A Briefing on Ethiopian Constitutional Reform and National Dialogue

A Briefing on Ethiopian Constitutional Reform and National Dialogue

Executive Summary

This briefing document synthesizes a series of proposals and critical reflections concerning the potential revision of the Ethiopian Constitution. The central thesis posits that Ethiopia’s previous constitutions have lacked "mass approval" or legitimacy, having been established primarily through state power rather than inclusive consensus.

The current political landscape, characterized by the National Dialogue Commission's efforts and the Prosperity Party’s legislative dominance, presents an opportunity for reform. However, the existing process is critiqued for a lack of transparency and technical competence. To address these deficiencies, the document outlines nine foundational pillars for an "Inclusive Constitution." These pillars advocate for a shift from ethnic-based federalism to a civil-centred "Autonomous Administration" model, the adoption of a semi-presidential hybrid government, land tenure reform, and the decentralization of federal power through the establishment of three distinct capital cities.

Context and Current Climate of Reform

The impetus for constitutional revision stems from the ongoing National Dialogue Commission, which is tasked with submitting consensus-based recommendations to the government. Given the current parliamentary majority held by the Prosperity Party, the two houses (the House of Peoples' Representatives and the House of Federation) possess the required two-thirds majority to enact constitutional amendments.

The Legitimacy Deficit

Historically, Ethiopian constitutions have been driven by the interests of the ruling government rather than the will of the majority.

• Power over Consent: Constitutional legitimacy in Ethiopia has traditionally relied on "absolute superiority of force" rather than popular mandate.
• Inclusivity Gaps: While the current FDRE Constitution involved public discussion during its drafting, it failed to include all political factions or achieve immediate mass acceptance.
• The "Red Flags" of the Dialogue: Some observers view the current National Dialogue process as lacking transparency. Concerns have been raised regarding the "incompetence" of the agenda-gathering phase and the absence of elite-modelled reconciliation before the broader dialogue.

The Nine Pillars for an Inclusive Constitution

The proposed framework for an "Inclusive Constitution" seeks to balance individual and group rights while moving away from ethnically exclusive governance.

1. Philosophical Reorientation: From Ethnic to Civil Society

The document argues that the current preamble views citizens solely as members of ethnic groups with mutually exclusive histories.

• Citizenship First: The constitution must recognize individual citizenship and balance it with group rights.
• Civil Identity: The state should be modelled as a "civil society" guided by scientific discovery and inclusive principles rather than "blood and inheritance."
• Renaming the Federal Units: The term "Region" (derived from Soviet-era concepts) should be replaced with "Autonomous Administration." These units should be named after geographic features (e.g., rivers or directions) rather than ethnic groups to prevent the sense of "ethnic enclosures."

2. Governance: Adoption of a Semi-Presidential System

To prevent party dictatorship and mitigate ethnic polarization, a hybrid or semi-presidential system is proposed:

• The President: Directly elected by the people. If no candidate secures 50%+1 of the vote, the runner-up becomes Vice President. The President oversees Defence and Foreign Affairs and is limited to two terms.
• The Prime Minister: Appointed from the majority party in Parliament. The PM manages the federal police, the bureaucracy, and the security sector.
• Local Empowerment: Directly elected presidents for autonomous administrations and mayors for cities, ensuring they are accountable to the electorate rather than federal appointees.

3. Electoral Reform: Mixed Representation

The current "First Past the Post" system is criticized for wasting votes.

• Executive Elections: Majoritarian (highest vote wins) for the President and Mayors to ensure decisive leadership.
• Legislative Elections: Proportional Representation for councils and parliament to ensure all voter voices are represented and to prevent single-party monopolies.

4. Federal Restructuring and the Three-Year Transition

The current federal structure is described as a collection of "ethnically exclusive homelands." The proposal suggests a radical restructuring:

• Administrative Balance: Large regions like Oromia and Amhara should be divided into three or four smaller autonomous administrations. Smaller entities, such as Harari, should be merged with neighbours to ensure balanced population sizes (ideally between 10 million and 20 million). To avoid conflict, restructuring must follow a peaceful, three-year roadmap involving a national census, boundary studies, and resource-sharing agreements.

 

5. Urban Governance: Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa

As centers of "mixed diversity," these cities should:

• Function as autonomous administrations reflecting their multicultural settlement.
• Use the primary languages spoken by their residents for work and education as models for inclusive society-building.

