The Imperative of Transparency in the Anti-Abiy Collaboration: A Pathway to Sustainable Political Change in Ethiopia

The Imperative of Transparency in the Anti-Abiy Collaboration: A Pathway to Sustainable Political Change in Ethiopia

The emergence of a collaborative initiative against Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed's administration marks a significant shift in Ethiopia's complex political landscape. This type of alliance—whether tactical (short-term, goal-specific) or strategic (long-term, vision-driven)—requires unified action and clear articulation of its purpose, structure, and guiding principles. In a multi-national, ideologically divided, and structurally contested country like Ethiopia, any political movement that seeks to challenge the sitting regime must overcome deeply entrenched historical, ethnic, and ideological rifts to achieve legitimacy and sustainability.

Ethiopia's Multi-National Reality and Structural Tensions

Ethiopia is not a monolithic state; it is a multi-national federation (at least constitutionally), where diverse nations, nationalities, and peoples coexist, each with distinct historical narratives, grievances, and aspirations. The federalist camp, primarily dominated by ethno-nationalist movements, views self-rule and regional autonomy as non-negotiable rights. Conversely, the unitary camp advocates for a centralised system prioritising national unity and territorial integrity over ethnic federalism. This fundamental disagreement has produced irreconcilable positions manifesting in political contestations, armed conflicts, and policy paralysis.

A vague or opaque coalition against the Abiy administration will not hold in this environment. Without a clearly communicated vision, objectives, and governance model, such an initiative risks being dismissed as another opportunistic power grab by dissatisfied elites rather than a credible, inclusive alternative.

The Necessity of Publicising the Collaboration Model

For this anti-Abiy collaboration to gain credibility, trust, and broad-based support, its leaders must publicly define:

The Desired Outcome: Is the goal to remove Abiy Ahmed only, or to dismantle the existing political order entirely? Will the coalition advocate for a transitional government, or is there a long-term political blueprint?

The Collaboration Framework: Who are the stakeholders? What power-sharing mechanisms will be in place? How will marginalised groups be included?

The Operational Mechanisms: What is the decision-making process? What are the methods for conflict resolution within the coalition? How will accountability and transparency be ensured?

Building Stakeholder Buy-In

Stakeholder buy-in is non-negotiable in Ethiopia's fractured political arena. Different groups—whether political parties, liberation fronts, civic organisations, religious institutions, or international partners—must see their interests and security concerns reflected in the collaboration’s design. Otherwise, they will either remain neutral or actively oppose the initiative, potentially leading to its premature collapse.

Transparency about goals, structures, and timelines is essential to mobilise public support and neutralise regime propaganda that may portray the alliance as an illegitimate, divisive force.

Avoiding the Pitfalls of Previous Alliances

Ethiopia’s modern political history is filled with failed alliances built on the temporary convergence of interests without foundational trust or a shared vision. The fall of the Derg, the rise and fall of the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), and the fragmentation of opposition groups in recent years all offer sobering lessons. Without:

Shared accountability mechanisms

Clear conflict management strategies

An inclusive national vision

No matter how promising, any alliance will ultimately disintegrate under the weight of internal contradictions.

Conclusion: 

The Path to Legitimate and Effective Collaboration

In conclusion, a successful anti-Abiy collaboration in Ethiopia cannot afford to be shrouded in secrecy or dominated by elite bargaining. It must be transparent, inclusive, and publicly accountable. The ideological divides, federal-unitary tensions, and multi-national sensitivities demand a level of openness and participatory design that moves beyond backroom deals and militaristic calculations.

To secure genuine buy-in from Ethiopia’s diverse stakeholders, the coalition must present a clear roadmap that answers critical questions about Ethiopia’s political future, not just about the fall of the current administration. Without this, the initiative risks another failed chapter in Ethiopia’s long struggle for democratic transformation and durable peace.

Power Sharing in the USA vs. Ethiopia: A Constitutional Comparison

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Power Sharing in the USA vs. Ethiopia: A Constitutional Comparison

1. United States Federalism: Constitutional Power Sharing

The United States operates under a dual federal system based on the U.S. Constitution (1789), which clearly divides powers between the federal (national) government and the individual state governments.

Federal Powers:

• Enumerated Powers: Listed explicitly in the Constitution (Article I, Section 8). These include:
  • Defence and foreign policy
  • Printing and regulating currency
  • Regulating interstate and international commerce
  • Immigration and citizenship
• Implied Powers: Based on the “Necessary and Proper Clause,” federal expansion can be allowed when needed.
• Supremacy Clause: Federal law prevails over state law in case of conflict.

State Powers:

• Reserved Powers: All powers not delegated to the federal government are reserved for the states (10th Amendment).
  • Public education
  • Policing and public safety
  • Local governance
  • Health regulations

Shared (Concurrent) Powers:

• Taxation
• Law enforcement
• Building infrastructure

Unique Feature:

• Strong Judicial Federalism: States have their own constitutions, courts, and laws as long as they do not violate the U.S. Constitution.
• Elastic System: Power balance has shifted over time through interpretation and negotiation, not armed conflict.

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2. Ethiopian Federalism: Constitutional Power Sharing

Ethiopia’s federal system is based on the FDRE Constitution of 1995, which is ethno-federalist in structure.

Federal Powers:

• National defense
• Foreign relations and diplomacy
• Regulating interstate and international commerce
• Monetary policy and issuing currency
• Managing large-scale infrastructure (e.g., railways, dams)

State (Regional) Powers:

• Extensive Autonomy: States are primarily organised along ethnic lines and have:

  • Power to establish their own constitutions
  • Authority over cultural, linguistic, educational, and local governance matters
  • Independent policing and security forces

• Right to Secession (Article 39): Unique to Ethiopia, regions have the constitutional right to secede from the federation through a formal process.

Shared (Concurrent) Powers:

• Tax collection (with some divisions)
• Natural resource management (disputed and often contested in practice)
• Law enforcement in areas of overlap

Key Problems in Practice:

• Lack of Implementation: Though the constitution provides broad regional autonomy, the federal government often overrides states through party mechanisms and security intervention.
• Weak Institutions: The Judiciary and electoral bodies lack independence, which escalates disputes.
• Centralised Political Control: Despite the federal design, power is often concentrated in the ruling party.

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Summary Table: USA vs. Ethiopia Federalism

Feature	United States	Ethiopia
Basis of Federation	Geographic regions	Ethnic groups
Power Source		Constitution
Federal Powers	: Defence, foreign	affairs, monetary policy, local government, national education
	nn policy, languag	e, culture, local policing, education
UniquElementem: t	Strojudicial federalismli, m	Right to secession (Article 39)
Practical Prob: em	Power negotiatithrough non-implementationalnal centralised	zed override
Conflict Resolution	Courts, politiprocessoc, es	Armed conflict, weak legal mechanisms

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Key Takeaway:

• USA: Balances power through an evolving system of negotiation, judicial review, and constitutional amendments, ensuring both federal strength and state autonomy.
• Ethiopia: While the constitutional design offers more regional autonomy on paper, itspolitical practice reflects its failurese, where power is centralised and the federal contract is not respected.

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Here are concrete recommendations to improve Ethiopia’s federal system by learning from the strengths and experiences of the U.S. federal model, while respecting Ethiopia’s unique context:

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Recommendations for Improving Ethiopian Federalism Based on U.S. Federal Experience

1. Strengthen Constitutional Implementation and Rule of Law: Lessons from the USA:

• The U.S. Constitution is actively implemented, and the courts have the final say in resolving federal-state disputes.

Recommendation for Ethiopia: Prioritise the strict implementation of the FDRE Constitution.

• Establish independent constitutional courts or strengthen the House of Federation’s judicial role to adjudicate federal-regional conflicts based on law, not party loyalty or armed force.

