Tuesday, August 9, 2022

Self-rule and shared rules.



የኢትዮጵያ ፌዴራላዊ ዲሞክራሲያዊ ሪፐብሊክ ሕገ መንግሥት በሚከተለው አንቀጾች ላይ የተመሠረተው ፍልስፍና ይህ ነው።
የራስን ዕድል በራስ የመወሰን ንድፈ ሐሳብ ትልቁ ጥቅም የሚሰጠው ግንዛቤ ነው።  ብቃት፣ ዝምድና እና ራስን በራስ ማስተዳደር ለተነሳሽነት እና አፈጻጸም ምን ያህል አስፈላጊ እንደሆኑ ከተገነዘቡ ፍላጎቶችዎ መሟላታቸውን ለማረጋገጥ እርምጃዎችን መውሰድ ይችላሉ።

 ይህ ችሎታ በስነ ልቦና ጤንነት እና ደህንነት ላይ ትልቅ ሚና ይጫወታል.  ራስን መወሰን ሰዎች በምርጫዎቻቸው እና በሕይወታቸው ላይ ቁጥጥር እንዳላቸው እንዲሰማቸው ያስችላቸዋል።  በተጨማሪም በተነሳሽነት ላይ ተፅእኖ አለው - ሰዎች የሚያደርጉት ነገር በውጤቱ ላይ ተጽእኖ እንደሚፈጥር ሲሰማቸው እርምጃ ለመውሰድ የበለጠ ተነሳሽነት ይሰማቸዋል.

የራሳቸውን ፖሊሲ ለመወሰን፣ የገንዘብ ድጋፍ እና ተግባራዊ ለማድረግ ምን ያህል ነፃ እንደሆኑ።  እርግጥ ነው፣ ራስን በራስ ማስተዳደር የተለያዩ መንገዶችን ሊወስድ ይችላል፣ ማለትም ከከፍተኛ ደረጃ ደረጃዎች ያፈነገጠ ወይም የሚቃረን የሕዝብ ፖሊሲ ​​ውሳኔዎችን የማድረግ ኃይል፣  በልዩ ቀረጥ ገቢን የማሳደግ አቅም - ወይም አይደለም, እና የክልል ተሻጋሪ የግብር ውድድርን ያቀጣጥላል;  ለተወሰኑ ፕሮጀክቶች የፌዴራል ገንዘብን የመቀበል ወይም የመከልከል ነፃነት;  ወይም ብሄራዊ ደንቦችን በክልል ዝርዝሮች መሰረት የመተግበር ችሎታ, ለምሳሌ.  ንብረትን ለመመዝገብ የበለጠ ከባድ ወይም ቀላል ያድርጉት።  በዚህ ሁሉ ግን፣ ውሳኔዎች ሁልጊዜ ከክልሉ ግዛት ጋር ብቻ ይዛመዳሉ፣ ይህም እራስን በራስ የማስተዳደር “ራስን” የሚያመለክተው ነው።  የተጋራ ህግ፣ በአንፃሩ፣ የግዛት ኃይሉን ሦስት  መገለጫዎች ሊያመለክት ይችላል፣ ይህም በትክክል ማን እንደ "ጋራ" - አካል - ልንጋራው የምንችለው ከሌላ ሰው ጋር ብቻ እንደሆነ በመወሰን፣ ይህ ሌላ የጋራ መረዳትን የሚገልጽ ነው።  
የራስን ዕድል በራስ የመወሰን ፅንሰ-ሀሳብ፣ አንድን ህዝብ ከነባሩ እናት ግዛቱ መገንጠሉን እንደ የመጨረሻ አማራጭ፣ ህዝብ በተጨቆነበት ሁኔታ ወይም የእናት ክልሉ መንግስት የህዝብን ጥቅም በህጋዊ መንገድ በማይወክልበት ሁኔታ ውስጥ ሆኖ ቆይቷል።  በ 20 ኛው ክፍለ ዘመን የዓለም አቀፍ ሕግ እድገት ሁሉ የማያቋርጥ።  ከተባበሩት መንግስታት ድርጅት ቻርተር በተጨማሪ የሁለት የተባበሩት መንግስታት መግለጫዎች የራስን እድል በራስ የመወሰንን ጉዳይ ማለትም እ.ኤ.አ.  ወደ መገንጠል የሚያደርሰው ቁርጠኝነት እንደ የመጨረሻ አማራጭ ከቅኝ ግዛት የመግዛት ሥርዓት ውስጥ ብቻ፡- እዚህ ላይ ሁለቱም ቅድመ ሁኔታዎች የተሟሉለት የራስን ዕድል በራስ የመወሰን መብት ቅኝ የተገዙ ህዝቦች እስከተጨቆኑ እና ቅኝ ገዥ መንግስቶቻቸው ጥቅማቸውን በበቂ ሁኔታ እስካልወከሉ ድረስ ነው።  ሁለቱም መግለጫዎች የነባር ግዛቶችን የግዛት አንድነት መርህ አስፈላጊነት ያረጋገጡ ሲሆን በዚህም ራስን በራስ ማስተዳደር የነባር ግዛቶችን የግዛት መፈራረስ በከፋ ጭቆና ወይም ቅኝ ግዛት ውስጥ ብቻ ነው የሚለውን ሀሳብ ተቀብለዋል።

 እንደየሁኔታው ውስጣዊም ሆነ ውጫዊ የራስን ዕድል በራስ የመወሰን መብቶችን የሚጨምር በመሆኑ፣ አለማቀፍ ህግ የራስን ዕድል በራስ የመወሰን መርህን በሁለትዮሽ መልክ ለመቀበል ተዘጋጅቷል ተብሎ ሊከራከር ይችላል።  በቅኝ ግዛት ስር ወይም በተጨቆኑ ቡድኖች ውስጥ ያልተካተቱ ህዝቦች እራሳቸውን በራሳቸው የማስተዳደር መብታቸውን በውስጥ መንገዶች ማለትም በነጻ የመደራጀት እና ራስን በራስ የማስተዳደር መብት ሊጠቀሙበት ይችላሉ።  የተጨቆኑ ወይም በቅኝ ግዛት ስር ያሉ ህዝቦች ግን ከእናት ሀገራቸው በመገንጠል የውጭ የራስን እድል በራስ የመወሰን መብት አላቸው።ይህ የራስን ዕድል በራስ የመወሰን አመለካከት በ1998 በካናዳ ጠቅላይ ፍርድ ቤት የቀረበውን የመገንጠል ሀሳብ በተመለከተ የተረጋገጠ ነው።  የኩቤክ ከካናዳ፣ ፍርድ ቤቱ ሁሉም ህዝቦች የተለያዩ የውስጥ የራስን ዕድል በራስ የመወሰን መብት እንዳላቸው፣ ነገር ግን አንዳንድ ህዝቦች ብቻ ለምሳሌ በወረራ፣ በቅኝ ግዛት ስር ያሉ እና ምናልባትም ጭቆና፣ የውጭ ራስን የማግኘት መብት ሊያገኙ እንደሚችሉ ገልጿል።  ውሳኔ በማሻሻያ መገንጠል ዛሬ፣ ዓለም አቀፍ ሕግ ለሁሉም ሕዝቦች የራስን ዕድል በራስ የመወሰን መብት ይሰጣል፣ ነገር ግን የውጭ የራስን ዕድል በራስ የመወሰን መብት፣ በመፍትሔ መገንጠል የሚሠራው በአስቸጋሪ ሁኔታዎች ውስጥ ብቻ ነው፣ በቅኝ ግዛት ሥር ለተያዙ እና ክፉኛ የሚመለከት ነው ብሎ መደምደም ይቻላል።  የሚሰደዱ ህዝቦች.

 መገንጠል

 አለም አቀፍ ህግ የራስን እድል በራስ የመወሰን መርህን ቢይዝም የመገንጠል መብት ግን አልያዘም።
 አለም አቀፍ ህግ መገንጠልን የሚታገሰው በውጫዊ የራስን ዕድል በራስ የመወሰን ሁኔታ፣ አንድ ህዝብ በቅኝ ግዛት ስር ወይም በተጨቆነ (እንደ ኮሶቮ ሁኔታ) ብቻ ነው ተብሎ መከራከር ይችላል።  በተጨማሪም ተገንጣይ አካል ሌላ መሰረታዊ የአለም አቀፍ ህግ ህግን በመጣስ ለምሳሌ የሃይል አጠቃቀምን (እንደ ሰሜናዊ ቆጵሮስ ሁኔታ) በመጣስ መለያየት በአለም አቀፍ ህግ የተከለከለ ነው።  መገንጠል፣ የሚመለከተው ህዝብ የማይጨቆንበት፣ እንደ ኩቤክ ወይም ስኮትላንድ፣ አለም አቀፍ ህግ መገንጠልን በተመለከተ ገለልተኛ ነው - የመገንጠል መብትን አይደግፍም ወይም መገንጠልን አይከለክልም።  ይልቁንም የመገንጠል ውዝግብ ለሀገር ውስጥ ህግ እና በእናት ግዛቱ እና በመገንጠል አካል መካከል ለሚደረገው ፖለቲካዊ ድርድር የተተወ ነው።

አንቀጽ 39. የብሔሮች፣ ብሔረሰቦችና ሕዝቦች መብቶች

 1. ማንኛውም የኢትዮጵያ ብሔር፣ ብሔረሰብና ሕዝብ የራስን ዕድል በራስ የመወሰን የመገንጠል መብትን ጨምሮ ያለ ምንም ቅድመ ሁኔታ መብት አለው።

 2. ማንኛውም የኢትዮጵያ ብሔር፣ ብሔረሰብ፣ ሕዝብ የራሱን ቋንቋ የመናገር፣ የመጻፍና የማሳደግ መብት አለው።  ባህሉን ለመግለጽ, ለማዳበር እና ለማስተዋወቅ;  እና ታሪኩን ለመጠበቅ.

