Tariffs, Trump, and the Illusion of Greatness: A Closer Look at America’s Economic Nationalism

Tariffs, Trump, and the Illusion of Greatness: A Closer Look at America’s Economic Nationalism

📅 By Habtamu Nini Abino

📍 Published: July 31, 2025

Introduction

Now serving as the 47th President of the United States, Donald J. Trump has reintroduced a key pillar of his economic agenda: tariffs. In a widely circulated Truth Social post, President Trump triumphantly declared that tariffs are “making America GREAT & RICH again,” asserting that the U.S. has transformed from a “dead country” to the “hottest” economy in the world in just one year.

Like much of Trump’s rhetoric, this bold and captivating claim warrants a sober and critical examination. Are tariffs truly the engine of America’s resurgence? Or are they a political mirage masking more profound economic distortions?

The Return of Economic Nationalism

President Trump’s worldview has long rested on economic nationalism—a belief that the U.S. has been exploited through globalisation and that the path to national greatness lies in protecting American industries from foreign competition. In his narrative, tariffs are not just tools of trade—they are symbols of sovereignty, pride, and economic justice.

But the reality is more complex. Tariffs are taxes on imports, and their effects ripple across supply chains, consumer prices, and global diplomatic relations. They are rarely neutral and rarely without unintended consequences.

Tariffs as Taxes, Not Magic

Trumpian rhetoric paints tariffs as a cure-all, but they function as regressive consumption taxes that affect ordinary consumers. During Trump’s first term, multiple studies—including those by the Peterson Institute and the Federal Reserve—found that his tariff regime raised costs for U.S. households by hundreds of dollars per year and hurt exporters caught in retaliatory measures.

In 2025, we’re seeing similar patterns:

Auto manufacturers report higher production costs due to tariffs on steel and aluminium.

Farmers face unstable foreign markets as China, the EU, and others retaliate.

Retail prices on electronics, tools, and home goods remain high due to ongoing tariffs on Chinese goods.

While some domestic industries gain temporary protection, the net effect is increased inefficiency, consumer burden, and geopolitical tension.

Tariffs as Foreign Policy Weapons

President Trump is not only using tariffs as economic tools—he’s weaponising them to pursue foreign policy goals. In recent months, his administration has:

Threatened trade penalties against Canada for recognising the Palestinian state.

Expanded tariffs on Chinese high-tech goods, intensifying the tech war.

Signalled a potential review of AGOA benefits to African nations that oppose U.S. policy.

This transactional approach to trade undermines multilateral institutions like the WTO and reshapes diplomacy into a loyalty test. It risks turning the U.S. from a global rule-maker into a unilateral enforcer, alienating long-standing allies and partners.

Is the U.S. Economy Really Booming?

Trump declares that America is now the “hottest country in the world.” Economically, the U.S. has shown strength in 2025—GDP growth is steady, and innovation in AI and clean tech is thriving. But the driving forces of that success are structural, not tariff-induced:

Post-pandemic resilience

High investment in automation, data, and digital infrastructure

Labour market recovery, especially in services and tech

Tariffs may marginally improve trade balances, but do not explain broader trends. If anything, they distort long-term competitiveness by inviting inefficiencies and inflating prices.

Conclusion:

 Between Political Showmanship and Economic Reality

Tariffs may serve as political theatre—loud, visible, and emotionally satisfying—but their real economic outcomes are uneven and often counterproductive. They can protect specific sectors, but they also stoke inflation, harm diplomatic ties, and weaken global economic cooperation.

President Trump’s revival of protectionism appeals to a population frustrated with inequality and economic insecurity. However, real national strength comes not from punishing imports but investing in innovation, skills, resilience, and alliances.

While the illusion of greatness may win elections, only substance and strategy can sustain prosperity.

✍️ About the Author

Habtamu Nini Abino is a legal scholar, author, and former Secretary General of Ethiopia’s House of Federation. He writes on international politics, trade, governance, and constitutional reform. His recent works include The Second Republic and the Politics of Article 39 in Ethiopia and Liberal Democracy and the Constitution of 1994: The User's Handbook.

 

Ethiopia’s Glass: Half Full, Half Empty — A Nation at the Crossroads

🇪🇹 Ethiopia’s Glass: Half Full, Half Empty — A Nation at the Crossroads

By Habtamu Nini Abino
July 31, 2025

In the discourse of development, democracy, and national identity, few metaphors capture the Ethiopian dilemma more accurately than the proverbial question: Is the glass half full or half empty? This simple analogy — often used to reveal a person’s optimism or pessimism — has profound relevance for a country like Ethiopia, where promise and peril constantly coexist.

Ethiopia is undoubtedly half full with a population exceeding 120 million, abundant natural resources, and a strategic location in the Horn of Africa. Yet, deep-rooted ethnic divisions, fragile institutions, chronic instability, and persistent poverty remind us that the glass is also half empty. The question is not which view is correct but which mindset will guide Ethiopia’s political future.

The Half Full Ethiopia: A Country of Potential

To speak of Ethiopia as "half full" is not delusion; it is reality. Despite regional tensions, the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) symbolises national pride and technological progress. The country's expanding road and energy infrastructure, the growing urban middle class, and the resilience of its youth offer real hope.

Furthermore, Ethiopia’s constitutional framework — with its federalist structure and commitment to self-rule — was once hailed as a bold experiment in managing diversity. In theory, it granted historically marginalised groups the right to self-govern, preserve culture, and share power within a unified state. It was an African attempt at inclusive governance.

These achievements represent the water in the glass — hard-earned, precious, and real.

The Half Empty Ethiopia: A State in Perpetual Crisis

But the other half — the empty part—can not be ignored. Ethiopia has not seen a year without significant conflict in over a decade. From Tigray to Oromia to Amhara, the federal compact has eroded into suspicion, rebellion, and bloodshed. The dream of unity in diversity has been replaced by zero-sum politics, where one group’s gain is another’s fear.

The Prosperity Party’s centralising ambitions and the remnants of EPRDF-era authoritarianism have undermined democratic transition. Institutions remain weak, elections contested, and dialogue replaced with drones and repression. Federalism, once seen as a solution, is now weaponised to fragment or dominate, depending on who holds power.

The glass is empty of political violence, economic dislocation, brain drain, and a growing loss of national confidence.

Beyond Optimism or Pessimism: Toward National Realism

The danger lies in choosing only one view.

Those who see Ethiopia as only half full often fall into denialism, claiming, “We are on the right path,” even as civil war erupts. Conversely, those who see only emptiness lose all faith in reform, becoming nihilistic or isolationist.

Ethiopia needs national realism: the courage to acknowledge failure and the wisdom to build on strengths. Realism means recognising that constitutional reform is necessary, not to erase the federal principle, but to ensure that it delivers autonomy and accountability. It means empowering institutions that are above ethnicity and beyond ideology.

It also means building a culture of shared sacrifice rather than perpetual grievance. The question must move from “What has my group gained or lost?” to “How do we fill the rest of the glass — together?”

Conclusion: The Political Future of a Divided Nation

Ethiopia is neither a failed state nor a functioning democracy. It is a fragile republic standing on a battlefield between history and hope. The half-full part of the Ethiopian glass reminds us of what is possible; the half-empty part warns us of what may come if we continue on the current trajectory.

The glass is there. It holds both pain and promise. The time has come not to argue about its fullness or emptiness — but to decide, as a nation, how to fill it with justice, peace, and shared prosperity.

Habtamu Nini Abino is a legal scholar, author, and former Ethiopian House of Federation secretary general. He regularly writes on constitutional law, federalism, and governance in Africa.

TPLF and Its Clandestine Network: A Strategic Threat to Ethiopia’s Peace and Security By :Habtamu Nini Abino

TPLF AND Its Clandestine Network: A Strategic Threat to ETHIOPIA’S Peace and Security
By Habtamu Nini Abino

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Introduction

The Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), once a dominant force in Ethiopia's ruling coalition, continues to pose a strategic threat to the peace and security of Ethiopia, even after its formal removal from federal power in 2018. The TPLF has reasserted itself as a destabilising force in Ethiopia's internal affairs and regional geopolitics through armed resistance, clandestine networks, diaspora lobbying, and digital propaganda. Understanding the multifaceted nature of this threat is essential for crafting a comprehensive national strategy to mitigate and neutralise its impact.