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2. Ensure Genuine Separation of Party and State. Lessons from the USA:U.S. political parties do not control the constitutional order; power flows through institutions.

Recommendation for Ethiopia:

• Dismantle the informal party structures that override constitutional federalism.
• The ruling party must not function as a parallel government. Parties should respect the state's autonomy, even if they belong to opposition groups.

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3. Institutionalise a Strong, Independent Judiciary: Lessons from the USA:

• The judiciary is central to balancing power and protecting federal and state rights.

Recommendation for Ethiopia:

• Build an independent judiciary with absolute authority and security of tenure.
• Constitutional disputes, election outcomes, and human rights cases should be resolved in courts, not on battlefields or through political deals.

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4. Develop a Functional, Negotiated Intergovernmental Relationship: Lessons from the USA:

• The U.S. has a cooperative federalism model, in which federal and state governments negotiate shared responsibilities.

Recommendation for Ethiopia: Establish formal intergovernmental councils and regular negotiation platforms to address shared issues such as security, taxation, infrastructure, and natural resources.

• Reduce reliance on ad-hoc, force-based solutions.

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5. Protect Regional Autonomy While Building National Solidarity: Lessons from the USA:

• States in the U.S. maintain strong identities but are unified under national symbols and collective projects.

Recommendation for Ethiopia:

• Respect regional autonomy in language, culture, and governance, but invest in federal programs that promote shared identity (e.g., national service, cross-regional infrastructure, inter-ethnic educational exchanges).
• Promote ‘Unity in Diversity’ practically, not just as a slogan.

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6. Clarify the Role and Process of Secession (Article 39), Lessons from the USA:

• The U.S. Constitution does not allow unilateral secession. It emphasises unity but provides strong legal mechanisms to address grievances.

Recommendation for Ethiopia:

• Provide a detailed, enforceable legal framework for self-determination and secession. Secession should not be the first solution to political grievance, but a carefully regulated, peaceful, and democratic last resort.

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7. Strengthen Local Governance Beyond the State Level: Lessons from the USA:

• U.S. local governments (counties, cities) have significant power, ensuring decisions are made close to the people.

Recommendation for Ethiopia:

• Empower local (woreda and kebele) governments with more fiscal and decision-making autonomy to avoid over-concentration of power at the regional level.
• Build trust by making local governance responsive and accountable.

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8. Promote Federalism Education Lessons from the USA:

• Americans learn about their constitution, rights, and federal system early.

Recommendation for Ethiopia:

• Integrate federalism and constitutional literacy into school curricula and public media.
• Educate citizens, politicians, and civil servants about their rights, the structure of federalism, and peaceful conflict resolution mechanisms.

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Final Reflection:

Ethiopia’s problem is not the federal system; the political culture and weak institutions undermine it.
The U.S. shows that federalism thrives with continuous negotiation, vigorous judicial enforcement, political pluralism, and a culture of respecting constitutional boundaries. Ethiopia can improve its federalismby rewriting it andy making it work through institution building, legal integrity, and respectful power sharing.

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Policy and Advocacy 

 Strengthening Ethiopian Federalism: Lessons from the United States and Pathways to Effective Implementation

Executive Summary: Ethiopia’s federal system, designed with significant input from international partners including the United States, Canada, Germany, and Switzerland, is rooted in a constitutional promise of self-rule, equality, and unity in diversity. However, Ethiopia's persistent failure to implement its constitutionally enshrined federalism has led to political crises, conflict, and institutional breakdowns. This policy paper draws lessons from the United States federal experience to offer actionable recommendations to strengthen Ethiopian federalism, focusing on constitutional enforcement, institutional integrity, and cooperative governance.

1. Introduction: The Federal Democratic Republic was established in 1995 with a federal system recognising the self-determination of "Nations, National centralisation." Despite its progressive design, the system suffers from cover-politicisation, a lack of constitutional implementation, weak institutions, and over-politicised governance. This document presents a comparative analysis and offers policy recommendations for reform.

2. Comparative Framework: USA and Ethiopia Federal Systems

Feature United States: Defence

Basis of Federation Geography

Federal Powers Defense, currency, foreign affairs Defense, foreign affair,s, monetary policy

State/Regional Powers: Local governance, education, policing, Language, culture, local policing, education

Unique Element: Judicial review, evolving federalism, right to secession (Article 39)

Conflict Resolution Courts, political processes Armed conflict, weak legal mechanisms

3. Policy Recommendations:

3.1. Strengthen Constitutional Implementation and Rule of Law

Enforce constitutional provisions without party interference.

Establish institutional courts to resolve federal-regional disputes.

3.2. Institutionalize an Independent Judiciary

Reform the judicial appointment process to ensure neutrality.

Guarantee security of tenure and protection from political pressure.

3.3. Separate Party from State Structures

Eliminate party mechanisms that override formal government processes.

Encourage multi-party competition at federal and regional levels.

3.4. Develop Formal Intergovernmental Platforms

Establish regular federal-regional councils for negotiation and cooperation.

Address shared responsibilities like taxation, infrastructure, and security through formal agreements.

3.5. Promote National Solidarity and Shared Identity

Develop federal programs that encourage inter-regional collaboration and inter-ethnic understanding.

Launch national service, exchange programs, and inclusive education initiatives

3.6. Clarify Secession Procedures (Article 39)

Codify a detailed legal process for self-determination and secession to ensure a peaceful resolution.

Encourage the use of political negotiation over secessionist movements. Decentralised Local Governments

Decentralize power to woreda and kebele levels to ensure grassroots participation and accountability.

Allocate fiscal resources directly to local governments to reduce dependency on regional elites.

3.8. Federalism and Civic Education

Introduce civic education programs focusing on federalism, constitutional rights, and conflict resolution.

Promote public awareness campaigns to build constitutional literacy among citizens and officials.

4. The Target Audience is federal: Federal and regional policymakers, civil society organisations, international development partners, and academic institutions.

Key Messages:

The failure is not in the design but in the lack of implementation.

Federalism can function successfully with strong, independent institutions.

Respecting constitutional boundaries is essential for peace and national unity.

Channels: Policy briefs, public dialogues, media campaigns, academic forums, and targeted workshops.

Alliances: Collaborate with international constitutional experts, federalist scholars, and local governance advocates.

5. Conclusion: Ethiopian federalism, by rewriting it, and a diverse nation, depends on the practical implementation of its federal constitution.

Multiple Perspectives Analysis of the Israeli Palestinian Conflict: From the Local Picture to the Challenge of Most Prominent Hegemony.

Multiple Perspectives Analysis of the Israeli Palestinian Conflict: From the Local Picture to the Challenge of Most Prominent Hegemony

The map of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and disputed territories (Credits: Jaakobou, Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons)

Geopolitical Report ISSN 2785-2598 Volume 35 Issue 7
Author: Samuele Vasapollo

This report provides a high-level overview of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict from the perspectives of important local and global stakeholders. It also shows that tunderstanding the war requires understanding he challenge to hegemony in Eurasia 

Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: Context

On October 7^th, the neighbouring state actor of the Gaza Strip, “Hamas”, launched operation Al-Aqsa Flood Offensive against surrounding Israeli targets. The first phase of said operation saw Hamas forces capturing over twenty Israeli settlers, inflicting a tremendous blow to Israeli intelligence and security.

Israel’s secret services branches failed to anticipate or even obtain any bit of information about Hamas’ offensive. It didn’t take much time for Israel to promise the international community harsh retaliation against all terrorist organisations populating the Gaza Strip, Hamas included.

The current situation carries a high risk of setting off a wide-scale regional conflict between Israel and its rivals, most notably Iran and its proxies in the Shiite crescent.

