Monday, June 1, 2020

Terrorism by the State
We have noted that the term “terrorism” was coined in the nineteenth century
to describe acts conducted by the French Republic. More than a century later,
some of the most devastating episodes of terrorism continue to be committed
by or sponsored under the authority of sovereign nations. Among the most
brutal examples are the following:
 The Khmer Rouge killing of nearly two million Cambodians under the dictatorship
of Pol Pot in the late 1970s
 The Baathist Army gassing of thousands of Kurds in Northern Iraq by Saddam
Hussein in 1988

 The Serbian killing of several thousand Muslims in Bosnia under Slobodan Milo-
sevic in the 1990s

These three are all examples of state-sponsored acts of terrorism that were
ordered directly and monitored closely by the leaders who sanctioned them.
In other instances, the acts are carried out more along the lines of patronage

or assistance than direct control. Iranian support for Hezbollah, the Popu-
lar Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and terrorist activities in Iraq and

elsewhere throughout the Middle East and other parts of the world all exem-
plify the patronage model of state-sponsored terrorism. Cuba is also known

to have supported terrorist activities in South America and Spain, and Pak-
istan is known to have supported such activities in Kashmir. Support of a

prolonged insurgency against communists by the United States and Britain
during the Cold War also qualifies. The support can range from ideological
encouragement and indoctrination to training and assistance in insurgency,
intelligence, operational support in the form of providing false documents
and safe havens, and financial rewards to the families of suicide bombers.
9

The Nature of Terrorism
These various forms of support may have any one or a combination of several
aims:
 To destabilize a state to gain greater influence in the region
 To create international visibility for a persistent problem, such as that of Palestine
 To retaliate against a target state in the region perceived as an enemy
 To undermine the influence of a larger power operating in the region
Although acts of state-sponsored terrorism are well known – both those
involving direct initiation and control and those involving patronage and
indirect support – few sovereign nations officially acknowledge involvement

in or support of these activities. Today, terrorism is widely thought to orig-
inate with groups like al Qaeda, operating outside the official auspices of

the state. Constitutional democracies have taken particularly strong stands
against terrorist attacks on noncombatants, especially in the post-Cold War

era. Leaders of nondemocratic nations generally express opposition to ter-
rorist activities as well, especially when the targets of those activities are

people who are friends of the state or when the activities are aimed directly

against the state and its resources. Although some nations provide covert sup-
port to terrorist groups and activities, typically indirectly through intermedi-
aries to obfuscate their involvement, none officially acknowledge support of

terrorism.
Connection to Larger Networks and the Extent
of Internal Organization
Terrorist groups and individuals are, at one extreme, operatives of larger

terrorist networks, much like business franchises. Some are only loosely affil-
iated – al Qaeda is the best known of such loosely associated networks. At

the other extreme, terrorists act as independent lone-wolf operatives, such as

“Unabomber” Ted Kaczynski, Austrian letter bomber Franz Fuchs, and abor-
tion clinic and Atlanta Olympic Park bomber Eric Rudolph. Larger, more

connected groups can benefit by taking advantage of teamwork, division of
labor, and power in numbers, but they tend to be subject to a greater risk of
detection because their exposure is increased with each additional individual
involved. Of course, even individuals must plan their attacks if they wish to
enhance the prospects for success, but the need for planning and coordinating
activities increases as the operations become more complex and the number
of individuals needed to carry out the act or acts increases. The effectiveness
of the group can be enhanced through practice, preparation, and secrecy, as
in the cases of 9/11 and the London subway attack of 2005, but any group
is generally only as effective as the competence of its weakest member.
10

The Nature of Terrorism

Terrorism by Militant Religious Extremists
Much terrorism is conducted in the name of a religious mission. With the 9/11
attack, Islamic jihadism1 became the most prominent example of terrorism
motivated by religious extremists, but by no means the only example of
terrorist acts done in the name of religion. Millions of innocent people were
slaughtered as infidels by Christian Crusaders for some 200 years beginning
in 1099, as were countless others by militant extremist factions of all the
major religions over the years. Examples are discussed in some detail in
Chapters 2 and 4.
Ethnic Terrorism

Ethnicity is typically associated with unique combinations of genetics, cul-
ture, language, religion, and common heritage, and ethnic terrorism is ter-
rorism involving an ethnic group. It occurs typically following long-standing

ethnic or tribal rivalries and is accompanied by slogans, such as the following:
you are not one of us, you interfere with our well-being and thus threaten

us, and we must defend ourselves against you and your kind. Ethnic terror-
ism usually follows acts of persecution, with the persecutor and persecuted

often switching roles in episodes of mutual retaliation. When a government
supports one side in an ethnic dispute, the other side often engages in acts of
terrorism against the government.
Ethnic terrorism ranges from the local level of the clan or tribe to the level
of the nation and beyond, as when an ethnic group has migrated to various
points throughout the world in diaspora. At the smallest level, warring clans
and tribes generally share a common ethnic heritage within a region, yet they
often feud over territorial or property disputes, acts of disrespect, or petty
matters involving unresolved grievances. A prominent example of terrorist
acts between clans in the United States is the decades-long feud between the
Hatfields and McCoys of Eastern Kentucky. Toward the other end of the
scale, the disputes become questions of national identity, such as whether
two warring ethnic groups are better as a single nation or as separate ones.
Daniel Byman (2007) observes that ethnic terrorism is often the product
of government interventions against ethnic minorities. He identifies several
common characteristics of such interventions. When a government acts with
force to stifle the dissent of an ethnic minority against government rule, the
actions tend to polarize the opposition and induce a stronger-than-anticipated
reaction. Such acts of force often induce other countries and institutions that
are unfriendly to the government to provide support to the ethnic minority.
The government often underestimates the advantages that local insurgents
have against an invading army, the principal one being the opportunity to
outlast the invaders and wear them down through acts of insurgency, as
11

The Nature of Terrorism
the American colonialists did to the British military in the late eighteenth
century. In the end, overly aggressive government action tends to escalate
ethnic terrorism.
Every continent has its history of ethnic rivalries that simmer and then
boil over into acts of terrorism, some not involving government intervention.
Although each of these histories has its own unique elements, they tend
to share many attributes: small differences become greatly magnified while
large commonalities and shared values are ignored; intermarriage between
individuals of opposing clans or tribes become taboo, and the identities of
the children of such marriages become confused; extremists on both sides put
moderates under pressure to choose sides and give up conciliatory or neutral
positions; and government interventions tend to be alternately inept and
needlessly brutal, with both sorts of reactions having the eventual effect of
energizing the opposition. In Chapter 3, I discuss several major examples of
ethnic terrorism in which there have been decades and sometimes centuries
of fighting: between Kurds and Turks in Turkey, Sunnis and Kurds in Iraq,
Sunnis and Shi’a in Iraq, Russians and Chechens in the Trans-Caucuses,
Basques and Spanish nationalists in Spain, Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda,
English Protestants and Irish Catholics in Northern Ireland, and the Tamils
and Sinhalese in Sri Lanka.
C. Critical Distinctions: Terrorism, Aggression,
Crime, and War
Terrorism is an extreme form of both crime and aggression. The social costs
and consequences of terrorism tend to be vastly greater than are customarily
associated even with serious acts of street crime and of violent aggression,
because of the scale of both the immediate harms caused by the acts and
the widespread fear produced by the acts and the consequences of that fear.
That terrorism is extreme, however, does not mean that it is fundamentally
different from those other acts: many of the sources of crime and aggression
are common to terrorism. Terrorism is in some ways more similar to war
than to crime, but it differs from war in important respects as well, despite the
use of war metaphors to garner political support for aggressive interventions
against terrorism. Box 1.2 highlights distinctions among several overlapping
concepts: aggression, crime, guerrilla action, insurgency, terrorism, and war.
Aggression is common to the other five concepts in the box, except for
crimes that do not involve force or threats of force.2 The primary distinctions
among the concepts have to do with the targets and motives of the aggression
involved. Each manifestation of aggression is similar to the others in several
ways, but is distinct in at least one way. Acts of insurgency are similar
to guerrilla acts, except that they include targets other than military or law
enforcement agents. Insurgents often use the tools of terrorism, and they may
12

The Nature of Terrorism

Box 1.2. Critical Distinctions: Terrorism, Aggression,
Crime, and War
Aggression: any act or threat of force by an individual or group against
another
Crime: the intentional violation of a criminal statute by an individual acting
either alone or with others
Guerrilla action: an act of aggression by an individual or group against a
state’s military or law enforcement authority

Insurgency: the systematic use of subversion and aggression against a con-
stituted government by an organized group of individuals opposed to the

government and acting outside of formal sovereign authority; insurgents
who succeed become heroic revolutionaries, whereas those who fail are
known as criminals
Terrorism: the premeditated and unlawful use or threatenedTerrorism by the State
We have noted that the term “terrorism” was coined in the nineteenth century
to describe acts conducted by the French Republic. More than a century later,
some of the most devastating episodes of terrorism continue to be committed
by or sponsored under the authority of sovereign nations. Among the most
brutal examples are the following:
 The Khmer Rouge killing of nearly two million Cambodians under the dictatorship
of Pol Pot in the late 1970s
 The Baathist Army gassing of thousands of Kurds in Northern Iraq by Saddam
Hussein in 1988

 The Serbian killing of several thousand Muslims in Bosnia under Slobodan Milo-
sevic in the 1990s

These three are all examples of state-sponsored acts of terrorism that were
ordered directly and monitored closely by the leaders who sanctioned them.
In other instances, the acts are carried out more along the lines of patronage

or assistance than direct control. Iranian support for Hezbollah, the Popu-
lar Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and terrorist activities in Iraq and

elsewhere throughout the Middle East and other parts of the world all exem-
plify the patronage model of state-sponsored terrorism. Cuba is also known

to have supported terrorist activities in South America and Spain, and Pak-
istan is known to have supported such activities in Kashmir. Support of a

prolonged insurgency against communists by the United States and Britain
during the Cold War also qualifies. The support can range from ideological
encouragement and indoctrination to training and assistance in insurgency,
intelligence, operational support in the form of providing false documents
and safe havens, and financial rewards to the families of suicide bombers.
9

The Nature of Terrorism
These various forms of support may have any one or a combination of several
aims:
 To destabilize a state to gain greater influence in the region
 To create international visibility for a persistent problem, such as that of Palestine
 To retaliate against a target state in the region perceived as an enemy
 To undermine the influence of a larger power operating in the region
Although acts of state-sponsored terrorism are well known – both those
involving direct initiation and control and those involving patronage and
indirect support – few sovereign nations officially acknowledge involvement

in or support of these activities. Today, terrorism is widely thought to orig-
inate with groups like al Qaeda, operating outside the official auspices of

the state. Constitutional democracies have taken particularly strong stands
against terrorist attacks on noncombatants, especially in the post-Cold War

era. Leaders of nondemocratic nations generally express opposition to ter-
rorist activities as well, especially when the targets of those activities are

people who are friends of the state or when the activities are aimed directly

against the state and its resources. Although some nations provide covert sup-
port to terrorist groups and activities, typically indirectly through intermedi-
aries to obfuscate their involvement, none officially acknowledge support of

terrorism.
Connection to Larger Networks and the Extent
of Internal Organization
Terrorist groups and individuals are, at one extreme, operatives of larger

terrorist networks, much like business franchises. Some are only loosely affil-
iated – al Qaeda is the best known of such loosely associated networks. At

the other extreme, terrorists act as independent lone-wolf operatives, such as

“Unabomber” Ted Kaczynski, Austrian letter bomber Franz Fuchs, and abor-
tion clinic and Atlanta Olympic Park bomber Eric Rudolph. Larger, more

connected groups can benefit by taking advantage of teamwork, division of
labor, and power in numbers, but they tend to be subject to a greater risk of
detection because their exposure is increased with each additional individual
involved. Of course, even individuals must plan their attacks if they wish to
enhance the prospects for success, but the need for planning and coordinating
activities increases as the operations become more complex and the number
of individuals needed to carry out the act or acts increases. The effectiveness
of the group can be enhanced through practice, preparation, and secrecy, as
in the cases of 9/11 and the London subway attack of 2005, but any group
is generally only as effective as the competence of its weakest member.
10

The Nature of Terrorism

Terrorism by Militant Religious Extremists
Much terrorism is conducted in the name of a religious mission. With the 9/11
attack, Islamic jihadism1 became the most prominent example of terrorism
motivated by religious extremists, but by no means the only example of
terrorist acts done in the name of religion. Millions of innocent people were
slaughtered as infidels by Christian Crusaders for some 200 years beginning
in 1099, as were countless others by militant extremist factions of all the
major religions over the years. Examples are discussed in some detail in
Chapters 2 and 4.
Ethnic Terrorism

Ethnicity is typically associated with unique combinations of genetics, cul-
ture, language, religion, and common heritage, and ethnic terrorism is ter-
rorism involving an ethnic group. It occurs typically following long-standing

ethnic or tribal rivalries and is accompanied by slogans, such as the following:
you are not one of us, you interfere with our well-being and thus threaten

us, and we must defend ourselves against you and your kind. Ethnic terror-
ism usually follows acts of persecution, with the persecutor and persecuted

often switching roles in episodes of mutual retaliation. When a government
supports one side in an ethnic dispute, the other side often engages in acts of
terrorism against the government.
Ethnic terrorism ranges from the local level of the clan or tribe to the level
of the nation and beyond, as when an ethnic group has migrated to various
points throughout the world in diaspora. At the smallest level, warring clans
and tribes generally share a common ethnic heritage within a region, yet they
often feud over territorial or property disputes, acts of disrespect, or petty
matters involving unresolved grievances. A prominent example of terrorist
acts between clans in the United States is the decades-long feud between the
Hatfields and McCoys of Eastern Kentucky. Toward the other end of the
scale, the disputes become questions of national identity, such as whether
two warring ethnic groups are better as a single nation or as separate ones.
Daniel Byman (2007) observes that ethnic terrorism is often the product
of government interventions against ethnic minorities. He identifies several
common characteristics of such interventions. When a government acts with
force to stifle the dissent of an ethnic minority against government rule, the
actions tend to polarize the opposition and induce a stronger-than-anticipated
reaction. Such acts of force often induce other countries and institutions that
are unfriendly to the government to provide support to the ethnic minority.
The government often underestimates the advantages that local insurgents
have against an invading army, the principal one being the opportunity to
outlast the invaders and wear them down through acts of insurgency, as
11

The Nature of Terrorism
the American colonialists did to the British military in the late eighteenth
century. In the end, overly aggressive government action tends to escalate
ethnic terrorism.
Every continent has its history of ethnic rivalries that simmer and then
boil over into acts of terrorism, some not involving government intervention.
Although each of these histories has its own unique elements, they tend
to share many attributes: small differences become greatly magnified while
large commonalities and shared values are ignored; intermarriage between
individuals of opposing clans or tribes become taboo, and the identities of
the children of such marriages become confused; extremists on both sides put
moderates under pressure to choose sides and give up conciliatory or neutral
positions; and government interventions tend to be alternately inept and
needlessly brutal, with both sorts of reactions having the eventual effect of
energizing the opposition. In Chapter 3, I discuss several major examples of
ethnic terrorism in which there have been decades and sometimes centuries
of fighting: between Kurds and Turks in Turkey, Sunnis and Kurds in Iraq,
Sunnis and Shi’a in Iraq, Russians and Chechens in the Trans-Caucuses,
Basques and Spanish nationalists in Spain, Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda,
English Protestants and Irish Catholics in Northern Ireland, and the Tamils
and Sinhalese in Sri Lanka.
C. Critical Distinctions: Terrorism, Aggression,
Crime, and War
Terrorism is an extreme form of both crime and aggression. The social costs
and consequences of terrorism tend to be vastly greater than are customarily
associated even with serious acts of street crime and of violent aggression,
because of the scale of both the immediate harms caused by the acts and
the widespread fear produced by the acts and the consequences of that fear.
That terrorism is extreme, however, does not mean that it is fundamentally
different from those other acts: many of the sources of crime and aggression
are common to terrorism. Terrorism is in some ways more similar to war
than to crime, but it differs from war in important respects as well, despite the
use of war metaphors to garner political support for aggressive interventions
against terrorism. Box 1.2 highlights distinctions among several overlapping
concepts: aggression, crime, guerrilla action, insurgency, terrorism, and war.
Aggression is common to the other five concepts in the box, except for
crimes that do not involve force or threats of force.2 The primary distinctions
among the concepts have to do with the targets and motives of the aggression
involved. Each manifestation of aggression is similar to the others in several
ways, but is distinct in at least one way. Acts of insurgency are similar
to guerrilla acts, except that they include targets other than military or law
enforcement agents. Insurgents often use the tools of terrorism, and they may
12

The Nature of Terrorism

Box 1.2. Critical Distinctions: Terrorism, Aggression,
Crime, and War
Aggression: any act or threat of force by an individual or group against
another
Crime: the intentional violation of a criminal statute by an individual acting
either alone or with others
Guerrilla action: an act of aggression by an individual or group against a
state’s military or law enforcement authority

Insurgency: the systematic use of subversion and aggression against a con-
stituted government by an organized group of individuals opposed to the

government and acting outside of formal sovereign authority; insurgents
who succeed become heroic revolutionaries, whereas those who fail are
known as criminals
Terrorism: the premeditated and unlawful use or threatenedTerrorism by the State
We have noted that the term “terrorism” was coined in the nineteenth century
to describe acts conducted by the French Republic. More than a century later,
some of the most devastating episodes of terrorism continue to be committed
by or sponsored under the authority of sovereign nations. Among the most
brutal examples are the following:
 The Khmer Rouge killing of nearly two million Cambodians under the dictatorship
of Pol Pot in the late 1970s
 The Baathist Army gassing of thousands of Kurds in Northern Iraq by Saddam
Hussein in 1988

 The Serbian killing of several thousand Muslims in Bosnia under Slobodan Milo-
sevic in the 1990s

These three are all examples of state-sponsored acts of terrorism that were
ordered directly and monitored closely by the leaders who sanctioned them.
In other instances, the acts are carried out more along the lines of patronage

or assistance than direct control. Iranian support for Hezbollah, the Popu-
lar Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and terrorist activities in Iraq and

elsewhere throughout the Middle East and other parts of the world all exem-
plify the patronage model of state-sponsored terrorism. Cuba is also known

to have supported terrorist activities in South America and Spain, and Pak-
istan is known to have supported such activities in Kashmir. Support of a

prolonged insurgency against communists by the United States and Britain
during the Cold War also qualifies. The support can range from ideological
encouragement and indoctrination to training and assistance in insurgency,
intelligence, operational support in the form of providing false documents
and safe havens, and financial rewards to the families of suicide bombers.
9

The Nature of Terrorism
These various forms of support may have any one or a combination of several
aims:
 To destabilize a state to gain greater influence in the region
 To create international visibility for a persistent problem, such as that of Palestine
 To retaliate against a target state in the region perceived as an enemy
 To undermine the influence of a larger power operating in the region
Although acts of state-sponsored terrorism are well known – both those
involving direct initiation and control and those involving patronage and
indirect support – few sovereign nations officially acknowledge involvement

in or support of these activities. Today, terrorism is widely thought to orig-
inate with groups like al Qaeda, operating outside the official auspices of

the state. Constitutional democracies have taken particularly strong stands
against terrorist attacks on noncombatants, especially in the post-Cold War

era. Leaders of nondemocratic nations generally express opposition to ter-
rorist activities as well, especially when the targets of those activities are

people who are friends of the state or when the activities are aimed directly

against the state and its resources. Although some nations provide covert sup-
port to terrorist groups and activities, typically indirectly through intermedi-
aries to obfuscate their involvement, none officially acknowledge support of

terrorism.
Connection to Larger Networks and the Extent
of Internal Organization
Terrorist groups and individuals are, at one extreme, operatives of larger

terrorist networks, much like business franchises. Some are only loosely affil-
iated – al Qaeda is the best known of such loosely associated networks. At

the other extreme, terrorists act as independent lone-wolf operatives, such as

“Unabomber” Ted Kaczynski, Austrian letter bomber Franz Fuchs, and abor-
tion clinic and Atlanta Olympic Park bomber Eric Rudolph. Larger, more

connected groups can benefit by taking advantage of teamwork, division of
labor, and power in numbers, but they tend to be subject to a greater risk of
detection because their exposure is increased with each additional individual
involved. Of course, even individuals must plan their attacks if they wish to
enhance the prospects for success, but the need for planning and coordinating
activities increases as the operations become more complex and the number
of individuals needed to carry out the act or acts increases. The effectiveness
of the group can be enhanced through practice, preparation, and secrecy, as
in the cases of 9/11 and the London subway attack of 2005, but any group
is generally only as effective as the competence of its weakest member.
10

The Nature of Terrorism

Terrorism by Militant Religious Extremists
Much terrorism is conducted in the name of a religious mission. With the 9/11
attack, Islamic jihadism1 became the most prominent example of terrorism
motivated by religious extremists, but by no means the only example of
terrorist acts done in the name of religion. Millions of innocent people were
slaughtered as infidels by Christian Crusaders for some 200 years beginning
in 1099, as were countless others by militant extremist factions of all the
major religions over the years. Examples are discussed in some detail in
Chapters 2 and 4.
Ethnic Terrorism

Ethnicity is typically associated with unique combinations of genetics, cul-
ture, language, religion, and common heritage, and ethnic terrorism is ter-
rorism involving an ethnic group. It occurs typically following long-standing

ethnic or tribal rivalries and is accompanied by slogans, such as the following:
you are not one of us, you interfere with our well-being and thus threaten

us, and we must defend ourselves against you and your kind. Ethnic terror-
ism usually follows acts of persecution, with the persecutor and persecuted

often switching roles in episodes of mutual retaliation. When a government
supports one side in an ethnic dispute, the other side often engages in acts of
terrorism against the government.
Ethnic terrorism ranges from the local level of the clan or tribe to the level
of the nation and beyond, as when an ethnic group has migrated to various
points throughout the world in diaspora. At the smallest level, warring clans
and tribes generally share a common ethnic heritage within a region, yet they
often feud over territorial or property disputes, acts of disrespect, or petty
matters involving unresolved grievances. A prominent example of terrorist
acts between clans in the United States is the decades-long feud between the
Hatfields and McCoys of Eastern Kentucky. Toward the other end of the
scale, the disputes become questions of national identity, such as whether
two warring ethnic groups are better as a single nation or as separate ones.
Daniel Byman (2007) observes that ethnic terrorism is often the product
of government interventions against ethnic minorities. He identifies several
common characteristics of such interventions. When a government acts with
force to stifle the dissent of an ethnic minority against government rule, the
actions tend to polarize the opposition and induce a stronger-than-anticipated
reaction. Such acts of force often induce other countries and institutions that
are unfriendly to the government to provide support to the ethnic minority.
The government often underestimates the advantages that local insurgents
have against an invading army, the principal one being the opportunity to
outlast the invaders and wear them down through acts of insurgency, as
11

The Nature of Terrorism
the American colonialists did to the British military in the late eighteenth
century. In the end, overly aggressive government action tends to escalate
ethnic terrorism.
Every continent has its history of ethnic rivalries that simmer and then
boil over into acts of terrorism, some not involving government intervention.
Although each of these histories has its own unique elements, they tend
to share many attributes: small differences become greatly magnified while
large commonalities and shared values are ignored; intermarriage between
individuals of opposing clans or tribes become taboo, and the identities of
the children of such marriages become confused; extremists on both sides put
moderates under pressure to choose sides and give up conciliatory or neutral
positions; and government interventions tend to be alternately inept and
needlessly brutal, with both sorts of reactions having the eventual effect of
energizing the opposition. In Chapter 3, I discuss several major examples of
ethnic terrorism in which there have been decades and sometimes centuries
of fighting: between Kurds and Turks in Turkey, Sunnis and Kurds in Iraq,
Sunnis and Shi’a in Iraq, Russians and Chechens in the Trans-Caucuses,
Basques and Spanish nationalists in Spain, Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda,
English Protestants and Irish Catholics in Northern Ireland, and the Tamils
and Sinhalese in Sri Lanka.
C. Critical Distinctions: Terrorism, Aggression,
Crime, and War
Terrorism is an extreme form of both crime and aggression. The social costs
and consequences of terrorism tend to be vastly greater than are customarily
associated even with serious acts of street crime and of violent aggression,
because of the scale of both the immediate harms caused by the acts and
the widespread fear produced by the acts and the consequences of that fear.
That terrorism is extreme, however, does not mean that it is fundamentally
different from those other acts: many of the sources of crime and aggression
are common to terrorism. Terrorism is in some ways more similar to war
than to crime, but it differs from war in important respects as well, despite the
use of war metaphors to garner political support for aggressive interventions
against terrorism. Box 1.2 highlights distinctions among several overlapping
concepts: aggression, crime, guerrilla action, insurgency, terrorism, and war.
Aggression is common to the other five concepts in the box, except for
crimes that do not involve force or threats of force.2 The primary distinctions
among the concepts have to do with the targets and motives of the aggression
involved. Each manifestation of aggression is similar to the others in several
ways, but is distinct in at least one way. Acts of insurgency are similar
to guerrilla acts, except that they include targets other than military or law
enforcement agents. Insurgents often use the tools of terrorism, and they may
12

The Nature of Terrorism

Box 1.2. Critical Distinctions: Terrorism, Aggression,
Crime, and War
Aggression: any act or threat of force by an individual or group against
another
Crime: the intentional violation of a criminal statute by an individual acting
either alone or with others
Guerrilla action: an act of aggression by an individual or group against a
state’s military or law enforcement authority

Insurgency: the systematic use of subversion and aggression against a con-
stituted government by an organized group of individuals opposed to the

government and acting outside of formal sovereign authority; insurgents
who succeed become heroic revolutionaries, whereas those who fail are
known as criminals
Terrorism: the premeditated and unlawful use or threatened

Friday, May 22, 2020

Acts. 15

Acts 15
1, 5 (Romans 2:24-29Galatians 5:6Ephesians 2:14-16Colossians 2:14-17Titus 1:9-11). Circumcision of No Value After the Cross—[Titus 1:9-11, 13, 14 quoted.] There were those in Paul’s day who were constantly dwelling upon circumcision, and they could bring plenty of proof from the Bible to show its obligation on the Jews; but this teaching was of no consequence at this time; for Christ had died upon Calvary’s cross, and circumcision in the flesh could not be of any further value. 6BC 1061.5
The typical service and the ceremonies connected with it were abolished at the cross. The great antitypical Lamb of God had become an offering for guilty man, and the shadow ceased in the substance. Paul was seeking to bring the minds of men to the great truth for the time; but these who claimed to be followers of Jesus were wholly absorbed in teaching the tradition of the Jews, and the obligation of circumcision (The Review and Herald, May 29, 1888). 6BC 1061.6
4-29. See EGW comment on Galatians 2:1-10. 6BC 1061.7
11 (Galatians 3:81 Corinthians 10:4). Only One Gospel—There is no such contrast as is often claimed to exist between the Old and the New Testament, the law of God and the gospel of Christ, the requirements of the Jewish and those of the Christian dispensation. Every soul saved in the former dispensation was saved by Christ as verily as we are saved by Him today. Patriarchs and prophets were Christians. The gospel promise was given to the first pair in Eden, when they had by transgression separated themselves from God. The gospel was preached to Abraham. The Hebrews all drank of that spiritual Rock, which was Christ (The Signs of the Times, September 14, 1882). 6BC 1061.8
(Exodus 13:21, 221 Corinthians 10:1-41 Timothy 2:5.) Christ’s Blood Avails for Us as for Israel—Shrouded in the pillar of cloud, the world’s Redeemer held communion with Israel. Let us not say, then, that they had not Christ. When the people thirsted in the wilderness, and gave themselves up to murmuring and complaint, Christ was to them what He is to us—a Saviour full of tender compassion, the Mediator between them and God. After we have done our part to cleanse the soul temple from the defilement of sin, Christ’s blood avails for us, as it did for ancient Israel (The Youth’s Instructor, July 18, 1901). 6BC 1061.9

 

Thursday, May 21, 2020

Federalism: New Frontiers in Ethiopian Politics

ANDEREAS ESHETE[1]
(andreaseshete@yahoo.com)

Ethiopian Journal of Federal Studies, Vol. 1., No. 1, May 2013

“…it is of great importance in the republicnot only to guard the society against the oppression of its rulers, but toguard one part of the society against the injustice of the other part.”
                                                               -James Madison
“Where is an example of ‘Federalism’ everhaving been a preconceived plan? Who carts around Federalism as an a priori panacea?  Federalism has always appeared in any factualsituation as a response to an existing division of power within a territorythat comes together, or is thrust together, in one State.”
                                                               -BernardCrick

 

