopia and Eritrea, creating a potential new flashpoint in the Horn of Africa. Ethiopia has accused Eritrea of fueling the potential rebellion in Tigray by exploiting the recent divisions in the region. Former Ethiopian President Mulatu Teshome even described Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki as a “pyromaniac who can’t resist setting fires.” The Eritrean government has repeatedly denied these accusations, describing them as part of Ethiopia’s unjustified campaign to seize its ports.
Despite growing tensions, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed's government has exercised strategic patience in managing the evolving situation in the Tigray region. It has approved key amendments to laws governing the federal intervention in the region’s local affairs. These amendments, endorsed by the federal parliament in early April 2025, enabled the extension of the interim administration’s term for an additional year. Later, Abiy accepted TPLF’s nomination of Gen. Werede as the new IRAT president, replacing Reda, while appointing the latter as his advisor for East African affairs. Abiy’s previous decision to nominate through email was rejected and boycotted even by opposition parties in Tigray.
Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed attends the handover ceremony of the Tigray interim administration from outgoing governor Getachew Reda (right) to Gen. Tadesse Werede (center)
Chances of Success for the New Administration
At his inauguration ceremony –attended by the Chairperson of the African Union (AU), representatives of the European Union (EU) and foreign diplomats, though held in the absence of TPLF’s representatives – IRAT’s new Chief Administrator Werede signed a document outlining the key responsibilities assigned to his administration. They included the following eight loosely defined tasks:
Facilitating the full return of internally displaced persons (IDPs) to their original places;
Overseeing the disarmament and reintegration of former combatants;
Ensuring the enforcement of the rule of law and halting unlawful activities that threaten public safety, stability and peace;
Coordinating regular development efforts, government operations, social services and reconstruction initiatives;
Ending unconstitutional and unlawful actions and affiliations;
Preparing the region for free and fair elections;
Ensuring the region selects its representatives for participation in the national dialogue;
Regulating the role of media outlets to foster national unity and cohesion.
These tasks do not explicitly conflict with the Pretoria Agreement, which serves as the legal framework governing relations between the federal government and Tigray’s regional administration. However, some critics argue that these endeavours constitute an attempt to constrain or bypass specific provisions of the agreement.
Amidst escalating tensions, Gen. Werede, who previously served as the deputy chief administrator of IRAT, head of security and peace and commander-in-chief of the Tigray Defence Forces, played a critical role in preventing the escalation of tensions into full-scale security threats and violence. He managed to do so through mediation between opposing factions and blocking Reda’s decision to dismiss three senior military commanders, which he regarded as a “violation of institutional procedures.” His priority remained preserving the neutrality of the Tigray Defence Forces and protecting them from divisions.
Tigray’s leadership transition was widely welcomed within and beyond the region as a significant “breakthrough” that will – even temporarily – de-escalate tension within TPLF and between the front and the central government. Abiy praised Gen. Werede, describing him as someone who “has a clear understanding of both the strengths and shortcomings of the previous administration” and is widely regarded as well-positioned to guide Tigray through this critical transition.
However, some observers argue that Abiy’s close ties to Werede, whose military background and allegiance to the old guard of TPLF are well known, marked a major political victory for the powerful radical camp led by TPLF’s leader Gebremichael and a consolidation of the domination of this camp at the expense of the moderate-reformist-progressive camp led by Reda, which has been marginalised along with opposition forces in the recently formed regional government.
This has caused resentment among opposition groups, which have denounced this cabinet as “illegitimate, dominated by a single faction,” describing it as a setback for democracy and a continuation of the front's previous exclusionary and authoritarian approach. Critics argue that this development undermines prospects for reform and political openness, diminishing the likelihood of free and fair democratic elections in Tigray.
Challenges in Advancing the Peace Process
Like the Pretoria Agreement, the document mentioned above includes a degree of ambiguity and inaccurate assessment of the complicated social and political dynamics within Tigray and the broader Ethiopian landscape. It leaves room for diverse interpretations among stakeholders, creating opportunities for manoeuvring rather than consolidated efforts toward a comprehensive reconciliation process and a genuine political transition in Tigray as a practical approach to put the region on the path of recovery and sustainable peace.