As the battle between Hamas and Israel resumes, geopolitical forces involving the Middle East’s most prominent actors and global powers have escalated. In conclusion, the Israeli-Palestinian political alignments and diplomatic activities by the US, Russia, and the Palestinian Authority's administration. Aslations.

The regional geopolitical scenario

He holds limited civil authority over the West Bank. This is a quick recap of the stance of the key parties in the region vis-à-vis the current conflict.

• Israel: Survival is critical. To ensure it, Israel must safeguard its southern border, specifically the Gaza Strip. The elimination of Hamas in this area would guarantee more security to Israel; furthermore, a successful operation against Hamas would display Israel’s military force vis-à-vis neighbouring rivals, among which are Lebanon, Syria, and Iran. The Jewish state’s humiliation on the 50^th anniversary of the hostile War compels Tel Aviv to retaliate brutally. Some observers think that, owing to the current process of normalisation of diplomatic relations between Israel and the Arab world, the Israeli response will have to be milder.
  However, the anti-Iranian ethos of Israel’s reconciliation initiatives with its Arab neighbours means that Israel will have to demonstrate to the latter that it can cope with Tehran’s challenges to the region. Israel will have to act in a way that is not incompatible with retaining strategic connections with the newly forged Israeli-Arab entente. Tel Aviv must only avert a massacre of the Palestinian people. No Arab/Islamic country would be ready to publicly strengthen relations with Israel if this occurred as a side effect of Hamas’ coventrization.

• The Palestinian Authority (PA): The PA, also known as the State of Palestine, is a governmental entity under the administration of Fatah. As stipulated by the Oslo agreements of 1993-1995, it holds limited civil authority over the West Bank.
  The Gaza Strip was under the governance of the Palestinian Authority until the 2006 Palestinian elections and the ensuing struggle between the Fatah and Hamas factions, which resulted in the former's loss of power and the latter's establishment of de facto authority. Despite this, the Palestinian Authority claims its authority over the Gaza Strip.
  The position of the Palestinian Authority about the ongoing war is characterised by a nuanced approach. The Palestinian Authority (PA) holds a hostile stance towards Hamas, as it views the group as a hindrance to the successful establishment of a comprehensive Palestinian state.
  Conversely, the PA is encountering increasing dissatisfaction among Palestinians due to its inability to solve the issue of Israeli occupation. Furthermore, there is a rising endorsement of armed resistance against Israel among Palestinians residing in the West Bank.
  It is becoming increasingly complex for Ramallah to completely oppose Hamas in this battle, especially in light of the civilian lossestowardflicted by the current Israeli bombing of the Gaza Striwhichth both the affirmation of Hamas and its full annihilation by Israel having potential consequences for the already precarious position of the Palestinian Authority and its leader Mahmoud Abbas, the Palestinian Authority find itself in a “loose loose” situation.
• Hamas, a normalising Muslim Brotherhood faction in Gaza, had minimal ties with Iran in the first Intifada because it wanted to operate freely. In the early 1990s, Iran supported Hamas. Narys expanded the intense influence of enduring ties. Iran then backed Hamas financially and militarily.
  After Hamas gained control of Gaza in June 2007, Iran upped its assistance package in hopes that it would lead the violent battle against Israel and strengthen its influence in the Palestinian arena. Iranian weapons have been sent to Gaza to improve Hamas’ arsenal. Among other things, Hamas seeks to weaken the Palestinian Authority by expanding the war and consolidating its grip over the West Bank, which is now controlled by the Palestinian Authority.
• The Islamic Republic of Iran: Iran has long maintained tight ties with Hamas. Financially favourable political support at public events helped put the Palestinian problem on the global forefront. Iran wants regional hegemony and supports every regionalisation tilt against Israel. Now, it informs its Gaza Strip strategy.
  Iran sees Israel as a foreign implant in the Middle East and the Zionist cause as the US’s imperialistic vanguard that advances its objectives. The Iranian regime’s animosity toward Israel gives it power and prestige in the Arab world, which supports its desire to rule the Muslim world.
  Yet, Iran does not want a Middle East role. Iran benefits from Hamas pressuring Israel in front of the world. Tehran believes the rising death toll of Palestinian civilians will deter prominent Arab nations from normalising relations with Israel.
  LIn the long term Iran wants to oust the US and its influence, including Israel, from the Middle East. ITo contain Iran, ran must first demolish the “counter-revolutionary bloc”—the American-Israeli-Arab alliance created by the 2020 Abraham Accords, which repaired relations between Israel and local players, Among other things, Iran uses the Palestinian problem to distance Israel from Saudi AArabia andGthe ulf’s dominating power, which China has mmediated to establishties.
• The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia: Saudi Arabia dominates the Arabian PPeninsuladue to its geography, rreligion, andenergy resources. Saudi covert diplomacy helped Israel restore ties with the UAE, Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco. The US-led restoration of diplomatic ties aims to restrict Iran’s ascent and create a favourable geopolitical order in the Middle East. The occurrence of the Hamas assault coincided with Saudi Arabia’s ongoing efforts to establish diplomatic normalisation wwithIsrael. The feasibility of such an aagreementis temporarily hindered, and it continues to be a key oobjectiveof vviewfor the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
  Riyadh’s otance hhas been moreconsistent. Qatar is well known for its eies with Iran, a longstanding adversary of Israel. Saudi Arabia is confronted with the task of safeguarding its interests regarding Israel, notwithstanding the adverse impact of the cconflicton the view of Israel wwithin the region
  Simultaneously, Riyadh is confronted with mmanaging and developing,and,. incontrast,i importing and mitigating In contrast, diplomatic reliance on the United States. A scenario in which Saudi Arabia and Iran maintain peaceful relations would result in.Ifeweractive conflicts  IIrantis o manage, diminishing its need for security assurances from the United States.
• The United Arab Emirates: The UAE has damaged its credibility by repairing ties with Israel before the rest of the Islamic world.t Asthe situation develops, the deaths it has caused in its bombardment of Gaza, the United Arab Emirates should stop soon before anti-Israel sentiment in Dar Al Islam reaches a boiling point.
  Abu Dhabi shares Riyadh’s view that this is a terrorist oorganisation but harsh nnormalisationof the movement might damage the UAE’s public iimage,Twhichbenefits from this. Policy leaders in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) exhibit significant apprehension over Iran’s potential direct involvement in tthe ongoing conflict andthe potential for Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states to suffer as collateral damage.
• Qatar: It is well known that Qatar is toremost in resolving both the Muslim Brotherhood and its most prominent offshoot, Hamas. In addition, Qatar has flonghosted a Hamas delegation, which made it possible for the oorganisationto establish an office in Doha. Qatar has also played hhostto other Hamas leaders who are now under international sanctions.
  As the fighting between Israel and Hamas gets worse, Doha is in a tough spot. As a long-time supporter of the Muslim Brotherhood, Qatar has a lot of power over Hamas, the movement’s Palestinian branch. In the short term, that seems like a massive chance. QA special EurasianEurrent political game because of its close ties to the. This organisation.
  But for the same reason, Doha is about to face the possibility of being criticized for its history of backing extreme Islamist groups, especiallycriticisedtar will serve as a focal point for both the pro-Hamas and anti-Hamas factions as the situation continues to develop. States that fall inside the intermediate range have a heightened level of autonomy.
• Turkey: The conflict emerged when Turkey actively pursued the normalisation of ties with many regional players, notably Israel. Several dynamics are at play.
  First, Turkey wants to assume the position of mediator in the Israeli-Hamas conflict. Second, drawing on the Russia-Ukraine conflict and its significant involvement in grain corridor diplomacy, Ankara aspires to capitalise on the current situation to cultivate a perception of Turkey as a prominent global player actively in resolving international issues. Third, Turin has a strong incentive to maintain the area stable, perhaps under its control, to safeguard the energy flows from the eastern Mediterranean, from which it benefits. If the conflict, involving countries and rekindled dormaSpecial Eurasia online course isurse iswill have to get involved more actively and, perhaps, militariloccurrence simultaneously contains some advantageous outcomes for the administration of Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi. In some respects, the government in question would express satisfaction if Israel were to eradicate Hamas. This organisation sprang from the Muslim Brotherhood, which is seen as a significant adversary of Hamas by Israel. President Si's withdrawal strategy inside his own country.
• Since the first Obama administration, the strategy has involved optimising Gaza, which has elicited significant popular indignation among the Egyptian population. Historically, government establishments in support of the Palestinian cause have functioned as occasions for individuals to voice their suppressed opposition against the Egyptian government, and there is potential for this pattern to recur in the future.
  However, recognising instability may potentially destabilise Sisi’s governance, as discontented theatreians become further disillusioned with a pursuit that impoverishes its citizens and neglects to alleviate the dire circumstances faced by their fellow Palestinians. Egypt is a candidate for being one of the most relevant actors in the diplomatic mediation of the conflict.