 3. ማንኛውም የኢትዮጵያ ብሔር፣ ብሔረሰብና ሕዝብ ራሱን በራሱ የማስተዳደር ሙሉ መብት አለው ይህም በሚኖርበት ክልል ውስጥ የመንግሥት ተቋማትን የማቋቋምና በክልል እና በፌዴራል መንግስታት ውስጥ ፍትሃዊ ውክልና የማግኘት መብትን ይጨምራል።

 4. የማንኛውም ብሔር፣ ብሔረሰብና ሕዝብ የራስን ዕድል በራስ የመወሰን የመገንጠል መብት ተግባራዊ ይሆናል።

 (ሀ) የመገንጠል ጥያቄ በብሔሩ፣ ብሔረሰቦች ወይም ሕዝቦች የሕግ አውጭ ምክር ቤት አባላት በሁለት ሦስተኛ ድምፅ ተቀባይነት ሲያገኝ፣

 ለ) የሚመለከተው ምክር ቤት የመገንጠል ውሳኔ ከተቀበለበት ጊዜ አንሥቶ በሦስት ዓመት ጊዜ ውስጥ መካሄድ ያለበትን ሕዝበ ውሳኔ የፌዴራሉ መንግሥት ሲያዘጋጅ።

 (ሐ) የመገንጠል ጥያቄ በሪፈረንደም አብላጫ ድምፅ ሲደገፍ፤

 (መ) የፌዴራሉ መንግሥት ሥልጣንን ለመገንጠል ድምፅ ለሰጠው የብሔር፣ ብሔረሰብ ወይም ሕዝብ ምክር ቤት ሲያስተላልፍ፤  እና

 (ሠ) የንብረት ክፍፍል በሕግ በተደነገገው መንገድ ሲሞት.

 5. “ብሔር፣ ብሔረሰብ ወይም ሕዝብ” ለዚህ ሕገ መንግሥት ዓላማ ሰፊ የሆነ የጋራ ባህል ወይም ተመሳሳይ ልማዶች፣ የቋንቋ መግባባት፣ የጋራ ወይም ተዛማጅ ማንነቶች ያላቸው ወይም የሚጋሩ ሰዎች ስብስብ ነው።  አንድ የተለመደ የስነ-ልቦና ሜካፕ፣ እና ሊለይ በሚችል በዋናነት ተያያዥነት ባለው ክልል ውስጥ የሚኖሩ።
አንቀጽ 46. የፌዴሬሽኑ ክልሎች

 1. ፌዴራላዊ ዲሞክራሲያዊ ሪፐብሊክ ክልሎችን ያቀፈ ይሆናል።

 2. ክልሎች የሚወሰኑት በሕዝብ አሰፋፈር፣ ቋንቋ፣ ማንነት እና ፈቃድ ላይ በመመስረት ነው።

Saturday, July 23, 2022

House of federation and Senate.




በኢትዮጵያ ፌዴሬሽን እንደሌሎች ፓርላሜንታሪ ዲሞክራሲ ሴኔት የለም።  የፌዴሬሽኑ ምክር ቤት በስልጣኑ እና ተግባሩ ከአሜሪካ ሴኔት የተለየ ነው።

አንቀጽ 62. 
የፌዴሬሽን ምክር ቤት ሥልጣንና ተግባር

  1. ምክር ቤቱ ሕገ መንግሥቱን የመተርጎም ሥልጣን አለው።

  2. የሕገ መንግሥት ጉዳዮች አጣሪ ጉባኤን ያደራጃል።

  3. የብሔሮች፣ ብሔረሰቦችና ሕዝቦች የራስን ዕድል በራስ የመወሰን የመገንጠል መብትን በሚመለከቱ ጉዳዮች ላይ በሕገ መንግሥቱ መሠረት ይወስናል።

  4. የኢትዮጵያ ህዝቦች በህገ መንግስቱ የተደነገጉትን እኩልነት ያጎለብታል፣ በጋራ መፈቃቀድ ላይ የተመሰረተ አንድነታቸውን ያበረታታል፣ ያጠናክራል።

  5. ለእሱ እና ለሕዝብ ተወካዮች ምክር ቤት በአደራ የተሰጡትን ሥልጣኖች በአንድ ጊዜ ይሠራል።

  6. በክልሎች መካከል ለሚፈጠሩ አለመግባባቶች ወይም አለመግባባቶች መፍትሄ ለማግኘት ጥረት ያደርጋል።

  7. ከፌዴራል እና ከክልሎች የጋራ የታክስ ምንጮች የሚገኘውን የገቢ ክፍፍል እና የፌዴራል መንግሥት ለክልሎች የሚሰጠውን ድጎማ ይወስናል።

  8. በሕዝብ ተወካዮች ምክር ቤት ሕጎች እንዲወጡ የሚጠይቁትን የፍትሐ ብሔር ጉዳዮች ይወስናል።

  9. ይህንን ሕገ መንግሥት በመጣስ የማንኛውም ክልል የፌዴራል ጣልቃ ገብነት ሕገ መንግሥታዊ ሥርዓቱን አደጋ ላይ ይጥላል።

  10. ቋሚና ጊዜያዊ ኮሚቴዎችን ያቋቁማል

  11. የምክር ቤቱን አፈ ጉባኤ እና ምክትል አፈ ጉባኤ ይመርጣል፣ የአሰራርና የውስጥ አስተዳደር ደንብ ያወጣል።
ሴኔቱ የፕሬዚዳንቱን ሹመት የማረጋገጥ፣የመምከር እና የመስጠት ስልጣን ብቻ ሲኖረው  ስምምነቶችን ለማጽደቅ ስምምነት.  ነገር ግን ከዚህ ህግ ውጪ ሁለት ሁኔታዎች አሉ፡ ምክር ቤቱ ለምክትል ፕሬዝዳንትነት ቀጠሮዎችን እና የውጭ ንግድን የሚመለከት ማንኛውንም ስምምነት ማጽደቅ አለበት።
የፌዴሬሽን ምክር ቤት ሕገ መንግሥቱን ይተረጉማል።  እንደ ዩኤስኤ ሴኔት የህግ አውጭነት ሚና እና ህግ ማውጣት።  ሆኖም የፌዴሬሽኑ ምክር ቤት ውሳኔ እንደ ሕግ ወይም የሕገ መንግሥቱ አካል ተደርጎ ይቆጠራል።
የፌዴሬሽኑ ምክር ቤት አብዛኞቹ ገጽታዎች የሪፐብሊኩን ሉዓላዊ ስልጣንን ይወክላል።  ውክልና ስለሆነ።

አንቀፅ 8. 

የህዝብ ሉዓላዊነት

  1. ሁሉም ሉዓላዊ ስልጣን የሚኖረው በኢትዮጵያ ብሄሮች፣ ብሄረሰቦችና ህዝቦች ውስጥ ነው።

  2. ይህ ሕገ መንግሥት የሉዓላዊነታቸው መግለጫ ነው።

  3. ሉዓላዊነታቸው የሚገለጸው በዚህ ሕገ መንግሥት መሠረት በተመረጡ ተወካዮቻቸው አማካይነትና በቀጥታ፣ በዴሞክራሲያዊ ተሳትፎ ነው።
ስለ አናሳ መብት ጥያቄዎ ፣ ሁሉም በእኩልነት በቤቱ ውስጥ ይወከላሉ እና የቤቱ ሚና ሁሉንም የአናሳዎች መብቶችን ስለመጠበቅ ነው።
የኢትዮጵያ ችግር በሕገ መንግሥቱ ላይ የተጻፈው አይደለም።  የሕገ መንግሥቱን መርሆች ተግባራዊ ማድረግ ያልቻሉ መሪዎች ችግር ነው።  የአቅም ማነስ፣ ድንቁርና እና እብሪተኝነት፣ በተጨማሪም የፖለቲካ ፍላጎት ማጣት።
Comments from kassim Adam. On this post. 
Michael Edwards በመጀመርያ ይህን የህገመንግስት አሰራር ሂደትና ፍልስፍና ፣ ስላካፈልከን ከልብ አመሰግናለሁ። ተመሳሳይ እይታዎችን ከ ፕሮፌሰር ህዝቅኤል ገቢሳ ጋር በተደረጉ ቃለ መጠይቆች ውስጥ መስማቴን አስታውሳለሁ። እኔ እስካሁን የነበረኝ እሳቤ ፣ የራሳቸው የፕሮፌሰሩ የግል አመለካከት እንደነበር ነው። እንደ እሳቸው አገላለፅ ፣ የኦሮሞ ክልል ፣ የራሱ ህገመንግስት ፣ የራሱ ሰራዊት ፣ የራሱ ህዝባዊ ሙዝሙር ፣ የራሱ ሃገ እና ባንዲራ አለው። አሁን የሚቀረው ይላሉ ፕሮፌሰር ፣ ኦሬሞ ነፃነቱን አውጆ ከውጭው አለም እውቅናን ማግኘት ብቻ ነው።  
        አሁን እየፃፍኩ ያለሁት ፣ ከላይ ካካፈልከን ነጥቦች ውስጥ አንቀፅ 3 ላይ በመነሳት ነው። እዚህ ላይ አንድ ነገር ላስገነዝብህ እወዳለሁ። የብሄሮች የራስን በራስ አስተዳደር ጥያቄ  በ1943 ይመስለኛል የተደረገው የተባበሩት መንግስታት ሸንጎ ያወጣው እና ያፀደቀው ረቂቅ ላይ የተመሰረተ ነው። ይህ ኮንቬንሽን ባስቀመጠው አለም አቀፍ መመሪያ መሰረት ብዙ የቅኝ ግዛት አገሮች ፣ በተለይም ከኢትዮጵያ በቀር መላው አፍሪካ ነፃ የወጣበትን እንቅስቃሴ ያቀጣጠለ ሰነድ ነው። ስለዚህም አሁን በእኛ ሁኔታ ፣ ኢትዮጵያ የምትባል አገር ቅኝ እየገዛችን ነው የሚሉ ፣ የሌላ አገር ቋንቋ ፣ ባህል እና ስርአት አባላት ካሉ ፣ የራሳቸውን አገር እና መንግስት እንዲፈጥሩ በር ይከፍታል ማለት ነው። ቀደም ሲል የኤርትራ ጥያቄ የብሄር ጥያቄ ነው ወይስ የቅኝ ግዛት ጥያቄ የሚለው ከፍተኛ ችግር የተነሳበት አይነተኛ ምክንያትም ይሄው ነው። ኤርትራውያንም ቅኝ እየተገዛን ነው ብለው ድርቅ ያሉበት ምክንያት ፣ ከኢትዮጵያ ለመገንጠል በነበራቸው ፅኑ አላማ የተነሳ ነው። 
      የዚሁ ኮንቬንሽን አንቀፅ ሁለት በሌላ በኩል ፣ ጥያቄው በአንድ Sovereign አገር ውስጥ ሲነሳ ፣ በዛ ሃገር የውስጥ ጉዳይ ላይ ማንም ጣልቃ መግባት የለበትም ሲል በግልፅ ይከለክላል። አሁን በኛ ዘመን ሶማሊ ውስጥ የተፈጠሩ የእርስ በርስ ችግሮች ፣ የተለያዩ ሪፓብሊኮችን የፈጠሩ ቢመስልም ፣ በተባበሩት መንግስታት ዘንድ እውቅናን ያላገኙበትም ምክንያት ይሄው ነው።
     የኦሮሞ ክልል level of autonomy ምን መሆን እንዳለበት መወሰን ያለበት እርልሱ የኦሮሞ ህዝብ ነው። ነገር ግን ይህን መናገር እንጅ መስራት ቀላል ነገር አይደለንም ። በጥያቄው ዙርያ ፣ ጥራት የሌለው እና ግልፅነት የተራበ ዕስትራቴጅ የሚያራምዱ አካሎች ፣ የፖለቲካ ድርጅቶች እየተራኮቱ በመሆኑ ማለቴ ነው። ኦሮሞ እና ትግራይ መሆን የሚፈልጉትን መሞገት ጥቅም የሌለው ነገር መሆኑን አሁን እየተገነዘብን ነው። ነገር ግን እነሱ የሆኑትን ሌላውም እንዲሆን አስገዳጅ ሁኔታዎች ተፈጥረዋል ብየ ነው የማምነው። ይህ ሁኔታ ደግሞ በፅሞና ካልታየ ፣ ኢትዮጵያን እንደ ሃገር ይበትናታል።

House of Federation.