6. Decentralization: Three Federal Capitals

To reduce political tension and distribute economic development, the federal government’s seats should be split across three different autonomous administrations:

1. Legislative Capital: Seat of the Parliament.

2. Executive Capital: Seat of government offices and the diplomatic community.

3. Judicial Capital: Seat of the High Courts and the Constitutional Court. Note: To maximize development elsewhere, the new autonomous administration encompassing Addis Ababa should not host any of these three seats.

 

 

7. Land Tenure Reform: Triple Ownership

The current state monopoly on land allows the government to use land as a tool of political patronage. The proposed "Triple Ownership" model includes:

• Private Ownership: For farmers and urban residents (owning the land, not just the structures).
• State Ownership: For unheld lands and limited infrastructure development.
• Communal Ownership: For pastoralists and urban community use.
• Neutrality: No ethnic group should have exclusive ownership rights over any specific territory.

8. Judicial Independence: A Dedicated Constitutional Court

Currently, the House of Federation—a political body—interprets the constitution.

• Independent Court: Establish a neutral Constitutional Court to ensure the rule of law.
• Tenure: Judges should be nominated by the President and approved by Parliament for 10-year terms to ensure stability and independence from the executive branch.

9. Linguistic Policy: The Three-Language Model

Modelled after successful implementations in India, this policy aims to balance national unity with local autonomy:

• Federal Level: Amharic and Afaan Oromo as official working and educational languages.
• Autonomous Level: Each administration uses one federal language, its own local working language, and English.

Summary of Proposed Structural Shifts

Current Feature	Proposed Reform
Preamble Focus	Ethnic group identity
Federal Units	Ethnic "Regions"
Government Type	Parliamentary
Electoral System	First Past the Post
Land Ownership	State-only
Capital City	Centralized (Addis Ababa)
Interpretation	House of Federation
Language Policy	Variable

 

 

 

 

 II Research Report on Building an Inclusive Constitution in Ethiopia with Popular Consent and Legitimacy

Historical Background of Constitutional Transition and Current Realpolitik

The effort to establish sustainable peace and political stability in Ethiopia is closely linked to the drafting of a constitutional framework capable of resolving historical structural contradictions. Analyzing based on historical realities (realpolitik), Ethiopia’s past constitutions were founded not on popular consensus and legitimacy, but rather on the desires of the ruling regimes and their absolute monopoly of force. When the current Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE) was ratified in 1995 (1987 E.C.), although it was drafted by a constitutional assembly and subjected to public discussion, it did not include all political forces and failed to achieve broad consensus. Consequently, it immediately lacked widespread national legitimacy. Since the primary source of legitimacy for Ethiopian governments has historically been the monopoly of force rather than popular consent, whenever they lose that dominance, the entire system faces collapse.

Past constitutional systems cannot be dismissed as entirely devoid of useful content; the current constitution also contains several constitutional provisions that ought to be preserved. However, the FDRE constitution—much like the United States Constitution, which has evolved through various amendments—must become a "living document" capable of adapting to modern political and social shifts.

Although the Ethiopian National Dialogue Commission (ENDC) was established by parliamentary proclamation to address fundamental disagreements over state-building narratives and the federal system, the process faces widespread criticism regarding its transparency and inclusivity. Political science analyses suggest that "elite political reconciliation" should have preceded the national dialogue. Without this, the dialogue risks becoming a mere tool to execute the government's will. The weaknesses in the agenda-gathering process and the failure to synthesize collected agendas into professional policy language are seen as indicators of limited operational capacity within the commission.

Furthermore, despite individuals with disabilities accounting for nearly 20% of the country's population, their representation in the dialogue process remains extremely low, and procedural gaps such as the lack of sign language services persist. Nonetheless, because the ruling Prosperity Party holds the necessary parliamentary seats to pass any constitutional amendment by a two-thirds majority, a government-led constitutional revision is highly likely.