Introduction

A newpolitical vision now guides Ethiopia. The vision is a departure from prevalent African politicalpractice.  In Ethiopia, too, the newpolitics - its source, spirit and style - seems unfamiliar to many.
Since 1991, Ethiopia has embarkedupon a bold experiment in the conduct of public life.  The hallmark of the experiment is a readinessto face the fact of ethnic diversity. New political arrangements aim to shape Ethiopian political identityaround the country's constituent nations and nationalities.  Even in this era of the politics of identity,Ethiopia's resolve to extend full public recognition to her varied national communitiesis unique. Ethiopia's recognition of Eritrea's right to self-determination isalso unprecedented. Following a referendum on independence held in 1993,Eritrea went her own way.  Theestablishment of a sovereign Eritrean homeland marks the first birth of anAfrican nation through secession. Within Ethiopia, the commitment to uphold theright to self-determination is equally striking.  The right to secession is now aconstitutional entitlement. All cultural communities are entitled to fairrepresentation in the institutions of state and federal government.  Territorially based nationalities exercisewide powers of self-government in political, economic, legal, cultural andeducational affairs.  The result is apolitical order open to cultural diversity, self-expression and autonomy.
Ethiopia's ethnic turn is a sharpbreak from African political practice. With rare exceptions such as Botswana and Somalia, vast culturaldiversity characterizes African states. African states are not built on nations of their own making.  Upon independence, African states inheritedpopulations capriciously contrived by colonial powers that arbitrarily joinedor divided cultural communities.  Thenewly independent states sought to preserve the uneasy national legacy of colonialism.  Amid heterogeneity, political rule tried tocreate and maintain unity in various ways. Some cobbled together coalitions whereby elites from diverse groupscould have a stake in a unitary polity. Others designed political arrangements blind to cultural differences andcleavages.  Another tack was to fosteroverarching identities---African or ideological---in order to overshadow orovercome internal differences over national and cultural identity.
Whatever the differences inapproach, the overriding aim almost everywhere in Africa was to refuse fullpolitical expression to cultural pluralism. Even on the rare occasion where national identity was an exercise inself-definition carried out through internal struggle and negotiation, therewas no disposition to cultivate or even to acknowledge diversity.  In the recent constitutional exercisesundertaken by South Africa and Uganda, the choice was in favor of a unitarystate.  The pursuit of political unity atthe expense of cultural plurality has been a leading objective of Africanstatecraft that enjoyed wide legitimacy: for example, ethnic parties were oftenprohibited by law; African states consistently complied with OAU's principle ofupholding colonial borders.
The inclination to ignore,conceal, subdue or erase cultural diversity in African politics has beensustained at considerable cost. Monopolistic political arrangements such as military government,one-party rule, systematic suppression of human and political rights are oftenrationalized as inescapable means of safeguarding unity.  Despite these draconian measures, ethnicdiversity has   not been banished.  Bitterwars for secession were fought by Katanga, Biafra, Eritrea and SouthernSudan.  Though nothing approaches thegenocide perpetrated in Rwanda, ethnic turmoil exists in most parts of Africa.
Even when strife in Africacentered on other matters, it was seldom altogether free of ethniccontention.  Yet neither the threat ofpartition nor ubiquitous ethnic contest called into question African allegianceto a conception of statehood that excludes national or cultural pluralism fromthe definition of political identity. Thus as we enter the new millennium, a vision of political unity thatdisavows or devalues diversity survives intact throughout most of Africa.
What, then, prompted Ethiopia togo virtually alone against the prevailing current in the continent?  Ethiopia's anomalous new course is all themore surprising, for, unlike the rest of Africa, her heterogeneity of nationalities,cultural traditions, religions and languages is not a fortuitous outcome ofalien imposition.  Though Ethiopia'sautonomous development is no guarantee of the emergence of a national society,it is hard to overlook the society's resilience in the face of a long historyof internal warfare and foreign encroachment. Even outsiders, without evident partisanship, detect the contours of anintegral political community.
Admittedly the image ofEthiopians as a well-defined people conveyed in international scholarship issometimes merely a result of selective perception.  Much the most addressed part of Ethiopia isthe north, where literate cultures and salvationist religions have flourishedsince the distant past[2].  Accessibility to modern scholarship andcultural affinity rendered this terrain familiar to western observers.  Another area of focus, one driven by concernsof development, is the small, largely urban area where modern economic andpolitical institutions have gained a foothold. The impression of homogeneity gleaned from these perspectives does notreflect Ethiopian culture as a whole but rather the interests of othersocieties.
Still, those aspects of Ethiopiacaptured from culturally alien perspectives cannot be dismissed as merefragments, for they have played a crucial role in drawing the wider communitytogether.  For good or ill, northernculture is diffused throughout the entire country.  For instance, Amharic speakers can be foundalmost everywhere; the new Regional State of the Southern Peoples has adoptedAmharic as its working language.  Amongthe small but culturally influential urban population, identities that cutacross nationality, religion and language have, and are seen to have, salience.  The purview of both Amhara - Tigraycivilization and urban culture tends to define Ethiopia not just under westerneyes; it is an important dimension of Ethiopian self-perception.
Even those who extend their sightbeyond comparatively self-contained or integrative elements of the society inorder to take notice of the whole are impressed by the presence of abidingaffinities among Ethiopia's dispersed and diverse cultural communities.[3]  Strands of a common sense of communityinclude:  close and longstandingconnections of far-flung trade and migration; collective historical legacy;shared cultural beliefs, rituals, symbols and ideals; common systems of socialand political authority.  On account ofthese ties, a distinctive community encompassing all the peoples in Ethiopia'spresent territory has endured despite recurrent fragmentation.  The confluence of Ethiopia's variedidentities can also be seen in the ambitions of empire-builders ---from withinand without---who rarely settled for less than domination over what is nowEthiopia.
Though important, these indicationsof a shared sense of community show, at most, the possibility of politicalunity.  Societies like Somaliawell-endowed with traits conducive to national self-identification and cohesionhave floundered in the search for statehood. Similarly, a bitter lesson of Ethiopian history is that the potentialfor unity, however promising, cannot be realized without effectiveinstitutional means for its political expression.
It is a testimony both to theweight of Ethiopia's past and its political inconclusiveness that differencesover the present dispensation are fought as battles over historicalinterpretation.  Is Ethiopia threethousands years old or only one hundred? Have the Oromo and the Southern Peoples always been members of Ethiopiansociety or were they joined to Ethiopia through invasion and conquest in thenineteenth century?  Is Eritrea anamputated limb of Ethiopia or is it a distinct society with only a brief,forced marriage to Ethiopia during the federation and subsequent incorporation?
Some speak with self-confidenceof belonging to an Ethiopia with a robust national identity intricatelyinterwoven out of the country's constituent identities.  They claim that they cannot recognizethemselves in the new ethnically defined Ethiopia.  Others, however, speak with distance ofEthiopia as a community of which they were never willing members.  For them, the new political vision enablesthem to identify with Ethiopia for the first time.  The former feel that the present diminishesthe past, creating a void that cannot be filled.  The latter feel that the present redeemsinjustices of the past.  These clashingconceptions of Ethiopia are a subject of everyday contention because of awidespread conviction that the uncertainties surrounding the country'sself-identity are rooted in the past. While everyone agrees that Ethiopia houses a plurality of languages,religious and nationalities, disagreement rages over whether or not ethnicdifferentiation and inequality is so entrenched in Ethiopian history that itrequires recourse to a new political order.
Even indisputable collectiveaccomplishments of Ethiopian history do not yield a shared sense of pride.  Undoubtedly the most significant achievementof modern Ethiopia is independence, successfully defended against a successionof invaders --- the British, the Egyptians, the Sudanese Mahdists, and theItalians.  In this history of struggle, asingular triumph was in 1896 at the Battle of Adwa, where Ethiopia inflicted astunning defeat on Italy.  Inspirationalas it was to oppressed peoples and their champions everywhere, the Adwa victorymarks a peak in Ethiopia's international prestige.  Internally, too, Adwa was a watershed.  Peoples from the entire empire marched to thebattle:  unlike previous resistance toforeign aggression, Adwa was a national victory.  Adwa was also a formative moment in thecreation of Ethiopia as a modern nation-state. In the wake of the victory, Ethiopian sovereignty was recognized by theEuropean powers.  Yet, Adwa's legacy remainsambiguous.  Emboldened by his nationaland international prestige, Emperor Menlik II continued his expansion into thesouth and west, and consolidated his empire in the decade following Adwa.  As a result, many peoples of Ethiopia whofought valiantly at Adwa are ambivalent about the victory: they see themselvesas victims of their own triumph.  Here aselsewhere, Ethiopians seem to be at once exalted and anguished by their past.
It is not obvious that anyone isnow in a position to resolve the sharp differences separating these conceptionsof Ethiopia's past and the attitudes they yield toward the politicalpresent.  These incompatible myths aboutthe Ethiopian past do show that the new political order that gives pride ofplace to cultural diversity has not yet settled over the landscape.  Myths about the past are conjured up in orderto bolster or undermine the legitimacy of the new political vision.  This is not of course a surprise:  "The past has always been the handmaidof authority.”[4]These judgments of the present by reference to the past are useful in otherways --for example, to reach a prognosis of the new politics.  The traumas and upheavals that the countryhas suffered explain the rise of nationalist politics as well as the principlesand practices in which it now finds political expression.   A glimpse at the past also enables us totake a measure of the novelty of the present. For all their novelty, the present arrangements may well showremnants--desirable or undesirable --of the past.
Federalism
Remarkson Method
Even believers in an idealconception of society do not insist that federalism must be realized in everylegitimate polity.  Nor is federalismsupported by all ideal conceptions of constitutional democracy.  Federalism therefore differs from publicideals of universal reach. For instance, federalism is distinct from humanrights: unlike federalism, “their political (moral) force extends to allsocieties, and they are binding on all peoples and societies, including outlawstates.”[5] Violationof human rights justifies condemnation or even coercive intervention.  In contrast, rejection of federalism by aregime does not demonstrate imperfection, much less, wrongdoing in the regime.
Federalism is not, therefore, anecessary part of an ideal conception or theory of a democratic society; it israther an ideal for a society in unfavorable circumstances, circumstancesunfavorable to constitutional democracy. It might, of course, be argued that all political ideals answer tounfavorable conditions.  For example,human rights are honored because everyone always needs to avoid being killed,assaulted, deceived, used as a resource, or neglected in an emergency. The illsagainst which human rights afford protection represent evils to which all humanbeings are always vulnerable.  The vitaldifference is that federalism is a public value tailored to conditionsunfavorable to constitutional democracy that are not universal but ratherpeculiar to certain societies.  However,the distinction suggested between ideal and nonideal theory may be blurred byadopting a position taken by a few political theorists: namely, either thatthere are no positive political values or that the only practicable publicvalues are those that serve to ward off unfavorable features of men or theirenvironment.  Forging an intellectuallink among all societies on the basis of the exclusive importance of pervasiveunfavorable conditions would yield a minimalist political theory such aslibertarianism or what Judith Shklar calls the liberalism of fear.[6]Still, this view is not a direct challenge to the proposal to treat federalismunder nonideal theory, for the view does not amount to a denial of nonidealtheory but rather to an affirmation of its ubiquity.
If, however, we subscribe to theposition that social co-operation can aim beyond the avoidance of vice to theachievement of virtue, the distinction between ideal and nonideal theorysurvives.  Federalism can then be seen asa proper part of nonideal theory which, according to John Rawls, “deals withunfavorable conditions, that is, with the conditions of societies whosehistorical, social, and economic circumstances make their achieving awell-ordered regime, whether liberal or decent, difficult or impossible.”[7]Nonideal theory delimits the requirements of an account of society burdenedwith unfavorable conditions.  First, toidentify the conditions – poverty; divisions of power, culture or identity; anintolerant public culture – that tend to stand in the way of fidelity to thevalues and institutions of constitutional democracy.  Second, to determine the policies andpractices that mitigate, overcome or deploy to advantage unfavorable conditionsin the service of constitutional democracy. In the task of unburdening a society from unfavorable conditions,nonideal theory is guided by the aim of reaching or approximating idealtheory.  In Rawls’s words: “nonidealtheory asks how the ideal conception of society … might be achieved or at leastworked toward, generally in gradual steps; it looks for policies and courses ofaction that are likely to be effectiveand politically permissible for that purpose”[8](italics mine). Rawls’s remarks indicate a third demand of nonideal theory:starting from where the society is now, the search is for a passage todemocratic institutions by democratic means. Unless nonideal theory furnishes democratic means for surmountingbarriers to democracy it cannot reconcile us to unfavorable conditions.
To clarify the significance of the treatment of federalism under theaspect of nonideal theory, it may be helpful to contrast it with its morefamiliar alternative: to explain and justify federalism as an integral part ofan ideal conception of constitutional democracy. A few political philosophershave made serious attempts to find a theoretical underpinning for federalismand other public manifestations of diversity as a freestanding value or idealof constitutional democracy.
A notable example is CharlesTaylor’s influential essay on “The Politics of Recognition.”[9]Taylor identifies two forms of recognition that he deems important tocontemporary politics. The first is recognition of what human beingsimportantly share, and it yields “a politics of universalism, emphasizing theequal dignity of citizens, and the content of this politics has been theequalization of rights and entitlements.”[10] Thesecond is a recognition of what makes human beings culturally distinct ordifferent, and it yields a politics of particularism. “With the politics ofequal dignity, what is established is meant to be universally the same, anidentical basket of rights and immunities; with the politics of difference,what we are asked to recognize is the unique identity of this individual orgroup from everyone else.” [11]Taylor’s chief concern is with the second form of recognition, for he believesthat the first is dominant in contemporary political theory and practice, andthat it has tended to undermine the second by aspiring to distance or evenefface the culturally distinct from political life. Taylor argues that ourallegiance to recognition of our common humanity should not blind us to thefact that recognition of distinctness is a vital human need, though the urgencyof the need makes itself felt only after our release from social forms wherethe identity of individuals and groups had been preordained. 
Taylor’s thesis then is that tobe recognized in one’s cultural distinctness is a universal human interest.Multiculturalism and its institutional expressions such as federalism arereasonable realizations of a human interest for recognition of culturaldistinctness. Indeed, to avoid denigration and forcible assimilation,universalist recognition of individuals as worthy of equal concern and respectdemands public affirmation of their culturally particularist identities.
Now, it is not entirely clear whyTaylor singles out cultural and linguistic identity, as opposed to, say,religious identity as a dimension of distinctness that warrants recognition anddifferential treatment in public life. Taylor does not, of course, deny thatreligious distinctness finds recognition outside public life in freeassociations. Yet he does not explain what is special about the claim ofdistinctness by Quebeckers such that he can say that here “what was at stakewas the desire of these people for survival, and their consequent demand forcertain forms of autonomy in their self-government, as well as the ability toadopt certain kinds of legislation deemed necessary for survival.”[12]
Even if we allow that there arereasons for politically privileging cultural distinctness, it is not evidentthat recognition of a particular cultural identity is a categorical demand.Taylor’s bold idea that recognition of one’s distinct cultural identity mustmatter and always requires public affirmation is not altogether convincing. Itseems more plausible to say that cultural identity does not necessarily matter,but if in a given case it does, it must be recognized. But then the claim torecognition of distinctness is not a fundamental human interest on a par, say,with the interest to be treated with equal concern and respect. The importanceof securing recognition for one’s cultural identity therefore depends onhistorical circumstance.
Why does Taylor suppose thatrecognition of one’s cultural distinctness always matters? Taylor seems to beled to the conclusion that he has seized upon a vital human interest by a focuson recognition to the exclusion of its source. Even if cultural identityhappens to be important to a person or a group and so anchors a claim torecognition of it by others, it is not obvious that recognition by any othersis what is desired or desirable. Do French Quebeckers seek recognition of theirdistinct society by Zulus or Texans? Would Zulus or Texans have standing toextend or withdraw recognition from French Quebeckers? Indeed, if we acceptTaylor’s idea of the value of cultural difference and its recognition, it ispuzzling why the demand for recognition is not put forward across societies asoften as it is within societies. It is more plausible to think that recognitionof distinctness or difference by others matters only when the others are thosewith whom there are reasons to feel closely identified. Recognition becomessalient with differences among those who, for any number of reasons, otherwisefeel a sense of mutual identification. Whether or not there are such reasonshas less to do with fundamental human needs or interests than with thecontingencies of history.
Will Kymlicka is anotherpolitical theorist who is impressed by worldwide resurgence of entho-culturaldisputes and conflicts. He concedes that “every dispute has its own uniquehistory and circumstance that need to be taken into account in devising a fairand workable solution.”[13]Still, his “aim is to step back and present a more general view of thelandscape—to identify some key concepts and principles that need to be takeninto account, and so clarify the basic building blocks for a liberal approachto minority rights.”[14] Despitethe modesty of this characterization, Kymlicka has the ambitious aim to locatemulticultural citizenship, group-differentiated rights and federativearrangements in the very foundations of a liberal conception of an idealsociety. According to Kymlicka, aside from protecting the individual’s choicesfrom intervention by others and government, a basic value of liberalism is toenable a person’s freedom to form and revise a conception of a worthwhile life.He faults contemporary liberalism for overlooking the fact that meaningfulchoice and pursuit of a way of life requires secure membership in a particularculture. “Put simply, freedom involves making choices amongst various options,and our societal culture not only provides these options, but also makes themmeaningful to us.”[15] Andagain: “Liberals should be concerned with the fate of cultural structures, notbecause they have some moral status of their own, but because it is onlythrough having a rich and secure cultural structure that people can becomeaware, in a vivid way, of the options available to them, and intelligentlyexamine their value.”[16]
For Kymlicka, the importance ofsecure cultural membership is a perfectly general claim about liberalism. It isacknowledged in the classical liberal theories of Mill and Green, and in thepractice of established liberal democracies, where liberal rule relies on anational culture upheld by the state. Kymlicka firmly resists the suggestionthat cultural membership can be secured in free associations or throughdecentralized policies in language, education and land tenure. Culturalmembership is instead a primary good that must be supported by a liberalpolitical community, if the capacity to fashion and revise a conception of aworthy individual life is to be realized. The separation of state and religioncannot serve as a model for the relation between the state and ethnic orcultural identity. “The whole idea of ‘benign neglect’ is incoherent, andreflects a shallow understanding of the relationship between states andnations. In the areas of official languages, political boundaries, and thedivision of powers, there is no way to avoid supporting this or that societalculture, or deciding which group will form a majority in political units thatcontrol culture-affecting decisions regarding language, education, andimmigration.”[17]Every liberalism is necessarily a national liberalism. The only question is tofind a fair way to reconcile multinational societies to the inseparability ofthe state and the nation, required by the ideal conception of liberal society.A federative arrangement with group-differentiated rights of self-government isthe only way to guarantee equality of cultural membership for individuals in amultinational society. Benign neglect or separation of state and ethnicitywould only mask the dominance of the official culture over the rest, whosemembers would be deprived of a context for the effective choice of a meaningfullife.
Kymlicka’s attempt to justify multicultural citizenship, collectiverights, and federative institutions by appeal to primary values and principlesof liberalism yields curious consequences that he countenances all too lightly.One concerns the extent to which a liberal, multinational state toleratesilliberal groups. Suppose a self-governing national group restricts thecapacity of its members to lead lives of their own choice. Kymlicka allows thatthe federal state should try to change the illiberal national community. But,barring extreme cases—cases that would justify international intervention—hethinks legal intervention is impermissible. To assent to this strangeconclusion is to grant that the rationale for rights to self-government can befreely violated by those exercising self-government. Put differently, individualsare entitled to secure cultural membership in order to ensure their freedom tolead a life of their own choice, but nothing more than persuasion is possibleif cultural membership robs them of this essential freedom.  How can a multinational state legitimatelycount as liberal if member states can violate rights central to liberalism withimpunity? The sanctity of cultural membership as a primary good of liberalsociety seems, in the end, to override the value of freedom it was originallyintended to subserve.
This result is doubly disquieting. First, a liberalism founded on thevalue of individual autonomy is more permissive in respect to infringements ofindividual freedom than liberalisms that avoid protection of substantivevalues, including autonomy, in public life. For example, in Rawls’s politicalliberalism human rights define the bounds of pluralism. Secondly, tolerance ofilliberal cultures eliminates Kymlicka’s sole ground for advocating a marriageof culture and a liberal state while endorsing the separation of religion andthe state. The ground is that religion, not culture, involves shared values.Leaving aside the question whether this is a trivial truth about liberalcultures or an interesting but controversial claim about all cultures, Kymlickastill faces a problem. Since both impose a conception of the good, there is nojustification for being tolerant toward illiberal cultures and intoleranttoward illiberal religions.
There is another unwelcome consequence of the liberal defense of multiculturalcitizenship, which Kymlicka points out, that has wider implications than heanticipates. Kymlicka argues that a stable liberal polity requires a sense ofsolidarity:  “a shared civic identitythat can sustain the level of mutual concern, accommodation and sacrifice thatdemocracies require.”[18]Yet, Kymlicka fears that a liberal state with a plurality of politicalcommunities may not foster an inclusive sense of solidarity sufficient tosustain the commitments of liberal citizenship to justice and the common good.Indeed, Kymlicka’s skepticism about the possibility of solidarity in amultinational state inclines him to side with Mill, who, in Kymlicka’s view,held that fidelity to liberalism is possible only in a state with a singlenational culture. Assuming that non-coercive assimilation is difficult,Kymlicka is unsure why a liberal faced with a multinational society should notbe favorably disposed to secession in order to pave the way for nation-states,the only settings suited to stable liberal democracies. What checks Kymlicka’sliberal advocacy of secession is that natural circumstances are unfavorable tothe exercise of secession. Many national groups may not prove viable asindependent states. Secession often occasions violent conflict. There is notenough room in the world to create states to accommodate all nations. Even ifall this is true, it is noteworthy that it does not prohibit a given nationalgroup from seeking secession on liberal grounds. More importantly, Kymlicka’spessimism on the fate of solidarity in a multinational state shows that it isunfavorable circumstances for states with a single national culture, notintrinsic merit from an ideal liberal point of view, that compels multinationalliberal states.
Given that multinational states are, though not strictly desirable,unavoidable, Kymlicka feels that we must somehow search for sources ofsolidarity in multinational states adequate to liberal democratic citizenship.Kymlicka considers shared public values, which he finds insufficient sincepeoples may go their own way despite such agreement. At any rate, as we sawearlier, there is no reason to expect adherence to the same principles orvalues in Kymlicka’s conception of the liberal multinational state. A morepromising basis is a commitment to what, following Taylor, he calls ‘deepdiversity.’ Roughly, this is to appreciate and prize that there are variedgrounds for allegiance to the wider political community in a multinationalstate. Even this he urges may be too thin unless it is coupled with somethingelse he deems most important. “For citizens to want to keep a multinationalstate together, therefore, they must value, not just ‘deep diversity’ ingeneral, but also the particular ethnic groups and national cultures with whomthey currently share the country.”[19]
This is an arresting conclusion: it is a clear admission that nationalidentity may be based on something other than a distinct cultural identity.Pride in historical achievements is a an example that Kymlicka offers of ashared national identity that does not draw on membership in a particularculture. Since Kymlicka insists it is Mill’s belief that a single nationalculture is a requirement of a liberal state, it is worth noting that Millhimself holds that a shared past is a powerful source of a sense ofnationality. He writes:
A portion of mankind may be said to constitute aNationality if they are united among themselves by common sympathies—which makethem cooperate with each other more willingly than with other people, desire tobe under the same government, and desire that it should be government bythemselves, or a portion of themselves, exclusively. This feeling ofnationality may have been generated by various causes. Sometimes it is theeffect of identity of race and descent. Community of language, community ofreligion greatly contribute to it. Geographical limits are one of its causes.But the strongest of all is identity of political antecedents, the possessionof national history, and consequent community of recollections; collectivepride and humiliation, pleasure and regret, connected with the same events inthe past.[20]

What Mill singles out as the strongest source of nationalidentity—collective pride and humiliation in a shared past—may, for all we know,account for a sense of community even in culturally homogeneous societies.  In any case, there is little reason to acceptthe thesis that a liberal political community is necessarily rooted in culture,the thesis on which Kymlicka, in part, mounts his case for a multinationalliberal state. There is also reason to doubt the claim that a distinct cultureis the only context for making choices about what life to lead. A shared pastand the sense of identity it engenders may enable a Swiss or a Canadian to lookinto options for a worthwhile life in the wider community beyond the particularculture to which the citizen belongs.
This brief discussion indicates that the search for an invariant,particularst value of constitutional democracy to anchor a generaljustification of multicultural politics and federative arrangements is vain.For example, the candidates put forward for an invariant value or ideal cannotpossibly account for the existence, importance or persistence of a federalstate in the United States and Germany, where cultural distinctness or securecultural membership does not loom large in federal politics. Moreover, theeffort to define collective rights or federal distribution of powers byreference to an invariant value—a task undertaken more by Kymlicka thanTaylor—tends to inhibit or distort abiding values of constitutional democracy.None of this is, of course, to deny the importance of the questions Taylor andKymlicka formulate and the problems they probe. Rather, the difficulties and limitationsin their answers and solutions attest to the limits of a particularist ideal orphilosophical theory in coming to terms with a particularist phenomenon such asfederalism.  Multiculturalism andfederalism enter the political agenda only under peculiar circumstancesunfavorable to familiar universal ideals of democracy. The unfavorableconditions as well as the democratic norms that answer to them varysignificantly. The focus of nonideal theory is on the actual unfavorablecircumstances and the specific ways in which they are reconciled to thestanding values of constitutional democracy. Since the unfavorable conditionsand the terms of reconciliation are diverse, a deeper understanding invites acomparative assessment of different federal arrangements. Under nonidealtheory, federalism thus seems a subject more fit for social science than forideal or philosophical theory. The reason is that multiculturalism,multinationalism, and federalism do not call for a new value or theory ofconstitutional democracy; instead, they necessitate a nuanced institutionalrealization of universal ideals of constitutional democracy. 
An application of the method ofnonideal theory to federalism circumscribes the scope of an adequateinterpretation of federalism.  First, theperspective guides and shapes the selection of conditions unfavorable todemocratic rule that call for federalist policies and practices.  Second, it requires us to show how theprinciples and structures of federalism promote democratic ideals by checkingand exploiting unfavorable circumstances. The defense of federalism is persuasive to the extent that it comes toterms with the unfavorable conditions that prompted it in ways that enhance or,at least, do not compromise democratic ideals of universal reach.
This understanding of theinterpretation of federalism from the perspective of nonideal theory leaveswide room for disagreement.  A site ofdebate over federalism since its inception are differences over what values itserves and how well it serves them.  Onearea of contention is how best to strike a balance between the claims of unityand the claims of diversity.  A formativeexample is the constitutional debate in the United States between federalists(inclusive nationalists) and anti-federalists (exclusive or localnationalists).[21] Another source ofdisagreement is whether federalism is a source of collective rights or merelyan effective protection of individual rights in a pluralist society.   An example is the debate over the status ofthe American bill of rights before and after the reconstruction.[22]Finally, there is a question kept alive by failed or troubled federalisms: Doesfederalism entrench or attenuate the nonfavorable conditions that occasion it?[23]This question arises not only where democratic aspirations have beendisappointed but also where they have been reasonably fulfilled.



Federalism: New Frontiers in Ethiopian Politics

ANDEREAS ESHETE[1]
(andreaseshete@yahoo.com)

EthiopianJournal of Federal Studies, Vol. 1., No. 1, May 2013

“…it is of great importance in the republicnot only to guard the society against the oppression of its rulers, but toguard one part of the society against the injustice of the other part.”
                                                               -JamesMadison
“Where is an example of ‘Federalism’ everhaving been a preconceived plan? Who carts around Federalism as an a priori panacea?  Federalism has always appeared in any factualsituation as a response to an existing division of power within a territorythat comes together, or is thrust together, in one State.”
                                                               -BernardCrick

 

