Key Takeaways
- The government of Abiy Ahmed demonstrated strategic patience in addressing the evolving situation in the Tigray region. It has approved key amendments to laws governing the federal intervention in the region’s local affairs, enabling the extension of the interim administration’s term for an additional year and facilitating the appointment of a new president for this administration.
- The future of Tigray – including its efforts to reorganise power and renew political and security structures – depends on the ability of key elites in Mekelle and Addis Ababa to navigate shifting dynamics, enhance critical aspects of the peace process and advance the implementation of the Pretoria Agreement.
- The most formidable challenge for Tigray’s interim administration is its ability to develop a unified and coherent strategy to advance an ideological assessment and internal reform of the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF). Successfully aligning political objectives with the Ethiopian state's central priorities and the Tigrayan people's urgent needs will be critical for long-term stability.
In a remarkable shift in the ongoing power struggle within the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) and its relationship with Ethiopia’s central government, Gen. Tadesse Werede was appointed as Chief Administrator of the Interim Regional Administration of Tigray (IRAT), whose mandate was extended for an additional year.
During his inauguration ceremony in Addis Ababa on April 8, 2025, Werede acknowledged the formidable challenge ahead, describing his role as a “hard test.” However, he voiced confidence in receiving broad support from the people of Tigray, the federal government, and the international community.
There are high hopes that the new leadership will chart a stable and prosperous future for Tigray by adopting a more balanced strategic approach and collectively introducing practical solutions to pressing issues. These could include national reconciliation, rebuilding and reorganising power structures, governance and security reforms, normalising the situation throughout Tigray and building constructive relations with the central and regional governments.
Background and Context of Political Change
Since August 2024, the Tigray region has been a flashpoint due to deep divisions and power struggle between TPLF’s two key factions: one led by Debretsion Gebremichael, TPLF’s longstanding leader and Tigray’s former president, and the other led by Getachew Reda, the former president of IRAT.
This internal conflict marks one of the most significant challenges in TPLF’s five-decade history, raising fears of renewed violence and the possibility of turning Tigray into a battleground for a proxy war between Ethiopia and Eritrea.
Concerns escalated after senior commanders of Tigray forces relinquished their neutrality and joined Gebremichael’s faction. Gebremichael made intensive moves to entrench authority in local councils and administrations, including Mekelle and Adigrat. He also dismantled the interim administration in Tigray by mid-March.
In response, Reda fled to Addis Ababa and called for direct federal intervention to stop a coup d’état against his authority. Reda also accused his rivals of aligning with the Eritrean regime in a rebellion against the central government.
This rift inside TPLF was not only a genuine test for the fragile peace between Mekelle and Addis Ababa but also risked reigniting hostilities between Ethiopia and Eritrea, creating a potential new flashpoint in the Horn of Africa. Ethiopia has accused Eritrea of fueling the potential rebellion in Tigray by exploiting the recent divisions in the region. Former Ethiopian President Mulatu Teshome even described Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki as a “pyromaniac who can’t resist setting fires.” The Eritrean government has repeatedly denied these accusations, describing them as part of Ethiopia’s unjustified campaign to seize its ports.
Despite growing tensions, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed's government has exercised strategic patience in managing the evolving situation in the Tigray region. It has approved key amendments to laws governing the federal intervention in the region’s local affairs. These amendments, endorsed by the federal parliament in early April 2025, enabled the extension of the interim administration’s term for an additional year. Later, Abiy accepted TPLF’s nomination of Gen. Werede as the new IRAT president, replacing Reda, while appointing the latter as his advisor for East African affairs. Abiy’s previous decision to nominate through email was rejected and boycotted even by opposition parties in Tigray.
Chances of Success for the New Administration
At his inauguration ceremony –attended by the Chairperson of the African Union (AU), representatives of the European Union (EU) and foreign diplomats, though held in the absence of TPLF’s representatives – IRAT’s new Chief Administrator Werede signed a document outlining the key responsibilities assigned to his administration. They included the following eight loosely defined tasks:
- Facilitating the full return of internally displaced persons (IDPs) to their original places;
- Overseeing the disarmament and reintegration of former combatants;
- Ensuring the enforcement of the rule of law and halting unlawful activities that threaten public safety, stability and peace;
- Coordinating regular development efforts, government operations, social services and reconstruction initiatives;
- Ending unconstitutional and unlawful actions and affiliations;
- Preparing the region for free and fair elections;
- Ensuring the region selects its representatives for participation in the national dialogue;
- Regulating the role of media outlets to foster national unity and cohesion.
These tasks do not explicitly conflict with the Pretoria Agreement, which serves as the legal framework governing relations between the federal government and Tigray’s regional administration. However, some critics argue that these endeavours constitute an attempt to constrain or bypass specific provisions of the agreement.