Table 1: Historical and Current Realpolitik of Ethiopian Constitutional Transitions

Historical Phase	Source of Legitimacy/Consent	Major Structural Weaknesses & Threats
Historical Constitutions (Pre-1995)	Monopoly of force and imperial/military regime desires	Entirely devoid of popular consent
1995 FDRE Constitution	Dominated by the victors with limited public discussion	Failed to include all political forces and immediately lacked popular consensus
2026 Historical Revision	Approved by the ruling party's parliamentary dominance under the guise of National Dialogue recommendations	Lack of sufficient elite political reconciliation, exclusion of key peripheral actors, and security instability

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Nine Structural Recommendations for an Inclusive Constitution

To guarantee the long-term survival of Ethiopia and build an "Inclusive Constitution" that commands popular consent, this report details and analyzes the following nine structural revisions

 

1. Modernizing Constitutional Philosophy with Inclusivity

The preamble of the current FDRE constitution, rather than recognizing Ethiopian citizenship, categorizes citizens solely as members of ethnic or national groups. This philosophy fosters conflicting narratives of history and demands, thereby weakening a shared national identity. The proposed constitutional philosophy must balance individual and collective rights.

Citizens have diverse collective identities (social, professional, and civic) beyond ethnic ones; the choice of which identity to prioritize must remain a matter of individual freedom rather than a constitutional mandate. The constitution should envision building an inclusive state and society based on civic ideals and civil society, rather than lineage (blood and heritage).

To implement this philosophy, the administrative units forming the federation should not be named "regions" (Kilils). The term "region" is derived from the Soviet Union's administrative division; it restricts an ethnic group to a specific territory and risks the federation's disintegration, similar to the Soviet Union's fate. To address this, the term "Autonomous Administration" will be implemented. The names of these autonomous administrations, zones, or woredas must not bear ethnic names. Instead, names should be based on geographic directions or prominent rivers. While autonomous administrations may have working languages, they will have no official ethnic identity, ensuring that any citizen with a legal residency ID enjoys equal rights and opportunities.

2. Limiting Power and Adopting a Semi-Presidential Form of Government

The current parliamentary system encourages single-party dominance and authoritarianism. In contrast, presidential systems, which clearly limit term limits, are more vulnerable to sudden electoral defeat. Since Ethiopia has no single ethnic group exceeding 50% of the population and is plagued by ethnic politics, a presidential system could soften ethnic polarization by requiring candidates to appeal to multiple ethnic groups to get elected.

However, to merge the benefits of both systems, this report argues for a semi-presidential or hybrid form of government. In this system, there will be two executive branches:

• The President: Directly elected by a majority vote nationwide, accountable to the electorate. The President will lead the national defence forces and foreign affairs. The President's power will be limited to two terms. If no candidate secures a 50% + 1 majority in the first round, the leading candidate is legally mandated to select the runner-up as their vice president. This mechanism ensures a joint executive backed by popular consensus.
• The Prime Minister: Nominated by the President from the party holding a majority in parliament and approved by parliament, accountable to parliament. The Prime Minister will oversee the federal police, the national security sector, and the civil bureaucracy.

This separation of power limits the absolute dominance of the federal executive over the legislative and judicial branches. Furthermore, ensuring that regional presidents and city mayors are directly elected by the public builds political accountability from the bottom up.

Table 2: Power and Accountability Division in the Semi-Presidential System

Executive Branch	Key Powers and Responsibilities	Constitutional Accountability	Term Limits
President	National Defence, Foreign Affairs, Nominating the Prime Minister	Directly to the electorate	Maximum of two terms
Prime Minister	Federal Police, National Security, Civil Bureaucracy	To the Federal Parliament (Legislative)	Subject to parliamentary confidence

3. Changing the Electoral System to a Hybrid of First-Past-The-Post and Proportional Representation

The current First-Past-The-Post (FPTP) electoral system leads to significant vote wasting. For example, in the 2021 election in Addis Ababa, opposition parties won approximately 32% of the vote but failed to secure a single seat in parliament due to the "winner-takes-all" system. This creates a sense of alienation among many citizens.

Conversely, Proportional Representation (PR) allocates seats based on the percentage of total votes won by political forces, ensuring the representation of all citizens' voices. However, because the President and mayors must be directly elected, PR is not suitable for executive elections.

Therefore, the following hybrid electoral system will be implemented:

• Executive Elections (President, Autonomous Administration Presidents, Mayors): Elected via the First-Past-The-Post (FPTP) system.
• Legislative Council Elections (Federal Parliament and Local Councils): Elected via Proportional Representation (PR). This reduces exclusion and enhances the quality of democratic representation.