Introduction

A newpolitical vision now guides Ethiopia. The vision is a departure from prevalent African politicalpractice.  In Ethiopia, too, the newpolitics - its source, spirit and style - seems unfamiliar to many.
Since 1991, Ethiopia has embarkedupon a bold experiment in the conduct of public life.  The hallmark of the experiment is a readinessto face the fact of ethnic diversity. New political arrangements aim to shape Ethiopian political identityaround the country's constituent nations and nationalities.  Even in this era of the politics of identity,Ethiopia's resolve to extend full public recognition to her varied national communitiesis unique. Ethiopia's recognition of Eritrea's right to self-determination isalso unprecedented. Following a referendum on independence held in 1993,Eritrea went her own way.  Theestablishment of a sovereign Eritrean homeland marks the first birth of anAfrican nation through secession. Within Ethiopia, the commitment to uphold theright to self-determination is equally striking.  The right to secession is now aconstitutional entitlement. All cultural communities are entitled to fairrepresentation in the institutions of state and federal government.  Territorially based nationalities exercisewide powers of self-government in political, economic, legal, cultural andeducational affairs.  The result is apolitical order open to cultural diversity, self-expression and autonomy.
Ethiopia's ethnic turn is a sharpbreak from African political practice. With rare exceptions such as Botswana and Somalia, vast culturaldiversity characterizes African states. African states are not built on nations of their own making.  Upon independence, African states inheritedpopulations capriciously contrived by colonial powers that arbitrarily joinedor divided cultural communities.  Thenewly independent states sought to preserve the uneasy national legacy of colonialism.  Amid heterogeneity, political rule tried tocreate and maintain unity in various ways. Some cobbled together coalitions whereby elites from diverse groupscould have a stake in a unitary polity. Others designed political arrangements blind to cultural differences andcleavages.  Another tack was to fosteroverarching identities---African or ideological---in order to overshadow orovercome internal differences over national and cultural identity.
Whatever the differences inapproach, the overriding aim almost everywhere in Africa was to refuse fullpolitical expression to cultural pluralism. Even on the rare occasion where national identity was an exercise inself-definition carried out through internal struggle and negotiation, therewas no disposition to cultivate or even to acknowledge diversity.  In the recent constitutional exercisesundertaken by South Africa and Uganda, the choice was in favor of a unitarystate.  The pursuit of political unity atthe expense of cultural plurality has been a leading objective of Africanstatecraft that enjoyed wide legitimacy: for example, ethnic parties were oftenprohibited by law; African states consistently complied with OAU's principle ofupholding colonial borders.
The inclination to ignore,conceal, subdue or erase cultural diversity in African politics has beensustained at considerable cost. Monopolistic political arrangements such as military government,one-party rule, systematic suppression of human and political rights are oftenrationalized as inescapable means of safeguarding unity.  Despite these draconian measures, ethnicdiversity has not been banished.  Bitterwars for secession were fought by Katanga, Biafra, Eritrea and SouthernSudan.  Though nothing approaches thegenocide perpetrated in Rwanda, ethnic turmoil exists in most parts of Africa.
Even when strife in Africacentered on other matters, it was seldom altogether free of ethniccontention.  Yet neither the threat ofpartition nor ubiquitous ethnic contest called into question African allegianceto a conception of statehood that excludes national or cultural pluralism fromthe definition of political identity. Thus as we enter the new millennium, a vision of political unity thatdisavows or devalues diversity survives intact throughout most of Africa.
What, then, prompted Ethiopia togo virtually alone against the prevailing current in the continent?  Ethiopia's anomalous new course is all themore surprising, for, unlike the rest of Africa, her heterogeneity of nationalities,cultural traditions, religions and languages is not a fortuitous outcome ofalien imposition.  Though Ethiopia'sautonomous development is no guarantee of the emergence of a national society,it is hard to overlook the society's resilience in the face of a long historyof internal warfare and foreign encroachment. Even outsiders, without evident partisanship, detect the contours of anintegral political community.
Admittedly the image ofEthiopians as a well-defined people conveyed in international scholarship issometimes merely a result of selective perception.  Much the most addressed part of Ethiopia isthe north, where literate cultures and salvationist religions have flourishedsince the distant past[2].  Accessibility to modern scholarship andcultural affinity rendered this terrain familiar to western observers.  Another area of focus, one driven by concernsof development, is the small, largely urban area where modern economic andpolitical institutions have gained a foothold. The impression of homogeneity gleaned from these perspectives does notreflect Ethiopian culture as a whole but rather the interests of othersocieties.
Still, those aspects of Ethiopiacaptured from culturally alien perspectives cannot be dismissed as merefragments, for they have played a crucial role in drawing the wider communitytogether.  For good or ill, northernculture is diffused throughout the entire country.  For instance, Amharic speakers can be foundalmost everywhere; the new Regional State of the Southern Peoples has adoptedAmharic as its working language.  Amongthe small but culturally influential urban population, identities that cutacross nationality, religion and language have, and are seen to have, salience.  The purview of both Amhara - Tigraycivilization and urban culture tends to define Ethiopia not just under westerneyes; it is an important dimension of Ethiopian self-perception.
Even those who extend their sightbeyond comparatively self-contained or integrative elements of the society inorder to take notice of the whole are impressed by the presence of abidingaffinities among Ethiopia's dispersed and diverse cultural communities.[3]  Strands of a common sense of communityinclude:  close and longstandingconnections of far-flung trade and migration; collective historical legacy;shared cultural beliefs, rituals, symbols and ideals; common systems of socialand political authority.  On account ofthese ties, a distinctive community encompassing all the peoples in Ethiopia'spresent territory has endured despite recurrent fragmentation.  The confluence of Ethiopia's variedidentities can also be seen in the ambitions of empire-builders ---from withinand without---who rarely settled for less than domination over what is nowEthiopia.
Though important, these indicationsof a shared sense of community show, at most, the possibility of politicalunity.  Societies like Somaliawell-endowed with traits conducive to national self-identification and cohesionhave floundered in the search for statehood. Similarly, a bitter lesson of Ethiopian history is that the potentialfor unity, however promising, cannot be realized without effectiveinstitutional means for its political expression.
It is a testimony both to theweight of Ethiopia's past and its political inconclusiveness that differencesover the present dispensation are fought as battles over historicalinterpretation.  Is Ethiopia threethousands years old or only one hundred? Have the Oromo and the Southern Peoples always been members of Ethiopiansociety or were they joined to Ethiopia through invasion and conquest in thenineteenth century?  Is Eritrea anamputated limb of Ethiopia or is it a distinct society with only a brief,forced marriage to Ethiopia during the federation and subsequent incorporation?
Some speak with self-confidenceof belonging to an Ethiopia with a robust national identity intricatelyinterwoven out of the country's constituent identities.  They claim that they cannot recognizethemselves in the new ethnically defined Ethiopia.  Others, however, speak with distance ofEthiopia as a community of which they were never willing members.  For them, the new political vision enablesthem to identify with Ethiopia for the first time.  The former feel that the present diminishesthe past, creating a void that cannot be filled.  The latter feel that the present redeemsinjustices of the past.  These clashingconceptions of Ethiopia are a subject of everyday contention because of awidespread conviction that the uncertainties surrounding the country'sself-identity are rooted in the past. While everyone agrees that Ethiopia houses a plurality of languages,religious and nationalities, disagreement rages over whether or not ethnicdifferentiation and inequality is so entrenched in Ethiopian history that itrequires recourse to a new political order.
Even indisputable collectiveaccomplishments of Ethiopian history do not yield a shared sense of pride.  Undoubtedly the most significant achievementof modern Ethiopia is independence, successfully defended against a successionof invaders --- the British, the Egyptians, the Sudanese Mahdists, and theItalians.  In this history of struggle, asingular triumph was in 1896 at the Battle of Adwa, where Ethiopia inflicted astunning defeat on Italy.  Inspirationalas it was to oppressed peoples and their champions everywhere, the Adwa victorymarks a peak in Ethiopia's international prestige.  Internally, too, Adwa was a watershed.  Peoples from the entire empire marched to thebattle:  unlike previous resistance toforeign aggression, Adwa was a national victory.  Adwa was also a formative moment in thecreation of Ethiopia as a modern nation-state. In the wake of the victory, Ethiopian sovereignty was recognized by theEuropean powers.  Yet, Adwa's legacy remainsambiguous.  Emboldened by his nationaland international prestige, Emperor Menlik II continued his expansion into thesouth and west, and consolidated his empire in the decade following Adwa.  As a result, many peoples of Ethiopia whofought valiantly at Adwa are ambivalent about the victory: they see themselvesas victims of their own triumph.  Here aselsewhere, Ethiopians seem to be at once exalted and anguished by their past.
It is not obvious that anyone isnow in a position to resolve the sharp differences separating these conceptionsof Ethiopia's past and the attitudes they yield toward the politicalpresent.  These incompatible myths aboutthe Ethiopian past do show that the new political order that gives pride ofplace to cultural diversity has not yet settled over the landscape.  Myths about the past are conjured up in orderto bolster or undermine the legitimacy of the new political vision.  This is not of course a surprise:  "The past has always been the handmaidof authority.”[4]These judgments of the present by reference to the past are useful in otherways --for example, to reach a prognosis of the new politics.  The traumas and upheavals that the countryhas suffered explain the rise of nationalist politics as well as the principlesand practices in which it now finds political expression.   A glimpse at the past also enables us totake a measure of the novelty of the present. For all their novelty, the present arrangements may well showremnants--desirable or undesirable --of the past.
Federalism
Remarkson Method
Even believers in an idealconception of society do not insist that federalism must be realized in everylegitimate polity.  Nor is federalismsupported by all ideal conceptions of constitutional democracy.  Federalism therefore differs from publicideals of universal reach. For instance, federalism is distinct from humanrights: unlike federalism, “their political (moral) force extends to allsocieties, and they are binding on all peoples and societies, including outlawstates.”[5] Violationof human rights justifies condemnation or even coercive intervention.  In contrast, rejection of federalism by aregime does not demonstrate imperfection, much less, wrongdoing in the regime.
Federalism is not, therefore, anecessary part of an ideal conception or theory of a democratic society; it israther an ideal for a society in unfavorable circumstances, circumstancesunfavorable to constitutional democracy. It might, of course, be argued that all political ideals answer tounfavorable conditions.  For example,human rights are honored because everyone always needs to avoid being killed,assaulted, deceived, used as a resource, or neglected in an emergency. The illsagainst which human rights afford protection represent evils to which all humanbeings are always vulnerable.  The vitaldifference is that federalism is a public value tailored to conditionsunfavorable to constitutional democracy that are not universal but ratherpeculiar to certain societies.  However,the distinction suggested between ideal and nonideal theory may be blurred byadopting a position taken by a few political theorists: namely, either thatthere are no positive political values or that the only practicable publicvalues are those that serve to ward off unfavorable features of men or theirenvironment.  Forging an intellectuallink among all societies on the basis of the exclusive importance of pervasiveunfavorable conditions would yield a minimalist political theory such aslibertarianism or what Judith Shklar calls the liberalism of fear.[6]Still, this view is not a direct challenge to the proposal to treat federalismunder nonideal theory, for the view does not amount to a denial of nonidealtheory but rather to an affirmation of its ubiquity.
If, however, we subscribe to theposition that social co-operation can aim beyond the avoidance of vice to theachievement of virtue, the distinction between ideal and nonideal theorysurvives.  Federalism can then be seen asa proper part of nonideal theory which, according to John Rawls, “deals withunfavorable conditions, that is, with the conditions of societies whosehistorical, social, and economic circumstances make their achieving awell-ordered regime, whether liberal or decent, difficult or impossible.”[7]Nonideal theory delimits the requirements of an account of society burdenedwith unfavorable conditions.  First, toidentify the conditions – poverty; divisions of power, culture or identity; anintolerant public culture – that tend to stand in the way of fidelity to thevalues and institutions of constitutional democracy.  Second, to determine the policies andpractices that mitigate, overcome or deploy to advantage unfavorable conditionsin the service of constitutional democracy. In the task of unburdening a society from unfavorable conditions,nonideal theory is guided by the aim of reaching or approximating idealtheory.  In Rawls’s words: “nonidealtheory asks how the ideal conception of society … might be achieved or at leastworked toward, generally in gradual steps; it looks for policies and courses ofaction that are likely to be effectiveand politically permissible for that purpose”[8](italics mine). Rawls’s remarks indicate a third demand of nonideal theory:starting from where the society is now, the search is for a passage todemocratic institutions by democratic means. Unless nonideal theory furnishes democratic means for surmountingbarriers to democracy it cannot reconcile us to unfavorable conditions.
To clarify the significance of the treatment of federalism under theaspect of nonideal theory, it may be helpful to contrast it with its morefamiliar alternative: to explain and justify federalism as an integral part ofan ideal conception of constitutional democracy. A few political philosophershave made serious attempts to find a theoretical underpinning for federalismand other public manifestations of diversity as a freestanding value or idealof constitutional democracy.
A notable example is CharlesTaylor’s influential essay on “The Politics of Recognition.”[9]Taylor identifies two forms of recognition that he deems important tocontemporary politics. The first is recognition of what human beingsimportantly share, and it yields “a politics of universalism, emphasizing theequal dignity of citizens, and the content of this politics has been theequalization of rights and entitlements.”[10] Thesecond is a recognition of what makes human beings culturally distinct ordifferent, and it yields a politics of particularism. “With the politics ofequal dignity, what is established is meant to be universally the same, anidentical basket of rights and immunities; with the politics of difference,what we are asked to recognize is the unique identity of this individual orgroup from everyone else.” [11]Taylor’s chief concern is with the second form of recognition, for he believesthat the first is dominant in contemporary political theory and practice, andthat it has tended to undermine the second by aspiring to distance or evenefface the culturally distinct from political life. Taylor argues that ourallegiance to recognition of our common humanity should not blind us to thefact that recognition of distinctness is a vital human need, though the urgencyof the need makes itself felt only after our release from social forms wherethe identity of individuals and groups had been preordained. 
Taylor’s thesis then is that tobe recognized in one’s cultural distinctness is a universal human interest.Multiculturalism and its institutional expressions such as federalism arereasonable realizations of a human interest for recognition of culturaldistinctness. Indeed, to avoid denigration and forcible assimilation,universalist recognition of individuals as worthy of equal concern and respectdemands public affirmation of their culturally particularist identities.
Now, it is not entirely clear whyTaylor singles out cultural and linguistic identity, as opposed to, say,religious identity as a dimension of distinctness that warrants recognition anddifferential treatment in public life. Taylor does not, of course, deny thatreligious distinctness finds recognition outside public life in freeassociations. Yet he does not explain what is special about the claim ofdistinctness by Quebeckers such that he can say that here “what was at stakewas the desire of these people for survival, and their consequent demand forcertain forms of autonomy in their self-government, as well as the ability toadopt certain kinds of legislation deemed necessary for survival.”[12]
Even if we allow that there arereasons for politically privileging cultural distinctness, it is not evidentthat recognition of a particular cultural identity is a categorical demand.Taylor’s bold idea that recognition of one’s distinct cultural identity mustmatter and always requires public affirmation is not altogether convincing. Itseems more plausible to say that cultural identity does not necessarily matter,but if in a given case it does, it must be recognized. But then the claim torecognition of distinctness is not a fundamental human interest on a par, say,with the interest to be treated with equal concern and respect. The importanceof securing recognition for one’s cultural identity therefore depends onhistorical circumstance.
Why does Taylor suppose thatrecognition of one’s cultural distinctness always matters? Taylor seems to beled to the conclusion that he has seized upon a vital human interest by a focuson recognition to the exclusion of its source. Even if cultural identityhappens to be important to a person or a group and so anchors a claim torecognition of it by others, it is not obvious that recognition by any othersis what is desired or desirable. Do French Quebeckers seek recognition of theirdistinct society by Zulus or Texans? Would Zulus or Texans have standing toextend or withdraw recognition from French Quebeckers? Indeed, if we acceptTaylor’s idea of the value of cultural difference and its recognition, it ispuzzling why the demand for recognition is not put forward across societies asoften as it is within societies. It is more plausible to think that recognitionof distinctness or difference by others matters only when the others are thosewith whom there are reasons to feel closely identified. Recognition becomessalient with differences among those who, for any number of reasons, otherwisefeel a sense of mutual identification. Whether or not there are such reasonshas less to do with fundamental human needs or interests than with thecontingencies of history.
Will Kymlicka is anotherpolitical theorist who is impressed by worldwide resurgence of entho-culturaldisputes and conflicts. He concedes that “every dispute has its own uniquehistory and circumstance that need to be taken into account in devising a fairand workable solution.”[13]Still, his “aim is to step back and present a more general view of thelandscape—to identify some key concepts and principles that need to be takeninto account, and so clarify the basic building blocks for a liberal approachto minority rights.”[14] Despitethe modesty of this characterization, Kymlicka has the ambitious aim to locatemulticultural citizenship, group-differentiated rights and federativearrangements in the very foundations of a liberal conception of an idealsociety. According to Kymlicka, aside from protecting the individual’s choicesfrom intervention by others and government, a basic value of liberalism is toenable a person’s freedom to form and revise a conception of a worthwhile life.He faults contemporary liberalism for overlooking the fact that meaningfulchoice and pursuit of a way of life requires secure membership in a particularculture. “Put simply, freedom involves making choices amongst various options,and our societal culture not only provides these options, but also makes themmeaningful to us.”[15] Andagain: “Liberals should be concerned with the fate of cultural structures, notbecause they have some moral status of their own, but because it is onlythrough having a rich and secure cultural structure that people can becomeaware, in a vivid way, of the options available to them, and intelligentlyexamine their value.”[16]
For Kymlicka, the importance ofsecure cultural membership is a perfectly general claim about liberalism. It isacknowledged in the classical liberal theories of Mill and Green, and in thepractice of established liberal democracies, where liberal rule relies on anational culture upheld by the state. Kymlicka firmly resists the suggestionthat cultural membership can be secured in free associations or throughdecentralized policies in language, education and land tenure. Culturalmembership is instead a primary good that must be supported by a liberalpolitical community, if the capacity to fashion and revise a conception of aworthy individual life is to be realized. The separation of state and religioncannot serve as a model for the relation between the state and ethnic orcultural identity. “The whole idea of ‘benign neglect’ is incoherent, andreflects a shallow understanding of the relationship between states andnations. In the areas of official languages, political boundaries, and thedivision of powers, there is no way to avoid supporting this or that societalculture, or deciding which group will form a majority in political units thatcontrol culture-affecting decisions regarding language, education, andimmigration.”[17]Every liberalism is necessarily a national liberalism. The only question is tofind a fair way to reconcile multinational societies to the inseparability ofthe state and the nation, required by the ideal conception of liberal society.A federative arrangement with group-differentiated rights of self-government isthe only way to guarantee equality of cultural membership for individuals in amultinational society. Benign neglect or separation of state and ethnicitywould only mask the dominance of the official culture over the rest, whosemembers would be deprived of a context for the effective choice of a meaningfullife.
Kymlicka’s attempt to justify multicultural citizenship, collectiverights, and federative institutions by appeal to primary values and principlesof liberalism yields curious consequences that he countenances all too lightly.One concerns the extent to which a liberal, multinational state toleratesilliberal groups. Suppose a self-governing national group restricts thecapacity of its members to lead lives of their own choice. Kymlicka allows thatthe federal state should try to change the illiberal national community. But,barring extreme cases—cases that would justify international intervention—hethinks legal intervention is impermissible. To assent to this strangeconclusion is to grant that the rationale for rights to self-government can befreely violated by those exercising self-government. Put differently, individualsare entitled to secure cultural membership in order to ensure their freedom tolead a life of their own choice, but nothing more than persuasion is possibleif cultural membership robs them of this essential freedom.  How can a multinational state legitimatelycount as liberal if member states can violate rights central to liberalism withimpunity? The sanctity of cultural membership as a primary good of liberalsociety seems, in the end, to override the value of freedom it was originallyintended to subserve.
This result is doubly disquieting. First, a liberalism founded on thevalue of individual autonomy is more permissive in respect to infringements ofindividual freedom than liberalisms that avoid protection of substantivevalues, including autonomy, in public life. For example, in Rawls’s politicalliberalism human rights define the bounds of pluralism. Secondly, tolerance ofilliberal cultures eliminates Kymlicka’s sole ground for advocating a marriageof culture and a liberal state while endorsing the separation of religion andthe state. The ground is that religion, not culture, involves shared values.Leaving aside the question whether this is a trivial truth about liberalcultures or an interesting but controversial claim about all cultures, Kymlickastill faces a problem. Since both impose a conception of the good, there is nojustification for being tolerant toward illiberal cultures and intoleranttoward illiberal religions.
There is another unwelcome consequence of the liberal defense of multiculturalcitizenship, which Kymlicka points out, that has wider implications than heanticipates. Kymlicka argues that a stable liberal polity requires a sense ofsolidarity:  “a shared civic identitythat can sustain the level of mutual concern, accommodation and sacrifice thatdemocracies require.”[18]Yet, Kymlicka fears that a liberal state with a plurality of politicalcommunities may not foster an inclusive sense of solidarity sufficient tosustain the commitments of liberal citizenship to justice and the common good.Indeed, Kymlicka’s skepticism about the possibility of solidarity in amultinational state inclines him to side with Mill, who, in Kymlicka’s view,held that fidelity to liberalism is possible only in a state with a singlenational culture. Assuming that non-coercive assimilation is difficult,Kymlicka is unsure why a liberal faced with a multinational society should notbe favorably disposed to secession in order to pave the way for nation-states,the only settings suited to stable liberal democracies. What checks Kymlicka’sliberal advocacy of secession is that natural circumstances are unfavorable tothe exercise of secession. Many national groups may not prove viable asindependent states. Secession often occasions violent conflict. There is notenough room in the world to create states to accommodate all nations. Even ifall this is true, it is noteworthy that it does not prohibit a given nationalgroup from seeking secession on liberal grounds. More importantly, Kymlicka’spessimism on the fate of solidarity in a multinational state shows that it isunfavorable circumstances for states with a single national culture, notintrinsic merit from an ideal liberal point of view, that compels multinationalliberal states.
Given that multinational states are, though not strictly desirable,unavoidable, Kymlicka feels that we must somehow search for sources ofsolidarity in multinational states adequate to liberal democratic citizenship.Kymlicka considers shared public values, which he finds insufficient sincepeoples may go their own way despite such agreement. At any rate, as we sawearlier, there is no reason to expect adherence to the same principles orvalues in Kymlicka’s conception of the liberal multinational state. A morepromising basis is a commitment to what, following Taylor, he calls ‘deepdiversity.’ Roughly, this is to appreciate and prize that there are variedgrounds for allegiance to the wider political community in a multinationalstate. Even this he urges may be too thin unless it is coupled with somethingelse he deems most important. “For citizens to want to keep a multinationalstate together, therefore, they must value, not just ‘deep diversity’ ingeneral, but also the particular ethnic groups and national cultures with whomthey currently share the country.”[19]
This is an arresting conclusion: it is a clear admission that nationalidentity may be based on something other than a distinct cultural identity.Pride in historical achievements is a an example that Kymlicka offers of ashared national identity that does not draw on membership in a particularculture. Since Kymlicka insists it is Mill’s belief that a single nationalculture is a requirement of a liberal state, it is worth noting that Millhimself holds that a shared past is a powerful source of a sense ofnationality. He writes:
A portion of mankind may be said to constitute aNationality if they are united among themselves by common sympathies—which makethem cooperate with each other more willingly than with other people, desire tobe under the same government, and desire that it should be government bythemselves, or a portion of themselves, exclusively. This feeling ofnationality may have been generated by various causes. Sometimes it is theeffect of identity of race and descent. Community of language, community ofreligion greatly contribute to it. Geographical limits are one of its causes.But the strongest of all is identity of political antecedents, the possessionof national history, and consequent community of recollections; collectivepride and humiliation, pleasure and regret, connected with the same events inthe past.[20]

What Mill singles out as the strongest source of nationalidentity—collective pride and humiliation in a shared past—may, for all we know,account for a sense of community even in culturally homogeneous societies.  In any case, there is little reason to acceptthe thesis that a liberal political community is necessarily rooted in culture,the thesis on which Kymlicka, in part, mounts his case for a multinationalliberal state. There is also reason to doubt the claim that a distinct cultureis the only context for making choices about what life to lead. A shared pastand the sense of identity it engenders may enable a Swiss or a Canadian to lookinto options for a worthwhile life in the wider community beyond the particularculture to which the citizen belongs.
This brief discussion indicates that the search for an invariant,particularst value of constitutional democracy to anchor a generaljustification of multicultural politics and federative arrangements is vain.For example, the candidates put forward for an invariant value or ideal cannotpossibly account for the existence, importance or persistence of a federalstate in the United States and Germany, where cultural distinctness or securecultural membership does not loom large in federal politics. Moreover, theeffort to define collective rights or federal distribution of powers byreference to an invariant value—a task undertaken more by Kymlicka thanTaylor—tends to inhibit or distort abiding values of constitutional democracy.None of this is, of course, to deny the importance of the questions Taylor andKymlicka formulate and the problems they probe. Rather, the difficulties and limitationsin their answers and solutions attest to the limits of a particularist ideal orphilosophical theory in coming to terms with a particularist phenomenon such asfederalism.  Multiculturalism andfederalism enter the political agenda only under peculiar circumstancesunfavorable to familiar universal ideals of democracy. The unfavorableconditions as well as the democratic norms that answer to them varysignificantly. The focus of nonideal theory is on the actual unfavorablecircumstances and the specific ways in which they are reconciled to thestanding values of constitutional democracy. Since the unfavorable conditionsand the terms of reconciliation are diverse, a deeper understanding invites acomparative assessment of different federal arrangements. Under nonidealtheory, federalism thus seems a subject more fit for social science than forideal or philosophical theory. The reason is that multiculturalism,multinationalism, and federalism do not call for a new value or theory ofconstitutional democracy; instead, they necessitate a nuanced institutionalrealization of universal ideals of constitutional democracy. 
An application of the method ofnonideal theory to federalism circumscribes the scope of an adequateinterpretation of federalism.  First, theperspective guides and shapes the selection of conditions unfavorable todemocratic rule that call for federalist policies and practices.  Second, it requires us to show how theprinciples and structures of federalism promote democratic ideals by checkingand exploiting unfavorable circumstances. The defense of federalism is persuasive to the extent that it comes toterms with the unfavorable conditions that prompted it in ways that enhance or,at least, do not compromise democratic ideals of universal reach.
This understanding of theinterpretation of federalism from the perspective of nonideal theory leaveswide room for disagreement.  A site ofdebate over federalism since its inception are differences over what values itserves and how well it serves them.  Onearea of contention is how best to strike a balance between the claims of unityand the claims of diversity.  A formativeexample is the constitutional debate in the United States between federalists(inclusive nationalists) and anti-federalists (exclusive or localnationalists).[21] Another source ofdisagreement is whether federalism is a source of collective rights or merelyan effective protection of individual rights in a pluralist society.   An example is the debate over the status ofthe American bill of rights before and after the reconstruction.[22]Finally, there is a question kept alive by failed or troubled federalisms: Doesfederalism entrench or attenuate the nonfavorable conditions that occasion it?[23]This question arises not only where democratic aspirations have beendisappointed but also where they have been reasonably fulfilled.
















Federalism: New Frontiers in Ethiopian Politics

ANDEREAS ESHETE[1]
(andreaseshete@yahoo.com)

EthiopianJournal of Federal Studies, Vol. 1., No. 1, May 2013

“…it is of great importance in the republicnot only to guard the society against the oppression of its rulers, but toguard one part of the society against the injustice of the other part.”
                                                               -JamesMadison
“Where is an example of ‘Federalism’ everhaving been a preconceived plan? Who carts around Federalism as an a priori panacea?  Federalism has always appeared in any factualsituation as a response to an existing division of power within a territorythat comes together, or is thrust together, in one State.”
                                                               -BernardCrick

 