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I. Historical Context: From Liberation Front to State Power

Founded in 1975 as a Marxist-Leninist guerrilla movement, the TPLF rose to power in 1991 by overthrowing the Derg regime and forming the backbone of the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). It dominated Ethiopia’s political, military, and intelligence apparatus for nearly three decades. During its rule, the TPLF entrenched itself in government institutions and built a shadow economy and network of cronies, many of whom remain embedded in Ethiopia’s bureaucracy and security infrastructure.

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II. Strategic Reorganisation after 2018

Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn's resignation and Abiy Ahmed's rise marked the formal end of the TPLF's central role in Ethiopian politics. However, rather than transition peacefully, the TPLF strategically withdrew to its Tigray stronghold, retained control over the regional government, and began reorganising its forces politically, diplomatically, and militarily.

Key strategies included:

• Weaponisation of the Constitution: The TPLF used Ethiopia’s federal constitution—notably Article 39 on self-determination—as a political shield to justify regional autonomy and secessionist aspirations.
• Digital Warfare: Leveraging its extensive media arms (including diaspora-run satellite channels and websites), the TPLF cultivated an international narrative of victimhood and ethnic persecution.
• Diaspora Mobilisation: The TPLF mobilised diaspora sections in the U.S., Canada, and Europe to lobby governments and international organisations, often painting the federal government as authoritarian and genocidal.
• Covert Operations: The TPLF’s clandestine network includes intelligence operatives embedded in federal institutions, business entities, NGOs, and international agencies.

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III. The Threat Matrix: Clandestine Network and Global Influence

The clandestine nature of the TPLF’s network is not confined to the Tigray region. It extends through:

• Economic infiltration: During its rule, the TPLF amassed vast economic capital through business conglomerates such as EFFORT, which it continues to use for influence and destabilisation.
• Security sector penetration: The TPLF retains sleeper agents within the national intelligence service, army, and police forces, who act as saboteurs or sources of sensitive information.
• International backchannels: With a history of cooperation with Western intelligence and NGOs, the TPLF has maintained favourable contacts with foreign governments that serve as pressure levers on Ethiopia’s current administration.

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IV. The Consequences: Cycles of War and Destabilisation

The 2020-2022 Tigray War exposed the extent of the TPLF’s militarisation and refusal to accept the constitutional order. Despite massive humanitarian costs, ceasefires have been short-lived due to TPLF’s demands that go beyond legitimate regional grievances and into zero-sum politics of ethnic supremacy and revanchism. The recent rearmament of TPLF forces and their ambiguous approach to peace talks suggest a preparation for a new phase of asymmetric warfare.

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V. Strategic Recommendations

To secure long-term peace and neutralise the TPLF’s destabilising network, Ethiopia must adopt a multi-dimensional national strategy:

1. Institutional Purging and Reform

   • Conduct comprehensive security vetting in intelligence, military, and federal agencies to remove clandestine TPLF loyalists.
   • Strengthen federal oversight of regional governments and ensure constitutional accountability.

2. Counter-Narrative Diplomacy

   • Establish a global task force to counter TPLF propaganda and promote Ethiopia’s national interests.
   • Engage diaspora communities constructively to isolate radicalised TPLF sympathisers.

3. Legal and Economic Sanctions

   • Freeze assets of known TPLF-affiliated enterprises.
   • Initiate prosecutions for war crimes, corruption, and treason based on evidence collected during the conflict.

4. Ethnic Reconciliation and Institutional Federalism

   • Reform the federation to address grievances without succumbing to the TPLF model of ethnic hegemony.
   • Promote inclusive governance that transcends ethnic party monopolies.

5. National Security Doctrine

   • Develop a new national security framework considering internal insurgencies and external manipulations as equal threats.
   • Prioritise cyber-intelligence, anti-disinformation campaigns, and strategic military preparedness.

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Conclusion

The TPLF and its clandestine network represent not merely a political opposition group but a systemic and strategic threat to Ethiopia’s statehood, peace, and territorial integrity. It operates as a shadow state, exploiting ethnic fault lines, global narratives, and institutional weaknesses. Ethiopia must respond not with a non-forcen rent statecraft doctrine that blends security, diplomacy, reform, and unity to ensure the republic's survival. The time for strategic management is now; delay only strengthens the adversary.

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National Security Planning Document

Strategic Response to Internal Clandestine Threats: The Case of TPLF and its Networks

I. Executive Summary

This plan addresses the continuing national security threat posed by the TPLF (Tigray People’s Liberation Front) and its affiliated clandestine networks. The TPLF has evolved into a hybrid force using asymmetric warfare, international propaganda, economic manipulation, and institutional infiltration. A new generation of national security planning is required to integrate intelligence-led operations, institutional reform, and soft power diplomacy.

II. National Security Objectives

1. Preserve the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ethiopia.

2. Eliminate clandestine networks threatening the constitutional order.

3. Disrupt the TPLF’s financial, military, and diplomatic capabilities.

4. Strengthen national cohesion and federal resilience.

5. Establish strategic deterrence against future insurrections.

III. Threat Assessment

Actors:

TPLF political leadership (domestic and diaspora)

Sleeper cells and sympathisers within federal institutions

Armed militias and reactivated military cadres

International lobbyists and media proxies

Capabilities:

Digital propaganda warfare

Diaspora financing and lobbying

Ethnic mobilisation and insurgent alliances

International legal warfare (lawfare)

Vulnerabilities:

Weak inter-agency coordination

Ethnic-based political fragmentation

Gaps in cyber defence and strategic communication

International media bias and policy manipulation

IV. Strategic Pillars

1. Intelligence and Counterintelligence

Create a National Counter-Clandestine Operations Unit (NCCOU) under the National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS).

Map and monitor all TPLF-affiliated domestic and diaspora entities.

Launch covert operations to disrupt TPLF logistics, sleeper cells, and propaganda distribution.

Coordinate intelligence-sharing between regional and federal agencies.

2. Legal and Constitutional Enforcement

Enforce the Proclamation on Terrorist Organisations and Anti-Treason laws against TPLF operatives.

Establish a Special Tribunal on Anti-State Actors to prosecute crimes committed during and after the Tigray war.

Audit and reform regional security forces to ensure loyalty to the federal constitution.

3. Digital and Cyber Defence

Create a National Cyber Command Centre to:

Monitor disinformation campaigns.

Trace and counter diaspora-run propaganda platforms.

Defend government infrastructure from cyber sabotage.

4. Military Readiness and Strategic Deterrence

Strengthen the Rapid Response and Border Defence Units.

Establish strategic military outposts in historically contested regions.

Develop an asymmetric warfare doctrine to counter TPLF-like insurgencies.

Increase investment in drones, signals intelligence (SIGINT), and counterinsurgency capabilities.

5. Economic Disruption and Resource Control

Impose targeted financial sanctions on TPLF-affiliated businesses (e.g., EFFORT).

Conduct forensic audits of regional governments with suspected TPLF infiltration.

Nationalise illicitly acquired assets linked to the TPLF regime era.

Partner with international banks to freeze foreign-based funds.

6. Strategic Communication and Narrative Warfare

Launch a Unified National Messaging Campaign to:

Promote a shared national identity over ethnic polarisation.

Expose the destructive history and objectives of the TPLF.

Win the trust of war-affected populations through Stabilisation messaging

Use diaspora embassies to directly challenge foreign misinformation

7. Foreign Policy and Diplomacy

Engage major powers (U.S., EU, China, Russia) with a White Paper on Clandestine Threats in Ethiopia.

Appoint special envoys to lobby international institutions against TPLF rehabilitation.

Forge counter-insurgency cooperation agreements with regional powers (Sudan, Djibouti, Kenya).

Work with Interpol and international law enforcement to apprehend wanted TPLF operatives

V. Institutional Reforms

Reform the Federal Police and NISS to ensure multi-ethnic loyalty, professionalise and ensure the integrity of Peace and enhance regional security coordination.

Establish a National Council for Threat Assessment and Strategic Response (NCTASR) reporting to the Prime Minister.