 4. Reorganizing the Federal Structure and Approving a 3-Year Transition Plan

The current FDRE federal structure is fenced by ethnic boundaries, whose ultimate goal is secession. This has created oppressive and exclusive homelands based on primordial lineage. To avoid this, autonomous administrations must be reconstructed based on administrative convenience and civic ideals rather than language and ancestry.

To address the vast disparities in population and geographic size among administrations, the following population limit formula shall be applied. The population P of each autonomous administration must fall within the following range:

10,000,000\le P\le 20,000,000

Taking into account Ethiopia’s rapid total population growth P_{\text{total}}, the population ratio of an individual administration relative to the national population must follow this formula:

0.07\le\frac{P}{P_{\text{total}}}\le0.15

Accordingly, massive regions like Oromia and Amhara will be divided into three to four smaller, administratively convenient autonomous administrations, while extremely small regions like Harari will merge with neighboring areas to establish a structure with a viable population size.

Implementing this boundary reorganization abruptly could trigger severe political tension and security crises on the ground. Thus, the restructuring process must be guided by a 3-year transition plan approved alongside the constitution. Over these three years, census-taking, border studies, asset sharing, and administrative transitions will be executed gradually and peacefully. Both federal and autonomous institutions can incorporate symbolic representations blending local traditions with modern governance.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Table 3: Demographic Boundary Formula for Autonomous Administrations

Metric	Minimum Threshold	Maximum Threshold	Administrative Purpose
Population Size (P)	10 Million	20 Million	Ensure equitable resource distribution and administrative convenience
Population Ratio (\frac{P}{P_{\text{total}}})	7%	15%	Establish balanced political representation across the nation

5. Reclassifying Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa as Autonomous Administrations Integrated with Surrounding Areas

Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa are highly diverse urban centers with mixed demographics. To reflect this reality legally, these cities will be integrated with their surrounding suburban and rural areas to form distinct autonomous administrations. The primary languages spoken by the residents will serve as the working and educational languages. This allows these cities to preserve their diversity and serve as models for building an inclusive society.

6. Establishing Three Capital Cities

Concentrating the federal capital in a single location (Addis Ababa) has made the city a focal point of political disputes and power struggles. It has also skewed the flow of resources and infrastructure toward a single direction. To decentralize power and spread the developmental benefits of hosting government institutions, and drawing on the experience of South Africa, the federal government will establish three distinct capital cities.

Accordingly, three cities will be selected within newly created autonomous administrations:

• The Legislative Capital (Parliament) will be seated in the first city.
• The Executive Capital (Government Ministries and Diplomatic Missions) will be seated in the second city.
• The Judicial Capital (Supreme and Constitutional Courts) will be seated in the third city.

This arrangement will distribute infrastructure and economic activity more equitably across different regions while significantly easing the political tension and pressure focused on Addis Ababa. To foster development elsewhere, the new autonomous administration containing Addis Ababa will be excluded from hosting any of these three capitals.

Table 4: Structural Division of the Three Federal Capitals

Branch of Government	Functional Center	Objectives and Benefits
Legislative	1st City (Outside Addis Ababa)	Enhance regional accessibility for public representatives
Executive	2nd City (Outside Addis Ababa)	Centralize bureaucracy and the diplomatic core
Judicial	3rd City (Outside Addis Ababa)	Guarantee judicial independence and insulation from politics

7. Making Land Ownership Private, Public, and Communal

Exclusive state ownership of land has allowed the government to act as a landlord, utilizing land as a political tool to cultivate loyalty and punish dissent. To resolve this and secure citizens' economic freedom, a tripartite land ownership system—originally championed in the policy platform of Ethiopian Citizens for Social Justice (Ezema)—must be implemented.

This system includes three types of ownership:

1. Private Ownership: Farmers, pastoralists, and urban landholders will own not only the structures built on the land but the land itself.

2. State Ownership: Forests, minerals, major rivers, and land required for infrastructure that are not privately held will be managed by the state. The state's power to manage land will be strictly limited by law.

3. Communal Ownership: Pasture and resource lands utilized collectively by urban communities and pastoralists will be placed under communal management.

The current constitution's implication that land belongs to specific ethnic groups poses a severe challenge to inclusivity. A core principle of the inclusive constitution is that no ethnic group shall have exclusive or preferential ownership over any piece of land.