The following key decisive issues might continue to pose significant challenges for the new interim leadership in Tigray, Tigrayan elites and broader stakeholders working to advance Ethiopia’s peace process:
1. Crisis of Legitimacy and Prestige: Dismantling the TPLF or Reorganising Power?
As the victor of the war, the Abiy Ahmed government is seeking to restructure the TPLF and reshape the political landscape in Tigray. A key example is the role of the Ethiopian National Electoral Board (NEB), whose decisions have hindered the TPLF’s attempts to restore the legitimacy it lost following its rebellion in late 2020. The board now requires the TPLF to register as a new political party “under special considerations,” following the amended Ethiopian Elections and Political Parties Registration Proclamation No. 1332/2023.
While this federalist stance has received some support from the progressive wing of the TPLF, represented by the Reda faction, it has also deepened internal divisions and pushed the front toward a dangerous level of fragmentation. The TPLF’s more hardline faction, led by Gebremichael, insisted that the party’s legal status be fully restored to its pre-war standing. It rejected NEB’s conditions and instead took unilateral steps to reassert the party’s autonomy, including convening an extended party congress in August 2024. This congress resulted in the re-election of the TPLF’s general assembly leadership as well as its central and executive committees – while simultaneously removing Reda and his allies.
These moves were carried out in defiance of the NEB’s decision, which Gebremichael’s faction viewed as inconsistent with both the TPLF’s internal constitution and the Pretoria Peace Agreement. Additionally, the faction further argued that the federal directive not only restricted the front’s ability to pursue political autonomy and development independent of federal control, but also threatened its financial base and strategic interests – especially through the potential nationalization and seizure of the party’s assets, including its headquarters, real estate holdings and investment shares in Addis Ababa.
2. Structuring the Security Sector: Disarming and Reintegrating the Tigray Defense Forces (TDF)
The disarmament and reintegration of Tigrayan fighters is central to the federal government’s broader effort to centralize authority in Tigray – an integral component of Abiy’s political project to build a more cohesive, centralized state and contain internal threats.
By May 2023, over 85% of the Tigray Defense Forces' (TDF) heavy weapons and air defense systems had been handed over. However, the rollout of the light disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and rehabilitation (DDRR) program for more than 200,000 Tigrayan combatants has since stalled. This impasse stems from two key issues. First, the process is contingent upon the withdrawal of Amhara and Eritrean forces from areas of Tigray, as stipulated in the Pretoria Peace Agreement – an obligation the federal government has thus far failed to fulfil. Second, many Tigrayan fighters remain reluctant to disarm, as the TDF is not merely the armed wing of the TPLF; it represents a broader cross-section of Tigrayan society, many of whom view the war as a genocidal campaign against their people. As such, the TPLF leadership lacks full control over the TDF’s orientations and decision-making.
The Pretoria Agreement may have further deepened the divide between the TPLF’s political and military wings. Many within the TDF were dissatisfied with the political leadership’s conduct during the negotiations and view the agreement as a "humiliating surrender." Consequently, resistance to disarmament persists – especially given the potential security threats from neighboring Amhara and Eritrean forces.
Addis Ababa and Mekelle remain on a fragile trajectory between peace and renewed conflict (news agencies)
3. The Sovereignty Dilemma: Reclaiming Disputed Areas with Amhara and Eritrea
For Abiy Ahmed’s former allies – the Amhara regional leadership and the Eritrean regime – the territorial disputes with Tigray represented both a primary reward and the chief motivation for joining the war effort against their shared adversary, the Tigrayan Front. The Eritrean army was quick to reoccupy areas in northern Tigray and impose a new status quo, particularly in Badme and Irob. These territories had been awarded to Eritrea under the Algiers Agreement and the 2002 UN-backed border demarcation ruling, but Ethiopia had previously refused to withdraw from them.