VI. Timeline and Phases

Phase Duration Objective

I. Immediate Action 0–6 months Intelligence ramp-up, legal action, digital defence setup

II. Stabilisation–18 months Military deterrence, economic sanctions, narrative warfare

III. NoNormalisation8–36 months Political reconciliation, institutional deep reforms

IV. Consolidation 3–5 years National unity, regional security leadership

VII. Monitoring and Evaluation

Monthly security risk assessment by NCCOU

Quarterly reviews by NCTASR

Bi-annual national security audit presented to Parliament

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VIII. Conclusion

The TPLF and its clandestine network must be understood as a political opposition and a hybrid insurgent entity operating through formal, informal, and digital realms. Ethiopia’s survival as a stable and united federation depends on how decisively and intelligently it confronts this threat. A clear-eyed national security plan—rooted in law, legitimacy, and strategic depth—is the sine qua non for lasting peace.

 

Ethiopianism Is a Political Ideology—Not a Primordial Identity

 Transcription (Quote by Dr. Gamachu Magarsa)

“Ethiopia is not the name of a country, ethnic group, or anything else; rather, it is the name of a political ideology. That is why we have Kenya, but not Kenyanism; we have Uganda, but not Ugandanism; and we have Ethiopia, but its Ethiopianism. This indicates that Ethiopia is essentially a political philosophy rather than a territorial state as we know it now.”

— Dr. Gamachu Magarsa (OSA 2021)

 Ethiopianism Is a Political Ideology—Not a Primordial Identity

By: Habtamu Nini Abino 

Location: Ottawa, Canada

Clarity is revolutionary in a world where the boundaries between statehood, ethnicity, and ideology are often blurred. Dr. Gamachu Magarsa, one of our time's most thoughtful Oromo scholars, offered such clarity in his 2021 address to the Oromo Studies Association. His words strike at the heart of a century-old confusion: “Ethiopia is not the name of a country, ethnic group, or anything else; rather, it is the name of a political ideology.”

This statement demands our attention because it exposes a truth long buried under imperial narratives: Ethiopianism is not a natural identity. It is a state-sponsored, historically constructed ideology of assimilation.

The Fabrication of “Ethiopianism”

Unlike other African nations whose names reflect geographic or historic consensus—Kenya, Tanzania, Senegal—Ethiopia carries a mythical, constructed aura. We do not speak of “Kenyanism” or “Ugandanism” because these countries are political territories, not ideologies. But “Ethiopianism” exists—and not by accident.

It was deliberately manufactured by successive regimes, from Menelik II to Haile Selassie, and later sustained by military and post-military governments, to serve one purpose: to assimilate and erase the identities of subjugated nations, especially the Oromo, through linguistic, religious, and cultural hegemony.

Ethiopianism elevated the Amharic language as a unifying national tool while criminalising and marginalising others. It elevated Orthodox Christianity as the “civilising faith” while branding indigenous beliefs like Waaqeffannaa as backwards. It glorified Abyssinian history while silencing the histories of the Oromo, Sidama, Somali, and others.

It is therefore not a surprise that those who opposed this ideology—those who dared to speak Afaan Oromo, preserve their customs, or honour their ancestors—were called “anti-Ethiopian.” In truth, they were anti-assimilation, anti-erasure, and above all, pro-freedom.

A Warning to Oromo Politicians

Yet in a bitter twist of irony, some Oromo politicians today, perhaps out of ignorance or political expediency, champion Ethiopianism as if it were a virtue. They speak of unity without truth, of peace without justice, and of “Ethiopian identity” without recognising the blood and chains that constructed it.

In rejecting Oromummaa (Oromo identity and values), these politicians believe they are building bridges. In reality, they reinforce the walls that once imprisoned their own people. They forget that Ethiopianism was never meant to include the Oromo—it was designed to absorb and erase them.

Identity Is Not the Enemy of Unity

Some argue that asserting Oromummaa threatens national unity. This is false. The Oromo are not against unity—they are against uniformity through coercion. True unity can only be built upon mutual respect, self-determination, and constitutional equality.

Ethiopia must become a home of nations and nationalities, not a prison of forced sameness. That requires rejecting Ethiopianism not as geography, but as ideology.

Conclusion: From Assimilation to Authenticity

Dr. Gamachu Magarsa’s insight invites us to rethink everything we know about Ethiopia. It invites us to distinguish between a people’s land and an empire’s project. Between Oromummaa and the imposed “Ethiopian identity.”

To the Oromo, today's call is clear: never confuse the chains with your character. Never accept an ideology that demands your silence as a condition of citizenship.

Let us build a future where diversity is constitutional, not conditional, where identity is celebrated, not assimilated, and where Ethiopia, if it is to survive, must finally confront the political fiction of Ethiopianism and choose truth over myth.

 

Oromo Nationalism as a Sine Qua Non of Power Survival for the Prosperity Party“Don’t trust politicians. The issue of Oromo nationalism is the issue of survival.

Oromo Nationalism as a Sine Qua Non of Power Survival for the Prosperity Party

“Don’t trust politicians. The issue of Oromo nationalism is the issue of survival.”

Introduction

In the volatile terrain of Ethiopian politics, the Prosperity Party (PP) has tried to maintain a fragile balance among competing nationalisms, historical grievances, and federalist aspirations. Among these, Oromo nationalism stands out not merely as a political identity but as a sine qua non—a condition without which the very survival of the ruling party becomes impossible. This essay explores why Oromo nationalism is indispensable to the Prosperity Party’s existence, how it has been instrumentalised, suppressed, or co-opted, and why mistrust toward political actors—especially those within the ruling class—is warranted in the Oromo struggle for justice and self-determination.

Oromo Nationalism: A Historical Force of Resistance

Oromo nationalism emerged not from the luxury of ideology but from the necessity of survival. Rooted in centuries of cultural repression, political marginalisation, and territorial dispossession, the Oromo national struggle has fought to recognise Oromummaa—the Oromo people's identity, language, values, and historical agency. The formation of organisations such as the Macha Tulama Association, OLF, and later movements like Qeerroo reflect this enduring desire for self-rule and dignity.

The fall of the Derg and the rise of the EPRDF brought hopes of constitutional self-determination (especially Article 39), but reality betrayed expectation. The Oromo cause was subsumed into a federal structure that allowed administrative autonomy while suppressing political freedom.

The Prosperity Party: Inheritor of a Volatile Federal Bargain

The Prosperity Party, formed after the dissolution of the EPRDF coalition in 2019, inherited a contradictory legacy: it championed “unity” while relying heavily on ethnic legitimacy, particularly from Oromia, the country’s largest and most populous region. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, who hails from Oromia, rose to power on the wave of Oromo protests and Qeerroo activism. Yet his administration soon turned against the forces that brought it to power.

From the assassination of Haacaaluu Hundeessaa to the mass imprisonment of Oromo leaders and the vilification of OLF and OLA, the PP revealed its true intentions: not to fulfil the Oromo national project but to manage and neutralise it. This betrayal has led many to rightly distrust politicians who weaponise identity for power while offering no substantive change.

Oromo Nationalism: The Sine Qua Non of PP’s Power Survival

Despite its repressive tendencies, the Prosperity Party cannot survive without Oromo nationalism for several reasons:

1. Demographic Weight: The Oromo comprise over 35% of the population. No party can claim democratic legitimacy or win national elections without their support or passive consent.

2. Geopolitical Centrality: Oromia geographically surrounds Addis Ababa and stretches from east to west, making it the geopolitical heart of Ethiopia. Instability in Oromia paralyses the country.

3. Narrative Control: By co-opting elements of Oromo nationalism (language, symbols, selective history), the Prosperity Party tries to project inclusive legitimacy at home and to international audiences.

4. Countering Amhara-Centric Unionism: To resist pressure from pan-Ethiopian and Amhara elites who seek to roll back multinational federalism, the PP uses Oromo nationalism as a counterbalance, even if hypocritically.

The Danger of Instrumentalisation

The Prosperity Party’s dependence on Oromo identity is not a genuine alliance but an instrumental survival. It uses selective inclusion to pacify Oromo grievances while suppressing genuine Oromo demands for autonomy, justice, and cultural renaissance. This explains the state's violent crackdown on Oromo youth, intellectuals, and liberation fronts.

This instrumentalisation weakens the Oromo cause from within and fuels disillusionment, cynicism, and justified mistrust of politicians, including those who speak Oromiffaa but act as guardians of the unitary state.