 

 

8. Establishing an Independent Constitutional Court

The judiciary must be separated from the executive. Currently, constitutional interpretation is handled by the House of Federation, which represents a major obstacle to the rule of law. Because the House of Federation is a body of political representatives, its decisions are often driven by political expediency rather than legal principles.

To prevent this, an independent Constitutional Court based on the German model should be established. Judges of the Constitutional Court will be nominated by the President and confirmed by Parliament for non-renewable terms of up to 10 years, granting them the stability and independence needed to uphold the rule of law free from political interference.

9. A Three-Language Policy

To foster deeper inclusivity, a Three-Language Policy modeled on India's successful experience should be enshrined in the inclusive constitution. Under this policy:

• At the federal level, Amharic and Oromo—the languages with the largest number of speakers—will serve as the working and educational languages of the federal government.
• Autonomous administrations will retain the full right to determine their own local working languages.
• The education system will mandate that every student learn three languages:

1. The Local/Regional Working Language (including mother tongue).

2. One Federal Language (which must be different from the student's local language).

3. English as the global language of communication.

This system will strengthen national unity, protect regional autonomy, and enhance global competitiveness.

Table 5: The Three-Language Policy in the Education System

Language Tier	Educational Role	Purpose and Implementation
1st Language (R1)	Local/Mother Tongue	Foster cognitive development and preserve cultural knowledge
2nd Language (R2)	Federal Working Language (Amharic or Oromo)	Facilitate inter-regional commerce, mobility, and national integration
3rd Language (R3)	English	Equipping the workforce to compete globally

Structural Challenges and Future Policy Directions

The proposed recommendations can potentially bring about fundamental structural shifts, yet their implementation clashes with several political and social realities.

1. Security Instability and Regional Resistance

Ongoing security crises and armed conflicts in Amhara, Oromia, and Tigray are massive hurdles to implementing a new constitutional design. In Tigray, political instability and the absence of a fully reconstituted regional government forced the agenda-gathering forums to be relocated to Addis Ababa. Groups like Salsay Weyane Tigray (SaWeT) and the Tigray Independence Party (TIP) argue that a constitutional order must be fully restored before meaningful dialogue can occur.

Additionally, there are concerns that the federal government intends to use the upcoming 2026 elections to replace the 1995 EPRDF constitution with PM Abiy Ahmed's centralized "Medemer" presidential vision. This centralization push is bound to trigger intense resistance from regional ethnonational forces.

2. Transitional Justice Integration Gap

Although a transitional justice policy was adopted by the Council of Ministers in 2024, its integration with the National Dialogue remains vague, slowing down both processes. If constitutional revision is decoupled from transitional justice, addressing historical grievances and grievances in a sustainable manner will be impossible. The non-derogable principle in Article 28 of the current constitution, which bars statutes of limitations and amnesties for gross human rights violations, must be strictly preserved in the new constitution.

Conclusion and Policy Recommendations

Ethiopia’s political crisis can only find a lasting resolution through fundamental, structurally sound constitutional amendments. Because the current constitution's amendment procedures (Articles 104 and 105) are extremely rigid and difficult to execute, a specialized Constitutional Amendment Commission must be established to translate the national dialogue's recommendations into law.

The following policy steps are recommended for the constitutional revision process:

• Establish an Elite Reconciliation Forum: Parallel to the broad national dialogue, create a high-level negotiation platform specifically for armed groups and key opposition leaders to reach political consensus.
• Form a Constitutional Amendment Commission: Establish an independent, time-bound, expert-led body authorized by parliament to draft the specific constitutional changes.
• Link Transitional Justice with Constitutional Reform: Systematically anchor transitional justice policies within the constitutional framework to legally address historical grievances.
• Enact a Phased Transition Plan: Avoid abrupt restructuring of federal boundaries; instead, mandate a 3-year phased transition plan based on detailed technical studies and public consensus.