The map of the Middle East (Credits: https://freevectormaps.com/world-maps/middle-east/WRLD-ME-02-0002?ref=atr)

Global geopolitical scenario

The following is a quick analysis of the three main world powers’ ambitions and positions on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

• United States of America: The United States is now involved in simultaneously containing Russia and China within the Eurasian region. In the first scenario, the objective is to prevent Moscow's annexation of Ukraine. In the subsequent scenario, the aim is to curb China’s ascent as the dominant force in the Pacific region, therefore challenging global hegemony.
  Due to this rationale, the United States has pursued a withdrawal strategy from the Middle Eastern area since the first Obama administration. In short, the strategy involves optimising existing resources and their allocation across strategically significant areas to sustain global hegemony.
  Establishing a security framework in the Middle East that includes Israel and key Arab actors can be seen as a strategic response by the United States to entrust the safeguarding of regional stability to other parties. This approach is driven by recognising the imperative to allocate American resources primarily to the Pacific theatre, which is considered more significant in pursuing global dominance.
  From the point of view of international law, the Abraham Accords set up a pro-American front that stands in for the US in the Middle East. The initiation of the final chapter in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict after the offensive instigated by Hamas on October 7^th, 2023, poses a potential threat to the fundamental principles of the “Abraham front”.
  This situation may facilitate the growth of the influence of entities antagonistic to the United States, which have, through diverse means, contributed to the progression of recent occurrences. Regarding the current war, the United States believes that it is imperative to prevent the escalation of the conflict due to two distinct rationales.
  The imposition of such a scenario would primarily require the United States’ intervention to maintain its dominant position in the Middle East and the Gulf region. Consequently, a substantial allocation of supplementary resources would be required, thus impeding the allocation of these resources towards the Russian and Chinese theatres.
  Furthermore, the escalation of a conflict would further deteriorate the relations between Israel and the Arab world, consequently affecting the relations between the United States and the Arab world. This situation would benefit Iran, China, and Russia, as they are positioning themselves as protectors of the local populations against perceived Western interference in the region.
• Russian Federation: The onset of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict provides Russia with some advantages, particularly due to the development of fronts that need the United States’ attention and defence. Consequently, this situation diminishes the resources available to Washington and hampers its capacity to financially support Kyiv during the ongoing conflict in Ukraine.
  Furthermore, the United States’ endorsement of Israel undermines its standing among the “Global South,” with a particular emphasis on the MENA region, where the majority of the population is in favour of Palestine and its internationally recognised right to complete self-determination.
  Lastly, the revival of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict brings Moscow back into the picture after a long break since the fall of the Soviet Union. Moscow can use its long history of fighting against the West and colonialism to get some of the most critical players in the region to support it. Russia wants to be the arbiter of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to lessen the influence of American power across the Middle Eastern chessboard. This comes after Russia increased its influence in Syria following its intervention in the Syrian civil war.
• People’s Republic of China: China’s long-term plan is to displace the United States as the region’s benign hegemon and gain dominance over the Arab Persian Gulf. Similar to Moscow, Beijing hopes to profit from the anti-American and anti-Western hostility caused by Washington’s failed foreign policy in the area, especially as it relates to the Palestinian question.
  Although China’s support for Palestine stems from purely pragmatic motives, it has been an established feature of Beijing’s Cold War–era foreign policy. China’s goal is to remove American dominance from Eurasia by forming a united anti-American front that includes Russia, Iran, the Gulf Monarchies, Syria, Lebanon, Turkey, etc.
  Beijing hopes to carve out the position of arbitrator and mediator in the crisis by capitalising on anti-American sentiments. In this particular time and place, a worsening of ties between Israel and Palestine might imply the chance to firmly divide the pro-American front in the area and replace it with a front that is currently under construction and being led by China and Russia.

The Challenge for Hegemony in Eurasia

The most recent episode of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict contains a simplified version of the most significant worldwide political processes that have occurred during the first quarter of the twenty-first century. The Middle East continues to demonstrate its significance as a barometer for gauging the distribution of power on a global scale. The following are some of the long-term geopolitical trajectories that are likely to accelerate as a collateral effect of the war that was caused by the operation that Hamas began on October 7^th, 2023:

• The gradual weakening of American unipolarity, as shown by the steadily increasing participation of players hostile to the United States in the management of local crises and in the formation of solutions to the most significant difficulties facing the MENA region;
• The manifestation of a multipolar balance of power, which sees the Islamic Republic of Iran jostling ever more forcefully for the role of leading regional power, to the detriment of the “Abraham Accords bloc”, which is progressively being absorbed by Tehran and its international sponsors, most notably China and Russia;
• China’s ascent to the position of co-manager of the Middle Eastern region is an area in which it has managed to become, if in a limited capacity, an arbitrator and mediator in the context of the most significant crises in the region. Even if it is impossible to say that the battle between Saudi Arabia and Iran for regional hegemony has ended, their struggle for regional hegemony has been partially absorbed by the normalisation of ties between the two powers owing to the mediation supplied by China.
  Above all else, there is Saudi Arabia’s admission of the “fait accompli,” or the fact that it is impossible to continue using force to curb Iranian influence in Iraq, Yemen, and Syria. The latter state’s President Bashar al-Assad was readmitted to the Arab League, confirming the Russian, Chinese, and Iranian diplomatic success over the Saudi and American endeavour to bring about a regime change in Syria;
• The restructuring of the Eurasian space as a result of the incorporation of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Iran, and Egypt into the BRICS reveals the United States' failure to prevent the diversification of the strategic ties of the aforementioned regional powers.

As a result, although Israel and Hamas are the protagonists in the newly erupted war, other far bigger political entities lurk behind these two players. The whole history of recent international relations is therefore concentrated in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and its diplomatic handling by the aforementioned local and global parties.

The unfolding of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the positioning of state and non-state subjects that comprise the structure of the current international political system must therefore be understood in light of the broader geopolitical dynamics involving the challengers for global dominance. The establishment of the Russian-Chinese-Iranian cooperation in Eurasia may be seen as anti-hegemonic coalition, defined by the phenomenon known as “geopolitical balancing”, from a theoretical point. Particularly affected by the pressure and containment exerted on them by the United States in recent years, Russia and Iran have welded their foreign policy plans to those of China.

China’s increased infrastructure investments in the Middle East since the start of Russian military operations in Syria are the result of a consistent Sino-Russian collaboration in which Beijing provides financial resources for the development of regions while Moscow provides its services to protect them. Iran has also been working more closely with China, with whom it signed a multi-decade strategic collaboration agreement in which Iran agreed to supply China with oil it had previously sold to European countries in exchange for massive investments in Iranian infrastructure, including military ones. Also, Iran shares China’s desire to build railways all over the Middle East so that it can link directly to the eastern Mediterranean, end its trade isolation, and make its western edge more stable.