Conclusion: 

Trust the People, Not the Politicians

In today’s Ethiopia, Oromo nationalism is not a negotiable ideology—it is a necessity for existence. But that necessity is not limited to the Prosperity Party’s power calculus. For millions of Oromo, it is about cultural survival, historical justice, and national dignity. The PP may ride the wave of Oromummaa to stay in office, but its survival will remain fragile and morally bankrupt without respecting the full scope of the Oromo struggle.

The Oromo people must remain vigilant and discerning. As the saying goes, “Do not trust politicians. Trust only in your struggle, your history, and your unity.” The future belongs not to those who manipulate identity for power, but to those who transform it into liberation, equality, and genuine democracy.

 

Memorandum to the Government of Ethiopia Subject: Strategic Diplomatic Positioning in Response to Potential U.S. Policy Shifts under Donald Trump

Memorandum to the Government of Ethiopia

Subject: Strategic Diplomatic Positioning in Response to Potential U.S. Policy Shifts under Donald Trump

To:

Office of the Prime Minister, Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS)

Ethiopian Immigration and Citizenship Services

House of Peoples’ Representatives – Foreign Affairs Standing Committee

From:

[Confidential Policy Advisor / Independent Strategic Analyst]

Date: July 23, 2025

Re: A Strategic Proposal to Pre-empt U.S. Immigration Pressure and Reposition Ethiopia as a Key Ally

Executive Summary:

In light of Donald Trump's anticipated return to the U.S. presidency and his well-documented hardline stance on immigration and foreign diplomacy, this memorandum proposes a proactive and brilliant diplomatic manoeuvre for the Ethiopian government. Rather than being caught off guard by pressure to accept Gaza resettlements or face diplomatic cold-shouldering, Ethiopia should offer an alternative humanitarian gesture: the voluntary intake of a manageable number of African-origin migrants currently in the U.S. illegally.

This strategic move could achieve three objectives:

1. Shield Ethiopia from any retaliatory rhetoric by Trump related to the Red Sea, Israel, or Gaza resettlement politics.

2. Position Ethiopia as a problem-solver and reliable regional partner aligned with U.S. interests, especially in migration and security.

3. Leverage this goodwill to negotiate economic incentives, security partnerships, and potential debt relief from the United States.

Background:

With U.S. domestic policy trending toward hardline deportation under Trump’s potential leadership, countries that fail to cooperate may be subject to political or economic pressure. Ethiopia has been under increasing scrutiny due to its position on the Red Sea, GERD, and internal instability.

While accepting Gaza settlers is ethically and politically risky for Ethiopia, offering a controlled intake of African-origin irregular migrants already within U.S. borders provides an alternative that:

Aligns with pan-African solidarity,

Avoids religious/ethnic tension at home,

And demonstrates goodwill toward Washington.

Proposal:

1. Publicly Frame the Offer Around Pan-Africanism and Shared Responsibility:

Emphasise that Ethiopia is responding to the humanitarian need to help African victims of global displacement.

Avoid making the offer look like a U.S.-dictated obligation.

2. Limit the Number and Scope:

Propose a symbolic number (e.g., 2,000–5,000 individuals annually).

Focus on returnees screened by the U.S. system and from neighbouring regions (Sudan, South Sudan, Eritrea, Somalia, etc.).

3. Demand Economic Offsets:

Request development aid, direct budget support, or infrastructure investment in return.

Use Canada’s refugee sponsorship model as a precedent.

4. Avoid Engagement on Gaza Directly:

Politely deflect any inquiries related to Gaza by stating Ethiopia's principle of non-alignment in Middle East internal affairs while reinforcing Ethiopia’s role as a humanitarian host for African refugees.

Strategic Messaging:

If framed correctly, the Prime Minister can state publicly:

 “While Ethiopia remains committed to peace in the Middle East, our moral and historic obligation is to our African brothers and sisters. We are open to assisting in regional stabilisation efforts, including humanitarian cooperation where feasible.”

Risks and Mitigations:

Risk Mitigation

Domestic backlash over foreign refugees. Limit intake to fellow Africans; use developmental funds to benefit local host communities

Perception of submission to the U.S. Frame the offer as proactive and Afrocentric

Resentment from Arab or Palestinian factions. Maintain apparent neutrality on Middle East politics

Long-term burden Demand short-term agreements with exit strategies if domestic capacity is overwhelmed

Conclusion:

If executed diplomatically and with full inter-agency coordination, this strategic move can neutralise potential Trump-era threats while leveraging Ethiopia’s position for economic benefit. It is neither surrender nor blind compliance, but rather a pragmatic repositioning in a volatile global order.

Recommended Action:

Initiate confidential backchannel talks with U.S. diplomats in Addis Ababa and Washington.

Convene an inter-ministerial committee on refugee integration and economic negotiation.

Prepare a white paper to present at AU or IGAD as a pilot continental strategy.

Prepared By:

[Your Name]

Policy and Strategy Consultant

[Contact Info – if needed]

 

Ethiopia’s Red Sea Ambition as a Sine Qua Non of National Survival.

 Ethiopia’s Red Sea Ambition as a Sine Qua Non of National Survival

Ethiopia, with its population exceeding 130 million, stands as the most populous landlocked country in the world. Its geographic confinement has become a geopolitical handicap, severely constraining its economic growth, trade capacity, and strategic sovereignty. In light of this reality, Ethiopia’s quest for access to the Red Sea is not merely a desire but a sine qua non: a non-negotiable condition for the country's long-term survival, development, and stability.

The Red Sea Access: More Than Just Geography

Since the loss of direct access to the sea following Eritrea’s independence in 1993, Ethiopia has been forced to rely almost exclusively on Djibouti, through which more than 95% of its imports and exports pass. This dependency has economic, political, and security consequences:

Trade bottlenecks and high costs undermine industrial growth.

Strategic vulnerability arises from relying on one narrow access route.

Regional influence is diminished without a maritime presence.

As Ethiopia's population, urbanisation, and industrialisation expand, the need for diversified and sovereign access to international waters becomes existential.

Applying the Sine Qua Non Principle

Under the sine qua non framework, we must ask:

Can Ethiopia fulfil its national objectives — economic development, food security, and regional power status — without a direct stake in Red Sea access?

The answer is no. Hence, Red Sea access becomes the sine qua non of Ethiopia’s national strategy.

This principle frames the port issue not as opportunistic aggression, but as a structural necessity — much like energy is to industry or oxygen is to life.

A Question of Means, Not Ends

While Ethiopia’s need for port access is non-negotiable, the means to achieve it must be responsible and legal:

Military expansionism or annexationist rhetoric would destabilise the region and isolate Ethiopia internationally.

Instead, Ethiopia must pursue regional integration, negotiated leases, and economic corridors with countries like Djibouti, Eritrea, or Somalia/Somaliland.

A mutual benefit model — where Ethiopia offers investment, labour markets, or infrastructure in exchange for port access — aligns with the sine qua non-logic and regional peace.

The International Dimension

Ethiopia’s growing diplomatic activism, including outreach to Gulf states, China, the U.S., and Israel, reflects a strategy to leverage global support for its Red Sea ambition. However, the sine qua non principle reminds these actors that ignoring Ethiopia’s maritime imperative is to risk fueling instability in the Horn of Africa — a fragile region.

Any durable peace and prosperity in the region must recognise that a landlocked giant of 130 million people cannot indefinitely remain boxed in.

Conclusion:

 A New Maritime Paradigm

Ethiopia’s ambition for access to the Red Sea is not expansionist fantasy — it is a rational pursuit of a geostrategic sine qua non. The challenge for Ethiopia and its neighbours is not whether this access should be granted, but how it can be achieved peacefully, legally, and cooperatively.

The Red Sea must cease to be a fault line and instead become a shared corridor of opportunity, or it will remain a source of perpetual tension.

 

Ethiopian Federalism at a Crossroads: A Sine Qua Non Analysis of Governance and Democracy"

 "Ethiopian Federalism at a Crossroads: A Sine Qua Non Analysis of Governance and Democracy"

Introduction

Ethiopia’s political architecture, codified in the 1995 Constitution, rests on a unique and controversial model of multinational federalism. Article 39, which grants “Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples” the right to self-determination, including secession, has been this framework's cornerstone and lightning rod. As Ethiopia faces mounting internal conflict, contested governance, and democratic stagnation, it is timely to apply the lens of the sine qua non theory — the principle of identifying essential, non-negotiable conditions — to examine what is indispensable for the survival and success of Ethiopian federalism, governance, and democracy.