Introduction

A newpolitical vision now guides Ethiopia. The vision is a departure from prevalent African politicalpractice.  In Ethiopia, too, the newpolitics - its source, spirit and style - seems unfamiliar to many.
Since 1991, Ethiopia has embarkedupon a bold experiment in the conduct of public life.  The hallmark of the experiment is a readinessto face the fact of ethnic diversity. New political arrangements aim to shape Ethiopian political identityaround the country's constituent nations and nationalities.  Even in this era of the politics of identity,Ethiopia's resolve to extend full public recognition to her varied national communitiesis unique. Ethiopia's recognition of Eritrea's right to self-determination isalso unprecedented. Following a referendum on independence held in 1993,Eritrea went her own way.  Theestablishment of a sovereign Eritrean homeland marks the first birth of anAfrican nation through secession. Within Ethiopia, the commitment to uphold theright to self-determination is equally striking.  The right to secession is now aconstitutional entitlement. All cultural communities are entitled to fairrepresentation in the institutions of state and federal government.  Territorially based nationalities exercisewide powers of self-government in political, economic, legal, cultural andeducational affairs.  The result is apolitical order open to cultural diversity, self-expression and autonomy.
Ethiopia's ethnic turn is a sharpbreak from African political practice. With rare exceptions such as Botswana and Somalia, vast culturaldiversity characterizes African states. African states are not built on nations of their own making.  Upon independence, African states inheritedpopulations capriciously contrived by colonial powers that arbitrarily joinedor divided cultural communities.  Thenewly independent states sought to preserve the uneasy national legacy of colonialism.  Amid heterogeneity, political rule tried tocreate and maintain unity in various ways. Some cobbled together coalitions whereby elites from diverse groupscould have a stake in a unitary polity. Others designed political arrangements blind to cultural differences andcleavages.  Another tack was to fosteroverarching identities---African or ideological---in order to overshadow orovercome internal differences over national and cultural identity.
Whatever the differences inapproach, the overriding aim almost everywhere in Africa was to refuse fullpolitical expression to cultural pluralism. Even on the rare occasion where national identity was an exercise inself-definition carried out through internal struggle and negotiation, therewas no disposition to cultivate or even to acknowledge diversity.  In the recent constitutional exercisesundertaken by South Africa and Uganda, the choice was in favor of a unitarystate.  The pursuit of political unity atthe expense of cultural plurality has been a leading objective of Africanstatecraft that enjoyed wide legitimacy: for example, ethnic parties were oftenprohibited by law; African states consistently complied with OAU's principle ofupholding colonial borders.
The inclination to ignore,conceal, subdue or erase cultural diversity in African politics has beensustained at considerable cost. Monopolistic political arrangements such as military government,one-party rule, systematic suppression of human and political rights are oftenrationalized as inescapable means of safeguarding unity.  Despite these draconian measures, ethnicdiversity has not been banished.  Bitterwars for secession were fought by Katanga, Biafra, Eritrea and SouthernSudan.  Though nothing approaches thegenocide perpetrated in Rwanda, ethnic turmoil exists in most parts of Africa.
Even when strife in Africacentered on other matters, it was seldom altogether free of ethniccontention.  Yet neither the threat ofpartition nor ubiquitous ethnic contest called into question African allegianceto a conception of statehood that excludes national or cultural pluralism fromthe definition of political identity. Thus as we enter the new millennium, a vision of political unity thatdisavows or devalues diversity survives intact throughout most of Africa.
What, then, prompted Ethiopia togo virtually alone against the prevailing current in the continent?  Ethiopia's anomalous new course is all themore surprising, for, unlike the rest of Africa, her heterogeneity of nationalities,cultural traditions, religions and languages is not a fortuitous outcome ofalien imposition.  Though Ethiopia'sautonomous development is no guarantee of the emergence of a national society,it is hard to overlook the society's resilience in the face of a long historyof internal warfare and foreign encroachment. Even outsiders, without evident partisanship, detect the contours of anintegral political community.
Admittedly the image ofEthiopians as a well-defined people conveyed in international scholarship issometimes merely a result of selective perception.  Much the most addressed part of Ethiopia isthe north, where literate cultures and salvationist religions have flourishedsince the distant past[2].  Accessibility to modern scholarship andcultural affinity rendered this terrain familiar to western observers.  Another area of focus, one driven by concernsof development, is the small, largely urban area where modern economic andpolitical institutions have gained a foothold. The impression of homogeneity gleaned from these perspectives does notreflect Ethiopian culture as a whole but rather the interests of othersocieties.
Still, those aspects of Ethiopiacaptured from culturally alien perspectives cannot be dismissed as merefragments, for they have played a crucial role in drawing the wider communitytogether.  For good or ill, northernculture is diffused throughout the entire country.  For instance, Amharic speakers can be foundalmost everywhere; the new Regional State of the Southern Peoples has adoptedAmharic as its working language.  Amongthe small but culturally influential urban population, identities that cutacross nationality, religion and language have, and are seen to have, salience.  The purview of both Amhara - Tigraycivilization and urban culture tends to define Ethiopia not just under westerneyes; it is an important dimension of Ethiopian self-perception.
Even those who extend their sightbeyond comparatively self-contained or integrative elements of the society inorder to take notice of the whole are impressed by the presence of abidingaffinities among Ethiopia's dispersed and diverse cultural communities.[3]  Strands of a common sense of communityinclude:  close and longstandingconnections of far-flung trade and migration; collective historical legacy;shared cultural beliefs, rituals, symbols and ideals; common systems of socialand political authority.  On account ofthese ties, a distinctive community encompassing all the peoples in Ethiopia'spresent territory has endured despite recurrent fragmentation.  The confluence of Ethiopia's variedidentities can also be seen in the ambitions of empire-builders ---from withinand without---who rarely settled for less than domination over what is nowEthiopia.
Though important, these indicationsof a shared sense of community show, at most, the possibility of politicalunity.  Societies like Somaliawell-endowed with traits conducive to national self-identification and cohesionhave floundered in the search for statehood. Similarly, a bitter lesson of Ethiopian history is that the potentialfor unity, however promising, cannot be realized without effectiveinstitutional means for its political expression.
It is a testimony both to theweight of Ethiopia's past and its political inconclusiveness that differencesover the present dispensation are fought as battles over historicalinterpretation.  Is Ethiopia threethousands years old or only one hundred? Have the Oromo and the Southern Peoples always been members of Ethiopiansociety or were they joined to Ethiopia through invasion and conquest in thenineteenth century?  Is Eritrea anamputated limb of Ethiopia or is it a distinct society with only a brief,forced marriage to Ethiopia during the federation and subsequent incorporation?
Some speak with self-confidenceof belonging to an Ethiopia with a robust national identity intricatelyinterwoven out of the country's constituent identities.  They claim that they cannot recognizethemselves in the new ethnically defined Ethiopia.  Others, however, speak with distance ofEthiopia as a community of which they were never willing members.  For them, the new political vision enablesthem to identify with Ethiopia for the first time.  The former feel that the present diminishesthe past, creating a void that cannot be filled.  The latter feel that the present redeemsinjustices of the past.  These clashingconceptions of Ethiopia are a subject of everyday contention because of awidespread conviction that the uncertainties surrounding the country'sself-identity are rooted in the past. While everyone agrees that Ethiopia houses a plurality of languages,religious and nationalities, disagreement rages over whether or not ethnicdifferentiation and inequality is so entrenched in Ethiopian history that itrequires recourse to a new political order.
Even indisputable collectiveaccomplishments of Ethiopian history do not yield a shared sense of pride.  Undoubtedly the most significant achievementof modern Ethiopia is independence, successfully defended against a successionof invaders --- the British, the Egyptians, the Sudanese Mahdists, and theItalians.  In this history of struggle, asingular triumph was in 1896 at the Battle of Adwa, where Ethiopia inflicted astunning defeat on Italy.  Inspirationalas it was to oppressed peoples and their champions everywhere, the Adwa victorymarks a peak in Ethiopia's international prestige.  Internally, too, Adwa was a watershed.  Peoples from the entire empire marched to thebattle:  unlike previous resistance toforeign aggression, Adwa was a national victory.  Adwa was also a formative moment in thecreation of Ethiopia as a modern nation-state. In the wake of the victory, Ethiopian sovereignty was recognized by theEuropean powers.  Yet, Adwa's legacy remainsambiguous.  Emboldened by his nationaland international prestige, Emperor Menlik II continued his expansion into thesouth and west, and consolidated his empire in the decade following Adwa.  As a result, many peoples of Ethiopia whofought valiantly at Adwa are ambivalent about the victory: they see themselvesas victims of their own triumph.  Here aselsewhere, Ethiopians seem to be at once exalted and anguished by their past.
It is not obvious that anyone isnow in a position to resolve the sharp differences separating these conceptionsof Ethiopia's past and the attitudes they yield toward the politicalpresent.  These incompatible myths aboutthe Ethiopian past do show that the new political order that gives pride ofplace to cultural diversity has not yet settled over the landscape.  Myths about the past are conjured up in orderto bolster or undermine the legitimacy of the new political vision.  This is not of course a surprise:  "The past has always been the handmaidof authority.”[4]These judgments of the present by reference to the past are useful in otherways --for example, to reach a prognosis of the new politics.  The traumas and upheavals that the countryhas suffered explain the rise of nationalist politics as well as the principlesand practices in which it now finds political expression.   A glimpse at the past also enables us totake a measure of the novelty of the present. For all their novelty, the present arrangements may well showremnants--desirable or undesirable --of the past.
Federalism
Remarkson Method
Even believers in an idealconception of society do not insist that federalism must be realized in everylegitimate polity.  Nor is federalismsupported by all ideal conceptions of constitutional democracy.  Federalism therefore differs from publicideals of universal reach. For instance, federalism is distinct from humanrights: unlike federalism, “their political (moral) force extends to allsocieties, and they are binding on all peoples and societies, including outlawstates.”[5] Violationof human rights justifies condemnation or even coercive intervention.  In contrast, rejection of federalism by aregime does not demonstrate imperfection, much less, wrongdoing in the regime.
Federalism is not, therefore, anecessary part of an ideal conception or theory of a democratic society; it israther an ideal for a society in unfavorable circumstances, circumstancesunfavorable to constitutional democracy. It might, of course, be argued that all political ideals answer tounfavorable conditions.  For example,human rights are honored because everyone always needs to avoid being killed,assaulted, deceived, used as a resource, or neglected in an emergency. The illsagainst which human rights afford protection represent evils to which all humanbeings are always vulnerable.  The vitaldifference is that federalism is a public value tailored to conditionsunfavorable to constitutional democracy that are not universal but ratherpeculiar to certain societies.  However,the distinction suggested between ideal and nonideal theory may be blurred byadopting a position taken by a few political theorists: namely, either thatthere are no positive political values or that the only practicable publicvalues are those that serve to ward off unfavorable features of men or theirenvironment.  Forging an intellectuallink among all societies on the basis of the exclusive importance of pervasiveunfavorable conditions would yield a minimalist political theory such aslibertarianism or what Judith Shklar calls the liberalism of fear.[6]Still, this view is not a direct challenge to the proposal to treat federalismunder nonideal theory, for the view does not amount to a denial of nonidealtheory but rather to an affirmation of its ubiquity.
If, however, we subscribe to theposition that social co-operation can aim beyond the avoidance of vice to theachievement of virtue, the distinction between ideal and nonideal theorysurvives.  Federalism can then be seen asa proper part of nonideal theory which, according to John Rawls, “deals withunfavorable conditions, that is, with the conditions of societies whosehistorical, social, and economic circumstances make their achieving awell-ordered regime, whether liberal or decent, difficult or impossible.”[7]Nonideal theory delimits the requirements of an account of society burdenedwith unfavorable conditions.  First, toidentify the conditions – poverty; divisions of power, culture or identity; anintolerant public culture – that tend to stand in the way of fidelity to thevalues and institutions of constitutional democracy.  Second, to determine the policies andpractices that mitigate, overcome or deploy to advantage unfavorable conditionsin the service of constitutional democracy. In the task of unburdening a society from unfavorable conditions,nonideal theory is guided by the aim of reaching or approximating idealtheory.  In Rawls’s words: “nonidealtheory asks how the ideal conception of society … might be achieved or at leastworked toward, generally in gradual steps; it looks for policies and courses ofaction that are likely to be effectiveand politically permissible for that purpose”[8](italics mine). Rawls’s remarks indicate a third demand of nonideal theory:starting from where the society is now, the search is for a passage todemocratic institutions by democratic means. Unless nonideal theory furnishes democratic means for surmountingbarriers to democracy it cannot reconcile us to unfavorable conditions.
To clarify the significance of the treatment of federalism under theaspect of nonideal theory, it may be helpful to contrast it with its morefamiliar alternative: to explain and justify federalism as an integral part ofan ideal conception of constitutional democracy. A few political philosophershave made serious attempts to find a theoretical underpinning for federalismand other public manifestations of diversity as a freestanding value or idealof constitutional democracy.
A notable example is CharlesTaylor’s influential essay on “The Politics of Recognition.”[9]Taylor identifies two forms of recognition that he deems important tocontemporary politics. The first is recognition of what human beingsimportantly share, and it yields “a politics of universalism, emphasizing theequal dignity of citizens, and the content of this politics has been theequalization of rights and entitlements.”[10] Thesecond is a recognition of what makes human beings culturally distinct ordifferent, and it yields a politics of particularism. “With the politics ofequal dignity, what is established is meant to be universally the same, anidentical basket of rights and immunities; with the politics of difference,what we are asked to recognize is the unique identity of this individual orgroup from everyone else.” [11]Taylor’s chief concern is with the second form of recognition, for he believesthat the first is dominant in contemporary political theory and practice, andthat it has tended to undermine the second by aspiring to distance or evenefface the culturally distinct from political life. Taylor argues that ourallegiance to recognition of our common humanity should not blind us to thefact that recognition of distinctness is a vital human need, though the urgencyof the need makes itself felt only after our release from social forms wherethe identity of individuals and groups had been preordained. 
Taylor’s thesis then is that tobe recognized in one’s cultural distinctness is a universal human interest.Multiculturalism and its institutional expressions such as federalism arereasonable realizations of a human interest for recognition of culturaldistinctness. Indeed, to avoid denigration and forcible assimilation,universalist recognition of individuals as worthy of equal concern and respectdemands public affirmation of their culturally particularist identities.
Now, it is not entirely clear whyTaylor singles out cultural and linguistic identity, as opposed to, say,religious identity as a dimension of distinctness that warrants recognition anddifferential treatment in public life. Taylor does not, of course, deny thatreligious distinctness finds recognition outside public life in freeassociations. Yet he does not explain what is special about the claim ofdistinctness by Quebeckers such that he can say that here “what was at stakewas the desire of these people for survival, and their consequent demand forcertain forms of autonomy in their self-government, as well as the ability toadopt certain kinds of legislation deemed necessary for survival.”[12]
Even if we allow that there arereasons for politically privileging cultural distinctness, it is not evidentthat recognition of a particular cultural identity is a categorical demand.Taylor’s bold idea that recognition of one’s distinct cultural identity mustmatter and always requires public affirmation is not altogether convincing. Itseems more plausible to say that cultural identity does not necessarily matter,but if in a given case it does, it must be recognized. But then the claim torecognition of distinctness is not a fundamental human interest on a par, say,with the interest to be treated with equal concern and respect. The importanceof securing recognition for one’s cultural identity therefore depends onhistorical circumstance.
Why does Taylor suppose thatrecognition of one’s cultural distinctness always matters? Taylor seems to beled to the conclusion that he has seized upon a vital human interest by a focuson recognition to the exclusion of its source. Even if cultural identityhappens to be important to a person or a group and so anchors a claim torecognition of it by others, it is not obvious that recognition by any othersis what is desired or desirable. Do French Quebeckers seek recognition of theirdistinct society by Zulus or Texans? Would Zulus or Texans have standing toextend or withdraw recognition from French Quebeckers? Indeed, if we acceptTaylor’s idea of the value of cultural difference and its recognition, it ispuzzling why the demand for recognition is not put forward across societies asoften as it is within societies. It is more plausible to think that recognitionof distinctness or difference by others matters only when the others are thosewith whom there are reasons to feel closely identified. Recognition becomessalient with differences among those who, for any number of reasons, otherwisefeel a sense of mutual identification. Whether or not there are such reasonshas less to do with fundamental human needs or interests than with thecontingencies of history.
Will Kymlicka is anotherpolitical theorist who is impressed by worldwide resurgence of entho-culturaldisputes and conflicts. He concedes that “every dispute has its own uniquehistory and circumstance that need to be taken into account in devising a fairand workable solution.”[13]Still, his “aim is to step back and present a more general view of thelandscape—to identify some key concepts and principles that need to be takeninto account, and so clarify the basic building blocks for a liberal approachto minority rights.”[14] Despitethe modesty of this characterization, Kymlicka has the ambitious aim to locatemulticultural citizenship, group-differentiated rights and federativearrangements in the very foundations of a liberal conception of an idealsociety. According to Kymlicka, aside from protecting the individual’s choicesfrom intervention by others and government, a basic value of liberalism is toenable a person’s freedom to form and revise a conception of a worthwhile life.He faults contemporary liberalism for overlooking the fact that meaningfulchoice and pursuit of a way of life requires secure membership in a particularculture. “Put simply, freedom involves making choices amongst various options,and our societal culture not only provides these options, but also makes themmeaningful to us.”[15] Andagain: “Liberals should be concerned with the fate of cultural structures, notbecause they have some moral status of their own, but because it is onlythrough having a rich and secure cultural structure that people can becomeaware, in a vivid way, of the options available to them, and intelligentlyexamine their value.”[16]
For Kymlicka, the importance ofsecure cultural membership is a perfectly general claim about liberalism. It isacknowledged in the classical liberal theories of Mill and Green, and in thepractice of established liberal democracies, where liberal rule relies on anational culture upheld by the state. Kymlicka firmly resists the suggestionthat cultural membership can be secured in free associations or throughdecentralized policies in language, education and land tenure. Culturalmembership is instead a primary good that must be supported by a liberalpolitical community, if the capacity to fashion and revise a conception of aworthy individual life is to be realized. The separation of state and religioncannot serve as a model for the relation between the state and ethnic orcultural identity. “The whole idea of ‘benign neglect’ is incoherent, andreflects a shallow understanding of the relationship between states andnations. In the areas of official languages, political boundaries, and thedivision of powers, there is no way to avoid supporting this or that societalculture, or deciding which group will form a majority in political units thatcontrol culture-affecting decisions regarding language, education, andimmigration.”[17]Every liberalism is necessarily a national liberalism. The only question is tofind a fair way to reconcile multinational societies to the inseparability ofthe state and the nation, required by the ideal conception of liberal society.A federative arrangement with group-differentiated rights of self-government isthe only way to guarantee equality of cultural membership for individuals in amultinational society. Benign neglect or separation of state and ethnicitywould only mask the dominance of the official culture over the rest, whosemembers would be deprived of a context for the effective choice of a meaningfullife.
Kymlicka’s attempt to justify multicultural citizenship, collectiverights, and federative institutions by appeal to primary values and principlesof liberalism yields curious consequences that he countenances all too lightly.One concerns the extent to which a liberal, multinational state toleratesilliberal groups. Suppose a self-governing national group restricts thecapacity of its members to lead lives of their own choice. Kymlicka allows thatthe federal state should try to change the illiberal national community. But,barring extreme cases—cases that would justify international intervention—hethinks legal intervention is impermissible. To assent to this strangeconclusion is to grant that the rationale for rights to self-government can befreely violated by those exercising self-government. Put differently, individualsare entitled to secure cultural membership in order to ensure their freedom tolead a life of their own choice, but nothing more than persuasion is possibleif cultural membership robs them of this essential freedom.  How can a multinational state legitimatelycount as liberal if member states can violate rights central to liberalism withimpunity? The sanctity of cultural membership as a primary good of liberalsociety seems, in the end, to override the value of freedom it was originallyintended to subserve.
This result is doubly disquieting. First, a liberalism founded on thevalue of individual autonomy is more permissive in respect to infringements ofindividual freedom than liberalisms that avoid protection of substantivevalues, including autonomy, in public life. For example, in Rawls’s politicalliberalism human rights define the bounds of pluralism. Secondly, tolerance ofilliberal cultures eliminates Kymlicka’s sole ground for advocating a marriageof culture and a liberal state while endorsing the separation of religion andthe state. The ground is that religion, not culture, involves shared values.Leaving aside the question whether this is a trivial truth about liberalcultures or an interesting but controversial claim about all cultures, Kymlickastill faces a problem. Since both impose a conception of the good, there is nojustification for being tolerant toward illiberal cultures and intoleranttoward illiberal religions.
There is another unwelcome consequence of the liberal defense of multiculturalcitizenship, which Kymlicka points out, that has wider implications than heanticipates. Kymlicka argues that a stable liberal polity requires a sense ofsolidarity:  “a shared civic identitythat can sustain the level of mutual concern, accommodation and sacrifice thatdemocracies require.”[18]Yet, Kymlicka fears that a liberal state with a plurality of politicalcommunities may not foster an inclusive sense of solidarity sufficient tosustain the commitments of liberal citizenship to justice and the common good.Indeed, Kymlicka’s skepticism about the possibility of solidarity in amultinational state inclines him to side with Mill, who, in Kymlicka’s view,held that fidelity to liberalism is possible only in a state with a singlenational culture. Assuming that non-coercive assimilation is difficult,Kymlicka is unsure why a liberal faced with a multinational society should notbe favorably disposed to secession in order to pave the way for nation-states,the only settings suited to stable liberal democracies. What checks Kymlicka’sliberal advocacy of secession is that natural circumstances are unfavorable tothe exercise of secession. Many national groups may not prove viable asindependent states. Secession often occasions violent conflict. There is notenough room in the world to create states to accommodate all nations. Even ifall this is true, it is noteworthy that it does not prohibit a given nationalgroup from seeking secession on liberal grounds. More importantly, Kymlicka’spessimism on the fate of solidarity in a multinational state shows that it isunfavorable circumstances for states with a single national culture, notintrinsic merit from an ideal liberal point of view, that compels multinationalliberal states.
Given that multinational states are, though not strictly desirable,unavoidable, Kymlicka feels that we must somehow search for sources ofsolidarity in multinational states adequate to liberal democratic citizenship.Kymlicka considers shared public values, which he finds insufficient sincepeoples may go their own way despite such agreement. At any rate, as we sawearlier, there is no reason to expect adherence to the same principles orvalues in Kymlicka’s conception of the liberal multinational state. A morepromising basis is a commitment to what, following Taylor, he calls ‘deepdiversity.’ Roughly, this is to appreciate and prize that there are variedgrounds for allegiance to the wider political community in a multinationalstate. Even this he urges may be too thin unless it is coupled with somethingelse he deems most important. “For citizens to want to keep a multinationalstate together, therefore, they must value, not just ‘deep diversity’ ingeneral, but also the particular ethnic groups and national cultures with whomthey currently share the country.”[19]
This is an arresting conclusion: it is a clear admission that nationalidentity may be based on something other than a distinct cultural identity.Pride in historical achievements is a an example that Kymlicka offers of ashared national identity that does not draw on membership in a particularculture. Since Kymlicka insists it is Mill’s belief that a single nationalculture is a requirement of a liberal state, it is worth noting that Millhimself holds that a shared past is a powerful source of a sense ofnationality. He writes:
A portion of mankind may be said to constitute aNationality if they are united among themselves by common sympathies—which makethem cooperate with each other more willingly than with other people, desire tobe under the same government, and desire that it should be government bythemselves, or a portion of themselves, exclusively. This feeling ofnationality may have been generated by various causes. Sometimes it is theeffect of identity of race and descent. Community of language, community ofreligion greatly contribute to it. Geographical limits are one of its causes.But the strongest of all is identity of political antecedents, the possessionof national history, and consequent community of recollections; collectivepride and humiliation, pleasure and regret, connected with the same events inthe past.[20]

What Mill singles out as the strongest source of nationalidentity—collective pride and humiliation in a shared past—may, for all we know,account for a sense of community even in culturally homogeneous societies.  In any case, there is little reason to acceptthe thesis that a liberal political community is necessarily rooted in culture,the thesis on which Kymlicka, in part, mounts his case for a multinationalliberal state. There is also reason to doubt the claim that a distinct cultureis the only context for making choices about what life to lead. A shared pastand the sense of identity it engenders may enable a Swiss or a Canadian to lookinto options for a worthwhile life in the wider community beyond the particularculture to which the citizen belongs.
This brief discussion indicates that the search for an invariant,particularst value of constitutional democracy to anchor a generaljustification of multicultural politics and federative arrangements is vain.For example, the candidates put forward for an invariant value or ideal cannotpossibly account for the existence, importance or persistence of a federalstate in the United States and Germany, where cultural distinctness or securecultural membership does not loom large in federal politics. Moreover, theeffort to define collective rights or federal distribution of powers byreference to an invariant value—a task undertaken more by Kymlicka thanTaylor—tends to inhibit or distort abiding values of constitutional democracy.None of this is, of course, to deny the importance of the questions Taylor andKymlicka formulate and the problems they probe. Rather, the difficulties and limitationsin their answers and solutions attest to the limits of a particularist ideal orphilosophical theory in coming to terms with a particularist phenomenon such asfederalism.  Multiculturalism andfederalism enter the political agenda only under peculiar circumstancesunfavorable to familiar universal ideals of democracy. The unfavorableconditions as well as the democratic norms that answer to them varysignificantly. The focus of nonideal theory is on the actual unfavorablecircumstances and the specific ways in which they are reconciled to thestanding values of constitutional democracy. Since the unfavorable conditionsand the terms of reconciliation are diverse, a deeper understanding invites acomparative assessment of different federal arrangements. Under nonidealtheory, federalism thus seems a subject more fit for social science than forideal or philosophical theory. The reason is that multiculturalism,multinationalism, and federalism do not call for a new value or theory ofconstitutional democracy; instead, they necessitate a nuanced institutionalrealization of universal ideals of constitutional democracy. 
An application of the method ofnonideal theory to federalism circumscribes the scope of an adequateinterpretation of federalism.  First, theperspective guides and shapes the selection of conditions unfavorable todemocratic rule that call for federalist policies and practices.  Second, it requires us to show how theprinciples and structures of federalism promote democratic ideals by checkingand exploiting unfavorable circumstances. The defense of federalism is persuasive to the extent that it comes toterms with the unfavorable conditions that prompted it in ways that enhance or,at least, do not compromise democratic ideals of universal reach.
This understanding of theinterpretation of federalism from the perspective of nonideal theory leaveswide room for disagreement.  A site ofdebate over federalism since its inception are differences over what values itserves and how well it serves them.  Onearea of contention is how best to strike a balance between the claims of unityand the claims of diversity.  A formativeexample is the constitutional debate in the United States between federalists(inclusive nationalists) and anti-federalists (exclusive or localnationalists).[21] Another source ofdisagreement is whether federalism is a source of collective rights or merelyan effective protection of individual rights in a pluralist society.   An example is the debate over the status ofthe American bill of rights before and after the reconstruction.[22]Finally, there is a question kept alive by failed or troubled federalisms: Doesfederalism entrench or attenuate the nonfavorable conditions that occasion it?[23]This question arises not only where democratic aspirations have beendisappointed but also where they have been reasonably fulfilled.


















Federalism: New Frontiers in Ethiopian Politics

ANDEREAS ESHETE[1]
(andreaseshete@yahoo.com)

EthiopianJournal of Federal Studies, Vol. 1., No. 1, May 2013

“…it is of great importance in the republicnot only to guard the society against the oppression of its rulers, but toguard one part of the society against the injustice of the other part.”
                                                               -JamesMadison
“Where is an example of ‘Federalism’ everhaving been a preconceived plan? Who carts around Federalism as an a priori panacea?  Federalism has always appeared in any factualsituation as a response to an existing division of power within a territorythat comes together, or is thrust together, in one State.”
                                                               -BernardCrick

 

Introduction

A newpolitical vision now guides Ethiopia. The vision is a departure from prevalent African politicalpractice.  In Ethiopia, too, the newpolitics - its source, spirit and style - seems unfamiliar to many.
Since 1991, Ethiopia has embarkedupon a bold experiment in the conduct of public life.  The hallmark of the experiment is a readinessto face the fact of ethnic diversity. New political arrangements aim to shape Ethiopian political identityaround the country's constituent nations and nationalities.  Even in this era of the politics of identity,Ethiopia's resolve to extend full public recognition to her varied national communitiesis unique. Ethiopia's recognition of Eritrea's right to self-determination isalso unprecedented. Following a referendum on independence held in 1993,Eritrea went her own way.  Theestablishment of a sovereign Eritrean homeland marks the first birth of anAfrican nation through secession. Within Ethiopia, the commitment to uphold theright to self-determination is equally striking.  The right to secession is now aconstitutional entitlement. All cultural communities are entitled to fairrepresentation in the institutions of state and federal government.  Territorially based nationalities exercisewide powers of self-government in political, economic, legal, cultural andeducational affairs.  The result is apolitical order open to cultural diversity, self-expression and autonomy.
Ethiopia's ethnic turn is a sharpbreak from African political practice. With rare exceptions such as Botswana and Somalia, vast culturaldiversity characterizes African states. African states are not built on nations of their own making.  Upon independence, African states inheritedpopulations capriciously contrived by colonial powers that arbitrarily joinedor divided cultural communities.  Thenewly independent states sought to preserve the uneasy national legacy of colonialism.  Amid heterogeneity, political rule tried tocreate and maintain unity in various ways. Some cobbled together coalitions whereby elites from diverse groupscould have a stake in a unitary polity. Others designed political arrangements blind to cultural differences andcleavages.  Another tack was to fosteroverarching identities---African or ideological---in order to overshadow orovercome internal differences over national and cultural identity.
Whatever the differences inapproach, the overriding aim almost everywhere in Africa was to refuse fullpolitical expression to cultural pluralism. Even on the rare occasion where national identity was an exercise inself-definition carried out through internal struggle and negotiation, therewas no disposition to cultivate or even to acknowledge diversity.  In the recent constitutional exercisesundertaken by South Africa and Uganda, the choice was in favor of a unitarystate.  The pursuit of political unity atthe expense of cultural plurality has been a leading objective of Africanstatecraft that enjoyed wide legitimacy: for example, ethnic parties were oftenprohibited by law; African states consistently complied with OAU's principle ofupholding colonial borders.
The inclination to ignore,conceal, subdue or erase cultural diversity in African politics has beensustained at considerable cost. Monopolistic political arrangements such as military government,one-party rule, systematic suppression of human and political rights are oftenrationalized as inescapable means of safeguarding unity.  Despite these draconian measures, ethnicdiversity has not been banished.  Bitterwars for secession were fought by Katanga, Biafra, Eritrea and SouthernSudan.  Though nothing approaches thegenocide perpetrated in Rwanda, ethnic turmoil exists in most parts of Africa.
Even when strife in Africacentered on other matters, it was seldom altogether free of ethniccontention.  Yet neither the threat ofpartition nor ubiquitous ethnic contest called into question African allegianceto a conception of statehood that excludes national or cultural pluralism fromthe definition of political identity. Thus as we enter the new millennium, a vision of political unity thatdisavows or devalues diversity survives intact throughout most of Africa.
What, then, prompted Ethiopia togo virtually alone against the prevailing current in the continent?  Ethiopia's anomalous new course is all themore surprising, for, unlike the rest of Africa, her heterogeneity of nationalities,cultural traditions, religions and languages is not a fortuitous outcome ofalien imposition.  Though Ethiopia'sautonomous development is no guarantee of the emergence of a national society,it is hard to overlook the society's resilience in the face of a long historyof internal warfare and foreign encroachment. Even outsiders, without evident partisanship, detect the contours of anintegral political community.
Admittedly the image ofEthiopians as a well-defined people conveyed in international scholarship issometimes merely a result of selective perception.  Much the most addressed part of Ethiopia isthe north, where literate cultures and salvationist religions have flourishedsince the distant past[2].  Accessibility to modern scholarship andcultural affinity rendered this terrain familiar to western observers.  Another area of focus, one driven by concernsof development, is the small, largely urban area where modern economic andpolitical institutions have gained a foothold. The impression of homogeneity gleaned from these perspectives does notreflect Ethiopian culture as a whole but rather the interests of othersocieties.
Still, those aspects of Ethiopiacaptured from culturally alien perspectives cannot be dismissed as merefragments, for they have played a crucial role in drawing the wider communitytogether.  For good or ill, northernculture is diffused throughout the entire country.  For instance, Amharic speakers can be foundalmost everywhere; the new Regional State of the Southern Peoples has adoptedAmharic as its working language.  Amongthe small but culturally influential urban population, identities that cutacross nationality, religion and language have, and are seen to have, salience.  The purview of both Amhara - Tigraycivilization and urban culture tends to define Ethiopia not just under westerneyes; it is an important dimension of Ethiopian self-perception.
Even those who extend their sightbeyond comparatively self-contained or integrative elements of the society inorder to take notice of the whole are impressed by the presence of abidingaffinities among Ethiopia's dispersed and diverse cultural communities.[3]  Strands of a common sense of communityinclude:  close and longstandingconnections of far-flung trade and migration; collective historical legacy;shared cultural beliefs, rituals, symbols and ideals; common systems of socialand political authority.  On account ofthese ties, a distinctive community encompassing all the peoples in Ethiopia'spresent territory has endured despite recurrent fragmentation.  The confluence of Ethiopia's variedidentities can also be seen in the ambitions of empire-builders ---from withinand without---who rarely settled for less than domination over what is nowEthiopia.
Though important, these indicationsof a shared sense of community show, at most, the possibility of politicalunity.  Societies like Somaliawell-endowed with traits conducive to national self-identification and cohesionhave floundered in the search for statehood. Similarly, a bitter lesson of Ethiopian history is that the potentialfor unity, however promising, cannot be realized without effectiveinstitutional means for its political expression.
It is a testimony both to theweight of Ethiopia's past and its political inconclusiveness that differencesover the present dispensation are fought as battles over historicalinterpretation.  Is Ethiopia threethousands years old or only one hundred? Have the Oromo and the Southern Peoples always been members of Ethiopiansociety or were they joined to Ethiopia through invasion and conquest in thenineteenth century?  Is Eritrea anamputated limb of Ethiopia or is it a distinct society with only a brief,forced marriage to Ethiopia during the federation and subsequent incorporation?
Some speak with self-confidenceof belonging to an Ethiopia with a robust national identity intricatelyinterwoven out of the country's constituent identities.  They claim that they cannot recognizethemselves in the new ethnically defined Ethiopia.  Others, however, speak with distance ofEthiopia as a community of which they were never willing members.  For them, the new political vision enablesthem to identify with Ethiopia for the first time.  The former feel that the present diminishesthe past, creating a void that cannot be filled.  The latter feel that the present redeemsinjustices of the past.  These clashingconceptions of Ethiopia are a subject of everyday contention because of awidespread conviction that the uncertainties surrounding the country'sself-identity are rooted in the past. While everyone agrees that Ethiopia houses a plurality of languages,religious and nationalities, disagreement rages over whether or not ethnicdifferentiation and inequality is so entrenched in Ethiopian history that itrequires recourse to a new political order.
Even indisputable collectiveaccomplishments of Ethiopian history do not yield a shared sense of pride.  Undoubtedly the most significant achievementof modern Ethiopia is independence, successfully defended against a successionof invaders --- the British, the Egyptians, the Sudanese Mahdists, and theItalians.  In this history of struggle, asingular triumph was in 1896 at the Battle of Adwa, where Ethiopia inflicted astunning defeat on Italy.  Inspirationalas it was to oppressed peoples and their champions everywhere, the Adwa victorymarks a peak in Ethiopia's international prestige.  Internally, too, Adwa was a watershed.  Peoples from the entire empire marched to thebattle:  unlike previous resistance toforeign aggression, Adwa was a national victory.  Adwa was also a formative moment in thecreation of Ethiopia as a modern nation-state. In the wake of the victory, Ethiopian sovereignty was recognized by theEuropean powers.  Yet, Adwa's legacy remainsambiguous.  Emboldened by his nationaland international prestige, Emperor Menlik II continued his expansion into thesouth and west, and consolidated his empire in the decade following Adwa.  As a result, many peoples of Ethiopia whofought valiantly at Adwa are ambivalent about the victory: they see themselvesas victims of their own triumph.  Here aselsewhere, Ethiopians seem to be at once exalted and anguished by their past.
It is not obvious that anyone isnow in a position to resolve the sharp differences separating these conceptionsof Ethiopia's past and the attitudes they yield toward the politicalpresent.  These incompatible myths aboutthe Ethiopian past do show that the new political order that gives pride ofplace to cultural diversity has not yet settled over the landscape.  Myths about the past are conjured up in orderto bolster or undermine the legitimacy of the new political vision.  This is not of course a surprise:  "The past has always been the handmaidof authority.”[4]These judgments of the present by reference to the past are useful in otherways --for example, to reach a prognosis of the new politics.  The traumas and upheavals that the countryhas suffered explain the rise of nationalist politics as well as the principlesand practices in which it now finds political expression.   A glimpse at the past also enables us totake a measure of the novelty of the present. For all their novelty, the present arrangements may well showremnants--desirable or undesirable --of the past.
Federalism
Remarkson Method
Even believers in an idealconception of society do not insist that federalism must be realized in everylegitimate polity.  Nor is federalismsupported by all ideal conceptions of constitutional democracy.  Federalism therefore differs from publicideals of universal reach. For instance, federalism is distinct from humanrights: unlike federalism, “their political (moral) force extends to allsocieties, and they are binding on all peoples and societies, including outlawstates.”[5] Violationof human rights justifies condemnation or even coercive intervention.  In contrast, rejection of federalism by aregime does not demonstrate imperfection, much less, wrongdoing in the regime.
Federalism is not, therefore, anecessary part of an ideal conception or theory of a democratic society; it israther an ideal for a society in unfavorable circumstances, circumstancesunfavorable to constitutional democracy. It might, of course, be argued that all political ideals answer tounfavorable conditions.  For example,human rights are honored because everyone always needs to avoid being killed,assaulted, deceived, used as a resource, or neglected in an emergency. The illsagainst which human rights afford protection represent evils to which all humanbeings are always vulnerable.  The vitaldifference is that federalism is a public value tailored to conditionsunfavorable to constitutional democracy that are not universal but ratherpeculiar to certain societies.  However,the distinction suggested between ideal and nonideal theory may be blurred byadopting a position taken by a few political theorists: namely, either thatthere are no positive political values or that the only practicable publicvalues are those that serve to ward off unfavorable features of men or theirenvironment.  Forging an intellectuallink among all societies on the basis of the exclusive importance of pervasiveunfavorable conditions would yield a minimalist political theory such aslibertarianism or what Judith Shklar calls the liberalism of fear.[6]Still, this view is not a direct challenge to the proposal to treat federalismunder nonideal theory, for the view does not amount to a denial of nonidealtheory but rather to an affirmation of its ubiquity.
If, however, we subscribe to theposition that social co-operation can aim beyond the avoidance of vice to theachievement of virtue, the distinction between ideal and nonideal theorysurvives.  Federalism can then be seen asa proper part of nonideal theory which, according to John Rawls, “deals withunfavorable conditions, that is, with the conditions of societies whosehistorical, social, and economic circumstances make their achieving awell-ordered regime, whether liberal or decent, difficult or impossible.”[7]Nonideal theory delimits the requirements of an account of society burdenedwith unfavorable conditions.  First, toidentify the conditions – poverty; divisions of power, culture or identity; anintolerant public culture – that tend to stand in the way of fidelity to thevalues and institutions of constitutional democracy.  Second, to determine the policies andpractices that mitigate, overcome or deploy to advantage unfavorable conditionsin the service of constitutional democracy. In the task of unburdening a society from unfavorable conditions,nonideal theory is guided by the aim of reaching or approximating idealtheory.  In Rawls’s words: “nonidealtheory asks how the ideal conception of society … might be achieved or at leastworked toward, generally in gradual steps; it looks for policies and courses ofaction that are likely to be effectiveand politically permissible for that purpose”[8](italics mine). Rawls’s remarks indicate a third demand of nonideal theory:starting from where the society is now, the search is for a passage todemocratic institutions by democratic means. Unless nonideal theory furnishes democratic means for surmountingbarriers to democracy it cannot reconcile us to unfavorable conditions.
To clarify the significance of the treatment of federalism under theaspect of nonideal theory, it may be helpful to contrast it with its morefamiliar alternative: to explain and justify federalism as an integral part ofan ideal conception of constitutional democracy. A few political philosophershave made serious attempts to find a theoretical underpinning for federalismand other public manifestations of diversity as a freestanding value or idealof constitutional democracy.
A notable example is CharlesTaylor’s influential essay on “The Politics of Recognition.”[9]Taylor identifies two forms of recognition that he deems important tocontemporary politics. The first is recognition of what human beingsimportantly share, and it yields “a politics of universalism, emphasizing theequal dignity of citizens, and the content of this politics has been theequalization of rights and entitlements.”[10] Thesecond is a recognition of what makes human beings culturally distinct ordifferent, and it yields a politics of particularism. “With the politics ofequal dignity, what is established is meant to be universally the same, anidentical basket of rights and immunities; with the politics of difference,what we are asked to recognize is the unique identity of this individual orgroup from everyone else.” [11]Taylor’s chief concern is with the second form of recognition, for he believesthat the first is dominant in contemporary political theory and practice, andthat it has tended to undermine the second by aspiring to distance or evenefface the culturally distinct from political life. Taylor argues that ourallegiance to recognition of our common humanity should not blind us to thefact that recognition of distinctness is a vital human need, though the urgencyof the need makes itself felt only after our release from social forms wherethe identity of individuals and groups had been preordained. 
Taylor’s thesis then is that tobe recognized in one’s cultural distinctness is a universal human interest.Multiculturalism and its institutional expressions such as federalism arereasonable realizations of a human interest for recognition of culturaldistinctness. Indeed, to avoid denigration and forcible assimilation,universalist recognition of individuals as worthy of equal concern and respectdemands public affirmation of their culturally particularist identities.
Now, it is not entirely clear whyTaylor singles out cultural and linguistic identity, as opposed to, say,religious identity as a dimension of distinctness that warrants recognition anddifferential treatment in public life. Taylor does not, of course, deny thatreligious distinctness finds recognition outside public life in freeassociations. Yet he does not explain what is special about the claim ofdistinctness by Quebeckers such that he can say that here “what was at stakewas the desire of these people for survival, and their consequent demand forcertain forms of autonomy in their self-government, as well as the ability toadopt certain kinds of legislation deemed necessary for survival.”[12]
Even if we allow that there arereasons for politically privileging cultural distinctness, it is not evidentthat recognition of a particular cultural identity is a categorical demand.Taylor’s bold idea that recognition of one’s distinct cultural identity mustmatter and always requires public affirmation is not altogether convincing. Itseems more plausible to say that cultural identity does not necessarily matter,but if in a given case it does, it must be recognized. But then the claim torecognition of distinctness is not a fundamental human interest on a par, say,with the interest to be treated with equal concern and respect. The importanceof securing recognition for one’s cultural identity therefore depends onhistorical circumstance.
Why does Taylor suppose thatrecognition of one’s cultural distinctness always matters? Taylor seems to beled to the conclusion that he has seized upon a vital human interest by a focuson recognition to the exclusion of its source. Even if cultural identityhappens to be important to a person or a group and so anchors a claim torecognition of it by others, it is not obvious that recognition by any othersis what is desired or desirable. Do French Quebeckers seek recognition of theirdistinct society by Zulus or Texans? Would Zulus or Texans have standing toextend or withdraw recognition from French Quebeckers? Indeed, if we acceptTaylor’s idea of the value of cultural difference and its recognition, it ispuzzling why the demand for recognition is not put forward across societies asoften as it is within societies. It is more plausible to think that recognitionof distinctness or difference by others matters only when the others are thosewith whom there are reasons to feel closely identified. Recognition becomessalient with differences among those who, for any number of reasons, otherwisefeel a sense of mutual identification. Whether or not there are such reasonshas less to do with fundamental human needs or interests than with thecontingencies of history.
Will Kymlicka is anotherpolitical theorist who is impressed by worldwide resurgence of entho-culturaldisputes and conflicts. He concedes that “every dispute has its own uniquehistory and circumstance that need to be taken into account in devising a fairand workable solution.”[13]Still, his “aim is to step back and present a more general view of thelandscape—to identify some key concepts and principles that need to be takeninto account, and so clarify the basic building blocks for a liberal approachto minority rights.”[14] Despitethe modesty of this characterization, Kymlicka has the ambitious aim to locatemulticultural citizenship, group-differentiated rights and federativearrangements in the very foundations of a liberal conception of an idealsociety. According to Kymlicka, aside from protecting the individual’s choicesfrom intervention by others and government, a basic value of liberalism is toenable a person’s freedom to form and revise a conception of a worthwhile life.He faults contemporary liberalism for overlooking the fact that meaningfulchoice and pursuit of a way of life requires secure membership in a particularculture. “Put simply, freedom involves making choices amongst various options,and our societal culture not only provides these options, but also makes themmeaningful to us.”[15] Andagain: “Liberals should be concerned with the fate of cultural structures, notbecause they have some moral status of their own, but because it is onlythrough having a rich and secure cultural structure that people can becomeaware, in a vivid way, of the options available to them, and intelligentlyexamine their value.”[16]
For Kymlicka, the importance ofsecure cultural membership is a perfectly general claim about liberalism. It isacknowledged in the classical liberal theories of Mill and Green, and in thepractice of established liberal democracies, where liberal rule relies on anational culture upheld by the state. Kymlicka firmly resists the suggestionthat cultural membership can be secured in free associations or throughdecentralized policies in language, education and land tenure. Culturalmembership is instead a primary good that must be supported by a liberalpolitical community, if the capacity to fashion and revise a conception of aworthy individual life is to be realized. The separation of state and religioncannot serve as a model for the relation between the state and ethnic orcultural identity. “The whole idea of ‘benign neglect’ is incoherent, andreflects a shallow understanding of the relationship between states andnations. In the areas of official languages, political boundaries, and thedivision of powers, there is no way to avoid supporting this or that societalculture, or deciding which group will form a majority in political units thatcontrol culture-affecting decisions regarding language, education, andimmigration.”[17]Every liberalism is necessarily a national liberalism. The only question is tofind a fair way to reconcile multinational societies to the inseparability ofthe state and the nation, required by the ideal conception of liberal society.A federative arrangement with group-differentiated rights of self-government isthe only way to guarantee equality of cultural membership for individuals in amultinational society. Benign neglect or separation of state and ethnicitywould only mask the dominance of the official culture over the rest, whosemembers would be deprived of a context for the effective choice of a meaningfullife.
Kymlicka’s attempt to justify multicultural citizenship, collectiverights, and federative institutions by appeal to primary values and principlesof liberalism yields curious consequences that he countenances all too lightly.One concerns the extent to which a liberal, multinational state toleratesilliberal groups. Suppose a self-governing national group restricts thecapacity of its members to lead lives of their own choice. Kymlicka allows thatthe federal state should try to change the illiberal national community. But,barring extreme cases—cases that would justify international intervention—hethinks legal intervention is impermissible. To assent to this strangeconclusion is to grant that the rationale for rights to self-government can befreely violated by those exercising self-government. Put differently, individualsare entitled to secure cultural membership in order to ensure their freedom tolead a life of their own choice, but nothing more than persuasion is possibleif cultural membership robs them of this essential freedom.  How can a multinational state legitimatelycount as liberal if member states can violate rights central to liberalism withimpunity? The sanctity of cultural membership as a primary good of liberalsociety seems, in the end, to override the value of freedom it was originallyintended to subserve.
This result is doubly disquieting. First, a liberalism founded on thevalue of individual autonomy is more permissive in respect to infringements ofindividual freedom than liberalisms that avoid protection of substantivevalues, including autonomy, in public life. For example, in Rawls’s politicalliberalism human rights define the bounds of pluralism. Secondly, tolerance ofilliberal cultures eliminates Kymlicka’s sole ground for advocating a marriageof culture and a liberal state while endorsing the separation of religion andthe state. The ground is that religion, not culture, involves shared values.Leaving aside the question whether this is a trivial truth about liberalcultures or an interesting but controversial claim about all cultures, Kymlickastill faces a problem. Since both impose a conception of the good, there is nojustification for being tolerant toward illiberal cultures and intoleranttoward illiberal religions.
There is another unwelcome consequence of the liberal defense of multiculturalcitizenship, which Kymlicka points out, that has wider implications than heanticipates. Kymlicka argues that a stable liberal polity requires a sense ofsolidarity:  “a shared civic identitythat can sustain the level of mutual concern, accommodation and sacrifice thatdemocracies require.”[18]Yet, Kymlicka fears that a liberal state with a plurality of politicalcommunities may not foster an inclusive sense of solidarity sufficient tosustain the commitments of liberal citizenship to justice and the common good.Indeed, Kymlicka’s skepticism about the possibility of solidarity in amultinational state inclines him to side with Mill, who, in Kymlicka’s view,held that fidelity to liberalism is possible only in a state with a singlenational culture. Assuming that non-coercive assimilation is difficult,Kymlicka is unsure why a liberal faced with a multinational society should notbe favorably disposed to secession in order to pave the way for nation-states,the only settings suited to stable liberal democracies. What checks Kymlicka’sliberal advocacy of secession is that natural circumstances are unfavorable tothe exercise of secession. Many national groups may not prove viable asindependent states. Secession often occasions violent conflict. There is notenough room in the world to create states to accommodate all nations. Even ifall this is true, it is noteworthy that it does not prohibit a given nationalgroup from seeking secession on liberal grounds. More importantly, Kymlicka’spessimism on the fate of solidarity in a multinational state shows that it isunfavorable circumstances for states with a single national culture, notintrinsic merit from an ideal liberal point of view, that compels multinationalliberal states.
Given that multinational states are, though not strictly desirable,unavoidable, Kymlicka feels that we must somehow search for sources ofsolidarity in multinational states adequate to liberal democratic citizenship.Kymlicka considers shared public values, which he finds insufficient sincepeoples may go their own way despite such agreement. At any rate, as we sawearlier, there is no reason to expect adherence to the same principles orvalues in Kymlicka’s conception of the liberal multinational state. A morepromising basis is a commitment to what, following Taylor, he calls ‘deepdiversity.’ Roughly, this is to appreciate and prize that there are variedgrounds for allegiance to the wider political community in a multinationalstate. Even this he urges may be too thin unless it is coupled with somethingelse he deems most important. “For citizens to want to keep a multinationalstate together, therefore, they must value, not just ‘deep diversity’ ingeneral, but also the particular ethnic groups and national cultures with whomthey currently share the country.”[19]
This is an arresting conclusion: it is a clear admission that nationalidentity may be based on something other than a distinct cultural identity.Pride in historical achievements is a an example that Kymlicka offers of ashared national identity that does not draw on membership in a particularculture. Since Kymlicka insists it is Mill’s belief that a single nationalculture is a requirement of a liberal state, it is worth noting that Millhimself holds that a shared past is a powerful source of a sense ofnationality. He writes:
A portion of mankind may be said to constitute aNationality if they are united among themselves by common sympathies—which makethem cooperate with each other more willingly than with other people, desire tobe under the same government, and desire that it should be government bythemselves, or a portion of themselves, exclusively. This feeling ofnationality may have been generated by various causes. Sometimes it is theeffect of identity of race and descent. Community of language, community ofreligion greatly contribute to it. Geographical limits are one of its causes.But the strongest of all is identity of political antecedents, the possessionof national history, and consequent community of recollections; collectivepride and humiliation, pleasure and regret, connected with the same events inthe past.[20]