Federeeshinii Itiyoophiyaa keessa akka biyyoota dimokiraasii paarlaamaa birootti senetiin hin jiru.  Manni Maree Federeeshinii Seenetii Ameerikaa irraa gama aangoo fi hojii isaatiin adda.
 Keewwata 62. 
Aangoo fi hojii Mana Maree Federeeshinii

   1. Manni Marichaa Heera Mootummaa hiikuuf aangoo qaba.

   2. Dhimmoota heera mootummaa irratti konfiraansii qorannoo ni qopheessa.

   3. Dhimmoota mirga hiree murteeffannaa saboota, sablammootaa fi ummattoota adda bahuun wal qabatan irratti bu’uura heera mootummaatiin murtee ni kenna.

   4. Walqixxummaa ummata Itiyoophiyaa heeraan tumame ni guddisa, tokkummaa isaaniis walii galtee irratti hundaa’e ni cimsa, ni cimsa.

   5. Aangoo imaanaa itti kennamee fi Mana Maree Bakka Bu’oota Uummataaf yeroo walfakkaatutti ni fayyadama.

   6. Falmii ykn waliigaltee dhabuu mootummoota gidduu jiru furuuf tattaaffii ni taasisa.

   7. Ramaddii galii maddoota taaksii waloo federaalaa fi naannolee irraa argamu fi deeggarsa mootummaan federaalaa naannoleef kennu ni murteessa.

   8. Dhimmoota siviilii seera tumachuu barbaadan Manni Maree Bakka Bu’oota Uummataa ni murteessa.

   9. Mootummaan federaalaa heera kana cabsuun gidduu seenuun isaa sirna heera mootummaa balaadhaaf saaxiluu danda’a.

   10. Koree dhaabbataa fi yeroo ni hundeessa

   11. Afyaa’ii fi Itti aanaa Afyaa’ii Mana Marichaa ni fila, akkasumas dambii ittiin bulmaataa fi bulchiinsa keessoo ni diriirsa.
 Seeneetiin aangoo muudama Pirezidaantii mirkaneessuu, yaada kennuu fi raggaasisuu qofa osoo qabuu waliigalteewwan raggaasisuu.  Garuu seera kanaan ala wantoota lamatu jira: Manni marichaa muudama itti aanaa pirezidaantii fi waliigaltee daldala alaa ilaallatu kamiyyuu raggaasisuu qaba.
 Manni Maree Federeeshinii Heera Mootummaa hiika.  Gahee seera baasuu fi seera baasuu akka Seenetii USA.  Haa ta’u malee, murtiin Mana Maree Federeeshinii akka seeraatti ykn qaama heera mootummaatti ilaalama.
 Manni Maree Federeeshinii aangoo abbaa biyyummaa rippabiliikaa keessaa harka caalu bakka bu’a.  Bakka bu'ummaa waan ta'eef.

 Keewwata 8. 
Abbaa biyyummaa ummataa

   1. Aangoon abbaa biyyummaa hundi saboota, sablammootaa fi ummattoota Itoophiyaa keessa jiraata.

   2. Heerri kun labsii abbaa biyyummaa isaaniiti.

   .
 Gaaffii keessan waa’ee mirga xiqqaa ilaalchisee, hundi mana maree keessatti walqixa bakka bu’ummaa kan qaban yoo ta’u, gaheen mana marichaa mirga saboota xiqqaa hunda eeguudha.
 Rakkoon Itoophiyaa waan heera mootummaa keessatti barreeffame miti.  Rakkoo hoggantoota qajeeltoowwan heera mootummaa hojiirra oolchuu dadhabaniiti.  Dandeettii dhabuu, wallaalummaa fi of tuulummaa, dabalataan fedhii siyaasaa dhabuu.

State and Religion



International Journal of Constitutional Law 


Aernout J. Nieuwenhuis
International Journal of Constitutional Law, Volume 10, Issue 1, January 2012, Pages 153–174,  

Abstract
Comparative law research regarding the relationship between state and religion often uses models. These models normally run from more to less separation between state and religion. In this article it will be argued that this approach is too simple. The relationship between state and religion has various dimensions. A fragmentary overview of current issues in a number of countries shows that religion’s role may differ widely in different domains.

Issue Section: Symposium: The State of Church and State 

1. Introduction
For ages, the relationship between state and religion, more particularly between state and church, has been studied. Nevertheless, thoughts about this relationship have changed. During the Middle Ages, in Europe, the Christian religion determined the position of the state as well as the position of the Church. Religion gave state authorities and state power its legitimacy, and the government was the protector of the Christian faith. Nowadays, religion is no longer that fundamental; the starting points are democracy and the rule of law.

Therefore, freedom of religion and the principle of equality play important roles, when answering questions about the meaning of religion in a state. This development shows the secularization of the state1 and constitutional theory. The position and meaning attributed to religion in several European states may differ,2 but, in general, constitutional discourse no longer has a religious basis.

The implication is not that the relationship between state and religion can do without attention. The twentieth century may have seen the idea come into being that, as a result of modernization and rationalization, religion’s role would fade away or would, at least, be limited to the private sphere. Today’s reality, however, presents another picture.3 First, the secularization of society never has been a “global” phenomenon. Outside of Europe, New Zealand and Uruguay might be the only countries with a similar development;4 within Europe, there exist huge differences as well. Second, the decrease in the number of members of religious communities need not correspond to a similar decrease in the number of believers.5 Third, religion remains an important factor in the social, cultural, and political domains. It turns out that religion cannot be reduced to a personal conviction, which has no meaning outside the private sphere, to some kind of a near hobby.

1.1. Renewed interest 

In Europe, one of the most important reasons for the renewed interest in the relationship between state and religion has been the large increase in the number of Muslims, whose religion sometimes appears to put a stamp on their entire life and whose religious communities seem to play an important social and cultural role.6 Simultaneously, there may exist a reinforced interest in the position of strict Christian groups.

Another, separate reason for this renewed interest is the emergence of religiously inspired terrorism. Even if that is not considered an overture to a clash of civilizations, the question has to be answered regarding what a government’s position should be facing radical religious groups. Other reasons for the renewed interest in the relationship between state and religion may also be mentioned such as a growing need for providing meaning to life and to society as a whole.7 In the Netherlands, in any case, there is an additional reason. The secularization and the simultaneous decline of the pillarization of society after World War II8 lead to specific questions about government’s role in connection with societal organizations with religious backgrounds.

1.2. Outline and terminology 

This article deals with the relationship between state and religion in a comparative law approach. As regards the term “religion,” the term can be defined as a coherent whole of doctrine and practice with belief in a supreme being as a central idea.

Many states are actually struggling with similar problems, although their points of departure differ widely. Comparative law studies often take for granted the existence of a spectrum of models running from an antagonistic relationship to a very close relationship between state and religion. Such a one-dimensional perspective, however, will be found to be too simple (section 2). One can distinguish at least three dimensions: religion’s role in state matters (section 3); government’s role in the religious domain (section 4); and the relationship between state and religion in several other domains, such as the formation of political opinion (section 5), the social service sector (section 6), and the field of education (section 7).

As a consequence, the term “public domain” is explicitly avoided. It is rather confusing to throw together state matters, public places, public opinion, publicly financed social services, public education, and so on.9 Religious expression in public, for that matter, falls outside the scope of this article. One remark, however, has to be made. Freedom of religion, even in a secular state such as France, not only protects religious expression in the private sphere. The French judiciary has blown the whistle on some overenthusiastic mayors who banned religious processions because of the public nature thereof.10

2. Comparative law and a spectrum of models 

The relationship between state and religion differs from country to country. Different approaches often appear in the constitutions. Article 1 of the French Constitution determines the laic nature of the French state. The establishment clause in the First Amendment of the Constitution of the United States prohibits not only the existence of an established church but has a wider meaning, as well, as will appear later. Article 140 of the German Constitution refers to some provisions of the constitution of the Weimar Republic that, on the one hand, prohibit the existence of an established church but, on the other hand, lay down that religious denominations may be recognized by the state. In England, of course, the Anglican Church is the established church.11 In the Netherlands, the separation of church and state is assumed to be an unwritten principle of constitutional law, as the Basic Law keeps silent on this issue.12

Legislation and case law elaborate the relationship between state and religion in the different countries. As a result, a very complicated picture arises. Therefore, comparative law studies often use models. Winfried Brugger, for example, uses six different models.13 In the first one, the state is completely opposed to religion. Albania, where in the seventies and eighties of the last century religion was officially banned, might have been an example. The second model is characterized by a “wall of separation” taken seriously not only in theory but in practice as well. Barring all religious signs from public education belongs here. The third model is less drastic: “separation” and “allowing for” are linked. Government may neither advance nor obstruct religion. The fourth model combines separation with some kind of cooperation. Germany, where the government, for example, takes care of the ‘church tax’ collection for recognized religious denominations, may serve as an example.14 This model can be distinguished from the fifth, which is characterized by a more formal unity of state and church in the form of an established church. State and church still have different aims, however; respectively, the citizen’s welfare and his salvation. In the last model that difference has disappeared, state and church actually converge in a theocracy.

It stands out—according to Brugger, as well—that the first and the last model do not agree with democracy and the rule of law. The fifth model causes some concern, at least, because an established church may have all kinds of advantages in comparison with other denominations.