Amidst escalating tensions, Gen. Werede, who previously served as the deputy chief administrator of IRAT, head of security and peace and commander-in-chief of the Tigray Defence Forces, played a critical role in preventing the escalation of tensions into full-scale security threats and violence. He managed to do so through mediation between opposing factions and blocking Reda’s decision to dismiss three senior military commanders, which he regarded as a “violation of institutional procedures.” His priority remained preserving the neutrality of the Tigray Defence Forces and protecting them from divisions.
Tigray’s leadership transition was widely welcomed within and beyond the region as a significant “breakthrough” that will – even temporarily – de-escalate tension within TPLF and between the front and the central government. Abiy praised Gen. Werede, describing him as someone who “has a clear understanding of both the strengths and shortcomings of the previous administration” and is widely regarded as well-positioned to guide Tigray through this critical transition.
However, some observers argue that Abiy’s close ties to Werede, whose military background and allegiance to the old guard of TPLF are well known, marked a major political victory for the powerful radical camp led by TPLF’s leader Gebremichael and a consolidation of the domination of this camp at the expense of the moderate-reformist-progressive camp led by Reda, which has been marginalised along with opposition forces in the recently formed regional government.
This has caused resentment among opposition groups, which have denounced this cabinet as “illegitimate, dominated by a single faction,” describing it as a setback for democracy and a continuation of the front's previous exclusionary and authoritarian approach. Critics argue that this development undermines prospects for reform and political openness, diminishing the likelihood of free and fair democratic elections in Tigray.
Challenges in Advancing the Peace Process
Like the Pretoria Agreement, the document mentioned above includes a degree of ambiguity and inaccurate assessment of the complicated social and political dynamics within Tigray and the broader Ethiopian landscape. It leaves room for diverse interpretations among stakeholders, creating opportunities for manoeuvring rather than consolidated efforts toward a comprehensive reconciliation process and a genuine political transition in Tigray as a practical approach to put the region on the path of recovery and sustainable peace.
The following key decisive issues might continue to pose significant challenges for the new interim leadership in Tigray, Tigrayan elites and broader stakeholders working to advance Ethiopia’s peace process:
1. Crisis of Legitimacy and Prestige: Dismantling the TPLF or Reorganising Power?
As the victor of the war, the Abiy Ahmed government is seeking to restructure the TPLF and reshape the political landscape in Tigray. A key example is the role of the Ethiopian National Electoral Board (NEB), whose decisions have hindered the TPLF’s attempts to restore the legitimacy it lost following its rebellion in late 2020. The board now requires the TPLF to register as a new political party “under special considerations,” following the amended Ethiopian Elections and Political Parties Registration Proclamation No. 1332/2023.
While this federalist stance has received some support from the progressive wing of the TPLF, represented by the Reda faction, it has also deepened internal divisions and pushed the front toward a dangerous level of fragmentation. The TPLF’s more hardline faction, led by Gebremichael, insisted that the party’s legal status be fully restored to its pre-war standing. It rejected NEB’s conditions and instead took unilateral steps to reassert the party’s autonomy, including convening an extended party congress in August 2024. This congress resulted in the re-election of the TPLF’s general assembly leadership as well as its central and executive committees – while simultaneously removing Reda and his allies.
These moves were carried out in defiance of the NEB’s decision, which Gebremichael’s faction viewed as inconsistent with both the TPLF’s internal constitution and the Pretoria Peace Agreement. Additionally, the faction further argued that the federal directive not only restricted the front’s ability to pursue political autonomy and development independent of federal control, but also threatened its financial base and strategic interests – especially through the potential nationalization and seizure of the party’s assets, including its headquarters, real estate holdings and investment shares in Addis Ababa.
2. Structuring the Security Sector: Disarming and Reintegrating the Tigray Defense Forces (TDF)
The disarmament and reintegration of Tigrayan fighters is central to the federal government’s broader effort to centralize authority in Tigray – an integral component of Abiy’s political project to build a more cohesive, centralized state and contain internal threats.
By May 2023, over 85% of the Tigray Defense Forces' (TDF) heavy weapons and air defense systems had been handed over. However, the rollout of the light disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and rehabilitation (DDRR) program for more than 200,000 Tigrayan combatants has since stalled. This impasse stems from two key issues. First, the process is contingent upon the withdrawal of Amhara and Eritrean forces from areas of Tigray, as stipulated in the Pretoria Peace Agreement – an obligation the federal government has thus far failed to fulfil. Second, many Tigrayan fighters remain reluctant to disarm, as the TDF is not merely the armed wing of the TPLF; it represents a broader cross-section of Tigrayan society, many of whom view the war as a genocidal campaign against their people. As such, the TPLF leadership lacks full control over the TDF’s orientations and decision-making.
The Pretoria Agreement may have further deepened the divide between the TPLF’s political and military wings. Many within the TDF were dissatisfied with the political leadership’s conduct during the negotiations and view the agreement as a "humiliating surrender." Consequently, resistance to disarmament persists – especially given the potential security threats from neighboring Amhara and Eritrean forces.