What Mill singles out as the strongest source of nationalidentity—collective pride and humiliation in a shared past—may, for all we know,account for a sense of community even in culturally homogeneous societies.  In any case, there is little reason to acceptthe thesis that a liberal political community is necessarily rooted in culture,the thesis on which Kymlicka, in part, mounts his case for a multinationalliberal state. There is also reason to doubt the claim that a distinct cultureis the only context for making choices about what life to lead. A shared pastand the sense of identity it engenders may enable a Swiss or a Canadian to lookinto options for a worthwhile life in the wider community beyond the particularculture to which the citizen belongs.
This brief discussion indicates that the search for an invariant,particularst value of constitutional democracy to anchor a generaljustification of multicultural politics and federative arrangements is vain.For example, the candidates put forward for an invariant value or ideal cannotpossibly account for the existence, importance or persistence of a federalstate in the United States and Germany, where cultural distinctness or securecultural membership does not loom large in federal politics. Moreover, theeffort to define collective rights or federal distribution of powers byreference to an invariant value—a task undertaken more by Kymlicka thanTaylor—tends to inhibit or distort abiding values of constitutional democracy.None of this is, of course, to deny the importance of the questions Taylor andKymlicka formulate and the problems they probe. Rather, the difficulties and limitationsin their answers and solutions attest to the limits of a particularist ideal orphilosophical theory in coming to terms with a particularist phenomenon such asfederalism.  Multiculturalism andfederalism enter the political agenda only under peculiar circumstancesunfavorable to familiar universal ideals of democracy. The unfavorableconditions as well as the democratic norms that answer to them varysignificantly. The focus of nonideal theory is on the actual unfavorablecircumstances and the specific ways in which they are reconciled to thestanding values of constitutional democracy. Since the unfavorable conditionsand the terms of reconciliation are diverse, a deeper understanding invites acomparative assessment of different federal arrangements. Under nonidealtheory, federalism thus seems a subject more fit for social science than forideal or philosophical theory. The reason is that multiculturalism,multinationalism, and federalism do not call for a new value or theory ofconstitutional democracy; instead, they necessitate a nuanced institutionalrealization of universal ideals of constitutional democracy. 
An application of the method ofnonideal theory to federalism circumscribes the scope of an adequateinterpretation of federalism.  First, theperspective guides and shapes the selection of conditions unfavorable todemocratic rule that call for federalist policies and practices.  Second, it requires us to show how theprinciples and structures of federalism promote democratic ideals by checkingand exploiting unfavorable circumstances. The defense of federalism is persuasive to the extent that it comes toterms with the unfavorable conditions that prompted it in ways that enhance or,at least, do not compromise democratic ideals of universal reach.
This understanding of theinterpretation of federalism from the perspective of nonideal theory leaveswide room for disagreement.  A site ofdebate over federalism since its inception are differences over what values itserves and how well it serves them.  Onearea of contention is how best to strike a balance between the claims of unityand the claims of diversity.  A formativeexample is the constitutional debate in the United States between federalists(inclusive nationalists) and anti-federalists (exclusive or localnationalists).[21] Another source ofdisagreement is whether federalism is a source of collective rights or merelyan effective protection of individual rights in a pluralist society.   An example is the debate over the status ofthe American bill of rights before and after the reconstruction.[22]Finally, there is a question kept alive by failed or troubled federalisms: Doesfederalism entrench or attenuate the nonfavorable conditions that occasion it?[23]This question arises not only where democratic aspirations have beendisappointed but also where they have been reasonably fulfilled.


















Federalism: New Frontiers in Ethiopian Politics

ANDEREAS ESHETE[1]
(andreaseshete@yahoo.com)

EthiopianJournal of Federal Studies, Vol. 1., No. 1, May 2013

“…it is of great importance in the republicnot only to guard the society against the oppression of its rulers, but toguard one part of the society against the injustice of the other part.”
                                                               -JamesMadison
“Where is an example of ‘Federalism’ everhaving been a preconceived plan? Who carts around Federalism as an a priori panacea?  Federalism has always appeared in any factualsituation as a response to an existing division of power within a territorythat comes together, or is thrust together, in one State.”
                                                               -BernardCrick

 

Introduction

A newpolitical vision now guides Ethiopia. The vision is a departure from prevalent African politicalpractice.  In Ethiopia, too, the newpolitics - its source, spirit and style - seems unfamiliar to many.
Since 1991, Ethiopia has embarkedupon a bold experiment in the conduct of public life.  The hallmark of the experiment is a readinessto face the fact of ethnic diversity. New political arrangements aim to shape Ethiopian political identityaround the country's constituent nations and nationalities.  Even in this era of the politics of identity,Ethiopia's resolve to extend full public recognition to her varied national communitiesis unique. Ethiopia's recognition of Eritrea's right to self-determination isalso unprecedented. Following a referendum on independence held in 1993,Eritrea went her own way.  Theestablishment of a sovereign Eritrean homeland marks the first birth of anAfrican nation through secession. Within Ethiopia, the commitment to uphold theright to self-determination is equally striking.  The right to secession is now aconstitutional entitlement. All cultural communities are entitled to fairrepresentation in the institutions of state and federal government.  Territorially based nationalities exercisewide powers of self-government in political, economic, legal, cultural andeducational affairs.  The result is apolitical order open to cultural diversity, self-expression and autonomy.
Ethiopia's ethnic turn is a sharpbreak from African political practice. With rare exceptions such as Botswana and Somalia, vast culturaldiversity characterizes African states. African states are not built on nations of their own making.  Upon independence, African states inheritedpopulations capriciously contrived by colonial powers that arbitrarily joinedor divided cultural communities.  Thenewly independent states sought to preserve the uneasy national legacy of colonialism.  Amid heterogeneity, political rule tried tocreate and maintain unity in various ways. Some cobbled together coalitions whereby elites from diverse groupscould have a stake in a unitary polity. Others designed political arrangements blind to cultural differences andcleavages.  Another tack was to fosteroverarching identities---African or ideological---in order to overshadow orovercome internal differences over national and cultural identity.
Whatever the differences inapproach, the overriding aim almost everywhere in Africa was to refuse fullpolitical expression to cultural pluralism. Even on the rare occasion where national identity was an exercise inself-definition carried out through internal struggle and negotiation, therewas no disposition to cultivate or even to acknowledge diversity.  In the recent constitutional exercisesundertaken by South Africa and Uganda, the choice was in favor of a unitarystate.  The pursuit of political unity atthe expense of cultural plurality has been a leading objective of Africanstatecraft that enjoyed wide legitimacy: for example, ethnic parties were oftenprohibited by law; African states consistently complied with OAU's principle ofupholding colonial borders.
The inclination to ignore,conceal, subdue or erase cultural diversity in African politics has beensustained at considerable cost. Monopolistic political arrangements such as military government,one-party rule, systematic suppression of human and political rights are oftenrationalized as inescapable means of safeguarding unity.  Despite these draconian measures, ethnicdiversity has not been banished.  Bitterwars for secession were fought by Katanga, Biafra, Eritrea and SouthernSudan.  Though nothing approaches thegenocide perpetrated in Rwanda, ethnic turmoil exists in most parts of Africa.
Even when strife in Africacentered on other matters, it was seldom altogether free of ethniccontention.  Yet neither the threat ofpartition nor ubiquitous ethnic contest called into question African allegianceto a conception of statehood that excludes national or cultural pluralism fromthe definition of political identity. Thus as we enter the new millennium, a vision of political unity thatdisavows or devalues diversity survives intact throughout most of Africa.
What, then, prompted Ethiopia togo virtually alone against the prevailing current in the continent?  Ethiopia's anomalous new course is all themore surprising, for, unlike the rest of Africa, her heterogeneity of nationalities,cultural traditions, religions and languages is not a fortuitous outcome ofalien imposition.  Though Ethiopia'sautonomous development is no guarantee of the emergence of a national society,it is hard to overlook the society's resilience in the face of a long historyof internal warfare and foreign encroachment. Even outsiders, without evident partisanship, detect the contours of anintegral political community.
Admittedly the image ofEthiopians as a well-defined people conveyed in international scholarship issometimes merely a result of selective perception.  Much the most addressed part of Ethiopia isthe north, where literate cultures and salvationist religions have flourishedsince the distant past[2].  Accessibility to modern scholarship andcultural affinity rendered this terrain familiar to western observers.  Another area of focus, one driven by concernsof development, is the small, largely urban area where modern economic andpolitical institutions have gained a foothold. The impression of homogeneity gleaned from these perspectives does notreflect Ethiopian culture as a whole but rather the interests of othersocieties.
Still, those aspects of Ethiopiacaptured from culturally alien perspectives cannot be dismissed as merefragments, for they have played a crucial role in drawing the wider communitytogether.  For good or ill, northernculture is diffused throughout the entire country.  For instance, Amharic speakers can be foundalmost everywhere; the new Regional State of the Southern Peoples has adoptedAmharic as its working language.  Amongthe small but culturally influential urban population, identities that cutacross nationality, religion and language have, and are seen to have, salience.  The purview of both Amhara - Tigraycivilization and urban culture tends to define Ethiopia not just under westerneyes; it is an important dimension of Ethiopian self-perception.
Even those who extend their sightbeyond comparatively self-contained or integrative elements of the society inorder to take notice of the whole are impressed by the presence of abidingaffinities among Ethiopia's dispersed and diverse cultural communities.[3]  Strands of a common sense of communityinclude:  close and longstandingconnections of far-flung trade and migration; collective historical legacy;shared cultural beliefs, rituals, symbols and ideals; common systems of socialand political authority.  On account ofthese ties, a distinctive community encompassing all the peoples in Ethiopia'spresent territory has endured despite recurrent fragmentation.  The confluence of Ethiopia's variedidentities can also be seen in the ambitions of empire-builders ---from withinand without---who rarely settled for less than domination over what is nowEthiopia.
Though important, these indicationsof a shared sense of community show, at most, the possibility of politicalunity.  Societies like Somaliawell-endowed with traits conducive to national self-identification and cohesionhave floundered in the search for statehood. Similarly, a bitter lesson of Ethiopian history is that the potentialfor unity, however promising, cannot be realized without effectiveinstitutional means for its political expression.
It is a testimony both to theweight of Ethiopia's past and its political inconclusiveness that differencesover the present dispensation are fought as battles over historicalinterpretation.  Is Ethiopia threethousands years old or only one hundred? Have the Oromo and the Southern Peoples always been members of Ethiopiansociety or were they joined to Ethiopia through invasion and conquest in thenineteenth century?  Is Eritrea anamputated limb of Ethiopia or is it a distinct society with only a brief,forced marriage to Ethiopia during the federation and subsequent incorporation?
Some speak with self-confidenceof belonging to an Ethiopia with a robust national identity intricatelyinterwoven out of the country's constituent identities.  They claim that they cannot recognizethemselves in the new ethnically defined Ethiopia.  Others, however, speak with distance ofEthiopia as a community of which they were never willing members.  For them, the new political vision enablesthem to identify with Ethiopia for the first time.  The former feel that the present diminishesthe past, creating a void that cannot be filled.  The latter feel that the present redeemsinjustices of the past.  These clashingconceptions of Ethiopia are a subject of everyday contention because of awidespread conviction that the uncertainties surrounding the country'sself-identity are rooted in the past. While everyone agrees that Ethiopia houses a plurality of languages,religious and nationalities, disagreement rages over whether or not ethnicdifferentiation and inequality is so entrenched in Ethiopian history that itrequires recourse to a new political order.
Even indisputable collectiveaccomplishments of Ethiopian history do not yield a shared sense of pride.  Undoubtedly the most significant achievementof modern Ethiopia is independence, successfully defended against a successionof invaders --- the British, the Egyptians, the Sudanese Mahdists, and theItalians.  In this history of struggle, asingular triumph was in 1896 at the Battle of Adwa, where Ethiopia inflicted astunning defeat on Italy.  Inspirationalas it was to oppressed peoples and their champions everywhere, the Adwa victorymarks a peak in Ethiopia's international prestige.  Internally, too, Adwa was a watershed.  Peoples from the entire empire marched to thebattle:  unlike previous resistance toforeign aggression, Adwa was a national victory.  Adwa was also a formative moment in thecreation of Ethiopia as a modern nation-state. In the wake of the victory, Ethiopian sovereignty was recognized by theEuropean powers.  Yet, Adwa's legacy remainsambiguous.  Emboldened by his nationaland international prestige, Emperor Menlik II continued his expansion into thesouth and west, and consolidated his empire in the decade following Adwa.  As a result, many peoples of Ethiopia whofought valiantly at Adwa are ambivalent about the victory: they see themselvesas victims of their own triumph.  Here aselsewhere, Ethiopians seem to be at once exalted and anguished by their past.
It is not obvious that anyone isnow in a position to resolve the sharp differences separating these conceptionsof Ethiopia's past and the attitudes they yield toward the politicalpresent.  These incompatible myths aboutthe Ethiopian past do show that the new political order that gives pride ofplace to cultural diversity has not yet settled over the landscape.  Myths about the past are conjured up in orderto bolster or undermine the legitimacy of the new political vision.  This is not of course a surprise:  "The past has always been the handmaidof authority.”[4]These judgments of the present by reference to the past are useful in otherways --for example, to reach a prognosis of the new politics.  The traumas and upheavals that the countryhas suffered explain the rise of nationalist politics as well as the principlesand practices in which it now finds political expression.   A glimpse at the past also enables us totake a measure of the novelty of the present. For all their novelty, the present arrangements may well showremnants--desirable or undesirable --of the past.
Federalism
Remarkson Method
Even believers in an idealconception of society do not insist that federalism must be realized in everylegitimate polity.  Nor is federalismsupported by all ideal conceptions of constitutional democracy.  Federalism therefore differs from publicideals of universal reach. For instance, federalism is distinct from humanrights: unlike federalism, “their political (moral) force extends to allsocieties, and they are binding on all peoples and societies, including outlawstates.”[5] Violationof human rights justifies condemnation or even coercive intervention.  In contrast, rejection of federalism by aregime does not demonstrate imperfection, much less, wrongdoing in the regime.
Federalism is not, therefore, anecessary part of an ideal conception or theory of a democratic society; it israther an ideal for a society in unfavorable circumstances, circumstancesunfavorable to constitutional democracy. It might, of course, be argued that all political ideals answer tounfavorable conditions.  For example,human rights are honored because everyone always needs to avoid being killed,assaulted, deceived, used as a resource, or neglected in an emergency. The illsagainst which human rights afford protection represent evils to which all humanbeings are always vulnerable.  The vitaldifference is that federalism is a public value tailored to conditionsunfavorable to constitutional democracy that are not universal but ratherpeculiar to certain societies.  However,the distinction suggested between ideal and nonideal theory may be blurred byadopting a position taken by a few political theorists: namely, either thatthere are no positive political values or that the only practicable publicvalues are those that serve to ward off unfavorable features of men or theirenvironment.  Forging an intellectuallink among all societies on the basis of the exclusive importance of pervasiveunfavorable conditions would yield a minimalist political theory such aslibertarianism or what Judith Shklar calls the liberalism of fear.[6]Still, this view is not a direct challenge to the proposal to treat federalismunder nonideal theory, for the view does not amount to a denial of nonidealtheory but rather to an affirmation of its ubiquity.
If, however, we subscribe to theposition that social co-operation can aim beyond the avoidance of vice to theachievement of virtue, the distinction between ideal and nonideal theorysurvives.  Federalism can then be seen asa proper part of nonideal theory which, according to John Rawls, “deals withunfavorable conditions, that is, with the conditions of societies whosehistorical, social, and economic circumstances make their achieving awell-ordered regime, whether liberal or decent, difficult or impossible.”[7]Nonideal theory delimits the requirements of an account of society burdenedwith unfavorable conditions.  First, toidentify the conditions – poverty; divisions of power, culture or identity; anintolerant public culture – that tend to stand in the way of fidelity to thevalues and institutions of constitutional democracy.  Second, to determine the policies andpractices that mitigate, overcome or deploy to advantage unfavorable conditionsin the service of constitutional democracy. In the task of unburdening a society from unfavorable conditions,nonideal theory is guided by the aim of reaching or approximating idealtheory.  In Rawls’s words: “nonidealtheory asks how the ideal conception of society … might be achieved or at leastworked toward, generally in gradual steps; it looks for policies and courses ofaction that are likely to be effectiveand politically permissible for that purpose”[8](italics mine). Rawls’s remarks indicate a third demand of nonideal theory:starting from where the society is now, the search is for a passage todemocratic institutions by democratic means. Unless nonideal theory furnishes democratic means for surmountingbarriers to democracy it cannot reconcile us to unfavorable conditions.
To clarify the significance of the treatment of federalism under theaspect of nonideal theory, it may be helpful to contrast it with its morefamiliar alternative: to explain and justify federalism as an integral part ofan ideal conception of constitutional democracy. A few political philosophershave made serious attempts to find a theoretical underpinning for federalismand other public manifestations of diversity as a freestanding value or idealof constitutional democracy.
A notable example is CharlesTaylor’s influential essay on “The Politics of Recognition.”[9]Taylor identifies two forms of recognition that he deems important tocontemporary politics. The first is recognition of what human beingsimportantly share, and it yields “a politics of universalism, emphasizing theequal dignity of citizens, and the content of this politics has been theequalization of rights and entitlements.”[10] Thesecond is a recognition of what makes human beings culturally distinct ordifferent, and it yields a politics of particularism. “With the politics ofequal dignity, what is established is meant to be universally the same, anidentical basket of rights and immunities; with the politics of difference,what we are asked to recognize is the unique identity of this individual orgroup from everyone else.” [11]Taylor’s chief concern is with the second form of recognition, for he believesthat the first is dominant in contemporary political theory and practice, andthat it has tended to undermine the second by aspiring to distance or evenefface the culturally distinct from political life. Taylor argues that ourallegiance to recognition of our common humanity should not blind us to thefact that recognition of distinctness is a vital human need, though the urgencyof the need makes itself felt only after our release from social forms wherethe identity of individuals and groups had been preordained. 
Taylor’s thesis then is that tobe recognized in one’s cultural distinctness is a universal human interest.Multiculturalism and its institutional expressions such as federalism arereasonable realizations of a human interest for recognition of culturaldistinctness. Indeed, to avoid denigration and forcible assimilation,universalist recognition of individuals as worthy of equal concern and respectdemands public affirmation of their culturally particularist identities.
Now, it is not entirely clear whyTaylor singles out cultural and linguistic identity, as opposed to, say,religious identity as a dimension of distinctness that warrants recognition anddifferential treatment in public life. Taylor does not, of course, deny thatreligious distinctness finds recognition outside public life in freeassociations. Yet he does not explain what is special about the claim ofdistinctness by Quebeckers such that he can say that here “what was at stakewas the desire of these people for survival, and their consequent demand forcertain forms of autonomy in their self-government, as well as the ability toadopt certain kinds of legislation deemed necessary for survival.”[12]
Even if we allow that there arereasons for politically privileging cultural distinctness, it is not evidentthat recognition of a particular cultural identity is a categorical demand.Taylor’s bold idea that recognition of one’s distinct cultural identity mustmatter and always requires public affirmation is not altogether convincing. Itseems more plausible to say that cultural identity does not necessarily matter,but if in a given case it does, it must be recognized. But then the claim torecognition of distinctness is not a fundamental human interest on a par, say,with the interest to be treated with equal concern and respect. The importanceof securing recognition for one’s cultural identity therefore depends onhistorical circumstance.
Why does Taylor suppose thatrecognition of one’s cultural distinctness always matters? Taylor seems to beled to the conclusion that he has seized upon a vital human interest by a focuson recognition to the exclusion of its source. Even if cultural identityhappens to be important to a person or a group and so anchors a claim torecognition of it by others, it is not obvious that recognition by any othersis what is desired or desirable. Do French Quebeckers seek recognition of theirdistinct society by Zulus or Texans? Would Zulus or Texans have standing toextend or withdraw recognition from French Quebeckers? Indeed, if we acceptTaylor’s idea of the value of cultural difference and its recognition, it ispuzzling why the demand for recognition is not put forward across societies asoften as it is within societies. It is more plausible to think that recognitionof distinctness or difference by others matters only when the others are thosewith whom there are reasons to feel closely identified. Recognition becomessalient with differences among those who, for any number of reasons, otherwisefeel a sense of mutual identification. Whether or not there are such reasonshas less to do with fundamental human needs or interests than with thecontingencies of history.
Will Kymlicka is anotherpolitical theorist who is impressed by worldwide resurgence of entho-culturaldisputes and conflicts. He concedes that “every dispute has its own uniquehistory and circumstance that need to be taken into account in devising a fairand workable solution.”[13]Still, his “aim is to step back and present a more general view of thelandscape—to identify some key concepts and principles that need to be takeninto account, and so clarify the basic building blocks for a liberal approachto minority rights.”[14] Despitethe modesty of this characterization, Kymlicka has the ambitious aim to locatemulticultural citizenship, group-differentiated rights and federativearrangements in the very foundations of a liberal conception of an idealsociety. According to Kymlicka, aside from protecting the individual’s choicesfrom intervention by others and government, a basic value of liberalism is toenable a person’s freedom to form and revise a conception of a worthwhile life.He faults contemporary liberalism for overlooking the fact that meaningfulchoice and pursuit of a way of life requires secure membership in a particularculture. “Put simply, freedom involves making choices amongst various options,and our societal culture not only provides these options, but also makes themmeaningful to us.”[15] Andagain: “Liberals should be concerned with the fate of cultural structures, notbecause they have some moral status of their own, but because it is onlythrough having a rich and secure cultural structure that people can becomeaware, in a vivid way, of the options available to them, and intelligentlyexamine their value.”[16]
For Kymlicka, the importance ofsecure cultural membership is a perfectly general claim about liberalism. It isacknowledged in the classical liberal theories of Mill and Green, and in thepractice of established liberal democracies, where liberal rule relies on anational culture upheld by the state. Kymlicka firmly resists the suggestionthat cultural membership can be secured in free associations or throughdecentralized policies in language, education and land tenure. Culturalmembership is instead a primary good that must be supported by a liberalpolitical community, if the capacity to fashion and revise a conception of aworthy individual life is to be realized. The separation of state and religioncannot serve as a model for the relation between the state and ethnic orcultural identity. “The whole idea of ‘benign neglect’ is incoherent, andreflects a shallow understanding of the relationship between states andnations. In the areas of official languages, political boundaries, and thedivision of powers, there is no way to avoid supporting this or that societalculture, or deciding which group will form a majority in political units thatcontrol culture-affecting decisions regarding language, education, andimmigration.”[17]Every liberalism is necessarily a national liberalism. The only question is tofind a fair way to reconcile multinational societies to the inseparability ofthe state and the nation, required by the ideal conception of liberal society.A federative arrangement with group-differentiated rights of self-government isthe only way to guarantee equality of cultural membership for individuals in amultinational society. Benign neglect or separation of state and ethnicitywould only mask the dominance of the official culture over the rest, whosemembers would be deprived of a context for the effective choice of a meaningfullife.
Kymlicka’s attempt to justify multicultural citizenship, collectiverights, and federative institutions by appeal to primary values and principlesof liberalism yields curious consequences that he countenances all too lightly.One concerns the extent to which a liberal, multinational state toleratesilliberal groups. Suppose a self-governing national group restricts thecapacity of its members to lead lives of their own choice. Kymlicka allows thatthe federal state should try to change the illiberal national community. But,barring extreme cases—cases that would justify international intervention—hethinks legal intervention is impermissible. To assent to this strangeconclusion is to grant that the rationale for rights to self-government can befreely violated by those exercising self-government. Put differently, individualsare entitled to secure cultural membership in order to ensure their freedom tolead a life of their own choice, but nothing more than persuasion is possibleif cultural membership robs them of this essential freedom.  How can a multinational state legitimatelycount as liberal if member states can violate rights central to liberalism withimpunity? The sanctity of cultural membership as a primary good of liberalsociety seems, in the end, to override the value of freedom it was originallyintended to subserve.
This result is doubly disquieting. First, a liberalism founded on thevalue of individual autonomy is more permissive in respect to infringements ofindividual freedom than liberalisms that avoid protection of substantivevalues, including autonomy, in public life. For example, in Rawls’s politicalliberalism human rights define the bounds of pluralism. Secondly, tolerance ofilliberal cultures eliminates Kymlicka’s sole ground for advocating a marriageof culture and a liberal state while endorsing the separation of religion andthe state. The ground is that religion, not culture, involves shared values.Leaving aside the question whether this is a trivial truth about liberalcultures or an interesting but controversial claim about all cultures, Kymlickastill faces a problem. Since both impose a conception of the good, there is nojustification for being tolerant toward illiberal cultures and intoleranttoward illiberal religions.
There is another unwelcome consequence of the liberal defense of multiculturalcitizenship, which Kymlicka points out, that has wider implications than heanticipates. Kymlicka argues that a stable liberal polity requires a sense ofsolidarity:  “a shared civic identitythat can sustain the level of mutual concern, accommodation and sacrifice thatdemocracies require.”[18]Yet, Kymlicka fears that a liberal state with a plurality of politicalcommunities may not foster an inclusive sense of solidarity sufficient tosustain the commitments of liberal citizenship to justice and the common good.Indeed, Kymlicka’s skepticism about the possibility of solidarity in amultinational state inclines him to side with Mill, who, in Kymlicka’s view,held that fidelity to liberalism is possible only in a state with a singlenational culture. Assuming that non-coercive assimilation is difficult,Kymlicka is unsure why a liberal faced with a multinational society should notbe favorably disposed to secession in order to pave the way for nation-states,the only settings suited to stable liberal democracies. What checks Kymlicka’sliberal advocacy of secession is that natural circumstances are unfavorable tothe exercise of secession. Many national groups may not prove viable asindependent states. Secession often occasions violent conflict. There is notenough room in the world to create states to accommodate all nations. Even ifall this is true, it is noteworthy that it does not prohibit a given nationalgroup from seeking secession on liberal grounds. More importantly, Kymlicka’spessimism on the fate of solidarity in a multinational state shows that it isunfavorable circumstances for states with a single national culture, notintrinsic merit from an ideal liberal point of view, that compels multinationalliberal states.
Given that multinational states are, though not strictly desirable,unavoidable, Kymlicka feels that we must somehow search for sources ofsolidarity in multinational states adequate to liberal democratic citizenship.Kymlicka considers shared public values, which he finds insufficient sincepeoples may go their own way despite such agreement. At any rate, as we sawearlier, there is no reason to expect adherence to the same principles orvalues in Kymlicka’s conception of the liberal multinational state. A morepromising basis is a commitment to what, following Taylor, he calls ‘deepdiversity.’ Roughly, this is to appreciate and prize that there are variedgrounds for allegiance to the wider political community in a multinationalstate. Even this he urges may be too thin unless it is coupled with somethingelse he deems most important. “For citizens to want to keep a multinationalstate together, therefore, they must value, not just ‘deep diversity’ ingeneral, but also the particular ethnic groups and national cultures with whomthey currently share the country.”[19]
This is an arresting conclusion: it is a clear admission that nationalidentity may be based on something other than a distinct cultural identity.Pride in historical achievements is a an example that Kymlicka offers of ashared national identity that does not draw on membership in a particularculture. Since Kymlicka insists it is Mill’s belief that a single nationalculture is a requirement of a liberal state, it is worth noting that Millhimself holds that a shared past is a powerful source of a sense ofnationality. He writes:
A portion of mankind may be said to constitute aNationality if they are united among themselves by common sympathies—which makethem cooperate with each other more willingly than with other people, desire tobe under the same government, and desire that it should be government bythemselves, or a portion of themselves, exclusively. This feeling ofnationality may have been generated by various causes. Sometimes it is theeffect of identity of race and descent. Community of language, community ofreligion greatly contribute to it. Geographical limits are one of its causes.But the strongest of all is identity of political antecedents, the possessionof national history, and consequent community of recollections; collectivepride and humiliation, pleasure and regret, connected with the same events inthe past.[20]