In the literature, a similar classification is often used, a spectrum running from theocracies, where Vatican City might be one of the few examples, to states that are more or less hostile to religion.15 Another possibility is to drop, from the outset, the models that are contrary to democracy and the rule of law. Chris Soper and Stephen Monsma, for example, use only three models in their comparative law study of the situation in the United Sates, the Netherlands, Australia, Germany and the United Kingdom: a strict separation model, an established church model, and a so-called structural pluralistic model, wherein government recognizes that religion may play a part in all sorts of domains.16

2.1. More dimensions 

All these models have an ideal character. Therefore, it is not a strong argument that the real situation in a country differs from a certain model. There is, however, a more fundamental objection. The models are set out along what we may call a one-dimensional line running from more to less separation between state and religion. A number of reasons make such a conception too simplistic, as examples will show.

Apart from France, Turkey is (or was) considered a good example of a laic state, a state with a strict separation between state and religion. That holds true as far as we see for regulation regarding religious expression in the state machinery; however, we receive a different impression if we look into the government’s involvement in religious affairs. In Turkey, the government strongly influences the appointment of imams. From this point of view, it would be odd if France and Turkey were to fall under the same model. Another example: England and Greece are both countries with established churches, but they differ widely as far as the government’s position toward other denominations is concerned. The difference could be seen as greater than between England and certain states without an established church.17 The existence of an established church, in other words, does not have that much impact in this respect.

The classification becomes even more problematic if we take into account the fact that state and religion meet in social and cultural domains. Soper and Monsma’s third model regards, preeminently, the relationship in those domains.18 However, their findings—that the existence of an established church does not rule out the possibility that government might be well-disposed toward social and cultural organizations of all denominations—imply that there are different and relatively independent dimensions in the relationship between state and religion

A one-dimensional line suggests, mistakenly, that only the choice of one of the models presented may lead to a consistent set of answers to all kinds of completely different issues: civil servants’ dress regulations, financing denominational education, penalization of blasphemy, monitoring radical religious movements, and so on. This article distinguishes more dimensions in the relationship between state and religion to avoid that very suggestion.19 A distinction is made between religion’s position in state matters, government’s position in religious matters, and their relationship in other domains: political opinion formation, social services, and education.20 It is not inconceivable that one may defend a strict separation on the one point whereas, on another, a closer relationship might be acceptable. The result of a comparative law approach may be that arguments for separation or alliance will differ by dimension. To achieve a multifaceted impression, attention will be paid in particular to France, the United States, England, Germany, and the Netherlands.

3. Religion in the state domain 

Two current questions have to be answered here. The first one is: Should the government be allowed to use religious symbols and religious references? The second question is: Should civil servants be allowed to display their religious conviction at work? Before answering these questions we have to deal briefly with the legitimization of government authority and the justification of government policy.

Constitutions of democratic states often legitimize government authority by referring to the sovereignty of the people (Sweden, South Africa, Germany) or to the sovereignty of the nation (France, Belgium, Poland).21 Government authority does not have a religious or religiously inspired foundation.22 If a constitution points out the state’s purpose or highest value, these are described in rather general and abstract terms. Examples are the “common good” (United States, Poland) and “human dignity” (Germany). Such concepts may, in one way or another, be influenced by Christian culture; they are not in themselves of a religious nature.

Every citizen should be able to accept government authority and every citizen should be able to agree with the general aims of the state.23 In a pluralistic society, where a lot of people do not believe in a supreme being and all sorts of religions coexist, a religious foundation is, from the outset, out of the question.

The counterargument, that religious people cannot accept government authority if religion does not play a part in the official grounding thereof, does not hold true. This argument fails to appreciate that the individual is not completely tied to the state, and that the state has no authority in spiritual or religious matters whatsoever. From a religious point of view, linking the will of the supreme being with ever-failing government policies is not self-evident either.24

A similar argument is possible regarding the justification of specific regulations, policies, and other decisions. Church dignitaries should not ex officio have any power of political decision making,25 and government may not enforce religious rules or apply religious criteria. Even if the government takes into account the wishes of certain religious communities, the reason cannot be that the supreme being prescribes a certain measure. The reason may only be that freedom of religion has a certain importance.

3.1. Governments using religious discourse?

The question of whether government may use religious discourse raises controversies in many countries. The case law of the Supreme Court of the U.S. on this issue seems to be a rather diffuse compromise between the recognition of certain traditions, on the one hand, and stricter ideas about the separation of state and religion, based on the establishment clause, on the other. A good example of the first approach is the Supreme Court’s judgment on the practice of beginning the legislative session of the House of Representatives of Nebraska with a prayer by a publicly funded chaplain. The Supreme Court judged this tradition not to be contrary to the First Amendment.26 Actually, the Supreme Court’s own sessions begin with the formula “God save the United States and this honorable Court.” In other cases, the Supreme Court has given the separation of state and religion more impact. The Court banned the setting up of a nativity scene on public property,27 and the Court banned, as well, a picture of the Ten Commandments from a court room.28

In other countries we see similar phenomena. Shortly after the French Revolution, crucifixes disappeared from the French courtrooms.29 One hundred and fifty years later, in Germany, a conflict arose over the presence of a crucifix in a courtroom. The German Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) judged the complaint, based on the right to freedom of religion, justified. If the crucifix is not removed, the individual concerned would be wrongfully forced to conduct an action “under the cross.”30 In the Netherlands, no crucifixes are to be found in courtrooms. Other traditional religious references do exist, however. The formula “Wij Beatrix, bij de gratie Gods” (We Beatrix, by the Grace of God) in the preamble of every act may serve as an example. Compulsory regulation and the supreme being are bound together in a manner that does not belong in a pluralistic society. If this formula was absent, there would probably not be much enthusiasm for introducing it now.

3.2. Civil servants and religious symbols 

In the old days, the relationship between government and religion gave members of nondominant denominations a smaller chance of obtaining a government job.31 As a reaction, several constitutions lay down an equal right to government office.32 Therefore, religion, as such, may not be the reason not to appoint someone. The question whether a civil servant may show his religion is a different one. In answering this question, we have to balance two interests: the importance of an appearance of government neutrality and the importance of freedom of religion. These interests turn out to be balanced very differently in different countries.33

In France, a strict state neutrality is seen as a necessary condition for freedom of religion outside the state domain. Therefore, freedom of religion has no substantial weight for a civil servant at work. Wearing religious symbols by civil servants is completely banned by law. The kind of work is not relevant; nor does it matter if a civil servant has contact with the public or not.34 The situation in England differs widely. For years, Sikhs wearing turbans have been working on the London Metropolitan Police Force. Headscarves matching the style of the uniforms have been designed, as well. That police officers should be allowed to wear a headscarf is not completely uncontroversial, however.

To a certain extent, the United States presents a similar picture. In 1986, the Supreme Court accepted a ban on a Jewish Air Force officer’s wearing a yarmulke, even though he was wearing it under his Air Force cap outside the officers’ premises. One of the arguments was the separation of church and state. Congress reacted, however, by introducing a law establishing the right to wear such religious signs.35

A ban on police officers’ wearing beards, permitting exceptions on medical grounds but not on religious grounds, was judged to be contrary to the First Amendment because government had failed to advance “compelling reasons.” Nowadays, some police forces are permitting officers to wear a headscarf. A prison guard who was told by the prison board that he was not allowed to wear his kufi anymore brought his case successfully to court.36

In my view, the importance of outward neutrality is rather small regarding civil servants working, for example, at the public gardens or civil servants who do not have contact with the public at all. In these cases, freedom of religion—even during working hours—outweighs neutrality arguments. The French general ban, therefore, is too harsh.

On the other hand, the importance of outward neutrality is considerable as regards civil servants exercising authority. In this respect, one may think, in the first place, of the judiciary, whose appearance of neutrality can even be justified by the fundamental right to a fair trial. In the second place, one may think of the police. Their uniforms are also meant to stress the impersonal and public character of their position.37 These civil servants’ interest in manifesting their religion is less important than the state’s interest in exercising authority without any appearance of religious preference. The constitutional principle of separation between state authority and religion takes precedence; otherwise, this same authority would be undermined in a partly multireligious and partly nonreligious society. Moreover, in specific cases, religious symbols may cause opposition to or mistrust of government actions. The counterargument—that government authority is reinforced when the public sees expressions of “pluriformity”38—has a rather ambiguous nature, especially if it is stressed, at the same time, that the symbols concerned can be made to harmonize with the uniform in such a way that they are no longer conspicious.

The objection that, for example, a judge wearing a religious symbol may be doing his job excellently ignores the issue that not expressing oneself religiously is an inherent part of the job. That is even truer for a civil servant who, by reason of religion, does not want to conclude civil marriages between homosexuals. He refuses to do a part of the job and, therefore, is not a likely person for his position.39

The argument to the effect that certain groups in society are being excluded from certain government jobs is not convincing. That exclusion, after all, is not motivated by pointing at religious conviction, as such, but by pointing at religiously inspired behavior.40

4. Government in the religious domain
A second dimension of the relationship between state and religion concerns the state’s tasks as far as religious matters are concerned. Attention must be paid to two interrelated issues. What part should government play regarding religion, substantively and should the government support religious communities financially?

4.1. Government and religious doctrine 

In the past, tensions between state and church were a regular phenomenon. As a result, governments were often inclined to interfere with the organization of religious communities and with religious doctrine. In England, the king as head of state, formally is still the supreme governor of the Church of England.41 The Crown has the power to appoint the bishops of the Church of England and the power to approve certain church regulations. In this connection, it should be mentioned that the Catholic bishops in the Alsace are appointed by the French president, a rather bizarre arrangement in a laical state.

In Turkey, the Diyanet, the Directorate General for Religious Matters, not only appoints imams42 but decides, as well, that respect for the state authorities and the army have to be represented as a religious duty. The power of the directorate to appoint imams is also relevant in other countries. The majority of the Dutch mosques for Muslims with a Turkish background fall under the powers of this directorate.43 Opportunistically, one might applaud this system, because the Turkish government prevents—up till now—the appointment of possibly radical imams.

Nevertheless, in a democracy under the rule of law, such forms of governmental influence should be rejected. The government should not prescribe which religious doctrine is right or true. Government has another vocation, and such entanglement often leads to advantages for certain denominations or certain currents of belief. From a religious point of view, it is also undesirable that the substance of a religion be dependent on political institutions and political decisions.

Preachers who teach that the supreme being rejects Western materialistic and degenerate societies may raise concern. The same holds true for the preaching of a rigid and archaic morality. There is no reason, however, for government intervention. Fundamental freedoms do exist for strongly dissenting convictions. For example, the opinion that heretics and apostates, after they are dead, will burn in hell, is a rather common fundamentalist starting point and does not amount to advocacy of lawless action. If preaching or teaching switches to coercion or incitement to criminal acts, of course, grounds for government intervention exist.