I. Understanding the Sine Qua Non Principle

Derived from Latin, sine qua non means “without which not” — a necessary precondition for something to exist or function. Applying this concept in governance and political theory allows us to isolate core components without which a system would collapse or lose its essence. In Ethiopia’s case, we must ask: What are the foundational elements without which federalism, effective governance, and democracy cannot meaningfully exist?

II. Sine Qua Non of Ethiopian Federalism: Article 39 and the Right to Identity

1. Federalism without Self-Determination Is Hollow

Ethiopia’s federation is not based on geography or economy but ethno-national identity.

The right to self-determination, as enshrined in Article 39, is the sine qua non of this federal arrangement. Without it, the federalism project loses legitimacy among historically marginalised groups.

2. Attacks on Article 39 Undermine the Federal Compact

Any move to repeal or suppress Article 39 risks unravelling the very basis upon which groups like the Oromo, Tigrayans, Sidama, and Somali accepted federal union in the first place.

Efforts to centralise power under the guise of “national unity” contradict the spirit of the federal constitution and reignite secessionist sentiment.

III. Sine Qua Non of Good Governance: Rule of Law and Institutional Autonomy

1. Rule of Law: The Foundation of Functional Governance

Governance in Ethiopia has often been personalised, militarised, or driven by party loyalty rather than institutions.

The rule of law — independent courts, constitutional supremacy, and impartial enforcement — is the sine qua non of credible governance.

2. Institutional Fragmentation as a Threat

Without autonomous institutions (e.g., electoral board, judiciary, human rights commission), governance degenerates into rule by decree or ethnic patronage.

Any reform agenda that bypasses institutional accountability mechanisms is doomed to reproduce authoritarianism.

IV. Sine Qua Non of Democracy: Genuine Political Pluralism and Dialogue

1. Democracy Without Dialogue Is Authoritarianism in Disguise

Ethiopia has held elections, but democratic substance — pluralism, freedom of association, respect for opposition — remains thin.

Political dialogue, particularly between federal and regional actors, is the sine qua non for democratic transition in a multi-ethnic state

2. Suppressing Dissent Erodes Democratic Legitimacy

Jailing opposition leaders, silencing critical media, or delegitimising political actors fuels radicalism and public cynicism.

The government must foster a culture of inclusive dialogue as a permanent process, not a crisis-response tool

V. Interlinking the Three Pillars: Federalism, Governance, Democracy

Using the sine qua non framework reveals how these three elements are interdependent:

Federalism without democratic governance becomes a decentralised autocracy.

Governance without respect for federal diversity becomes a re-centralised empire.

Democracy without federal accommodation becomes majoritarian tyranny.

Thus, any political solution or national dialogue that isolates one element without reinforcing the others is incomplete and unsustainable

VI. Policy Implications and Recommendations

1. Recommit to Article 39 in Spirit and Practice

Self-determination should be viewed as a guarantee of voluntary unity rather than a threat.

Support regional autonomy within a shared constitutional order.

2. Reform Institutions, Not Just Elites

Empower courts, electoral boards, and ombudsmen to act independently.

End political interference in regional administrations and the judiciary.

3. Institutionalise National Dialogue

Create a permanent federal council of nationalities for inter-regional dialogue.

Use the National Dialogue Commission to heal past wounds and shape a new federal consensus.

Conclusion

In the Ethiopian context, Article 39, the rule of law, and inclusive dialogue are not optional ideals. They are the sine qua non — the non-negotiable foundations — of a viable federal, democratic, and governable state. Ignoring any of these pillars risks pushing the country further into fragmentation, violence, or authoritarian relapse. A sustainable Ethiopia requires that its leaders, intellectuals, and citizens recognise and defend the essentials — for only by safeguarding the indispensable can the country endure.

 

Op-Ed: Ethiopia’s Inevitable Transition—Who Will Seize the Moment?

 

Op-Ed: Ethiopia’s Inevitable Transition—Who Will Seize the Moment?

By Habtamu Nini Abino

Two years ago, during the height of the conflict between Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF), the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) entered a tactical alliance with the TPLF and other opposition forces. Their shared goal was to remove Abiy from power. The agreement was born out of mutual interest, not ideological alignment.

However, when the TPLF advanced toward central Ethiopia and threatened to cross into Oromia, the OLA and the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) issued a surprising and powerful statement: “TPLF forces should not enter the borders of Oromia.” It was a moment of clarity that gave many of us hope. Yet, this statement did not stop the TPLF from reaching Addis Ababa—it was the reality of power. The TPLF lacked the strength, Western diplomatic backing, and technological superiority. Abiy’s drone warfare halted their momentum.

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A New Conversation: What Comes After Abiy?

Recently, a new public discourse has emerged: What comes after Abiy? Scholars, politicians, and the general public are now asking the vital question: What would a post-Abiy Ethiopia look like?

This conversation has not gone unnoticed by the regime. From internet shutdowns to speeches in Parliament and cabinet-level warnings, it is clear that the government sees this discussion as a direct threat. But such discussions are not threats—they are essential. They assume something we all sense but rarely admit: Abiy's political fall is now within possibility.

Jawar Mohammed recently framed the potential collapse of Abiy’s rule with striking clarity: 60% Abiy himself, 30% economic collapse, and 10% organised political resistance. That final 10% includes widespread protests and all organised political and armed forces—OLA, OLF, Oromo Federalist Congress (OFC), Fanno, TPLF, Amhara militias, etc. External actors, while not quantified, undoubtedly remain a decisive factor.

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Who Will Control the Transition?

This brings us to the most critical question: Who will hijack the transition this time? History is full of lessons.

• When Haile Selassie fell, the Derg military junta hijacked the transition and ruled with an iron fist for 17 years, sidelining the popular forces that brought him down.
• When the Derg fell, the TPLF emerged as the most organised force, taking power and shaping Ethiopia's political architecture for nearly three decades.
• In 2018, when the TPLF's dominance crumbled under popular pressure, the OPDO, later rebranded under Abiy's Prosperity Party, hijacked the moment.

The most organised and militarily powerful faction took control each time, often ignoring democratic voices and marginalising allied groups once the dust settled.

So we must ask: Who will hijack the next transition? Will it be an internal democratic coalition or an opportunistic foreign-backed faction? That answer depends on what happens today, not tomorrow.

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Time to Prepare: Strength, Strategy, and Alliances

The time to prepare is now. Oromo political forces—armed or civic, traditional or progressive—must be unified, focused, and strategically aligned. We must define:

• Who are our allies?
• What strength are we building?
• What vision do we offer beyond resistance?

Transitions are rarely shared voluntarily. They are seized. Unless Oromo forces and others committed to justice prepare their strategy and institutions today, they risk being excluded again.

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What If Another War Breaks Out?

The stakes grow higher by the day. Rumours of renewed war involving Eritrea, the TPLF, and the federal government have intensified. If such a war erupts, Oromo political movements face a dangerous decision:

• Should they side with Abiy’s government?
• Should they align with TPLF and Eritrean forces to topple him?
• Or should they chart an independent path that protects Oromo interests and national stability?

Each of these choices carries consequences. And silence or indecision is also a choice that history may not forgive.

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Final Thought: From Resistance to Responsibility

The fall of Abiy Ahmed—if and when it comes—will not automatically yield democracy or justice. That requires organised, principled, and visionary forces ready to act with unity and clarity. Ethiopia’s transitions are often hijacked because power fills a vacuum faster than principle.

So let us talk—not just about the fall of a regime but about the birth of a new political order. Let us ask, “Who will fall?” and “Who will rise with purpose and legitimacy?”

If we fail to plan now, we risk becoming spectators of our own future.

—END—

Habtamu Nini Abino is the author of The Second Republic and the Politics of Article 39 in Ethiopia and Liberal Democracy and the Constitution of 1994: The User’s Handbook. He writes on federalism, constitutionalism, and governance in the Horn of Africa.