As the influential US national security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski warned, the most dangerous scenario would be a grand coalition of China, Russia, and perhaps Iran, a ‘anti-hegemonic’ coalition united not by ideology but by common suffering.

Concluding, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict represents a strategic contest between multipolarism and unipolarity and serves as a barometer for wider geopolitical alliances that have emerged on a Eurasian level.

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Disclaimer. The views and opinions expressed in this report are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of SpecialEurasia.

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October 30, 2023

Key words: Geopolitical Report ISSN 2785-2598, Hamas, Israel, Israeli Palestinian conflict, Middle East, Palestine, Samuele Vasapollo

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The Economic Impact of Ethiopia's Decision to Open Its Banking Sector to Foreign Participation

The Economic Impact of Ethiopia's Decision to Open Its Banking Sector to Foreign Participation

Introduction

On June 25, 2025, the National Bank of Ethiopia (NBE) announced a groundbreaking regulatory shift by issuing Directive No. SBB/94/2025, which for the first time permits foreign participation in Ethiopia’s banking sector. This move represents a significant milestone in Ethiopia’s economic liberalisation agenda, aiming to attract foreign capital, expertise, and competition to a historically closed financial system. This essay evaluates the potential economic impacts of this decision, analysing its benefits, risks, and the long-term implications for Ethiopia’s financial landscape.

Positive Economic Impacts

1. Increased Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)

One of the most immediate impacts of the directive is the potential surge in foreign direct investment. Allowing foreign banks, subsidiaries, and representative offices to operate in Ethiopia creates an attractive entry point for global investors seeking to tap into one of Africa’s fastest-growing populations and markets. This influx of capital is expected to:

Strengthen the country’s foreign exchange reserves.

Enhance the liquidity of the financial sector.

Provide much-needed capital for infrastructure and development projects.

2. Improved Financial Sector Competitiveness

The entry of foreign banks will likely introduce advanced financial products, improved technology, and global best practices into the Ethiopian banking system. Increased competition may push domestic banks to:

Upgrade their digital banking services.

Improve customer service.

Offer more competitive interest rates and financial products. This can lead to greater financial inclusion and a more efficient allocation of financial resources across the economy.

3. Economic Growth and Job Creation

With expanded banking services and capital availability, sectors such as agriculture, manufacturing, and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) may experience easier access to credit. This could stimulate business expansion, create employment opportunities, and boost economic growth. Additionally, the arrival of foreign banks may generate direct employment in the financial sector, along with spillover effects into allied industries such as legal services, real estate, and information technology.

4. Regulatory Modernisation and Institutional Development

The directive’s requirement for the National Bank of Ethiopia to license and supervise foreign representative offices signals a strengthening of regulatory capacity. Exposure to international banking standards will likely push the NBE to modernise its supervisory frameworks, which can contribute to greater financial sector stability and resilience.

Potential Risks and Challenges

1. Pressure on Domestic Banks

Ethiopian banks, historically in a protected environment, may struggle to compete with well-capitalised and technologically advanced foreign entrants. Without adequate preparation, local banks could face market share losses or consolidation pressures, potentially leading to instability in the short term.

2. Risk of Capital Flight

While foreign banks may bring capital into Ethiopia, there is also a risk that profits will be repatriated rather than reinvested locally. This could pressure the country’s balance of payments, especially if the inflows do not sufficiently exceed outflows over time.

3. Regulatory Oversight Challenges

The NBE will face the complex task of effectively regulating a more diverse and interconnected banking system. Weaknesses in regulatory capacity could expose the system to risks such as money laundering, financial misconduct, and currency speculation.

Long-Term Implications

If carefully managed, the decision to open Ethiopia’s banking sector to foreign players could serve as a catalyst for the country’s broader economic transformation. It aligns with Ethiopia’s aspiration to fully integrate into the global economy and signals a commitment to market-oriented reforms. The competitive pressure and capital inflows have the potential to drive innovation, enhance service delivery, and build a more robust financial sector capable of supporting sustainable development.

However, success will depend heavily on the government’s ability to:

Strengthen regulatory institutions.

Provide transitional support to domestic banks.

Implement complementary reforms in exchange rate management and capital account liberalisation

Conclusion

The National Bank of Ethiopia’s decision to issue Directive No. SBB/94/2025 is pivotal in reshaping the country’s financial landscape. The anticipated benefits, including increased investment, greater competition, and accelerated financial inclusion, could significantly enhance Ethiopia’s economic prospects. Nevertheless, realising these gains will require careful regulatory oversight and proactive measures to support domestic banks and manage the potential risks. If these challenges are effectively addressed, Ethiopia’s bold move could become a model for financial sector liberalisation in other emerging economies.

The Horn of Africa and the Red Sea: A Potential New Front in the Israel-Iran Conflict.

The Horn of Africa and the Red Sea: A Potential New Front in the Israel-Iran Conflict

The Israel-Iran war has long been perceived as a Middle Eastern confrontation confined to airstrikes, missile attacks, cyber warfare, and proxy engagements in Lebanon, Syria, and Gaza. However, as the conflict intensifies, emerging scenarios suggest that the next phase of this geopolitical struggle may pivot towards the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa. The region’s strategic waterways, critical ports, and fragile political landscapes could make it the next major theatre in this widening confrontation. Eritrea, Yemen, Djibouti, and the disputed Assab port could all become key battlegrounds in the silent chess game between Israel, Iran, and their global allies.

---

The Red Sea Arena: Israel’s Unfinished Battle

While Israel has achieved tactical successes against Iran’s direct and proxy threats, it has yet to neutralise the Houthi militia in Yemen. The Houthis, heavily supported by Iran, have grown bolder in their operations, frequently launching attacks on commercial vessels and U.S.-aligned assets in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. These attacks not only threaten Israel’s maritime interests but also undermine global trade routes connecting Europe and Asia through the Suez Canal.

Israel’s security doctrine cannot ignore the growing threat on this southern flank. As the Houthis persist in targeting Red Sea navigation, the Israel-Iran confrontation is likely to extend beyond the Levant into the waters surrounding Yemen, Eritrea, and Djibouti. The map of U.S. military deployments and Houthi-controlled areas illustrates the gravity of the situation. The Red Sea is rapidly becoming an unavoidable battleground.

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Eritrea’s Geopolitical Crossroads: The Fate of Assab

Eritrea’s strategic location and control over the Assab port are becoming increasingly relevant. Historically, Ethiopia has sought access to the sea, particularly through Assab, following the loss of its coastline after Eritrea’s independence in the 1990s. The possibility of regime change in Eritrea—implied in the emerging geopolitical discourse—suggests that external powers, potentially including Israel, may be manoeuvring to realign Eritrea’s political landscape in a way that could shift control of this critical port.

If Ethiopia collaborates with Israel—overtly or covertly—it could find an opportunity to regain access to Assab, a prize that would dramatically alter Ethiopia’s geopolitical and economic position. For Israel, securing Assab through allied Ethiopian control would serve as a strategic counterbalance to Houthi and Iranian influence across the Red Sea.

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A Geopolitical Domino Effect

The scenario does not stop with Eritrea and Ethiopia. Djibouti, which already hosts multiple foreign military bases (including U.S., French, and Chinese), would inevitably be drawn deeper into this conflict. Djibouti’s control over the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait—a chokepoint for global oil and shipping—makes it an indispensable player.

Sudan, Somalia, and other fragile regional states could be pressured into taking sides as the Red Sea arena becomes more militarised. Russia, China, the United States, and Gulf nations would likely intensify their involvement, each seeking to secure their maritime, energy, and strategic interests.