What Mill singles out as the strongest source of nationalidentity—collective pride and humiliation in a shared past—may, for all we know,account for a sense of community even in culturally homogeneous societies.  In any case, there is little reason to acceptthe thesis that a liberal political community is necessarily rooted in culture,the thesis on which Kymlicka, in part, mounts his case for a multinationalliberal state. There is also reason to doubt the claim that a distinct cultureis the only context for making choices about what life to lead. A shared pastand the sense of identity it engenders may enable a Swiss or a Canadian to lookinto options for a worthwhile life in the wider community beyond the particularculture to which the citizen belongs.
This brief discussion indicates that the search for an invariant,particularst value of constitutional democracy to anchor a generaljustification of multicultural politics and federative arrangements is vain.For example, the candidates put forward for an invariant value or ideal cannotpossibly account for the existence, importance or persistence of a federalstate in the United States and Germany, where cultural distinctness or securecultural membership does not loom large in federal politics. Moreover, theeffort to define collective rights or federal distribution of powers byreference to an invariant value—a task undertaken more by Kymlicka thanTaylor—tends to inhibit or distort abiding values of constitutional democracy.None of this is, of course, to deny the importance of the questions Taylor andKymlicka formulate and the problems they probe. Rather, the difficulties and limitationsin their answers and solutions attest to the limits of a particularist ideal orphilosophical theory in coming to terms with a particularist phenomenon such asfederalism.  Multiculturalism andfederalism enter the political agenda only under peculiar circumstancesunfavorable to familiar universal ideals of democracy. The unfavorableconditions as well as the democratic norms that answer to them varysignificantly. The focus of nonideal theory is on the actual unfavorablecircumstances and the specific ways in which they are reconciled to thestanding values of constitutional democracy. Since the unfavorable conditionsand the terms of reconciliation are diverse, a deeper understanding invites acomparative assessment of different federal arrangements. Under nonidealtheory, federalism thus seems a subject more fit for social science than forideal or philosophical theory. The reason is that multiculturalism,multinationalism, and federalism do not call for a new value or theory ofconstitutional democracy; instead, they necessitate a nuanced institutionalrealization of universal ideals of constitutional democracy. 
An application of the method ofnonideal theory to federalism circumscribes the scope of an adequateinterpretation of federalism.  First, theperspective guides and shapes the selection of conditions unfavorable todemocratic rule that call for federalist policies and practices.  Second, it requires us to show how theprinciples and structures of federalism promote democratic ideals by checkingand exploiting unfavorable circumstances. The defense of federalism is persuasive to the extent that it comes toterms with the unfavorable conditions that prompted it in ways that enhance or,at least, do not compromise democratic ideals of universal reach.
This understanding of theinterpretation of federalism from the perspective of nonideal theory leaveswide room for disagreement.  A site ofdebate over federalism since its inception are differences over what values itserves and how well it serves them.  Onearea of contention is how best to strike a balance between the claims of unityand the claims of diversity.  A formativeexample is the constitutional debate in the United States between federalists(inclusive nationalists) and anti-federalists (exclusive or localnationalists).[21] Another source ofdisagreement is whether federalism is a source of collective rights or merelyan effective protection of individual rights in a pluralist society.   An example is the debate over the status ofthe American bill of rights before and after the reconstruction.[22]Finally, there is a question kept alive by failed or troubled federalisms: Doesfederalism entrench or attenuate the nonfavorable conditions that occasion it?[23]This question arises not only where democratic aspirations have beendisappointed but also where they have been reasonably fulfilled.


















Federalism: New Frontiers in Ethiopian Politics

ANDEREAS ESHETE[1]
(andreaseshete@yahoo.com)

EthiopianJournal of Federal Studies, Vol. 1., No. 1, May 2013

“…it is of great importance in the republicnot only to guard the society against the oppression of its rulers, but toguard one part of the society against the injustice of the other part.”
                                                               -JamesMadison
“Where is an example of ‘Federalism’ everhaving been a preconceived plan? Who carts around Federalism as an a priori panacea?  Federalism has always appeared in any factualsituation as a response to an existing division of power within a territorythat comes together, or is thrust together, in one State.”
                                                               -BernardCrick

 

Introduction

A newpolitical vision now guides Ethiopia. The vision is a departure from prevalent African politicalpractice.  In Ethiopia, too, the newpolitics - its source, spirit and style - seems unfamiliar to many.
Since 1991, Ethiopia has embarkedupon a bold experiment in the conduct of public life.  The hallmark of the experiment is a readinessto face the fact of ethnic diversity. New political arrangements aim to shape Ethiopian political identityaround the country's constituent nations and nationalities.  Even in this era of the politics of identity,Ethiopia's resolve to extend full public recognition to her varied national communitiesis unique. Ethiopia's recognition of Eritrea's right to self-determination isalso unprecedented. Following a referendum on independence held in 1993,Eritrea went her own way.  Theestablishment of a sovereign Eritrean homeland marks the first birth of anAfrican nation through secession. Within Ethiopia, the commitment to uphold theright to self-determination is equally striking.  The right to secession is now aconstitutional entitlement. All cultural communities are entitled to fairrepresentation in the institutions of state and federal government.  Territorially based nationalities exercisewide powers of self-government in political, economic, legal, cultural andeducational affairs.  The result is apolitical order open to cultural diversity, self-expression and autonomy.
Ethiopia's ethnic turn is a sharpbreak from African political practice. With rare exceptions such as Botswana and Somalia, vast culturaldiversity characterizes African states. African states are not built on nations of their own making.  Upon independence, African states inheritedpopulations capriciously contrived by colonial powers that arbitrarily joinedor divided cultural communities.  Thenewly independent states sought to preserve the uneasy national legacy of colonialism.  Amid heterogeneity, political rule tried tocreate and maintain unity in various ways. Some cobbled together coalitions whereby elites from diverse groupscould have a stake in a unitary polity. Others designed political arrangements blind to cultural differences andcleavages.  Another tack was to fosteroverarching identities---African or ideological---in order to overshadow orovercome internal differences over national and cultural identity.
Whatever the differences inapproach, the overriding aim almost everywhere in Africa was to refuse fullpolitical expression to cultural pluralism. Even on the rare occasion where national identity was an exercise inself-definition carried out through internal struggle and negotiation, therewas no disposition to cultivate or even to acknowledge diversity.  In the recent constitutional exercisesundertaken by South Africa and Uganda, the choice was in favor of a unitarystate.  The pursuit of political unity atthe expense of cultural plurality has been a leading objective of Africanstatecraft that enjoyed wide legitimacy: for example, ethnic parties were oftenprohibited by law; African states consistently complied with OAU's principle ofupholding colonial borders.
The inclination to ignore,conceal, subdue or erase cultural diversity in African politics has beensustained at considerable cost. Monopolistic political arrangements such as military government,one-party rule, systematic suppression of human and political rights are oftenrationalized as inescapable means of safeguarding unity.  Despite these draconian measures, ethnicdiversity has not been banished.  Bitterwars for secession were fought by Katanga, Biafra, Eritrea and SouthernSudan.  Though nothing approaches thegenocide perpetrated in Rwanda, ethnic turmoil exists in most parts of Africa.
Even when strife in Africacentered on other matters, it was seldom altogether free of ethniccontention.  Yet neither the threat ofpartition nor ubiquitous ethnic contest called into question African allegianceto a conception of statehood that excludes national or cultural pluralism fromthe definition of political identity. Thus as we enter the new millennium, a vision of political unity thatdisavows or devalues diversity survives intact throughout most of Africa.
What, then, prompted Ethiopia togo virtually alone against the prevailing current in the continent?  Ethiopia's anomalous new course is all themore surprising, for, unlike the rest of Africa, her heterogeneity of nationalities,cultural traditions, religions and languages is not a fortuitous outcome ofalien imposition.  Though Ethiopia'sautonomous development is no guarantee of the emergence of a national society,it is hard to overlook the society's resilience in the face of a long historyof internal warfare and foreign encroachment. Even outsiders, without evident partisanship, detect the contours of anintegral political community.
Admittedly the image ofEthiopians as a well-defined people conveyed in international scholarship issometimes merely a result of selective perception.  Much the most addressed part of Ethiopia isthe north, where literate cultures and salvationist religions have flourishedsince the distant past[2].  Accessibility to modern scholarship andcultural affinity rendered this terrain familiar to western observers.  Another area of focus, one driven by concernsof development, is the small, largely urban area where modern economic andpolitical institutions have gained a foothold. The impression of homogeneity gleaned from these perspectives does notreflect Ethiopian culture as a whole but rather the interests of othersocieties.
Still, those aspects of Ethiopiacaptured from culturally alien perspectives cannot be dismissed as merefragments, for they have played a crucial role in drawing the wider communitytogether.  For good or ill, northernculture is diffused throughout the entire country.  For instance, Amharic speakers can be foundalmost everywhere; the new Regional State of the Southern Peoples has adoptedAmharic as its working language.  Amongthe small but culturally influential urban population, identities that cutacross nationality, religion and language have, and are seen to have, salience.  The purview of both Amhara - Tigraycivilization and urban culture tends to define Ethiopia not just under westerneyes; it is an important dimension of Ethiopian self-perception.
Even those who extend their sightbeyond comparatively self-contained or integrative elements of the society inorder to take notice of the whole are impressed by the presence of abidingaffinities among Ethiopia's dispersed and diverse cultural communities.[3]  Strands of a common sense of communityinclude:  close and longstandingconnections of far-flung trade and migration; collective historical legacy;shared cultural beliefs, rituals, symbols and ideals; common systems of socialand political authority.  On account ofthese ties, a distinctive community encompassing all the peoples in Ethiopia'spresent territory has endured despite recurrent fragmentation.  The confluence of Ethiopia's variedidentities can also be seen in the ambitions of empire-builders ---from withinand without---who rarely settled for less than domination over what is nowEthiopia.
Though important, these indicationsof a shared sense of community show, at most, the possibility of politicalunity.  Societies like Somaliawell-endowed with traits conducive to national self-identification and cohesionhave floundered in the search for statehood. Similarly, a bitter lesson of Ethiopian history is that the potentialfor unity, however promising, cannot be realized without effectiveinstitutional means for its political expression.
It is a testimony both to theweight of Ethiopia's past and its political inconclusiveness that differencesover the present dispensation are fought as battles over historicalinterpretation.  Is Ethiopia threethousands years old or only one hundred? Have the Oromo and the Southern Peoples always been members of Ethiopiansociety or were they joined to Ethiopia through invasion and conquest in thenineteenth century?  Is Eritrea anamputated limb of Ethiopia or is it a distinct society with only a brief,forced marriage to Ethiopia during the federation and subsequent incorporation?
Some speak with self-confidenceof belonging to an Ethiopia with a robust national identity intricatelyinterwoven out of the country's constituent identities.  They claim that they cannot recognizethemselves in the new ethnically defined Ethiopia.  Others, however, speak with distance ofEthiopia as a community of which they were never willing members.  For them, the new political vision enablesthem to identify with Ethiopia for the first time.  The former feel that the present diminishesthe past, creating a void that cannot be filled.  The latter feel that the present redeemsinjustices of the past.  These clashingconceptions of Ethiopia are a subject of everyday contention because of awidespread conviction that the uncertainties surrounding the country'sself-identity are rooted in the past. While everyone agrees that Ethiopia houses a plurality of languages,religious and nationalities, disagreement rages over whether or not ethnicdifferentiation and inequality is so entrenched in Ethiopian history that itrequires recourse to a new political order.
Even indisputable collectiveaccomplishments of Ethiopian history do not yield a shared sense of pride.  Undoubtedly the most significant achievementof modern Ethiopia is independence, successfully defended against a successionof invaders --- the British, the Egyptians, the Sudanese Mahdists, and theItalians.  In this history of struggle, asingular triumph was in 1896 at the Battle of Adwa, where Ethiopia inflicted astunning defeat on Italy.  Inspirationalas it was to oppressed peoples and their champions everywhere, the Adwa victorymarks a peak in Ethiopia's international prestige.  Internally, too, Adwa was a watershed.  Peoples from the entire empire marched to thebattle:  unlike previous resistance toforeign aggression, Adwa was a national victory.  Adwa was also a formative moment in thecreation of Ethiopia as a modern nation-state. In the wake of the victory, Ethiopian sovereignty was recognized by theEuropean powers.  Yet, Adwa's legacy remainsambiguous.  Emboldened by his nationaland international prestige, Emperor Menlik II continued his expansion into thesouth and west, and consolidated his empire in the decade following Adwa.  As a result, many peoples of Ethiopia whofought valiantly at Adwa are ambivalent about the victory: they see themselvesas victims of their own triumph.  Here aselsewhere, Ethiopians seem to be at once exalted and anguished by their past.
It is not obvious that anyone isnow in a position to resolve the sharp differences separating these conceptionsof Ethiopia's past and the attitudes they yield toward the politicalpresent.  These incompatible myths aboutthe Ethiopian past do show that the new political order that gives pride ofplace to cultural diversity has not yet settled over the landscape.  Myths about the past are conjured up in orderto bolster or undermine the legitimacy of the new political vision.  This is not of course a surprise:  "The past has always been the handmaidof authority.”[4]These judgments of the present by reference to the past are useful in otherways --for example, to reach a prognosis of the new politics.  The traumas and upheavals that the countryhas suffered explain the rise of nationalist politics as well as the principlesand practices in which it now finds political expression.   A glimpse at the past also enables us totake a measure of the novelty of the present. For all their novelty, the present arrangements may well showremnants--desirable or undesirable --of the past.
Federalism
Remarkson Method
Even believers in an idealconception of society do not insist that federalism must be realized in everylegitimate polity.  Nor is federalismsupported by all ideal conceptions of constitutional democracy.  Federalism therefore differs from publicideals of universal reach. For instance, federalism is distinct from humanrights: unlike federalism, “their political (moral) force extends to allsocieties, and they are binding on all peoples and societies, including outlawstates.”[5] Violationof human rights justifies condemnation or even coercive intervention.  In contrast, rejection of federalism by aregime does not demonstrate imperfection, much less, wrongdoing in the regime.
Federalism is not, therefore, anecessary part of an ideal conception or theory of a democratic society; it israther an ideal for a society in unfavorable circumstances, circumstancesunfavorable to constitutional democracy. It might, of course, be argued that all political ideals answer tounfavorable conditions.  For example,human rights are honored because everyone always needs to avoid being killed,assaulted, deceived, used as a resource, or neglected in an emergency. The illsagainst which human rights afford protection represent evils to which all humanbeings are always vulnerable.  The vitaldifference is that federalism is a public value tailored to conditionsunfavorable to constitutional democracy that are not universal but ratherpeculiar to certain societies.  However,the distinction suggested between ideal and nonideal theory may be blurred byadopting a position taken by a few political theorists: namely, either thatthere are no positive political values or that the only practicable publicvalues are those that serve to ward off unfavorable features of men or theirenvironment.  Forging an intellectuallink among all societies on the basis of the exclusive importance of pervasiveunfavorable conditions would yield a minimalist political theory such aslibertarianism or what Judith Shklar calls the liberalism of fear.[6]Still, this view is not a direct challenge to the proposal to treat federalismunder nonideal theory, for the view does not amount to a denial of nonidealtheory but rather to an affirmation of its ubiquity.
If, however, we subscribe to theposition that social co-operation can aim beyond the avoidance of vice to theachievement of virtue, the distinction between ideal and nonideal theorysurvives.  Federalism can then be seen asa proper part of nonideal theory which, according to John Rawls, “deals withunfavorable conditions, that is, with the conditions of societies whosehistorical, social, and economic circumstances make their achieving awell-ordered regime, whether liberal or decent, difficult or impossible.”[7]Nonideal theory delimits the requirements of an account of society burdenedwith unfavorable conditions.  First, toidentify the conditions – poverty; divisions of power, culture or identity; anintolerant public culture – that tend to stand in the way of fidelity to thevalues and institutions of constitutional democracy.  Second, to determine the policies andpractices that mitigate, overcome or deploy to advantage unfavorable conditionsin the service of constitutional democracy. In the task of unburdening a society from unfavorable conditions,nonideal theory is guided by the aim of reaching or approximating idealtheory.  In Rawls’s words: “nonidealtheory asks how the ideal conception of society … might be achieved or at leastworked toward, generally in gradual steps; it looks for policies and courses ofaction that are likely to be effectiveand politically permissible for that purpose”[8](italics mine). Rawls’s remarks indicate a third demand of nonideal theory:starting from where the society is now, the search is for a passage todemocratic institutions by democratic means. Unless nonideal theory furnishes democratic means for surmountingbarriers to democracy it cannot reconcile us to unfavorable conditions.
To clarify the significance of the treatment of federalism under theaspect of nonideal theory, it may be helpful to contrast it with its morefamiliar alternative: to explain and justify federalism as an integral part ofan ideal conception of constitutional democracy. A few political philosophershave made serious attempts to find a theoretical underpinning for federalismand other public manifestations of diversity as a freestanding value or idealof constitutional democracy.
A notable example is CharlesTaylor’s influential essay on “The Politics of Recognition.”[9]Taylor identifies two forms of recognition that he deems important tocontemporary politics. The first is recognition of what human beingsimportantly share, and it yields “a politics of universalism, emphasizing theequal dignity of citizens, and the content of this politics has been theequalization of rights and entitlements.”[10] Thesecond is a recognition of what makes human beings culturally distinct ordifferent, and it yields a politics of particularism. “With the politics ofequal dignity, what is established is meant to be universally the same, anidentical basket of rights and immunities; with the politics of difference,what we are asked to recognize is the unique identity of this individual orgroup from everyone else.” [11]Taylor’s chief concern is with the second form of recognition, for he believesthat the first is dominant in contemporary political theory and practice, andthat it has tended to undermine the second by aspiring to distance or evenefface the culturally distinct from political life. Taylor argues that ourallegiance to recognition of our common humanity should not blind us to thefact that recognition of distinctness is a vital human need, though the urgencyof the need makes itself felt only after our release from social forms wherethe identity of individuals and groups had been preordained. 
Taylor’s thesis then is that tobe recognized in one’s cultural distinctness is a universal human interest.Multiculturalism and its institutional expressions such as federalism arereasonable realizations of a human interest for recognition of culturaldistinctness. Indeed, to avoid denigration and forcible assimilation,universalist recognition of individuals as worthy of equal concern and respectdemands public affirmation of their culturally particularist identities.
Now, it is not entirely clear whyTaylor singles out cultural and linguistic identity, as opposed to, say,religious identity as a dimension of distinctness that warrants recognition anddifferential treatment in public life. Taylor does not, of course, deny thatreligious distinctness finds recognition outside public life in freeassociations. Yet he does not explain what is special about the claim ofdistinctness by Quebeckers such that he can say that here “what was at stakewas the desire of these people for survival, and their consequent demand forcertain forms of autonomy in their self-government, as well as the ability toadopt certain kinds of legislation deemed necessary for survival.”[12]
Even if we allow that there arereasons for politically privileging cultural distinctness, it is not evidentthat recognition of a particular cultural identity is a categorical demand.Taylor’s bold idea that recognition of one’s distinct cultural identity mustmatter and always requires public affirmation is not altogether convincing. Itseems more plausible to say that cultural identity does not necessarily matter,but if in a given case it does, it must be recognized. But then the claim torecognition of distinctness is not a fundamental human interest on a par, say,with the interest to be treated with equal concern and respect. The importanceof securing recognition for one’s cultural identity therefore depends onhistorical circumstance.
Why does Taylor suppose thatrecognition of one’s cultural distinctness always matters? Taylor seems to beled to the conclusion that he has seized upon a vital human interest by a focuson recognition to the exclusion of its source. Even if cultural identityhappens to be important to a person or a group and so anchors a claim torecognition of it by others, it is not obvious that recognition by any othersis what is desired or desirable. Do French Quebeckers seek recognition of theirdistinct society by Zulus or Texans? Would Zulus or Texans have standing toextend or withdraw recognition from French Quebeckers? Indeed, if we acceptTaylor’s idea of the value of cultural difference and its recognition, it ispuzzling why the demand for recognition is not put forward across societies asoften as it is within societies. It is more plausible to think that recognitionof distinctness or difference by others matters only when the others are thosewith whom there are reasons to feel closely identified. Recognition becomessalient with differences among those who, for any number of reasons, otherwisefeel a sense of mutual identification. Whether or not there are such reasonshas less to do with fundamental human needs or interests than with thecontingencies of history.
Will Kymlicka is anotherpolitical theorist who is impressed by worldwide resurgence of entho-culturaldisputes and conflicts. He concedes that “every dispute has its own uniquehistory and circumstance that need to be taken into account in devising a fairand workable solution.”[13]Still, his “aim is to step back and present a more general view of thelandscape—to identify some key concepts and principles that need to be takeninto account, and so clarify the basic building blocks for a liberal approachto minority rights.”[14] Despitethe modesty of this characterization, Kymlicka has the ambitious aim to locatemulticultural citizenship, group-differentiated rights and federativearrangements in the very foundations of a liberal conception of an idealsociety. According to Kymlicka, aside from protecting the individual’s choicesfrom intervention by others and government, a basic value of liberalism is toenable a person’s freedom to form and revise a conception of a worthwhile life.He faults contemporary liberalism for overlooking the fact that meaningfulchoice and pursuit of a way of life requires secure membership in a particularculture. “Put simply, freedom involves making choices amongst various options,and our societal culture not only provides these options, but also makes themmeaningful to us.”[15] Andagain: “Liberals should be concerned with the fate of cultural structures, notbecause they have some moral status of their own, but because it is onlythrough having a rich and secure cultural structure that people can becomeaware, in a vivid way, of the options available to them, and intelligentlyexamine their value.”[16]
For Kymlicka, the importance ofsecure cultural membership is a perfectly general claim about liberalism. It isacknowledged in the classical liberal theories of Mill and Green, and in thepractice of established liberal democracies, where liberal rule relies on anational culture upheld by the state. Kymlicka firmly resists the suggestionthat cultural membership can be secured in free associations or throughdecentralized policies in language, education and land tenure. Culturalmembership is instead a primary good that must be supported by a liberalpolitical community, if the capacity to fashion and revise a conception of aworthy individual life is to be realized. The separation of state and religioncannot serve as a model for the relation between the state and ethnic orcultural identity. “The whole idea of ‘benign neglect’ is incoherent, andreflects a shallow understanding of the relationship between states andnations. In the areas of official languages, political boundaries, and thedivision of powers, there is no way to avoid supporting this or that societalculture, or deciding which group will form a majority in political units thatcontrol culture-affecting decisions regarding language, education, andimmigration.”[17]Every liberalism is necessarily a national liberalism. The only question is tofind a fair way to reconcile multinational societies to the inseparability ofthe state and the nation, required by the ideal conception of liberal society.A federative arrangement with group-differentiated rights of self-government isthe only way to guarantee equality of cultural membership for individuals in amultinational society. Benign neglect or separation of state and ethnicitywould only mask the dominance of the official culture over the rest, whosemembers would be deprived of a context for the effective choice of a meaningfullife.
Kymlicka’s attempt to justify multicultural citizenship, collectiverights, and federative institutions by appeal to primary values and principlesof liberalism yields curious consequences that he countenances all too lightly.One concerns the extent to which a liberal, multinational state toleratesilliberal groups. Suppose a self-governing national group restricts thecapacity of its members to lead lives of their own choice. Kymlicka allows thatthe federal state should try to change the illiberal national community. But,barring extreme cases—cases that would justify international intervention—hethinks legal intervention is impermissible. To assent to this strangeconclusion is to grant that the rationale for rights to self-government can befreely violated by those exercising self-government. Put differently, individualsare entitled to secure cultural membership in order to ensure their freedom tolead a life of their own choice, but nothing more than persuasion is possibleif cultural membership robs them of this essential freedom.  How can a multinational state legitimatelycount as liberal if member states can violate rights central to liberalism withimpunity? The sanctity of cultural membership as a primary good of liberalsociety seems, in the end, to override the value of freedom it was originallyintended to subserve.
This result is doubly disquieting. First, a liberalism founded on thevalue of individual autonomy is more permissive in respect to infringements ofindividual freedom than liberalisms that avoid protection of substantivevalues, including autonomy, in public life. For example, in Rawls’s politicalliberalism human rights define the bounds of pluralism. Secondly, tolerance ofilliberal cultures eliminates Kymlicka’s sole ground for advocating a marriageof culture and a liberal state while endorsing the separation of religion andthe state. The ground is that religion, not culture, involves shared values.Leaving aside the question whether this is a trivial truth about liberalcultures or an interesting but controversial claim about all cultures, Kymlickastill faces a problem. Since both impose a conception of the good, there is nojustification for being tolerant toward illiberal cultures and intoleranttoward illiberal religions.
There is another unwelcome consequence of the liberal defense of multiculturalcitizenship, which Kymlicka points out, that has wider implications than heanticipates. Kymlicka argues that a stable liberal polity requires a sense ofsolidarity:  “a shared civic identitythat can sustain the level of mutual concern, accommodation and sacrifice thatdemocracies require.”[18]Yet, Kymlicka fears that a liberal state with a plurality of politicalcommunities may not foster an inclusive sense of solidarity sufficient tosustain the commitments of liberal citizenship to justice and the common good.Indeed, Kymlicka’s skepticism about the possibility of solidarity in amultinational state inclines him to side with Mill, who, in Kymlicka’s view,held that fidelity to liberalism is possible only in a state with a singlenational culture. Assuming that non-coercive assimilation is difficult,Kymlicka is unsure why a liberal faced with a multinational society should notbe favorably disposed to secession in order to pave the way for nation-states,the only settings suited to stable liberal democracies. What checks Kymlicka’sliberal advocacy of secession is that natural circumstances are unfavorable tothe exercise of secession. Many national groups may not prove viable asindependent states. Secession often occasions violent conflict. There is notenough room in the world to create states to accommodate all nations. Even ifall this is true, it is noteworthy that it does not prohibit a given nationalgroup from seeking secession on liberal grounds. More importantly, Kymlicka’spessimism on the fate of solidarity in a multinational state shows that it isunfavorable circumstances for states with a single national culture, notintrinsic merit from an ideal liberal point of view, that compels multinationalliberal states.
Given that multinational states are, though not strictly desirable,unavoidable, Kymlicka feels that we must somehow search for sources ofsolidarity in multinational states adequate to liberal democratic citizenship.Kymlicka considers shared public values, which he finds insufficient sincepeoples may go their own way despite such agreement. At any rate, as we sawearlier, there is no reason to expect adherence to the same principles orvalues in Kymlicka’s conception of the liberal multinational state. A morepromising basis is a commitment to what, following Taylor, he calls ‘deepdiversity.’ Roughly, this is to appreciate and prize that there are variedgrounds for allegiance to the wider political community in a multinationalstate. Even this he urges may be too thin unless it is coupled with somethingelse he deems most important. “For citizens to want to keep a multinationalstate together, therefore, they must value, not just ‘deep diversity’ ingeneral, but also the particular ethnic groups and national cultures with whomthey currently share the country.”[19]
This is an arresting conclusion: it is a clear admission that nationalidentity may be based on something other than a distinct cultural identity.Pride in historical achievements is a an example that Kymlicka offers of ashared national identity that does not draw on membership in a particularculture. Since Kymlicka insists it is Mill’s belief that a single nationalculture is a requirement of a liberal state, it is worth noting that Millhimself holds that a shared past is a powerful source of a sense ofnationality. He writes:
A portion of mankind may be said to constitute aNationality if they are united among themselves by common sympathies—which makethem cooperate with each other more willingly than with other people, desire tobe under the same government, and desire that it should be government bythemselves, or a portion of themselves, exclusively. This feeling ofnationality may have been generated by various causes. Sometimes it is theeffect of identity of race and descent. Community of language, community ofreligion greatly contribute to it. Geographical limits are one of its causes.But the strongest of all is identity of political antecedents, the possessionof national history, and consequent community of recollections; collectivepride and humiliation, pleasure and regret, connected with the same events inthe past.[20]