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Op-Ed: The Hijacking That Could Shake the Horn of Africa

Op-Ed: The Hijacking That Could Shake the Horn of Africa

By Habtamu Nini Abino

On July 19, 2025, Somalia’s Ministry of Internal Affairs issued a serious and urgent statement. It accused Puntland authorities of unlawfully hijacking a Turkish military vessel bound for the TURKSOM military academy in Mogadishu. The rule of law, national unity in Somalia, and the stability of the wider Horn of Africa are at stake.

If true, this incident represents more than a domestic dispute. It challenges international partnerships, tests federal authority, and could potentially catalyse regional destabilisation.

Federalism on Trial

Somalia’s federal structure was born from a desire to unite a fragmented state through decentralisation. Yet this hijacking, attributed to Puntland, dangerously stretches the bounds of federal autonomy. The message from Mogadishu is unambiguous: Somalia’s unity cannot be held hostage to rogue actions by federal states.

Federalism cannot be used as a cloak for militancy or obstruction. If involved, Puntland risks undermining the constitutional order that guarantees its existence.

Türkiye: A Strategic Partner, Not a Target

The alleged interference with a Turkish vessel threatens more than Somali sovereignty—it jeopardises Somalia’s most crucial security partnership. Türkiye has invested heavily in rebuilding Somalia’s national army through the TURKSOM military academy, providing training, equipment, and diplomatic support.

To sabotage this alliance is to sabotage Somalia’s future. It sends the wrong signal to Turkey and to other international partners. If Somalia cannot guarantee the safety of its allies’ interests, it risks becoming isolated once again.

A Region on Edge

The Horn of Africa is one of the most volatile regions in the world. Ethiopia is battling internal insurgencies, Sudan is trapped in civil war, Eritrea remains unpredictable, and the Red Sea is increasingly militarised. Somalia cannot afford to add fuel to this fire.

The alleged hijacking also undermines maritime security in one of the world’s most strategic sea lanes. The Gulf of Aden already faces threats from piracy and proxy conflicts. Acts like these can invite foreign intervention and further militarisation.

Upholding the Law, Preserving the Union

The Federal Government of Somalia must act swiftly and within constitutional bounds to de-escalate the crisis, restore order, and ensure accountability. The future of the Somali state depends on its ability to balance regional autonomy with national unity, and diplomacy with firmness.

This is a defining moment—not only for Somalia, but for the regional order of the Horn of Africa. Missteps now could have irreversible consequences.

 The Path Forward:

This is not the time for federal defiance or strategic sabotage. It is time for legal clarity, institutional resilience, and national dialogue. The Federal Government must stand firm, and all regions—including Puntland—must recommit to the unity and sovereignty of the Somali state.

In the eyes of the international community, this crisis will measure Somalia’s maturity as a nation. It must rise to the occasion.

—END—

Habtamu Nini Abino is the author of The Second Republic and the Politics of Article 39 in Ethiopia and Liberal Democracy and the Constitution of 1994: The User’s Handbook. He writes on governance, federalism, and constitutional law in the Horn of Africa.

Summary of The Communist Manifesto

Summary of The Communist Manifesto

By Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels (1848)

 Core Ideas

1. History as Class Struggle

All history is the history of class struggles between oppressors and the oppressed.

In Marx's time, this was framed as the bourgeoisie (capitalist ruling class) vs. the proletariat (working class).

In feudal times, it was lords vs. serfs; in modern times, capitalists vs. workers.

2. Capitalism and Its Contradictions

Capitalism revolutionised production but also exploited labour and concentrated wealth.

It creates inequality, alienation, and instability, laying the ground for its own downfall.

3. Proletarian Revolution

Marx and Engels call for the working class (proletariat) to unite, overthrow the capitalist system, and seize political power.

The goal is a classless, stateless, and egalitarian society—communism.

4. Abolition of Private Property

Not personal property, but the abolition of private ownership of the means of production (land, factories, etc.)

Calls for collective ownership, free education, progressive taxation, and the end of inherited wealth.

5. Internationalism

The working class has no country—“Workers of the world, unite!”

Opposes nationalism when it serves the ruling elites.

 Using the Marxist Framework to Analyse Ideological Conflict in Ethiopia

Context: Ethiopia's Ideological Divide

Followers of the Old Feudal Regime:

These include conservative elites, centralists, and some monarchist-influenced groups who want a unitary Ethiopia. They often emphasise a centralised state, a glorified past (imperial rule), and cultural homogenization, particularly under Amhara-Habesha hegemony.

Supporters of Federalism (Ethnic Federalists):

They support the current constitutional arrangement, which grants “Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples” the right to self-rule, identity, and secession (Article 39). They argue that it corrects historical subjugation and land dispossession.

 Applying The Communist Manifesto as a Tool

1. Class Struggle → Nation-Nationality Struggle

Marx’s class conflict (bourgeoisie vs. proletariat) can be reinterpreted in Ethiopia as:

> Old imperial elite (centralist, land-owning class) vs. oppressed nations and nationalities (historically marginalised ethnic groups)

The feudal regime and its modern heirs represent the dominant ruling class, while the federalists often speak for the historically exploited peripheries (Oromo, Sidama, Somali, etc.).

2. Superstructure and Ideology

Marx argued that the ruling class controls not only the economy but also culture, religion, and education.

In Ethiopia, centralists have historically imposed a unified identity (Amharan language, Orthodox Christianity, imperial history)—this reflects ideological domination, a key Marxist concern.

3. Economic Base and Exploitation

Feudal landownership in Ethiopia was built on "gabbar" (serf-like) systems, where peasants worked land owned by the imperial class.

Federalism, especially in Oromia and the South, is seen as a movement to reclaim land, language, and dignity, aligning with Marx’s call for the oppressed to regain control over their material and cultural life.

4. Revolution and Resistance

The rise of the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) in the 1990s, led by Marxist-inspired groups like the TPLF, reflected a partial implementation of revolutionary ideas, mainly through federalism.

However, critics argue that EPRDF institutionalised ethnic division for control, deviating from Marxist ideals of unity and class-based revolution.

 Key Takeaways for Ethiopian Analysis

Marxist Concept Ethiopian Analogy

Bourgeoisie vs. Proletariat: The old centralist elites vs. oppressed nations and ethnic groups

Superstructure: The Amhara-dominated national culture, language, and  religion

Class Consciousness Rise of ethnonational awareness among Oromo, Sidama, etc.

Revolution Struggles for federalism, self-determination, and land reform

Internationalism: Federalist resistance to state nationalism and homogenization

✍️ Conclusion

Karl Marx's Communist Manifesto offers a powerful lens through which to understand Ethiopia’s ideological divide. At its heart, the struggle between old feudal forces and federalist movements is not just political—it's about power, history, and who controls the nation's narrative. By applying Marx’s framework, we can see that Ethiopia's conflict is, in many ways, a modern form of class struggle, rooted in colonial-like domination, historical injustice, and the demand for equality and self-rule.

 

Abraham and Waaqeffannaa: A Reflection on Pre-Abrahamic Spirituality

 Abraham and Waaqeffannaa: A Reflection on Pre-Abrahamic Spirituality

Introduction

Abraham is regarded as the patriarch of the three major monotheistic religions: Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. Collectively known as the "Abrahamic religions," these faiths trace their spiritual ancestry to Abraham, who is said to have lived over 4,000 years ago in Mesopotamia. However, long before the codification of these formal religions, human beings practised indigenous spiritual traditions grounded in their connection with nature, morality, and the unseen power that governs the universe. One such spiritual system is Waaqeffannaa, the traditional belief system of the Oromo people of East Africa. This essay explores the idea that Abraham may have held beliefs similar to Waaqeffannaa before the emergence of organised Abrahamic religions.

Waaqeffannaa: The Indigenous Monotheism of the Oromo

Waaqeffannaa is the indigenous monotheistic faith of the Oromo people, centred on the worship of Waaqa, the one supreme being. It emphasises the moral law known as Safuu, the balance between nature, society, and the divine. Unlike many other traditional belief systems, Waaqeffannaa upholds a clear sense of ethical order, reverence for elders, harmony with nature, and spiritual equality.

Waaqeffannaa is deeply rooted in the idea of oneness with Waaqa, not as a distant god, but as an ever-present being that permeates all life. There are no prophets, holy books, or institutionalised temples. Yet, the faith operates with profound moral teachings and rituals guided by the Qaalluu spiritual leaders and the Gadaa democratic socio-political system.