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The Risk of Proxy Escalation

A war in the Red Sea region would not mirror conventional state-to-state battles. It would more likely manifest through proxy forces, asymmetric naval warfare, and hybrid tactics including cyberattacks, maritime blockades, and economic sabotage. Israel could engage through naval operations and covert alliances with Horn of Africa states. At the same time, Iran would continue leveraging the Houthis and other local militias to destabilise shipping routes and challenge Israeli-aligned movements.

The resulting proxy entanglements would heighten regional instability, risking the collapse of already fragile governments and triggering humanitarian crises through disrupted trade and potential blockades of food and fuel supplies.

---

Ethiopia’s Strategic Calculations

Ethiopia's temptation to regain Assab would be immense, particularly if it were promised logistical, intelligence, or military support from Israel and its Western allies. However, such a move would carry significant risks, potentially sparking conflict with Eritrea and inviting opposition from Iran, the Houthis, and other regional actors aligned with anti-Israel sentiments.

Ethiopia’s decision would likely hinge on a complex cost-benefit analysis: the economic and geopolitical gain of sea access versus the danger of becoming a frontline player in the Israel-Iran war, with all the military and diplomatic consequences that would entail.

---

Conclusion: A Messy Realignment Ahead

The Israel-Iran war is no longer confined to missile exchanges and proxy fights in the Levant. The Red Sea and the Horn of Africa are likely theatres of confrontation, where naval supremacy, control of strategic ports, and influence over fragile states will determine the balance of power.

If the scenario unfolds as anticipated, regime change in Eritrea, Ethiopian realignment, intensified proxy wars, and expanded U.S. and Israeli naval operations in the Red Sea will define a dangerously complex new phase in the Middle East conflict. Long on the periphery of great power struggles, the Horn of Africa may soon find itself at the centre of a global geopolitical realignment that promises to be as messy as it is consequential.

Israel’s Major War Objectives Against Iran: A Strategic Analysis

Major War Objectives Against Iran: A Strategic Analysis

The longstanding tension between Israel and Iran is one of the most critical geopolitical conflicts shaping the Middle East. While the rivalry has spanned decades through proxy battles, intelligence wars, and diplomatic standoffs, a direct war between the two nations would reveal Israel’s strategic military objectives with clarity. Israel's primary goals in such a conflict can be understood as a combination of security imperatives, regional power calculations, and long-term survival strategies. The following essay explores these objectives in depth.

1. Dismantling Iran’s Nuclear Capability

Israel has consistently regarded Iran's nuclear program as an existential threat. Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons would fundamentally alter the balance of power in the Middle East and significantly undermine Israel’s national security. Israel’s top priority in any war with Iran is to destroy nuclear facilities, enrichment sites, and weaponisation programs. Through preemptive strikes, sabotage, and cyber warfare (such as the Stuxnet virus in 2010), Israel aims to prevent Iran from reaching nuclear weapons capability. The objective is not simply military but is anchored in Israel’s doctrine of "Never Again", a post-Holocaust national ethos that obliges the country to proactively eliminate existential threats.

2. Destroying Missile and Drone Threats

Iran’s growing missile and drone arsenals, capable of striking deep inside Israeli territory, represent another significant danger. Iran’s ballistic missiles, coupled with its increasing drone warfare capacity, have dramatically expanded Tehran’s ability to launch asymmetric attacks. Israel’s goal is to neutralise missile launch sites, drone factories, storage facilities, and key military bases before they can be used effectively. This is essential for protecting Israeli population centres, critical infrastructure, and military assets. The Iron Dome and other missile defence systems can intercept incoming threats, but Israel prefers to eliminate these threats at their source to reduce long-term risks.

3. Breaking Iran’s Proxy Network

Iran’s influence across the region is not confined to its borders. Tehran has built a formidable network of proxy groups, including Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas and Islamic Jihad in Gaza, Shia militias in Iraq, the Houthis in Yemen, and armed groups in Syria. Israel’s objective in the war is to disrupt and dismantle this network. By targeting Hezbollah’s missile stockpiles, conducting airstrikes on Iranian positions in Syria, and undermining supply chains that connect Iran to its proxies, Israel seeks to weaken Iran’s ability to wage a multi-front war against the Jewish state. Breaking this network is critical for Israel to prevent the "ring of fire" that Iran is attempting to establish around its borders.

4. Maintaining Deterrence and Military Superiority

Israel’s security strategy is heavily reliant on deterrence through military dominance. The wars Israel fights are often designed not just to neutralise immediate threats but to reinforce the perception that attacking Israel carries unbearable costs. By demonstrating overwhelming technological and operational superiority, Israel aims to deter Iran and other adversaries from future aggression. Maintaining this edge involves advanced weaponry and cyber capabilities, intelligence networks, and precision-strike capabilities that set Israel apart as a leading military power in the region

5. Ensuring the Security of Israeli Citizens

The defence of its population is Israel’s foremost responsibility in any conflict. Iran’s capacity to strike Israeli cities directly or through proxies poses a constant threat to civilian life. The war objectives, therefore, include disrupting attack plans, destroying weapons before they can be deployed, and minimising the risk to Israeli civilians. Through offensive operations, defensive systems like the Iron Dome, and civil protection measures, Israel’s goal is to ensure the highest possible security for its people.

6. Limiting Iranian Regional Influence

Finally, Israel aims to roll back Iran’s regional influence. A powerful Iran threatens not only Israel but also regional Arab states that view Tehran’s expansion as destabilising. By challenging Iran’s presence in Syria, opposing its support for Hezbollah, and blocking arms shipments, Israel seeks to contain and degrade Iran’s capacity to shape regional dynamics. This objective aligns Israel with several Gulf countries, such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, which share similar concerns about Iranian hegemony.

Conclusion

Israel’s primary war objectives against Iran are multifaceted but interconnected. They are built upon the principles of prevention, protection, deterrence, and regional stabilisation. By focusing on dismantling Iran’s nuclear program, destroying missile and drone threats, breaking the proxy network, maintaining military dominance, safeguarding its citizens, and limiting Iran’s regional influence, Israel pursues a strategy aimed at long-term security and survival. These objectives are not merely tactical; they are deeply embedded in Israel’s strategic culture and its historical understanding of the existential threats it faces. As such, any future war between Israel and Iran will likely be shaped by these same foundational goals.

Part 2

Israel: A Strategic Nightmare for Iran – Lessons from the 12-Day War

The 12-day war between Israel and Iran marked a significant turning point in the history of Middle Eastern conflicts. It was a rapid, intense, and highly coordinated military campaign that showcased Israel’s unmatched intelligence capabilities, advanced technological warfare, and strategic precision. For Iran, the war was not just a tactical defeat; it reinforced a haunting reality: Israel will remain a persistent nightmare for Tehran’s geopolitical ambit indefinitely.

The war served as a harsh reminder that Israel's resolve, combined with its superior military doctrine, poses a long-term, inescapable challenge to Iran's pursuit of regional dominance.

1. Israel’s Technological Superiority: An Unmatched Edge

One of the most striking lessons from the 12-day war was Israel’s ability to wage multi-layered, weaponised, and sophisticated warfare. Israeli forces demonstrated the seamless integration of cyber warfare, electronic jamming, satellite surveillance, and precision airstrikes. Israel's cyber units disrupted Iran’s missile command systems, communications networks, and even manipulated GPS signals, forcing Iran to switch to the Chinese BeiDou navigation system in the middle of the war.

Iran’s technological lag was fully exposed. While Iran boasts of missile stockpiles and regains, its inability to defend its own critical infrastructure or counter Israel’s air superiority reveals an enduring strategic weakness. For Iran, this technological imbalance is not easily solvable. Israel’s relentless investment in innovation ensures that Tehran is an operational precision more advanced adversary.