Up till now, in particular, government restrictions have been discussed. Governmental restraint in criminalizing dissenting opinions, however, leaves open the possibility that government itself defends and propagates liberal values.

4.2. State aid for religious communities
Another aspect of government involvement with churches and religious communities might be in backing them financially.

In a lot of countries, there exist various forms of government aid to religious communities. In France, the government is the owner of many church buildings and puts these buildings at the disposal of religious communities.44 It happens, as well, that governments back the construction of a church or a mosque.45 In Germany, the tax department collects the so-called church tax from the members of the denominations recognized under public law. Normal tax law sanctions apply. This church tax is an 8 percent surcharge above the tax on wages. This regulation results in the national religious communities in Germany being among the richest religious communities in Europe.46

In Belgium, since 1830, government not only pays the maintenance of church buildings but priests, reverends, and rabbis receive a state salary as well. This regulation pertains to only the recognized denominations. The main criteria for recognition is whether a denomination supplies a need for a segment of the population. By now, also imams receive a state salary.

Religious communities in England, including the established Church of England, do not receive direct state subsidies, nor do the religious communities in the United States.47 As far back as 1785, in Virginia, a tax plan meant to back religious communities was voted down. Jefferson was among the opponents.48 Nowadays, the establishment clause prohibits every form of state aid. The well-known Lemon test includes the strong criteria that “direct advancement of religion” is not allowed. Even the briefest of all interpretations of the establishment clause—“no coercion, no money”—makes clear that subsidies are completely out of the question.49

Arguments for state aid in European countries differ. In France, supporting.religious communities is seen against the background of the “nationalization” of church property after the French Revolution. In other countries, the supposed utility of religion is a point for attention as well.50 Sometimes, the argument seems to be that government has a part to play in guaranteeing the supply of basic spiritual needs, similar to government’s role in the health service. A counterargument could be that a lot of citizens do not really show a spiritual or religious need. Attributing such a need to every citizen is based on a unproven portrayal of mankind. An additional, tricky question is whether government should be allowed to control—as in the health service—the quality of the spiritual and religious services.

Speaking of religion’s value may mean, as well, that religion and religious communities play an important and useful role in society, providing a foundation for a common morality. However, religion’s role concerning morals is more and more controversial. In this respect, arguments against state aid are advanced as well. First, a citizen should not be forced to pay taxes for backing the preaching of convictions contrary to his own deeply felt convictions. This argument carries a certain weight in the U.S. doctrine of separation of church and state.51 In Europe, however, this argument is less forceful. The European Commission of Human Rights, for example, judged the support of religious communities with general public resources not contrary to freedom of religion, as laid down in article 9 ECHR.52

The above-mentioned U.S. doctrine may become stronger if one points to the fact that some denominations are presently teaching ideas that do not contribute to the well-being of homosexuals, unhappily married couples, or unmarried happy couples. In this respect, churches cannot be compared, for example, with museums or sports associations, which are often receive state aid. A government call to play sports more regularly, or to visit museums is not very controversial; a government call to visit churches or mosques more regularly, would be a horse of a different color.

One might put forward that only religious communities that feel very strongly about democratic values and the rule of law deserve state aid. Such an appraisal of religious doctrine, however, is neither possible nor desirable.53 Secular standards are not really proper or useful to assess the nature of spiritual and transcendental convictions. In this respect, one may point to former local Dutch government plans to bring more liberal forms of Islam into action to minimize radicalization.54 Such a policy is at odds with the principle of government neutrality, apart from the issue whether such a policy is effective at all. Such a policy might actually damage the credibility of more liberal religious communities.55

If a government financially backs certain religious communities, then the right of freedom of religion and the principle of equal treatment are rather strong arguments for possible aid to all denominations.56 If the government does not contribute financially to any denomination at all, neither freedom of religion nor the equality principle make it mandatory that a government should take care that every religious community has a similar quality building for their gatherings.57

The starting point, namely, that freedom of religion, in general, gives no grounds for facilitating religious communities, does not apply when government itself is responsible for hindering the exercise of the right to freedom of religion. Therefore, in most countries governments take care, for example, to supply the spiritual needs in the military.

5. State, religion and the forming of political opinion
In the United States, political candidates often use or have to use religious references to attract voters; in other countries, such as Germany and the Netherlands, this is less obvious, even though, at the same time, political parties with religious backgrounds do exist.

In this section, we will deal with several interrelated issues. First, the meaning and relevance of religious arguments in political debate; second, the question of whether a democracy under the rule of law should limit religiously inspired political ambitions. The answer to the question as to whether religiously inspired political parties have a special position follows naturally from this argument.

5.1. Religiously inspired political arguments58
It would be strange if diversity in a religiously pluralistic society would not show itself in the process of political opinion formation. Believers are religiously motivated, which does not always change when they enter the political arena. Moreover, religious communities may have special interests that they want to have represented in political debate. In a democracy, political rights like freedom of speech and association guarantee that everybody is entitled to participate in political discussions. In view of these fundamental rights, religiously inspired contributions have the same status as other contributions.59

All the same, we have seen that in a pluralistic society government had better not base its decisions on a religious foundation. From this point of view, religious arguments in the political debate might be considered less relevant.60 Some distinctions, however, may be useful here. Religious points of view may enrich discussions with arguments that otherwise would be without a voice.61 One may point to the idea that humans are imperfect beings. Such an idea casts doubt on all political movements wishing to build a perfect society.62 If, in this manner, political ideas are criticized by means of religious concepts, politicians, naturally, must be allowed to criticize these religious concepts for their part.

Another possibility could be that religiously inspired participants in the political debate translate their views and arguments into arguments with which anybody—believer or nonbeliever—might agree. Years ago, the main argument of a Dutch Reformed political party against the liberalization of pornography laws was that pornography should be considered a gross offense against God.63 On the other hand, a larger Christian political party wondered whether certain kinds of pornography were not contrary to human dignity.64 This latter argument may have a religious background, it still might appeal to everyone.

The assumption that religious arguments need some sort of translation is also important because compromises play a rather important part in democratic political opinion formation and decision making. A religious argument that is tantamount to an appeal to the inalterable will of the supreme being probably prevents concluding political compromises.

5.2. Limits to political opinion formation
Up till now, the argument in this section has focused mainly on the desirability of a well-functioning political debate. So far, the need for juridical norms limiting political rights has not been discussed. The situation might be different if religiously inspired political movements strive to establish a theocratic political system, wish to abolish equality between men and women, or want to classify nonbelievers as second-rate citizens.65

In countries such as the United States, a more formal concept of democracy prevails. Political freedoms are indivisible in the sense that they protect views and aspirations completely contrary to the starting points of a democracy under the rule of law. As long as political opinions are not considered incitement to imminent lawlessness, they are protected, no matter if they are, for example, of a racist or dictatorial nature. In other countries, a more substantive concept of democracy prevails. That appears clearly if a constitution—as in Germany, for example—includes unchangeable provisions, and a so-called abuse-of-fundamental-rights provision, which lays down that someone using his political freedoms to attack the liberal democratic “basic order” cannot appeal to fundamental political rights. As a result, the Constitution presents a framework for acceptable political opinion formation.

The Dutch Constitution does not explicitly lay down such a substantive framework; no abuse-of-fundamental-rights provision is included. Nevertheless, it is still possible that unwritten supraconstitutional starting points exist.66 While banning the political party CP86, the District Court argued that the activities of this party violated the generally accepted foundations of our state order, such as freedom and human dignity.67

Further research into such possible foundations falls beyond the scope of this article. Nevertheless, the position of religiously inspired political parties is clear enough. These parties have, in principle, the same position as other political parties.68 If religiously inspired parties strive for aims contrary to the starting points of a democracy under the rule of law, in Europe, they may be treated differently. Political parties which are convicted for discrimination may lose their state subsidies.69 In 2010, the Dutch Supreme Court ruled that political parties may not exclude women when drawing up lists of candidates for parliamentary elections. The party concerned is the SGP, an orthodox Christian political party, which, on the basis of biblical interpretation, assumes women to have a vocation outside the political sphere.

In certain circumstances, a political party striving for the establishment of a theocracy or the introduction of Shari’a may even be banned altogether.

6. State, religion, and social services
State and religion meet in society in the social and cultural domain. Of old, churches and religious communities have been involved in physical and mental health care and have supported the poor. Religious organizations in these fields were and still are assisted by a relatively large number of volunteers.

During the last two centuries, the part played by religious organizations in these areas has decreased, however. First, the above-mentioned services have been professionalized. As a result, the link with religion has become weaker, and the room for voluntary work has diminished. Second, the state has claimed a greater role for itself. Government’s task in this field is often affirmed by fundamental social rights provisions in constitutions or treaties, although these rights do not imply that there has to be a public sector supplying all the necessary services. So the question arises, what might be the role of private organizations with a religious background and, more particularly, whether and under what conditions government may or should subsidize such organizations?

Looking at different countries, a varied picture may be seen. In France, after the Revolution, the health care system was secularized, while, at the same time, illnesses were treated on a more medical-scientific basis. The present strong stress on laicism does not mean, however, that organizations such as the Catholic Juvenile Assistance Organization are excluded from financial support by the government. In the United Kingdom, a whole range of such organizations is backed by the government. In Germany, freedom of religion by itself obliges the government to create enough space for this kind of organizations.

Under positive Dutch law, the government has no strict obligation to give those tasks to private organizations. Policy considerations of a financial nature, for example, could point in another direction. If the government supports private organizations, however, the government may not exclude organizations just because they have a religious background. Neither may the government favor special religious denominations or “philosophy of life” movements.

In the United States, the situation is rather ambiguous. On the one hand, the idea exists that government may not further religion. On the other, organizations with a religious background, active in the child welfare, for example, or care for the elderly, do receive state support.80 This kind of funding is not, by definition, contrary to the Constitution’s establishment clause. The so called Lemon test still seems to present a rather accurate picture of the criteria, with which such public funding has to be judged.First, organizations that want to qualify for public funding should have a secular purpose. Second, the primary effect of the funding measure may not advance or obstruct religion. And third, the measure should not lead to an excessive entanglement between state and religion.

In my opinion, there are two interrelated justifications for supporting organizations with a religious or philosophy-of-life background. People might prefer the social, cultural, or health services offered by such organizations. In any case, the existence thereof increases people’s choices. At the same time these organizations can be considered a form of desirable civic “self-rule”; citizens take certain responsibilities, with the result that the government itself does not have to fulfill certain tasks.

Still, it must be stressed that those organizations are supported because and only insofar as they meet professional standards and, therefore, their activities can be considered to be in the public interest. That implies that government may and should lay down quality requirements. These requirements, however, do not regard the religious background of these organizations but their professional activities.