What Mill singles out as the strongest source of nationalidentity—collective pride and humiliation in a shared past—may, for all we know,account for a sense of community even in culturally homogeneous societies.  In any case, there is little reason to acceptthe thesis that a liberal political community is necessarily rooted in culture,the thesis on which Kymlicka, in part, mounts his case for a multinationalliberal state. There is also reason to doubt the claim that a distinct cultureis the only context for making choices about what life to lead. A shared pastand the sense of identity it engenders may enable a Swiss or a Canadian to lookinto options for a worthwhile life in the wider community beyond the particularculture to which the citizen belongs.
This brief discussion indicates that the search for an invariant,particularst value of constitutional democracy to anchor a generaljustification of multicultural politics and federative arrangements is vain.For example, the candidates put forward for an invariant value or ideal cannotpossibly account for the existence, importance or persistence of a federalstate in the United States and Germany, where cultural distinctness or securecultural membership does not loom large in federal politics. Moreover, theeffort to define collective rights or federal distribution of powers byreference to an invariant value—a task undertaken more by Kymlicka thanTaylor—tends to inhibit or distort abiding values of constitutional democracy.None of this is, of course, to deny the importance of the questions Taylor andKymlicka formulate and the problems they probe. Rather, the difficulties and limitationsin their answers and solutions attest to the limits of a particularist ideal orphilosophical theory in coming to terms with a particularist phenomenon such asfederalism.  Multiculturalism andfederalism enter the political agenda only under peculiar circumstancesunfavorable to familiar universal ideals of democracy. The unfavorableconditions as well as the democratic norms that answer to them varysignificantly. The focus of nonideal theory is on the actual unfavorablecircumstances and the specific ways in which they are reconciled to thestanding values of constitutional democracy. Since the unfavorable conditionsand the terms of reconciliation are diverse, a deeper understanding invites acomparative assessment of different federal arrangements. Under nonidealtheory, federalism thus seems a subject more fit for social science than forideal or philosophical theory. The reason is that multiculturalism,multinationalism, and federalism do not call for a new value or theory ofconstitutional democracy; instead, they necessitate a nuanced institutionalrealization of universal ideals of constitutional democracy. 
An application of the method ofnonideal theory to federalism circumscribes the scope of an adequateinterpretation of federalism.  First, theperspective guides and shapes the selection of conditions unfavorable todemocratic rule that call for federalist policies and practices.  Second, it requires us to show how theprinciples and structures of federalism promote democratic ideals by checkingand exploiting unfavorable circumstances. The defense of federalism is persuasive to the extent that it comes toterms with the unfavorable conditions that prompted it in ways that enhance or,at least, do not compromise democratic ideals of universal reach.
This understanding of theinterpretation of federalism from the perspective of nonideal theory leaveswide room for disagreement.  A site ofdebate over federalism since its inception are differences over what values itserves and how well it serves them.  Onearea of contention is how best to strike a balance between the claims of unityand the claims of diversity.  A formativeexample is the constitutional debate in the United States between federalists(inclusive nationalists) and anti-federalists (exclusive or localnationalists).[21] Another source ofdisagreement is whether federalism is a source of collective rights or merelyan effective protection of individual rights in a pluralist society.   An example is the debate over the status ofthe American bill of rights before and after the reconstruction.[22]Finally, there is a question kept alive by failed or troubled federalisms: Doesfederalism entrench or attenuate the nonfavorable conditions that occasion it?[23]This question arises not only where democratic aspirations have beendisappointed but also where they have been reasonably fulfilled.





Federalism: New Frontiers in Ethiopian Politics

ANDEREAS ESHETE[1]
(andreaseshete@yahoo.com)

EthiopianJournal of Federal Studies, Vol. 1., No. 1, May 2013

“…it is of great importance in the republicnot only to guard the society against the oppression of its rulers, but toguard one part of the society against the injustice of the other part.”
                                                               -JamesMadison
“Where is an example of ‘Federalism’ everhaving been a preconceived plan? Who carts around Federalism as an a priori panacea?  Federalism has always appeared in any factualsituation as a response to an existing division of power within a territorythat comes together, or is thrust together, in one State.”
                                                               -BernardCrick

 

Introduction

A newpolitical vision now guides Ethiopia. The vision is a departure from prevalent African politicalpractice.  In Ethiopia, too, the newpolitics - its source, spirit and style - seems unfamiliar to many.
Since 1991, Ethiopia has embarkedupon a bold experiment in the conduct of public life.  The hallmark of the experiment is a readinessto face the fact of ethnic diversity. New political arrangements aim to shape Ethiopian political identityaround the country's constituent nations and nationalities.  Even in this era of the politics of identity,Ethiopia's resolve to extend full public recognition to her varied national communitiesis unique. Ethiopia's recognition of Eritrea's right to self-determination isalso unprecedented. Following a referendum on independence held in 1993,Eritrea went her own way.  Theestablishment of a sovereign Eritrean homeland marks the first birth of anAfrican nation through secession. Within Ethiopia, the commitment to uphold theright to self-determination is equally striking.  The right to secession is now aconstitutional entitlement. All cultural communities are entitled to fairrepresentation in the institutions of state and federal government.  Territorially based nationalities exercisewide powers of self-government in political, economic, legal, cultural andeducational affairs.  The result is apolitical order open to cultural diversity, self-expression and autonomy.
Ethiopia's ethnic turn is a sharpbreak from African political practice. With rare exceptions such as Botswana and Somalia, vast culturaldiversity characterizes African states. African states are not built on nations of their own making.  Upon independence, African states inheritedpopulations capriciously contrived by colonial powers that arbitrarily joinedor divided cultural communities.  Thenewly independent states sought to preserve the uneasy national legacy of colonialism.  Amid heterogeneity, political rule tried tocreate and maintain unity in various ways. Some cobbled together coalitions whereby elites from diverse groupscould have a stake in a unitary polity. Others designed political arrangements blind to cultural differences andcleavages.  Another tack was to fosteroverarching identities---African or ideological---in order to overshadow orovercome internal differences over national and cultural identity.
Whatever the differences inapproach, the overriding aim almost everywhere in Africa was to refuse fullpolitical expression to cultural pluralism. Even on the rare occasion where national identity was an exercise inself-definition carried out through internal struggle and negotiation, therewas no disposition to cultivate or even to acknowledge diversity.  In the recent constitutional exercisesundertaken by South Africa and Uganda, the choice was in favor of a unitarystate.  The pursuit of political unity atthe expense of cultural plurality has been a leading objective of Africanstatecraft that enjoyed wide legitimacy: for example, ethnic parties were oftenprohibited by law; African states consistently complied with OAU's principle ofupholding colonial borders.
The inclination to ignore,conceal, subdue or erase cultural diversity in African politics has beensustained at considerable cost. Monopolistic political arrangements such as military government,one-party rule, systematic suppression of human and political rights are oftenrationalized as inescapable means of safeguarding unity.  Despite these draconian measures, ethnicdiversity has not been banished.  Bitterwars for secession were fought by Katanga, Biafra, Eritrea and SouthernSudan.  Though nothing approaches thegenocide perpetrated in Rwanda, ethnic turmoil exists in most parts of Africa.
Even when strife in Africacentered on other matters, it was seldom altogether free of ethniccontention.  Yet neither the threat ofpartition nor ubiquitous ethnic contest called into question African allegianceto a conception of statehood that excludes national or cultural pluralism fromthe definition of political identity. Thus as we enter the new millennium, a vision of political unity thatdisavows or devalues diversity survives intact throughout most of Africa.
What, then, prompted Ethiopia togo virtually alone against the prevailing current in the continent?  Ethiopia's anomalous new course is all themore surprising, for, unlike the rest of Africa, her heterogeneity of nationalities,cultural traditions, religions and languages is not a fortuitous outcome ofalien imposition.  Though Ethiopia'sautonomous development is no guarantee of the emergence of a national society,it is hard to overlook the society's resilience in the face of a long historyof internal warfare and foreign encroachment. Even outsiders, without evident partisanship, detect the contours of anintegral political community.
Admittedly the image ofEthiopians as a well-defined people conveyed in international scholarship issometimes merely a result of selective perception.  Much the most addressed part of Ethiopia isthe north, where literate cultures and salvationist religions have flourishedsince the distant past[2].  Accessibility to modern scholarship andcultural affinity rendered this terrain familiar to western observers.  Another area of focus, one driven by concernsof development, is the small, largely urban area where modern economic andpolitical institutions have gained a foothold. The impression of homogeneity gleaned from these perspectives does notreflect Ethiopian culture as a whole but rather the interests of othersocieties.
Still, those aspects of Ethiopiacaptured from culturally alien perspectives cannot be dismissed as merefragments, for they have played a crucial role in drawing the wider communitytogether.  For good or ill, northernculture is diffused throughout the entire country.  For instance, Amharic speakers can be foundalmost everywhere; the new Regional State of the Southern Peoples has adoptedAmharic as its working language.  Amongthe small but culturally influential urban population, identities that cutacross nationality, religion and language have, and are seen to have, salience.  The purview of both Amhara - Tigraycivilization and urban culture tends to define Ethiopia not just under westerneyes; it is an important dimension of Ethiopian self-perception.
Even those who extend their sightbeyond comparatively self-contained or integrative elements of the society inorder to take notice of the whole are impressed by the presence of abidingaffinities among Ethiopia's dispersed and diverse cultural communities.[3]  Strands of a common sense of communityinclude:  close and longstandingconnections of far-flung trade and migration; collective historical legacy;shared cultural beliefs, rituals, symbols and ideals; common systems of socialand political authority.  On account ofthese ties, a distinctive community encompassing all the peoples in Ethiopia'spresent territory has endured despite recurrent fragmentation.  The confluence of Ethiopia's variedidentities can also be seen in the ambitions of empire-builders ---from withinand without---who rarely settled for less than domination over what is nowEthiopia.
Though important, these indicationsof a shared sense of community show, at most, the possibility of politicalunity.  Societies like Somaliawell-endowed with traits conducive to national self-identification and cohesionhave floundered in the search for statehood. Similarly, a bitter lesson of Ethiopian history is that the potentialfor unity, however promising, cannot be realized without effectiveinstitutional means for its political expression.
It is a testimony both to theweight of Ethiopia's past and its political inconclusiveness that differencesover the present dispensation are fought as battles over historicalinterpretation.  Is Ethiopia threethousands years old or only one hundred? Have the Oromo and the Southern Peoples always been members of Ethiopiansociety or were they joined to Ethiopia through invasion and conquest in thenineteenth century?  Is Eritrea anamputated limb of Ethiopia or is it a distinct society with only a brief,forced marriage to Ethiopia during the federation and subsequent incorporation?
Some speak with self-confidenceof belonging to an Ethiopia with a robust national identity intricatelyinterwoven out of the country's constituent identities.  They claim that they cannot recognizethemselves in the new ethnically defined Ethiopia.  Others, however, speak with distance ofEthiopia as a community of which they were never willing members.  For them, the new political vision enablesthem to identify with Ethiopia for the first time.  The former feel that the present diminishesthe past, creating a void that cannot be filled.  The latter feel that the present redeemsinjustices of the past.  These clashingconceptions of Ethiopia are a subject of everyday contention because of awidespread conviction that the uncertainties surrounding the country'sself-identity are rooted in the past. While everyone agrees that Ethiopia houses a plurality of languages,religious and nationalities, disagreement rages over whether or not ethnicdifferentiation and inequality is so entrenched in Ethiopian history that itrequires recourse to a new political order.
Even indisputable collectiveaccomplishments of Ethiopian history do not yield a shared sense of pride.  Undoubtedly the most significant achievementof modern Ethiopia is independence, successfully defended against a successionof invaders --- the British, the Egyptians, the Sudanese Mahdists, and theItalians.  In this history of struggle, asingular triumph was in 1896 at the Battle of Adwa, where Ethiopia inflicted astunning defeat on Italy.  Inspirationalas it was to oppressed peoples and their champions everywhere, the Adwa victorymarks a peak in Ethiopia's international prestige.  Internally, too, Adwa was a watershed.  Peoples from the entire empire marched to thebattle:  unlike previous resistance toforeign aggression, Adwa was a national victory.  Adwa was also a formative moment in thecreation of Ethiopia as a modern nation-state. In the wake of the victory, Ethiopian sovereignty was recognized by theEuropean powers.  Yet, Adwa's legacy remainsambiguous.  Emboldened by his nationaland international prestige, Emperor Menlik II continued his expansion into thesouth and west, and consolidated his empire in the decade following Adwa.  As a result, many peoples of Ethiopia whofought valiantly at Adwa are ambivalent about the victory: they see themselvesas victims of their own triumph.  Here aselsewhere, Ethiopians seem to be at once exalted and anguished by their past.
It is not obvious that anyone isnow in a position to resolve the sharp differences separating these conceptionsof Ethiopia's past and the attitudes they yield toward the politicalpresent.  These incompatible myths aboutthe Ethiopian past do show that the new political order that gives pride ofplace to cultural diversity has not yet settled over the landscape.  Myths about the past are conjured up in orderto bolster or undermine the legitimacy of the new political vision.  This is not of course a surprise:  "The past has always been the handmaidof authority.”[4]These judgments of the present by reference to the past are useful in otherways --for example, to reach a prognosis of the new politics.  The traumas and upheavals that the countryhas suffered explain the rise of nationalist politics as well as the principlesand practices in which it now finds political expression.   A glimpse at the past also enables us totake a measure of the novelty of the present. For all their novelty, the present arrangements may well showremnants--desirable or undesirable --of the past.
Federalism
Remarkson Method
Even believers in an idealconception of society do not insist that federalism must be realized in everylegitimate polity.  Nor is federalismsupported by all ideal conceptions of constitutional democracy.  Federalism therefore differs from publicideals of universal reach. For instance, federalism is distinct from humanrights: unlike federalism, “their political (moral) force extends to allsocieties, and they are binding on all peoples and societies, including outlawstates.”[5] Violationof human rights justifies condemnation or even coercive intervention.  In contrast, rejection of federalism by aregime does not demonstrate imperfection, much less, wrongdoing in the regime.
Federalism is not, therefore, anecessary part of an ideal conception or theory of a democratic society; it israther an ideal for a society in unfavorable circumstances, circumstancesunfavorable to constitutional democracy. It might, of course, be argued that all political ideals answer tounfavorable conditions.  For example,human rights are honored because everyone always needs to avoid being killed,assaulted, deceived, used as a resource, or neglected in an emergency. The illsagainst which human rights afford protection represent evils to which all humanbeings are always vulnerable.  The vitaldifference is that federalism is a public value tailored to conditionsunfavorable to constitutional democracy that are not universal but ratherpeculiar to certain societies.  However,the distinction suggested between ideal and nonideal theory may be blurred byadopting a position taken by a few political theorists: namely, either thatthere are no positive political values or that the only practicable publicvalues are those that serve to ward off unfavorable features of men or theirenvironment.  Forging an intellectuallink among all societies on the basis of the exclusive importance of pervasiveunfavorable conditions would yield a minimalist political theory such aslibertarianism or what Judith Shklar calls the liberalism of fear.[6]Still, this view is not a direct challenge to the proposal to treat federalismunder nonideal theory, for the view does not amount to a denial of nonidealtheory but rather to an affirmation of its ubiquity.
If, however, we subscribe to theposition that social co-operation can aim beyond the avoidance of vice to theachievement of virtue, the distinction between ideal and nonideal theorysurvives.  Federalism can then be seen asa proper part of nonideal theory which, according to John Rawls, “deals withunfavorable conditions, that is, with the conditions of societies whosehistorical, social, and economic circumstances make their achieving awell-ordered regime, whether liberal or decent, difficult or impossible.”[7]Nonideal theory delimits the requirements of an account of society burdenedwith unfavorable conditions.  First, toidentify the conditions – poverty; divisions of power, culture or identity; anintolerant public culture – that tend to stand in the way of fidelity to thevalues and institutions of constitutional democracy.  Second, to determine the policies andpractices that mitigate, overcome or deploy to advantage unfavorable conditionsin the service of constitutional democracy. In the task of unburdening a society from unfavorable conditions,nonideal theory is guided by the aim of reaching or approximating idealtheory.  In Rawls’s words: “nonidealtheory asks how the ideal conception of society … might be achieved or at leastworked toward, generally in gradual steps; it looks for policies and courses ofaction that are likely to be effectiveand politically permissible for that purpose”[8](italics mine). Rawls’s remarks indicate a third demand of nonideal theory:starting from where the society is now, the search is for a passage todemocratic institutions by democratic means. Unless nonideal theory furnishes democratic means for surmountingbarriers to democracy it cannot reconcile us to unfavorable conditions.
To clarify the significance of the treatment of federalism under theaspect of nonideal theory, it may be helpful to contrast it with its morefamiliar alternative: to explain and justify federalism as an integral part ofan ideal conception of constitutional democracy. A few political philosophershave made serious attempts to find a theoretical underpinning for federalismand other public manifestations of diversity as a freestanding value or idealof constitutional democracy.
A notable example is CharlesTaylor’s influential essay on “The Politics of Recognition.”[9]Taylor identifies two forms of recognition that he deems important tocontemporary politics. The first is recognition of what human beingsimportantly share, and it yields “a politics of universalism, emphasizing theequal dignity of citizens, and the content of this politics has been theequalization of rights and entitlements.”[10] Thesecond is a recognition of what makes human beings culturally distinct ordifferent, and it yields a politics of particularism. “With the politics ofequal dignity, what is established is meant to be universally the same, anidentical basket of rights and immunities; with the politics of difference,what we are asked to recognize is the unique identity of this individual orgroup from everyone else.” [11]Taylor’s chief concern is with the second form of recognition, for he believesthat the first is dominant in contemporary political theory and practice, andthat it has tended to undermine the second by aspiring to distance or evenefface the culturally distinct from political life. Taylor argues that ourallegiance to recognition of our common humanity should not blind us to thefact that recognition of distinctness is a vital human need, though the urgencyof the need makes itself felt only after our release from social forms wherethe identity of individuals and groups had been preordained. 
Taylor’s thesis then is that tobe recognized in one’s cultural distinctness is a universal human interest.Multiculturalism and its institutional expressions such as federalism arereasonable realizations of a human interest for recognition of culturaldistinctness. Indeed, to avoid denigration and forcible assimilation,universalist recognition of individuals as worthy of equal concern and respectdemands public affirmation of their culturally particularist identities.
Now, it is not entirely clear whyTaylor singles out cultural and linguistic identity, as opposed to, say,religious identity as a dimension of distinctness that warrants recognition anddifferential treatment in public life. Taylor does not, of course, deny thatreligious distinctness finds recognition outside public life in freeassociations. Yet he does not explain what is special about the claim ofdistinctness by Quebeckers such that he can say that here “what was at stakewas the desire of these people for survival, and their consequent demand forcertain forms of autonomy in their self-government, as well as the ability toadopt certain kinds of legislation deemed necessary for survival.”[12]
Even if we allow that there arereasons for politically privileging cultural distinctness, it is not evidentthat recognition of a particular cultural identity is a categorical demand.Taylor’s bold idea that recognition of one’s distinct cultural identity mustmatter and always requires public affirmation is not altogether convincing. Itseems more plausible to say that cultural identity does not necessarily matter,but if in a given case it does, it must be recognized. But then the claim torecognition of distinctness is not a fundamental human interest on a par, say,with the interest to be treated with equal concern and respect. The importanceof securing recognition for one’s cultural identity therefore depends onhistorical circumstance.
Why does Taylor suppose thatrecognition of one’s cultural distinctness always matters? Taylor seems to beled to the conclusion that he has seized upon a vital human interest by a focuson recognition to the exclusion of its source. Even if cultural identityhappens to be important to a person or a group and so anchors a claim torecognition of it by others, it is not obvious that recognition by any othersis what is desired or desirable. Do French Quebeckers seek recognition of theirdistinct society by Zulus or Texans? Would Zulus or Texans have standing toextend or withdraw recognition from French Quebeckers? Indeed, if we acceptTaylor’s idea of the value of cultural difference and its recognition, it ispuzzling why the demand for recognition is not put forward across societies asoften as it is within societies. It is more plausible to think that recognitionof distinctness or difference by others matters only when the others are thosewith whom there are reasons to feel closely identified. Recognition becomessalient with differences among those who, for any number of reasons, otherwisefeel a sense of mutual identification. Whether or not there are such reasonshas less to do with fundamental human needs or interests than with thecontingencies of history.
Will Kymlicka is anotherpolitical theorist who is impressed by worldwide resurgence of entho-culturaldisputes and conflicts. He concedes that “every dispute has its own uniquehistory and circumstance that need to be taken into account in devising a fairand workable solution.”[13]Still, his “aim is to step back and present a more general view of thelandscape—to identify some key concepts and principles that need to be takeninto account, and so clarify the basic building blocks for a liberal approachto minority rights.”[14] Despitethe modesty of this characterization, Kymlicka has the ambitious aim to locatemulticultural citizenship, group-differentiated rights and federativearrangements in the very foundations of a liberal conception of an idealsociety. According to Kymlicka, aside from protecting the individual’s choicesfrom intervention by others and government, a basic value of liberalism is toenable a person’s freedom to form and revise a conception of a worthwhile life.He faults contemporary liberalism for overlooking the fact that meaningfulchoice and pursuit of a way of life requires secure membership in a particularculture. “Put simply, freedom involves making choices amongst various options,and our societal culture not only provides these options, but also makes themmeaningful to us.”[15] Andagain: “Liberals should be concerned with the fate of cultural structures, notbecause they have some moral status of their own, but because it is onlythrough having a rich and secure cultural structure that people can becomeaware, in a vivid way, of the options available to them, and intelligentlyexamine their value.”[16]
For Kymlicka, the importance ofsecure cultural membership is a perfectly general claim about liberalism. It isacknowledged in the classical liberal theories of Mill and Green, and in thepractice of established liberal democracies, where liberal rule relies on anational culture upheld by the state. Kymlicka firmly resists the suggestionthat cultural membership can be secured in free associations or throughdecentralized policies in language, education and land tenure. Culturalmembership is instead a primary good that must be supported by a liberalpolitical community, if the capacity to fashion and revise a conception of aworthy individual life is to be realized. The separation of state and religioncannot serve as a model for the relation between the state and ethnic orcultural identity. “The whole idea of ‘benign neglect’ is incoherent, andreflects a shallow understanding of the relationship between states andnations. In the areas of official languages, political boundaries, and thedivision of powers, there is no way to avoid supporting this or that societalculture, or deciding which group will form a majority in political units thatcontrol culture-affecting decisions regarding language, education, andimmigration.”[17]Every liberalism is necessarily a national liberalism. The only question is tofind a fair way to reconcile multinational societies to the inseparability ofthe state and the nation, required by the ideal conception of liberal society.A federative arrangement with group-differentiated rights of self-government isthe only way to guarantee equality of cultural membership for individuals in amultinational society. Benign neglect or separation of state and ethnicitywould only mask the dominance of the official culture over the rest, whosemembers would be deprived of a context for the effective choice of a meaningfullife.
Kymlicka’s attempt to justify multicultural citizenship, collectiverights, and federative institutions by appeal to primary values and principlesof liberalism yields curious consequences that he countenances all too lightly.One concerns the extent to which a liberal, multinational state toleratesilliberal groups. Suppose a self-governing national group restricts thecapacity of its members to lead lives of their own choice. Kymlicka allows thatthe federal state should try to change the illiberal national community. But,barring extreme cases—cases that would justify international intervention—hethinks legal intervention is impermissible. To assent to this strangeconclusion is to grant that the rationale for rights to self-government can befreely violated by those exercising self-government. Put differently, individualsare entitled to secure cultural membership in order to ensure their freedom tolead a life of their own choice, but nothing more than persuasion is possibleif cultural membership robs them of this essential freedom.  How can a multinational state legitimatelycount as liberal if member states can violate rights central to liberalism withimpunity? The sanctity of cultural membership as a primary good of liberalsociety seems, in the end, to override the value of freedom it was originallyintended to subserve.
This result is doubly disquieting. First, a liberalism founded on thevalue of individual autonomy is more permissive in respect to infringements ofindividual freedom than liberalisms that avoid protection of substantivevalues, including autonomy, in public life. For example, in Rawls’s politicalliberalism human rights define the bounds of pluralism. Secondly, tolerance ofilliberal cultures eliminates Kymlicka’s sole ground for advocating a marriageof culture and a liberal state while endorsing the separation of religion andthe state. The ground is that religion, not culture, involves shared values.Leaving aside the question whether this is a trivial truth about liberalcultures or an interesting but controversial claim about all cultures, Kymlickastill faces a problem. Since both impose a conception of the good, there is nojustification for being tolerant toward illiberal cultures and intoleranttoward illiberal religions.
There is another unwelcome consequence of the liberal defense of multiculturalcitizenship, which Kymlicka points out, that has wider implications than heanticipates. Kymlicka argues that a stable liberal polity requires a sense ofsolidarity:  “a shared civic identitythat can sustain the level of mutual concern, accommodation and sacrifice thatdemocracies require.”[18]Yet, Kymlicka fears that a liberal state with a plurality of politicalcommunities may not foster an inclusive sense of solidarity sufficient tosustain the commitments of liberal citizenship to justice and the common good.Indeed, Kymlicka’s skepticism about the possibility of solidarity in amultinational state inclines him to side with Mill, who, in Kymlicka’s view,held that fidelity to liberalism is possible only in a state with a singlenational culture. Assuming that non-coercive assimilation is difficult,Kymlicka is unsure why a liberal faced with a multinational society should notbe favorably disposed to secession in order to pave the way for nation-states,the only settings suited to stable liberal democracies. What checks Kymlicka’sliberal advocacy of secession is that natural circumstances are unfavorable tothe exercise of secession. Many national groups may not prove viable asindependent states. Secession often occasions violent conflict. There is notenough room in the world to create states to accommodate all nations. Even ifall this is true, it is noteworthy that it does not prohibit a given nationalgroup from seeking secession on liberal grounds. More importantly, Kymlicka’spessimism on the fate of solidarity in a multinational state shows that it isunfavorable circumstances for states with a single national culture, notintrinsic merit from an ideal liberal point of view, that compels multinationalliberal states.
Given that multinational states are, though not strictly desirable,unavoidable, Kymlicka feels that we must somehow search for sources ofsolidarity in multinational states adequate to liberal democratic citizenship.Kymlicka considers shared public values, which he finds insufficient sincepeoples may go their own way despite such agreement. At any rate, as we sawearlier, there is no reason to expect adherence to the same principles orvalues in Kymlicka’s conception of the liberal multinational state. A morepromising basis is a commitment to what, following Taylor, he calls ‘deepdiversity.’ Roughly, this is to appreciate and prize that there are variedgrounds for allegiance to the wider political community in a multinationalstate. Even this he urges may be too thin unless it is coupled with somethingelse he deems most important. “For citizens to want to keep a multinationalstate together, therefore, they must value, not just ‘deep diversity’ ingeneral, but also the particular ethnic groups and national cultures with whomthey currently share the country.”[19]
This is an arresting conclusion: it is a clear admission that nationalidentity may be based on something other than a distinct cultural identity.Pride in historical achievements is a an example that Kymlicka offers of ashared national identity that does not draw on membership in a particularculture. Since Kymlicka insists it is Mill’s belief that a single nationalculture is a requirement of a liberal state, it is worth noting that Millhimself holds that a shared past is a powerful source of a sense ofnationality. He writes:
A portion of mankind may be said to constitute aNationality if they are united among themselves by common sympathies—which makethem cooperate with each other more willingly than with other people, desire tobe under the same government, and desire that it should be government bythemselves, or a portion of themselves, exclusively. This feeling ofnationality may have been generated by various causes. Sometimes it is theeffect of identity of race and descent. Community of language, community ofreligion greatly contribute to it. Geographical limits are one of its causes.But the strongest of all is identity of political antecedents, the possessionof national history, and consequent community of recollections; collectivepride and humiliation, pleasure and regret, connected with the same events inthe past.[20]

What Mill singles out as the strongest source of nationalidentity—collective pride and humiliation in a shared past—may, for all we know,account for a sense of community even in culturally homogeneous societies.  In any case, there is little reason to acceptthe thesis that a liberal political community is necessarily rooted in culture,the thesis on which Kymlicka, in part, mounts his case for a multinationalliberal state. There is also reason to doubt the claim that a distinct cultureis the only context for making choices about what life to lead. A shared pastand the sense of identity it engenders may enable a Swiss or a Canadian to lookinto options for a worthwhile life in the wider community beyond the particularculture to which the citizen belongs.
This brief discussion indicates that the search for an invariant,particularst value of constitutional democracy to anchor a generaljustification of multicultural politics and federative arrangements is vain.For example, the candidates put forward for an invariant value or ideal cannotpossibly account for the existence, importance or persistence of a federalstate in the United States and Germany, where cultural distinctness or securecultural membership does not loom large in federal politics. Moreover, theeffort to define collective rights or federal distribution of powers byreference to an invariant value—a task undertaken more by Kymlicka thanTaylor—tends to inhibit or distort abiding values of constitutional democracy.None of this is, of course, to deny the importance of the questions Taylor andKymlicka formulate and the problems they probe. Rather, the difficulties and limitationsin their answers and solutions attest to the limits of a particularist ideal orphilosophical theory in coming to terms with a particularist phenomenon such asfederalism.  Multiculturalism andfederalism enter the political agenda only under peculiar circumstancesunfavorable to familiar universal ideals of democracy. The unfavorableconditions as well as the democratic norms that answer to them varysignificantly. The focus of nonideal theory is on the actual unfavorablecircumstances and the specific ways in which they are reconciled to thestanding values of constitutional democracy. Since the unfavorable conditionsand the terms of reconciliation are diverse, a deeper understanding invites acomparative assessment of different federal arrangements. Under nonidealtheory, federalism thus seems a subject more fit for social science than forideal or philosophical theory. The reason is that multiculturalism,multinationalism, and federalism do not call for a new value or theory ofconstitutional democracy; instead, they necessitate a nuanced institutionalrealization of universal ideals of constitutional democracy. 
An application of the method ofnonideal theory to federalism circumscribes the scope of an adequateinterpretation of federalism.  First, theperspective guides and shapes the selection of conditions unfavorable todemocratic rule that call for federalist policies and practices.  Second, it requires us to show how theprinciples and structures of federalism promote democratic ideals by checkingand exploiting unfavorable circumstances. The defense of federalism is persuasive to the extent that it comes toterms with the unfavorable conditions that prompted it in ways that enhance or,at least, do not compromise democratic ideals of universal reach.
This understanding of theinterpretation of federalism from the perspective of nonideal theory leaveswide room for disagreement.  A site ofdebate over federalism since its inception are differences over what values itserves and how well it serves them.  Onearea of contention is how best to strike a balance between the claims of unityand the claims of diversity.  A formativeexample is the constitutional debate in the United States between federalists(inclusive nationalists) and anti-federalists (exclusive or localnationalists).[21] Another source ofdisagreement is whether federalism is a source of collective rights or merelyan effective protection of individual rights in a pluralist society.   An example is the debate over the status ofthe American bill of rights before and after the reconstruction.[22]Finally, there is a question kept alive by failed or troubled federalisms: Doesfederalism entrench or attenuate the nonfavorable conditions that occasion it?[23]This question arises not only where democratic aspirations have beendisappointed but also where they have been reasonably fulfilled.