Abraham and Pre-Abrahamic Spirituality

Before the Abrahamic religions existed, Abraham lived in a society where polytheism was common. According to Abrahamic scripture, Abraham rejected his time's idol worship and sought belief in one universal Creator—a trait that aligns with the fundamental tenet of Waaqeffannaa. Like Waaqeffannaa, Abraham’s belief in one supreme deity preceded institutional religion, dogma, or scripture.

This suggests that Abraham’s original faith was more spiritual than religious, intuitive rather than doctrinal. He sought truth, harmony, and morality, core values also found in Waaqeffannaa. He worshipped God directly, without the intermediaries that later religious systems developed.

Parallels Between Abrahamic Belief and Waaqeffannaa

1. Monotheism: Abraham and the Oromo traditional religion uphold belief in one Supreme Being—God (Waaqa).

2. Moral Code: Abraham is described as righteous and obedient to God’s law; Waaqeffannaa upholds Safuu, a moral code that governs human behaviour.

3. Nature and Spirituality: Waaqeffannaa integrates the natural world into its spirituality. Abraham, too, is portrayed as someone who worshipped in nature and received revelations under the stars and sky.

4. Absence of Organised Religion: Abraham's faith was personal and spiritual before Judaism or Islam. Similarly, Waaqeffannaa operates without codified dogma.

Implications and Reflection

The possibility that Abraham’s original worldview resembled Indigenous faiths like Waaqeffannaa opens a powerful perspective on human spirituality. It suggests that long before organised religion, humanity’s search for the divine was rooted in nature, ethics, and a sense of cosmic order. It invites us to recognise that spiritual truth can exist outside religious institutions.

Moreover, it reaffirms the value of Indigenous African belief systems. For too long, African spirituality has been dismissed as "pagan" or primitive. Yet systems like Waaqeffannaa demonstrate a complex and intensely monotheistic understanding of the universe—one that might have been shared by patriarchs like Abraham himself.

Conclusion

Abraham’s journey toward one God may not have been unique but rather part of a larger human consciousness that sought unity, truth, and moral clarity. In this light, Waaqeffannaa is not just an Oromo religion; it is a global heritage—a living example of how humanity has always reached toward the divine. Before becoming a figurehead of Judaism, Christianity, or Islam, Abraham may have walked a spiritual path similar to that of the Oromo people—believing in Waaqa, living by Safuu, and honouring the sacred connection between creation and Creator.

The Basic Principles of Waaqeffannaa: An Indigenous Faith of the Oromo People

The Basic Principles of Waaqeffannaa: An Indigenous Faith of the Oromo People

Introduction

Waaqeffannaa is the indigenous spiritual belief system of the Oromo people of the Horn of Africa. Rooted in ancient tradition and oral knowledge, it reflects a worldview centred on harmony, ethical responsibility, respect for creation, and spiritual reverence toward Waaqaa—the supreme being. Unlike Abrahamic religions, Waaqeffannaa does not rely on centralised scripture or institutionalised hierarchy but is passed through generations by elders and spiritual leaders known as Qaalluus and Qaallittii.

The following essay outlines and explains the five core principles of Waaqeffannaa that define its cosmology, ethics, and social order.

1. Supremacy of Waaqaa (God)

At the heart of Waaqeffannaa is the belief in Waaqaa, the creator, sustainer, and moral judge of all existence. Waaqaa is omniscient, omnipresent, and omnipotent, but is not anthropomorphised. The Oromo see Waaqaa not only as a distant deity but as an active daily force guiding the natural and moral order.

Waaqaa is considered benevolent and just, never causing harm or evil. Because of this belief, followers of Waaqeffannaa are encouraged to live in alignment with Waaqaa’s will, which manifests through peace, balance, and ethical conduct. Worship of Waaqaa is expressed through prayers, rituals, naming ceremonies, and seasonal festivals, especially under sacred trees or near rivers, which are seen as pure channels of divine presence.

2. Interconnection of Human Beings, Nature, and Waaqaa

Waaqeffannaa teaches that humans, animals, plants, and natural forces are all part of a divinely connected whole. The Oromo worldview is ecological and relational: no strict boundary exists between the spiritual and natural realms. The earth (lafti), sky (samii), and all elements of creation are interconnected and animated by Waaqaa’s presence.

This principle cultivates deep environmental ethics among Waaqeffannaa followers. Cutting down sacred trees, polluting rivers, or abusing animals is seen not only as an ecological crime but also as a spiritual violation. Humans are considered caretakers—not owners—of nature, with moral duties to sustain and protect it for future generations.

3. Human Dignity and Rights

Waaqeffannaa affirms the inherent dignity of every individual as a creation of Waaqaa. Each person, regardless of gender, age, or status, is born with intrinsic value and is entitled to respect, freedom, and responsibility. Believing personal dignity extends to communal life, where fairness, truthfulness, and justice are paramount.

This spiritual view underpins Oromo concepts of social equality and democracy, especially as practised in the Gadaa system, the traditional Oromo political order. Leaders are expected to be wise, humble, and accountable, and no person is believed to have divine authority over others.

4. Safuu: Moral Law and Ethical Responsibility

Safuu is one of the most critical moral principles in Waaqeffannaa. It refers to the sacred order, moral code, and spiritual discipline that governs the relationship between humans, nature, and Waaqaa. To act against Safuu is to offend both moral law and divine harmony.

Examples of violating Safuu include:

Lying or deceiving

Exploiting others

Disrespecting elders

Destroying nature

Abusing one's role or position

Conversely, a person who upholds Safuu is seen as spiritually clean, socially trustworthy, and ethically upright. Teaching Safuu begins in childhood and is reinforced through oral storytelling, proverbs, and community enforcement. It's more than law—a lived spiritual ethic that organises personal behaviour and collective identity.

5. Nageenya: Peace, Harmony, and Balance

Nageenya—meaning peace—is not merely the absence of violence but a deep spiritual and social harmony state. Peace in Waaqeffannaa is holistic: it must exist between individuals, communities, nature, and Waaqaa. Disturbing this balance—through conflict, greed, dishonesty, or exploitation—destroys society and the spirit.

Conflict resolution in Oromo tradition emphasises Araara (reconciliation), Luba (age-based negotiation), and public apology and restoration rather than punishment. Maintaining Nageenya is a community duty, and elders play a central role in preserving social equilibrium.

Conclusion

Waaqeffannaa is a profound Indigenous spiritual system that integrates theology, ecology, ethics, and governance. Its principles—supremacy of Waaqaa, interconnectedness, dignity, Safuu, and Nageenya—create a foundation for a morally grounded and ecologically conscious way of life. In a world facing moral crisis, ecological destruction, and identity loss, Waaqeffannaa’s teachings offer a reminder that spiritual beliefs can be intensely local yet universally relevant.

As Oromos reclaim their heritage and identity, the revival and understanding of Waaqeffannaa will continue to play a critical role in restoring dignity, peace, and moral clarity in both personal and national spheres.

 

Grotius and Gadaa: Rethinking Article 39 of the Ethiopian Constitution Through Indigenous and International Legal Lenses.

Grotius and Gadaa: Rethinking Article 39 of the Ethiopian Constitution Through Indigenous and International Legal Lenses

By:  Habtamu Nini Abino, 

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Abstract

This article explores the conceptual tension and synergy between Hugo Grotius’s foundational principles of international law and the Oromo Gadaa system of indigenous governance in the context of Article 39 of the Ethiopian Constitution, which grants nations, nationalities, and peoples the right to self-determination up to secession. By analysing the philosophical underpinnings of both traditions, the article argues that a deeper synthesis of global legal norms and African indigenous values could inform a more coherent and just framework for federalism, unity, and peaceful coexistence in Ethiopia.

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1. Introduction

Ethiopia's constitutional framework, particularly Article 39, has long been the subject of intense debate. It provides a legal basis for ethnic self-determination, including the right to secede. While this clause was designed to resolve Ethiopia’s historic “nationalities question,” its application has contributed to political fragmentation and conflict.

This article situates Article 39 within two intellectual traditions:

• The natural law and sovereignty doctrine of Hugo Grotius, founder of modern international law.
• The indigenous democratic ethics of the Gadaa system—the traditional Oromo governance system.