7. State, religion, and education
For ages, churches and religious organizations have played a central role in the field of education. In the nineteenth century, however, in a lot of Western countries a system of public education was developed with, originally, some kind of Christian character. Further developments in western countries differ widely.

In countries such as Germany—at least in certain states (Länder)85—Christian values, in some respects, have maintained a position in public education. Lessons in religion, the substance of which is decided by the churches, are a normal part of the curriculum in a lot of public schools. Pupils, however, may obtain an exemption. Case law of the Constitutional Court shows that voluntary “überkonfessionnel” (supradenominational) school prayers are allowed.86 The whole education may also be colored by Christian culture (“christlich-abendländische Kultur”). Moreover, the government, in certain circumstances, is obliged to support private schools with a religious background, if their quality is similar to the quality of public schools.

There is a world of difference between the situation in Germany and the situation in France. In France, primary and secondary schools in the public education sector are obliged to ban all religious influences. That is thought to be the only way a child is able to develop into a free citizen of the French Republic. In this approach, subsidies for private schools with a religious background are not really acceptable.89 Nevertheless, the law permits supporting private schools by paying their teachers’ wages, if the curriculum is comparable to the curriculum in the public education system, and lessons in religion are not mandatory.

In the United States, the “wall of separation doctrine” puts up a barrier for subsidies for private primary and secondary schools.90 It has to be added, however, that this wall has become lower.91 The Supreme Court accepted a system of vouchers that channels government money to private schools by way of the children’s parents. One may mention, as well, that a lot of private colleges and universities receive state aid, even if they have a religious background. Only if an institution is “pervasively religious” is state support out of the question. As far as public education is concerned, Christian influences are, from time to time, judged contrary to the establishment clause.

In the middle of the nineteenth century, the Netherlands had a system of public education imparting general Christian morals. Some stricter Protestant groups found this form of public education neither flesh nor fowl; Catholics were not satisfied, either. So these denominations started their own schools. In 1917, religious parties had achieved such influence in parliament they managed to insert a provision in the Constitution to the effect that private schools have a right to state funding on an equal level with schools in the public education sector. That is the main reason why in the Netherlands the private education sector has an enormous size. Nowadays, however, only in a small percentage of these private schools, religion plays an all-important role.

As far as public education is concerned, teaching of Christian morals as such has disappeared, to be replaced by a certain openness to different religions and philosophies of life.

7.1. Various interests
Churches and religious parents consider education at school one of the means of conveying to children valuable religious ideas.That very interest has expressed itself in the right to freedom of education. The government, as well, is not only interested in imparting knowledge and competences. It, too, wants to convey certain common values to all future citizens.

Against this background, some current questions have to be answered. The first question is: Should the government support private schools with religious backgrounds and, if so, under what conditions? The second question is: To what extent should there be room for religious expression in the public education sector?

7.2. State subsidies to private schools
Given the great national differences in Europe, it is self-evident that freedom of education, laid down in article 2 of the First Protocol of the ECHR, does not oblige states to support private schools. State subsidies, however, have certain advantages. State support leads to diversity in the supply of education. Citizens take responsibility in governing these schools. As a result, government may remain aloof. These advantages are similar to those in the social service sector. An important difference with the social service sector is that private education with a religious background really does convey “religious truths.” In my opinion, that is not, as such, an argument of overriding importance against state support, given the existence of compulsory education and the fact that educating children in schools is, in some respects, a continuation of education at home.

Still, the conditions to establish for private schools are of the utmost importance. Again, the starting point is that the government will back private schools because and only so far as the education meets quality standards and the teachers are professionals. That implies that disciplines have to be taught thoroughly. Pupils must learn about evolution theory. That does not hamper private schools from teaching, as well, that, according to the Bible, man is—in a higher sense—God’s creation.

Quality education has to prepare pupils for active citizenship,103 for participation in a democracy under the rule of law. Therefore, some knowledge of the presuppositions thereof, such as freedom of religion, freedom of speech, and equality between citizens, is mandatory. These presuppositions are rather neutral and do not push forward any particular portrayal of mankind. If the religious background of a school prevents fulfillment of these conditions, state support should be out of the question. In other words, one may expect from private schools a certain openness to democracy under the rule of law.

A counterargument might be that these conditions aim too high, given the social and cultural background of some pupils. The teaching of notions like democracy and the rule of law at schools might simply be too demanding at those schools where even keeping the everyday order in class is a quite a job.The argument, however, is not convincing if it is meant that a lot of pupils have a background where democratic values are missing altogether. That would be all the more reason to pay attention to these values at school.

Another counterargument might be that private schools may be contributing to the existence of communities that distance themselves from the rest of society. Children, living in these communities and being educated at home and at school both with the same outlook, risk missing a good preparation for active citizenship in a pluralistic society, goes the argument. On the other hand, support for private schools under certain conditions may also lead to understanding democratic values, both through the curriculum itself as well as by the fact that government supports diversity, and citizens and government together are responsible for education. In the Netherlands, there is no proof that schools with an Islamic background, as such, cannot prepare pupils for citizenship or that they contribute to the radicalization of Islamic youngsters. Nevertheless, news reports exposing abuses in this respect at some schools, may give reason for extra attention by the State School Inspection agency.

7.3. Religion in the public education sector
A different question concerns the position of religion in the public education system. The issue of wearing head scarves has received a lot of attention. However, the curriculum’s content is relevant as well. At schools, attention must be paid to freedom of religion and to the diversity of religious denominations and philosophies of life. It is self-evident that teachers may not propagate or attack certain religions. When dealing with the issue of religious expression in the public education sector, a distinction must be made between religious symbols installed by the school, religious symbols worn by teachers, and religious symbols worn by pupils.

In Germany, the Constitutional Court judged the regulation in Bavaria, which made it mandatory for schools to install a crucifix, contrary to freedom of religion. This judgment has lead to much commotion, which is to be understood against the background that in certain Länder public education is informed by Christian values. In the Netherlands, on the other hand, there seems to be a consensus that pupils at state schools should not learn “under the cross” or under any other religious sign installed by the school.

If a teacher wears a religious symbol, we have a different situation. A teacher may appeal to the right of freedom of religion. Under French law that right carries no real weight for civil servants at work. As has been pointed out, no civil servant is allowed to wear religious symbols. In other countries, such as Germany, freedom of religion carries some more weight for teachers at state schools.Nevertheless, state legislators may ban teachers from wearing religious symbols such as headscarves.

In my opinion, it is important to understand that teachers do not exercise public authority in the actual sense of this term. The fact that teachers at private schools have similar authority shows this in perfect clarity. Still, the relationship between a teacher and a pupil is longer lasting than the relationship between, for example, a police officer and a citizen. Therefore, the teacher’s open attitude is important, more important than the symbol. Yet a comment must be made. A teacher wearing a head scarf should forestall the suggestion this is the right thing to do, especially in a situation where a controversy exists in this respect. If it were established that such kinds of problems regularly occur, reconsideration would be necessary.

The question whether pupils should be allowed to wear religious symbols is also answered differently in various European countries. Tolerance reigns in Engla

Monday, June 27, 2022

Eastern Africa’s drought the worst in recent history? And are worse yet to come?

Eastern Africa’s drought the worst in recent history? And are worse yet to come?

Published: June 26, 2022

 David Nash, University of Brighton
Large areas of Ethiopia, Somalia and Kenya are currently in the grip of a severe drought. An estimated 16.7 million people face acute food insecurity. That’s more than the combined populations of Austria and Switzerland.

Four consecutive rainy seasons have now failed since late 2020, a climatic event not seen in at least 40 years. This meteorological drought has resulted in a loss of soil moisture, caused waterways to dry up, and led to the death of millions of livestock.

The Horn of Africa experiences two rainy seasons per year. The timing varies across the region, but rains broadly fall from March to May (the “long rains”) and from September to December. The delayed start and then failure of the March to May rains this year has been felt particularly in equatorial parts of the region, where the long rains contribute 70% of the annual total.

The situation is unlikely to improve in the short term. Forecasts suggest that the September to December rainy season could also fail. This would set the stage for an unprecedented five-season drought.

Written by academics, edited by journalists, backed by evidence.Get newsletter

The ongoing humanitarian crisis caused by the drought raises serious questions about future food and water security in the Horn of Africa. The latest Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change report projects that global warming will negatively affect food systems in the region by shortening growing seasons and increasing water stress.

The crisis also raises the questions: is the current drought the worst in recent history and might future droughts be even worse?

Exploring past data

I’m a physical geographer who uses descriptions of weather conditions within historical documents, combined with meteorological data, to explore how rainfall has varied in the past across various regions of Africa – a discipline known as historical climatology. To understand the relative severity of the current drought, we need to examine both historical records and data.

For the purposes of this article, I am focusing on the last 200 years. This time-span includes what is called the period of instrumental record – the period during which we have used standardised instruments (called rain gauges) to measure rainfall. The earliest systematic rainfall data collection in Africa began in the 1830s for coastal Algeria and southwest South Africa. In eastern Africa, however, continuous runs of data are only available from the 1870s onwards.

Fortunately, we can fill in gaps for years and areas where there are no measured rainfall data using historical information sources. The most important of these are oral histories and collections of documents written mainly by settlers, explorers, missionaries and colonial governments that describe past climate and conditions related to climate.

There are several droughts that stand out.

According to recent research, 2016 was the driest single year of the last four decades – Ethiopia, Somalia and Kenya received 40% less rainfall between August and October than the long-term average. The 2016 drought followed a particularly strong El Niño event, when patterns of warmer and cooler water in the Pacific Ocean shifted, with knock on effects for the Indian Ocean and eastern African rainfall.

The drought from 1983 to 1986 – which triggered global humanitarian efforts such as the music fundraising initiative Live Aid – was also very severe. Like the current drought, the event was prolonged and therefore had a cumulative effect. Going back further, rainfall series spanning the full instrumental period suggest that the mid-1950s was almost as dry as 2016 in Ethiopia and Somalia.

It is possible that even more severe droughts occurred during the pre-instrumental period. It isn’t easy to compare the magnitude of the rainfall deficit during modern droughts with earlier periods when rainfall wasn’t measured. However, a major, continent-wide historical climate study shows that eastern Africa experienced droughts –  at least as bad as those in recent decades – throughout the 1820s and 1830s, during the 1880s and around 1900.

The 1820s-1830s drought was probably the worst of the last 200 years. Lake levels fell in central Kenya (with Lake Baringo drying up completely), and reports from European travellers describe prolonged famine, possibly lasting as long as 20 years, affecting areas including Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda.