 

REFERENCES:

1. Ethiopia Country Report 2026 - BTI Transformation Index, https://bti-project.org/en/reports/country-report/ETH

2. የሕገ-መንግሥት ፍርድ ቤት፡ የብሔርና ብሔረሰቦች ሉዓላዊነት መቃብር - Blog - Abyssinia Law, https://www.abyssinialaw.com/blog/constitutional-court

3. Rethinking Ethiopia's National Dialogue - Clingendael Institute, https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/2025-08/Rethinking_Ethiopia%E2%80%99s_National_Dialogue.pdf

4. Ethiopia 2026: Elections Without Democracy? - Issue No. 285 - Sahan Global, https://sahan.global/issues/the-ethiopian-cable/ec-issue-no-285

5. National Dialogue Commission moves Tigray agenda-gathering forum to Addis Abeba, https://addisstandard.com/national-dialogue-commission-moves-tigray-agenda-gathering-forum-to-addis-ababa/

6. የኢትዮጵያ እንደራሴዎች ክራሞት, https://bridge-et.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/Bridge_Amharic_013.pdf

7. የኢፌድሪ ሕገ-መንግሥትን በሕገ-መንግሥታዊ መንገድ ለማሻሻል ብቸኛው መንገድ፡- የአስቸኳይ ጊዜ አዋጅን ተግባራዊ ማድረግ - Blog - Abyssinia Law, https://abyssinialaw.com/blog/the-only-way-to-amend-the-fdre-constitution-constitutionally-is-by-implementing-state-of-emergency

 8. የሕገመንግስት ስልጠና ሞጁል በፌዴራል የፍትህ Aካላት ማሰልጠኛ ማEከል የተዘጋጀ - Ethiopian Legal Brief, https://chilot.wordpress.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/revised-module-on-the-justice-system-and-the-role-of-justice-organs1.pdf

 9. የአገራዊ ምክክር ኮሚሽን ማቋቋሚያ ዐዋጅ ምን ይላል? | Addis Maleda, https://addismaleda.com/archives/10135

10. አገራዊ ምክክር ኮሚሽን የአካል ጉዳተኞችን ተሳትፎ እንዲያረጋገጥ ተጠየቀ - ኢዜአ አማርኛ - ENA English, https://www.ena.et/web/amh/w/am_172232 11. በሕገ መንግሥት ማሻሻያ አንቀጽ 39ኝን መቀየር ይቻል ይሆን? - Blog - Abyssinia Law, https://www.abyssinialaw.com/blog/constitutional-amendment-and-article-39

12. Usuari Discussió:Pere Serafi/constitució - Viquipèdia, l'enciclopèdia lliure, https://ca.wikipedia.org/wiki/Usuari_Discussi%C3%B3:Pere_Serafi/constituci%C3%B3

 13. የኢዜማ ሀገራዊ ምክክር ሰነድ - Oromia Today,  

14. Ethiopia's National Dialogue needs time and an interim report | ISS Africa, https://issafrica.org/iss-today/ethiopia-s-national-dialogue-needs-time-and-an-interim-report

15. If your country had 3 capital cities like South Africa which cities would or should they be? - Reddit, https://www.reddit.com/r/Africa/comments/1i0encm/if_your_country_had_3_capital_cities_like_south/

 16. Top 10 Geography Quiz Questions Answers to Boost Your Knowledge | EarthChasers Blog, https://www.earthchasers.com/blog/geography-quiz-questions-answers

17. The three language formula as a bridge to India's linguistic unity - Organiser, https://organiser.org/2026/04/27/350745/bharat/the-three-language-formula-as-a-bridge-to-indias-linguistic-unity/

18. India Today.In features the Ethiopian Government Delegation and IPE Global Meet, https://www.ipeglobal.com/india-today-in-features-the-ethiopian-government-delegation-and-ipe-global-meet/

19. Three-Language Formula: Resistance, State Decisions, and NEP 2020 - ClearIAS, https://www.clearias.com/three-language-formula/

 20. Literacy and Linguistic Diversity in Multilingual India (Chapter 8), https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/global-variation-in-literacy-development/literacy-and-linguistic-diversity-in-multilingual-india/9CCB51D9AA06751FD4B258134986E6C3

21. Language Policy and Federalism in Independent India, https://forumfed.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/OPS-58-Language-Policy.pdf

22. Third Language Bill, 2020: Boon or Bane - iPleaders, https://blog.ipleaders.in/third-language-bill-2020-boon-bane/

23. Ethiopia: Expanding Representation While Managing Centrifugal Forces, https://africacenter.org/spotlight/en-elections-2026/ethiopia/