Together, these frameworks offer rich, if underexplored, tools for rethinking federalism, justice, and legitimacy in Ethiopia.

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2. Hugo Grotius and the Legal Foundation of Sovereignty

A Dutch jurist, Hugo Grotius (1583–1645), articulated the first coherent theory of international law in his seminal work De Jure Belli ac Pacis (On the Law of War and Peace). He argued that:

• All nations and peoples are subject to natural law, a universal moral order grounded in human reason.
• Sovereign states are equal but morally obligated to uphold peace, justice, and freedom of navigation.
• War is only justified in defence of rights; otherwise, peace is the default human condition.

Though Grotius did not explicitly endorse secession, his framework accommodates the right to resist unjust authority, a precursor to modern doctrines of self-determination.

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3. The Gadaa System: Indigenous Ethics and Democratic Governance

The Gadaa system is a traditional socio-political order of the Oromo people, structured by age-sets and time-based leadership cycles. It is founded on core principles such as:

• Safuu – the moral code of proper conduct and spiritual balance.
• Nagaa – peace, harmony, and conflict resolution through dialogue.
• Araara – reconciliation over retaliation.
• Odaa – the sacred assembly where collective decisions are made.

Unlike the modern state system, Gadaa does not view sovereignty as state-centred, but rather people-centred, exercised by consensus through public deliberation.

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4. Article 39: Between Legal Right and Political Reality

Article 39 of the 1995 FDRE Constitution states:

“Every Nation, Nationality and People in Ethiopia has an unconditional right to self-determination, including the right to secession.”

This clause was introduced in a post-civil war context to recognise the rights of historically oppressed groups. However, its implications have been contentious:

• Positive: Recognition of ethnic identity, local governance, and cultural autonomy.
• Negative: Legalised fragmentation, inter-ethnic conflict, and state instability.

Modern Ethiopian politics often invokes Article 39 as a political weapon rather than a tool for justice and inclusion.

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5. Grotius, Gadaa, and the Ethics of Self-Determination

5.1 Grotius: Moral Limits on Sovereignty

Grotius maintained that even sovereign actors must respect universal justice. Therefore, secession or rebellion must serve justice, not ambition. Inspired by his ideas, modern international law recognises secession only in extreme cases like colonialism or genocide.

5.2 Gadaa: Moral Community over Political Exit

In contrast, the Gadaa system views collective unity as sacred. Decisions such as separation or rebellion must undergo public debate, ethical review (via Safuu), and consensus. The Gadaa principle of Nagaa would discourage any group from breaking away unless all peaceful remedies have been exhausted.

5.3 Shared Principles

Principle	Grotius	Gadaa
Justice must guide legal action	✔️	✔️
Peace preferred over conflict	✔️	✔️
Legitimacy comes from moral and public accountability	✔️	✔️
Unilateral actions are morally questionable	✔️	✔️

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6. Toward a Reinterpretation of Article 39

To reconcile the letter of Article 39 with both Grotius’s legal ethics and Gadaa’s indigenous wisdom, Ethiopia must:

1. Reframe self-determination as a process, not a threat.
   Emphasise democratic negotiation, not forced exit.

2. Require moral and communal justification for secession.
   Use mechanisms like public deliberation and independent review to legitimise claims.

3. Prioritise reconciliation and institutional reform.
   Create space for peaceful political dissent, equitable representation, and intergroup trust.

4. Recognise indigenous systems like Gadaa as legal resources.
   Integrate customary law in national governance, especially in conflict mediation.

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7. Conclusion

Grotius and Gadaa provide essential moral foundations for evaluating the legitimacy of self-determination and secession. While Ethiopia’s Article 39 gives nations legal rights, it lacks the ethical safeguards envisioned by Western and African legal traditions. To move forward, Ethiopia must root its federalism in law and justice, dialogue, and shared moral responsibility.

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References

• Grotius, H. (1625). De Jure Belli ac Pacis.
• FDRE Constitution, 1995.
• Asmerom Legesse. (2000). Oromo Democracy: An Indigenous African Political System.
• United Nations Charter, 1945.
• African Union Constitutive Act, Article 4(h).

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Ethiopia’s Politics of Survival: A Century Lost to Power Struggles?

Ethiopia’s Politics of Survival: A Century Lost to Power Struggles?

Introduction

With its ancient civilisation and diverse peoples, Ethiopia has long been considered a unique African state that has never been formally colonised and is rich in history. Yet beneath this legacy lies a deep-rooted political crisis. Ethiopia has been trapped in a cycle of authoritarianism, exclusionary politics, and survivalist governance for much of its modern history. The assertion that “Ethiopia’s politics is unscientific and a politics of survival, where the powerful take all” reflects a reality deeply embedded in its political culture. This essay argues that unless foundational changes are made, Ethiopia will unlikely witness true democracy and good governance—even in the next 100 years.

I. The Nature of Ethiopia’s Political Culture

Ethiopian politics has historically revolved around zero-sum competition. Power is viewed not as a public trust, but as a prize to be won and monopolised. The winner dominates, the loser is excluded and often persecuted. This pattern was present under imperial rule (Haile Selassie), socialist dictatorship (Mengistu Haile Mariam), and ethnic federalism (EPRDF and beyond).

The political culture lacks the scientific foundations of modern governance, meaning it lacks transparent institutions, predictable laws, accountability mechanisms, and evidence-based policymaking. Instead, personal loyalty, ethnic favouritism, and force determine who rules and how resources are allocated.

II. Politics of Survival: The Root of Authoritarianism

In Ethiopia, losing political power often means losing personal security, property, and life. This high-stakes environment creates a “politics of survival,” where rulers prioritise short-term control over long-term nation-building. They:

Suppress dissent through imprisonment, censorship, or military action.

Exploit ethnic divisions to weaken opposition and consolidate loyalty.

Manipulate elections not to gain legitimacy, but to maintain dominance.

Centralise power in the executive, ignoring judicial independence or parliamentary oversight.

This political logic is self-reinforcing. It leads to instability, rebellion, and regime collapse, which is followed by another group using the same tactics to cling to power.

III. Ethiopia’s Democratic Illusions

There have been moments of hope in Ethiopia’s political journey—transitional periods in 1991 (post-Derg) and 2018 (Abiy Ahmed’s rise). Each promised reform, democracy, and reconciliation. Yet both turned into renewed authoritarianism.

The reason lies in the absence of:

Independent institutions that can resist executive overreach.

Genuine federalism that respects the autonomy of nations and nationalities.

Civic education and democratic culture among elites and the public.

The rule of law protects minority rights and punishes abuse.

Without these foundations, elections become rituals, constitutions become manipulation tools, and democracy becomes a façade.

IV. The Next 100 Years: Why the Cycle May Persist

Assuming current trends continue, Ethiopia will unlikely achieve genuine democracy in the coming century. The reasons include:

1. Deep structural inequality – wealth, education, and power are concentrated among a few groups.

2. Militarised politics – the reliance on armed groups and security forces to resolve disputes.

3. Ethno-nationalist polarisation – making consensus-building nearly impossible.

4. Youth alienation – a rising generation that sees no future in peaceful politics.

5. External manipulation: Foreign powers support regimes that serve their interests, not democratic norms.

Even if one group attempts reform, the political culture often swallows them into the same patterns. The cycle will repeat without a radical rethinking of state structure and political philosophy.

V. Is There Hope? Conditions for Change

While pessimism is justified, political outcomes are not fixed. To break the cycle, Ethiopia would need:

A new social contract recognising the equality and self-determination of all nations and peoples within Ethiopia.

Independent institutions are protected from partisan capture.

Truth and reconciliation processes to address historical grievances.

A shift from survivalist politics to service-based leadership, emphasising competence over loyalty.

These changes, however, require leadership, sustained grassroots pressure, and international support aligned with democratic values.

Conclusion

Ethiopia’s political history is a cautionary tale of how the absence of scientific governance and democratic culture can trap a nation in endless cycles of conflict and repression. The current political model—winner-takes-all, power-at-any-cost—is unsustainable and corrosive. Without fundamental transformation, the next century may mirror the last: promises made, hopes dashed, and power seized in the name of survival. True democracy and good governance will remain a distant dream unless Ethiopia reinvents the very foundation of its statehood.