Introduction
The relationship between the Oromo people and the Abyssinian (Habesha) state has long been marked by tension, resistance, and cycles of domination. Central to this historical dynamic is a deep-rooted mistrust based on the experiences of political conquest, cultural suppression, and economic exploitation. Many Oromo scholars and activists argue that the Habesha elite’s attempts at collaboration with the Oromo have often served as a strategic façade for the broader goal of reasserting control, what some call the "recolonisation" of Oromia. This essay explores this historical relationship, examining the roots of Oromo resistance, the motivations behind Abyssinian political collaboration, and the implications for Ethiopia's current political landscape.
I. Historical Background of Oromo-Abyssinian Relations
The Oromo are one of the largest ethnolinguistic groups in Africa. They have a distinct culture, language (Afaan Oromo), and traditional democratic system known as the Gadaa. Before the late 19th century, the Oromo lived in decentralised polities and maintained relative autonomy across their vast territories.
The expansion of the Abyssinian empire under Emperor Menelik II in the late 1800s brought with it a violent conquest of the south, including Oromia. Supported by European powers eager to see a Christian empire dominate the region, Menelik's campaign incorporated Oromo lands into the newly centralised Ethiopian state. This incorporation was not consensual but instead characterised by military subjugation, enslavement, and the destruction of indigenous institutions like the Gadaa system.
II. Cultural and Political Suppression
Succeeding Ethiopian regimes systematically attempted to assimilate or suppress Oromo identity in the post-conquest period. Afaan Oromo was banned from official use, including in schools and courts, and many Oromo were forced to adopt Amharic names, language, and culture. The Ethiopian Orthodox Church, a key ideological arm of the state, promoted Habesha norms while devaluing Oromo spirituality and traditions.
These policies laid the groundwork for a colonial relationship between the Abyssinian centre and the Oromo periphery. Oromos were often treated as second-class citizens, denied meaningful representation in state institutions, and their lands were redistributed to northern settlers or imperial loyalists under feudal arrangements.
III. Oromo Resistance Movements
Resistance has always been a defining element of Oromo history. From local rebellions during Menelik’s era to the more organised movements of the 20th century, such as the Macha-Tulama Association and later the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), Oromo people have consistently fought for self-determination, recognition, and justice.
The rise of pan-Oromo nationalism in the late 20th century reframed the struggle as one of decolonisation. For many Oromo intellectuals and activists, Ethiopia was seen not as a shared homeland but an empire built through conquest and sustained through repression.
IV. The Question of Collaboration: A Tool of Recolonisation?
Throughout history, the Abyssinian elite has frequently sought collaboration with certain Oromo elites or figures, offering them positions of power or symbolic inclusion. However, such gestures have rarely translated into structural change. Often, they fragment Oromo unity and undermine grassroots resistance movements.
For example, including Oromo figures in the Derg or EPRDF regimes was often superficial. While individuals may have held titles, power remained centralised in the hands of the northern ruling class. Attempts to co-opt Oromo politicians have frequently been accompanied by continued suppression of Oromo dissent and protests, most notably during the Qeerroo-led uprisings (2014–2018).
This pattern suggests that collaboration is not necessarily a move toward reconciliation, but a strategic mechanism for maintaining hegemony over Oromia. In this view, every political rapprochement is interpreted through a lens of suspicion, as a potential step toward "recolonisation" rather than genuine federalism or equality.
V. Contemporary Implications
The emergence of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed—an Oromo by identity—initially raised hopes for a new era. However, his “Medemer” philosophy, which calls for unity and compromise, has been criticised by many Oromos as a rhetorical mask for recentralizing power and diluting Oromo aspirations.
The resurgence of military occupation in Oromia, the banning of Oromo organisations, and the imprisonment or killing of prominent Oromo leaders have all contributed to the belief that Habesha-led governments are still committed to a policy of domination. The lack of genuine power-sharing and the continued marginalisation of Afaan Oromo and the Gadaa system further strengthen this narrative.
Conclusion
The history of Oromo-Abyssinian relations is not merely one of ethnic diversity within a single nation-state—it is a history of conquest, suppression, and enduring resistance. While moments of cooperation have occurred, they have often been used to legitimise continued dominance. For many Oromos, collaboration with the Habesha elite is not a step toward peace or unity, but a strategy of recolonisation aimed at breaking Oromo self-determination. Until the Ethiopian state reckons honestly with this history and builds a truly inclusive federal system, the cycle of resistance and domination is likely to continue.
References:
Jalata, Asafa. Oromo Nationalism and the Ethiopian Discourse. The Red Sea Press, 1998.
Hassen, Mohammed. The Oromo and the Christian Kingdom of Ethiopia (1300–1700). James Currey, 2015.
Legesse, Asmarom. Gadaa: Three Approaches to the Study of African Society. The Red Sea Press, 2000.
Bulcha, Mekuria. “Contested Narratives and the Crisis of the Multinational Ethiopian State.” Northeast African Studies, Vol. 14(2), 2014.
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