Federalism: New Frontiers in Ethiopian Politics

ANDEREAS ESHETE[1]
(andreaseshete@yahoo.com)

EthiopianJournal of Federal Studies, Vol. 1., No. 1, May 2013

“…it is of great importance in the republicnot only to guard the society against the oppression of its rulers, but toguard one part of the society against the injustice of the other part.”
                                                               -JamesMadison
“Where is an example of ‘Federalism’ everhaving been a preconceived plan? Who carts around Federalism as an a priori panacea?  Federalism has always appeared in any factualsituation as a response to an existing division of power within a territorythat comes together, or is thrust together, in one State.”
                                                               -BernardCrick

 

Introduction

A newpolitical vision now guides Ethiopia. The vision is a departure from prevalent African politicalpractice.  In Ethiopia, too, the newpolitics - its source, spirit and style - seems unfamiliar to many.
Since 1991, Ethiopia has embarkedupon a bold experiment in the conduct of public life.  The hallmark of the experiment is a readinessto face the fact of ethnic diversity. New political arrangements aim to shape Ethiopian political identityaround the country's constituent nations and nationalities.  Even in this era of the politics of identity,Ethiopia's resolve to extend full public recognition to her varied national communitiesis unique. Ethiopia's recognition of Eritrea's right to self-determination isalso unprecedented. Following a referendum on independence held in 1993,Eritrea went her own way.  Theestablishment of a sovereign Eritrean homeland marks the first birth of anAfrican nation through secession. Within Ethiopia, the commitment to uphold theright to self-determination is equally striking.  The right to secession is now aconstitutional entitlement. All cultural communities are entitled to fairrepresentation in the institutions of state and federal government.  Territorially based nationalities exercisewide powers of self-government in political, economic, legal, cultural andeducational affairs.  The result is apolitical order open to cultural diversity, self-expression and autonomy.
Ethiopia's ethnic turn is a sharpbreak from African political practice. With rare exceptions such as Botswana and Somalia, vast culturaldiversity characterizes African states. African states are not built on nations of their own making.  Upon independence, African states inheritedpopulations capriciously contrived by colonial powers that arbitrarily joinedor divided cultural communities.  Thenewly independent states sought to preserve the uneasy national legacy of colonialism.  Amid heterogeneity, political rule tried tocreate and maintain unity in various ways. Some cobbled together coalitions whereby elites from diverse groupscould have a stake in a unitary polity. Others designed political arrangements blind to cultural differences andcleavages.  Another tack was to fosteroverarching identities---African or ideological---in order to overshadow orovercome internal differences over national and cultural identity.
Whatever the differences inapproach, the overriding aim almost everywhere in Africa was to refuse fullpolitical expression to cultural pluralism. Even on the rare occasion where national identity was an exercise inself-definition carried out through internal struggle and negotiation, therewas no disposition to cultivate or even to acknowledge diversity.  In the recent constitutional exercisesundertaken by South Africa and Uganda, the choice was in favor of a unitarystate.  The pursuit of political unity atthe expense of cultural plurality has been a leading objective of Africanstatecraft that enjoyed wide legitimacy: for example, ethnic parties were oftenprohibited by law; African states consistently complied with OAU's principle ofupholding colonial borders.
The inclination to ignore,conceal, subdue or erase cultural diversity in African politics has beensustained at considerable cost. Monopolistic political arrangements such as military government,one-party rule, systematic suppression of human and political rights are oftenrationalized as inescapable means of safeguarding unity.  Despite these draconian measures, ethnicdiversity has not been banished.  Bitterwars for secession were fought by Katanga, Biafra, Eritrea and SouthernSudan.  Though nothing approaches thegenocide perpetrated in Rwanda, ethnic turmoil exists in most parts of Africa.
Even when strife in Africacentered on other matters, it was seldom altogether free of ethniccontention.  Yet neither the threat ofpartition nor ubiquitous ethnic contest called into question African allegianceto a conception of statehood that excludes national or cultural pluralism fromthe definition of political identity. Thus as we enter the new millennium, a vision of political unity thatdisavows or devalues diversity survives intact throughout most of Africa.
What, then, prompted Ethiopia togo virtually alone against the prevailing current in the continent?  Ethiopia's anomalous new course is all themore surprising, for, unlike the rest of Africa, her heterogeneity of nationalities,cultural traditions, religions and languages is not a fortuitous outcome ofalien imposition.  Though Ethiopia'sautonomous development is no guarantee of the emergence of a national society,it is hard to overlook the society's resilience in the face of a long historyof internal warfare and foreign encroachment. Even outsiders, without evident partisanship, detect the contours of anintegral political community.
Admittedly the image ofEthiopians as a well-defined people conveyed in international scholarship issometimes merely a result of selective perception.  Much the most addressed part of Ethiopia isthe north, where literate cultures and salvationist religions have flourishedsince the distant past[2].  Accessibility to modern scholarship andcultural affinity rendered this terrain familiar to western observers.  Another area of focus, one driven by concernsof development, is the small, largely urban area where modern economic andpolitical institutions have gained a foothold. The impression of homogeneity gleaned from these perspectives does notreflect Ethiopian culture as a whole but rather the interests of othersocieties.
Still, those aspects of Ethiopiacaptured from culturally alien perspectives cannot be dismissed as merefragments, for they have played a crucial role in drawing the wider communitytogether.  For good or ill, northernculture is diffused throughout the entire country.  For instance, Amharic speakers can be foundalmost everywhere; the new Regional State of the Southern Peoples has adoptedAmharic as its working language.  Amongthe small but culturally influential urban population, identities that cutacross nationality, religion and language have, and are seen to have, salience.  The purview of both Amhara - Tigraycivilization and urban culture tends to define Ethiopia not just under westerneyes; it is an important dimension of Ethiopian self-perception.
Even those who extend their sightbeyond comparatively self-contained or integrative elements of the society inorder to take notice of the whole are impressed by the presence of abidingaffinities among Ethiopia's dispersed and diverse cultural communities.[3]  Strands of a common sense of communityinclude:  close and longstandingconnections of far-flung trade and migration; collective historical legacy;shared cultural beliefs, rituals, symbols and ideals; common systems of socialand political authority.  On account ofthese ties, a distinctive community encompassing all the peoples in Ethiopia'spresent territory has endured despite recurrent fragmentation.  The confluence of Ethiopia's variedidentities can also be seen in the ambitions of empire-builders ---from withinand without---who rarely settled for less than domination over what is nowEthiopia.
Though important, these indicationsof a shared sense of community show, at most, the possibility of politicalunity.  Societies like Somaliawell-endowed with traits conducive to national self-identification and cohesionhave floundered in the search for statehood. Similarly, a bitter lesson of Ethiopian history is that the potentialfor unity, however promising, cannot be realized without effectiveinstitutional means for its political expression.
It is a testimony both to theweight of Ethiopia's past and its political inconclusiveness that differencesover the present dispensation are fought as battles over historicalinterpretation.  Is Ethiopia threethousands years old or only one hundred? Have the Oromo and the Southern Peoples always been members of Ethiopiansociety or were they joined to Ethiopia through invasion and conquest in thenineteenth century?  Is Eritrea anamputated limb of Ethiopia or is it a distinct society with only a brief,forced marriage to Ethiopia during the federation and subsequent incorporation?
Some speak with self-confidenceof belonging to an Ethiopia with a robust national identity intricatelyinterwoven out of the country's constituent identities.  They claim that they cannot recognizethemselves in the new ethnically defined Ethiopia.  Others, however, speak with distance ofEthiopia as a community of which they were never willing members.  For them, the new political vision enablesthem to identify with Ethiopia for the first time.  The former feel that the present diminishesthe past, creating a void that cannot be filled.  The latter feel that the present redeemsinjustices of the past.  These clashingconceptions of Ethiopia are a subject of everyday contention because of awidespread conviction that the uncertainties surrounding the country'sself-identity are rooted in the past. While everyone agrees that Ethiopia houses a plurality of languages,religious and nationalities, disagreement rages over whether or not ethnicdifferentiation and inequality is so entrenched in Ethiopian history that itrequires recourse to a new political order.
Even indisputable collectiveaccomplishments of Ethiopian history do not yield a shared sense of pride.  Undoubtedly the most significant achievementof modern Ethiopia is independence, successfully defended against a successionof invaders --- the British, the Egyptians, the Sudanese Mahdists, and theItalians.  In this history of struggle, asingular triumph was in 1896 at the Battle of Adwa, where Ethiopia inflicted astunning defeat on Italy.  Inspirationalas it was to oppressed peoples and their champions everywhere, the Adwa victorymarks a peak in Ethiopia's international prestige.  Internally, too, Adwa was a watershed.  Peoples from the entire empire marched to thebattle:  unlike previous resistance toforeign aggression, Adwa was a national victory.  Adwa was also a formative moment in thecreation of Ethiopia as a modern nation-state. In the wake of the victory, Ethiopian sovereignty was recognized by theEuropean powers.  Yet, Adwa's legacy remainsambiguous.  Emboldened by his nationaland international prestige, Emperor Menlik II continued his expansion into thesouth and west, and consolidated his empire in the decade following Adwa.  As a result, many peoples of Ethiopia whofought valiantly at Adwa are ambivalent about the victory: they see themselvesas victims of their own triumph.  Here aselsewhere, Ethiopians seem to be at once exalted and anguished by their past.
It is not obvious that anyone isnow in a position to resolve the sharp differences separating these conceptionsof Ethiopia's past and the attitudes they yield toward the politicalpresent.  These incompatible myths aboutthe Ethiopian past do show that the new political order that gives pride ofplace to cultural diversity has not yet settled over the landscape.  Myths about the past are conjured up in orderto bolster or undermine the legitimacy of the new political vision.  This is not of course a surprise:  "The past has always been the handmaidof authority.”[4]These judgments of the present by reference to the past are useful in otherways --for example, to reach a prognosis of the new politics.  The traumas and upheavals that the countryhas suffered explain the rise of nationalist politics as well as the principlesand practices in which it now finds political expression.   A glimpse at the past also enables us totake a measure of the novelty of the present. For all their novelty, the present arrangements may well showremnants--desirable or undesirable --of the past.
Federalism
Remarkson Method
Even believers in an idealconception of society do not insist that federalism must be realized in everylegitimate polity.  Nor is federalismsupported by all ideal conceptions of constitutional democracy.  Federalism therefore differs from publicideals of universal reach. For instance, federalism is distinct from humanrights: unlike federalism, “their political (moral) force extends to allsocieties, and they are binding on all peoples and societies, including outlawstates.”[5] Violationof human rights justifies condemnation or even coercive intervention.  In contrast, rejection of federalism by aregime does not demonstrate imperfection, much less, wrongdoing in the regime.
Federalism is not, therefore, anecessary part of an ideal conception or theory of a democratic society; it israther an ideal for a society in unfavorable circumstances, circumstancesunfavorable to constitutional democracy. It might, of course, be argued that all political ideals answer tounfavorable conditions.  For example,human rights are honored because everyone always needs to avoid being killed,assaulted, deceived, used as a resource, or neglected in an emergency. The illsagainst which human rights afford protection represent evils to which all humanbeings are always vulnerable.  The vitaldifference is that federalism is a public value tailored to conditionsunfavorable to constitutional democracy that are not universal but ratherpeculiar to certain societies.  However,the distinction suggested between ideal and nonideal theory may be blurred byadopting a position taken by a few political theorists: namely, either thatthere are no positive political values or that the only practicable publicvalues are those that serve to ward off unfavorable features of men or theirenvironment.  Forging an intellectuallink among all societies on the basis of the exclusive importance of pervasiveunfavorable conditions would yield a minimalist political theory such aslibertarianism or what Judith Shklar calls the liberalism of fear.[6]Still, this view is not a direct challenge to the proposal to treat federalismunder nonideal theory, for the view does not amount to a denial of nonidealtheory but rather to an affirmation of its ubiquity.
If, however, we subscribe to theposition that social co-operation can aim beyond the avoidance of vice to theachievement of virtue, the distinction between ideal and nonideal theorysurvives.  Federalism can then be seen asa proper part of nonideal theory which, according to John Rawls, “deals withunfavorable conditions, that is, with the conditions of societies whosehistorical, social, and economic circumstances make their achieving awell-ordered regime, whether liberal or decent, difficult or impossible.”[7]Nonideal theory delimits the requirements of an account of society burdenedwith unfavorable conditions.  First, toidentify the conditions – poverty; divisions of power, culture or identity; anintolerant public culture – that tend to stand in the way of fidelity to thevalues and institutions of constitutional democracy.  Second, to determine the policies andpractices that mitigate, overcome or deploy to advantage unfavorable conditionsin the service of constitutional democracy. In the task of unburdening a society from unfavorable conditions,nonideal theory is guided by the aim of reaching or approximating idealtheory.  In Rawls’s words: “nonidealtheory asks how the ideal conception of society … might be achieved or at leastworked toward, generally in gradual steps; it looks for policies and courses ofaction that are likely to be effectiveand politically permissible for that purpose”[8](italics mine). Rawls’s remarks indicate a third demand of nonideal theory:starting from where the society is now, the search is for a passage todemocratic institutions by democratic means. Unless nonideal theory furnishes democratic means for surmountingbarriers to democracy it cannot reconcile us to unfavorable conditions.
To clarify the significance of the treatment of federalism under theaspect of nonideal theory, it may be helpful to contrast it with its morefamiliar alternative: to explain and justify federalism as an integral part ofan ideal conception of constitutional democracy. A few political philosophershave made serious attempts to find a theoretical underpinning for federalismand other public manifestations of diversity as a freestanding value or idealof constitutional democracy.
A notable example is CharlesTaylor’s influential essay on “The Politics of Recognition.”[9]Taylor identifies two forms of recognition that he deems important tocontemporary politics. The first is recognition of what human beingsimportantly share, and it yields “a politics of universalism, emphasizing theequal dignity of citizens, and the content of this politics has been theequalization of rights and entitlements.”[10] Thesecond is a recognition of what makes human beings culturally distinct ordifferent, and it yields a politics of particularism. “With the politics ofequal dignity, what is established is meant to be universally the same, anidentical basket of rights and immunities; with the politics of difference,what we are asked to recognize is the unique identity of this individual orgroup from everyone else.” [11]Taylor’s chief concern is with the second form of recognition, for he believesthat the first is dominant in contemporary political theory and practice, andthat it has tended to undermine the second by aspiring to distance or evenefface the culturally distinct from political life. Taylor argues that ourallegiance to recognition of our common humanity should not blind us to thefact that recognition of distinctness is a vital human need, though the urgencyof the need makes itself felt only after our release from social forms wherethe identity of individuals and groups had been preordained. 
Taylor’s thesis then is that tobe recognized in one’s cultural distinctness is a universal human interest.Multiculturalism and its institutional expressions such as federalism arereasonable realizations of a human interest for recognition of culturaldistinctness. Indeed, to avoid denigration and forcible assimilation,universalist recognition of individuals as worthy of equal concern and respectdemands public affirmation of their culturally particularist identities.
Now, it is not entirely clear whyTaylor singles out cultural and linguistic identity, as opposed to, say,religious identity as a dimension of distinctness that warrants recognition anddifferential treatment in public life. Taylor does not, of course, deny thatreligious distinctness finds recognition outside public life in freeassociations. Yet he does not explain what is special about the claim ofdistinctness by Quebeckers such that he can say that here “what was at stakewas the desire of these people for survival, and their consequent demand forcertain forms of autonomy in their self-government, as well as the ability toadopt certain kinds of legislation deemed necessary for survival.”[12]
Even if we allow that there arereasons for politically privileging cultural distinctness, it is not evidentthat recognition of a particular cultural identity is a categorical demand.Taylor’s bold idea that recognition of one’s distinct cultural identity mustmatter and always requires public affirmation is not altogether convincing. Itseems more plausible to say that cultural identity does not necessarily matter,but if in a given case it does, it must be recognized. But then the claim torecognition of distinctness is not a fundamental human interest on a par, say,with the interest to be treated with equal concern and respect. The importanceof securing recognition for one’s cultural identity therefore depends onhistorical circumstance.
Why does Taylor suppose thatrecognition of one’s cultural distinctness always matters? Taylor seems to beled to the conclusion that he has seized upon a vital human interest by a focuson recognition to the exclusion of its source. Even if cultural identityhappens to be important to a person or a group and so anchors a claim torecognition of it by others, it is not obvious that recognition by any othersis what is desired or desirable. Do French Quebeckers seek recognition of theirdistinct society by Zulus or Texans? Would Zulus or Texans have standing toextend or withdraw recognition from French Quebeckers? Indeed, if we acceptTaylor’s idea of the value of cultural difference and its recognition, it ispuzzling why the demand for recognition is not put forward across societies asoften as it is within societies. It is more plausible to think that recognitionof distinctness or difference by others matters only when the others are thosewith whom there are reasons to feel closely identified. Recognition becomessalient with differences among those who, for any number of reasons, otherwisefeel a sense of mutual identification. Whether or not there are such reasonshas less to do with fundamental human needs or interests than with thecontingencies of history.
Will Kymlicka is anotherpolitical theorist who is impressed by worldwide resurgence of entho-culturaldisputes and conflicts. He concedes that “every dispute has its own uniquehistory and circumstance that need to be taken into account in devising a fairand workable solution.”[13]Still, his “aim is to step back and present a more general view of thelandscape—to identify some key concepts and principles that need to be takeninto account, and so clarify the basic building blocks for a liberal approachto minority rights.”[14] Despitethe modesty of this characterization, Kymlicka has the ambitious aim to locatemulticultural citizenship, group-differentiated rights and federativearrangements in the very foundations of a liberal conception of an idealsociety. According to Kymlicka, aside from protecting the individual’s choicesfrom intervention by others and government, a basic value of liberalism is toenable a person’s freedom to form and revise a conception of a worthwhile life.He faults contemporary liberalism for overlooking the fact that meaningfulchoice and pursuit of a way of life requires secure membership in a particularculture. “Put simply, freedom involves making choices amongst various options,and our societal culture not only provides these options, but also makes themmeaningful to us.”[15] Andagain: “Liberals should be concerned with the fate of cultural structures, notbecause they have some moral status of their own, but because it is onlythrough having a rich and secure cultural structure that people can becomeaware, in a vivid way, of the options available to them, and intelligentlyexamine their value.”[16]
For Kymlicka, the importance ofsecure cultural membership is a perfectly general claim about liberalism. It isacknowledged in the classical liberal theories of Mill and Green, and in thepractice of established liberal democracies, where liberal rule relies on anational culture upheld by the state. Kymlicka firmly resists the suggestionthat cultural membership can be secured in free associations or throughdecentralized policies in language, education and land tenure. Culturalmembership is instead a primary good that must be supported by a liberalpolitical community, if the capacity to fashion and revise a conception of aworthy individual life is to be realized. The separation of state and religioncannot serve as a model for the relation between the state and ethnic orcultural identity. “The whole idea of ‘benign neglect’ is incoherent, andreflects a shallow understanding of the relationship between states andnations. In the areas of official languages, political boundaries, and thedivision of powers, there is no way to avoid supporting this or that societalculture, or deciding which group will form a majority in political units thatcontrol culture-affecting decisions regarding language, education, andimmigration.”[17]Every liberalism is necessarily a national liberalism. The only question is tofind a fair way to reconcile multinational societies to the inseparability ofthe state and the nation, required by the ideal conception of liberal society.A federative arrangement with group-differentiated rights of self-government isthe only way to guarantee equality of cultural membership for individuals in amultinational society. Benign neglect or separation of state and ethnicitywould only mask the dominance of the official culture over the rest, whosemembers would be deprived of a context for the effective choice of a meaningfullife.
Kymlicka’s attempt to justify multicultural citizenship, collectiverights, and federative institutions by appeal to primary values and principlesof liberalism yields curious consequences that he countenances all too lightly.One concerns the extent to which a liberal, multinational state toleratesilliberal groups. Suppose a self-governing national group restricts thecapacity of its members to lead lives of their own choice. Kymlicka allows thatthe federal state should try to change the illiberal national community. But,barring extreme cases—cases that would justify international intervention—hethinks legal intervention is impermissible. To assent to this strangeconclusion is to grant that the rationale for rights to self-government can befreely violated by those exercising self-government. Put differently, individualsare entitled to secure cultural membership in order to ensure their freedom tolead a life of their own choice, but nothing more than persuasion is possibleif cultural membership robs them of this essential freedom.  How can a multinational state legitimatelycount as liberal if member states can violate rights central to liberalism withimpunity? The sanctity of cultural membership as a primary good of liberalsociety seems, in the end, to override the value of freedom it was originallyintended to subserve.
This result is doubly disquieting. First, a liberalism founded on thevalue of individual autonomy is more permissive in respect to infringements ofindividual freedom than liberalisms that avoid protection of substantivevalues, including autonomy, in public life. For example, in Rawls’s politicalliberalism human rights define the bounds of pluralism. Secondly, tolerance ofilliberal cultures eliminates Kymlicka’s sole ground for advocating a marriageof culture and a liberal state while endorsing the separation of religion andthe state. The ground is that religion, not culture, involves shared values.Leaving aside the question whether this is a trivial truth about liberalcultures or an interesting but controversial claim about all cultures, Kymlickastill faces a problem. Since both impose a conception of the good, there is nojustification for being tolerant toward illiberal cultures and intoleranttoward illiberal religions.
There is another unwelcome consequence of the liberal defense of multiculturalcitizenship, which Kymlicka points out, that has wider implications than heanticipates. Kymlicka argues that a stable liberal polity requires a sense ofsolidarity:  “a shared civic identitythat can sustain the level of mutual concern, accommodation and sacrifice thatdemocracies require.”[18]Yet, Kymlicka fears that a liberal state with a plurality of politicalcommunities may not foster an inclusive sense of solidarity sufficient tosustain the commitments of liberal citizenship to justice and the common good.Indeed, Kymlicka’s skepticism about the possibility of solidarity in amultinational state inclines him to side with Mill, who, in Kymlicka’s view,held that fidelity to liberalism is possible only in a state with a singlenational culture. Assuming that non-coercive assimilation is difficult,Kymlicka is unsure why a liberal faced with a multinational society should notbe favorably disposed to secession in order to pave the way for nation-states,the only settings suited to stable liberal democracies. What checks Kymlicka’sliberal advocacy of secession is that natural circumstances are unfavorable tothe exercise of secession. Many national groups may not prove viable asindependent states. Secession often occasions violent conflict. There is notenough room in the world to create states to accommodate all nations. Even ifall this is true, it is noteworthy that it does not prohibit a given nationalgroup from seeking secession on liberal grounds. More importantly, Kymlicka’spessimism on the fate of solidarity in a multinational state shows that it isunfavorable circumstances for states with a single national culture, notintrinsic merit from an ideal liberal point of view, that compels multinationalliberal states.
Given that multinational states are, though not strictly desirable,unavoidable, Kymlicka feels that we must somehow search for sources ofsolidarity in multinational states adequate to liberal democratic citizenship.Kymlicka considers shared public values, which he finds insufficient sincepeoples may go their own way despite such agreement. At any rate, as we sawearlier, there is no reason to expect adherence to the same principles orvalues in Kymlicka’s conception of the liberal multinational state. A morepromising basis is a commitment to what, following Taylor, he calls ‘deepdiversity.’ Roughly, this is to appreciate and prize that there are variedgrounds for allegiance to the wider political community in a multinationalstate. Even this he urges may be too thin unless it is coupled with somethingelse he deems most important. “For citizens to want to keep a multinationalstate together, therefore, they must value, not just ‘deep diversity’ ingeneral, but also the particular ethnic groups and national cultures with whomthey currently share the country.”[19]
This is an arresting conclusion: it is a clear admission that nationalidentity may be based on something other than a distinct cultural identity.Pride in historical achievements is a an example that Kymlicka offers of ashared national identity that does not draw on membership in a particularculture. Since Kymlicka insists it is Mill’s belief that a single nationalculture is a requirement of a liberal state, it is worth noting that Millhimself holds that a shared past is a powerful source of a sense ofnationality. He writes:
A portion of mankind may be said to constitute aNationality if they are united among themselves by common sympathies—which makethem cooperate with each other more willingly than with other people, desire tobe under the same government, and desire that it should be government bythemselves, or a portion of themselves, exclusively. This feeling ofnationality may have been generated by various causes. Sometimes it is theeffect of identity of race and descent. Community of language, community ofreligion greatly contribute to it. Geographical limits are one of its causes.But the strongest of all is identity of political antecedents, the possessionof national history, and consequent community of recollections; collectivepride and humiliation, pleasure and regret, connected with the same events inthe past.[20]

What Mill singles out as the strongest source of nationalidentity—collective pride and humiliation in a shared past—may, for all we know,account for a sense of community even in culturally homogeneous societies.  In any case, there is little reason to acceptthe thesis that a liberal political community is necessarily rooted in culture,the thesis on which Kymlicka, in part, mounts his case for a multinationalliberal state. There is also reason to doubt the claim that a distinct cultureis the only context for making choices about what life to lead. A shared pastand the sense of identity it engenders may enable a Swiss or a Canadian to lookinto options for a worthwhile life in the wider community beyond the particularculture to which the citizen belongs.
This brief discussion indicates that the search for an invariant,particularst value of constitutional democracy to anchor a generaljustification of multicultural politics and federative arrangements is vain.For example, the candidates put forward for an invariant value or ideal cannotpossibly account for the existence, importance or persistence of a federalstate in the United States and Germany, where cultural distinctness or securecultural membership does not loom large in federal politics. Moreover, theeffort to define collective rights or federal distribution of powers byreference to an invariant value—a task undertaken more by Kymlicka thanTaylor—tends to inhibit or distort abiding values of constitutional democracy.None of this is, of course, to deny the importance of the questions Taylor andKymlicka formulate and the problems they probe. Rather, the difficulties and limitationsin their answers and solutions attest to the limits of a particularist ideal orphilosophical theory in coming to terms with a particularist phenomenon such asfederalism.  Multiculturalism andfederalism enter the political agenda only under peculiar circumstancesunfavorable to familiar universal ideals of democracy. The unfavorableconditions as well as the democratic norms that answer to them varysignificantly. The focus of nonideal theory is on the actual unfavorablecircumstances and the specific ways in which they are reconciled to thestanding values of constitutional democracy. Since the unfavorable conditionsand the terms of reconciliation are diverse, a deeper understanding invites acomparative assessment of different federal arrangements. Under nonidealtheory, federalism thus seems a subject more fit for social science than forideal or philosophical theory. The reason is that multiculturalism,multinationalism, and federalism do not call for a new value or theory ofconstitutional democracy; instead, they necessitate a nuanced institutionalrealization of universal ideals of constitutional democracy. 
An application of the method ofnonideal theory to federalism circumscribes the scope of an adequateinterpretation of federalism.  First, theperspective guides and shapes the selection of conditions unfavorable todemocratic rule that call for federalist policies and practices.  Second, it requires us to show how theprinciples and structures of federalism promote democratic ideals by checkingand exploiting unfavorable circumstances. The defense of federalism is persuasive to the extent that it comes toterms with the unfavorable conditions that prompted it in ways that enhance or,at least, do not compromise democratic ideals of universal reach.
This understanding of theinterpretation of federalism from the perspective of nonideal theory leaveswide room for disagreement.  A site ofdebate over federalism since its inception are differences over what values itserves and how well it serves them.  Onearea of contention is how best to strike a balance between the claims of unityand the claims of diversity.  A formativeexample is the constitutional debate in the United States between federalists(inclusive nationalists) and anti-federalists (exclusive or localnationalists).[21] Another source ofdisagreement is whether federalism is a source of collective rights or merelyan effective protection of individual rights in a pluralist society.   An example is the debate over the status ofthe American bill of rights before and after the reconstruction.[22]Finally, there is a question kept alive by failed or troubled federalisms: Doesfederalism entrench or attenuate the nonfavorable conditions that occasion it?[23]This question arises not only where democratic aspirations have beendisappointed but also where they have been reasonably fulfilled.