2are strategic manoeuvres: The Shadow of Mossad

Perhaps the most devastating reality for Iran is the sheer penetration of Israeli intelligence networks. The 12-day war revealed that Israel knew precisely where key Iranian military assets, nuclear facilities, and leadership figures were located. Mossad's reach seemed to extend into Iran's most secure sites, with Israeli officials stating they even tracked the minimising of enriched uranium stockpiles.

This intelligence supremacy is a nightmare scenario for Iran. It means that no matter how Tehran tries to conceal its operations or disperse its weapons, Israel can likely find them. The psychological impact of knowing that Israeli agents, drones, satellites, and cyber units can strike at any moment deeply undermines Iran’s confidence in its own security.

3. Asymmetrical Proxy Network in Crisis

Iran’s long-standing strategy of using proxy militias—such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, Shiite militias in Iraq, and the Houthis in Yemen—was significantly challenged during the war. Israel’s rapid strikes not only targeted Iranian bases but also systematically dismantled key nodes in the proxy network. Israeli forces showcased their ability to hit multiple fronts simultaneously, neutralising threats before they could coalesce into an effective counteroffensive.

For Iran, this exposes its proxy model, designed to keep Israel entangled in regional conflicts, which can be rapidly decapitated with precision strikes. The war proved that Israel is capable of bypassing traditional battlefields and targeting the core architects and suppliers of proxy forces directly within Iranian territory.

4. Psychological and Political Consequences

Beyond the battlefield, the 12-day war inflicted severe psychological and political blows on Iran. The quick and decisive nature of Israel’s operations demoralised not only Iran’s military leadership but also the broader public perception of Iran’s strength. In the future, it can affect credibility among its allies and people.

Israel, through its bold and public messaging, made it clear that the Jewish state would act unilaterally and without hesitation when its survival is threatened. This reinforced Israel’s posture as an unpredictable and unstoppable force—a state that Iran cannot intimidate or outmanoeuvre in conventional or asymmetric warfare.

5. Iran’s Strategic Dilemma: A Perpetual Adversary

The war left Iran with an uncomfortable strategic reality: Israel is not just a temporary obstacle; it is a permanent adversary that will continuously monitor and challenge, and strike when necessary. Israel’s capacity to project power far beyond its borders and its willingness to take preemptive action ensure that Iran’s path to regional hegemony will always be blocked.

Even Iran’s nuclear technology remains under constant threat. Israel’s refusal to target enriched uranium stockpiles during the war to prevent an environmental disaster was a calculated decision, not a limitation. This demonstrates that Israel has the operational capability to neutralise Iran’s nuclear assets at a time and place of its choosing.

Conclusion

The 12-day war was more than a military campaign—it was a strategic message that echoes loudly in Tehran: Israel will remain a nightmare that Iran cannot wake from. Whether through cyber warfare, intelligence penetration, precision airstrikes, or the dismantling of proxy networks, Israel has proven that it is not just defending itself—it is shaping the battlefield on its own terms.

For Iran, this war was a painful lesson that Israel’s vigilance, adaptability, and technological dominance are long-term realities that no amount of proxy expansion, missile accumulation, or nuclear posturing can easily overcome. Israel’s shadow will continue to haunt Iran’s regional ambitions, making it a nightmare that Tehran must confront forever.

Part 3

 Iran’s Shift from Western GPS to BeiDou: A Strategic Response in the 12-Day War

The 12-day war between Israel and Iran not only reshaped military balances but also revealed a critical new dimension of modern warfare: the battle for control over space-based navigation systems. One of the most significant developments during this conflict was Iran’s official shutdown of Western GPS services within its borders and its rapid switch to China’s BeiDou satellite network. This move is more than a tactical adjustment; it is a profound geopolitical and technological statement that signals Iran’s determination to sever its dependence on Western-controlled infrastructures.

The Role of GPS in Modern Warfare

Global Positioning System (GPS) technology, developed and controlled by the United States, has become the backbone of global navigation, timing, and targeting. Modern military operations—from drone strikes to missile guidance, troop movements, and precision logistics—rely heavily on satellite-based navigation.

In previous conflicts, the United States and its allies have leveraged GPS dominance to achieve operational superiority. Access to or denial of GPS signals can critically influence the outcome of military engagements. For Iran, continued reliance on Western GPS presented a security vulnerability, particularly in the face of advanced Israeli airstrikes, cyber operations, and surveillance that may have been coordinated or enhanced using GPS-based intelligence.

Iran’s Decision to Shut Down Western GPS

During the 12-day war, Iran reportedly disabled GPS systems within its territory, cutting itself off from Western satellite navigation to prevent precision strikes, surveillance, and tracking by foreign actors. By doing so, Iran likely sought to:

Protect sensitive military sites from being targeted via GPS-guided munitions.

Disrupt foreign intelligence and drone operations that rely on GPS accuracy.

Demonstrate technological resilience against cyber and space-based attacks.

This action illustrates a growing awareness within Iran’s military command of the risks associated with being part of a system controlled by geopolitical adversaries.

The Switch to China’s BeiDou System

Iran’s gain of technical independence and the establishment of a Satellite System is a strategic manoeuvre with military and diplomatic consequences.

Military Advantages:

Independent Navigation: Using BeiDou, Iran ensures it is no longer vulnerable to GPS manipulation, jamming, or signal denial by Western powers.

Secure Communication: BeiDou offers encrypted, high-precision military-grade signals less susceptible to external interference.

Alliance Strengthening: Adopting BeiDou may open access to China’s growing military especially those involvingcing Iran’s defence capabilities.

Diplomatic Signal:

Iran’s embassies, civilian conveniences, and political message: Tehran embassies and civilian institutions are away from political spheres of influence and aligning themselves with China’s global technological framework. It formally rejects Western dominance in digital infrastructure and a public pivot towarnuclearcprogram

This shithe capabilitymotes BeiDou as a competitor to GPS, especially among countries resistant to U.S. global infconcealment methods BeiDou network, Iran is gaining technical independence and strengthening its partnership with China in the context of what is increasingly seen as a multipolar world order.

Broader Implications

For the Region:

Iran’s decision could inspire other nations in the Middle East to explore alternatives to GPS, especially those seeking to distance themselves from Western hegemony. The proliferation of BeiDou in the regipath, Israeldde U.S. technologicaltactical advantageslandigation Competition:

This development highlights the growing weaponisation of space-based inThis.ise systems are civilian conveniences and battlegrounds for influence, security, and control. As more countries Logicalran shift to alternative systems, the world may see the emergence of parallel navigation ecosystems with competing technical standards and security protocols.

For Iran’s Future Conflicts:

By switching to BeiDou, Iran has signalled that it will no longer be vulnerable to Western-controlled satellite warfare. This complicates the intelligence landscape, making future precision attacks more difficult for adversaries like Israel and the United States.

Conclusion: A Technological Break with the West

Iran’s shutdown of GPS within its borders and its rapid adoption of China’s BeiDou system during the 12-day war is a turning point in both military strategy and geopolitical alignment. It reflects a strategic decoupling from Western infrastructures and a clear choice to integrate into China’s growing sphere of technological influence.

This move underscores how modern warfare is no longer confined to land, sea, and air—it is increasingly fought in the invisible realms of cyberspace and satellite networks. As Iran builds its future military capabilities on platforms outside of Western control, the balance of technological power continues to shift, heralding a new phase in the global contest for space-based dominance.

Part  4

Israel’s Strategic Restraint: Balancing Military Success and Environmental Responsibility

In the recent escalation between Israel and Iran, reports have surfaced that Israeli intelligence had precise knowledge of the location of Iran's enriched uranium stockpiles. According to statements made by Israeli officials to Al Hadath, much of this uranium was either relocated or ended up buried under the rubble following Israeli airstrikes on Iranian nuclear and military facilities. Notably, Israel deliberately chose not to directly target these enriched uranium reserves. The reason? A calculated decision to prevent a potential environmental and nuclear catastrophe.