3. The Sovereignty Dilemma: Reclaiming Disputed Areas with Amhara and Eritrea
For Abiy Ahmed’s former allies – the Amhara regional leadership and the Eritrean regime – the territorial disputes with Tigray represented both a primary reward and the chief motivation for joining the war effort against their shared adversary, the Tigrayan Front. The Eritrean army was quick to reoccupy areas in northern Tigray and impose a new status quo, particularly in Badme and Irob. These territories had been awarded to Eritrea under the Algiers Agreement and the 2002 UN-backed border demarcation ruling, but Ethiopia had previously refused to withdraw from them.
In parallel, Eritrean forces supported their Amhara allies in expanding territorial control over key areas in southern and western Tigray – including Raya, Wolkait and Humera – regions that collectively account for roughly one-third of Tigray’s total land area (50,000 square kilometers). This territorial reconfiguration significantly reduced the Tigrayan Front’s operational space and effectively severed its western access to Sudan, compounding its strategic vulnerabilities.
Although Addis Ababa turned a blind eye to the actions of its wartime allies – Eritrea and the Amhara regional forces – due to their critical role in the military campaign, the way the conflict was ultimately resolved excluded both Asmara and Amhara from the peace process. This exclusion, which they perceived as a “stab in the back,” has left the Ethiopian government with a persistent dilemma.
The Pretoria Peace Agreement calls for the withdrawal of all “foreign” forces from the Tigray region, the restoration of the pre-war status quo (as of November 2020) in disputed areas and the resolution of regional border disputes through legal mechanisms and the federal constitution. This commitment has compelled – and continues to compel – Addis Ababa to take decisive measures to remove Amhara forces from the contested territories. These efforts have included the use of military force to dismantle newly established political and security structures in those areas and to replace them with Tigrayan administration, federal police and national defense forces. Such actions are viewed as prerequisites for the return of hundreds of thousands of forcibly displaced Tigrayan civilians. However, these moves have triggered a deepening confrontation with Amhara nationalists, particularly the Fano militia, which has been waging an armed insurgency against the federal government since August 2023.
Thus, even if Eritrea is neutralized, resolving the Amhara-Tigray border dispute remains a complex challenge – one that requires not only a more favorable political environment but also the establishment of key conditions, including a nuanced understanding of the historical context and legal frameworks, as well as genuine national reconciliation efforts. This entails engaging all relevant stakeholders in a transparent, inclusive dialogue aimed at addressing long-standing grievances and correcting entrenched demographic imbalances.
Conclusions and Expectations
The future of Tigray – including its internal power reorganization, the renewal of political and security structures, the advancement of governance, reconciliation, recovery and long-term stability, as well as the redefinition of its relations with the federal government and rival nationalities, particularly the Amhara – will largely depend on the capacity of key elites in both Mekelle and Addis Ababa to respond to shifting dynamics. Their success will rest on strengthening critical elements of the peace process, especially the creation of conditions conducive to the full implementation of the Pretoria Agreement.
The major challenge facing Tigray’s new interim administration is whether it can formulate a unified, coherent and viable strategy for undertaking the ideological reassessment and internal reform within the TPLF. This includes reorganizing power within the region and aligning these policy goals with both federal directives and the urgent needs of the Tigrayan population. Successfully doing so would demonstrate the TPLF’s ability to adapt and regain relevance at both the regional and national levels – thereby enhancing its prospects of remaining a key political force in Ethiopia and, at a minimum, ensuring continued influence over the governance and future of Tigray.
This suggests that Addis Ababa and Mekelle may remain on a fragile trajectory between peace and renewed conflict – particularly if they continue to diverge on key issues such as the recognition of TPLF as a legitimate political party and the alignment of federal disarmament directives with TPLF’s concerns. These tensions are further exacerbated by the unresolved status of disputed territories, which remain at the center of a broader and deepening polarization involving both the Amhara region and Eritrea.
While the future trajectory of these evolving dynamics remains uncertain, continued stagnation of unresolved issues is likely to deepen the crisis and fuel dangerous conflict patterns. This could include the emergence of new political and military alliances – or the formalization of existing informal ones with growing nationalist overtones. One possible outcome is a convergence between the Oromo and Tigray (e.g., an Abiy Ahmed–TPLF alignment) against the Asmara–Amhara axis, potentially aiming to forcibly remove Eritrean forces and Amhara militias from Tigrayan territory. Alternatively, hardline elements within the TPLF and the Eritrean regime may pursue a reactive and destabilizing course, reminiscent of their cooperation during the armed struggle of the early 1990s, when they jointly sought to overthrow the Marxist Derg regime led by Mengistu Hailemariam.
Note: This paper was originally published in Arabic on May 8, 2025.
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