A more recent historical climate study provides further detail for Kenya, including vivid descriptions of the multi-year, drought-driven, famine around 1900. This is locally referred to as the “lwaya” (crocodile) famine, as people had to hunt crocodiles for food. By 1902, colonial authorities had to distribute Indian rice, brought in via the under-construction railway linking the coast to Lake Victoria, as famine relief.

Taking this information as whole, the current drought in eastern Africa is clearly unprecedented in recent decades. This is due mainly to the fact that below-average rainfall has fallen in four consecutive seasons. The worst recent food security crises in the region have been associated with multi-season dry spells.

However, the droughts of the 1820s and 1830s, before the advent of global humanitarian aid, were even more protracted and therefore probably more severe in terms of cumulative human impacts.

The future

In addition to having human impacts – recorded in the types of historical documents described earlier – droughts also impact upon natural vegetation and landscapes. These impacts leave a legacy in pollen and sedimentary records that can be studied by botanists and geologists to understand past climate variability.

Data from marine sediments in the Gulf of Aden spanning the past 2,000 years, for example, indicate a close association between globally warm conditions and drying in the eastern Horn of Africa. If this association holds into the future, global warming will be met with drying and we may anticipate worse droughts.

Climate change is already affecting rainfall levels in the Horn of Africa. Human-induced warming has raised the temperature of the western Pacific Ocean, leading to concerning rainfall deficits in eastern Kenya, Somalia, and Ethiopia. This may be the reason why droughts in back-to-back seasons are becoming more common in the region.

As with any semi-arid region, droughts are an integral part of the climate of eastern Africa and will continue to be so into the future. The positive news is that groups of scientists such as the Famine Early Warning Systems Network can now provide early warning of acute food insecurity. Drought in eastern Africa is often linked to the build-up of La Niña conditions in the Pacific Ocean. Forecasting is such that governments and aid agencies can now put emergency provisions in place well in advance of drought onset.

Measures to improve the resilience of eastern African communities to climate shock and stresses meant that the overall impact of the 2016 drought was much lower than the mid-1980s and 1973 droughts. As resilience continues to improve, it should be possible to move from crisis management to risk management of droughts in the Horn of Africa.

Drought Horn of Africa FamineLivestockSomalia
Ethiopia Rainfall KenyaHumanitarian aid

Saturday, June 25, 2022

Viewpoint: Somalia’s 2022 Election: Implications for the HoA Region

Viewpoint: Somalia’s 2022 Election: Implications for the HoA Region
 
JUNE 25, 2022

On 23 May, President Hassan Sheikh Mohmoud has officially assumed office as the 10th President of the Federal Republic of Somalia following an official handover ceremony held at Villa Somalia.

By Faisal Roble @faisalroble19

Addis Abeba – If the late professor Mesfin Woldemarian penned “Somalia: The Problem child of Africa” to defend Derg policies in 1977, it is fitting for a rejoinder to write “Somalia: The Emerging Light of Electoral Democracy.” After the election of Hassan Sheikh Mohmoud, many people in the region saw a glimmer of hope in Somalia’s electoral system. Many, including Ethiopians, took their appreciations of said change to social media and to the airwaves. 

This article will focus on the probable implications of the election of Hassan Sheikh Mohamoud for the Horn of Africa region. First, I will make a general overview of the Horn of Africa condition, followed by the electoral politics that brought Hassan Sheikh to office. I will conclude with some tangible and intangible implications it could have for the region.

 The Horn: A Turbulent Region

The Horn of Africa region (the region) means different things to different people. Somalia is the lone Horn of Africa country to some. To others, the region includes Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Sudan and South Sudan, Kenya and Uganda. For the purpose of this article, however, I will limit my discussion to Somalia, Eritrea, and Ethiopia, precisely because of the tripartite alliance (the alliance) these three countries forged under Prime Minister Abiy, former President Mohamed Farmajo, and Eritrea’s Isaias Afwerki . The alliance and its war in Tigray has worsened an already difficult condition characterized by a man-made famine.  

Wars have been perennial in the region. For example, Ethiopia invaded Somalia  in 1964; again in 1977, the two countries fought another bloody war. In 2006, Ethiopia invaded Somalia under the  rubric of “war on terror.”  Up in the north, Ethiopia and Eritrea also have waged one of the most devastating wars in Sub-saharan Africa that prompted one commentator to call the conflict “a war over a comb.” Tigray and Eritrea also fought their own fratricidal wars. 

For a moment Prime Minister Abiy seemed to have broken the Iron Curtain of Eritrea. However, the purported joint action for peace and stability turned into a war plan against Tigray first and Oromia next

Many thought Abiy Ahmed Ali’s ascendance to power in Ethiopia in 2018 will bring a wind of change towards a democratic transition and regional stability. In the months of June to October 2018, Prime Minister Abiy shuttled between these three countries culminating in the issuance of a highly publicized communique on November 10, 2018. In it the vision for the HOA integration comprising Ethiopia, Somalia and Eritrea was formalized. For a moment Prime Minister Abiy seemed to have broken the Iron Curtain of Eritrea. However, the purported joint action for peace and stability turned into a war plan against Tigray first and Oromia next.

To President Isaias Afwerki, the war against Tigray, for whom he holds grudges, represented a means to get even with the TPLF leadership. For Abiy, the alliance was an opportunity to vanquish TPLF and consolidate power. Besides Tigray, an equally intense war is being waged in the Oromia region. Given the Oromia region’s location, it is feasible that it could easily spill over to Kenya and Somalia with far more serious implications. Left unchecked, wars in Tigray and Oromia regions could  be a recipe for a potential disintegration of Ethiopia.

Why did Prime Minister Abiy invite smaller neighboring countries to fight his civil war remains a mystery to many. What is not a mystery is that this war eroded Ethiopia’s already weak cohesion. Imagine Nigeria inviting Cameron, Chad, and Benin to fight Igbo, or Rwanda inviting Congo, Kenya, and Uganda against the Hutu community. The damage to the national psyche and the unity of Ethiopia is so damaged that holding this country together may require a miracle. 

Somalia: A Democratic Outlier

On May 15, 2022, the Somali parliament elected Hassan Sheikh Mohamoud by a 214 against 110 votes. Often credited as  the first African democratic country, power in Somalia changed hands peacefully as far back as the early 1960s. Electoral politics has roots in Somalia making the current election more possible despite its fragile state. So far with the exception of the late Mohamed Siyyad Barre, who usurped power by a military coup in 1969, nine presidents have taken/lost office through the electoral process. Hassan Sheikh Mohamoud became the 10th and the only president elected twice in Somali history since independence in 1960.  

Following a comprehensive national reconciliation at the Arta village (Djibouti) in 2000, a road map and a draft federal constitution (2012) made peaceful power transfer possible in post conflict Somalia. Hassan Sheik promises to continue reconciliation even after 20 years of preliminary work on this issue. Since the Arta reconciliation convention in 2000, six elections with often surprising results – replacing the incumbent – took place. 

Despite intense campaigning and last minute horse trading prior to Election Day, a new political culture emerged in Somalia; every four years, friends and families gather together to watch as the voting and subsequent counting of votes are televised by the National Somali TV. Once the final results are tallied, the loser congratulates the victor; in a unison voice, they raise their clenched fists to promise to the nation and the world to collectively work for Somalia. Within weeks, the new president moves into Villa Somalia. This is something even the last US presidential election could not achieve. In the case of this last election, on May 23, 2022, only a week after the election took place, a peaceful power transfer was completed!

Unlike his predecessor, Hassan Sheikh declared that he will ensure stability by fostering a “Somalia that is at peace with itself and lives peacefully with its neighbors.” This is of course a daunting task in the  Horn of Africa which is plagued by climate change, famine  and war? As this piece goes to print, Hassan Sheikh taps on and appoints a technocrat, Hamze Abdi Barre, as his premier to tackle real political and economic challenges that haunted Somalia, a failed state that is slowly but certainly recovering.

Somalia: Implications for the Horn

Can Hassan Sheikh Mohamoud, a 68 year-old man, be a peacemaker in the region? So far, leaders from Djibouti, Kenya, Ethiopian, Egypt, South Sudan, Uganda, and Turkey attended his inauguration party. The Tigray administration, the Ogaden Liberation Front, and the Oromo Liberation Front, as well as the presidents of the Somali and Oromo regions sent their respective congratulatory messages. Missing in these inter-regional gestures is the president of the region’s Iron Curtain, Isaias Afwerki. It is plausible to see Somalia’s leadership de-emphasize the culture of war and advise to move towards a more peaceful region.  

If and when Ethiopia puts its house in order, however, perhaps a limited but meaningful discussion of economic cooperation can start.

Somalia has enough burden of its own that would make peace an indispensable domestic and regional policy. As such, President Hassan Sheikh is likely to end the tripartite alliance.  At the conclusion of his coronation at Villa Somalia on May 23, 2022, Hassan Sheikh ordered 5000 Somali troops trained in Eritrea return home. Whether that marks the beginning of the end of the tripartite alliance remains to be seen.  

Abiy’s premature pronouncement of integration between Somalia and Ethiopia will be placed on the back burner, if not dead. Standing on the steps of Villa Somalia with Farmajo, Abiy Ahmed declared in June 2018 the potential unification of the two countries. That was certainly a premature clarion call. If and when Ethiopia puts its house in order, however, perhaps a limited but meaningful discussion of economic cooperation can start. Somalis and Oromo could particularly benefit from a more realistic regional economic cooperation. That, however, depends on how much peace is in the region. 

 An intangible implication is whether Somalia’s televised and relatively transparent elections would make Ethiopians more resolved to pursue change through a peaceful means. It is too early to make a definitive assessment of whether this would lead to an Arab Spring version of the Horn of Africa region. 

Somalia has enough burden of its own that would make peace an indispensable domestic and regional policy. As such, President Hassan Sheikh is likely to end the tripartite alliance

What would come out of the thousands of Ethiopians and Eritreans who  have noticed and taken their appreciation to the airwaves regarding Somalia’s peaceful power transfer and its electoral exercise?  Somalia’s recovery and electoral process is a testimony to the adage that “politics is the art of the possible.” It is therefore plausible to argue that democratization is possible in the Horn of Africa. The question is whether Somalia’s electoral experience will reverberate in the rest of the region. More importantly, will it have positive impacts on the youth, activists, and political groups all of whom long for a meaningful change in the Horn of Africa region?