This revelation underscores a critical, often overlooked, dimension of modern warfare: the responsibility to mitigate collateral damage, not just in terms of human life, but also in safeguarding the environment from long-lasting, irreversible harm. Israel’s decision reflects a complex balance between its national security interests and moral responsibility toward the region and the broader international community.

Military Strategy vs. Environmental Catastrophe

Israel’s principal security concern has long been the prevention of Iran obtaining nuclear weapons. However, this goal is pursued within a framework that includes environmental calculations. Enriched uranium, while not yet weaponised, remains highly dangerous if suddenly exposed or dispersed, particularly in populated areas. An airstrike directly on these uranium stockpiles could have resulted in the contamination of vast areas, potentially causing widespread ecological damage and public health emergencies not just in Iran, but potentially across borders, affecting neighbouring countries as well.

By choosing not to bomb these sites, Israel demonstrated a sophisticated level of strategic restraint. It prioritised degrading Iran’s nuclear development infrastructure—such as centrifuges, command centres, and missile systems—without risking the kind of disaster that would have generated international condemnation and potentially even backlash from its closest allies.

Intelligence and Operational Precision

This episode also highlights the depth and precision of Israeli intelligence. Knowing not just where Iran’s nuclear assets were originally located but also tracking their movement under wartime conditions is a testament to the capabilities of Israel’s intelligence services, likely involving Mossad and advanced technological surveillance.

Such intelligence allows for surgical strikes that achieve maximum military effectiveness while minimising unintended consequences. It demonstrates a modern shift in military doctrine where raw firepower is supplemented, and sometimes subordinated, to information dominance and precision targeting.

The Ethical Dimension of Warfare

The choice not to attack the enriched uranium also raises important ethical considerations. In warfare, especially in asymmetrical conflicts or wars involving weapons of mass destruction, ethical decision-making can play a pivotal role in maintaining a country’s global standing. Israel, often under international scrutiny, appeared to weigh the costs not only in terms of Iranian retaliation but in terms of potential humanitarian and environmental disaster.

Avoiding an environmental crisis likely preserved civilian lives, regional ecological balance, and even the long-term health of the Iranian population, many of whom are not aligned with the country's ruling regime. In this context, while aggressive in military terms, Israel's decision also exhibits a degree of humanitarian consideration.

Implications for Future Conflicts

This calculated restraint sets a potential precedent for how future conflicts, especially those innvolving nuclear materials, might be conducted. It sends a message to adversaries that while critical infrastructure can be targeted and disabled, there are boundaries that even hostile states may respect—boundaries dictated by global norms and the universal interest in preventing environmental disasters.

Moreover, this situation could influence how Iran secures its nuclear assets going forward. Knowing that Israel has the capability to detect and monitor these stockpiles—even under the rubble—could force Iran to adopt new methods of concealment or reconsider its storage strategies.

Conclusion

The Israeli decision to avoid targeting Iran’s enriched uranium stockpiles directly demonstrates a sophisticated approach to warfare that blends military efficiency with ethical restraint. It reflects an understanding of the interconnected nature of modern conflict, where military, environmental, and humanitarian concerns are inseparably linked. In choosing this path, Israel not only achieved significant tactical victories but also avoided crossing a threshold that could have triggered catastrophic regional consequences. This episode stands as a powerful example of how national security can be pursued with an acute awareness of global responsibility.

 

Iran’s Shift from Western GPS to BeiDou: A Strategic Response in the 12-Day War

 Iran’s Shift from Western GPS to BeiDou: A Strategic Response in the 12-Day War

The 12-day war between Israel and Iran not only reshaped military balances but also revealed a critical new dimension of modern warfare: the battle for control over space-based navigation systems. One of the most significant developments during this conflict was Iran’s official shutdown of Western GPS services within its borders and its rapid switch to China’s BeiDou satellite network. This move is more than a tactical adjustment; it is a profound geopolitical and technological statement that signals Iran’s determination to sever its dependence on Western-controlled infrastructures.

The Role of GPS in Modern Warfare

Global Positioning System (GPS) technology, developed and controlled by the United States, has become the backbone of global navigation, timing, and targeting. Modern military operations—from drone strikes to missile guidance, troop movements, and precision logistics—rely heavily on satellite-based navigation.

In previous conflicts, the United States and its allies have leveraged GPS dominance to achieve operational superiority. Access to or denial of GPS signals can critically influence the outcome of military engagements. For Iran, continued reliance on Western GPS presented a security vulnerability, particularly in the face of advanced Israeli airstrikes, cyber operations, and surveillance that may have been coordinated or enhanced using GPS-based intelligence.

Iran’s Decision to Shut Down Western GPS

During the 12-day war, Iran reportedly disabled GPS systems within its territory, cutting itself off from Western satellite navigation to prevent precision strikes, surveillance, and tracking by foreign actors. By doing so, Iran likely sought to:

• Protect sensitive military sites from being targeted via GPS-guided munitions.
• Disrupt foreign intelligence and drone operations that rely on GPS accuracy.
• Demonstrate technological resilience against cyber and space-based attacks.

This action illustrates a growing awareness within Iran’s military command of the risks associated with being part of a system controlled by geopolitical adversaries.

The Switch to China’s BeiDou System

Iran’s immediate transition to China’s BeiDou Navigation Satellite System is a strategic manoeuvre with military and diplomatic consequences.

Military Advantages:

• Independent Navigation: Using BeiDou, Iran ensures it is no longer vulnerable to GPS manipulation, jamming, or signal denial by Western powers.
• Secure Communication: BeiDou offers encrypted, high-precision military-grade signals less susceptible to external interference.
• Alliance Strengthening: Adopting BeiDou may open access to China’s growing military technology ecosystem, enhancing Iran’s defence capabilities.

Diplomatic Signal:

Iran’s embrace of BeiDou also has a clear political message: Tehran is moving further away from Western spheres of influence and aligning itself with China’s global technological framework. It formally rejects Western dominance in digital infrastructure and a public pivot toward alternative power centres.

This shift comes as China actively promotes BeiDou as a competitor to GPS, especially among countries resistant to U.S. global influence. By joining the BeiDou network, Iran is not only gaining technical independence but also strengthening its partnership with China in the context of what is increasingly seen as a multipolar world order.

Broader Implications

For the Region:

Iran’s decision could inspire other nations in the Middle East to explore alternatives to GPS, especially those seeking to distance themselves from Western hegemony. The proliferation of BeiDou in the region could gradually erode U.S. technological dominance.

For Global Navigation Competition:

This development highlights the growing weaponisation of space-based infrastructure. Satellite systems are not just civilian conveniences but battlegrounds for influence, security, and control. As more countries like Iran shift to alternative systems, the world may see the emergence of parallel navigation ecosystems with competing technical standards and security protocols.

For Iran’s Future Conflicts:

By switching to BeiDou, Iran has signalled that it will no longer be vulnerable to Western-controlled satellite warfare. This complicates the intelligence landscape, making future precision attacks more difficult for adversaries like Israel and the United States.

Conclusion: A Technological Break with the West

Iran’s shutdown of GPS within its borders and its rapid adoption of China’s BeiDou system during the 12-day war is a turning point in both military strategy and geopolitical alignment. It reflects a strategic decoupling from Western infrastructures and a clear choice to integrate into China’s growing sphere of technological influence.

This move underscores how modern warfare is no longer confined to land, sea, and air—it is increasingly fought in the invisible realms of cyberspace and satellite networks. As Iran builds its future military capabilities on platforms outside of Western control, the balance of technological power continues to shift, heralding a new phase in the global contest for space-based dominance.