In parallel, Eritrean forces supported their Amhara allies in expanding territorial control over key areas in southern and western Tigray – including Raya, Wolkait and Humera – regions that collectively account for roughly one-third of Tigray’s total land area (50,000 square kilometers). This territorial reconfiguration significantly reduced the Tigrayan Front’s operational space and effectively severed its western access to Sudan, compounding its strategic vulnerabilities.
Although Addis Ababa turned a blind eye to the actions of its wartime allies – Eritrea and the Amhara regional forces – due to their critical role in the military campaign, the way the conflict was ultimately resolved excluded both Asmara and Amhara from the peace process. This exclusion, which they perceived as a “stab in the back,” has left the Ethiopian government with a persistent dilemma.
The Pretoria Peace Agreement calls for the withdrawal of all “foreign” forces from the Tigray region, the restoration of the pre-war status quo (as of November 2020) in disputed areas and the resolution of regional border disputes through legal mechanisms and the federal constitution. This commitment has compelled – and continues to compel – Addis Ababa to take decisive measures to remove Amhara forces from the contested territories. These efforts have included the use of military force to dismantle newly established political and security structures in those areas and to replace them with Tigrayan administration, federal police and national defense forces. Such actions are viewed as prerequisites for the return of hundreds of thousands of forcibly displaced Tigrayan civilians. However, these moves have triggered a deepening confrontation with Amhara nationalists, particularly the Fano militia, which has been waging an armed insurgency against the federal government since August 2023.
Thus, even if Eritrea is neutralized, resolving the Amhara-Tigray border dispute remains a complex challenge – one that requires not only a more favorable political environment but also the establishment of key conditions, including a nuanced understanding of the historical context and legal frameworks, as well as genuine national reconciliation efforts. This entails engaging all relevant stakeholders in a transparent, inclusive dialogue aimed at addressing long-standing grievances and correcting entrenched demographic imbalances.
Conclusions and Expectations
The future of Tigray – including its internal power reorganization, the renewal of political and security structures, the advancement of governance, reconciliation, recovery and long-term stability, as well as the redefinition of its relations with the federal government and rival nationalities, particularly the Amhara – will largely depend on the capacity of key elites in both Mekelle and Addis Ababa to respond to shifting dynamics. Their success will rest on strengthening critical elements of the peace process, especially the creation of conditions conducive to the full implementation of the Pretoria Agreement.
The major challenge facing Tigray’s new interim administration is whether it can formulate a unified, coherent and viable strategy for undertaking the ideological reassessment and internal reform within the TPLF. This includes reorganizing power within the region and aligning these policy goals with both federal directives and the urgent needs of the Tigrayan population. Successfully doing so would demonstrate the TPLF’s ability to adapt and regain relevance at both the regional and national levels – thereby enhancing its prospects of remaining a key political force in Ethiopia and, at a minimum, ensuring continued influence over the governance and future of Tigray.
This suggests that Addis Ababa and Mekelle may remain on a fragile trajectory between peace and renewed conflict – particularly if they continue to diverge on key issues such as the recognition of TPLF as a legitimate political party and the alignment of federal disarmament directives with TPLF’s concerns. These tensions are further exacerbated by the unresolved status of disputed territories, which remain at the center of a broader and deepening polarization involving both the Amhara region and Eritrea.
While the future trajectory of these evolving dynamics remains uncertain, continued stagnation of unresolved issues is likely to deepen the crisis and fuel dangerous conflict patterns. This could include the emergence of new political and military alliances – or the formalization of existing informal ones with growing nationalist overtones. One possible outcome is a convergence between the Oromo and Tigray (e.g., an Abiy Ahmed–TPLF alignment) against the Asmara–Amhara axis, potentially aiming to forcibly remove Eritrean forces and Amhara militias from Tigrayan territory. Alternatively, hardline elements within the TPLF and the Eritrean regime may pursue a reactive and destabilizing course, reminiscent of their cooperation during the armed struggle of the early 1990s, when they jointly sought to overthrow the Marxist Derg regime led by Mengistu Hailemariam.
Note: This paper was originally published in Arabic on May 8, 2025.
Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in the content are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the Emirates Policy Center’s position.