 Concluding Remarks

During his victory speech as well as in past speeches, the new president considers taking Somalia out of its neighbors’ business. As he put it, he wants Somalia to “live in peace with itself and with its neighbors.” The implications of this could mean that Somalia will not be part of the war inside Ethiopia. In the horizon are the following implications the Somalia election may have:

Hassan Sheikh has already decided to pull out Somali soldiers from Eritrea and nullify any future collaboration with Eritrea until further evaluation. He will also investigate if any Somali soldier took part in the Tigray war.He will immediately pull out Somalia from the Tripartite alliance and instead strengthen Somalia’s role in IGAD. Djibouti and Somalia’s relationship will be rekindled while that with Eritrea will be most likely downgraded.  Somalia will recommit itself to IGAD in lieu of the current exclusive tripartite pact crafted in 2020 leading to the war in Tigray.Regional and bilateral economic cooperation with a democratic lens will be encouraged as. 
Editor’s Note: Faisal Roble is Principal City Planner and CEO for Racial Justice & Equity for the Planning Department, Los Angeles City. This article is first published on the June 2022 Edition of Addis Standard, Horn of Africa Column.
 

Friday, June 10, 2022

U.Sn Itoophiyaa keessatti nagaa dallaaluu dandeessi




U.S.n Itoophiyaa keessatti nagaa dallaaluu dandeessi?

 Ergamaa addaa haaraa kanaaf jalqabaa Ministirri Dhimma Alaa U.S. Antony Blinken torban darbe ergamaa Addaa haaraa Gaanfa Afrikaatti Ambaasaaddar Deeviid aangoo gadhiisaa jiran bakka bu’uuf muudamuu isaanii beeksisaniiru
 Saatarfiild jedhamuun beekama. Saatarfiild ergamaa addaa jalqabaa Ambaasaaddar Jeefrii Feltmaan bakka bu'ee ture. Feltman ji’a sagaliif ture; Satterfield, ji'a afur qofa.

 Ergamaan addaa haaraa kan ta’an Ambaasaaddar Maayikeel Haamar bara 2018 irraa eegalee siyaasa Afrikaa Rippabiliika Dimookiraatawaa Koongoo irratti ilkaan isaanii muranii, gamaaggama wal-makaa ta’uun isaanii ni yaadatama. Ifatti dubbachuun isaa inni tokko tokko akka qabeenya dippilomaasii tokkootti, kaan ammoo – keessumaa elite siyaasaa Koongoo kanneen iftoomina isaa fudhachuuf jiran – akka itti gaafatamummaatti ilaalama. Hammer jechoota mince gochuun hin beekamu, waggoota dheeraaf dippilomaasii ummataa keessatti tajaajiluu fi miidiyaa irratti beekumsa qabaachuudhaan maqaa gaarii qabaatus.

 Akka barreeffamni barruu Emirati, The National News jedhamu irratti ba’etti, warri Hammer dura turan lamaan isaanii tattaaffii isaanii Ministeerri Dhimma Alaa maayikiroo bulchuu isaatiin mufatan – dhugaa dubbachuuf, aangoo argachuu fi latitude akka bira darbuuf kennameef osoo hin taane dubbi himaa imaammata Ministeera Dhimma Alaa taasiseera kan birokraasii ta’e
 danqaawwan Foggy Bottom.

 Hammer amma ergamaa addaa sadaffaa ta'ee siyaasa Horn keessatti akka relative novice ta'ee hojii kana fudhatedha. Akkuma Feltman fi Satterfield, Hammer naannoo waliin walbaruu dhabuun isaa miidhaa uumamaan qabu keessa isa galcha. Xiinxala hubannoo qabu gahee ergamtoota addaa imaammata alaa U.S. keessatti qaban irratti, dippilomaatii olaanaa yeroo dheeraa Prinsiston Lyman
 qeeqa ejjennoo ergamaa addaa irratti dhihaate keessaa tokko “namoota alaa haala jiru irratti beekumsa xiqqoo qaban, kanneen dhiibbaa bal’aa inni qabu irratti miira gahaa hin qabne beeksisuu” jechuun ibseera.

 Dhugumatti, muuxannoon Feltman fi Satterfield harka dheeraa Ministeera Dhimma Alaa – waan waraanni U.S, Pentagon fagoo irraa gidduu seenuu isaa eeruun, “the 8000-mile-long screwdriver” jedhee waamu – garuu lakkoofsa kan kutaalee socho’an, marsaa walxaxiinsaa fi dhangala’aa ta’aniin olka’e
 kan qooda fudhattoota siyaasaa fi gamtaa isaanii, akkasumas sodaachisaa ta’uu qaba.
 Wanti tattaaffii ergamaa addaa haaraa kanaa kan warra isa dura turan caalaa bu’a qabeessa taasisuu danda’u, seeneffama ofiisaa Ministeerri Dhimma Alaa jajjabeesse bira darbee hubannoo haala jiru irratti qabu bal’isuu ta’uu danda’a. Ministeerri Dhimma Alaa
 mala hin hojjenne keessatti liqimfamee jira – “both-sides-ism” isaa irraa kaasee hanga waa’ee hoggansa siyaasaa naannichaa darbee darbee nama ajaa’ibsiisuutti. Jecha biraatiin, Hammer yaada siyaasaa tokko tokko kan ofiisaa Washington, DC jalaa miliqe horachuu danda'aa.? Hubannoo waldhabdee irratti qabnu irra deebiin bocuu fi adeemsa sana fuulduratti tarkaanfachiisuuf gargaaruu danda’an ibsa dhugaa tokko tokko kunooti. Primer kun karaa kamiinuu gadi fagoo miti, garuu yaadonni isaa ijoo hanga ammaatti tuffatamaniiru.
1. Akka seera addunyaatti gargaarsa namoomaaf haalduree hin jiru. Ta’us yaadonni dhukaasa dhaabuu fi diinummaa xumuruuf dhihaatan namoota beela’an fuulduratti nyaata fannisuu irratti hundaa’uun hoggansa isaanii kaayyoo siyaasaaf kaka’umsa ta’ee ture. MM Itoophiyaa Abiy Ahimad beela akka meeshaa waraanaatti fayyadamaa jiru, kunis yakka waraanaati. Gargaarsi namoomaa nyaata bira darbee tajaajila mootummaa kan akka ibsaa fi bishaanii deebisanii dhaabuu, hojii baankii deebi’ee jalqabuu, tajaajila qunnamtii deebi’ee banamuu akka dabalatus dhugaadha.

 2. MM Dr. Abiyyi Ahimad nama dubbii isaa ta'uu isaa hin agarsiifne. Bu’a qabeessummaan dippilomaasii U.S. dhugaa fi amanamummaa gaarii hoggansa naannichaa irratti amantii qabaachuudhaan walxaxaa ta’a. Abiyyi Ahimad yeroo yerootti soba gaabbii hin qabne ollaa isaa gara kaabaa jiru agarsiisa ajaa’ibsiisaa kan ofitti amanamummaa, ija jabinaafi of tuulummaatiin walsimsiiseera. Argamuu isaaf beekamtii kennuu diduu irraa
 kan loltoota Eertiraa jalqaba waraanaa irratti gargaarsa namoomaaf Tigraay dhaqqabuuf danqaan malee dhaqqabna jechuun MM kijibsiiseera.

 3. Dhangala’uu fi gamtaan jijjiiramaa Itoophiyaas ta’e naannoo bal’aa irra deebiin safaruu hojii guyyaa guyyaa akka ta’u taasisa. Kanuma waliin mootummaan U.S. qubsuma siyaasaa gidduu seenuuf yaaluun tapha xumuraa barbaadamu irratti mirkanaa’aa hin taane fakkaata. Ergamaan addaa haaraan kun kaayyoo ifa ta’e nagaa gidduu seenuu fi furmaata siyaasaa qabachuun seenuu qaba. Kana jechuun furmaanni dirqama waan U.S. barbaaddu fakkaata jechuu miti; sun hanga qooda fudhattoota siyaasaa Itoophiyaa keessa jiranitti ta'a. Garuu U.S.n adeemsa kana haala mijeessuuf gargaaru roadmap qopheessuu qabdi.

 4. Adeemsa kana keessatti preezdaantiin Eertiraa akka nama balleessutti ni hojjeta. U.S.n Eertiraadhaaf onnachiiftuu Isaayaas Afeworqii Raashiyaa fi hiriyyoota isaa haaraa Baha Giddu Galeessaa jiran irraa ari’u tokkollee dhiyeessuu hin dandeessu. Waggoota 25 oliif nageenya uummata Eertiraa wareegamee aangoo qabatee Itoophiyaa keessa weedii oofaa jira. Hanga Isaayaan aangootti maxxantutti naannicha keessatti gonkumaa nagaan hin jiraatu. Waraanni Tigraay keessatti geggeeffamaa jiru dhumarratti Asmaraatti xumurama.

 5. Gama biraatiin waraanni Tigraay keessatti gaggeeffamaa jiru qofaa miti kan Itoophiyaa keessatti uumamu miti. Oromiyaa keessatti waraanni mootummaa federaalaa fi mormitoota Abiy gidduutti adeemsifamaa jiru kan wal bira qabamee yoo ilaalamu xiyyeeffannoo idil addunyaa xiqqaa argatu jira. Waraanni kun rakkoolee Itoophiyaa biroof furmaata siyaasaa gosa kamiifuu dhiibbaa gadi fagoo kan qabu waan ta’eef adeemsa biyyoolessaa siyaasaa hunda hirmaachisuun furmaata argachuu qaba
 paartilee.

 6. Seenaan Wayyaanee marsee jiru dhugaa har’aa calaqqisiisuu qaba. Itoophiyaa bulchuu hin barbaadan. Isaan komunistoota miti. Isaan shororkeessitoota miti. Yaadni bu’uuraa kun yeroo baay’ee haasaa keessatti ni badu. Humnoota dhiiga hin barbaachifne kana xumuruuf ykn dheeressuuf – ykn daangaa Itoophiyaatiin alatti babal’isuuf illee hojjetaa jiran hunda hubachuun rakkisaadha. Hoggansi siyaasaa naannoo gaanfa Afrikaa jijjiirama guddaa qabu kana – Abiyyi Ahimadiifi Isaayyaas Afeworqii – yaada siyaasaa maraatummaa xumuruuf hin qaban. Kanaafidha jiddu-galummaan alaa, dippilomaatota dhugaa lafaa naannichaa beekaniitiin durfamu, nagaa dallaaluuf gargaaruu fi Itiyoophiyaa baasuuf furmaata siyaasaa haala mijeessuudhaaf barbaachisaa ta’e
 maraatummaa kanaa. Ambaasaaddar Hammer hojii qormaata ajaa'ibaa kana yeroo fudhatu milkaa'ina hawwina.

 Garee Keebilii Itoophiyaatiin